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INTRODUCTION

1. PROBLEM AND METHOD

One of the most difficult things to do is to treat a segment of Hegel's thought in isolation from his whole system. His works form an organic system and to isolate one section from the other is to be "abstract" and not "concrete." One of the purposes of this thesis is to analyze the way Hegel's philosophy of history fits into the rest of his system. But the main purpose is to ascertain what principle Hegel uses throughout his philosophy of history. Many summary sentences can be given of Hegel's principle and his definition of history. Among them are:

Universal History . . . is the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially.¹

The History of the World is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom.²

History is the exhibition of the divine, absolute development of Spirit in its highest forms -- that gradation by which it attains its truth and consciousness of itself.³

In terms of man,

The History of the World is the discipline of the uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into

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1. Hegel, PH, 18.
(This method of abbreviation in footnotes is essentially the following: last name of author, first letters of main words in title, and page number. Full material is to be found in the bibliography.)
 2. Ibid., 19.
 3. Ibid., 53.

obedience to a Universal principle and conferring subjective freedom.¹

In terms of God,

God governs the world; the actual working of his government -- the carrying out of his plan -- is the History of the World.²

For Hegel, "Reason is the Sovereign of the World. . . .

The history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process."³ The goal of that process is freedom, the continual unfolding and development of the highest capacities of Spirit as we find such in man who of all creatures alone possesses reason and self-consciousness.

All these abstract, incomplete definitions are well and good except that we cannot see the actual meaning of these words unless we understand their connection with his system and what the words mean when Hegel uses them.⁴ To understand them and to view some of their connections in his system is the purpose of Chapter I. This first chapter is an attempt to understand what Hegel means by "Reason," "Spirit," and "Freedom" and to find out just what is the principle operating in the historical process. The difficulty with this method is that the discussion will be somewhat abstract, and, accordingly, will do some injustice to Hegel. What Hegel insists upon

1. Hegel, PH, 104.
2. Ibid., 36.
3. Ibid., 9.
4. An excellent example of this is his use of the word "Freedom."

all through his philosophy of history is that his principle must be applicable to the empirical facts. This is another way of saying that for Hegel all universals are concrete universals and are incomplete until they are applied to the particulars. Or, rather, the particulars are contained in, and are an organic part of, the universal.

The purpose of the second chapter is to give these particulars, i. e. to show Hegel's application of his principle to the concrete facts of history. According to the Hegelian mode, the second chapter should be an organic part of the first chapter.

The third chapter will deal with some of the difficulties of Hegel's Philosophy of History.

2. THE SUBJECT: "PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY"

The philosophy of history in its broadest extension encompasses the questions who we are, where we are, and how we got this way. It might include man's reflection upon himself, his future, and his present position in the universe. But this might be applied to the whole field of philosophy and especially to metaphysics. Historically, the philosophy of history has been connected with metaphysics and with the attempt to discover an over-all plan behind the course of history. But this attempt is not the only role of the philosopher. The metaphysical implications of the thought of historians and, indeed, their speculation as to the historical

process itself, warrant a philosophical analysis. The selection, interpretation, and evaluation of historical facts entail assumptions pertaining to the nature of man, the world, and man's place in it. It could even be maintained that the rejection of any metaphysical implications whatsoever in historical interpretations entails a perspective which, when analyzed, reveals metaphysical implications. We need not deny these implications, thereby confusing the issue. We need only to make their bases as clear and coherent as possible.

Much of the strong reaction against a philosophy of history has come about by its connection with metaphysics and the "apriorism" of certain philosophical principles which have tended to misrepresent the historical facts.¹ But this criticism certainly does not invalidate all philosophies of history, for

not the principle of the philosophy of history but the way in which it is practiced is to be condemned. If the term is in bad repute, it is because of the use which has been made of it; the concept is still legitimate.²

To understand what the nature of the philosophy of history is, let us examine some of its functions. The first function we might look into is its metaphysical function. This is to "study the principles of historiography, and first of all, their background, their causes and underlying laws, their mean-

1. This is essentially W. Windelband's criticism of Hegel's history of philosophy. Cf. Windelband, HP, 612.

2. Berr and others, Art.(1932), 360.

ing and motivation."¹ The philosophy of history is performed in another way and that is to inquire into the nature and validity of historical knowledge. This function compares favorably with the Philosophy of Science. This is essential in any philosophy of history.

Without a philosophical critique of these epistemological and methodological problems it would be difficult to support the claim that the science of history can achieve a true phenomenal definition of history.²

The methodological and the metaphysical roles of philosophy cannot be separated. They go hand in hand in any analysis of a philosophy of history. This is especially true in the case of Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel's dialectical method is an integral part of his metaphysics and his philosophy of history is in organic connection with his metaphysics.³ Any consideration of Hegel's philosophy of history entails a consideration of this principle and the whole of which it is a part.

History, not "natural history," is what we are concerned about. Just as man is a social animal so is he a historical animal. "History" exists because of man. If there is a historical reality, it is because men understand each other and "establish their thoughts in collective works, their conduct in institutions, and benefit, at each instant, from the

1. Runes (ed.), DP, 137.

2. Lavelly, Art.(1951), 8.

3. See McTaggart, SHD, for a minute study of Hegel's dialectic principle.

collective acquisitions."¹ Also, social process itself is inextricably bound up in historical process. The philosopher must apply himself in "determining the proper character of historical ensembles: institutions, political systems, economic regimes, civilizations, and society as a whole."²

The philosophy of history is indeed broad but if we are going to consider history at all the necessity for interpretations of history is impossible to escape. Hegel realizes this as well as the difficulty in finding an adequate interpretation to account for all the "facts."³ Our present environment naturally restricts us in our interpretations. We must have a certain perspective. "We cannot ignore the human agency in history."⁴ But this acknowledgment of relativity does not destroy all possibilities of knowledge and judgment. Rather "it is the outcome of comprehensive knowledge, and the means to further knowledge of man's history."⁵ The tremendous amount of data gathered by the sociologists, anthropologists, and historians also makes interpretation necessary. The nature of these data forces upon us the admission of the impossibility of history and a philosophy of history becoming strictly scientific. But "history is more generally scientific in

1. Aron, Art.(1950), 306.

2. Ibid., 312. As to the problem of what kind of entities have histories, see Morton C. White's article "An Analytic Philosophy of History" in the same volume, 723.

3. Cf. Hegel, PM, 276f.

4. Muller, UP, 40.

5. Ibid., 48.

spirit as it takes into account the reasons why it cannot be utterly objective or strictly scientific in method."¹ One of the most apparent reasons why we cannot generalize about history with scientific certainty "is that we cannot isolate, measure, or grasp the multiple forces that determine it."²

All this is by way of a defense of a philosophy of history. But what of the course of history and the possibility of a full meaning being discovered behind the historical process. The question Hegel asks: What is the significance of the entire course of the world's history?

One of the most important concepts in the last three hundred years in the fields of physics, biology, psychology, and the philosophy of religion is the concept of process. We owe its greatest impetus to Hegel. He is the philosopher who has systematized history and given a philosophy of history which has brought into systematic combination the intellectual labor of two thousand years.³ His influence on future thinking was just as great.

3. THE INFLUENCE OF HEGEL⁴

The Hegelian thought and spirit has had a great impact upon subsequent thought. Bradley and Bosanquet may be numbered

1. Muller, UP, 35.

2. Ibid., 36.

3. Cf. Windelband, HP, 612.

4. The following section is based on E. S. Brightman's article on "Hegel's Influence in the Contemporary Social Situation," in the Crozer Quarterly, January, 1935.

among those who have been influenced by his logic. Marx and Engels have been influenced by Hegel's dialectical principle also. Neither Socialism nor Communism would be in its present form if it were not for Hegel. Facism also had one foot in Hegelianism. In the principle of the dialectic and the organic theory of society Hegel has had a strong influence, not to mention the strong neo-Hegelian movements in Italy (Croce and Gentile), in Germany (Glockner and Hoering), in Britain (T. H. Green, the Scotch school), and in America (the St. Louis school, Royce, Calkins, Creighton). Hegel enjoyed great influence during his own time also. In the philosophy of history, the study of Hegel is necessary to understand its later development in terms of those who followed him and those who reacted against his speculative philosophy of history. Despite these reactions against a speculative philosophy of history, Hegel does represent the first thorough and consistent philosophy of history.

4. THE PLACE OF HISTORY IN HEGEL'S SYSTEM

Logic or the science of the Idea forms a part of the triad, Logic, Nature, and Spirit. Nature is the idea's externalization and forms the antithesis. Spirit, or mental life, represents the synthesis and the return of Nature and the Idea to itself. Within Spirit we have another triad, subjective, objective, and absolute Spirit. History is treated in Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (or Spirit) under the title of "Universal History" in sections 548 - 552.¹ It is under the section entitled "The

1. Hegel, PM, 275.

State" which is the synthesis of Social Ethics which in turn is the synthesis of Objective Spirit.¹ The Philosophy of Right is another treatment of Objective Spirit and at the end of this book Hegel treats World History.² "History is mind [spirit] clothing itself with the forms of events or the immediate actuality of nature."³ We shall throughout this thesis use "Spirit" and "Mind" as synonymous and interchangeable.

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1. Cf. Hegel, PM, 7.
 2. Knox, HPR, 216.
 3. Ibid., 217.

CHAPTER I

THE PRINCIPLE OF HISTORY

1. TYPES OF HISTORIOGRAPHY

Hegel begins his introduction to the Philosophy of History with a consideration of some of the methods of treating history.

A. The first he calls "original history." Writers of original history merely describe the events which took place during the writers' own time. Herodotus and Thucydides are examples of this type of historiography. They change the happenings of their own day or period into objects for the conceptive faculty. The writer's spirit and the actions he describes are one and the same for both are contemporaneous. What they put into the speeches and the orations of their subjects are simply uncorrupted transcripts of their own intellectual and moral habits. Their aims, in the case of events, are to present the events to posterity as clearly as they themselves possessed the events through personal observations. These writers are limited by their subject matter and merely get a "glimpse of the great world through a miserable cranny."¹ In modern times, the memoir literature represents this type of historiography.

1. Hegel, PH, 4.

B. The second type of historiography is called the "reflective." The writer of reflective history is not limited to the time in which he narrates his story. On the contrary, he tries to transcend his own time; his spirit is other than the period he treats. Accordingly, he must depend upon sources. The Roman historian, Livy, is an example of this type. Hegel rightly maintains that a historian who tries to traverse long periods of time, or tries to be universal, must foreshorten its representations by abstractions.¹

1. "Pragmatic" (didactic) history writing is the first form of reflective history. Pragmatic historiography reverts to "similar" circumstances in the past for the purposes of moral or political teaching in the present. Hegel is quite against this attempt: "But what experience and history teach is this -- that peoples and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it."²

2. The second form of reflective history is the "Critical." These writers, prevalent in Hegel's own day, especially in the field of philology, concern themselves with an investigation into the truth and credibility of historical literature

1. Hegel, PH, 5.

2. Ibid., 6. What Hegel is against here, though, seems to be the taking of these past examples and literally following the example. "It is only a thorough, liberal, comprehensive view of historical relations" that can be of use. (Cf. Ibid., 6-7).

This passage quoted in the text itself also gives an indication of Hegel's negative attitude toward the possibilities of historical prediction. He is mainly interested in explaining the past rationally.

and historical facts. Hegel criticizes the extremes to which his contemporaries have gone in "putting subjective fancies in the place of historical data."¹

3. The last form of reflective history is the "Abstract." For Hegel, it forms a transition to what he considers the important type of historical analysis: the Philosophical. Abstract historiography is the history of the specific sciences and special fields, e.g. the history of music, law, etc. Hegel asks an important question on this point: Are these various abstract histories which the historian gathers internally or externally related to each other? Are they merely peculiar and accidental expressions of a nation or do they constitute "an inward guiding soul" of the occurrences and actions that occupy a nation's annals? Any knowledge of Hegel's thought would tell us that he maintains that they are internally related. His insistence upon synoptic and organic principles tells us he is looking for an inward guiding soul in historical processes. This brings us to the third type of historiography. C. It is the task of the Philosophical historian to take the historical material and weld it into a coherent story. "The most general definition that can be given, is, that the Philosophy of History means nothing but the thoughtful con-

1. Hegel, PH, 7. Many examples of this could be cited today. The argument over the actual authorship of Shakespeare's plays presents an example of this. It seems to this writer that the argument has been reduced to this: Shakespeare did not write the Shakespearian plays. Someone exactly like him did only he had a different name.

sideration of it."¹ It is not the task of the Philosophy of History to amass the facts or collect the data but to obtain rational insight into their meaning and significance. This is true of any science based upon experience. These sciences "exert upon the mind a stimulus to overcome the form in which their varied contents are presented and to elevate these contents to the rank of necessary truth."² In fact, history only attains importance when it is exhibited in its rational connections.

Hegel sees the difficulties in maintaining that a purely receptive attitude toward historical facts is the proper method in understanding it. The historian "brings his categories with him, and sees the phenomena presented to his mental vision, exclusively through these media."³

In the act of knowing, the mind is active. Hegel does not just mean that historical phenomena are apprehended under the categories of causality, time, space, etc. Whenever we have reason functioning as a thought-unity in and through differences, we have a category.⁴ The Hegelian categories are not abstract forms or molds with which we clamp upon reality or, in this case, history. We do not have on the one side consciousness

1. Hegel, PH, 8.

2. Wallace, LOH, 19. In this connection Hegel says: "Experimental physics will present the rational science of Nature -- as history will present the science of human affairs and actions -- in an external picture, which mirrors the philosophic notion" (Ibid., 27).

3. Hegel, PH, 11.

4. J. B. Baillie maintains that in Hegelian thought "we can treat a category as a specific realization of the operation of reason, and can trace its source to the one supreme function of self-conscious mind" (Baillie in Hegel, POM, 35).

"with a reality per se over against it on the other."¹ For Hegel, these two sides are one. The categories are constitutive of reality.

But we can carry this a step further. For Hegel, the categories form a plurality of categories, an organic system, and all are the expression of the one supreme activity of reason.² The task of the philosopher is not just to describe these categories abstractly but "to comprehend them as the moments of a single unitary development."³ This means for Hegel that to see each category in its significance it must be seen in relation to the Whole and seen as moments of the Whole. The comprehension of the Whole is the comprehension of the Absolute. To comprehend historical events as moments within a single process and development is the task of the historian. Historical truth does not mean just correctness or just an accurate report of events.⁴ Historical truth is brought about by the comprehension of an event's significance in light of an aim toward which the process is moving and in light of the process of the Whole. Those historians who claim no presupposition under which to classify events are being "impartial" at the expense of a significant narrative. This is why Hegel says that the first category that occupies the attention of the historian is the one "of deciding the simple

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1. Hegel, POM, 276.
 2. Cf. Ibid., 35.
 3. Windelband, HP, 611.
 4. Cf. Hegel, PM, 279.

question of the relative importance of events."¹ In this, Hegel insists that the historian get down to the heart of history writing: the meaning of history.

