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dc.contributor.authorFloyd, Julieten_US
dc.date2018-11-24
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-16T15:32:41Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-21
dc.identifier.citationJuliet Floyd. 2020. "Wittgenstein on ethics: working through Lebensformen." Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 46, Issue 2 - Special Issue on Nature, Value and Normativity, pp. 115 - 130. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453718810918
dc.identifier.issn0191-4537
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/41203
dc.description.abstractIn his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein conveyed the idea that ethics cannot be located in an object or self-standing subject matter of propositional discourse, true or false. At the same time, he took his work to have an eminently ethical purpose, and his attitude was not that of the emotivist. The trajectory of this conception of the normativity of philosophy as it developed in his subsequent thought is traced. It is explained that and how the notion of a ‘form of life’ (Lebensform) emerged only in his later thought, in 1937, earmarking a significant step forward in his philosophical method. We argue that the concept of Lebensform represents a way of domesticating logic itself, the very idea of a claim or reason, supplementing the idea of a ‘language game’, which it deepens. Lebensform is contrasted with the phenomenologists’ Lebenswelt through a reading of the notions of ‘I’, ‘world’ and ‘self’ as they were treated in the Tractatus, The Blue and Brown Books and Philosophical Investigations. Finally, the notion of Lebensform is shown to have replaced the notion of culture (Kultur) in Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein’s spring 1937 ‘domestication’ of the nature of logic is shown to have been fully consonant with the idea that he was influenced by his reading Alan Turing’s 1936/1937 paper, ‘On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem’.en_US
dc.format.extentp. 115 - 130en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSAGE Publicationsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy and Social Criticism
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectEthicsen_US
dc.subjectForms of lifeen_US
dc.subjectLebenswelten_US
dc.subjectNormativityen_US
dc.subjectTuringen_US
dc.subjectWittgensteinen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectPolitical scienceen_US
dc.subjectHistory and philosophy of specific fieldsen_US
dc.titleWittgenstein on ethics: working through Lebensformenen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0191453718810918
dc.description.embargo2020-07-21
pubs.elements-sourcemanual-entryen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: 6 monthsen_US
pubs.notesThis was edited a bit at proof. Penultimate version.en_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Philosophyen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
dc.date.online2020-01-21
dc.identifier.orcid0000-0002-2916-4178 (Floyd, Juliet)
dc.identifier.mycv422525


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