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The neglected war: intervention and extra-state war duration, 1816-2007

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BOSTON UNIVERSITY
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Thesis

**THE NEGLECTED WAR:
INTERVENTION AND EXTRA-STATE WAR DURATION, 1816-2007**

by

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ABSTRACT

Extra-state war, a conflict between a state and non-state actor outside of the state's borders, is an understudied phenomenon. In order to begin a discussion on this topic, this paper seeks to understand the factors that affect extra-state war duration. Using literature on interstate and intrastate wars, I hypothesize that military intervention in support of the non-state actor, an equitable distribution of third-party military interventions, and economic intervention in the form of support will increase war duration. I also hypothesize that military intervention on behalf of the state and diplomatic intervention by a third party will decrease duration. I test my hypotheses using a multi-method resource design. First, using quantitative data drawn from extra-systemic wars between 1816 and 2007, I find support for the hypothesis that military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor increases duration. In addition, I find that military intervention on behalf of the state also increases war duration. I supplement my regression analysis with a series of case studies on the Western Saharan War, Cisplatine War, and Mozambican War of Independence. I find that an equitable distribution of military interventions as well as economic support increase duration. Diplomatic intervention, on the other hand, decreases war duration. Taken together, my findings suggest that the various forms of intervention play a crucial role in explaining extra-state war duration.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------------|--|
| SADR..... | Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic |
| UPRP..... | United Provinces of the River Plate |
| FRELIMO | Front for the Liberation of Mozambique |

Introduction

Within security studies, war is studied from beginning to end. There are numerous works on causation, termination, and the success of peace negotiations. Squeezed in between the studies on causation and termination is the less-discussed topic of war duration. Understanding the variables that influence war duration and to what extent is crucial from both a theoretical and policy perspective. Wars inevitably take up resources and human lives. Therefore, an understanding of what can either shorten or elongate a war can help save these same resources and lives.

War itself comes in various forms. The three major types of wars are interstate, intrastate, and extra-state. Interstate wars refer to the traditional state vs. state conflict. Intrastate or civil wars occur when citizens or members of the same country fight each other within a country's borders. Lastly, extra-state wars are conflicts between a state actor and a non-state actor outside of the state's borders. Although interstate and intrastate wars have been extensively studied, extra-state wars are nearly neglected. This neglect is unfortunate since extra-state wars are rising in frequency with the emergence of numerous terrorist and guerilla organizations. However, it should be noted that extra-state wars are not a new phenomenon. There have been almost 200 cases of extra-state wars in the last 200 years or so. Yet, due to the dearth of research on this topic, we do not have any means of explaining extra-state war duration.

What explains extra-state war duration? In interstate and intrastate war duration research, intervention is a commonly assessed variable. In many studies, intervention becomes key to explaining war duration. Much like war, intervention also comes in many

forms. Military intervention involves a third party contributing soldiers to the war, and therefore becoming an active actor within the conflict. Economic intervention can come in two forms: support and sanctions. Economic support occurs when a third party provides financial aid, training, and arms. Economic sanctions refer to when a third party restricts trade or the flow of capital to the actors involved in the conflict. Lastly, diplomatic intervention occurs when a third party enters the conflict with the sole purpose of mediating and ending the war.

The question now is how does intervention factor into extra-state war duration? This question is not only specifically inquiring about intervention in extra-state war duration, but is also attempting to begin a much-needed discussion and analytical debate on how extra-state wars fit into our conceptualization of international conflicts.

Literature Review

There has been a large number of works in recent years dedicated to the coined phrase, “the changing character of war.”¹ This group of literature argues that we are witnessing a change in war types and tactics.² More specifically, we are now witnessing the rise of insurgency groups, guerilla tactics, and prevalent non-state actors.

Consequently, these works assume that non-state groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda are recent phenomena. Built into this assumption is the idea that prior to the latter half of the 20th century, wars either fell into two categories: interstate and intrastate. Another

¹ Hew Strachan, *The Changing Character of War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

² Michael Fowler, *Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Modern Conflict*, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2005).

K. J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

category does exist. Extra-state wars may seem prevalent in today's international environment, but they are far from new or rare. Judging from how often extra-state wars take place, the International Relations and policy-making community would benefit greatly from further research on the matter. This literature review will show that that research on extra-state war duration is nonexistent. This research attempts to fill that niche through assessing the relationship between intervention and extra-state war duration.

Extra state war can be defined as a conflict between a state and a non-state actor outside of the state's borders.³ A non-state actor can include any group that is not recognized as part of the international state system. Therefore, this term includes guerilla groups, colonies, and even unrecognized nations. Colonial (wars of decolonization) and imperial (wars of conquest/colonization) wars are the two main subsets of conflict that fall under the extra-state umbrella. To give some historical perspective, the American Revolution was a colonial extra-state war between Great Britain (the state) and the Continental Army (the non-state actor). Even though the present-day U.S. was a group of colonies controlled by Great Britain at the time, these colonies were nonetheless outside what were considered Great Britain's official borders. Examples of imperial extra-state wars range from the Second Opium war (Great Britain vs. the Qings) to the 2003 invasion of Iraq (U.S. vs. Al Qaeda/Iraqi Shia militias).

³ Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War: 1816 – 2007*, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010).

Examples of extra-state wars in both distant and recent history are plenty. What is not plenty is the amount of academic and analytical research dedicated to understanding the nuances and factors of extra-state warfare. Moreover, with extra-state wars recently becoming especially significant in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, war duration and termination become highly relevant. It is in most of the international community's interest to contain these conflicts and eventually find resolutions. We have seen in Syria and Afghanistan, just to name a couple, how large-scale conflicts have attracted interveners from other states. These states intervene with varying interests, but at the end of the day, are attempting to end the war with conditions favorable to their side.

Intervention can be defined in many ways. In the following literature review, I will look at a couple interpretations of what intervention looks like and assess whether these definitions are applicable to this line of research. This research is novel in that no other academic has attempted to empirically or theoretically assess the effect of intervention on extra-state war duration. On the other hand, there has been plenty of empirical research on intrastate and interstate war duration. Therefore, the beginnings of understanding extra-state warfare will be based on previous work intrastate and interstate warfare. Although extra-state, interstate, and intrastate wars are all qualitatively different and a characteristic of one type of war will not necessarily apply to another, these are the constraints in which this research must work in. Apart from the definition of an extra-state war, there is a dearth of theory on this type of war. Contrastingly, intervention and its implications on conflicts have been thoroughly studied. Many theoretical works on

intervention focus on the ethics of humanitarian intervention and normative suggestions for future interventions.⁴ However, the ethics of intervention is not within the scope of this paper's research question. Instead, this theoretical section will focus on a few definitions of interventions and arguments about war termination with a short Kantian normative introduction.

In "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," Immanuel Kant states his fifth tenant for peace as "No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state." Although not explicitly stated, this refers to unwelcome intervention. Kant's normative suggestion and rejection of intervention refers to interstate conflicts. However, in his explanation of this tenant, he does limit his declaration by stating that when a state enters a civil war, and is hence broken up into multiple quasi-states, assistance to one faction, in the hopes of avoiding anarchy, would not be considered a constitutional interference.⁵ This is the type of intervention we see in extra-state wars, though the "assistance" may be for either the state or non-state actor and is almost always welcome to the receiving side. However, an extra-state war is not a civil war. Kant's caveat on civil wars and preventing anarchy cannot always apply to extra-state wars because these wars do not necessarily invoke the potential for anarchy. On the other

⁴ Eric A. Heinze, *Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009).

Ciaran Burke, *An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention*, (London: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2013).

J. L. Holzgrefe, Robert O. Keohane, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Stanley Hoffman, Robert C. Johansen, James P. Sterba, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1996).

Jonathan Moore, *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998).

⁵ Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," (1795).

hand, extra-state wars have been known to cause enough chaos to the point that anarchy may not seem so far away. Today's Syria is a combination of intrastate, extra-state, and proxy inter-state wars. Found within this medley is the destruction of state and governing institutions. Under Kant's theory, this situation may ethically permit interventions. The main takeaway from Kant is that he helps us define intervention as some form of "interference." However, we do need to look to other sources to find a more specific definition.

In his book, *Political Theory and International Relations*, Charles Beitz spends a section discussing intervention. Although most of this section focuses on what conditions, if any, would make an intervention ethically permissible, Beitz does allot some space to discussing the definition of intervention. He first offers a widely used definition of intervention. He states that intervention has been interpreted as "all actions and policies that constitute impermissible interference in a state's internal affairs."⁶ Almost immediately, Beitz acknowledges that this definition is extremely broad and encompasses almost any action taken by a state in an international context. I have a similar issue with this definition. When discussing interventions in extra-state wars, we have to understand that not all interventions are unwelcome. For example, in the Soviet Quagmire in Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen welcomed Pakistan's military equipment, training, and bases. In turn, Pakistan welcomed U.S. economic and military support. These are categorized as interventions, but not necessarily "impermissible." Nonetheless,

⁶ Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 74.

Beitz does add onto the base definition that Kant provided by specifying “actions and policies” as the mechanism for interventions.

In his book, *Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention*, Anthony Lang adds to the ethical debate on military and humanitarian interventions. Although the ethical aspect of intervention is not this paper’s focus, this research benefits from the definitions of intervention given in these various works. Lang defines military intervention as the “use of armed troops to effect a change in the political system of a sovereign state without prior permission and without declaring war.”⁷ He admits that this definition does not take into account the full spectrum of intervention, but it serves his purpose of the ethical dimension of unwelcome interventions.⁸ Moreover, he argues that when a state intervenes, it seeks to create a political order in the other state modelled after its own politics.⁹

As mentioned before, “unwelcome” interventions are not the only type of intervention this research is seeking to unpack. However, the idea that a military intervention involves some form of armed forces meant to alter the situation at hand fits into the type of interventions found in extra-state wars. Furthermore, Lang even touches on the topic of diplomatic intervention by stating that diplomacy provides a space where conflicts can be resolved.¹⁰ Inadvertently, Lang is moving into the realm of war duration and how this one type of intervention can help reduce the potential duration of a conflict.

⁷ Anthony Lang, *Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 193.

To complete a working definition of intervention, Patrick Regan's 1998 article, "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions into Internal Conflicts as a Policy Choice," will be considered. Regan defines intervention "convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces."¹¹ Although comprehensive and applicable to my study, this definition does not incorporate diplomatic intervention nor does it acknowledge the possibility of an intervention aimed at the authority structures of a non-state group. With the addition of those two caveats, this definition will be the one used going forward when discussing intervention.

Fred Iklé's book, *Every War Must End*, contributes a succinct overview on some war duration theories. Iklé argues that even if governments have a purpose for fighting, they do not have clear war aims. Hence, they start a war without really knowing how to finish it, prolonging the conflict.¹² According to him, nations seek out peace settlements that will bring about better conditions for the two nations than before the outbreak of war. However, as each side attempts to improve their position for possible future conflict, they risk losing the ongoing war.¹³ Therefore, wars are prolonged while peace settlements are postponed as states try to reach for a higher position. He also argues that top government leaders make decision that allow wars to go past their "rational" end. A "rational" end would be for a war to end at a situation better than before. However, government leaders

¹¹ Patrick Regan, "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts," *The Journal of Politics* 60, no. 3 (1998).

¹² Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 10.

do not allow new battlefield information to change or shape their initial broad war aims, causing wars to continue far past their “rational” end. According to Iklé, if decision were rational, wars should be just as easy to get out of then to get into.¹⁴

Iklé argues that the larger a war effort, the more committed a state becomes to their initial conditions of peace, making it more difficult to arrive at a settlement.¹⁵ Moreover, during a war, there is an intense domestic struggle on what would constitute as a “good” end to the war. War doves and hawks battle each other and create indecisiveness for a peace settlement. However, Iklé argues that this conflict between doves and hawks is actually preceded by a conflict over war aims. This political struggle intrudes on further formulation of war aims, colors military estimates, and inhibits negotiation with the enemy.¹⁶

In *Military Intervention in Civil Wars*, Bertil Duner delineates the various forms of military intervention. He argues that non-intervention has gradually become outmoded due to the international structural changes like transnationalism, economic interdependence, and globalism.¹⁷ He outlines direct combat, indirect combat, direct para-combat, and indirect para-combat, stating that each form of intervention involves a different number of troops, type of operation and interests.¹⁸ Therefore, the form of intervention is very pertinent to how it affects the duration and resolution of the conflict.

¹⁴ Ibid., 16.

¹⁵ Ibid., 42.

¹⁶ Ibid., 84.

¹⁷ Bertil Duner, *Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 4.

¹⁸ Ibid., 17.

Most works on war duration fall under the neo-positivist umbrella of International Relations and attempt to use empirical models/statistics to support their arguments. Although many of these works touch on interstate and intrastate war duration, there is virtually no research on extra-state war duration. Moreover, there is no consensus on how intervention or what types of intervention effect war duration.

Research has been conducted on the role of regime types, intervention, bargaining, information, effectiveness, economics, and initiation. Interestingly, there has not been a consensus on the how third-party intervention affects the duration of a war. Moreover, several researchers, like Gartner and Siverson, have argued that since initiators of war select target actors that will probably not receive third-party help, there is a drastic selection bias when attempting to conduct quantitative research on interventions in conflicts.¹⁹ Similarly, Wood, Kathman, and Gent state that third-party actors intervene when they expect to have the greatest impact, and hence hope to shift the balance of power. Moreover, the degree to which the intervention influences the outcome/duration is determined by the strength of the intervention. Researchers need to take these conditions into account when deciding to study the role of intervention in war duration.²⁰

Goemans touched on the effect of regime type on war duration, concluding that wars with mixed regimes will last longer. Mixed regimes will face harsh punishment regardless of whether they lose a war moderately or dismally, motivating those leaders to

¹⁹ Scott Sigmund Gartner, Randolph Siverson, "War Expansion and War Outcome," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 1 (1996).

²⁰ Reed Wood, Jacob Kathman, Stephen Gent, "Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 5 (2012).

continue a war in a gamble to escape punishment.²¹ Mousseau also studied how regime types affect interstate conflict duration and found that democratic dyads are not only less likely to begin a war, but are more likely to compromise before the conflict escalates into a full-fledged war.²² These findings are coupled with other research that found that democracies are more likely to win wars because they select themselves into conflicts they can win.²³ Contrastingly, Werner's research concluded that regime type has no effect on the terms of settlement.²⁴

Weisiger found that interstate conflict will lead to a quicker settlement when the overall level of fighting is relatively intense, recent fighting was unusually intense, and when there have been substantial shifts in battlefield success.²⁵ Nilsson disproves the assumption of the offense-defense theory that wars are shorter when offense has the advantage. In actuality, asymmetric information about expected offensive capacity tends to lengthen wars.²⁶ Slantchev argues that initiators of war tend to do badly the longer the war progresses because initiators are slow to update their outcome estimates after the

²¹ H. E. Goemans, "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 5 (2000).

²² Michael Mousseau, "Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 2 (1998).

²³ Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998).

Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, *Democracies at War*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

David Clark, Reed William, "A Unified Model of War Onset and Outcome," *The Journal of Politics* 65, no. 1 (2003).