But Hegel does not stop with the categories. For one who looks upon the world and its history rationally they in turn present themselves as being rational through and through. R. G. Collingwood points out that Hegel is right: history is the history of thought, of rationality. "It is not knowing what people did but understanding what they thought that is the proper definition of the historian's task."² For example, to understand a political conflict, the historian must see how the two parties conceived the situation. Hegel expresses this distinction more fully. In political history

we see, or at least divine in it, that essential connection in which the individual events have their place and relation to an end or aim, and in this way obtain significance. For the significant in history is such only through its relation to and connection with a Universal. To perceive this Universal is thus to apprehend the significance.³

We can see what Hegel is after. He is not after the universal, or principle, which would explain one political conflict, but the entire world's history. As Collingwood says, Hegel thinks he has the clue in the nature of thought and reason and its place in history.

At the outset Hegel presents us with a hypothesis which

1. Hegel, PH, 11.
 2. Collingwood, IH, 115.
 3. Hegel, HP, 6.

he considers only a hypothesis in the domain of history. In the domain of philosophy, or perhaps we should say metaphysics, he claims it to have been proven by speculative cognition and not just a hypothesis. This is ". . . that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world therefore presents us with a rational process."¹ But we must proceed empirically, historically. Hegel's hypothesis must present itself as a result of historical study. Much follows from his view of how and to what extent the world is rational.

Before we consider how and to what extent Hegel uses his principle of Reason, it would be fruitful to bring in just what Hegel is trying to do. He is not merely trying to prove that Reason rules the world, and consequently that world history too is a rational process. That the historical process is intelligible is true for Hegel but not only in that we can discover the causal laws in this process but we can also know the grounds of this process. In other words, Hegel is asking the "why" of history in two senses: (1) the "why" connected with efficient causality; and (2) the "why" connected with final cause.² He is looking for the meaning of the entire historical process. The empirical facts have already been established and the questions as to the legitimacy of these facts is not Hegel's concern. He is interested in the meaning of the whole process, the why of

1. Hegel, PH, 9.

2. In this aspect of final cause, Hegel claims his subject is a Theodicaea, a justification of the ways of God (Cf. Ibid., 457).

both the efficient and final cause. Or, better, the final cause gives him the "why;" the efficient cause the "how."

2. REASON .

That the real is rational and the rational is real Hegel was convinced and attempted to prove.¹ The French Revolution had added to Hegel's conviction that the world of man is capable of becoming orderly and rational.

Never since the sun had stood in the firmament and the planets revolved around him had it been perceived that man's existence centers in his head, i.e. in Thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality. Anaxagoras had been first to say that NOUS governs the World; but not until now had man advanced to the recognition of the principle that thought ought to govern spiritual reality.²

A. Abstract Characteristics of Reason.

Hegel's concept of reason is quite comprehensive. It is the substance and infinite energy of the universe. It is its own basis of existence and its own final aim as well as the energizing power realizing this aim, ". . . developing itself not only in the phenomena of the Natural, but also of the Spiritual Universe -- the History of the World."³ It is a

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1. T. M. Knox points out that "real" does not mean existent but represents the synthesis of essence and existence. What is actual, effective, is the working out of God's rational purpose. Cf. Knox, PR, 302.
 2. Hegel, PH, 447. This statement set apart from Hegel's text as it is could be misleading. The French Revolution had only announced this principle and as yet viewed it only abstractly.
 3. Ibid., 9.

vital principle at work in the world and in its most concrete, i.e. most inclusive, form is God. In finite persons, Reason is present as their absolute, substantial being. Man is explicitly man only in the form of developed and cultivated reason, which has made itself to be what it is implicitly.

"Reason is purposive activity."¹ Taken abstractly its power of moving is its existence for itself (für sich). Reason is the highest function of the mind. As this function it is self-complete and self-determining according to its own inner law. It retains its contents within itself. "Wherever we have a function of thought-unity in and through differences, there we have a category, and there we have the operation of reason."²

For Hegel, reason denotes both the Providential design in human history and the basis behind the movement of finite thought. Reason cannot govern reality until reality becomes rational through the efforts of man. The movement of thought and reason is seen to be, in Hegel's system, constitutive of reality. "Objective" reality is found to be for the subject. In fact, Hegel holds that being is, in its essence, a "subject." In other words, consciousness has been driven to see itself as

1. Hegel, POM, 83.

2. Ibid., 34.

object. "Reason is the certainty of being all reality."¹

In the Logic, thought has followed a series of abstract predicates dialectically. But abstract reason (and its characteristics which we have given in this section) are only a partial view of reality. Reason and experience are not two distinct aspects of reality. The whole of experience is completely rational. Ideas somehow hold to a concrete applicability. Thus the Idea to fully realize itself needs concrete embodiment. This is accomplished first in the externalization of itself as nature and the "returning to" itself as concrete Spirit. In history we have to do with Spirit. "History in general is therefore the development of Spirit in time, as Nature is the development of the Idea in space."²

B. Reason's Rule.

At the very outset Hegel does not wish to have his concept of reason confused with the abstract concept of Anaxagoras who had not the power to apply his principle to the concrete facts. We cannot have a universal, the principle of Reason, without its

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1. Hegel, POM, 276. This, of course, involves Hegel's epistemological position which is monistic. Hegel's procedure in arriving at this position is questionable as is, it seems to this writer, his actual position in regards to epistemological monism. Whether he holds to epistemological monism or epistemological dualism seems to depend upon whether one is looking at it in terms of the Absolute or in terms of the finite mind. Hegel says of Absolute knowledge that "since each moment has the form of the notion, it unites the objective form of truth and the knowing self in an immediate unity" (Ibid., 805). The finite mind seems to be limited to whatever stage it has arrived.
 2. Hegel, PH, 72.

being concrete also. A pure universal, abstract concept does not help to explain the history of the world, i.e. the life of concrete individuals, just as an abstract conception of God cannot help to explain religious experience and moral obligation.¹ We must also know the means it uses to rule the world as well as the principle to explain the negative elements which seem to go against this principle. We must understand "that rich product of active Reason which the History of the World offers us."²

3. SPIRIT

Self-conscious Reason is Spirit.

Reason is spirit, when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to the level of truth, and reason is consciously aware of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself.³

The self consciously unifies differences within itself and it is the function of Reason to synthesize these differences into a unity. Spirit is the unity of what is understood and the understanding person. But as this unity which, by virtue of its drive toward completion, is reflective, it must appear to itself.⁴ What is confined within itself must become objective to itself and known. The manner and method of this objectivity is the

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1. This is one of the difficulties in Spinozistic thought.
 2. Hegel, PH, 15. Italics mine.
 3. Hegel, POM, 457.
 4. In the Phenomenology of Mind, experience is viewed as a dialectical process whereby the subject becomes increasingly conscious of itself as constituting its object. Spirit is this movement toward more complete experience, toward totality and finally emerging into social consciousness.

manner and method of consciousness as well as the manner and method of the historical stages. But, as stated above, these differences are contained within Spirit itself. Subjective spirit is the potential realizing itself in the form of objective spirit. Josiah Royce rightly maintains that, ultimately, this is only an inner differentiation of the Absolute itself.¹ Spirit in its self-consciousness must become an object to itself. It is this objectivity that involves the differences which make up the distinct spheres of objective spirit.

A. Abstract Characteristics of Spirit.

The essence of Spirit is Freedom. Spirit is self-contained existence (Bei-sich-selbst-sein) which is equivalent to Freedom. It does not have its unity outside itself as does Matter. Matter has its unity and essence in gravity but Spirit has its unity and essence within itself.² This is self-consciousness. Spirit knows itself.

Self-consciousness is an important concept in Hegelian thought. Hegel often uses self-consciousness as a stage in the process of Reason which we have found is another important Hegelian concept. Reason as a principle and a movement of thought is a purposive activity which arrives at the stage of self-consciousness or Spirit. Hegel uses the "purpose" in a way similar to Aristotle. It carries with it the idea of potentiality, i.e. as a latent germ which becomes more explicit

1. Cf. Royce, LMI, 221.
2. Cf. Hegel, PH, 17.

through growth. For Hegel purpose is an inner principle which, when realized, is concrete actuality. The purposive law or principle does not fall outside the activity. Hegel's is an organic concept of purpose and the essential nature of what is organic

lies altogether rather in having its moments equally universal in concrete reality, i.e. in having them as permeating processes, and not in giving a copy of the universal [the essential nature] in an isolated thing. . . . But . . . the organism consists inherently in being simple universality, wherein all determinations are dissolved, and in being the process of this resolution.¹

We can see that Hegel's Philosophy of History revolved around a teleological conception of the process of history. Purpose is a difficult concept to analyze. How purpose could exist without intelligence or, indeed, personality is impossible to conceive. This is one of the points which seem to indicate that Hegel is conceiving of the Absolute in terms of personality.

But just as Spirit is self-consciousness, that which knows itself, it is also an energy able to realize itself. It, too, is purposive and can make actual that which it is potentially. Universal history being in the realm of Spirit is defined as "that exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially,"² and that which Spirit is potentially is Free. The realization that man is free is represented in history. "The History of the World is

1. Hegel, POM, 296.
2. Hegel, PH, 18.

none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom."¹
 Spirit's gradual consciousness of its own freedom is the final
 cause of the world.

B. Freedom.

Freedom is Spirit in its completeness, its essential nature.
 The concept of Freedom is essential in an understanding of
 Hegel's Philosophy of History. What he means by freedom is
 self-contained existence. "I am free . . . when my existence
 depends upon myself."² Man, by virtue of his own power of
 reason, can control his external conditions which limit his own
 self-realization. Man as a unifying agent can bring reason
 into the world and so realize himself.³ Freedom is seen to
 have its embodiment in thought for only in thought can man be
 self-sufficient. This the Stoics realized in the principle that

consciousness is essentially that which thinks,
 is a thinking reality, and that anything is really
 essential for consciousness, or is true and good,
 only when consciousness in dealing with it adopts
 the attitude of a thinking being.⁴

Freedom is often taken to be synonymous with "to be
 conscious of." Toward the later stages of history man stands
 in a "conscious relation to his Spirit, and therefore a free
 relation."⁵

1. Hegel, PH, 19.

2. Ibid., 17.

3. This is exemplified in man's overcoming nature. The institu-
 tion of private property represents one of the first stages
 of this appropriation. Man has given himself "into" private
 property and then projected his personality into it, thereby
 making property a sphere of his own self-realization.

4. Hegel, POM, 244.

5. Hegel, PH, 103.

But the Stoics recognized only the notion of freedom. They withdrew into themselves to realize their freedom. Again, Hegel insists that this is merely abstract freedom and, as such, only part of the story and a transition. It lacks the "concrete filling of life." It is not "living freedom."¹ Self-consciousness, or Spirit, has only "sought to save and keep itself at the expense of the world or its own actuality . . . [but now] it discovers the world as its own new real world."² This is precisely the stage and development of reason. Or, to make the connection between Reason and Freedom more explicit, "reason is thought conditioning itself with perfect freedom."³ This process, as we shall see, is the process of history.

But the foregoing could be misleading until we see what the relationship is between thought, will, and freedom. "Freedom constitutes the substance and essential character of the will, and the system of right is the kingdom of actualized freedom."⁴ Thought and will are not two separate faculties. "The will is a special way of thinking; it is thought translating itself into reality; it is the impulse of thought to give itself reality."⁵ The will as well as thought aims to appropriate its object. When we reflect upon our own desires and impulses they are compared and, through thought they are

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1. Cf. Hegel, POM, 245.
 2. Ibid., 273.
 3. Hegel, PH, 13.
 4. Hegel, POR, 10.
 5. Ibid., 11.

raised to abstract universality. This process Hegel calls "thinking getting its own way in the will . . . It is only as thinking intelligence that the will is genuinely a will and free."¹ The will is free implicitly and becomes explicitly free. As implicitly free, it finds itself determined by nature. A free will is one which is self-sufficient, and self-sufficiency is dependent upon the work of thought and its transcendence of alienation.

How can the individual will which has the capacity to see things as "mine" and "thine" ever become the will of "our" and thus express a common interest? The attainment of positive freedom requires that man leave his private interests and will general freedom as such.²

The principle of right, morality, and all forms of social ethics are forms of self-conscious freedom. Or, to put it differently, "the ethical system is thus the conception of freedom developed into the present world, and also into the nature of self-consciousness."³ But what about a proper social order? All we have thus far is free wills asserting their individual needs.

We must not forget that we are in the realm of Objective Mind, or Spirit, and that the development of freedom is . . . identical with the moral reason of man as exhibited in an external system of social relations.⁴

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1. Knox, HPR, 30.
 2. Cf. Marcuse, RR, 188.
 3. Hegel, POR, 155.
 4. Collingwood, IH, 144.

We need an institution that would preserve individual wills and yet stand above their competing relationships. We need this union between the particular and the universal. We need an identity between the general and particular will. This we find in the state.

The state is the embodiment of concrete freedom. In this concrete freedom, personal individuality and its particular interests, as found in the family and civic community, have their complete development.¹

"Society and the State are the very conditions in which Freedom is realized."²

The state is the goal of history as well as a standard by which to measure the significance of an historical epoch. Historical advance is dependent upon man's ability to comprehend and be conscious of freedom as the goal of history and willing to make it so. Freedom here means the consciousness of freedom.

The Philosophy of History exhibits the successive stages by which he [man] reaches the consciousness that it is his own inmost being that thus governs him -- i.e. a consciousness of self-determination or 'Freedom.'³

In History, just as in the Phenomenology of Mind, we have a movement of consciousness. Freedom does not exist as a natural and original state of man as in Rousseau. It must be sought and won. "Substantial Freedom is the abstract undeveloped Reason implicit in volition, proceeding to develop

1. Hegel, POR, 248.

2. Hegel, PH, 41.

3. Footnote by Sibree (ed.) in Hegel, PH, 104.

itself in the State."¹ Historical development presents this process along with and in organic connection with the development of subjective Freedom which is realized in the individual.

