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# A theory of hope based upon Gabriel Marcel with implications for the psychiatrist and the minister

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GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

A THEORY OF HOPE BASED UPON GABRIEL MARCEL

WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR

THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE MINISTER

BY

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1. The Problem of This Study

The problem of this dissertation is to formulate a theory of hoping, based upon Gabriel Marcel's analysis of hope, and to indicate what implications this theory of hoping has for the work of the psychiatrist and the minister.

To study hope, or the hoping process, necessarily involves the consideration of: (1) the conditions of hope's occurrence; (2) the distinctive indicators of hoping, in contrast to other modes of expectation; and (3) the dynamic consequences of hoping.

Gabriel Marcel's analysis of hope considers these problems, as well as others, and it, therefore, provides a foundation for further study.

There are several different meanings attributed to the word "hope." There are many more meanings implied by the use of the word in everyday conversations. Hope has become a word that is often used but rarely with the same meaning. This is due partly to the lack of descriptive analyses of hope with implications relating to those persons, who would most likely apply the analyses to conditions of life. The purpose of this study is to make such an analysis.

## 2. Some Previous Concerns

The subject of hope has received renewed concern and study in recent years. For theology this revived interest reflects a traditional attention that has been given to the understanding of the meaning of hope.

There have been attempts of organized Christianity to bring together the various notions of hope in order to form a composite understanding of hope's meaning and significance.

The most recent such attempt was that of the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches at Evanston, Illinois in 1954 when the assembly dealt with the subject of hope.<sup>1</sup> Special preparation was made prior to the meeting in such books as The Christian Hope and the Second Coming by Paul Minear,<sup>2</sup> and The Christian Hope: The Presence and the Parousia by J. E. Fison.<sup>3</sup>

Historically the word "hope" has been variously understood and used within Christianity. These manifold applica-

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<sup>1</sup>The Christian Hope and the Task of the Church, Evanston preparatory volume, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).

<sup>2</sup>Paul Minear, The Christian Hope and the Second Coming (London: Westminster Press, 1954).

<sup>3</sup>J. E. Fison, The Christian Hope: The Presence and the Parousia, (London: Longmans, Green, 1954).

tions and considerations continue to remain and to confuse the issue.

Other disciplines, as well, have made attempts to understand this subject. Particularly is this true of the psychologically oriented disciplines. However, consideration of the meaning of hope is relatively new for these groups. Due to the newness of this interest, it is difficult to find many references to the subject of hope within the professional writings of such fields as psychology or psychiatry.

Some of the more notable examples are the chapter on "Hope" in Karl Menninger's Love Against Hate,<sup>1</sup> Paul Pruyser's paper "On Phenomenology and Dynamics of Hoping,"<sup>2</sup> Thomas French's several volume work The Integration of Behavior,<sup>3</sup> and the psychobiological laboratory studies of Curt Richter.<sup>4</sup> It is quite possible that new interest has been generated by Dr. Menninger's address on "Hope" before the American Psychiatric Association in Philadelphia, in 1959.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Karl A. Menninger, Love Against Hate (New York:Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1942), pp. 214-59.

<sup>2</sup>Paul W. Pruyser, "On Phenomenology and Dynamics of Hoping," (unpublished paper, The Menninger Foundation).

<sup>3</sup>Thomas M. French, The Integration of Behavior (3 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952-1958).

<sup>4</sup>Curt P. Richter, "On the Phenomenon of Sudden Death in Animals and Man," Psychosomatic Medicine, XIX (May-June, 1957).

<sup>5</sup>Karl A. Menninger, "Hope," American Journal of Psychiatry, CXVI (December, 1959), 481-91.

Notwithstanding such efforts, the problem of understanding the meaning of hope remains nearly the same. Conjecture concerning hope continues to range presently, as it has historically, from the metaphysical to the phenomenological and from theological and philosophical categories to metaphorical analogies.

There continues to be a need for an analysis of the meaning of hope that is descriptive in nature and which makes implications that meet the interests of the two fields most interested in the subject of hope at the present time--religion and psychiatry. This need provides some of the incentive for this study.

Also the impetus for this study follows from another direction. The implication, alluded to by the address of Karl Menninger<sup>1</sup> and by others such as Paul Pruyser<sup>2</sup> and Albert Ellis,<sup>3</sup> that hope might well be a significant variable in the recovery and the treatment of a patient, lends more importance to any attempt to understand the meaning and the dynamics of hope. For the minister, who also makes it his business to help troubled people and who often purports to bring The Hope to those

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 486.