²⁴ Suzanne Werner, "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998).

²⁵ Alex Weisiger, "Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration," *International Organization* 70, no. 2 (2016).

²⁶ Marco Nilsson, "Offense-Defense Balance, War Duration, and the Security Dilemma," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 3 (2012)

Marco Nilsson, "War and Unreason: Bounded Learning Theory and War Duration," *Goteborg Studies in Politics* (2010).

outbreak of war.²⁷ Additionally, Thyne's research found that when power consolidation within a government reduces the number of people who need to approve a settlement, conflicts will be shorter because it will be harder for others to derail an agreement.²⁸

Cunningham, Gleditch, and Salehyan focus their research on non-state actors in intrastate conflicts. They argue that strong rebels will engage in shorter wars because they pose enough of a military challenge that the government will make concessions. Weak rebels, on the other hand, can operate in regional peripheries, defying government victory but not being strong enough to extract concessions, leading to longer wars. Ultimately, if the insurgents can find an alternative means to violence, but still get their political message across, the intrastate conflict will be shorter.²⁹ Yet, if rebel groups have some sort of major funding, the war will be longer.³⁰ Balcells and Kalyvas argue that irregular conflicts last longer than traditional conflicts because of the high level of civilian victimization and use of guerilla tactics.³¹

Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom outline key structural indicators that may lengthen or shorten the duration of a civil war. Such characteristics for lengthening a civil war include low income per capita, high inequality, and a moderate degree of ethnic division. Indicators that may shorten a civil war are a decline in the price of export

²⁷ Branislav Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (2004).

²⁸ Clayton Thyne, "Information, Commitment, and Intra-War Bargaining: The Effect of Government Constraints on Civil War Duration," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 2 (2012).

²⁹ David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* onlinefirst, (2009).

³⁰ James Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004).

³¹ Laia Balcells, Stathis Kalyvas, "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 8 (2014).

commodities and external military intervention on the side of the rebels.³² Patricia Sullivan argues that higher troop commitments decreases duration while also increasing the chances of an intervening state winning.³³ Along the same lines, Patrick Brandt argues that the larger the government's military in a civil war, the shorter the war because the capability gap between the rebel forces and the government forces is larger. However, if intervention occurs on the side of the rebels, the duration of the civil war will be extended because the balance of power is slightly more equalized.³⁴

Similarly, Regan's research found that the use of force by an intervener will shorten the expected duration of a civil war. Along those lines, an early intervention with force will shorten the conflict relative to a later use of force. According to Regan, an intervention right after the conflict begins is best for reducing duration, while subsequent interventions tend to lead to longer wars. As the war progresses for quite some time, mediation is once again helpful in shortening the expected duration. However, unilateral intervention in support of the non-state actor early in the conflict will lengthen the duration. In addition, interventions that attract counter-interventions will increase the expected duration, especially when the intervening states are competing for influence in the war. Additionally, Regan and Aydin specify that intervention can be divided into military, economic, and diplomatic intervention, where each type functions differently.

³² Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Mans Soderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004).

³³ Patricia Sullivan, "At What Price Victory? The Effects of Uncertainty on Military Intervention Duration and Outcome," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 1 (2008).

³⁴ Patrick Brandt, David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Nicolai Petrovsky, Dagmar Radin, "When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil War," *Defence and Peace Economics* 19, no. 6 (2008).

According to their research, civil war duration is decreased the most when diplomatic and economic interventions are combined.³⁵

Escriba-Folch also touched on the role of economic intervention. His research found that sanctions and embargoes are effective measures in shortening intrastate conflicts, especially if the sanctions are imposed by an international organization of which the target state is a member.³⁶

Bennett and Stam used empirical data from all the interstate wars between 1816 and 1985 in order to conclude that factors such as strategy, terrain, capabilities, and government type play key roles in interstate war duration. In their research, the data supported the hypothesis that wars will be shorter when more states are involved. According to them, as more states form coalitions, the benefits of victory will be distributed to the point that leaders will have a difficult time convincing their state to continue fighting.³⁷ Their reasoning supports the findings of Mason, Weingarten, and Fett who state that negotiated settlement will be more likely if the value of payoffs from victory is reduced.³⁸

³⁵ Patrick Regan, Allan Stam, "In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (2000).
Patrick Regan, "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002)

Aysegul Aydin, Patrick Regan, "Networks of Third-Party Interveners and Civil War Duration," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 3 (2011).

³⁶ Abel Escriba-Folch, "Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010).

³⁷ D. Scott Bennett, Allan Stam, "The Duration of Interstate Wars," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 2 (1996).

D. Scott Bennett, Allan Stam, "Revisiting Predictions of War," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 3 (2009)

³⁸ T. David Mason, Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (1996).
T. David Mason, Joseph Weingarten, Patrick Fett, "Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars," *Political Research Quarterly* 52, no. 2 (1999).

Contrasting to the position that intervention can lead to shorter wars, there is a group of researchers who argue that intervention actually lengthens a conflict. Vasquez argues that wartime alliances help reduce the cost of interstate war preparations by pooling resources, therefore sustaining wars for longer periods of time.³⁹ Accordingly, Bueno de Mesquita's research found that the duration of war is linked with increases in interstate systemic tightness. In other words, tighter alliances and blocs increase war duration and occurrence.⁴⁰

In terms of intrastate war, Balch-Lindsay argues that when both sides of the war have an equitable distribution of third-party intervention, the civil war will be extremely long. Third-party interventions increase the chance of stalemates which prolongs the conflict. However, when one side of the civil war has a higher degree of third-party support, the expected duration will decrease.⁴¹ Arguing against Balch-Lindsay, Gates and Lujala found that interventions on the government side of a civil war specifically will increase duration.⁴²

Elbadawi also touches on intervention in civil wars. His research found that since external intervention reduces the cost of either coordinating or fighting a rebellion, the duration of a civil war will increase.⁴³ Cunningham argues that when an intrastate conflict

³⁹ John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁴⁰ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22, no. 2 (1978).

⁴¹ Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1880-1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000).

⁴² Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, Paivi Lujala, "Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009).

⁴³ Ibrahim Elbadawi, "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 2433 (2000).

has more than two actors, war duration will increase. He outlines that this is the case because there will be fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more likely to occur, and shifting alliances make negotiation more difficult.⁴⁴ Along the same lines, Shirkey found that when third parties enter an interstate conflict later, it complicates the bargaining by adding new issues to the war and increasing uncertainty about the balance of forces. In effect, more information will be needed to find an agreement which means there will be additional fighting and a longer war.⁴⁵ His argument relies on Langlois and Langlois' research on information updating. They argue that fighting informs concessions and bargaining.⁴⁶

There is another group of researchers who, rather than assessing intervention's role in war duration, research the role of intervention in peace-making. Walter argues that third-party intervention is needed to guarantee a civil war settlement and provide security for both sides.⁴⁷ Regan agrees with this and states that a combination of economic and diplomatic intervention is an effective way of conflict management.⁴⁸ DeRouen similarly

⁴⁴ David Cunningham, "Veto Players and Civil War Duration," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006).

⁴⁵ Zachary Shirkey, "When and How Many: The Effects of Third-Party Joining on Causalities and Duration in Interstate Wars," *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 2 (2012).

⁴⁶ Jean Pierre Langlois, Catherine Langlois, "Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty, and the Failure of Bargaining," *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 (2012).

⁴⁷ Barbara Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997).

Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement to Civil Wars*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

⁴⁸ Patrick Regan, Aysegul Aydin, "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 5 (2006).

argues that UN intervention increases the chances of a conflict ending in a treaty or truce.⁴⁹

All the research mentioned is empirically sound and thorough. Each researcher has done their best to assess war duration and outcome. They found key insights into war operation and factors affecting said operation. After assessing the literature, it seems that the effect of intervention is highly dependent on the type of intervention, what side the intervention is on, balance of power, and the characteristics of the conflict itself. However, there are a few gaps in the literature.

Although interstate and intrastate conflict have been meticulously researched, extra-state war has been unfortunately neglected. There have been no major findings on extra-state war duration and outcome. Although extra-state conflicts are not as widespread as civil wars nor as large-scale as interstate wars, there have been almost 200 cases of it in just the past 200 or so years. In fact, extra-state war is becoming increasingly pertinent to world affairs when taking terrorist organizations into account. With its importance on the rise, more research needs to be conducted on extra-state war duration and outcome. Factors that either shorten, lengthen, or settle a conflict are extremely useful for states that have found themselves embroiled in such conflicts.

Furthermore, although the relationship between intervention and war duration has been revisited countless times, there is no consensus on how intervention affects war

⁴⁹ Karl DeRouen, David Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004)

Karl DeRouen, Jenna Lea, Peter Wallensteen, "The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 4 (2009).

duration. Empirical data on this topic needs to be further investigated in order to get one step closer to describing the reality of intervention on war duration.

This research project will fill that gap in war duration literature by assessing intervention on extra-state war duration. Research on this topic is very much needed in order to give policymakers and leaders a fuller picture on how various factors may affect different types of war. As seen by the literature, factors such as intervention, economics, and capabilities react differently when assessed in an interstate setting or an intrastate setting. There is no reason to believe otherwise when assessing extra-state conflicts. By using a mix empirical analysis and case studies, this research will add to the ongoing debate about the effect of third-party intervention in war. However, it will also begin a new debate on what influences extra-state warfare and what states can expect when entering into one.

Theoretical Puzzle

If we were to only use the existing literature, we would be forced to apply the theories on intrastate war duration to extra-state war duration. This application would require an assumption that civil wars and extra-state wars have many overlapping characteristics. It is true that both types of wars involve a state actor and a non-state actor and typically fall under either a colonial or imperial conflict. When looking at basic

descriptive statistics from 1816 to 2007, extra-state wars and interstate wars have similar average durations with about 100 days (or 3 months) of difference.⁵⁰

However, civil war theory cannot be extended to extra-state wars because of the various factors and nuances unique to extra-state warfare. In intrastate wars, the conflict may be between multiple non-state factions or between the state and a non-state actor. In both situations, all the actors belong to the same state and tend to fight within those borders. In extra-state wars, the conflict is characterized by a state and a non-state actor that is outside of the state's borders. In most civil wars, the state actor is pulled into a war against a non-state actor because that non-state group poses a direct threat to state security and government rule. Due to the geographic distance between the state and non-state actor in extra-state wars, the state does not usually face an existential threat from the non-state actor, and therefore has more of a choice on whether to enter into a war with the non-state actor.⁵¹ Moreover, terrain becomes a more salient issue when assessing extra-state wars. In civil wars, both the state and non-state actor are indigenous to the land and therefore have a more equal footing when engaging in conflict in the country. With extra-state wars, the information asymmetry on terrain knowledge is more obvious and the tooth-to-tail ratio is much larger. The non-state group has better leverage on the environment and guerilla tactics involving the terrain.⁵²

⁵⁰ Meredith Reid Sarkees, and Frank Wayman. *Resort to War: 1816 - 2007*. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010).

⁵¹ Scott Sigmund Gartner, Randolph Siverson, "War Expansion and War Outcome," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 1 (1996).

⁵² Carl Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007).

The similar durations for extra-state and intra-state wars are puzzling. According to the literature, when given the choice, rational states enter into a conflict when they believe they will have the greatest impact and the greatest chance of success.⁵³ However, for most civil wars, this choice is taken away due to the immediate security threat non-state actors pose to the state's control of the land. For extra-state wars, the greater choice (though not always present) of entering into a war with an external non-state actor is available for external states. Even if the state is attacked by the non-state actor, the state will most likely not face an existential threat due to the geographic distance and the large capability disparity between the state and non-state actor. These states have the opportunity to make the necessary calculations on whether their goals and interests will be met with the lowest potential costs of entering into an extra-state war. Hence, it is more likely that extra-state wars are fought by states which believe they have the upper hand and can resolve the conflict quickly.⁵⁴ At times this assumption may have proven wrong when states were not prepared for guerilla tactics and the opposition's resiliency.⁵⁵ Overall, the obvious military superiority of states and this choice of opting into "easy" wars should result in much lower durations than we see in intrastate wars. On the other hand, the larger tooth-to-teeth ratio and unfamiliarity with terrain from the state's perspective would decrease the military asymmetry and may actually increase extra-state

⁵³ Reed Wood, Jacob Kathman, Stephen Gent, "Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 5 (2012).

⁵³ H. E. Goemans, "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 5 (2000).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

duration. However, instead, we see similar durations between intrastate and extra-state wars.

Due to the lack of research on extra-state warfare, we do not have available theories to help deconstruct the mechanics behind this type of war and understand what factors into its duration. It has been established that the characteristics of extra-state wars and intrastate wars are too different to apply overarching theories even if they have similar durations. Instead, we need to look for the factors behind extra-state duration and why it lasts as long as it does. Despite the presence of extra-state wars in the last 200 years, this type of war has been undertheorized. In the last few years, we see a prevalence of these types of war when looking at Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Syria. Ultimately, we need to begin unpacking extra-state war duration and identify the various factors that contribute to it the same way other researchers have unpacked intra-state warfare. Only after doing this can we begin to compare extra-state and intra-state warfare and understand the nuances and relative consequences of each type of war.

To start the line of research on extra-state warfare, this paper will argue that intervention is a key component in explaining extra-state war duration. I used the basis of Regan's 1998 traditional definition of intervention in order for it to incorporate non-state actors. Intervention can be defined as convention-breaking military/economic/diplomatic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of a state or non-state group with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the state

and the opposition forces.⁵⁶ A third-party can be either a state or non-state actor.

However, almost all cases of intervention in the last 200 years of extra-state warfare have been conducted by states. Intervention is just one factor in explaining extra-state war duration, but it can help give key insights into how third-party support or lack thereof can influence the direction of the war. Literature on intrastate wars has shown that military, economic, and diplomatic support can sway the duration of the war. Now, it is time to see if this holds true for extra-state wars.

Hypotheses

A military intervention occurs when a third party contributes forces or military equipment to one of the sides of an extra-state war. When looking at military support theoretically, it seems straightforward that an addition of resources and actors would increase the duration of a war by giving the needed materials to continue fighting for longer.⁵⁷ However, within intrastate war literature, military intervention can bring about mixed results. For example, if a military intervention occurs on behalf of the state, it increases the already existing capability asymmetry and makes the defeat of the non-state actor quicker.⁵⁸ On the other hand, if the non-state actor receives military support, the imbalance is lessened, allowing for a longer conflict.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Patrick Regan, "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts," *The Journal of Politics* 60, no. 3 (1998).

⁵⁷ John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 183.

⁵⁸ Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1880-1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000).

⁵⁹ Ibrahim Elbadawi, "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 2433 (2000).