As already stated, Freedom is also an abstract characteristic of Spirit. The latent abstract development of Spirit is regarded as necessary while "that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as their interest, belongs to the domain of Freedom."² The freedom of man does not seem to mean his freedom of choice but a stage of realization by the individual that his interests and truth lie in the universal.

It is interesting and important here to understand what is meant by saying that the individual's interests and truth lie in the universal. In society, each individual as a rational self-conscious unit pursues his own ends but at the same time these ends and individuals interrelate and come into conflict. When such individuals are considered to be merely together without a common purpose or principle guiding their actions, their interests are individual and their freedom is restricted. But, on the other hand, when each individual reflects the totality of the social life, society and the individual are free and self-determined. The person as an intelligent being performs his duty "as his own and as something which is; and in this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom."³ In the state, the sway of particular wills

1. Hegel, PH, 104.
 2. Ibid., 26.
 3. Hegel, PM, 253.

such as that of the "liberalist" of the French Revolution¹ is only the formal side of Freedom. Real Freedom is only possible when the individual finds his realization in the requirement of reasonable Laws.

For Hegel, freedom and necessity are not mutually exclusive. In fact, freedom presupposes necessity and if you take either separately you have abstraction on both sides. "Freedom is no blank indeterminateness: essentially concrete, and unvaryingly self-determinate, it is so far at the same time necessary."² An example of what Hegel means can be given in the case of a criminal who looks upon his punishment as a restriction of his freedom. The punishment is not an external force imposed upon him but really a manifestation of his own act. If he sees this he comports himself as a free man. "In short, man is most independent when he knows himself to be determined by the absolute idea throughout."³

Likewise, the freedom of choice is but an abstract way of looking at concrete freedom. Concrete freedom, however, includes freedom of choice while at the same time transcending it. When we examine free choice we see that it involves contradictions. The alternatives are "given" and hence depend upon outward circumstances and the freedom involved here is only the freedom to choose one of the given alternatives. This freedom is freedom in form.

1. Cf. Hegel, PH, 452.
 2. Knox, HPR, 71.
 3. Wallace, LOH, 283.

The genuinely free will, which includes free choice as suspended, is conscious to itself that its content is intrinsically firm and fast, and knows it at the same time to be thoroughly its own.¹

Volition is a form of thinking and in so far as it is thinking it is rational. Rational means for Hegel logically necessary according to the dialectical process. In the Philosophy of Right, for example, Hegel names the constitution as being developed and actualized rationality and as being the basis of the state. As this basis, the constitution determined the individual's attitude toward the state. It is also the basis of public freedom because their particular freedom becomes realized in a rational form.

The constitutional laws, while in a narrow sense are restrictions upon the individual, are at the same time the means by which the individual receives protection from other wills. But to stop here is to misrepresent Hegel's view of the constitution. Law is not the mutual restraint of all against all but is the objectification of spirit, volition in its true form. "Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys itself -- it is independent and so free."² In a constitution the laws must be reasonable and their actualization secured. When I, as a citizen, identify my particular end with the universal, I become free. Spirit, as self-consciousness, is free, i.e. self-sufficient, when it connects its laws with

1. Wallace, LOH, 264.
2. Hegel, PH, 39.

universal reason.

All constitutions are one-sided unless they can sustain in themselves the principle of free subjectivity and know how to correspond with a natural rationality.¹

The constitution of any given nation is rooted in the stage of development at which its self-consciousness, its view of its subjective freedom, has arrived. It manifests the stage at which the nation has arrived.² Moreover, constitutions grow and mature.³ The Emperor in the Holy Roman Empire was at one time the judge and travelled the Empire on circuit. However, external reasons made him relegate his judicial power to a group of judges.³ For man, freedom consists in voluntarily belonging to the larger social whole, the state, and being conscious that his will must be a will to general Freedom, the union of the universal and particular will, the State. This is the end of man's long education in history that his truth and essence are to be found in the objective world. In fact, the objective, social world is nothing but man's essence and truth and their separation and supposed independence is only the result of taking both too abstractly. The thorough molding

1. Knox, HPR, 286.

2. Constitutions are not just the creation of individuals. Socrates' principle of morality required time before it could become part and parcel of the self-consciousness of everyone. Likewise, a merely conceived constitution would not better the realization of freedom unless the individual took the principles of the constitution as his own. Cf. Ibid., 287.

3. Cf. Ibid., 291.

and interpenetration of the constitution of society by freedom is "a process identical with history itself."¹

C. The Means of Spirit.

Freedom is an undeveloped, potential idea which uses phenomena (that which presents itself to our sensuous vision or, in this case, actual historical events) for its manifestation in the History of the World. Hegel again repeats his insistence against taking an abstract concept as a principle and explanation and not applying it to concrete facts.

"Principle -- Plan of Existence -- Law -- is a hidden, undeveloped essence, which as such -- however true in itself -- is not completely real."² Aims have a place in our subjective design only and have not yet emerged into existence. The idea of Spirit is yet something abstract. Spirit is merely potential until it gets its actualization and realization, until it becomes real. "A second element must be introduced in order to produce actuality -- viz., actuation, realization; and whose motive power is the Will -- the activity of man in the widest sense."³ Both are needed to make history possible. "The first the Idea, the second the complex of human passions; the one the warp, the other the woof of the vast arras-web of

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1. Hegel, PH, 18.
 2. Ibid., 22.
 3. Ibid.

Universal History."¹

The general aim of history is only implicit at first. The idea of Spirit is yet only an unconscious instinct. The historical process "is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one."²

"Although Freedom is primarily an undeveloped idea, the means it uses are external and phenomenal."³ Hegel realizes here that the needs and desires of men are the most effective springs of actions and that human lives, including their geographical and temporal conditions and limitations, are efficient agents in history. Hegel has not forgotten that "to explain History is to depict the passions of mankind, the genius, the active powers, that play their part on the great stage."⁴ These activities constitute the means whereby the World-Spirit attains its object. Man seeks to satisfy his own purposes and yet is at the same time an instrument of a higher purpose.

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1. Hegel, PH, 23. Hegel means by "human passions" human activity resulting from interests. He does not restrict interests to a volitional aim. Rather, it involves the whole character and personality of man. It is not limited to private interests but also supplies the actuating force for accomplishing deeds and interests shared in by society (Cf. Hegel, PH, 24). The motive force is subjective; that which is aimed at can be public. This is important in Hegel's thought. The state represents the concrete union of the two, i.e. the idea and will. In the ideal state, private interests are at one with the common interests.
 2. Ibid., 25.
 3. Ibid., 20.
 4. Ibid., 13.

In the process of the World's History itself . . . the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct object of desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious of the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them, and is realizing itself through them.¹

However, in history, collisions come about between the acknowledged duties and laws "and those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system."² New ideas and ways of life are created in opposition to the prevalent system of life. These contingencies involve a different principle from that on which the permanence of a state depends. These principles lie in the aim of individuals.

Such men are to be called World-Historical Individuals,³ e.g. Caesar, Alexander, and Napoleon. The individual will of man sometimes carries with it an essential phase in the development of the creating Spirit. These individuals are the instruments and the means of Spirit.

What they have personally gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (prepared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjective mental idea -- Fame, which is their reward.⁴

Such world-historical individuals who follow their private aims advance the historical process further than they are conscious of during their time. For example, Caesar's victory

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1. Hegel, PH, 25-26.
 2. Ibid., 29.
 3. Cf. Ibid., 29.
 4. Hegel, PM, 280.

over the Roman statesmen was not merely his private gain but "an unconscious impulse that occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe."¹ The Roman Republic could no longer exist. The individuals in the state were alienated from the state and could not find objective satisfaction. Public affairs according to Cicero were decided by the more eminent private citizens. "Caesar . . . did the Right; since he furnished a mediating element, and that kind of political bond which men's condition required."² After the death of Caesar it became evident that only a single will could guide the state. During the time in which these World-Historical Individuals lived, their deeds appeared to be only their interests and their work, just as Caesar appeared only as an individual after power. "It was theirs to know this nascent principle; the necessary, directly sequent step in progress, which their world was to take; to make this their aim, and to expend their energy in promoting it."³

These World-Historical Individuals may also in their actions treat even sacred interests inconsiderately.

What the absolute aim of Spirit requires and accomplishes -- what Providence does -- transcend the obligations, and the liability to imputation and the ascription of good or bad motives, which attach to individuality in virtue of its social relations.⁴

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1. Hegel, PH, 30.
 2. Ibid., 312.
 3. Ibid., 30.
 4. Ibid., 67.

However, Hegel maintains in the Philosophy of Right that heroes only come on the scene in uncivilized conditions. Their aims are right and necessary, but "once the state has been founded, there can no longer be any heroes."¹

If we look upon the lives of such individuals we find no happy existence either. Some died early, like Alexander, or were murdered, like Caesar. History is "the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized."² Reason sets man's passions to work for it. "The Idea pays the penalty of determinate existence and of corruptibility, not from itself, but from the passions of individuals."³ This Hegel calls the "cunning of Reason."

God lets men do as they please with their particular passions and interests; but the result is the accomplishment of -- not their plans, but His, and these differ decidedly from the ends primarily sought by those whom He employs.⁴

There is no doubt that Hegel is trying to justify, in his concept of the "cunning of Reason," the rise and fall of cultures and men, and the corruptibility and evil found in the empirical facts of history. R. G. Collingwood in a sympathetic, comprehensive and, unfortunately, too short treatment of Hegel's Philosophy of History defends Hegel in

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1. Knox, HPR, 245. In this connection, Hegel defends Machiavelli's work, The Prince. Machiavelli "having the profound consciousness of the necessity for the formation of a State, has here exhibited the principles on which alone states could be founded in the circumstances of the times" (Hegel, PH, 403).
 2. Hegel, PH, 21.
 3. Ibid., 33.
 4. Wallace, LOH, 350.

regard to Hegel's concept of the "cunning of Reason,"¹ by asserting that the reason involved is man's reason and, as such, involves irrational elements within it. This we can agree with. The historical process is a process whereby man is making his world rational and gradually overcoming the uncontrollable elements in the world. But we might also emphasize that the Reason involved in history is at the same time Universal and Divine Reason and the individual is the means for something which transeends him but does not exclude him. Divine Providence is at work in the world.

So, then, by the individual's unhappiness, suffering, and death, the World Historical process is advanced.

The special interest of passion is thus inseparable from the active development of a general principle; for it is from the special and determinate and from its negation, that the Universal results.²

But World-Historical individuals are by no means the only way in which historical transitions are effected. The very attempt to prevent change sometimes effects a violent change. For example, before the French Revolution the grandees had clung to their power and their class privileges. This very reluctance to change gave the first impulse to discontent on the part of the lower classes. This oppression drove men to investigate into the prevailing conditions. Then "the conception, the idea of Right asserted its authority all at

1. See Collingwood, IH, 117.

2. Hegel, PH, 32.

once, and the old framework of injustice could offer no resistance to its onslaught."¹ These movements in individual and national life have their own significance and partial justification.

World-history, however, is above the point of view from which these things matter. Each of its stages is the presence of a necessary moment in the Idea of the world mind, and that moment attains its absolute right in that stage.²

1. Hegel, PH, 447.
2. Knox, HPR, 217.

CHAPTER II

THE PRINCIPLE IN HISTORY

Future generations may typify the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the age of "progress." We say may because their concept of progress may be quite different from the prevalent concept of progress as scientific, technical advance. It would be perhaps closer to the truth to predict the future's typification of our age as the age of the importance of the concept of process. The notion of "process" is certainly not something new in the history of thought, for we find it in ancient thought. But it has received a new emphasis not only in Social Philosophy and the Philosophy of History but in Physics, Biology, and Psychology. Hegel and his process principle, the dialectic, have been most influential in bringing out this emphasis upon process.

1. THE NATURE OF THE DIALECTIC

The dialectical process is not anything new, for we find it in the Heraclitian contrast of opposites wherein the strife between opposites is the central point in the movement of the process. Plato also used the dialectical process, although in a somewhat different sense. But, in Hegelian thought, the dialectical process has received its most comprehensive and significant embodiment.

For Hegel, the nature of a thing is more fully disclosed if we know its organic relationship to other things or to the whole. A thought and its negation are related in such a way that we come closer to the truth if we know both. Whenever we start thinking (thesis), we find we have left something out (antithesis). Knowing a thing just as it is and knowing a thing in its relations and negations is the difference between abstract and concrete knowledge.

An analysis of an object consists in differentiating the various phases of the object (i.e., negations and relations) as integral moments of a process. The dialectical process is driven by this conflict until between the thesis and antithesis a synthesis is formed (aufgehoben). It is the nature of thought and reality to go on to more inclusive wholes and larger explications. "The motive power of the dialectic lies in the relation of the abstract idea explicitly before the mind and the concrete idea implicitly before it in all experience and all consciousness."¹ Without the idea implicitly before the mind, only contradiction would result.

Reason cannot rest in contradictions and so we are pushed on to the synthesis. By adding a negative we limit the thesis and thus determine it and turn it into the synthesis. S. Hook has clearly stated this principle of Negativität:

Each term regards the relation as internal to itself and the other term as external to itself. An antinomy results which can be solved only by

1. McTaggart, SHD, 8.

reinterpreting the situation and by looking at both terms and their relation from a point of view of a wider relation, and etc.¹

It has been and is being argued that Hegel, in stating that a category contains its own opposite, its own negation, is denying the law of contradiction, e.g. that the category - Being - contains and generates out of itself its own opposite - nothing, or non-being. According to the law of contradiction, either a thing is or it is not. This is not true in the dialectic for the relation between thesis and antithesis is not a formal relation of contradiction but of opposition and, furthermore, it is because of the law of contradiction that our reason compels us to move from antithesis to synthesis. The relation between the thesis and antithesis derives its meaning and existence from the synthesis. The thesis and antithesis cannot stand alone. The lower categories have no independent existence but are abstractions from the higher and more concrete category.

In the example given above, the category of becoming represents the synthesis of both being and nothing. The synthesis, becoming, contains within itself the opposition between being and nothing while at the same time expressing their underlying unity and harmony.

The opposites in Hegelian dialectic retain their opposition while, at the same time, they are identical; or, rather, they are identical in and through their differences. The opposition is just as real as the identity. The understanding

1. Hook, FHM, 67.

takes both as separate; reason takes both, but together.¹

J. E. McTaggart points out that the dialectic should be looked on as a process not of construction but of reconstruction.² The Absolute Idea is always implicitly present to us but not always explicitly present to us. We must explicitly unravel or reconstruct the Absolute Idea. This happens in experience as well as in history.