<sup>2</sup>Pruyser, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup>Albert Ellis, "Helping Troubled People," Pastoral Psychology, IX (March, 1958), 33.

he serves, there would be a significant need for further study of the concept of hope.

### 3. Some Concepts of Hope

A comprehensive, historical survey of the varying concepts of hope is neither possible nor desirable in the context of this dissertation.

The real need at this point would appear to be the establishment of some relationship between the genesis of the concepts of hope and the present understanding of the term. Such a connection is represented in at least two historical positions. These positions are: (1) hope conceived as the expectation of evil or as evil itself, and (2) hope seen as an expectation of the future good.

#### i. Hope as the Expectation of Evil

Hope was seen as the expectation of evil or as evil itself. Often it was evil simply because there was a certain risk involved in committing oneself to that promise which may go unfulfilled. This is vividly expressed by Pindar who writes, ". . . The chase of a cheating prey with hopes that shall never be fulfilled."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Pindar Pythian Odes iii. 23.

Theognis of Megara writes in the Odes that, "Hope and risk in the world are alike: they are both spirits difficult to do with."<sup>1</sup> Solon of Athens gives similar counsel.<sup>2</sup>

This impression of hope has not escaped the writings of the more recent poets such as Cowper and Shelley. In his Prometheus Unbound, Shelly has hope abandoned as a failure,<sup>3</sup> and considers the absence of hope to be a blessing.<sup>4</sup> Cowper writes that hope is the delusion which ". . . sets the stamp of vanity on all, that men have deemed substantial since the fall."<sup>5</sup>

There was a period in Greek classical literature when hope was viewed as having aspects of both the evil and the good. This was especially true in the period dated by the writings of Homer (c. 700 B.C.) to those of the Greek historian, Herodotus of Halicarnassus (484? - 425? B.C.).

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<sup>1</sup>Theognis Odes i. 637-38.

<sup>2</sup>J. M. Edmonds (ed.) Elegy and Iambus, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), I, p. 149.

<sup>3</sup>Percy B. Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, ed. Vida Scudder (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1897), p. 427.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 462-66.

<sup>5</sup>William Cowper, The Poetical Works of William Cowper, (London: Frederick Warne and Co., n.d.), pp. 152-53.

Homer wrote in the Iliad, "Like strength is felt from hope and despair."<sup>1</sup> The word "hope" occurs at least twice in the Odyssey and holds only a neutral position in respect to the expectation of either good or evil.<sup>2</sup>

Plato still writes within this general vein of ambiguity, but tends more than earlier writers to be moving in the direction of using hope to mean the expectation of the good more than the evil. Plato writes in the Republic, "But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age: . . ."<sup>3</sup> Again Plato writes:

And therefore, I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.<sup>4</sup>

Hoping always that God will diminish the troubles that fall upon them by the blessings which he bestows, and will change for the better the present evils; and as to their blessings, hoping that they, contrariwise, will with the help of good fortune, be increased.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Homer Iliad xii. 852.

<sup>2</sup>Homer Odyssey xvi. 101. xix. 84.

<sup>3</sup>Plato Republic 331<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>4</sup>Plato Phaedo 63<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>5</sup>Plato Laws i. 732<sup>c</sup>.

## 11. Hope as Expectation of the Good

The concept of hope which appears the most prevalent historically is the notion of hope as expectation of obtaining that which is considered to be the "good" or the "desired."

This view of hope as the expectation of the good found its greatest support in the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

Ever since its Gospel origins, Christianity has forced theology and philosophy to become explicit about hope, to inculcate hope, to assume hope, to extol hope, to help people towards hope. Not that it invented hope or suddenly discovered its existence, but it called cognitively and dynamically man's attention to the fact that he is a hoping being.<sup>1</sup>

### 1) Hebrew Hope

The Hebrew words most often translated as "hope" are tikwah and seber. Mikweh, kislah, and tohelet are also thus rendered but they are more closely denoting trust, waiting for, and expectation.<sup>2</sup>

The earlier Jewish hope was centered in the glorious and blessed future of the nation of Israel and did not go much beyond the range of contemporary circumstances. "In its traditional form the hope of Israel was nationalistic in character."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Pruyser, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Adolf Guttmacher, "Hope" The Jewish Encyclopedia Vol. VI (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1906), p. 459.

<sup>3</sup>Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity In Its Contemporary Setting, (New York: Living Age Books Published by Meridian Books, 1956), p. 81.