I argue that for extra-state wars, military intervention on the side of the non-state actor will increase duration. It has been argued that an increase in total military forces in a conflict will lengthen a war.⁶⁰ This is because external interventions reduce the costs of coordinating a rebellion, hence making it more feasible to continue the conflict.⁶¹ Furthermore, when conflicts have multiple actors, all these players need to approve a settlement. With more actors, there are fewer acceptable agreements due to information asymmetries, shifting alliances, and differing incentives.⁶² Ultimately, interventions lengthen wars because they complicate the bargaining process and push the chance of a successful settlement further down the road.⁶³

Some theorists like Bennett and Stam argue that when there is greater capability imbalance between the actors, we will see a shorter war.⁶⁴ Correspondingly, stalemates and/or an equitable distribution of third party interventions on both sides will prolong wars because it decreases the imbalance.⁶⁵ However, this idea that disparity in military capability leads to shorter wars is under the assumption that the actors are using conventional military operations. When it comes to counterinsurgency warfare, we need to take into account that rebels can easily withdraw, hide, regroup, and continue attacks

⁶⁰ Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998)

⁶¹ Havard Hegre, "The Duration and Termination of Civil War," *The Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004).

⁶² David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* onlinefirst, (2009).

⁶³ Zachary Shirkey, "When and How Many: The Effects of Third-Party Joining on Causalities and Duration in Interstate Wars," *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 2 (2012).

⁶⁴ Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998)

⁶⁵ Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1880-1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000).

during a conflict. They usually do not have a clear base and tend to blend into the population, making it difficult to find a target to attack. Ultimately, their strengths lie in the fact that they are able to wage offensive attacks against their opponent while also utilizing guerilla tactics as a defensive strategy.⁶⁶

If the non-state-side is given military support, the capability imbalance will be reduced. When on more equal footing, the conflict will lengthen because it will be more difficult for either side to gain the upper hand.⁶⁷ The non-state actor started off in the conflict already aware of its many disadvantages against a professional state military. With additional military support and legitimization from a third-party actor, the non-state actor will receive a boost in morale and fighting power, allowing it to continue participating in the conflict. In fact, if conventional military operations already had a difficult time attacking the elusive non-state actor, the situation would only become more difficult as the rebel group gains more resources to continue its guerilla warfare. Furthermore, with interventions, there is an increase in the number of invested actors and therefore an increase in the number of actors who need to settle on a negotiation, lengthening the conflict due to the delay in settlement.⁶⁸

Hypothesis 1: Military intervention in support of the non-state actor will increase the duration of the war.

⁶⁶ David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* onlinefirst, (2009).

⁶⁷ Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998).

⁶⁸ David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* onlinefirst, (2009).

Researchers like Cunningham and Shirkey often state that interventions lengthen the duration of a war because it complicates the bargaining process. In other words, it takes more time and effort to placate the added actors in the conflict. I argue, however, that when an intervention takes place on the side of the state, extra-state war duration will decrease. This argument mainly rests on the theory that the greater the military capability asymmetry, the shorter the war.⁶⁹ In any conflict involving a state and a non-state actor, the state actor is has more resources and a larger military. The imbalance already exists. Therefore, when a third party actor contributes military support, that imbalance grows. In effect, the state actor has greater capabilities and renewed optimism to defeat the non-state actor. This, of course, widely depends on the amount of military support and the already existing capabilities of the state.

It is true that the non-state actor can utilize their guerilla tactics to evade state attacks as they previously had done and regroup. However, with added forces or resources, the state can better locate and attack non-state targets. Going back to Cunningham and Shirkey, it would seem more difficult to reach a negotiated settlement when more actors are involved. However, if a state can attract enough military support to severely weaken the non-state actor, there may be no need for a “negotiated” settlement. Instead, the state would have full control over the non-state actor’s domain and future. Moreover, the military intervention on the side of the state would increase the intensity of

⁶⁹ Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998).

the conflict eventually past the breaking point for the non-state actor, making settlement occur quicker.⁷⁰

Hypothesis 2: Military intervention on the side of the state will decrease duration.

When both sides have equitable third-party military support, the war will likely turn towards a stalemate, lengthening the conflict.⁷¹ If an extra-state conflict has already transformed into a war, then the state was not strong enough to defeat the non-state actor off the bat. Rather, the non-state actor was able to use its unconventional tactics and knowledge of the terrain to evade attacks and regroup.⁷² Therefore, when both sides of the conflict receive military aid, it gives them the ability to continue the conflict for a longer period of a time.

Pooling of resources and the increase of total military forces within a conflict contribute to the “means” of continuing a conflict.⁷³ Without additional resources, we would see that both sides would eventually reach their breaking point where the costs of the war were outweighing the potential benefits. However, with equitable military support, that breaking point becomes farther away. Furthermore, if both sides were

⁷⁰ Alex Weisiger, “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration,” *International Organization* 70, no. 2 (2016).

⁷¹ Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1880-1992,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000).

⁷² David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* onlinefirst, (2009).

⁷³ John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 183.
Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998).

considering negotiated settlement, but were offered military aid, they would aim to get their optimal settlement rather than compromising. Since neither side would want to compromise at that point, we would see a reversion back to the conflict, eventually leading to a stalemate.

Hypothesis 3: If there is an equitable distribution of third party military interventions, war duration will increase.

Diplomatic intervention is in reference to a neutral third party actor acting as a mediator in hopes of resolving and ending the conflict at hand. Without diplomatic interventions, negotiated settlements are very difficult to come by. Each side will use extreme bargaining in hopes of getting their optimal settlement. However, this model would result in a prolonged war because a settlement would be difficult to achieve.⁷⁴ Without a third party to facilitate exchanging of information, there is a high degree of uncertainty, which in turn increases the expected duration of the war. Information acquired during the war does outweigh the information available prior to the outbreak of war but there are very few mechanisms to exchange and negotiate with this information.⁷⁵ Moreover, states are unwilling to negotiate with rebel groups, especially if they are

⁷⁴ Jean Pierre Langlois, Catherine Langlois, "Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty, and the Failure of Bargaining," *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 (2012).

⁷⁵ Branislav Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (2004).

extreme or illegitimate.⁷⁶ Therefore, without an avenue for negotiation or the proper exchange of information, wars continue on without an immediate end in sight.

I argue that diplomatic interventions reduce duration by creating a negotiation space, improving the exchange of information. Moreover, diplomatic interventions tend to occur when a war is relatively destructive or already long.⁷⁷ At that point, both parties are more amenable to a negotiated settlement in order to alleviate some of the economic and military burden. Furthermore, Barbara Walter argues that civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlements because without a neutral third party actor, there are no credible guarantees to decrease the level of insecurity between the main actors.⁷⁸ By giving a credible security guarantee, diplomatic interventions not only help facilitate a settlement, but also help make sure the settlement is adhered to so that the conflict does not return. In terms of civil wars, Regan and Aydin used an empirical model to support the theory that diplomatic interventions do result in shorter wars.⁷⁹

Hypothesis 4: Diplomatic intervention by an international organization or neutral third party will decrease duration.

⁷⁶ David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* onlinefirst, (2009).

⁷⁷ T. David Mason, Patrick Fett, "How Civil Wars End," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (1996).

⁷⁸ Barbara Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997).

Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement to Civil Wars*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

⁷⁹ Aysegul Aydin, Patrick Regan, "Networks of Third-Party Interveners and Civil War Duration," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 3 (2011).

Economic sanctions refer to trade embargoes, limitations, and tariffs meant to send a message and coerce a state into acting along internationally accepted lines. It is very difficult to place sanctions on a non-state group because they easily can blend into a country's population at large. Moreover, trade relationships are almost never established between international organizations/states and a rebel group. Therefore, these sanctions usually are not targeted at rebel groups because sanctions will not directly affect these groups.

Sanctions will cause economic hardship and strain on the belligerent state, resulting in resource depletion. This strain on resources will persuade the state that it can no longer continue a war. Hence, we will see the state putting in more effort to reach a settlement with the non-state actor. When wars are already long, the decision to continue the war is already related to the economic resources available.⁸⁰ Regan and Aydin's empirical work did find that economic interventions helped reduce duration.⁸¹ Similarly, Balch-Lindsay found that the greater the domestic costs of a civil war, the shorter the war.⁸² However, these studies were conducted on civil wars. For extra-state wars, economic sanctions were not as common which makes case selection difficult. Moreover, sanctions are an indirect form of intervention and do not fall into the group of interventions being discussed in this paper. Therefore, this research will not test for the effect of economic sanctions on duration.

⁸⁰ John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 260.

⁸¹ Aysegul Aydin, Patrick Regan, "Networks of Third-Party Interveners and Civil War Duration," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 3 (2011).

⁸² Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1880-1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000).

Economic support, on the other hand, was widely implemented in extra-state wars from 1816 to 2007. Moreover, this form of intervention works very much in the same way as military support. Usually, when a country militarily intervenes on behalf of an actor in the conflict, economic support is included. The aid or trade benefits an actor receives from another party allows it to increase its capabilities and continue fighting the conflict. However, economic support does not always directly contribute to military capability the way military intervention does. It can come in the form of arms deals which is in direct involvement with the conflict and allows non-state actors to continue their role in the conflict. On the other hand, economic support can include loans, grants, lowering of tariffs etc. These forms of support usually apply to a state actor and help keep the state's economy afloat. Moreover, a state is more likely to take international loans or seek such forms of support when it is struggling to continue the conflict. If a state can pad its budget in such a way and keep the population's support for the war, it can most likely continue its involvement in the conflict. In other words, economic support on behalf of the state actor does not directly increase the capability imbalance between the state and non-state actor the same way military support does. It does, however, allow the state to continue pursuing the conflict through economic cushioning.⁸³

Hypothesis 5: Economic support for either side of the conflict will increase duration.

⁸³ Ibrahim Elbadawi, "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 2433 (2000).
John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Research Design

To test the hypotheses outlined above I use a mixed-methods research design. First I engage in quantitative analysis to test for the presence of my phenomena, correlation between military intervention and war duration. The quantitative analysis also provides an overview of trends and the possible effects intervention might have on extra-state war duration.

While quantitative analysis is helpful to understanding correlation between military interventions and duration, it is unable to illuminate the validity of my proposed causal mechanisms. Moreover, due to data constraints, the regression analysis is limited to hypotheses related to military interventions, and ignoring the effect of economic and diplomatic interventions on war during.

Hence, I use case studies to complement the findings of my regression analysis. Case studies provide a closer look at how intervention may interact with war duration and whether this interaction is truly causal or just a correlation. Moreover, if causality can be supported, there is also an opportunity to identify causal mechanisms or how intervention affects war duration. By just focusing on case studies, I would not be able to generalize to the greater population of extra-state wars and there is a possibility of selection bias. However, in combination with the regression analysis, the case studies will help get closer to understanding the motivations behind some interventions, the mechanisms of interventions, and how those mechanisms affect duration.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Case Studies

According to Gerring, there are two types of case study approaches: descriptive and causal. For the purposes of testing the previously outlined hypotheses and identifying causal mechanisms within the relationship between interventions and war duration, I will be opting into the causal case study route.

Causal case studies aim to understand how the independent variables affects the dependent variable. For the purpose of this research, the case studies will be focused on how intervention affects extra-state war duration. However, these case studies will not be able to identify a precise or numerical effect due to the complexities and multiple variables involved in wars. Gerring states that this is acceptable for case studies and ultimately, the goal is to discover some working relationship between the variables. Moreover, case studies give the opportunity to focus on mechanisms and potential confounders, which will be very useful due to limited explanations regression analysis can give.⁸⁵

The three main groups of causal case studies are exploratory, estimating, and diagnostic. The exploratory group is used in order to identify an independent variable that explains the variation in the dependent variable. For our purposes, this is unnecessary because intervention is already identified as the independent variable. The two groups of case studies which will inform this project's case selection are estimating and diagnostic.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 52.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 54.

Estimating case studies aim to test a hypothesis and focus on the independent variable. Within the estimating group, longitudinal cases, also known as interrupted time series, observes the dependent variable before and after a change occurs in the independent variable, while holding controls constant.⁸⁷

Diagnostic cases are used to confirm/reject/refine hypotheses that have already been tested. In other words, diagnostic cases are very useful in identifying causal mechanisms, which confirm and explain hypotheses. Within Diagnostic cases, pathway cases indicate a strong relationship between the variables and hence make it viable to identify causal mechanisms.⁸⁸

To test hypothesis 3, whether an equitable distribution of military interventions will increase duration, the Western Sahara War will be studied. This case falls in the Diagnostic Pathway group. This is the only extra-state conflict with military interventions on behalf of the state and the non-state actor. In other words, this case would be the only opportunity to see the effect of two-sided military interventions on war duration. This war lasted almost 98 months, while the average for all extra-state wars is about 26 months. Hence, there is a strong positive correlation between the interventions and duration. This case will be complex because of the multiple interventions, but it will also provide plenty of opportunities to assess causal mechanisms of intervention on duration. Moreover, this case can help elucidate the potential differences in how intervention affects duration depending on which side of the conflict it takes place on.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 69-71.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 72-81.

For hypothesis 4, I will analyze the Cisplatine War, which had diplomatic intervention, but no military or economic intervention. This case falls in the Estimating Longitudinal group because it is attempting to test the relationship between the independent and dependent variable without any previous quantitative analysis. Moreover, this case heavily focuses on the independent variable (diplomatic intervention) and isolates it from other types of intervention. By isolating the independent variable, this case will also provide opportunities to identify causal mechanisms.

Lastly, the Mozambique War will be used to test hypothesis 5. This war had economic intervention, but no military or diplomatic intervention. This case is also an Estimating Longitudinal case because the hypothesis has not been previously tested and the case was chosen based on the independent variable. Again, by isolating economic intervention, this case will help us understand how economic intervention effects duration.

These three cases will not singlehandedly prove their respective hypotheses. However, they will contribute to our understanding of how these different types of intervention potentially play a causal role in the duration of the conflict. This case study analysis is more geared towards isolating the various causal mechanisms of intervention in order to support or detract from the findings of the regression analysis.

Regression Analysis

To test my hypotheses I conduct an Ordinary Least Squares Regression analysis. An OLS regression will provide data on how intervention and duration are correlated. If

that analysis proves a statistically significant correlation, I can take the next step by identifying potential causal mechanisms through case studies.

Operationalization of Variables

The Correlates of War dataset on extra-state wars ranges from 1816 to 2007. Duration is defined as how long a war lasts. For this project and based on the specificity of the Correlates of War data, duration will be defined in months. There were many instances where the war could have been measured by days, but due to the numerous cases where only the months were available, this research will focus on months.

Military intervention will be included as a nominal-level set for how many interventions occurred. According to Correlates of War, “to be coded as a participant, a state must either commit 1000 troops to operations in the combat zone or suffer 100 battle-deaths in the course of such operations.” Most cases of military interventions will either be coded 0 for no intervention or 1 for the presence of interventions. The interventions will then be divided by which side they were on behalf of: the state or non-state actor. Moreover, the timing of the intervention will be split into three groups: within the first year, after the first year, and after five years of the conflict. In addition, the interventions will be divided based on whether they were part of a coalition (like the invasion of Afghanistan) or a unilateral decision (like the French intervention in the Moroccan Rif war).

