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dc.contributor.authorStoughton, Alleyen_US
dc.contributor.authorVaria, Mayanken_US
dc.coverage.spatialSanta Barbara, CAen_US
dc.date2017-04-23
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-27T18:54:23Z
dc.date.available2021-10-27T18:54:23Z
dc.date.issued2017-08-21
dc.identifier.citationA. Stoughton, M. Varia. 2017. "Mechanizing the Proof of Adaptive, Information-Theoretic Security of Cryptographic Protocols in the Random Oracle Model." https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8049653/. 30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium. Santa Barbara, CA, 2017-08-21 - 2017-08-25. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2017.36
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/43227
dc.description.abstractWe report on our research on proving the security of multi-party cryptographic protocols using the EASYCRYPT proof assistant. We work in the computational model using the sequence of games approach, and define honest-butcurious (semi-honest) security using a variation of the real/ideal paradigm in which, for each protocol party, an adversary chooses protocol inputs in an attempt to distinguish the party's real and ideal games. Our proofs are information-theoretic, instead of being based on complexity theory and computational assumptions. We employ oracles (e.g., random oracles for hashing) whose encapsulated states depend on dynamically-made, nonprogrammable random choices. By limiting an adversary's oracle use, one may obtain concrete upper bounds on the distances between a party's real and ideal games that are expressed in terms of game parameters. Furthermore, our proofs work for adaptive adversaries, ones that, when choosing the value of a protocol input, may condition this choice on their current protocol view and oracle knowledge. We provide an analysis in EASYCRYPT of a three party private count retrieval protocol. We emphasize the lessons learned from completing this proof.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.ispartofhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8049653/
dc.titleMechanizing the proof of adaptive, information-theoretic security of cryptographic protocols in the random Oracle modelen_US
dc.typeConference materialsen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/CSF.2017.36
pubs.elements-sourcemanual-entryen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, Administrationen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Computer Scienceen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, Faculty of Computing & Data Sciencesen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublished onlineen_US
dc.date.online2017-09-28
dc.identifier.mycv362753


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