Hope was then seen as the belief that all things of the world are controlled for the happiness of man, particularly the chosen of Israel, who had God as their special guardian<sup>1</sup> and as their redeemer.<sup>2</sup>

In addition, hope was essentially significant as the anticipation of help and aid from God that would come in future time and which was expected to counter the present troubles and difficulties. In emergencies the people would turn to the Lord and cry out, "O Lord, the hope of Israel,"<sup>3</sup> and expect to receive help from God.

In a real sense, these nationalistic hopes were representations of earthly hopes such as the hopes of social regeneration and well-being. These were prophetic types of hope or expressions of hope. There was an active expectation that God would deliver the nation from its oppressors and restore the former glory of the Davidic kingdom under the rule of the "Messiah," who was to be from the house of David. Israel was to be a righteous nation that would be immortal.<sup>4</sup> Men waited for the realization of their hope and "the greater the oppres-

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<sup>1</sup>Isaiah 41:8. 48:20.

<sup>2</sup>Exodus 6:6-8. Deuteronomy 7:6. Isaiah 43:4. Psalms 103:13.

<sup>3</sup>Jeremiah 14:8. 17:13. Psalms 119:116.

<sup>4</sup>II Samuel 7:12,16. Psalms 89:35-36. Jeremiah 23:5.

sion, the more excited the expectations and the more certain the conviction that the end is at hand and the greater their eagerness for its dawning."<sup>1</sup>

Later views of hope were to take on more supernatural connotations. The Messiah became more a figurehead of a government whose king was actually to be God himself. This was based on the conviction that God who is the moral judge of the world would bring about the final censure of vice and the justification of the righteous.<sup>2</sup> Broadly, whenever the national expectations foundered, the hope of Israel was centered and anchored in the expectation of the messianic kingdom.<sup>3</sup> The more often these hopes were dashed by unfulfillment the more frequent became the emphasis upon the supernatural rule of God through the Messiah.

Gradually the enemies of God were seen as more supernatural than human. The seer in Daniel describes some fantastic beasts that are enemies of God and the "saints of the most high."<sup>4</sup> But all enemies of God can and will be destroyed, even

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<sup>1</sup>Bultmann, op. cit., p. 80.

<sup>2</sup>Daniel 7. IV Ezra 7:33-37.

<sup>3</sup>James Hastings (ed.) A Dictionary of the Bible, Vol. II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), pp. 412-13.

<sup>4</sup>Daniel 7:1-7, 26, 27.

by the word of his mouth.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever war that was envisioned as necessary to bring about the rule of the Messianic Kingdom, it was considered to be one that would be settled by supernatural powers. The object of hope became salvation that follows some kind of cosmic catastrophe that would do away with the present world.<sup>2</sup> The doctrine of the resurrection of the dead is significantly attached to the rule of the Messianic Kingdom so that those who had suffered while waiting for its coming would not miss it, but they would be resurrected to enjoy the blessings of it.

Rudolf Bultmann writes that the most important development, during this period of emphasis upon the ruling Messiah coming in a future age, was the growth of apocalyptic writings and the working out of a cosmic eschatology while Israel was under Babylonian and Persian influence.<sup>3</sup>

This Hebrew eschatology was dedicated to the prophecy of two ages, the present age and the age to come. There was a definite period of separation between the two ages and Hebrew eschatology also attempted to discover when this division of the ages would come and how the people of Israel might recog-

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<sup>1</sup>Psalms of Solomon 17:27, 39.

<sup>2</sup>Daniel 7.

<sup>3</sup>Bultmann, op. cit., p. 82.

nize the signs of the approach of the new age. Equally important was the consideration of the changing of the hearts of the inhabitants of the world and the judgment by God of that world. The result of the judgment was to be the rewarding of eternal life to the righteous and the destruction of the ungodly.

The book of Daniel describes this judgment. The judge is God whose clothing and hair are white as snow and who appears as the "Ancient of Days." He is to be ministered unto by "thousands of thousands" while "ten thousand times ten thousands" stand before him for judgment, and set before him and opened are the books in which the deeds of men are recorded.<sup>1</sup>

Following the judgment, "one like unto a son of man" is to be given dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, a kingdom where all the people and nations will serve him. The "saints of the Most High," who receive the kingdom, will possess it forever as the reward of the righteous.<sup>2</sup> It is then that the new age begins. The hearts of the inhabitants of the world are to be changed into a different kind of spirit. Evil is blotted out and deceit extinguished. Corruption will be vanquished. Faithfulness will flourish and truth will be made manifest.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Daniel 7:9-10.

