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dc.contributor.authorSchmieder, J.F.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTrenkle, S.en_US
dc.date2019-09-01
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-19T18:47:24Z
dc.date.available2021-03-19T18:47:24Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationJ.F. Schmieder, S. Trenkle. 2020. "Disincentive effects of unemployment benefits and the role of caseworkers." Journal of Public Economics, Volume 182, 104096. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104096.
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/42295
dc.description.abstractA large literature has documented that the unemployment duration of unemployment insurance (UI) recipient increases with the generosity of the UI system. This has been interpreted as the disincentive effect of UI benefits, however, unemployed workers typically also have caseworkers assigned who are monitoring and assisting the job search efforts. These caseworkers may respond to differences in UI eligibility by shifting resources (financial or time) between unemployed individuals in order to counteract the moral hazard effect of UI benefits or in order to focus resources to where they have the largest effect. This suggests that the typical estimates of the disincentive effects of UI may be biased in studies that compare workers within the same UI agency. We estimate whether caseworkers respond to the generosity of UI using a regression discontinuity (RD) design in Germany, where potential UI durations vary with age. We show that across a wide variety of measures, such as meetings, sanctions, and training programs UI caseworkers do not treat unemployed with different eligibility differently. At best we find a very small effect that workers with shorter eligibility close to the exhaustion point are more likely to be assigned to training programs that prolong their UI eligibility. The typical RD estimates of the UI disincentive effects thus seem to be valid estimates.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public Economics
dc.rightsThe accepted manuscript version of this work is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
dc.subjectUnemployment insuranceen_US
dc.subjectActive labor market programsen_US
dc.subjectSanctionsen_US
dc.subjectCaseworkersen_US
dc.subjectRegression discontinuity designsen_US
dc.subjectJ65en_US
dc.subjectUnemployment benefitsen_US
dc.subjectEconomic theoryen_US
dc.subjectApplied economicsen_US
dc.subjectEconometricsen_US
dc.subjectEconomicsen_US
dc.titleDisincentive effects of unemployment benefits and the role of caseworkersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
pubs.elements-sourcemanual-entryen_US
pubs.notesWaiver: I do not hold the copyrighten_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Indefiniteen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
dc.identifier.mycv94500


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The accepted manuscript version of this work is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as The accepted manuscript version of this work is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.