For Hegel, immediate forms of existence are incomplete for they do not permit things to be what they are capable of becoming. The real nature of a thing is made manifest to us when we recognize that the immediate state is negated. When we become "subjects" and strive to make our object (which is the negation) conform to ourselves and our potentialities, we realize our real natures. Thinking in the mathematical form does not touch the concrete fact nor its inner nature or notion.

For what is lifeless, not being self-moved, does not bring about distinction within its essential nature; does not attain to essential opposition or unlikeness; and hence involves no transition of one opposite element into its other, no qualitative, immanent movement, no self-movement.³

Or, again

The abstract \int as in the case of mathematics and the understanding \int or unreal is not its element and content, but the real, what is self-establishing, has life within itself, existence in its very notion. It

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1. W. T. Stace asserts that any philosophy which reduces the variety of the world to a unity must believe in the identity of opposites (Stace, POH, 95).
 2. McTaggart, SHD, 3.
 3. Hegel, POM, 103.

is the process that creates its own moments in its course, and goes through them all; and the whole of this movement constitutes its positive content and truth.¹

It is not we who frame these movements of notions. We only reproduce them. Their development is an objective, ontological development in which eternal Reason is realizing itself in man's thought.

The dialectical process is this developmental process involving a constant change from potentiality to actuality.

The principle of Development involves also the existence of a latent germ of being -- a capacity or potentiality striving to realize itself. This formal conception finds actual existence in Spirit; which has the History of the World for its theatre, its possession, and the sphere of its realization.²

The freedom of man is this unfolding of one's potentiality and the self-realization of Spirit. True freedom is the true necessity of this inner law.

2. THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL CHANGE

As we look at the history of the world, the thought "which first presents itself in this restless mutation of individuals and peoples, existing for a time and then vanishing - is that of change at large."³ Hegel is cognizant of the ruins and decay of Rome, Carthage and other civilizations which have presented us with a rich national life. Or, as he

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1. Hegel, POM, 105.
 2. Hegel, PH, 54.
 3. Ibid., 72.

expresses it, he is impressed by change "in its negative aspect." The Orient has also given us another idea of change: that of metempsychosis wherein from the ashes of the old a new life is born. The changes in nature, too, we notice. They are infinite and manifold but they only present a repeating cycle of changes. "In Nature there happens nothing new under the sun."¹

The change that Hegel is concerned with is that of development. In opposition to natural change and change as found in the idea of memempsychosis, the region of Spirit presents us with a real capacity for change "and that for the better -- an impulse of perfectibility."² This impulse of perfectibility is realized along the line of a self-producing change wherein Spirit "makes itself actually what it always was potentially."³ But this process by Spirit, the realization of its Idea in history, is mediated by consciousness and will (the means of freedom) which are really an organic part, another manifestation of, Spirit itself. "Thus Spirit is at war with itself; it has to overcome itself as its most formidable

1. Hegel, PH, 54.

2. Ibid., 54.

3. Ibid., 55. Described in terms of self-consciousness, development means coming to consciousness of itself. In terms of the notion, it is a process going from the abstract to the concrete (Cf. Hegel, POM, 22-23).

obstacle."¹ In terms of the preceding section, viz. the nature of the dialectic, Spirit contains its own negation, the anti-thesis comes out of the thesis. Hence, in speaking of the Spirit of a people, Hegel states that it exists "as a genus, and consequently carries within it its own negation."²

But perhaps we can go one step further and apply the dialectical triad to the concepts we covered in Chapter I, viz. Reason, the passions of man, and Freedom.³ In this case, Reason, containing potential Freedom, would form the thesis. The passions of man, the means of Freedom, would form the anti-thesis and the negation of Reason, i.e. particularity and individuality is in opposition to Universal Reason. The synthesis would be the concrete unity of the two wherein man finds his interests and desires fulfilled according to and in harmony with the design of Universal Reason, i.e. man attains to the realm of concrete freedom.

In this context, man has a part to play in the history of the world. He must learn to will rational Freedom and transcend natural and subjective limitations. But, as stated before,

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1. Hegel, PH, 55. At this point Hegel presents what seems to be a contradiction. He says that Spirit's growth is not that of "the tranquillity of mere growth, as does that of organic life, but a stern reluctant working against itself." The probable distinction he means between organic growth which has been taken to be the essence of his developmental principle and Spirit's growth is that Spirit has no "other" in which to move. Its movement is only a self-differentiation.
 2. Ibid., 75.
 3. This triadic scheme is nowhere explicitly stated in Hegel's works, at least in so far as this writer was able to discover. However, it does represent the general scheme of Hegel's exposition in his introduction to the Philosophy of History.

man is a means. Hegel's concept of the "cunning of Reason" makes this so.

But man is not entirely or merely a means. It is true that when man's passions and subjective will have an "object which is the truth and essence of a reality,"¹ they constitute a world-historical passion and are means for the development of Spirit. However, Hegel regards man as not a mere means in so far as the Divine is in man in the form of morality, ethics, and religion. In these forms man shares in the ideal aim itself. These forms of man's existence "are intimately connected with Reason, and share in its absolute claims."²

Hegel's point here is that the means by which the ideal aim is realized has something in common with that ideal aim. Man is not in an external relation to this aim and an instrument which is used up; the means by which a purpose is realized must have something in common with that purpose. In this context, man is an end in himself and is responsible for the depravation of morals and religion to the extent that he is free, i.e. to the extent that Reason is active in him.

This is the seal of the absolute and sublime destiny of man -- that he knows what is good and what is evil; that his Destiny is his very ability to will either good or evil -- in one word, that he is the subject of moral imputation, imputation not only of evil, but of good; and not only concerning this or that particular matter, and all that happens ab extra, but also the good and evil attaching to his individual freedom.³

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1. Hegel, PH, 78.
 2. Ibid., 37.
 3. Ibid., 34.

The ruin of religious, moral, and ethical purposes we observe in history are merely the ruin of one of the forms of an eternal essence. The religion and morality of even a limited form of life, e.g. that of a shepherd wherein religion is only extended to the few simple relations of life, has infinite worth.

With the application of the dialectic principle, or, more specifically, the concept of negation, Hegel is trying to explain the decay, corruption, and fall of nations and peoples. In this context, we are back to an attempt to justify the ways of God -- the Theodicaea. Freedom has to be won and the winning of Freedom presents itself as a task for man. It is as yet only implicit. We have seen that, in the dialectical process, negation is necessary for movement toward more inclusive syntheses which is at the same time a movement toward wholeness and truth. Negation, or, as represented in history, the dying of cultures, is necessary for growth. The negation, the antithesis, represents a truth of the thesis, i.e. the thesis is better known when the antithesis is seen.¹ In fact, the negation, or, rather, the movement to overcome the negation and opposition, is the motive of the process.² The potentialities of Spirit cannot be realized unless its existent form

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1. Herbert Marcuse reminds us that K. Marx sees crises as a necessary stage in the self-differentiation of capitalism. Capitalism reveals its true form in its negative act of breakdown (Cf. Marcuse, RR, 159).
 2. Cf. Hegel, PH, 54, the "impulse of perfectibility."

is negated. Unless Reason is realized concretely, Hegel is saying, the opposition between "ideal" and "real" will remain an opposition.

But what, we might ask, is the criterion of this process? What is the end and result toward which this movement proceeds? The criterion of this process would be, in Hegel's terms, "Spirit in its Completeness, in its essential nature, i.e. Freedom."¹ The historical phenomena, the actual events in history, resulted from this principle alone and only possess a sense of value when referred to it. All other perspectives as to the historical advance of one particular culture over another are "relative and not absolute goals of attainment."²

Spirit is a subject which when dialectically passing from stage to stage reconstitutes, or comes to fuller possession of, its own nature which, in turn, constitutes its Freedom. This is the nature of self-conscious thought, and it can be said to be actual only in so much as it is aware that it is and to be potential only in so far as it is limited to not seeing what its real nature is. What man is implicitly (being-in-itself) must become explicit (being-for-itself), that is, must become an object for him. "In this way it is in thought alone

1. Hegel, PH, 55.

2. Ibid., 56. Hegel would perhaps look askance upon the criterion of progress of technical production so prevalent today. He might deem this criterion as only a criterion for "abstract" history and remark upon the extent man's partial and incomplete "understanding" has taken him.

that thought is object; reason produces what is rational: reason is its own object."¹ To become explicit makes all the difference; it creates new content. "The whole variation in the development of the world in history is founded on this difference."² This bringing out what is implicit for Spirit is a process within itself and comes back to itself. Only thought and consciousness can do this. In the introduction to the History of Philosophy Hegel says, "The course of history does not show us the Becoming of things foreign to us, but the Becoming of ourselves and of our own knowledge."³ But the first stages of this becoming are not unreal. That which is only potential is not Maya but a necessary stage in the entire process.⁴

For Hegel, thinking is a creative activity and, for the existing conditions of an historical phase, a destructive one. "Spirit . . . is employed in rendering itself an object of its own contemplation; but it cannot develop itself objectively in its essential nature, except in thinking itself."⁵ For Hegel,

1. Hegel, HP, 21.

2. Ibid., 21.

3. Ibid., 4.

4. G. R. G. Mure, who presents a good comparison between the thought of Aristotle and of Hegel, has this to say about Hegel's view of the relation between form and matter. "Hegel strove to unite the fully actual and the partly potential by bringing the lower levels of the Scala within the ambitus of an all-embracing correlativity of subject and object; to develop the distinction of potential and actual into that of apparent and real without giving to 'appearance' a subjectivist meaning" (Mure, AIH, 53).

5. Hegel, PH, 76.

this is virtually the same thing as saying that historical progress is impossible without thought. Thought brings out negations and hence development. Thought, which has as its nature universality, allows individuals to see and reflect upon their traditional mode of existence and to see the opposition between the requirements of universal thought and their "Belief," "Trust," and "Customary Morality." They demand reasons thereby making their present limitations become patent and then seek to change the existing conditions of things to accord with their thought.¹

The relation of thought to change is presented by Hegel by means of the ancient Greek myths of Chronos and Zeus.² If mere desire impels nations to activity, such activity and deeds pass away without leaving a trace because time soon overcomes the nations' deeds. In Hegel's words, "Thus it was first Chronos -- Time -- that ruled; . . . the offspring of that Chronos -- was devoured by it."³ But Zeus, who represents the activity of thought, has devoured Chronos. Reason and self-consciousness (Zeus) have enabled man to see

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1. An excellent example of this is Socrates who taught that the moral man is one who not merely wills and does the right but who is conscious of what he is doing. Thus "the principle of Socrates manifests a revolutionary aspects [sic] towards the Athenian State" which was only based on Customary Morality. Cf. Hegel, PH, 270.
 2. Cf. Ibid., 75ff.
 3. Ibid., 75.

the distinction between ideal and real and to bring into the world something durable thereby "negating" or "devouring" time. Reason has created something durable, the State. "He [Zeus] is the Political god, who produced a moral work -- the State."¹ Because the State is the embodiment of Reason and morality, it endures and thus transcends time.

But Zeus and his race is, in turn, devoured "by the very power that produced them -- the principle of thought, perception, reasoning, insight derived from rational grounds, and the requirement of such grounds."² Thought is that "universal" which preserves identity with itself and it negates itself thereby creating a higher form of its embodiment. The negation "is an activity of Thought, it is at the same time conservative and elevating in its operation."³

Herbert Marcuse has rightly pointed out that Hegel has connected the destructive dynamics of thought with historical progress towards real universality in the state and in society. In the Logic, the notion is the unity of the universal and particular. Accordingly, in the Philosophy of History, the state represents the freedom of the subject in conscious union with the whole.⁴

Summarily, then, Spirit in making itself objective and making this object the object of thought, negates the determinate

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1. Hegel, PH, 76.
 2. Ibid., 77.
 3. Ibid., 77.
 4. Cf. Marcuse, RR, 240f.

form of its being and also gains a more complete comprehension of the universal element which lies in its potentiality.

3. THE STATE

In the Philosophy of History, Hegel does not discuss the State as such or its place in his system. The State is covered as such in the Philosophy of Right where the State represents the synthesis of the family and civil society.¹ In the Philosophy of History, Hegel deals with the State only in its concrete forms as represented in history. However, we would do well to consider what position the State has in Hegelian thought before we consider its appearance in history.

A. The State in Relation to Freedom.²

Hegel insists that we need an institution which will preserve subjective, individual wills and yet transcend their strife and competitive ways. We need an identity between the general and particular will. Only in this sense is Freedom realized and the State is this embodiment of concrete Freedom.

The abstract actuality or substantiality of the state consists in this, that the end pursued by the state is the general interest, which, being the substance of all particular interests, includes the preservation of them also.³

The State is Reason having become objectively present to the individual. The Universal is to be found in the State and

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1. Cf. Hegel, PM, 262.
 2. Cf. Chapter I, p. 26.
 3. Hegel, POR, 257.

its laws. The Union of the Universal and subjective will is truth and, indeed, Hegel says "the State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth." Freedom has obtained objectivity. Hegel identifies the state with law and law is the objective form of Spirit. "Only that will which obeys law, is free: for it obeys itself -- it is independent and so free."¹ The State is the embodiment of rational freedom.

Hegel's concept of the State can be regarded as a "system of three Syllogisms."

(1) The Individual . . . through his particularity or physical and mental needs (which when carried out to their full development give civil society), is coupled with the universal, i.e. with society, law, right, government.

(2) The will or action of the individuals is the intermediating force which procures for these needs satisfaction in society, in law, etc., and which gives to society, law, etc. their fulfilment and actualization.

(3) But the universal . . . is the permanent underlying mean in which the individuals and their satisfaction have and receive their fulfilled reality, inter-mediation, and persistence.²

All the activity of Spirit strives to become conscious of the union of the objective idea and the subjective will that wills it. In this it is conscious of its own freedom.³

Again, the stress should be upon the word "conscious," for history is the progression of the consciousness of Freedom by Spirit. "The state works and acts in obedience to conscious ends, known principles and laws, which are not merely implied,

1. Hegel, PH, 39.
 2. Wallace, LOH, 340.
 3. Cf. Hegel, PH, 49.

but expressly before its consciousness."¹ The state must not be dependent upon a system of individual and contingent needs and wants as it is in civil society. This only affords a "spectacle of excess, misery, and physical and social corruption."² The state must be consciously willed by the individual. The individual should know and will the universal in the form of the state. The members of the state take it "as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit . . . and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end."³

B. The State as the Object of History.⁴

We have found that the consciousness of Freedom is the absolute aim of history and that subjective will and thought, the passions of men, are the means of realizing this Freedom. We have found also that the objective existence of the union of these two is the state.

