Hegel's conception of philosophy
Reiss, Lester J
MetadataShow full item record
This thesis is an investigation into Hegel's logic and his conception of philosophy. Its purpose is to give a reasonable interpretation to his logic and to determine what constitutes his conception of philosophy and its relation to contemporary philosophy. Further, this thesis also compares its interpretation with that given by Stace to determine which is the more justified in light of the evidence. The first three categories of Sein are the following: Being is simple and immediate awareness; Nothing is the awareness of that simple and immediate awareness; Becoming is the interplay between the first two, that is, the process by which an individual comes to know an object. The first three categories of Wesen are the following: Identity is the awareness of the object; Difference is the awareness of the awareness of the object; Ground is the interplay between the two, that is, the process by which an individual comes to know the idea of an object. The first three categories of Begriff are the following: the Universal is the awareness of the idea of an object; the Particular is the awareness of the awareness of the idea of an object; the Individual is the completely self aware person as the interplay between the first two. Hence, Sein is the realm of immediate experience. Wesen is the realm of science and mathematics. Begriff is the completely self individual and the realm of metaphysics. Hegel's conception of philosophy involves the choice of an analogy which can account for the unity and variety found in experience. This experience is Begriff since it contains both the unity or Sein and the diversity of Wesen. The analogy chosen is Begriff, itself. Hegel's conception of empiricism proposes that every ingredient within Sein be treated as evidential at the beginning of inquiry. His principle of intelligibility is the dialectic, the name of a very personal urge to know which prompts the individual to go on to Begriff, which organizes experience into the three levels of Sein, Wesen, and Begriff, and is Begriff, itself. Stace's analysis asserts that Hegel uses an analogy from Wesen, namely, logic to account for Begriff. Such an assertion violates Hegel's conception of empiricism, ignores his conception of philosophy and does not take into account the nature of the dialectic. Analytic philosophy is compatible with Hegel's conception of philosophy only if the analytic philosopher has made a comparison between analytic philosophy and metaphysics to find that the latter does not satisfy his urge to know as well as the former.
Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University