<sup>2</sup>Daniel 7:13-14, 18, 27.

<sup>3</sup>IV Ezra 6:26-28.

The new age is a return of Parádise where plenteousness is made ready, wisdom prevails, death is hidden, corruption forgotten, sorrows placed behind, and where the treasures of immortality are made manifest.<sup>1</sup>

## 2) Hope of the New Testament

The New Testament continues to emphasize hope as the expectation of the good. This "good" is often expressed as a joyful expectation of eternal salvation and is found in several places of the New Testament.<sup>2</sup> Hope is variously described in the New Testament by such terms as "good hope,"<sup>3</sup> "blessed hope,"<sup>4</sup> "hope of glory,"<sup>5</sup> and "hope of righteousness."<sup>6</sup>

In general the New Testament eschatology, marked by the preaching and teaching of Jesus, is in agreement with the Old Testament's imminent expectation of the Messianic Kingdom.<sup>7</sup> It is still open to question as to whether Jesus thought the reign of God was immediately imminent or already present in his person. Today the latter is called "realized eschatology."

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<sup>1</sup>IV Ezra 8:52-54.

<sup>2</sup>Acts 23:6. 26:6-7. Romans 8:24. I Peter 1:3. 3:15. Hebrews 6:19. Titus 3:7.

<sup>3</sup>II Thessalonians 2:16.

<sup>4</sup>Titus 2:13.

<sup>5</sup>Colossians 1:27.

<sup>6</sup>Galatians 5:5.

<sup>7</sup>Mark 1:15.

However, Jesus does repudiate the nationalistic form of hope by stress upon the coming spiritual reign of God.

This spiritual reign begins partly now as it is within individuals that God is to reign according to the New Testament. "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observations: Neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you."<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, it is said by the Scriptures that there is a future time when the "Son of man" shall come in the clouds with great power and glory. The sun and the moon will be darkened, the stars of heaven will fall, and the evil powers shall be shaken. The Son of man will send his angels to gather together the elect from the uttermost parts of the earth, and it is to be a time of gathering of which no one knows but the Father and for which men must prepare and watch.<sup>2</sup> Bultmann writes of Jesus:

He never looks back upon the past epochs of world history or attempts to date the End. He never invites his hearers to look for signs of the end in nature or history. Equally, he eschews all elaboration of detail as regards the judgment, resurrection and future glory. All these elements are absorbed in the single all-embracing thought that God will then reign.<sup>3</sup>

New Testament eschatology concerning hope can be understood from at least three different viewpoints: (1) realized

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<sup>1</sup>Luke 17:20-21.

<sup>2</sup>Mark 13:24-27, 32-37.

<sup>3</sup>Bultmann, op. cit., p. 87.

hope, (2) the fulfillment of hope as yet to come, and (3) a combined view that hope is at once fulfilled and future.

The viewpoint of hope as realized is influenced largely by such views of eschatology as C. H. Dodd's theory of "realised eschatology."<sup>1</sup> The effect of such a theory is that the final age is considered to be already present. The present days are seen as the last days and this age is to be the final phase of God's dealings with men. Hope is to be fulfilled in this present age and man's hope for salvation is to be made complete and final.

Support for this view is gathered from the teachings of Jesus that declare that the time is fulfilled and the reign of God has come near or is at hand<sup>2</sup> and from the belief of Jesus that in his own work the powers of God's kingdom were already being unleashed.<sup>3</sup> Satan, who once held the world under his power, is now on the way to being conquered by God.

And the seventy returned again with joy, saying, Lord even the devils are subject to us through thy name. And he said unto them, I beheld Satan as lightening fall from heaven. Behold, I give unto you power to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy, and nothing shall by any means hurt you.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and Its Development (2d. ed. New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1944), passim.

<sup>2</sup>Mark 1:15.

<sup>3</sup>Luke 11:20. Matthew 12:28.

<sup>4</sup>Luke 10:17-19.

The viewpoint of realized hope is also based upon Christ's expectations of the coming of the Son of man. "For as the lightning cometh out of the east, and shineth even unto the west; so shall also the coming of the Son of man be."<sup>1</sup> The Son of man was expected by Jesus to come in all the glory of his Father in heaven<sup>2</sup> and to have the power to "confess" and "deny" men before the angels of God.<sup>3</sup> Additional support to this position by reliance upon the teachings of Jesus is found in Jesus' concern with the resurrection of the dead and the life that follows<sup>4</sup> and with the coming judgment.<sup>5</sup>

The writings of Paul are also considered by some to add support to the argument of the "end as having come." Paul makes reference to those who are now perishing and those who are now being saved.<sup>6</sup> Paul believes that Christians have been made a new creation.<sup>7</sup> Those who are of the new creation are seen by Paul as having been bought by the blood of Jesus and thus brought from death to life<sup>8</sup> and delivered from the dominion of darkness.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Matthew 24:27.