The state represents for Hegel the basis and center for the other elements of the life of a people. It actuates the life of the people who compose it. Its laws are the rights of its members; the history of the state, their deeds -- "it

1. Hegel, POR, 258, italics mine.

2. *Ibid.*, 188.

3. Knox, HPR, 160-161.

4. The word "object" is used here in the sense that it is of all the diverse aspects of history the center toward which the philosophical historian should turn his attention.

constitutes their existence, their being."¹ It represents the spirit of one people and is the actuality of the ethical Idea. In Hegel's words

The state exists immediately in custom, mediately in individual self-consciousness, knowledge, and activity, while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment towards the state finds in the state, as its essence and the end and product of its activity, its substantive freedom.²

Hegel will not have us identifying subjective freedom with substantive freedom spoken of above. Let us point out briefly this distinction by an example. A man may recognize the dictates of his own consciousness and so, in this respect, he is a law to himself. In this recognition man has attained to abstract subjective freedom. But this same man may regard law as an extraneous force governing him in which he regards himself as only an accident to it. This view of law would be similar to children who obey their parents without insight of their own. But when man realizes that this law is only the law of Spirit of which he is only an imperfect embodiment, he has reached substantive freedom. He has reached the consciousness "that it is his own inmost being that governs him -- i.e.

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1. Hegel, PH, 52. Perhaps the connection between the state and the people in it can be more readily seen in a passage in Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (p. 267). He says the "collective spirit" of a people and its actualization, a constitution, are inseparable. The collective spirit could not exist without forming a constitution. The constitution develops from the national spirit through the same grades. "It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and, be it added, the history is only that spirit's history) by which constitutions have been made and are being made."
 2. Knox, HPR, 155.

a consciousness of self-determination or [substantive] 'Freedom.'"¹ The State as the highest embodiment of social morality sustains my freedom of will and compels me to rise above my mere personal and contingent interests.

The Spirit of a people constructs itself into the objective world and exists in the form of the whole complex of institutions. "Nations are what their deeds are."² The nation which has itself fully presented to itself in objective form is in full reality. "The contradiction between its potential, subjective being -- its inner aim and life -- and its actual being is removed."³ Once this opposition is removed, the nation dies a natural death. To transcend this boredom and death, nations need a "new National Spirit."⁴

But at the same time "this Spirit of a People is a determinate and particular Spirit"⁵ and represents a form and objectification of Spirit.⁶

1. Footnote by Sibree (ed.) in Hegel, PH, 104.

2. Hegel, PH, 74.

3. Ibid., 74.

4. Cf. Ibid., 75. But those nations who are influenced by Zeus, or reason, do not die this natural death; Spirit and Reason are their all-pervading principles.

5. Ibid., 53.

6. At this point Hegel presents us with an analogy between the Spirit of a People and Spirit before its objectification. His analogy is drawn to the Soul in relationship to its faculties. The faculties in their form of concentration in a simple unity produce that Soul. It is questionable at this point whether Hegel is subscribing to a group-mind theory of culture. (Cf. Ibid., 53.) Hegel's conception of Weltgeist and Volksgeist points to a belief in a group mind.

Spirit is

One Individuality which, presented in its essence as God, is honored and enjoyed in Religion; which is exhibited as an object of sensuous contemplation in Art; and is apprehended as an intellectual conception in Philosophy.¹

The Spirit of the State and these other forms of Spirit form an inseparable bond. "Only in connection with this particular religion, can this particular political constitution exist."² The same holds true with Philosophy and Art.

Because Hegel sees the state as an individual totality, an organic whole in which the life of the people is inextricably bound up, he chooses the state to represent historical forms. This is not the only reason. In the state man possesses his spiritual reality "for his spiritual reality consists in this, that his own essence -- Reason -- is objectively present to him, that it possesses objective immediate existence for him."³ The state is the embodiment of rational Freedom and, as we remember, reason is our hypothesis in the philosophical comprehension of history.

The Idea of Spirit in its successive phases manifests itself in distinct political principles. The state is also the manifestation of human Will and its Freedom. The state represents the "union of the objective side -- the Idea -- and the subjective side -- the personality that conceives and

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1. Hegel, PH, 53.
 2. Ibid., 53.
 3. Ibid., 39.

wills it."¹ For Hegel, the state is the World-Spirit through which the law of history operates. "It is to the State, therefore, that change in the Aspect of History indissolubly attaches itself."²

But Hegel insists that the subjective side must play its part. The form in which the state appears in history is dependent upon the stage to which man has developed. The form of the state corresponds to and has its basis in the stage at which man has become conscious or, rather, self-conscious, of his own freedom, e.g. the German world has recognized that all are free and, accordingly, the form of the state which is most adequate to express this recognition is a constitutional monarchy. For Hegel, the state represents the entire culture of a nation and "the Spirit of the People itself."³ The forms which the state assumes correspond with the stages or historical periods in which the realization of Freedom is coming about.

But the successive forms of states are subordinate to a higher principle which is the World-Spirit. The World-Spirit "constitutes itself absolute judge over states."⁴

Each nation has a history of its own and is assigned one task, one deed, in Universal History.⁵ Each of these "National Spirits" forms one individual in Universal History. To realize

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1. Hegel, PH, 49.
 2. Ibid., 47.
 3. Ibid., 50.
 4. Hegel, POR, 248.
 5. Cf. Hegel, PM, 275f.

their individual grades is the impulse of the World-Spirit. These grades are, moreover, preappointed in the process of the grand Whole.¹ The Spirit of the people itself (what we might call "culture") is the substance that receives the form of concrete reality in the form of the state. Spirit receives its realization in the phenomenal form of the state.

It may be questioned at this point whether the state for Hegel is the proper object of history. Hegel says that "the conception of God . . . constitutes the general basis of a people's character."² The form of the state rests upon and is in organic connection with the form of religion. The state is universal only in so far as it is recognized as the phenomenal existence of the Divine Essence. "The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth."³ Religion and the State are inseparable. Hegel says that

in the Protestant state, the constitution and the code . . . embody the principle and the development of the moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion, when reinstated in its original principle and in that way as such first becomes actual.⁴

It is modern folly "to make a revolution without having made a reformation."⁵

1. Cf. Hegel, PH, 46.

2. Ibid., 50.

3. Ibid., 39.

4. Hegel, PM, 290. For an extensive view of Hegel's thoughts on religion and the state, see Hegel, PM, 282ff.

5. Ibid., 286. The Russian Communists have indeed learned much from Hegel, but have they stood Hegel on his head or are they looking at the world upside down?

H. Marcuse maintains that the actual relationship between the realm of absolute Mind and the State underwent frequent changes in Hegel's thought.¹ However, Marcuse states further on that the place of the state in Hegel's actual system, i.e. in objective mind, points to the impossibility of regarding the state as the highest reality within the whole system.²

In thinking, a people can raise itself into an object of its own contemplation, it can make its world reasonable. As soon as it realizes the principle which it embodies, it has attained its highest point. But in the attainment of this principle its own negation, annihilation, comes about while at the same time bringing to the fore a new principle. But this rise and decay is only a movement within a movement.

The principles of the successive phases of Spirit that animate the Nations in a necessitated gradation, are themselves only steps in the development of the one universal Spirit, which through them elevates and completes itself to a self-comprehending totality.³

This new form on the part of universal Spirit alters "the substantial character of the National Spirit."⁴

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1. Cf. Marcuse, RR, 87.
 2. Cf. Ibid., 178. In this connection, R. G. Collingwood points out that by giving the state the central position in his history, Hegel is inconsistent. Hegel ought to have had the historian dealing with the process of absolute mind not so much just objective mind (Cf. Collingwood, IH, 121). It can be pointed out here that much of the subject matter dealt with in the Philosophy of History concerns itself with religion rather than the state.
 3. Hegel, PH, 78.
 4. Ibid.; 78.

4. THE NATURAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR. IN HISTORY

Hegel is well aware of the influence which nature plays in history. It is the "necessary and essential" basis on which the production of the Spirit of a People depends. The Idea of Spirit in the History of the world appears in an actually existing people and as such falls under the influence of nature, time, and space.¹ "As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural conditions, it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and climatic qualities."² Nations make their appearances under the form of nature. Hegel warns us again against being abstract and not taking a concrete view of a people and state. The form of a constitution of a people is dependent upon the condition of the people, including natural conditions. The constitution of a people makes

one substance -- one spirit -- with its religion, its art and philosophy, or, at least, with its conceptions and thoughts -- its culture generally; not to expatiate upon the additional influences, ab extra, of glimate, of neighbors, of its place in the world.³

But Hegel is not too clear as to the extent of the nature's influence. This is shown in the safe statement he makes when he says "Nature should not be rated too high or too low: the mild Ionic sky certainly contributed much to

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1. Cf. Hegel, PH, 79.
 2. Hegel, PM, 725.
 3. Hegel, PH, 46.

the charm of the Homeric poems, yet this alone can produce no Homers."¹

Hegel gives us what might be termed a more psychological approach to nature's influences. He speaks of natural influences on the soul and the diversity of climate constituting the diversities of race and, even more specific, "local minds."² Nature's influence however is more effective in "the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and moral character of the several peoples."³ But "these points of dependence [upon nature] lose importance in proportion to his civilization, and the more his whole frame of soul is based upon a substructure of mental freedom."⁴

Hegel's point here can readily be seen, for example, in his approach to religion in Africa. Religion begins with man's consciousness that there is something higher than man. In sorcery as exhibited in Africa, however, man is shown to be the highest power having a position of command over Nature. This is not to say that the African is not conscious of his dependence upon Nature, but this dependence does not conduct them to the consciousness of a Higher Power. They are too absorbed with nature and the means to control it. "It is they who command the elements, and this they call 'magic.'"⁵

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1. Hegel, PH, 80.
 2. Cf. Hegel, PM, 172.
 3. Ibid., 172.
 4. Ibid., 171-172.
 5. Hegel, PH, 94.

Real reverence is only gotten by having a consciousness of a Higher Power. "For if arbitrary choice is the absolute, the only substantial objectivity that is realized, the mind cannot in such be conscious of any Universality."¹

However, nature is the first step by which man can gain freedom within himself.² There are some climate zones in which man cannot even start his path toward freedom -- "cold and heat are here too powerful to allow Spirit to build up a world for itself."³ Man cannot turn to the general and more elevated because his attention is constantly turned toward nature. Man is too busy, as Aristotle said, with "pressing needs." The theatre of History is the temperate zone.

Hegel here presents us with a discussion of America and the influences of its geography and climate. He makes some startling analyses and also some very doubtful ones.⁴ Extreme individualism is recognized by Hegel. For example, he names it as one of the causes for so many religious sects which he, by the way, regards as "the very acme of absurdity."⁵ He also recognizes that the opening frontier of early America was one of the reasons why social and economic pressures were alleviated.⁶ He says, in summary, that America "is therefore

1. Hegel, PH, 95.

2. Cf. Hegel's view of property and personality above, p. 23n.

3. Hegel, PH, 80.

4. For example, "The weakness of the American [i.e., Indian] physique was a chief reason for bringing negroes to America" (Ibid., 82).

5. Cf. Ibid., 85.

6. This idea Hitler was to use later (Lebensraum Politik) in an attempt to justify militarism and imperialism.

the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself."¹

Hegel now gives us a triadic scheme of geographical zones. They need not concern us much except in outline and the essential points connected with the development of Spirit.

A. The Elevated Land.²

Included under this division are the general areas between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, parts of Africa, and South America. The peoples are characterized by patriarchal and nomadic life and are a careless people as to their own future.

B. The Valley Plains.

Included under this division are China, India, Egypt, and the Tigris and Euphrates area. The foundations of great states begin here, as the land is conducive to property and legal regulations.

C. The Coast Land.

Hegel recognizes that water, the sea, is much less a separating element than it is a uniting element among peoples. The sea has made the Mediterranean area the focus of national life.

The sea expands man's horizon and gives him "the idea of the indefinite, the unlimited, the infinite."³

1. Hegel, PH, 80.

2. Cf. *ibid.*, 88.

3. *Ibid.*, 90. Hegel excludes China from this influence on man by the sea and doesn't mention Japan. He also hints that it is the cause of separation of coast-lands from the interior states, naming Holland and Portugal as examples. Many more examples could be given to the contrary.

Hegel generalizes even further and gives us characteristics of Africans, Asians, and Europeans. It might be added here that his characterizations are not in terms of "race," i.e. an inherent type, pure and unpure, forever ingrained in a man, but in terms of nature's effects upon a man's character. Let us give just one reason why Hegel's characterizations are what they are. Though general, he presents us with some interesting thoughts.

In the African, consciousness has not yet made the distinction between itself as an individual and the universality contained within its essential being.¹ Their religion is yet in the form of magic wherein they do not as yet recognize a higher, moral God. They remain at the point of mere sensuous volition. They show a want of self-control.²

In Asia, however, "we find ourselves for the first time on the real theatre of History."³ The Light of Spirit first appears here. All religious and political principles have originated here. Europe presents us with the scene of their development.

5. THE COURSE OF THE WORLD'S HISTORY

The course of history, the course of Spirit's becoming free, is presented by Hegel in the form of an image somewhat

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1. Cf. Hegel, PH, 93.
 2. Cf. Chapter II, p. 61.
 3. Hegel, PH, 99.

reminiscent of Plato's image of the cave. The "Sun" of self-consciousness arises in the east, Hegel says, but only as an individual sun. Man, when he first sees this sun, is blinded by it and astonished by its brilliancy but, at the same time, the objects around him are perceived more readily and brought to light. In this clear perception, man is brought around to the perception of the relation between his own inner being and the sun. Man then begins to construct a "building" from his own inner sun and deems this inner sun higher than the original external sun "for now he stands in a conscious relation to his Spirit, and therefore a free relation."¹ History presents us with the education of the natural will from a state in connection with nature to free conformity to a Universal principle. The conscious relation of Spirit by Spirit is the aim of the world and the world's history presents us with the task of "rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one,"² while at the same time man is bringing about this realization by recognizing that his own Freedom is to be found in the Universal will.

In general, this process will be one from abstraction to concretion as found in Hegel's system as a whole. The success in which a given state integrates the individuals contained within that state determines the degree of abstraction or concreteness. It will also be a movement toward freedom while

1. Hegel, PH, 103.
2. Ibid., 56.

at the same time being a repudiation of inadequate and abstract forms of freedom. The whole historical process is essentially dialectical. Man is blinded by the "Sun" and as such he is obedient to an abstract and external law. The "negation" of this is the view that external law and custom have no authority over the individual and that he should follow only the dictates of his own conscience and reason. The "synthesis" is the view of a people that their own conscience and reason are already there in law and Reason as contained in Society and the State. In terms of Spirit, this process is the same, only the different stages present us with (1) Spirit's immersion in Nature, (2) the advancing of Spirit's consciousness of its freedom but as yet still having an incomplete separation from Nature, and (3) the elevation of Spirit to its pure universal form.¹ Between (2) and (3) above is the main concern of Hegel's historical narrative. The east, Greece, and Rome present us with this advancement while the Germanic world under the influence of Christianity presents Spirit's elevation.

