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dc.contributor.authorCoppock, Elizabethen_US
dc.date2017-08-30
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-24T14:29:24Z
dc.date.available2020-04-24T14:29:24Z
dc.date.issued2017-12-20
dc.identifierhttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-017-9222-y
dc.identifier.citationElizabeth Coppock. 2017. "Outlook-based Semantics." Linguistics and Philosophy, Volume 41, Issue 2, pp. 125 - 164. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-017-9222-y
dc.identifier.issn0165-0157
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/40329
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents and advocates an approach to the semantics of opinion statements, including matters of personal taste and moral claims. In this framework, 'outlook-based semantics', the circumstances of evaluation are not composed of a possible world and a judge (as in 'world-judge relativism'); rather, outlooks replace possible worlds in the role of circumstance of evaluation. Outlooks are refinements of worlds that settle not only matters of fact but also matters of opinion. Several virtues of the framework and advantages over existing implementations of world-judge relativism are demonstrated in this paper. First, world-judge relativism does not actually explain the 'disagreement' of 'faultless disagreement', while a straightforward explanation suggests itself in outlook-based semantics. Second, outlook-based semantics provides an account of subjective attitude verbs that can capture lack of opinionatedness. Third, outlook-based semantics unproblematically explains the connection-building role of aesthetic discourse and the group-relevance of discretionary assertions, while capturing the same effects in world-judge relativism obviates the purpose of the judge parameter. Finally, because the proposed circumstances of evaluation (outlooks) are entirely analogous to possible worlds, the framework is easy to use and extend.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10988-017-9222-y
dc.format.extentpp. 125 - 164.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSpringer-Verlagen_US
dc.relation.ispartofLinguistics and Philosophy
dc.subjectRelativismen_US
dc.subjectPredicates of personal tasteen_US
dc.subjectSubjectivityen_US
dc.subjectIndexicalityen_US
dc.subjectTruthen_US
dc.subjectSocial sciencesen_US
dc.subjectLinguisticsen_US
dc.subjectLanguageen_US
dc.subjectEpistemic modalsen_US
dc.subjectRelative truthen_US
dc.subjectDisagreementen_US
dc.subjectDependenceen_US
dc.subjectContexten_US
dc.subjectCognitive sciencesen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.titleOutlook-based semanticsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10988-017-9222-y
pubs.elements-sourcemanual-entryen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Linguisticsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublished onlineen_US
dc.date.online2017-12-20
dc.description.oaversionPublished version
dc.identifier.mycv328750


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