Controls will include

- 1) War Type: colonial war or imperial war
- 2) Number of state battle deaths

- 3) Number of non-state battle deaths
- 4) Who initiated the conflict
 - a) the state actor
 - b) the non-state actor
- 5) Outcome
 - a) state win
 - b) non-state win
 - c) compromise
 - d) the war transformed into another type of war
 - e) the war is ongoing as of 12/31/2007
 - f) Stalemate
 - g) conflict continues at below war level,
- 6) Region
 - a) Western Hemisphere
 - b) Europe
 - c) Africa
 - d) Middle East
 - e) Asia
 - f) Oceania
- 7) If the extra-state war was transformed from another type of war (intrastate or interstate)
- 8) If the extra-state war transformed into another type of war (intrastate or interstate)

These controls aim to isolate potential alternative explanations for duration.

Colonial and imperial wars are fundamentally different because they occur for different reasons. In colonial wars, the state is on the defensive while in imperial wars, the state can take either the defensive or offensive position. On average, a colonial war lasts about a year longer than an imperial war, supporting the idea that these wars have fundamental differences which can contribute to duration. By controlling for the type of war, the effect of intervention on duration can be further isolated.

The number of state and non-state battle deaths are indicators of the intensity of the conflict and can help control for how war intensity effects duration. Moreover, wars may differ in duration depending on who initiated the conflict and whether the state must initially take the offensive or defensive position. In addition, the controlling of the outcome of the conflict helps explain whether stalemates and continuing low-intensity conflict significantly contribute to duration. Similarly, identifying whether a war transformed into another type of war or transformed from another type of war plays a similar role in ruling out other explainers of duration. Lastly, controlling for region attempts to isolate whether some regions/countries produce longer/shorter wars.

To test the robustness of the overall OLS regression, I conduct regressions on more specific aspects of intervention. First, I conduct a multivariate regression for interventions on the side of the state, as well as on the side of the non-state actor. These regressions will either support or take away from the overall regression analysis, while also lending some data to test my first two hypotheses. There is one case where military intervention took place on both sides of the conflict. This case will be included in both the intervention (state) and intervention (non-state) groups.

Interventions occur with different motivations and interests. Some states hope to see a conflict come to an end and choose to intervene for that reason. Other states use intervention to continue the conflict in hope that the involved countries will be weakened. Through quantitative analysis, it is very difficult to understand the motivations/interests driving an intervention, and therefore difficult to assess the intended effect and mechanism of the intervention.

In order to partially account for the wide spectrum of motivations involved with interventions, the cases will be divided based on timing of the intervention. Intervention will be divided into three groups: within the first year, after the first year, and after the first five years. Although the exact reasoning behind each intervention cannot be clearly delineated, an intervention within the first six months of a conflict and an intervention after five years of a conflict might have different characteristics whether it has to do with motivation, interests, goals, military power, or economic prosperity. If not, these regressions will produce equal results.

Using this classification, I will conduct another set of regressions testing how these different intervention timings effect duration. It is important to note that these groups of intervention timing will not be compared to each other, but rather, they would be compared to the overall regression conducted at the start of this analysis to see if there are any conflicting results. It would not make sense to compare these groups to each other because wars that attract intervention after five years and wars that attract intervention within six months are not comparable samples of the larger population of extra-state conflicts. In essence, there are too many unobserved variables that make these types of wars too different for comparison.

To finish off this robustness check, a last regression will be conducted dividing intervention into a coalition group and a non-coalition group. Coalitions occurs when a state enters into a war with supporters already contributing to its side. For example, the United States, and the United Kingdom launched Operation Enduring Freedom (invasion of Afghanistan) together in 2001 and were later joined by Australia, Canada, and

Germany. The U.S. and UK would be considered a coalition since they started the conflict together, while the later support from other countries would fall under non-coalition interventions. In the overall regression, coalitions and non-coalitions are not distinguished as different types of intervention. This is because in the few cases of coalition conflicts, there is usually one state that leads the conflict, with the others providing military support. In the case of Afghanistan, the U.S. was leading the operation with British assistance. However, to check the robustness of this design choice, a regression separating coalitions and non-coalition interventions will be necessary.

As mentioned before, all of these regressions will have the same controls. These controls will be whether the war was colonial or imperial, state battle deaths, non-state battle deaths, initiator, outcome, region, and whether the extra-state war was transformed from another type of war.

Constraints

Interventions are not random, creating an issue of omitted variable bias. The type of conflict that attracts an intervention, regardless of whether that intervention was military, economic, or diplomatic, may involve another variable that is actually the factor behind the duration of the conflict. This makes it extremely difficult to isolate intervention as a causal factor explaining war duration. In essence, this omitted variable bias occurs because I am unable to know why countries intervene, what characteristics of a conflict attract that intervention, and why these countries intervene when they do.

Data-wise, I do not have access to economic or diplomatic interventions. My data on extra-state wars runs from 1816 to 2007, stating only whether a military intervention occurred. In some situations, states do not reveal that they economically supported a party in an extra-state conflict due to fear of international repercussions. These “secret” interventions make it very difficult to categorize all the military interventions and keep them separate from possible economic/military support that might have been occurring covertly.

Moreover, I do not have data describing the intensity of the intervention. This includes data on the number of troops committed, number of weapons given, amount of aid, training etc. Even if this data was accessible, its accuracy could be debated since many states do not reveal the extent of their intervention. For example, in Syria today, Iran is unwilling to fully disclose the amount of aid and the number of troops it sends on behalf of Assad.

Another categorization issue comes up with coalitions. Some extra-state wars are fought between a coalition of states and a non-state actor. For example, the invasion of Afghanistan consisted of a coalition of states attacking Al-Qaeda. Usually, a coalition is headed by a single state. In the case of Afghanistan, the U.S. was the prime member of the coalition. The question then becomes whether to count this coalition war as a non-intervention war or count the other members of the coalition as interveners. For the purposes of this research, coalitions are considered as cases of intervention. However, the regression analysis will include the control of whether the interventions were coalitions or not.

On top of that, mixed wars are difficult to place under a single type of war. The Syrian Civil War is an intrastate war, an extra-state war, and arguable a proxy interstate war. Categorizing a situation like Syria becomes confusing and could muddle the data.

Although these constraints are extensive, other studies, including published ones, have these same constraints. Just because this research topic will not yield “perfect” and a completely sound research design, does not mean it is not worth studying. I understand that these constraints exist and make it difficult to isolate intervention as a causal factor in war duration. However, going forward with this research helps us understand a little more how intervention and war duration interact. More importantly, this design will begin a much-needed debate and discussion on extra-state wars and possibly variables that are important to explaining duration.

Results

Before conducting the OLS regression analysis on the military interventions in extra-state wars, a survey of the descriptive statistics of these cases is necessary. As illustrated by Table 1, there were 162 cases of extra-state wars since 1816. The duration, measured in months, averaged around 26 months with the shortest war lasting four days (Allied bombardment of Algiers) and the longest war lasting nearly 14 years (Angolan-Portuguese war). There were 17 cases of military intervention, with 15 interventions on behalf of the state and 3 interventions on behalf of the non-state actor. In those cases, 1 conflict did have both a state and non-state-side intervention (Western Sahara war).

In regards to timing, 12 of the interventions took place within the first year of the conflict, while 5 took place after the first year. There were no interventions that took

place after five years of an ongoing conflict. Similarly, 12 of the interventions involved coalitions, while 5 did not.

Table 1: Number of Observations and Averages of Variables

| | Observations | Range (min-max) | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|--|-------|--------------------|
| Duration (months) | 162 | 0.167-166.733 | 25.9 | 33.677 |
| Military Intervention | 17 interventions | 0: No intervention 1: Intervention | 0.105 | 0.307 |
| State side | 15 state-side interventions | 0: No state side intervention 1: State side intervention | 0.093 | 0.291 |
| Non-State side | 3 non-state side interventions | 0: No non-state side intervention 1: Non-state side intervention | 0.019 | 0.135 |
| Timing | 17 interventions | 0: No intervention 1: Within the first year 2: After the first year 3: After five years | 0.136 | 0.425 |
| Coalition | 5 coalitions | 0: No intervention 1: Intervention without coalition 2: Intervention with coalition | 0.136 | 0.425 |

Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 tests the correlation between the occurrence of military intervention and war duration. The regression reveals that extra-state wars with military intervention are, on average, 24 months longer than wars without military intervention. The control variables that do correlate to war duration

are the type of war, whether the conflict transformed from another type of war, the number of state-side battle deaths, and the number of non-state-side battle deaths.

Model 2 was testing to see whether only interventions on behalf of the state correlated with war duration. Similar to model 1, model 2 shows that wars with state-side intervention are on average 22 months longer than wars without state-side intervention. For this model, the only controls that were statistically significant were the type of war and battle deaths for both sides of the conflict. Hypothesis 2 stated that war duration will decrease if there is intervention on behalf of the state. This hypothesis was not supported by model 2's findings.

Model 3 focused on wars with intervention on behalf of the non-state actor. There were only 3 cases with such type of intervention. These cases were, on average, almost 54 months longer than wars without non-state-side intervention. This model does support hypothesis 3, which stated that war duration would increase with intervention on behalf of the non-state actor.

Model 4 looks at the differences involved with intervention timing. According to this regression, wars that had an intervention within the first year of the conflict were on average 17 months longer than wars without any intervention. Moreover, wars that had an intervention after the first year were about 34 months longer than wars without interventions and 17 months longer than wars that had an intervention within the first year. Lastly, model 5 looks at the duration of conflicts with coalition interventions and non-coalition interventions. Wars with a non-coalition intervention were, on average almost 15 months longer than wars without any intervention. In addition, wars with coalition interventions were about 29 months longer than wars without any intervention and about 15 months longer than wars that had a non-coalition intervention.

Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Extra-state War Duration and Intervention

| | Duration (months) | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
| Military Intervention | 24.041** (3.03) | - | - | - | - |
| State side | - | 22.120* (2.57) | - | - | - |
| Non-State side | - | - | 53.674** (2.87) | - | - |
| Timing | - | - | - | 16.837** (2.96) | - |
| Coalition | - | - | - | - | 14.616* (2.55) |
| War Type (Colonial or Imperial) | -11.058* (-2.04) | -10.925* (-2.00) | -12.600* (-2.31) | -11.064* (-2.04) | -10.630 (-1.94) |
| Initiator (State or Non-State) | 0.706 (0.14) | 1.471 (0.28) | 0.284 (0.06) | 0.007 (0.00) | -0.167 (-0.03) |
| Outcome of the Conflict | 1.932 (1.13) | 2.032 (1.18) | 1.767 (1.03) | 2.326 (1.38) | 2.054 (1.19) |
| Transformed from another type of war | 29.310* (2.26) | 26.316 (1.95) | 47.591*** (3.62) | 31.694* (2.47) | 35.410** (2.77) |
| Transformed to another type of war | 8.310 (0.74) | 14.451 (1.26) | -1.649 (-0.14) | 5.661 (0.50) | 5.897 (0.51) |
| Region of the conflict | 0.086 (0.07) | 0.0115 (0.09) | 0.468 (0.39) | 0.144 (0.12) | 0.145 (0.12) |
| State Battle Deaths | .0005** (2.49) | .0005* (2.39) | .0006** (3.01) | .0005* (2.51) | .0005* (2.51) |
| Non-state Battle Deaths | .0003* (2.18) | .0003* (2.19) | .0002 (1.85) | .0003* (2.16) | .0003* (2.15) |
| Constant | 19.625* (2.54) | 19.135* (2.46) | 20.237* (2.61) | 19.271* (2.50) | 19.650* (2.52) |
| Observations | | | 162 | | |

t statistics in parentheses

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001


Figure 1 illustrates the differences in duration between intervening on behalf of the state and on behalf of the non-state actor. The data does support the hypothesis stating that military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor will correlate to higher duration (hypothesis 1). However, this same data does not support the hypothesis stating that military intervention will correlate to lower durations (hypothesis 2). Figure 1 shows that intervention correlates to higher durations more when the intervention was on behalf of the non-state actor. However, the overall intervention-duration regression line seems to be closely aligned to the state-side intervention regression line. This might be attributed to the fact that a large majority of all the interventions were on behalf of the state actor.

Although this graph detracts from the strength of hypothesis 2, it does support the theory forming the basis of the first two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 and 2 were based on the idea that the non-state actor and state actor have a large capacity gap. In essence, the state actor is most probably in the advantaged situation. Hence, if a state actor receives military support, the capacity gap widens, allowing for the state to defeat the non-state actor quicker. However, if the non-state actor receives military support, the capacity gap closes, leveling the playing field and protracting the conflict.

Figure 1 shows that military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor correlates to higher durations than interventions on the state-side. In other words, an increase in military support for the non-state actor allows them to close the capacity gap enough to continue the conflict. This effect rings true for interventions on behalf of the state as well, but not to the same degree. The case studies in the second half of this paper

will help illuminate how the effects of interventions may differ based on which side they are on behalf of.

Figure 1: Extra-state War Duration by Interventions on Behalf of the State and Non-State Actor



Overall, these regressions show a strong positive correlation between interventions and extra-state war duration. However, the issue of omitted variable bias has not disappeared. For example, model 3 showed that conflicts with interventions on behalf of the non-state actor are almost 54 months longer than conflicts without that type of intervention. It could be that conflicts that happen to attract intervention on the side of the non-state actor have another characteristic or driving variable that elongates the war. Although this problem still exists, the regression analysis does tell us that conflicts with intervention last much longer than conflicts without. This regression analysis has not proved that intervention is the causal link between the varying degrees of duration.

However, it does give us some insight into how extra-state conflicts can be characteristically different and that intervention interacts with these characteristics. To understand how intervention interacts with these difference and to test hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, a case study analysis will be conducted.

The Western Sahara War: 1975-1983 [1991]

The Western Sahara War took place between mainly Morocco and the Polisario Front, who claimed self-determination, from 1975 to 1983, outside of Morocco's internationally recognized borders. For the next eight years the conflict continued at low-level intensity until a ceasefire was signed in 1991.

This conflict involves all three types of intervention. Mauritania entered the war with Morocco as a coalition, providing military support. Although this was a coalition, Mauritania played a minor role compared to Morocco, which is why this conflict is usually framed between Morocco and the Polisario. Moreover, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and France provided varying levels of economic support to Morocco. In addition, France provided limited military intervention through an aerial bombing campaign. The Polisario received economic support from Libya and Algeria. Algeria played a much larger role and even engaged in military combat in the beginning of the conflict. Lastly, although the conflict was no longer considered a war by 1991, a UN-sponsored ceasefire (diplomatic intervention) is what ended the conflict. However, the actual "war" ended in 1983 merely out of a decrease in operational activities and battle deaths.