Before we present a general outline and characterization of the various phases through which Spirit attains its freedom, let us consider the period before Spirit starts its advance, i.e. its immersion in Nature.

1. Cf. Hegel, PH, 56. A comparison between Hegel's Philosophy of Mind with its stages of Subjective, Objective, and Absolute Mind and the Phenomenology of Mind with its stages of Consciousness, Self-consciousness and Reason would be both fruitful and entailing a volume in itself.

A. The Ante-historical.

The philosophical consideration of the world's history does not begin with the mere undeveloped potentiality of Spirit but only where "rationality begins to manifest itself in the actual conduct of the World's affairs."¹ History begins when man adopts universal objects such as Right and Law and produces a reality in accordance with them -- the State.² "Consciousness alone is clearness; and is that alone for which God (or any other existence) can be revealed."³ For Hegel, only those people who present us with a record which is "intelligent" and "definite" can be said to have a history. For Hegel, the philosopher should be concerned not so much with what has happened as with the narration of what has happened.⁴ An historical people must, if we are to consider them, "have had an aim within the domain of Reality, and, at the same time, of substantial Freedom."⁵ This is, Hegel feels, when people have formed a state. The State, inextricably bound up with religion and representing the Moral Whole and the embodiment of rational Freedom, presents itself as the center of the historical process. Accordingly and in terms of political forms

1. Hegel, PH, 56.

2. This is the beginning of the consciousness of personality wherein "the person performs its [the Universal] duty as his own and as something which is; and in this necessity he has himself in his actual freedom" (Hegel, PM, 252).

3. Hegel, PH, 59.

4. Cf. *ibid.*, 60.

5. *Ibid.*, 62.

expressing the historical stages of Spirit, the history of the world presents us with the process of the recognition that one is free. This stage takes place in the east and comes under the form of despotism.

B. The East.

Under this heading are China and the Mongols with theocratic despotism as the main form of government; India with theocratic aristocracy; and Persia with theocratic monarchy.¹

The Oriental World has the Substantial as its inherent principle. Morality is governed externally by laws. "Nothing subjective in the shape of disposition, Conscience, formal Freedom, is recognized."² When the western world obeys a law, what man is required to do is confirmed by an internal sanction. In the East, their want of subjective confirmation is showing. "What should be internal subjective sentiment is made a matter of external arrangement."³ To Hegel, this shows only that "Spirit has not yet attained subjectivity, it wears the appearance of spirituality still involved in the conditions

1. The bulk of Hegel's volume on the Philosophy of History is spent on the actual facts of history. It would be senseless to try to cover every phase of his treatment of history. Modern historical research including that of archeological studies has presented facts which Hegel could not have possibly known. Perhaps it would be sufficient to say that Hegel's knowledge of history is nothing less than amazing and that he sticks to the facts a great deal of the time. That he is able to do this and yet bring the facts under the comprehensive system which he has has been even more amazing. To have thought in such a comprehensive and synoptic manner is one of the things which makes the reading of Hegel both difficult and exciting.
2. Hegel, PH, 111.
3. Ibid., 112.

of Nature."¹ Distinctions in customs and the state are only the accidents of personal power and individual personality loses its rights and perishes. Spirit, as the movement toward absolute knowledge of itself, or substantial freedom, has not yet even freed itself from natural immediacy. The East has not even attained to subjective freedom.

The glory of Oriental conception is the One Individual as that substantial being to which all belongs, so that no other individual has a separate existence, or mirrors himself in his subjective freedom.²

When subjective freedom does arise, however, man contemplates external reality in his own soul or, in other words, man is cognizant of the relation between his own inner being and the sun.³

The drawing back from the actual world forms ipso facto an antithesis, of which one side is the absolute Being -- the Divine -- the other the human subject as an individual.⁴

In the East, these two are not as yet distinguished.

Only One (the Despot) is subjectively free.

1. China.

In the east, subjective freedom is not known, yet history begins here.⁵ In China, the despot stands alone and no other

1. Hegel, PH, 112.

2. Ibid., 105.

3. Cf. Chapter II, p. 65.

4. Hegel, PH, 104.

5. Cf. ibid., 112. Strictly speaking, however, China and India lie outside the world's history. They constitute "the mere presupposition of elements." (Cf. ibid., 116).

individual has a separate existence from the One Power. Individuality has not yet arisen, "the subjective will is governed by Laws as by an external force."¹ The Universal Will displays its activity immediately through the individual. No antithesis between Universal will and individual will comes about.² Morality is a matter of external arrangement in China and not that of subjective sentiment. Spirit has not reached subjectivity and is still under the condition of Nature. China's peoples, ruled by a patriarchal type of government, are, for Hegel, like children.

They are fed from central stores and not regarded as self-subsistent and adults [and] . . . so far as children are concerned, universality and the substance of things resides in their parents [in this case the Despot].³

2. India.

In India, the external condition, the civil machinery, becomes the internal one, the separation into castes according to natural distinctions, but they do not show the distinct conception "that the natural and the spiritual world should be recognized in the subjective aspect belonging to intelligence."⁴ This idea is only expressed in the imagination. The individual loses himself in this dream. Spirit is as in a dream confusing Universality with subjectivity, making the spiritual sensuous and the sensuous spiritual.

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1. Hegel, PH, 111.
 2. Cf. the family, Hegel, PM, 254.
 3. Knox, HPR, 265.
 4. Hegel, PH, 139.

The Indians have not also recognized inward morality and freedom. The division of society into castes is only done in terms of birth. They cannot look at an independent object and see its connections with other objects and hence cannot attain to the consciousness of their own existence, i.e. be self-conscious.¹

There is a type of freedom exemplified by India, though. This is negative freedom which is the ability to give oneself universality, i.e. "to extinguish all particularity, all determinacy."² This freedom is abstract and one-sided. It is held by the Hindu to be the persistence of the bare knowledge of one's simple identity with oneself and, Hegel goes on to say, "there is no longer any distinction between the finite man and Brahma. In fact, in this universality every difference has disappeared."³

In the Indian society subjective particularity, the individual, was not included in the societal organization as a whole and the individual is denied his rights. However, when the individual is given his rights and he is upheld by the objective order of society then he becomes the animated principle of the entire civil society.

The recognition and the right that what is brought about by reason of necessity in civil society and the state shall at the same time be effected by the mediation of the arbitrary will

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1. Hegel, PH, 162.
 2. Knox, HPR, 227.
 3. Ibid., 227.

is the more precise definition of what is primarily meant by freedom in common parlance.¹

3. Persia.

In Persia, Spirit first frees itself from the substantial unity with nature. They are "the first Historical People."² External natural law is recognized as something the individual possesses and it stands in opposition to nature. But "the representation, therefore, which Spirit makes of itself is, at this grade of progress, of a purely natural kind -- Light."³ The universality recognized is only a natural universality and not that of the personal soul.

In Persia, Spirit has shown its existence. But the Persian could not organize an empire upon Spirit.⁴ Persia has to tolerate several principles because of its recognition that its principle is Universal and shines over all. Zoroaster's "Light" is a principle which belongs to the world of consciousness. Man finally sees himself as a partaker in the Universal essence. In India, right and duties are attached to nature (natural classes); in China, with external commands; but in Persia man attains freedom from the merely natural and attains a relation to something spiritual. In China the totality of

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1. Knox, HPR, 133.
 2. Hegel, PH, 193.
 3. Ibid., 114.
 4. Cf. ibid., 222.

the moral Whole excluded subjectivity and both were only externally arranged. In India, distinctions were there but the principle of separation was only natural, unspiritual. The unity, Abstract Good, in Persia is a principle and not just an external bond. "The fact that everyone has a share in that principle, secures him personal dignity."¹ The Unity and Universal of the Brahmans carried with them the individual's negation and the destruction of consciousness. In Persia, man has a relation to the Universal, he is preserved in that Universal.

Egypt presents the transitional stage from Persia to Greece. Egypt combines the natural elements from the Syrians and Babylonians with the spiritual element among the Phoenicians and Jews. Egypt's symbol is the Sphinx, a half-man (Spirit) and half-animal (nature) which symbolizes Spirit's rise from nature. In Egypt this was a riddle. It took a Greek to solve it.

C. Greece.²

The east is the childhood of History, trusting and in repose. Greece presents us with the boyhood of history, boisterous and turbulent, showing us individualities forming themselves. In Asia, morality is imposed from the outside. In Greece, "the Union of the Moral with the Subjective Will"

1. Hegel, PH, 175.

2. The History of Greece is further divided into (1) the maturity of Spirit, (2) Spirit's manifestation into the world of Art and Politics, and (3) the decline of Spirit of Greece (Cf. Hegel, PH, 250).

takes place. Nature bears the stamp of the spiritual in Greek art. This is only immediate unity, however, and their subjectivity is not as yet free.

It was with the Greeks that the principle of individuality arose.¹ However, this principle of the Greeks is only the beginning of the development of subjective freedom. It is interesting and important here to see Hegel's point for the person's right of subjective freedom "is the pivot and centre of the difference between antiquity and modern times."²

T. M. Knox points out what Hegel means by subjective freedom.

He does not mean the satisfaction of desire or impulse in itself. He means freedom to find satisfaction of the whole self, i.e. of rationalized desires. . . . [Hegel] held that subjective freedom never came within the Greek purview at all, since the principle of conscience, of self-certainty, on which 'subjective freedom' in all its forms depends, came into the world with the Christian revelation.³

When man makes a decision, an "I will" must be given by man himself. Even though a democratic constitution was present in Athens, the final decisions were made from external observations such as oracles and the flight of birds. Man still lacked the strength to look within himself for the final word.⁴

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1. Hegel points out in this connection that the principle of individuality first appeared under its philosophic shape in the *Monadology* of Leibnitz (Cf. Wallace, LOH, 275).
 2. Knox, HPR, 84.
 3. Ibid., 339.
 4. Cf. ibid., 184 and 288.

Subjective freedom was not reached by the Greeks. Even the Greek Gods were subject to an impersonal and blind destiny. In relation to this destiny, man's freedom is nullified. However, in Christianity "our particular personality is recognized not merely as something to be solely and simply nullified, but at the same time something to be preserved."¹ Hegel cannot forget the attitude which the Greeks held toward the barbarians and slaves. "Man as man was not then recognized to be of infinite worth and to have infinite rights."²

But the morality present in Greece is not impressed upon the individual as in the Orient. The substantial and the individual are not in complete separation but in immediate unity and hence abstract unity. Hence it is not true morality because "it is not yet purified to the standard or the free subjectivity that is the essence of true morality."³ The individual is not completely fused with the Universal in a concrete unity. We reach this stage only in a constitutional monarchy.

The Greek Spirit was attaining to freedom, but still it was somewhat conditioned by external nature. It is

the medium between the loss of individuality on the part of man (such as we observe in the Asiatic principle, in which the Spiritual and Divine exists only under a Natural form), and Infinite Subjectivity as pure certainty of itself -- the position that the Ego is the ground of all that can lay claim to

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1. Wallace, LOH, 270.
 2. Ibid., 293.
 3. Hegel, PH, 107.

substantial existence. The Greek Spirit as the medium between these two, begins with Nature, but transforms it into a mere objective form of its (Spirit's) own existence; Spirituality is therefore not yet absolutely free; not yet absolutely self-produced -- is not self-stimulation.¹

The abstract and universal is overcome by the Greek.

He transforms nature into an objective form of his own existence but this stimulated still by nature.² The Greek Spirit is the plastic artist who transforms materials (nature) into the embodiment of man's own spirit. Their idea of the state was abstract in the sense that the state was created only in the spirit of a definite form of social life.

In Greece we have the freedom of the Individual but not yet advanced to the recognition of his dependence upon the general principle -- the state.³ The individual will embodies this principle, the political bond, but only in connection with his particular idiosyncrasy. The general interest is considered "only as Custom, in the form of Objective Will, so that morality property so called -- subjective conviction and intention -- has not yet manifested itself."⁴

Laws were obeyed because they were laws and the interests of the community are still intrusted to the will of the citizen. "The Democratic Constitution is here the only possible one: the citizens are still unconscious of particular

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1. Hegel, PH, 238.
 2. Cf. ibid., 238.
 3. Cf. ibid., 250.
 4. Ibid., 251.

interests."¹ In Democracy, Hegel says, it is all very well to put a question to the vote but the essential question is the character of the voters.

In a democracy, the general interest is the main concern but the general interest is only so as Custom. Morality, subjective conviction, has not yet manifested itself.² The law in the Greek democracy rests upon an objective morality and the choice of one law or the other rests upon custom. The people's will has no ulterior sanction. But subjective freedom and with it the rise of critical thinking reflect upon the customary morality and question the character of the customary morality and also its basis and justification.

Socrates undertook to teach them what moral virtues, duties, etc. were. The moral man is not he who merely wills and does that which is right -- not the merely innocent man -- but he who has the consciousness of what he is doing.³

Democracy was possible in Greece because the subjective Freedom had not been developed. When it was developed it came as a destructive element in Greece "for the polity which that world embodied was not calculated for this side of humanity."⁴

It is Socrates who introduced⁵ this destructive element

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1. Hegel, PH, 252, italics mine. Cf. also the treatment of this transition in Marcuse, RR, 242ff.
 2. Cf. Ibid., 251.
 3. Ibid., 269.
 4. Ibid., 253.
 5. Hegel names the Sophist, however, as the first to introduce subjective reflection. Cf. ibid., 253.

and it was Socrates who showed us that "Spirit had acquired the propensity to gain satisfaction for itself -- to reflect."¹ It has been the work of thought and reflection which has brought about this destructive element for the Greeks. A Democratic state is inadequate for the preservation and realization of the conscious individual.

