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dc.contributor.authorOrtner, Juanen_US
dc.contributor.authorNakabayashi, Junen_US
dc.contributor.authorKawai, Keien_US
dc.contributor.authorChassang, Sylvainen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-24T15:52:01Z
dc.date.available2021-03-24T15:52:01Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationJuan Ortner, Jun Nakabayashi, Kei Kawai, Sylvain Chassang. "Screening Adaptive Cartels."
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/42315
dc.description.abstractWe propose a theory of equilibrium antitrust oversight in which: (i) regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patters; (ii) cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators, and may in fact use them to enforce cartel compliance. We emphasize the use of safe tests, i.e. tests that can be passed by competitive players under a broad class of environments. Such tests do not hurt competitive industries and do not help cartels support new collusive equilibria. We show that optimal collusive schemes in plausible environments fail natural safe tests, and that cartel responses to such tests explain unusual patterns in bidding data from procurement auctions held in Japan. This provides evidence that adaptive responses from cartels is a real concern that data-driven antitrust frameworks should take into account.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectCollusionen_US
dc.subjectAuctionsen_US
dc.subjectProcurementen_US
dc.subjectAntitrusten_US
dc.titleScreening adaptive cartelsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionFirst author draften_US
pubs.elements-sourcemanual-entryen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusUnpublisheden_US
dc.identifier.mycv591036


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