Given that the Western Sahara War is characterized by military interventions on both sides, I am able to test hypothesis 3: if there is an equitable distribution of third party military interventions, war duration will increase. In addition, there are instances of economic intervention on both sides.⁸⁹ In many conflicts, different types of interventions

⁸⁹ Although multiple occurrences of intervention may complicate the causal effect between one type of intervention and duration, many conflicts have the same issue. If we are to look for external validity and apply some of the identified mechanisms to other cases, the case cannot be purely unique.

overlap and interact with each other. Since this conflict has a high correlation between intervention and duration, the purpose of using this case is not necessarily just to identify whether intervention increases/decreases duration. Rather, this case provides ample opportunity to identify how military or economic intervention affects duration and through which mechanisms. Hence, it falls under the Diagnostic Pathway case group.⁹⁰

In sum, this case is looking to understand whether and how military and economic interventions increase war duration. I hypothesize that the interventions gave both sides the means to fight whether it be through weapons or economic support, prolonging the conflict. According to Weisiger, Vasquez, Bennett and Stam, without additional resources, both sides would reach their breaking point sooner where the costs of the war would outweigh the benefits.⁹¹ Hence, when both sides receive military aid, they feel less need to compromise and continue fighting until a stalemate.

Historical Overview

Morocco is a northwestern African country that achieved independence from French (and somewhat Spanish) control in 1956. The territory of Western Sahara was under Spanish control until 1975, when Spain handed control to Morocco and Mauritania. The Sahrawi people of Western Sahara developed a sense of identity and nationalism for

⁹⁰ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁹¹ Alex Weisiger, "Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration," *International Organization* 70, no. 2 (2016).
John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 183.
Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998).

a few decades prior to this transfer and by 1973, created the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (the Polisario Front) in order to stake a claim for self-determination.

Morocco was split into a French and Spanish protectorate from 1912 to 1956. In 1956, Morocco achieved independence from France. However, Spain had a claim on the Western Sahara since the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. By the mid-20th century, Spain established Spanish West Africa which was composed Ifni, Saqiya al Hamra, and Rio de Oro. In 1958, Spain gave the Tarfaya Strip and later in 1969, gave the Ifni region to Morocco in return for fishing privileges. The Sahrawi people of this region were key players in Morocco's anticolonial movement through the creation of the Sahrawi Liberation Army, which attacked Spanish and French outposts.

Although Morocco was independent, the Western Sahara was still considered Spanish Sahara. The Sahrawi people, through decades of resisting colonial powers and forming coalitions, began to see themselves as a separate ethnic group with nationalist goals. In 1971, El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed, with other nationalists, started what would become the Polisario Front by 1973. This group called for armed struggle to resist the Spanish and potentially create a state separate from Morocco or Mauritania. On October 15, 1975, the UN Mission to Spanish Sahara came out in favor of Western Saharan self-determination. One day later, the International Court of Justice issued a ruling against Morocco claiming the Western Sahara. In response, Hassan II of Morocco made plans for the "Green March" on the same day as the ICJ ruling. The Green March culminated on November 6, 1975 where about 350,000 unarmed Moroccans made their way over to the

Western Sahara on foot in order to claim it for Morocco. After Spain decided to negotiate on the matter of the Western Sahara, Hassan II ordered the volunteers to reenter Morocco.

On November 14, 1975, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed the Madrid Accords which would divide the Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. As Spain prepared to withdraw, the Polisario began attacking Moroccan and Mauritanian forces, beginning the Western Sahara War on December 11, 1975. The Polisario Front utilized their knowledge of the terrain and guerilla tactics to throw both Moroccan and Mauritanian forces off. However, due to the war, many Sahrawis fled to neighboring Algeria.

By February of 1976, the Polisario Front created the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The Polisario focused on attacking Mauritanian forces at the start of the conflict, knowing that they were the weaker component of the coalition. Soon enough, the effective guerilla tactics on supply lines and military bases forced Mauritania to withdraw and eventually recognize the SADR in 1979. Morocco responded by starting the “Berm” initiative which consisted of building large walls around Polisario-dominated regions from 1981 to 1987. The decrease in war intensity is somewhat contributed to the Berm, as well as to Morocco’s strained economy. In September of 1991, both parties agreed to a UN ceasefire which called for a referendum on the future of Western Sahara.

However, that referendum is still in discussion mainly due to a disagreement on voter eligibility.⁹²

Interventions on Behalf of the Polisario Front

Although Algeria was the main supporter of the Polisario, it was not the first. Starting in 1973, Libya was the sole economic supporter of the Polisario. Using profits from its oil resources, Libya contributed weapons, training, and even broadcasting capabilities.⁹³ However, any weapons it sent had to go through Algeria and needed Algerian permission.⁹⁴ Therefore, the Polisario did receive limited support from Algeria, although their weapons were exclusively Libyan from 1973 to 1975.⁹⁵ Libya continued to offer its economic support up until 1984 when it signed the Treaty of Oujda with Morocco.⁹⁶ This treaty arose out of Gaddafi's fears of a balkanized Maghreb and an increase in regional issues.

At the start of the conflict, Algeria was more concerned with maintaining its détente with Morocco than it was with promoting self-determination in Western Sahara. In the mid-1970s, El Ouali, founder of the Polisario, approached many countries,

⁹² "War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara," *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

⁹³ Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony*, (London: Zed Books, 2004), 194.

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Saharans*, (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1980), 259.

⁹⁴ Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War*, (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1984), 326.

⁹⁵ Oyvind Osterud, "War Termination in the Western Sahara," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 20, no. 3 (1989).

⁹⁶ Erik Jensen, *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 23.

requesting aid for their cause. He was rejected by most countries, including Algeria.⁹⁷ In the Arab League Summit in Rabat in 1974, Boumedienne even gave his blessing to the Moroccan goals in Western Sahara and promised not to oppose the occupation.⁹⁸ However, the release of the UN and ICJ opinions on Western Sahara's right to self-determination along with Morocco's Green March shifted Algeria's outlook. Boumedienne became horrified by the lack of self-determination, Morocco's perpetual thirst for expansion, and the potential of using profits from the phosphate found in the Western Sahara to fund weapons research. Even then, Algeria was unsure on how organized and effective the Sahrawi people were.⁹⁹

Algeria watched as the Polisario executed small but successful guerilla attacks against the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces. Their ability to rally support amongst their people and organize effective military strategies impressed Algerian officials.¹⁰⁰ The UN/ICJ rulings on self-determination, Polisario's effectiveness, and the potential of getting access to an Atlantic trading port all contributed to Algeria's decision to militarily and economically support the Polisario.¹⁰¹ The Polisario rose to a new level of militancy after receiving Algerian support.¹⁰² They began to receive recoilless artillery, 14.5 mm ZPU anti-aircraft machine guns, 120 mm mortars, multiple rocket launchers, SAM 7

⁹⁷ Suresh Saxena, *Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle*, (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1995), 118.

⁹⁸ Phillip Naylor, "Spain and France and the Decolonization of Western Sahara: Parity and Paradoxes, 1975-87," *Africa Today* 34, no. 3 (1987).

⁹⁹ Suresh Saxena, *Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle*, (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1995), 121.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 122.

¹⁰¹ Phillip Naylor, "Spain and France and the Decolonization of Western Sahara: Parity and Paradoxes, 1975-87," *Africa Today* 34, no. 3 (1987).

¹⁰² Suresh Saxena, *Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle*, (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1995), 124.

portable missile launchers, rocket-propelled grenades, T55 tanks, SAM 6 missile systems, armored troop carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and reconnaissance vehicles.¹⁰³ With these weapons at hand, the Polisario could now wage a proper war of attrition against the Moroccans. Coupled with their pre-existing knowledge of the terrain and extensive use of guerilla tactics, the Polisario became a real threat to the Moroccan military.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, Algeria accepted and supported the thousands of Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf and other camps. In fact, almost one half of the native population has lived as refugees in Algeria since 1976.¹⁰⁵ It is estimated that Algeria spent \$50,000 a day supporting refugees in the late 1970s alone.¹⁰⁶ In addition, refugee camps such as the one in Tindouf served as training and recruitment sanctuaries for Polisario fighters. Most of the missile and anti-aircraft training took place in these camps.¹⁰⁷ On top of that, Algeria provided the Polisario with a radio station called, “Voice of Free Sahara” to rally support and recruit.¹⁰⁸

Interestingly, Algeria’s military intervention was very limited and only took place at the start of the conflict.¹⁰⁹ On January 27, 1976, Moroccan troops attacked armed Algerian troops in Amgala, Western Sahara (but close to the Algerian border). These Algerian troops claimed they were stationed there to help with the stream of refugees

¹⁰³ “War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴ Suresh Saxena, *Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle*, (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1995), 169.

¹⁰⁵ “War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ John Mercer, *The Sahrawis of Western Sahara*, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1979), 16.

¹⁰⁷ David Price, *The Western Sahara*, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1979), 29.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁰⁹ Oyvind Osterud, “War Termination in the Western Sahara,” *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 20, no. 3 (1989).

coming in. The Battle of Amgala ensued for 36 hours with about 400 Moroccan deaths and 200 Algerian deaths. The Algerian troops retreated, but with tensions high, fighting resumed in February of 1976 for two days.¹¹⁰ Although Algeria did not contribute troops to the conflict after these two instances, the military intervention did highlight its motivations for involving itself in the war. In the battles of Amgala, Algeria witnessed Morocco's refusal for Sahrawi self-determination and its lust for territorial expansion. Having been initially attacked by Moroccan troops, Algeria could not end its support for the Polisario after investing so much. Moreover, Polisario success against the Moroccan troops only strengthened Algeria's resolve in continuing to support the guerilla group.¹¹¹

Polisario Capabilities Before and After

Prior to both Libyan and Algerian support, the Polisario was a disorganized band of Sahrawi nationalists. In 1975, the Polisario was composed of about 800 men with very few weapons.¹¹² They were confined to a small tract of land from Guelta to the Algerian border, making it easier for Moroccan aircrafts to track them.¹¹³ During the time that they were poorly equipped, most reports did not see a real match between Morocco and the Polisario. The war was not predicted to last long because of the severe capability differences between the two actors.¹¹⁴ The Polisario understood this early on and began

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 32.

¹¹¹ Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War*, (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1984), 332.

¹¹² Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Saharans*, (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1980), 252.

¹¹³ John Mercer, *The Sahrawis of Western Sahara*, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1979), 10.

¹¹⁴ Suresh Saxena, *Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle*, (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1995), 127.

an intensive public relations campaign where they would invite delegations and journalists in hopes of reaching international ears, while also garnering recruitment.¹¹⁵ With help from Libya's broadcasting channels and Algeria's radio station, the Polisario grew from 800 men in 1975 to 10,000 men in 1977 and to almost 20,000 men in 1981.¹¹⁶ In essence, Libya's and Algeria's support helped transform the Polisario into an almost conventional army within a couple years. By the mid-1980s, the Polisario had about 100 tanks, 60 carriers, and 100 artillery units.¹¹⁷

What is interesting to note is that by 1979, Morocco began relying on air power to track and attack Polisario units. Normally, on such a small area of land, this would prove to be destructive. Even though the Polisario mostly operated at night, the Moroccan military had advanced infrared technology. However, the Polisario received SAM 7 missiles and anti-aircraft training from the Algerian military. Through effective use of the training and technology, the Polisario were able to evade many of Morocco's air attacks.¹¹⁸ Ultimately, Algerian and somewhat Libyan support helped build the Polisario from a small guerilla group into an effective and successful military.

¹¹⁵ Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Saharans*, (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1980), 251.

¹¹⁶ Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Saharans*, (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1980), 253. Suresh Saxena, *The Liberation War in Western Sahara*, (New Delhi: Vidya Publishers, 1981), 64.

¹¹⁷ Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony*, (London: Zed Books, 2004), 194.

¹¹⁸ Yahia Zoubir, *International Dimensions of the Western Saharan Conflict*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 157.

Interventions on Behalf of Morocco

Mauritania holds a very interesting position within the Western Sahara conflict. On one hand, it entered the war in a coalition with Morocco. However, being a much weaker ally, Mauritania is never considered a major belligerent in the war. In fact, it only took a part in the conflict from 1976 to 1979. Even though Mauritania entered the conflict alongside Morocco, it is considered a military intervener because of its limited role in the conflict.

On November 14, 1975, representatives from Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania signed the Pact of Madrid. This agreement divided the Western Sahara territory between its neighbors: Morocco and Mauritania. Hence, as Spain withdrew and the war began, Mauritania found itself forced to work with Morocco in protecting one of the few assets it possessed. However, Mauritania's resources and military were much smaller than those of Morocco.¹¹⁹ In 1976, Mauritania's army consisted of about 5,000 troops.¹²⁰ In comparison, Morocco's starting military size ranged from 60,000 to 80,000 troops. In essence, Mauritania, limited by its own capabilities, was only able to commit very few human and material resources.

The Polisario quickly realized they were fighting a two-front war and strategized accordingly. Recognizing the drastic military difference between their adversaries, the Polisario refocused its attacks on Mauritania. The ultimate goal was to attack and weaken Mauritania's government to the point that they would back out of the conflict and seek

¹¹⁹ "War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara," *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

¹²⁰ Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony*, (London: Zed Books, 2004), 43.

peace purely for survival. This would allow the Polisario to concentrate their forces on Morocco. In July of 1976, the Polisario crossed the border into Mauritania and shelled the suburbs of the capital, Nouakchott. Then, in May of 1977, the Polisario attacked the mining city of Zouerate, taking six French hostages. Within two months, they re-attacked Nouakchott. By 1977, Mauritania casualties included 1,600 deaths, 900 wounded, and 16 prisoners. The costs of war took up about 40% of Mauritania's state budget in 1977, eventually going up to 60% in 1978. Due to the hostage situation, foreign workers began leaving the country, halting the iron industry and weakening the economy even further.

Apart from financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Ivory Coast, Mauritania mostly received aid from France. France's historical and economic ties to Mauritania, compounded by the hostage situation brought on a short French intervention.

¹²¹ The Franco-Mauritanian military agreement resulted in extensive French aid to its former colony. Using their base in Dakar, Senegal, France conducted Jaguar air strikes against ahrawi columns in Mauritania from December 1977 to July 1978.¹²² On top of that, France's aid boosted Mauritania's military from 5,000 troops in 1976 to about 17,000 troops in 1978.¹²³ Moreover, Mauritania received about 50 tanks, aerial surveys, paratrooper missions, and the eventual Jaguar strikes on small Western Saharan towns like Oum Dreyga.¹²⁴

¹²¹ "War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara," *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

¹²² Phillip Naylor, "Spain and France and the Decolonization of Western Sahara: Parity and Paradoxes, 1975-87," *Africa Today* 34, no. 3 (1987).

¹²³ Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony*, (London: Zed Books, 2004), 43.

¹²⁴ John Mercer, *The Sahrawis of Western Sahara*, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1979), 13.

However, the economic burden coupled with the extensive drought made the government quite unpopular with the Mauritanian people. In 1977, there were number cabinet changes, eventually leading to a July 1978 coup and ousting of President Daddah.¹²⁵ By the time of the coup, the French already realized Mauritania's dwindling chances against the Polisario and succeeded in evacuating all foreign French workers from Mauritania. Hence, France's intervention came to an abrupt end.¹²⁶ The new Mauritanian regime quickly realized the country's weakened state and withdrew its forces from the conflict in 1979. Soon after, Mauritania signed a peace agreement with the Polisario on August 5, 1979. Morocco did not hesitate to claim the former Mauritanian land.¹²⁷

Although Mauritanian intervention was limited, it brought in a powerful ally for the Moroccans: the French. France continued to support Morocco through the conflict. Throughout the war, Morocco received about \$2 billion in weapons from France, with only half of them being purchases. These weapons included jets, missiles, helicopters, gunships, and intelligence-gathering technologies.¹²⁸ Other countries that provided weapons and aid include Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Iraq, South Africa, Belgium, Italy,

¹²⁵ Phillip Naylor, "Spain and France and the Decolonization of Western Sahara: Parity and Paradoxes, 1975-87," *Africa Today* 34, no. 3 (1987).

