Essays on household economics
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Citation
Abstract
This dissertation delves into the field of household economics, specifically examining the intricate process of intrahousehold bargaining. By employing a comprehensive blend of theoretical and empirical methodologies, the objective is to unravel the underlying determinants that give rise to inequalities and impact labor supply and consumption patterns within households. Emphasis is placed on investigating the multifaceted influences of policies, social norms, and cultural factors in shaping these dynamics. The first chapter of this dissertation investigates how enhancing women's property rights can improve the welfare of both spouses. It examines the effects of a change in marriage law that protects wives' property rights in the event of a divorce. The study focuses on a unique marriage institution prevalent in China where the bride's family sets a bride price and provides a dowry to the new couple. The model takes into account patrilocal residence and parental altruism towards their children. The couple divides their income and the dowry, with the dowry playing a crucial role in determining the allocation of resources. The study derives equilibrium prices for marriage payments. It shows that increasing the wife's property rights leads to a Pareto improvement if the bride price increases. Using a regression discontinuity design, I show that the law encourages larger dowries and bride prices and thus financially benefits both the husband and wife. In the second chapter, conducted in collaboration with Prof. Kevin Lang, we utilize a collective model and household consumption data, combined with the concept of \textit{hukou} status---a national segregation policy in mainland China---to examine how hukou status influences intrahousehold bargaining power. By leveraging the differences in status between husbands and wives within China's hukou system, we demonstrate how differential access to resources affects the balance of bargaining power within couples. Using a structural model, we estimate that the wife's bargaining weight increases by .07 if she provides the household's local-urban \textit{hukou}. Thus, we show that this migrationpolicy, although not intended to affect the division of power within a household, nevertheless has notable effects. The third chapter of this dissertation proposes a revised version of the conventional Chiappori-style collective model to investigate the impact of degenderization on labor allocation within same-sex couples. This study aims to address the limitations of Becker and Gronau's theory of time allocation, which fails to fully account for the labor supply behaviors observed among same-sex couples based solely on comparative advantages. To address this gap, I introduce a gender-neutralized collective model that incorporates the shift in individual preferences away from traditional gender norms. Within this framework, gay men exhibit reduced aversion to household tasks, while lesbian women experience decreased aversion to paid work. As a result, a gay man is likely to allocate less labor to market work and more to home production, whereas a lesbian woman is expected to allocate more labor to market work and less to home production. Moreover, same-sex couples are more inclined to exhibit a balanced distribution of labor between paid work and housework. The empirical evidence obtained from the American Time Use Survey provides support for the theoretical framework proposed in this study. Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of intrahousehold dynamics, elucidating the influence of policies, social norms, and evolving preferences on the determination of intrahousehold allocations and labor supplies. Moreover, it sheds light on how these factors shape inequality within households.
Description
2023
License
Attribution 4.0 International