D. Rome.

In the Roman realm the differentiation between abstract individuality and abstract universality² is carried to its conclusion. "Ethical life is sundered without end into the extremes of the private self-consciousness of persons on the one hand, and abstract universality on the other."³ The aristocracy of Rome grew into a self-seeking power while the democratic element of free personality became more corrupt.⁴

In the Roman state, the Social aim absorbs all individual aims and presents us with the severe labors of the manhood of history. In Greece, individuality was rated high. In Rome,

1. Hegel, PH, 270.

2. "Abstract" because the Universal, the form of the state, does not contain and preserve the individual. Aristocracy by its very nature is constantly on the verge of lapsing into either tyranny or anarchy because of the divorce between public authority and private interests (Knox, HPR, 178). T. M. Knox points out that Hegel assumes that this danger was due to the nature of aristocracy itself rather than the inability of the particular form of Roman aristocratic government to adopt itself to the rule of an empire (Cf. Knox, HPR, 368).

3. Ibid., 221.

4. Cf. the end of the Roman Republic from the time of Gracchi to the time of Augustus.

the Universal subjugates the individual but at the same time the individuals become persons.

The Universal subjugates the individuals; they have merged their own interests in it; but in return the abstraction which they themselves embody -- that is to say, their personality -- is recognized.¹

Personality is recognized with definite rights. This is not voluntary on the part of persons and an antithesis results between the Universal and the subjective. The element of subjectivity which was not found in Greece is found among the Romans with their recognition of personality in relationship to property.² The recognitions of personality by the Roman is only the recognition of a formal and abstract type of personality. It comes to a recognition of my property being mine and goes no further. "Individuals are thereby posited as atoms; but they are at the same time subject to the severe rule of the One."³ Private Right is thus nullified. Each person is entitled only to possession while the Person of Persons lays claim to the possession of all the individuals. This contradiction afflicted the Roman world and made the Roman wretched.⁴

Before we proceed, let us sum up briefly the course of history thus far. Hegel calls the Roman State the severe

1. Hegel, PH, 107.

2. Cf. ibid., 320.

3. Ibid., 320. Cf. Knox, HPR, 37.

4. It is interesting here to note also that in property a person exists for the first time as reason but the freedom gained by it is falsely gained because it is realized in an external thing (Cf. Knox, HPR, 236).

labors of Manhood and then goes on to say

for true manhood acts neither in accordance with the caprice of a despot [the East], nor in obedience to a graceful caprice of its own [Greece]; but works for a general aim [Abstract Universality], one in which the individual perishes and realizes his own private object [Abstract Individuality] only in that general aim.¹

The human will is only emancipated abstractly thus far.

"Up to this point, finite Freedom has been only annulled, to make way for infinite Freedom."² The Customary Morality we found among the Greeks is now replaced by the Christian principle of man's absolute Freedom in God. Man as man has infinite value. Man's freedom is no longer conditional and no longer dependent upon Oracles and Slaves. "Man now forms his own determinations and recognizes himself as plenipotentiary in regard to all finite existence."³

The Roman world with its emphasis upon Universality results in despotism or tyranny and so man is driven back into himself wherein he recognizes the "Empire of Spirit" in the full sense of Christianity. The antithesis Rome presents us with is that between the state's aims, absolute power, and abstract personality.⁴ Individuality soon begins to wane and so a despot is created to control the State and people thereby driving individuals back into themselves.

1. Hegel, PH, 107.

2. Ibid., 333.

3. Ibid., 334.

4. Of course, all through Hegel's history there are smaller transitions within the history of one civilization. For example, Hegel treats Roman history in three periods, monarchy, republic, and empire (Cf. ibid., 283).

According to Christianity, the individual as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love, destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself, and have God's mind dwelling in him: i.e. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom.¹

In the Christian religion, Truth and Freedom in God are presented to the conceptive faculty. The state is governed by that same Reason but it is a

temple of Human Freedom concerned with the perception and volition of a reality, whose purport may itself be called divine . . . the process displayed in History is only the manifestation of Religion as Human Reason -- the production of the religious principle which dwells in the heart of man, under the form of Secular Freedom.²

Only when this is produced is the discord between the inner life of the heart and the actual world removed. To realize this synthesis is the task of the German people.

E. The German World.

In Christianity, the essence of man is seen to be spirit, but not as yet spirit objectified. This presents the fourth phase of world history and is called by Hegel the "Old Age." Spengler to the contrary, Hegel does not mean by "Old Age" an age of decay and weakness. This is only true of nature. "That of Spirit [old age] is its perfect maturity and strength, in which it returns to unity with itself, but in its fully developed character as Spirit."³

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1. Hegel, PM, 239.
 2. Hegel, PH, 335.
 3. Ibid., 109.

Hegel divides this period into three stages. Until the time of Charlemagne, the Christian world presents itself as "Christendom" in which the Spiritual and the Secular present themselves as only different aspects.

Until the first half of the sixteenth century, which forms our second stage, this antithesis between the Spiritual and Secular develops the opposition. The church develops into a Theocracy and the state develops into a Feudal Monarchy. Three reactions took place: (1) particular nationalities against the universal sovereignty of the Frank Empire; (2) the individual against legal authority and executive power resulting in the Feudal system of protection; and (3) a reaction against secular extravagances by the church (e.g. Gregory VII's enforced celibacy of the clergy).

During this mediaeval period, contradictions are patent in both Church and State. On the one hand the church (or religious feeling) has nothing to do with the secular. The church "may make its appearance in that sphere on a mission of mercy, but this stops short of a strict socially ethical connection with it -- does not come up to the idea of Freedom."¹ The church is no longer a spiritual power but an ecclesiastical one. On the other hand, the state is caught in contradiction. The Emperor has an empty title and holds no solid authority and the individuals in the state, though pious, show "a bar-

1. Hegel, PH, 380.

barous deficiency in point of intelligence and will."¹

The third stage begins where the second ends, viz. the first half of the sixteenth century. Secularity is developed until it recognizes its own value and worth. During this time also the Christian principle attains truth and reality in the Reformation. The secular in its interest in the sensuous as exemplified in the revival of learning and the flourishing of the fine arts no longer feels compunction in being separated from the church. The church had become corrupt and turned toward the external sensuous world.² In Luther's teachings, Christian Freedom is actualized.

In the Lutheran Church the subjective feeling and the conviction of the individual is regarded as equally necessary with the objective side of truth . . . the subject himself must be imbued with truth, surrendering his particular being in exchange for the substantial truth, and making that truth his own. If Subjectivity be placed in feeling only, without that objective side, we have the stand-point of the merely Natural Will.³

Man is now in full recognition that the objective process, the "secular" world, is the existence and definite manifestation of the Divine Essence. The harmony of Objective and Subjective Will

which has resulted from the painful struggles of History, involves the recognition of the Secular as capable of being an embodiment of Truth . . . that Morality and Justice in the State are also divine and commanded by God, and that in point of substance there is nothing higher. . . . Obedience

1. Hegel, PH, 382.

2. E.g. good works are thought of as the performance of ceremonies.

3. Hegel, PH, 416.

to the laws of the State, as the Rational element in volition and action, was made the principle of human conduct.¹

But as yet, Hegel warns us, the harmony between the State and the Church is only an immediate and abstract harmony. "It was not yet expanded into a system by which the moral world could be regulated."²

This development is the second stage of the Reformation. The Protestant Church increases and stabilizes its political existence into a monarchy like that of Frederick II.

Thought, "the ne plus ultra of Inwardness, of Subjectiveness,"³ is the stage Spirit reached at the time of the French Revolution. "Spirit perceives that Nature -- the World -- must also be an embodiment of Reason, for God created it on principles of Reason."⁴ Experimental science was discovering Laws of the Universe, which is to say the Reason of the Universe. An intellectual principle is discovered to serve as a basis for the state. But purely abstract principles, e.g. "Virtue" based only on man's dispositions, are set up by Robespierre. "Liberalism" as an abstract, atomistic principle which asserts the sway of individual wills receives sanction. Hegel insists that the contingent will must be subjugated by a monarchical form of government. The individual's freedom must not be merely asserted, however, as it was in the French Revolution.

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1. Hegel, PH, 422-423.
 2. Ibid., 424.
 3. Ibid., 439.
 4. Ibid., 439.

The union of individuals must not be based upon the arbitrary wills of the individuals.

The will of the Many expels the Ministry from power, and those who had formed the Opposition fill the vacant places; but the latter having now become the Government, meet with hostility from the Many, and share the same fate.¹

In a hereditary monarchy, the individual is organically connected with the State, the Whole, which at the same time preserves his essence. "The monarchical constitution is . . . the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason."²

Reason received its embodiment in the world. Man's obligation to the substantive, rational laws of the State are at the same time a realization of his particular freedom. The union of the subjective will and the objective order is the actualization of freedom and the state itself is this union, this ethical whole.

The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not only . . . gain explicit recognition for their result, . . . but . . . they also pass over of their own accord into the interests of the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit.³

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1. Hegel, PH, 452.
 2. Hegel, PM, 269.
 3. Knox, HPR, 160.

CHAPTER III

ANTITHESES

1. COHERENCE

The first and second chapters of this thesis have been an attempt to state the principles involved in Hegel's Philosophy of History and also their concrete application. The present chapter presents a critique, a pointing out of problems, and also a defense of some of the more moot points entailed in Hegel's Philosophy of History.

We have seen during the discussion the necessity for understanding just what Hegel has set himself to do in his Philosophy of History. The role and function of the philosophical historian is to think systematically about history. In this sense, philosophical history is speculative history, and is done from an armchair. Hegel is only incidentally interested in the historian's methods for fact gathering. For the philosophically minded historian, the historical facts have already been established. The philosophical historian has only to give them fuller meaning and significance by placing them under or in relation to the whole plan or aim of Universal History. This procedure compares favorably to the methods of crime detection. The detective who also has at his disposal the unconnected facts is to re-construct

the crime wherein all the facts will "fit into" or cohere with his conceived hypothesis. But just as in the Hegelian mode of thought, so for the detective all the facts must cohere with all the other facts as well as with the whole. For Hegel, seeing the place of the fact in relation to all the other facts and the whole is seeing the fact's significance. This coherence theory Hegel applies to the philosophical comprehension of history.

The whole from which Hegel is working is an organic whole. The parts which need explaining and need to be given significance are in Hegel's view not only organically connected with the whole but are also teleologically connected with it. If, Hegel is saying, we can comprehend as a whole a certain period in history, the spirit of the times, we throw light upon and give meaning to the particular events within that period. Moreover, even greater illumination will come to those who can know the purpose behind the movement of the civilization. But as we know, Hegel does not stop with the history of civilizations. He raises and applies what we have said above to an even higher synthesis. If we can gain a comprehension of Universal History, i.e. the entire course of world history, we can explain the particular national histories contained within it.

In considering Hegel's use of coherence as a principle of historical interpretation, however, let us point out several questions which arise. If the interpretation of historical data is in terms of coherence, how are we to

comprehend the whole, i.e. universal history, when history hasn't even completed itself yet and, consequently, we cannot know the whole? This brings to the fore several problems which have presented themselves during this study of Hegel's Philosophy of History.

One of the problems is the difficulty in establishing Hegel's position as to the end of history. This has direct bearing on his coherence theory. R. G. Collingwood tries to help us on this problem by stating that Hegel believed history must end with the present simply because nothing else has happened. To the historian the future must remain closed.¹ In terms of a coherent theory of the course of history, then, the best possible solution would be to obtain the most synoptic and inclusive viewpoint from which to view and interpret the facts or parts. This is perhaps why Hegel insists upon the principle of Reason as a hypothesis and only a hypothesis in the realm of history. In the realm of history, our hypotheses must be open-ended, i.e. subject to revision, because of the incomplete nature of history itself. The question is now to be asked in this manner: Is Hegel's hypothesis open-ended and subject to revision?

R. Flint says of Hegel's Philosophy of History: "To construe and formulate history as if it were complete was a very serious step."² In defense of Hegel we can say nothing

1. Cf. Collingwood, IH, 120.
2. Flint, PHE, 534.

except that a hypothesis as to the overall plan of history cannot be based on anything but the past. We certainly cannot have it based on the future which is not known as yet. Hegel himself says that the inference from history that history is a rational process must present itself "as the ultimate result of History."¹

Marcuse is correct in pointing out² that Hegel says after the description of the Restoration, "This is the point which consciousness has attained."³ The development of the Idea of Freedom, the realization of Spirit, has been realized. Spirit itself is eternal and the present form of Spirit

comprehends within it all earlier steps. These have indeed unfolded themselves in succession independently; but what Spirit is it has always been essentially; distinctions are only the development of this essential nature.⁴

What the specific course of the World's history will be is not the task of the philosophical historian, but from the study of the past we can see that "what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not 'without God,' but is essentially His Work."⁵

The eternal nature of Spirit presents a problem which carries us into the realm of metaphysics. Carried to this plane, the question involves the question of the place of

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1. Cf. Hegel, PH, 10.
 2. Marcuse, RR, 227.
 3. Hegel, PH, 456.
 4. Ibid., 79. Cf. also Hegel, POM, 808.
 5. Hegel, PH, 457.

time in Hegel's system. Without getting into a lengthy discussion concerning Hegel's actual position in regard to time, let us point out the problem. We know that, for Hegel, history is the development of Spirit in time,¹ yet, on the other hand, we also learn that "the element of Spirit is Eternity. Duration, properly speaking, cannot be said to belong to it."² Does Hegel provide us with a reconciliation? If history is merely phenomenal, a mode of externalization of Spirit, how can it be said that Spirit, which is eternal, presents us with a development in time? This is not to say that Hegel regards time as being more fundamental than Spirit, but the Eternal Idea and Spirit are working themselves out in time. If the Idea is process,³ what can a process mean that has no duration, no "before" and "after?" We can merely point out this apparent difficulty as the arguments on either side would involve a volume in themselves.

2. A PRIORISM

Hegel is often accused of a priorism.⁴ J. B. Bury says of Hegel's Philosophy of History:

Hegel's Philosophy of History is better known

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1. Cf. Hegel, PH, 72.
 2. Ibid., 110.
 3. Cf. Wallace, LOH, 356.
 4. By a priorism we mean the deduction of historical facts from presuppositions regarding its aim and end so as to misrepresent the empirical facts of history (Cf. Hegel, PM, 276).

than Fichte's. Like Fichte, he deduced the [his-
 torical] phases a priori from his metaphysical
 principle, but he condescended to review in some
 detail the actual phenomena.¹

Likewise, M. R. Cohen makes the assertion that Hegel
 deduced a priori the facts of history from philosophic
 principles.² The question we ask here: Is this criticism
 justified? The answer would seem to be: Not entirely.

In his treatment of history, Hegel insists upon an
 empirical approach. "We must proceed historically -- em-
 pirically."³ The idea that man was free by nature and that
 civilization has hindered his freedom Hegel rejects on
 empirical grounds. He is quite emphatic about it.