¹²⁶ Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony*, (London: Zed Books, 2004), 44.

¹²⁷ "War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara," *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

¹²⁸ Yahia Zoubir, *International Dimensions of the Western Saharan Conflict*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 156.

Spain, and Brazil. However, compared to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, these countries were minor contributors to Moroccan military capabilities.¹²⁹

Morocco had been receiving aid from the U.S. from the last year of the Carter administration to the early 1980s, when the conflict began to stabilize.¹³⁰ Interestingly, Moroccan failure to quickly subdue the Polisario prompted the U.S. (as well as Saudi Arabia and France) to support Morocco. From 1976 to 1984, the U.S. spent, on average \$1 million a year just training Moroccan officers, pilots, and counterinsurgency (COIN) specialists. Moreover, by 1982, there were about 100 U.S. advisors in Morocco training Moroccan troops on US bases on missile countermeasures and evasion.¹³¹ On top of that, the U.S. provided about \$140-\$150 million a year in loans and grants.¹³²

In terms of weapons, the U.S. sold about \$150 million in arms in 1980 itself. These weapons included F-5s, armored vehicles, cluster bomb units, and anti-tank weapons.¹³³ Specifically, the U.S. helped Morocco install a Forward Area Altering Radar system in February of 1980, allowing for detection of troop and armor movements.¹³⁴ Moreover, Morocco received about \$750 million in Foreign Military Sales and \$150 million in Commercial Sales. About one-fourth of all Moroccan military purchases came

¹²⁹ “War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

¹³⁰ Oyvind Osterud, “War Termination in the Western Sahara,” *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 20, no. 3 (1989).

¹³¹ “War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

¹³² Richard Lawless, *War and Refugees: The Western Sahara Conflict*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1987), 127.

¹³³ Leo Kamil, *Fueling the Fire: U.S. Policy and the Western Sahara Conflict*, (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1987), 44.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

from the U.S.¹³⁵ In terms of training, the U.S trained over 1500 troops in exchange for \$17 million, while also providing electronic surveillance and radar to coordinate strikes. On top of that, the U.S. provided \$475 million in credits and almost \$200 million in grants.¹³⁶ There was even some suspicion of a Green Berets clandestine operation from 1982 to 1983.¹³⁷

As the Moroccan economy turned for the worse in the mid-1980s with a two year drought, budget limitations, costs of war, world recession, and inflation, the U.S. found ways to keep their economy afloat.¹³⁸ By 1983, Morocco was \$11 billion in debt. In the early 1980s, the IMF issued the largest rescue operation in the third world. It provided \$1 billion in standby credit as requested by President Reagan. In addition, the U.S. increased its Foreign Military Sales Credits to \$100 million in 1982 in the hopes that Morocco would get closer to winning the war.¹³⁹ Moreover, due to the ongoing conflict, many foreign investors became weary of putting capital into Morocco's phosphate industry. Soon enough, U.S. investors began supporting phosphate mining.¹⁴⁰

Saudi Arabia also provided a major support system for the Moroccan economy. In 1979, when Morocco's war costs exceeded 40% of its state budget, Saudi Arabia began its economic aid to ease the burden.¹⁴¹ Throughout the war, Saudi Arabia gave about \$1

¹³⁵Yahia Zoubir, *International Dimensions of the Western Saharan Conflict*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 152.

¹³⁶Yahia Zoubir, *International Dimensions of the Western Saharan Conflict*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 155.

¹³⁷ Leo Kamil, *Fueling the Fire: U.S. Policy and the Western Sahara Conflict*, (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1987), 70.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 72.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 73.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 83.

¹⁴¹ "War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara," *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

billion a year in aid to Morocco.¹⁴² Saudi Arabia's reasoning was similar to that of the U.S. It saw a weakening Morocco succumbing to a guerilla non-state actor.

Ultimately, Morocco's inability to quickly defeat the Polisario opened the door for foreign economic interventions. In summary, the U.S. provided material goods, the French issued training and intelligence, and the Saudis heavily financed the Moroccan military.¹⁴³

Moroccan Capabilities: Before and After

In 1975, the Moroccan army consisted of 60,000 troops. However, by just 1978, this size went over 80,000 troops, 61 combat planes, armored tanks, and helicopters.¹⁴⁴ In 1979, the army consisted of 120,000 troops. In 1978, the military budget was \$760 million.¹⁴⁵ In the initial onset of the conflict, Morocco quickly took over all Western Saharan settlements and outposts, hoping to remove any form of cover available to the Polisario. Although there was initial success in disorganizing the Polisario, the guerilla group quickly regrouped and strategized. Soon enough, the Polisario used their anti-missile technology (from Algeria and Libya) to shoot down Moroccan planes. On top of that, their knowledge of the terrain made it extremely difficult for Moroccan troops to

¹⁴² Erik Jensen, *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 25.

¹⁴³ "War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara," *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

¹⁴⁴ John Mercer, *The Sahrawis of Western Sahara*, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1979), 12.

¹⁴⁵ "War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara," *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

locate and disband them.¹⁴⁶ The Moroccan military had to refocus on defense fortifications.¹⁴⁷

Due to the weapons technology Morocco received, the U.S. ambassador to Morocco and the Institute for Strategic Studies both predicted that the desert terrain would allow for a rapid COIN campaign. In other words, Morocco would easily be able to defeat and disband the Polisario.¹⁴⁸ This prediction was not unsupported. Morocco had a larger military, more advanced weapons, and richer foreign supporters.¹⁴⁹ However, Western Saharan terrain was actually amenable to guerilla activities due to good cover and areas for small bases. Moroccan COIN became extremely ineffective. Even with infrared technology given by the U.S. and France, the issues of poor training, particle haze, and not being able to cover remote outposts forced the Moroccans into a defensive position. Instead of seeking out the Polisario through desert operations, the Moroccans focused on the “useful triangle” between El Aaiun, Smara and Bukra. However, Polisario attacks became quite dangerous. By 1977, Moroccan casualties included 4,200 dead, 2,800 wounded, and 96 imprisoned. In order to take a somewhat offensive position, Moroccan began using mechanized army units and air power in 1979.¹⁵⁰ However, air attacks produced less-than-satisfactory results due to the Polisario’s anti-aircraft

¹⁴⁶ John Mercer, *The Sahrawis of Western Sahara*, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1979), 11.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴⁸ “War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified May 2013, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf>.

¹⁴⁹ Suresh Saxena, *Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle*, (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1995), 169.

¹⁵⁰ Yahia Zoubir, *International Dimensions of the Western Saharan Conflict*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 151.

technology and training. By 1981, Morocco only controlled 10% of the Western Sahara territory.

From 1982 to 1991, Morocco built a series of walls called “The Berm.” It encircled about 200,000 km² of the 260,000 km² of the Western Sahara, forcing the Polisario to conduct concentrated attacks on the wall. The wall became extremely costly and only furthered a long war of attrition. By building the wall, Morocco had almost accepted that the conflict would conclude with a long-awaited stalemate.

The costs of the war put a heavy burden on the Moroccan economy. By 1983, Morocco was spending \$1.9 billion a year on the conflict and maintain over 100,000 troops just in the Western Sahara territory. This number turned to \$1 million a day in 1987.¹⁵¹ In 1984, Moroccan debt reached over \$13 billion. The IMF even rescheduled debt payments, Morocco cut subsidies for basic foods, welfare, infrastructure, public investment, and had devalue its currency.¹⁵² According to the 1981 World Bank report, about 40% of the Moroccan population was living below poverty.¹⁵³ Moreover, Morocco’s phosphate exports declined dramatically. Due to Polisario mine attacks, investors became reluctant to input their capital. The mining industry was only uplifted through U.S. investment.¹⁵⁴

Soaring security expenditures, the phosphate export collapse, increased cost of fuel imports, and rising food imports brought on widespread protests in 1981 and 1984,

¹⁵¹ Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa’s Last Colony*, (London: Zed Books, 2004), 54.

¹⁵² Richard Lawless, *War and Refugees: The Western Sahara Conflict*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1987), 77.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁵⁴ Suresh Saxena, *The Liberation War in Western Sahara*, (New Delhi: Vidya Publishers, 1981), 66.

with mostly antiwar propaganda.¹⁵⁵ However, Morocco was only able to continue on financing the conflict through gifts from Saudi Arabia and weapon loans from the U.S.¹⁵⁶ With foreign economic support, the Moroccan military was able to attain 524 tanks, 785 carriers, and 2000 artillery by the 1990s.¹⁵⁷ Ultimately, Morocco would not economically been able to continue the conflict with the Polisario if it was not for its rich and invested interveners.

The Impact of Interventions

In many cases of extra-state war, military and economic interventions overlap, making it extremely difficult to isolate the effect of each type of intervention. However, the Western Sahara War had relatively limited military intervention when compared to the excessive instances of economic intervention. On the side of the Polisario, Algeria engaged in two small-scale skirmishes at the start of the conflict. This intervention was not even planned or intentional, but arose more out of spontaneous conflict between Moroccan and Algerian troops. Morocco entered the war in a coalition with Mauritania, but Mauritania left the conflict in three years. Even in those three years, Mauritania committed a relatively low number of troops and material resources. On top of that, their involvement was largely supported by the French. Both these interventions were limited and did not extensively alter the military capabilities of the either actor. The Algerian

¹⁵⁵ Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War*, (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1984), 294.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 78.

¹⁵⁷ Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony*, (London: Zed Books, 2004), 194.

skirmishes did not enhance or limit the Polisario's ability to wage a guerilla war against Moroccan troops.

In the Moroccan-Mauritanian case, Mauritania's intervention forced the Polisario to initially focus their attacks on them rather than on the Moroccans. In that sense, Morocco was able to buy time from 1976 to 1979 while not facing the brunt of the Polisario attacks. The two-front war temporally extended Morocco's ability to wage a longer war with the Polisario. It did not have to expend as many resources or lose as many troops while the Polisario concentrated their efforts against Mauritania.

What these military interventions have in common is that they brought in economic interventions. Algeria became more firm in its campaign against Morocco after seeing how the skirmishes in Amgala turned out. Mauritania's weakness brought on French support. Moreover, when Mauritania signed the peace agreement, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia saw a weak Morocco in much need of military and financial aid. The seemingly endless flow of aid made it impossible for either side to achieve a military solution, eventually leading to a stalemate.¹⁵⁸ The economic interventions increased the ability to wage war without shortening the duration. This could be attributed to the idea that all the powers involved preferred an endless war to a solution where the other side comes out stronger. Consequently, foreign powers continued to give more and more assistance to persuade the other side to surrender. This, in essence, led to a regional arms race between the Polisario and Morocco, prolonging the conflict.¹⁵⁹ Each side was able to

¹⁵⁸ Yahia Zoubir, *International Dimensions of the Western Saharan Conflict*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 164.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 165.

obtain the resources to continue the conflict. In other words, they did not face enough economic pressure to actively seek some sort of settlement. It was only in the late 1980s, when the conflict was no longer considered a war due to the low intensity, that the two sides realized how the conflict had exhausted their resources and capabilities.

In the Western Sahara case, military intervention inadvertently brought on economic intervention. Although the military intervention itself did not extensively alter the paradigm of the conflict, it allowed for economic interventions to raise the capabilities of both sides. With higher military capabilities, both actors felt less pressure to compromise and continued fighting in hopes of getting a settlement that would solely benefit them.

In other words, this case supports the hypothesis that an equitable distribution of military interventions increases war duration. In the Western Saharan case, military intervention brought on economic support. The economic support increased the capabilities of both sides, making it seem like each side could achieve their initial goals. Hence, the conflict continued without any real attempt at compromise.

The Cisplatine War, 1825-1828

The Cisplatine War took place from 1825 to 1828 and was initially between Brazil and a small guerilla group from Buenos Aires called the 33 Orientals. This conflict was over a contested territory called La Banda Oriental (later to become Uruguay). Due to the low intensity level of violence, this conflict on its own could not be considered a war. However, this conflict sparked a larger militarized conflict between the United Provinces of the River Plate (later to become Argentina) and Brazil. The war ended in 1828 due to British mediation.

In 1825, the United Provinces of the River Plate was not an internationally recognized state and was, more accurately, a loose confederation of provinces.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, the Cisplatine War falls under the extra-state categorization because it was a conflict between a system member (the Empire of Brazil) and a non-system member (The United Provinces of the River Plate).

The Cisplatine War was chosen to test hypothesis 4: diplomatic intervention by an international organization or neutral third party will decrease duration. This case falls under the Estimating Longitudinal group. There is no previous quantitative data support or rejecting this hypothesis and the case focuses mostly on the independent variable of diplomatic intervention. The Cisplatine War does not have clear evidence of influential, external military and economic intervention. Therefore, the characteristics of this case

¹⁶⁰ “The Effects of War on the Economy of the United Provinces,” *History of Argentine Foreign Relations*, last modified 2000, <http://www.argentina-rree.com/3/3-029.htm>.

will make it simpler to understand the relationship between diplomatic intervention and extra-state war duration.

According to Slantchev and Cunningham, a third party facilitates an exchanging of information, decreasing the degree of uncertainty. In essence, the third party becomes a channel to exchange and negotiate information.¹⁶¹ However, it is also important to note that the character of the third party is vital. The third party needs to be a state or organization that is legitimate and powerful in the eyes of the actors. In the Cisplatine War, the British diplomatic intervention was successful in shortening the duration of the war because both actors were economically dependent on Great Britain.

Historical Overview

The border between Portuguese Brazil and the Spanish Empire had been contentious since the 1680s. By the 18th century, Portugal had occupied most of the Banda Oriental, while Spain developed small towns in the region like Montevideo. In the early 1800s, Jose Gervasio Artigas led a war of independence for the region for almost a decade. However, in 1821, a questionable referendum gave control of the land to Brazil. The United Provinces of the River Plate (UPRP) never accepted those results.

In 1825, one of Artigas' former lieutenants, Juan Antonio Lavalleja led an expedition with 33 "Orientals" from Buenos Aires to the Banda Oriental.¹⁶² Lavalleja

¹⁶¹ Branislav Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (2004).

David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* onlinefirst, (2009).

