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dc.contributor.authorMargaria, Chiaraen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-29T18:52:49Z
dc.date.available2020-04-29T18:52:49Z
dc.date.issued2020-01
dc.identifier.citationChiara Margaria. 2020. "Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game." Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 119, pp. 234 - 250. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.006
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/40471
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the interplay of informational and payoff externalities in a two-player irreversible investment game. Each player learns about the quality of his project by observing a private signal and the action of his opponent. I characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in a timing game that features a second-mover advantage, allowing for arbitrary correlation in project qualities. Despite private learning, the game reduces to a stochastic war of attrition. In contrast to the case of purely informational externalities, all investments happen at the same real time instant—irrespective of the sign of the correlation—and beliefs never get trapped in a no-learning region, provided that the second-mover advantage is sufficiently high.en_US
dc.format.extentp. 234 - 250en_US
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavior
dc.subjectEconomic theoryen_US
dc.subjectApplied economicsen_US
dc.subjectIrreversible investmenten_US
dc.subjectPayoff externalitiesen_US
dc.subjectWar of attritionen_US
dc.subjectReal optionen_US
dc.titleLearning and payoff externalities in an investment gameen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.006
pubs.elements-sourcecrossrefen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
dc.identifier.mycv521077


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