That assumption [that man is free by nature]
 is one of those nebulous images which theory pro-
 duces; an idea which it cannot avoid originating,
 but which it fathers upon real existence, without
 sufficient historical justification.⁴

Hegel likewise rejects the idea of a primitive para-
 disiacal condition of man because of its lack of basis in
 empirical fact.⁵ He is well aware of experience and its
 importance in knowledge but he was also aware of going to
 extremes in this insistence upon being empirical. Hegel
 strives to walk the middle path between the fallacy and
 impossibility of being completely empirical and impartial;
 i.e. the reading of history as a series of unrelated instances,

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1. Bury, IP, 254.
 2. Cf. Cohen, MHH, 88.
 3. Hegel, PH, 10.
 4. Ibid., 40.
 5. Cf. ibid., 57.

and the other extreme of imposing concepts upon historical facts. Of the former extreme of alleged impartiality, Hegel maintains that a historian without some aim, some view by which the important facts can be sorted out, would be

only an imbecile mental divagation, not as good as a fairy tale, for even children expect a motif in their stories, a purpose at least dimly surmise-able with which events and actions are put into relation.¹

In considering the other extreme, viz. the imposition of concepts upon historical data, Hegel tries to avoid this extreme also. Hegel likens his procedure as being a priori only in the sense in which Kepler was a priori. Kepler, in order to understand and discover his laws, was familiar a priori with ellipses, cubes, etc. He was familiar with "a whole circle of conceptions to which the principles in question belonged."² In history, Hegel asserts, to know that a certain quality characterizes the peculiar genius of a people must be established empirically. But we must first be familiar with these characterizations in order to look for them in the empirical data. These concepts Hegel gets from philosophy and he claims that this basic concept or category has been proven in that field -- Reason.

At this point J. B. Bury and M. R. Cohen might interpret by saying that this is a priorism. If the speculative philosopher can detect Reason at work why cannot the non-philosophical

1. Hegel, PM, 277.
2. Hegel, PH, 64.

historian? If you reply that they lack knowledge of Hegelian Logic, then the logic shows itself the deus ex machina we claim it is.¹ Indeed, we have an argument.

But let us again hear Hegel's side of the story.

It is an act of thought to include in one simple conception an object which itself includes a large and significant historical conception, e.g. Man, Art, Science. It also takes an act of thought to "resolve such a conception -- duly to isolate in idea the conceptions which it contains, and to give them particular names."² Only as we can connect historical events through reason, thought, and show that the events are rational, can we show history as being a rational process. As R. G. Collingwood points out, Hegel is viewing historical events as expressions of thought. The connections in history are not between the events themselves. It is an act of thought which makes connections between events in history just as thought made it possible for Kepler to establish relations between astronomical phenomena. The philosophical historian must study the documents and other evidence afforded him and see the thought, the "Spirit," behind them. Collingwood goes on to point out that Hegel's dialectic principle does not assert that there is opposition between events. The opposition lies in the inward thoughts which lie behind these events. For example, the events which took place between the Greek civiliza-

1. Cf. Walsh, IPH, 151.

2. Hegel, PH, 68.

tion and the Roman civilization were not in opposition. The opposition lies rather between the Greek conception of man and idea of life and the Roman conception of man and idea of life.¹

In this context, Hegel is saying that when we take a synoptic view of these oppositions we see a pattern or uniformity working toward a definite end -- Freedom. But the only way in which these facts appear coherent and meaningful is in terms of this synoptic view and in terms of thought. The philosophical historian is familiar with these forms of experience and thought and so grasps the connections.

But perhaps we can go one step further in this discussion of Hegel's "a priorism." It is worth while to point out what might be called Hegel's theory of historical type. In this sense, Hegel was a priori in his method. This is not to say that he took these types and imposed them upon the historical facts whether they fitted or not. These types only guided him in looking for significance in history. But first let us consider these historical types.

The relationship between Hegel's Philosophy of History and the Phenomenology of Mind is by no means easy to ascertain. But a clarification of this relationship is necessary in order to understand what we mean by a "theory of historical types."

The Phenomenology of Mind purports to be an introduction

1. Cf. Collingwood, IH, 118.

to Hegel's system.¹ One could characterize it as a study of human nature or, indeed, a history of human experience.² In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel uses many historical illustrations as exemplars for his characterizations of a certain type of experience. The Hegelian connecting link between a type of experience and an historical example is important to try to understand.

In this context, we might say that the system of experience both individual and social has for Hegel an historical aspect and a logical aspect.³ These aspects represent both an individual aspect as found in the events of history and a universal aspect as found in the Idea. To obtain a connection between historical events we must generalize or universalize. For Hegel this means to connect it to the Idea. To have the Idea actualized we must individualize it, make it concrete.

Both [of these aspects] are satisfied at once if the experience considered by this system is treated as the experience of a generalized individual. This working conception enables us to treat experience as a whole and at the same time to embrace the various modes of experience as these appear discretely in history.⁴

Hegel's use of Spirit on two levels, i.e. that of the World Spirit and the national spirit, are treated as generalized

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1. In regards to this purpose, it could be considered a failure. J. Royce says: "Few would have felt themselves introduced to anything." (Royce, LMI, 139).
 2. William James' book, The Varieties of Religious Experience, could be used to characterize the Phenomenology of Mind. Cf. Royce, LMI, 139.
 3. Cf. Hegel, POM, 46.
 4. Footnote by Baillie (tr.), in Hegel, POM, 46.

individuals. History is treated as an experiential process whereby Spirit becomes increasingly conscious of its Freedom. Ultimately, the true subject of history is the universal.

In so far as Hegel has taken these types of experience from the Phenomenology of Mind and looked for them in history, Hegel is a priori. If not the detail of history, at least the outline of history is arrived at in this way. But when we reflect that for Hegel the Phenomenology of Mind is a description of the movement of experience and is grounded in the attempt on Hegel's part to be empirically founded, we wonder whether even attributing to him this bit of a priorism is justified.

However, criticism is justified on account of one thing which seems to be the bugbear in this connection between the historical process and the dialectical process. This link is given by Royce:

The Phaenomenologie unites logic and history rather by means of a reducing of the thinking process to pragmatic terms than by means of a false translation of real life into the abstract categories of logic.¹

However, the aspect we fail to understand between Hegel's Logic and his Philosophy of History is his concept of necessity. He says, for instance, "that the history in question has constituted the rational necessary course of the World-Spirit."² World history must take the necessary next step

1. Royce, LMI, 145.
2. Hegel, PH, 10.

in progression. The transitions involved in history are necessary transitions.

The individual traverses as a unity various grades of development, and remains the same individual; in like manner also does a people, till the Spirit which it embodies reaches the grade of universality. In this point lies the fundamental, the Ideal necessity of transition.

In speaking of the form of constitution, Hegel very definitely gives us the idea of not only necessity but pre-destination. The particular form of constitution.

is only a step in the development of the grand Whole -- with its place preappointed in the process; a fact which gives the highest sanction to the constitution in question, and establishes its absolute necessity.²

3. ABSOLUTE AND FINITE

The rest of the problems to be dealt with could be put under the heading: "Problems arising out of the relationship between the Absolute and finite."³ We have hinted at the difficulties entailed in Hegel's doctrine of time in its relation to history.

Understanding Hegel's use of the concept of the "cunning of Reason" presents us with some difficulty also. Reason sets men's passions to work for it, and History "is the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states,

1. Hegel, PH, 78.

2. Ibid., 46.

3. The problem of the "cunning of Reason" could be put under this heading.

and the virtue of individuals have been victimized."¹ The moral claims of individuals must not be brought into collision with world-historical deeds and their accomplishment. Is this reconcilable with the fact that "God governs the world; the actual working of his government -- the carrying out of his plan -- is the History of the world?"² This view, although Hegel would declaim influence, can easily be the justification for the sacrificing of individuals for a "divine cause."

Difficulties come about also when we consider Hegel's view of Freedom. We found that the State represented the embodiment of concrete freedom and history presented us with the realization by man that his interests and truth lie in the universal. But we have seen that the latent abstract development of Spirit is regarded as necessary.

Since mind is implicitly and actually reason, and reason is explicit to itself in mind as knowledge, world history is the necessary development, out of the concept of mind's freedom alone.

It seems true that man is making the world his own and thereby attaining to Freedom in the sense of self-sufficiency and autonomy. But if the freedom of choice is to be included within this concrete freedom of Hegel's,⁴ we are still left with the problem of the place of the individual in light of

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1. Hegel, PH, 21.
 2. Ibid., 36.
 3. Knox, HPR, 216.
 4. Cf. Wallace, LOH, 264.

the social whole. Moreover, what could the freedom of the individual ultimately mean in Hegel's system? What could "self-determinate" and "self-sufficiency" mean in a system which holds to organicism and internal relations? The only self-determined and self-sufficient thing would be the Whole, the Absolute.¹

In conclusion, something needs to be said about the place of the individual in Hegel's Philosophy of History.

The individual does not seem to play an important role in Hegel's system. History has to do with the World Spirit and except for a few world-historical individuals the individual seems relegated to taking a back seat.

The individual receives Providential care and the pious recognize it as such but compared to the Providence as found in History it is "peddling."

But these instances of providential design are of a limited kind, and concern the accomplishment of nothing more than the desire of the individual in question. But in the history of the World, the Individuals we have to do with are Peoples; Totalities that are States. We cannot, therefore, be satisfied with what we may call this "peddling" view of Providence.²

But whether we accuse Hegel of losing the individual in the Absolute, in the state, or in the World Spirit, the individual still has a part to play. A case can be made for both sides.

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1. Even the statement that Hegel's Absolute is self-sufficient is at least questionable. Josiah Royce states that "an Absolute which is not expressed in finite form is impossible" (Royce, LMI, 169). Is this a limitation upon the Absolute?
 2. Hegel, PH, 14.

The individual must make the world a part of himself, a part of his own doing. In so far as the individual embodies a universal principle, in so far as he possesses Reason, he will be working in accordance with God's Providential Plan. Hegel is working on the hypothesis, perhaps we could say the conviction, that the rational is overcoming the irrational and contingent. Through the efforts of the individual, the World of Reason must become constructed, nature must become organized, according to the principles of Reason. This is the path toward truth, the Whole.

Royce states that "the Infinite exists only as the truth of the finite; the perfect can be real only as the fulfillment of what is sought by the imperfect."¹

This only can be done if it is established that our knowledge is an expression of ourselves and the Absolute and not of something alien from us.² The subject is to make the world its own work. But first he must discover his own freedom and his own infinite capabilities. This discovery of man's basic freedom was made in Greece with the dictum, "Man, know thyself." The making of the world of reality into the subject's own doing took until the French Revolution. This process of knowledge is the process of history.

1. Royce, LMI, 218.

2. Hegel's confidence in human knowledge no doubt is derived largely from his epistemological monism; therein lies part of the rub. Does a metaphysical monism follow directly from this?

The course of history does not show us the
 Becoming of things foreign to us, but the Becoming
 of ourselves and of our own knowledge.¹

Without fear of being too histrionic, let us say that
 Hegel believes man has a task to perform and that is to
 realize his own freedom and his place in the universe. This
 task, this striving to find a place, is expressed wonderfully
 by Walt Whitman in one of his better poems:

A noiseless patient spider,
 I mark'd where on a little promontory
 it stood isolated,
 Mark'd how to explore the vacant vast
 surrounding,
 It launch'd forth filament, filament,
 filament, out of itself.
 Ever unreeling them, ever tirelessly
 speeding them.

And you O my soul where you stand,
 Surrounded, detached, in measureless
 oceans of space,
 Ceaselessly musing, venturing, throwing,
 seeking the spheres to connect them.
 Till the bridge you will need be form'd,
 till the ductile anchor hold,
 Till the gossamer thread you fling
 catch somewhere, O my soul.

1. Hegel, HP, 4.

ABSTRACT

We have found that Hegel's philosophy of history is in organic connection with the rest of his philosophical system. His hypothesis, the concept of Reason, has been taken from his system. Any understanding of his philosophy of history entails some acquaintance with his system as a whole.

An understanding of Hegel's philosophy of history and, indeed, his thought in general, is made much easier if the direction in which he is going, the end he has in mind, is comprehended. Hegel's philosophy of history is an attempt to discover a meaning behind the entire course of the world. The empirical and historical facts are given to the philosophical historian; it is his task to ascertain the significance of these facts and the significance of their particular sequence. Hegel, by taking a comprehensive and synoptic view of the world's history, gives us, at first by way of hypothesis, the final cause of the world's history: Reason. Reason is the "inward guiding soul" of the world's history and that history presents us with a rational process.

Hegel's concept of Reason is quite comprehensive. It is man's substantial being and lies implicit within him. In this sense, the history of the world presents us man's gradual discipline of his own uncontrolled natural will. In terms of the Absolute, Reason is the Providential design at work in the

world's history, and as such it is a purposive activity. Hegel's philosophy of history is, then, teleological. The history of the world offers us God's purposive and rational activity and in this respect history is, for Hegel, a Theodicaea.

We have found also that another concept inextricably bound up with his system is the concept of Freedom. Self-conscious Reason, or Spirit, is gradually becoming conscious of its own freedom. Change in the realm of Spirit shows us an impulse of perfectibility. Freedom means for Hegel the Conscious realization upon the part of man that his interests, his inmost being, lie with the Universal. This is concrete Freedom and the State represents its embodiment.

The State then plays a central role in Hegel's philosophy of history. It represents the freedom of man in conscious union with the Whole. History presents us with state or political forms which have shown the advancement of man's recognition of his own freedom. Hegel's division of the world's history is in accordance with these stages.

The course of the world's history is one toward concreteness and inclusiveness. The success with which a given state integrates its citizens contained within the state determines the stage at which that society has reached. In the East man is blinded by the "Sun" and as such he is obedient to an abstract and external law. The "negation" of this is beginning to be realized by the Graeco-Roman civilizations, that external

law and custom have no authority over the individual and that he should follow the dictates of his own conscience and reason. The "synthesis" of these two is the realization of the German World that their own conscience and reason are already there in the law and Reason contained in Society and the State.

The freedom attained in history by man, then, is the freedom from the irrational control of nature while at the same time the freedom from uncontrolled natural will.

In regard to the empirical facts of history, the actual events of history, Hegel does amazingly well. He considers the natural, geographical, and economic factors in history.

We have found that the criticism charging Hegel with a priorism is not wholly founded but that certain difficulties do come about when we look closely at the relation which he holds between Absolute and finite mind. The "cunning of Reason" hardly seems reconcilable with the Theodicaea and there are difficulties in understanding what freedom as self-sufficiency could mean in an absolutistic system.

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