¹⁶² Peter Henderson, "Border Wars in South America during the 19th Century," *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*, last modified August 2016,

waged war on April 19, 1825 and gathered 200 more men from Buenos Aires within a few days.¹⁶³ Fructoso Rivera, another former lieutenant, along with 500 men, later joined him. As they spread their way into the Banda Oriental, they gathered thousands of supporters.¹⁶⁴ Within six months, they controlled a large section of the region with only Montevideo and Colonia still under Brazilian rule.¹⁶⁵

On August 25, 1825, they organized the Uruguayn Assembly, which voted to denounce Brazilian rule, and opted for either independence or joining the UPRP. Prior to this event, the UPRP was too decentralized with almost no army or navy to speak of in order to give open support to the rebels. However, Buenos Aires became an unofficial base for supplying volunteers, munitions, and supplies.¹⁶⁶ Through private donations from wealthy families in Buenos Aires, the rebels received 16,000 pesos within the first couple of months of their expedition.¹⁶⁷

However, the UPRP was witnessing dramatic expansions in foreign investment and commerce with about 2 million pounds in trade a year. Half of this was just with Great Britain.¹⁶⁸ With Brazilian militarization in the Banda Oriental, the UPRP began making plans for precautious military expansion while still maintaining a policy of

<http://latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-36>.

¹⁶³ Brian Vale, *A War Betwixt Englishmen: Brazil Against Argentina on the River Plate*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 3.

¹⁶⁴ Marvin Alisky, *Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1969), 20.

¹⁶⁵ Brian Vale, *A War Betwixt Englishmen: Brazil Against Argentina on the River Plate*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 3.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁶⁷ John Street, *Artigas and the Emancipation of Uruguay*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 341.

¹⁶⁸ Brian Vale, *A War Betwixt Englishmen: Brazil Against Argentina on the River Plate*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 6.

neutrality.¹⁶⁹ Seeing this, Brazil began making plans for a blockade of Buenos Aires stirring up further animosities from the UPRP. The UPRP reversed its policy of neutrality, applauded the Uruguayan Assembly, and welcomed them into the United Provinces.¹⁷⁰ Ultimately, Brazil, armed with the strongest navy in the Americas at that time, declared war on the UPRP on December 10, 1825.¹⁷¹ The many battles that erupted in the Banda Oriental usually did not have a clear winner. The UPRP was standing its own for much of the war, creating a military stalemate between the two powers.¹⁷² At the same time, Brazil was maintaining a very successful blockade on the port of Buenos Aires, only allowing neutral vessels access at the end of 1826.¹⁷³ Prices in the UPRP skyrocketed as the blockade strangled the economy. In response, the UPRP issued about 118 privateering licenses between 1826 and 1827, allowing individual privateers to attack and loot Brazilian ships.¹⁷⁴

Foreign traders made it known that they were unhappy with the trade restrictions. Privateering had to be put on hold at the peak of its success because of the complaints received about foreign ships being attacked and looted.¹⁷⁵ As both the UPRP's and Brazil's population felt the effects of a wartime economy, public skirmishes and revolts became commonplace. As Brazil was trying to handle the UPRP, the Oriental rebels took

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 7.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 11.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 12.

¹⁷² Ibid., 24.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 85.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 97.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 197.

advantage of the unoccupied theatre of war and took control of most of the Banda Oriental by 1827.¹⁷⁶

The UPRP understood that a military stalemate would only deplete its resource even further. In 1827, it sent MJ Garcia to Rio de Janeiro in hopes of an armistice with an independent Banda Oriental. However, negotiations failed as Brazil was adamant about keeping the region.¹⁷⁷ This failure resulted in the emergence of a new UPRP government under the decentralization-favoring Federalist Party.¹⁷⁸

Brazil, also feeling the economic effects of the war, tried to accelerate the conflict in 1827 by tightening the blockade, capturing, and destroying privateer ships.¹⁷⁹ However, these actions only exacerbated foreign grievances. Ultimately, the British negotiated a peace agreement on August 27, 1828, known as the Treaty of Montevideo. This agreement granted the Banda Oriental independence from both powers, allowing it to develop into the state of Uruguay.¹⁸⁰

Capabilities and Costs

At the start of the conflict, Brazil had a presence of about 6000 troops in the Banda Oriental. Montevideo hosted 2500 troops, Colonia had about 1100, and 1500 men

¹⁷⁶ John Street, *Artigas and the Emancipation of Uruguay*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 354.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 352.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 353.

¹⁷⁹ Brian Vale, *A War Betwixt Englishmen: Brazil Against Argentina on the River Plate*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 200.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 209.

were dispersed through the region.¹⁸¹ After the “Orientals” began attacking Brazilian bases and regiments, Brazil sent about ten gunboats/schooners along with armed ships carrying 1200 more troops.¹⁸² On top of that, the Brazilian navy was composed of about 65 fighting vessels, 690 guns, 21 launches, 74 gunships, 6 frigates, 18 brigs, 19 schooners, and 16 small gunboats.¹⁸³

In comparison, the “Orientals” numbered around a few thousand individuals by the end of 1826 with only basic guns and bayonets for defense. Despite the capability gap, the insurgency group outperformed Brazil’s military, leading to a military stalemate in the Banda Oriental.¹⁸⁴ The “Orientals” had greater knowledge of the terrain and were able to rally the rural population, making it difficult for the Brazilians to distinguish between civilian and combatant. By 1827, the “Orientals” controlled the entire region except for Montevideo and Colonia.

Another reason for the stalemate was Brazil’s divided attention between the “Orientals” and the UPRP’s professional military. In 1825, the UPRP had barely an army or navy to speak of. However, it began making plans to expand its military in order to further consolidate the federation. In 1825, the UPRP began making plans to purchase six

¹⁸¹ Brian Vale, *A War Betwixt Englishmen: Brazil Against Argentina on the River Plate*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 3.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁸⁴ Peter Henderson, “Border Wars in South America during the 19th Century,” *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*, last modified August 2016, <http://latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-36>.

gunboats and three frigates. By 1826, it had purchased 11 gunboats for port defense of Buenos Aires.¹⁸⁵

The UPRP knew that the only way to defend against the Brazilian blockade was through utilizing a strong navy. It spent nearly 4.5 million pesos on rebuilding the navy, where half of that money was used just to buy ships. The central government was attempting to use the war to consolidate power. In the February of 1826, the government set up a presidential magistracy even though the official republic did not exist yet. President Rivadavia spearheaded the consolidation movement but soon ran into economic barriers. The UPRP's government income was about 1.2 million pesos a year. However, the war was costing the government 600,000 pesos a month. Most of the costs were taken on by Buenos Aires, but the government also issued excessive banknotes and decreased cash backing. Coupled with the blockade, these actions led to high inflation rates and skyrocketed prices. Food shortages soon became commonplace.¹⁸⁶ The Argentinian Civil War could trace its origins to this era due to the extreme conflict between centralists and federalists over what direction the federation should take in terms of consolidation.¹⁸⁷

Although Brazil already had a strong navy to begin with, the costs of war also took a toll on the country. The privateering attacks severely hurt Brazilian trade. Consequently, Brazilians were having a harder time paying for everyday goods. Due to

¹⁸⁵ Brian Vale, *A War Betwixt Englishmen: Brazil Against Argentina on the River Plate*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 24.

¹⁸⁶ "The Effects of War on the Economy of the United Provinces," *History of Argentine Foreign Relations*, last modified 2000, <http://www.argentina-rree.com/3/3-029.htm>.

¹⁸⁷ John Street, *Artigas and the Emancipation of Uruguay*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 351.

the lack of resources, skirmishes became monthly occurrences as public opinion on the war dropped.

For the first, two years of the war, Pedro I proved inflexible on the war, arguing that the nation's honor would not allow him to retreat from the Cisplatine province. However, with the onslaught of public protests, he began to waver in his determination for the Banda Oriental.¹⁸⁸ The UPRP sent MJ Garcia in 1827 to find an end to the war, but due to miscommunication and resolve to not appear weak in front of their adversary, the peace agreement fell through.

British Diplomatic Intervention

The war ended when the British drafted the Treaty of Montevideo on August 27, 1828 asking both actors to withdraw from the Banda Oriental region and allow self-determination. Their economic interests and their need to maintain an advantageous position in both nations by preserving a balance of power mostly spurred the British.¹⁸⁹ British trade with Brazil was around 2.6 million pounds annually, while its trade with the UPRP was around 1 million pounds annually.¹⁹⁰ The blockade, privateering, and consequent effects of both nations' economies severely damaged British trade

¹⁸⁸ Peter Henderson, "Border Wars in South America during the 19th Century," *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*, last modified August 2016, <http://latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-36>.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ Brian Vale, *A War Betwixt Englishmen: Brazil Against Argentina on the River Plate*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 166.

connections. In 1828, both nations were still stuck in their stalemate, without the proper communication lines to compromise.

Apart from trade, the British had other connections to the two nations. In the UPRP, there was a British community of 3000 individuals who settled in the region due to commercial opportunities, good wages, cheap cost of living, and religious tolerance.¹⁹¹ In Brazil, one-third of the naval officers were British, due to the shortage of skilled Brazilians.¹⁹² On top of that, Great Britain enjoyed a special place in Brazilian politics because the Portugal court sailed under British protection to Brazil during the Napoleonic wars.¹⁹³

The British were pivotal in ending the war because both the UPRP and Brazil had an incentive to listen to the British. Moreover, although both sides wanted to end the war, there was too much discord, animosity, and fear of public uproar for these nations to actively seek out peace. They both invested three years into the conflict, and felt that the war would be worthless if they did not come out with the Banda Oriental. The British, as an economic superior, were able to end the conflict by not allowing either side to gain the Banda Oriental. By doing this, the British minimized the potential for future conflict over the region, while also creating a buffer state between the two nations.

Ultimately, the diplomatic intervention by the British was effective because Great Britain was a nation that both the UPRP and Brazil had an incentive to please. Moreover,

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 6.

¹⁹² Ibid., 16.

¹⁹³ John Street, *Artigas and the Emancipation of Uruguay*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 355.

the clauses of the agreement made it that neither nation truly won or lost, maintaining national honor on both sides.

Conclusion and Counterfactuals

The Cisplatine case was analyzed to test whether diplomatic intervention shortens war duration. This case does support that hypothesis. However, the question is whether the conflict would have ended around the same time even without British intervention.

From the state of their economies, and their political turmoil, both nations wanted the war to end soon. Brazil was even tightening the blockade in order to accelerate and finish off the war. That being said, if the UPRP and Brazil had to negotiate on the Banda Oriental by themselves, a peace agreement would have taken much longer to form. They needed a neutral third party like the British to almost coerce them through soft power into finalizing an agreement. Neither side wanted to give up the Banda Oriental, a territory they spent three years fighting for. However, British mediation made it that neither side could get that territory, and therefore maintaining a balance of power. On top of that, British involvement ensured that neither side could break the tenants of the treaty without facing consequences from Great Britain. By having an economically and militarily more powerful nation keeping a check on the situation, the conflict would have a much harder time to re-emerge.

Great Britain served as a legitimate negotiation channel for Brazil and the UPRP. Without it, both sides would have continued to fight until they exhausted their resources. At the time of the diplomatic intervention, both sides were not in too dire of

circumstances that they would have ended the war right there and then. It was through British-aided negotiations that they were able to end the conflict at the time that they did. In terms of Slantchev's and Cunningham's argument, Great Britain allowed the two sides to exchange and negotiate information that they would not have been able to exchange before. It is through this mechanism that the Cisplatine War support the hypothesis that diplomatic intervention shortens war duration.

Mozambican War of Independence, 1964-1975

The Mozambican War of Independence took place from 1964 to 1975. This conflict was between Portugal and guerilla group known as the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) over the fate of independence for Mozambique. Out of the three cases being analyzed in this paper, this case is the only case of a “colonial” war. Portugal, the colonizer state, fought a non-state actor (FRELIMO) in its colony, Mozambique. This war did not have any significant military or diplomatic intervention. However, each side attracted substantial economic support/intervention throughout the duration of the war. The war ultimately ended in a negotiated agreement for Mozambique’s independence in 1975.

This case was chosen to test hypothesis 5: economic support for either side of the conflict will increase duration. Although the Western Saharan War touched on the effects of economic intervention, it did not isolate economic intervention. The Mozambican War of Independence case is within the Estimating Longitudinal group. Apart from the Western Saharan case, there is no empirical data in this paper so far to support or reject hypothesis 5. I chose the Mozambique case in order to focus on the independent variable of economic intervention. As previously mentioned, there were no significant instances of military or diplomatic intervention, making it simpler to isolate and concentrate on the effect of economic intervention.

In other words, the analysis of this case is assessing whether economic support has an effect on war duration, and through what mechanisms it might have an effect. In line with Vasquez, any form of wartime alliances, including economic alliances, would

result in longer wars. This is due to the pooling of resources, which reduces the cost of war preparations for the actors in the conflict.¹⁹⁴ Similarly, Elbadawi argues that external interventions increase the duration of a war by reducing the cost of coordinating or fighting the opponent.¹⁹⁵ Although these two researchers focused on mostly military interventions, the same rationale applies for economic interventions. When actors in a conflict receive economic aid, their ability to continue fighting is increased, allowing them to pursue their original war goals rather than opting for compromise. Their military capability is indirectly boosted through loans, financing, and arms sales. The increased capability translates into continuing the conflict until one actor reaches their goals or runs out of steam.

In the case of the Mozambican War of Independence, economic support plays a vital role in the duration of the conflict. FRELIMO, an initially small and unequipped guerilla group, depended on foreign arms and training to launch successful attacks on the Portuguese. Similarly, Portugal, under economic constraints, needed loans to finance this war while maintaining economic development back home. Without economic support, neither side would have had the resources to organize an effective or long-lasting campaign.

¹⁹⁴ John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

¹⁹⁵ Ibrahim Elbadawi, "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 2433 (2000).

Historical Overview

Mozambique had been a colony of Portugal since the 1500s after Vasco de Gama rounded the cape of Africa. For many centuries, Portugal treated Mozambique as an overseas province useful as a trade partner and a setting to produce goods.¹⁹⁶ However, this translated into a repressive regime for native Mozambicans. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mozambique was not immune to the wave of nationalist and independence movements sweeping Africa and Asia. Several nationalist groups had coexisted for a quite a number of years by this period. In 1962, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) formed under President Mondlane as a coalition amongst already existing nationalist groups.¹⁹⁷ Some of the participating groups were the Mozambique National Democratic Union, the Mozambique Independence Union, and the Mozambique African National Union.¹⁹⁸ This group formed in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania due to the strict and repressive regime in Mozambique.¹⁹⁹ Mondlane hoped the coalition would represent a united front, pool resources, and coordinate military efforts. These would be the key to victory.²⁰⁰

Already embroiled in an unexpected independence war in Angola, Portugal began making military preparations in Mozambique as soon as FRELIMO began forming. From 1961 to 1964, the Portuguese army in Mozambique grew from 4,000 units to 35,000 units. They patrolled the Tanzanian border and frontier, created landing strips, and mortar

¹⁹⁶ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 99.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 170.

¹⁹⁸ Jeremy Weinstein, "Mozambique: A Fading UN Story," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002).

¹⁹⁹ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 168.

