Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorFuller, Benjaminen_US
dc.contributor.authorVaria, Mayanken_US
dc.contributor.authorYerukhimovich, Arkadyen_US
dc.contributor.authorShen, Emilyen_US
dc.contributor.authorHamlin, Arielen_US
dc.contributor.authorGadepally, Vijayen_US
dc.contributor.authorShay, Richarden_US
dc.contributor.authorMitchell, John Darbyen_US
dc.contributor.authorCunningham, Robert K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-08T19:50:20Z
dc.date.available2020-05-08T19:50:20Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifierhttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/mostRecentIssue.jsp?punumber=7957740
dc.identifier.citationBenjamin Fuller, Mayank Varia, Arkady Yerukhimovich, Emily Shen, Ariel Hamlin, Vijay Gadepally, Richard Shay, John Darby Mitchell, Robert K Cunningham. 2017. "SoK: Cryptographically Protected Database Search.." IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.10
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/40722
dc.description.abstractProtected database search systems cryptographically isolate the roles of reading from, writing to, and administering the database. This separation limits unnecessary administrator access and protects data in the case of system breaches. Since protected search was introduced in 2000, the area has grown rapidly, systems are offered by academia, start-ups, and established companies. However, there is no best protected search system or set of techniques. Design of such systems is a balancing act between security, functionality, performance, and usability. This challenge is made more difficult by ongoing database specialization, as some users will want the functionality of SQL, NoSQL, or NewSQL databases. This database evolution will continue, and the protected search community should be able to quickly provide functionality consistent with newly invented databases. At the same time, the community must accurately and clearly characterize the tradeoffs between different approaches. To address these challenges, we provide the following contributions:(1) An identification of the important primitive operations across database paradigms. We find there are a small number of base operations that can be used and combined to support a large number of database paradigms.(2) An evaluation of the current state of protected search systems in implementing these base operations. This evaluation describes the main approaches and tradeoffs for each base operation. Furthermore, it puts protected search in the context of unprotected search, identifying key gaps in functionality.(3) An analysis of attacks against protected search for different base queries.(4) A roadmap and tools for transforming a protected search system into a protected database, including an open-source performance evaluation platform and initial user opinions of protected search.en_US
dc.format.extentp. 172 - 191en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherIEEE Computer Societyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
dc.subjectCryptographyen_US
dc.subjectArraysen_US
dc.subjectServersen_US
dc.subjectAlgebraen_US
dc.subjectDatabase systemsen_US
dc.subjectSearchable symmetric encryptionen_US
dc.subjectProperty preserving encryptionen_US
dc.subjectOblivious random access memoryen_US
dc.subjectPrivate information retrievalen_US
dc.titleSoK: cryptographically protected database searchen_US
dc.typeConference materialsen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/SP.2017.10
pubs.elements-sourcedblpen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: No embargoen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Computer Scienceen_US
dc.identifier.mycv362804


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record