²⁰⁰ Jeremy Weinstein, "Mozambique: A Fading UN Story," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002).

placements.²⁰¹ Mozambique was a key gateway to the economic development and potential residing in Rhodesia, Zambia, and Malawi.²⁰² In September of 1964, FRELIMO began its attack with raids. Although materially prepared, Portugal was expecting a raid from across the Tanzanian border. Instead, FRELIMO began their attacks from within Mozambique using guerilla tactics. They ambushed patrols, sabotaged communications and then faded into the Makonde highlands where they would receive food and information on government maneuvers. FRELIMO's initial successes encouraged smaller raids into southern district, diverting troops from the northern region.²⁰³ Soon enough, FRELIMO controlled the northern regions of Mozambique or about one-fifth of the land.²⁰⁴

FRELIMO was not looking for a military victory. Rather, they aimed for a war of attrition in order to make the war costly enough for Portugal to negotiate independence.²⁰⁵ The first four years of the conflict saw FRELIMO success and Portuguese disorganization. However, by the late 1960s, FRELIMO'S success slowed down. Portuguese resistance and a unique resettlement program made recruitment and guerilla tactics difficult.²⁰⁶ Moreover, Mondlane was killed in 1969, leading to chaos amongst the leadership of FRELIMO. There was intense discussion on whether FRELIMO should take on an ideological direction.²⁰⁷ Prior to this, Mondlane strayed

²⁰¹ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 185.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 206.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 187.

²⁰⁴ Drew Thompson, "Visualizing FRELIMO's Liberated Zones in Mozambique, 1962-1974," *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies*, published online (2013).

²⁰⁵ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 187.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 190.

²⁰⁷ Jeremy Weinstein, "Mozambique: A Fading UN Story," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002).

away from ideology in order to garner support from both the East and West, while forging a wide coalition.²⁰⁸ A lack of funds, uncertainty over leadership, a large Portuguese counteroffensive, and difficulties in consolidation all contributed to FRELIMO's declining success.²⁰⁹

The new leadership was conspicuously left-leaning and socialist. This sharpened agenda prompted an intensified military campaign, eventually attracting Chinese and Soviet involvement.²¹⁰ Prior to this, FRELIMO only received a small number of arms and training from Algeria and Egypt.²¹¹ This new support from China and the Soviet Union bolstered FRELIMO and gave it new life.²¹² On the other side of the conflict, Portugal had been receiving NATO, US, French, and South African support for a couple years by now. It is with their training, arms, and loans that Portugal was able to effectively execute the counterinsurgency tactics that slowed FRELIMO down.²¹³

However, the economic toll the three wars (Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau) were taking on Portugal had consequences. A fervent antiwar movement and internal discontent developed within Portugal due to war weariness, hatred of the Caetano dictatorship, and socioeconomic hardships. On top of that, Portugal was dealing with a collapsing military position by the early 1970s. It was unable to contain the guerillas in remote regions and could not protect white civilians.²¹⁴ FRELIMO was an unstoppable

²⁰⁸ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 173.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 192.

²¹⁰ Jeremy Weinstein, "Mozambique: A Fading UN Story," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002).

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 200.

²¹² Luis B. Serapiao and A. El-Khawas, *Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1975), 47.

²¹³ Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, (London: Zed Press, 1983), 144.

²¹⁴ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 219.

force as it spread southward. Ultimately, Portugal agreed to begin talks on independence in February of 1974.²¹⁵ However, the negotiations did not end the violence. FRELIMO captured cities like Murrumbala during the talks, plummeting army morale.²¹⁶ Unsurprisingly, Caetano was overthrown in Portugal in April of 1974.²¹⁷ With new Portuguese leadership, the negotiations were sped up, leading to Mozambican independence on June 25, 1975.²¹⁸ However, the new country would soon enter a bloody and long civil war.²¹⁹

Impact of Interventions

Prior to the start of the conflict, FRELIMO was receiving support from a handful of African and Middle Eastern countries. Tanzania acted as the host country for FRELIMO, offering it refuge, financial aid, training grounds, and a channel to request outside assistance.²²⁰ Without Tanzania, FRELIMO would have had a much harder time forming and consolidating its members. By June 1963, FRELIMO began preparations for its raids. With a starting number of 250 men in Mozambique, FRELIMO began to send recruits to Algeria and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) for guerilla training.²²¹ Algeria and Egypt also provided a small number of arms to get FRELIMO

²¹⁵ Ibid., 218.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 220.

²¹⁷ George Houser and Herb Shore, *Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom*, (Africa Fund, 1975), 62.

²¹⁸ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 224.

²¹⁹ Jason Sumich and Joao Honwana, "Strong Party, Weak State? Frelimo and State Survival through the Mozambican Civil War: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making," *Crisis States Research Centre*, last modified December 2007,

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp232.pdf>.

²²⁰ Luis B. Serapiao and A. El-Khawas, *Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1975), 271.

²²¹ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 186.

started in its pursuit for independence.²²² FRELIMO's determination to battle its colonizer triggered recent memories for Tanzania, Algeria, and Egypt. Their assistance was their method of showing support for anti-colonial movements across Africa.

From the guerilla training in Algeria and knowledge of the terrain, FRELIMO started off their raids with relative success with rising Portuguese casualties.²²³ Their mission for independence coupled with this success made recruitment easier.²²⁴ From only 250 men in 1964, FRELIMO grew to 2000 by 1965, 8000 by 1967, and 10,000 by 1969.²²⁵ However, within a couple years, Portugal developed stronger counterinsurgency tactics, slowing FRELIMO's southward movement.²²⁶ During this time, Mondlane sought out diplomacy and propaganda. He aimed to get a wider audience and engender legitimacy by printing bulletins, hosting tours for journalists, and making visits to foreign states, all while remaining ideologically unshackled.²²⁷ Algeria acted as a distribution center for propaganda as well as a transit point between Tanzania and Europe for FRELIMO members.²²⁸ However, Mondlane's death and the rising costs of this war caught up to FRELIMO. It is at this point that FRELIMO leaders begin looking

²²² Thomas Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1975*, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1983), 184.

²²³ Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, (London: Zed Press, 1983), 140.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 139.

²²⁵ George Houser and Herb Shore, *Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom*, (Africa Fund, 1975), 36-38.

²²⁶ Thomas Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1975*, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1983), 184.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 182.

²²⁸ Drew Thompson, "Visualizing FRELIMO's Liberated Zones in Mozambique, 1962-1974," *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies*, published online (2013).

elsewhere for assistance. Seeing FRELIMO's leftward movement, China begins sending advisers to train recruits in Tanzania.²²⁹

By the early 1970s, FRELIMO was receiving Chinese, Russian, and Czech weaponry along with key guerilla training from the Chinese. Chinese training involved small arms tactics and explosive effectiveness.²³⁰ For example, Chinese advisers instructed FRELIMO to scale down their units to six men in what was called "tactics of the ants." This small unit size allowed FRELIMO to increase the number of raids, while diminishing vulnerability to retaliation.²³¹ The Soviets provided AK 47s, 122 mm rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft machine guns.²³² By the early 1970s, the individual guerilla fighter was more equipped than the individual Portuguese soldier.²³³

The training and weapons the Soviet Union and China provided increased FRELIMO's effectiveness dramatically. They were able to control most of the northern regions of Mozambique and eventually make their way down south to capture other major cities. Their recruitment increased due to this success. By 1974, FRELIMO was composed of over 13,000 fighters and 25,000 party activists.²³⁴ Moreover, the Organization of African Unity began providing material and logistical support after witnessing FRELIMO's rise within Mozambique.²³⁵

²²⁹ Thomas Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1975*, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1983), 184.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 187.

²³¹ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 200-201.

²³² Thomas Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1975*, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1983), 186.

²³³ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 201.

²³⁴ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 202.

²³⁵ Luis B. Serapiao and A. El-Khawas, *Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1975), 280.

The economic support provided by Tanzania, Algeria, and Egypt were crucial in FRELIMO's development and initial success. This initial success brought the attention of bigger players such as China and the Soviet Union when FRELIMO needed it the most. Without the training and weaponry provided by these two countries, FRELIMO would have fallen victim to Portugal's COIN strategies and superior military. Therefore, the economic interventions on the side of FRELIMO allowed it to continue playing a major role in the conflict, and therefore elongating the conflict.

By the time Portugal got into the Mozambican Independence War, it was already fighting two independence movements in Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Prepared to fight FRELIMO, Portugal put about 70,000 men in Mozambique.²³⁶ However, unprepared for FRELIMO's guerilla raids and fighting three different wars put economic and military strain on Portugal. At the start of the conflict, Portugal did not have any armored vehicles in Mozambique and only had five aircrafts.²³⁷ In an attempt to militarily expand in Mozambique, Portugal poured money into increasing the number of soldiers. However, only a portion of the military presence could be used to fighting FRELIMO directly. Portugal had to use their soldiers to protect infrastructure and white towns. Actually, only about 30,000 of the 70,000 Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique were used in combat.²³⁸

The military campaigns began eating away almost half of the state's budget, which became increasingly more difficult to explain to citizens who demanded economic development.²³⁹ In addition, Portugal incited West Germany to set up bases in Portugal to

²³⁶ George Houser and Herb Shore, *Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom*, (Africa Fund, 1975), 36.

²³⁷ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 186.

²³⁸ George Houser and Herb Shore, *Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom*, (Africa Fund, 1975), 141.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 37.

fill the military gap left at home. This only weakened the regime's support base because it was allowing foreign military into its borders.²⁴⁰ Moreover, since FRELIMO had the advantage of choosing the time and place for raids, Portugal saw an increase in casualties in the first three years of the conflict with about 4000 dead.²⁴¹

Portuguese defense costs doubled between 1960 and 1970, forcing the government to impose higher taxes and increase importation of goods. By 1973, the war was costing Portugal \$70 million: a cost it just could not support on its own.²⁴²

From the mid-1960s, Portugal began receiving aid from NATO, the U.S., South Africa, and certain European countries due to the costliness of this war.²⁴³ NATO, through the UK, France, and the U.S., provided arms, training in COIN, and financing. This aid could not be used within Portugal's colonies. However, NATO aid freed up Portugal's military requirement in its own country, allowing it to use its resources in its colonies. South Africa, France, Germany also provided arms to Portugal's army in Mozambique.²⁴⁴ The U.S. gave about \$48 million in military aid between 1961 and 1968. After 1968, it continued to give \$5 million annually.²⁴⁵

By 1967, Portugal was receiving generous loans which it invested in its military in Mozambique.²⁴⁶ In fact, Portugal became extremely dependent on these loans because by 1968, about 49% of its annual budget went to the army. It was forced to borrow

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 142.

²⁴¹ Ibid., 141.

²⁴² Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 208.

²⁴³ Ibid., 187.

²⁴⁴ George Houser and Herb Shore, *Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom*, (Africa Fund, 1975), 144.

²⁴⁵ Thomas Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1975*, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1983), 174.

²⁴⁶ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1979), 204.

money. Internal debt rose by about 23% and foreign debt rose by almost 40%.²⁴⁷

Weakened by three wars, internal turmoil, and military ineffectiveness, Portugal would not have been able to continue the war without economic support. It did not have the resources on its own to support a military of 70,000 in Mozambique. With NATO and other allies, Portugal somehow managed to keep its budget intact (although stretched) for the many years of the war. In 1974, a coup and dire economic circumstances forced Portugal to accept FRELIMO's calls for independence. Without foreign support, Portugal most likely would have given into FRELIMO's demands years in advance.

Conclusion

The Mozambican War of Independence was almost dependent on economic support for both sides. This case does support the hypothesis that economic intervention, in the form of support, can increase the duration of an extra-state war. In this case, FRELIMO could not have formed nor gained its initial rise without the aid of certain African countries. It was only able to increase its military effectiveness and eventual success with economic support from China and the Soviet Union. Without any of this support, FRELIMO would have been defeated or become inconsequential within the first four years of the war. Portugal was in an unfavorable situation. It had to deal with three different wars of independence in its African colonies. Without NATO and ally support,

²⁴⁷ Luis B. Serapiao and A. El-Khawas, *Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1975), 246.

Portugal would have either given independence sooner or collapsed from economic overextension.

Much like Vasquez and Elbadawi argued, the reason economic intervention played such a pivotal role in this conflict is because it reduced the cost of fighting. This, in turn, allows the two actors to continue fighting for a longer period of time in hopes of achieving their original goal. Compromise becomes less desirable when there is a potential for winning completely. In the Mozambican case, after FRELIMO received Chinese and Soviet assistance, it truly believed it could achieve independence. Similarly, Portugal continued the conflict, with economic support, believing that it could crush the FRELIMO movement. If one of the sides could no longer find the resources to fight, which is what eventually happened with Portugal, we would have seen a call for negotiation much earlier on. Ultimately, the economic intervention in the Mozambican War of Independence increased the capabilities of both actors, and therefore, increased the duration of the war.

Conclusion

Although extra-state wars may not be as plentiful as interstate or intrastate wars, they have been numerous enough to warrant attention and discussion. The question driving this paper was how intervention factors in extra-state war duration. The goal of this research is twofold. On one hand, I hoped to understand whether intervention effects extra-state war duration and how it would do so. On the other hand, the study of extra-state war duration or extra-state wars in general is not exhausted. This research is meant to begin a debate on extra-state wars, and bring more research and understanding on the characteristics and variables involved with this type of war.

In terms of empirical evidence, the regression analysis focused on the first two hypotheses. These hypotheses were on how military intervention effects duration. The regression analysis supported one out of the two hypotheses. Overall, the analysis supported the idea that military intervention, regardless of which side it is on, is correlated with higher durations. However, since this regression analysis could only focus on military intervention and could only prove correlation, I also conducted three case studies.

The first case, the Western Saharan War, was chosen to test the hypothesis that military interventions on both sides of the conflict increases the duration. The second case, the Cisplatine War, tested whether diplomatic intervention decreases duration. Lastly, the third case, the Mozambican War of Independence, looked into whether economic support increases war duration. All three cases supported their respective hypotheses. It is important to note that these cases cannot singlehandedly prove their

hypotheses. Rather, they allowed me to locate potential causal mechanisms between intervention and war duration. For example, the Mozambican War of Independence showed that economic support increases war duration by reducing the cost of fighting.

This research has not definitively proved that certain types of intervention increase war duration and other types decrease it. Instead, it lends support to the previously outlined hypotheses and allows others to weigh in on the same matter. This topic has important policy implications. Political leaders need to address what their goals are when planning on an intervention. Do they want to make sure one side definitively wins or are they hoping to put an end to it? Depending on the answer to that question, they can decide on the type of intervention.

Further research is definitely needed for this topic. Would the results change if the intensity of the military intervention were accounted for? How would a survival analysis rather than a regression analysis affect the data? Moreover, how does a war like the Syrian Civil War fall into the typology of wars? Is it just an intrastate war or are there elements of interstate and extra-state conflict? These research questions show the potential breadth of this topic. Extra-state wars are prevalent enough to warrant more study.

Ultimately, this paper supports the hypothesis that intervention does factor into extra-state war duration. Intervention can be a tool or weapon for third parties to use and has pivotal implications for the arch of extra-state wars. Hopefully, state leaders are aware of the consequences of their interventions into future extra-state wars.

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