<sup>2</sup>Mark 8:38.

<sup>3</sup>Luke 12:8-9.

<sup>4</sup>Mark 12:18-27.

<sup>5</sup>Luke 11:31-32.

<sup>6</sup>II Corinthians 2:15.

<sup>7</sup>II Corinthians 5:17.

<sup>8</sup>Romans 6:13.

<sup>9</sup>Colossians 1:13.

For those who are of the new creation there is now no condemnation<sup>1</sup> because they have received the atonement<sup>2</sup> according to Paul.

We, then, as workers together with him, beseech you also that ye receive not the grace of God in vain. (For he saith, I have heard thee in a time accepted, and in a day of salvation have I succoured thee: behold, now is the accepted time; behold, now is the day of salvation.)<sup>3</sup>

In summary, it has been suggested that one way of perceiving hope is as hope based upon the eschatological position that the "end" is already realized in the person of Jesus. In terms of the expectation of the good, this view of hope would see the good as, at least partially, already being fulfilled.

Another position taken on hope is that hope has not been realized or fulfilled and is yet to come in future time. It is based primarily on an eschatological position that contends that the "end is yet to come." This view in some ways is an extreme continuation of the Hebrew apocalyptic strain, and this position would declare that the kingdom is to be inaugurated by a cataclysmic intervention at which time Christ will return in full power to establish the divine rule.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Romans 8:1.

<sup>2</sup>Romans 5:11.

<sup>3</sup>II Corinthians 6:1-2.

<sup>4</sup>Harold L. DeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 306-07.

Support for this view, like the first position, comes basically from the teachings of Jesus and how one interprets those teachings. It is held that the New Testament not only speaks of what has happened in the past and what is presently taking place, but that the New Testament also looks forward to a future consummation of what has already begun.

It is argued that the portion of the prayer taught by Jesus to his disciples that asks "Thy Kingdom Come"<sup>1</sup> can be interpreted as support for the future fulfillment of that kingdom. Jesus called himself a sign like unto the sign of Jonah that would be a signal of the kingdom coming.<sup>2</sup> But, the coming of the Son of Man, who is to be a sign of the kingdom, will be at a time when men think not.<sup>3</sup>

Jesus spoke of having seen Satan fall like lightning from heaven,<sup>4</sup> but Paul wrote of Satan as still at work on the earth.<sup>5</sup>

The apocalyptic purport of peace, that is to come with the kingdom, must remain to future fulfillment when consideration is made of Christ's claim that his present coming was to divide

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<sup>1</sup>Matthew 6:10.

<sup>2</sup>Luke 11:29-30.

<sup>3</sup>Luke 12:40, 46.

<sup>4</sup>Luke 10:18.

<sup>5</sup>I Corinthians 7:5. I Thessalonians 2:18.

rather than to give peace.<sup>1</sup>

Jesus described the world following the resurrection of the dead, which apocalyptic literature held to be a part of the new age and the kingdom of God, as one where men are not given in marriage nor can they die anymore since they have become the children of God.<sup>2</sup>

Before such a resurrection takes place there shall be wars, earthquakes, famines, pestilences, fearful sights, and great signs from heaven but still the end is not yet. Jesus proclaims that before the end shall come there shall be signs in the sun, moon, and the stars; there shall be distress and perplexity among nations of the earth where men's hearts fail them for fear; and then shall men see the Son of man coming in a cloud with great power and glory.<sup>3</sup> Jesus concludes, "So likewise ye, when ye see these things come to pass, know ye that the kingdom of God is nigh at hand."<sup>4</sup>

In summary, another way of perceiving hope is as hope based on the eschatological position that the "end" is yet to come in future time. In terms of expectation of the good, this view, while not necessarily denying that some hope is already fulfilled, holds that the good is yet primarily future.

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<sup>1</sup>Luke 12:51.

<sup>2</sup>Luke 20:34-36.

<sup>3</sup>Luke 21:7-11. 25-27.

<sup>4</sup>Luke 21:31.

In light of the apparent opposition of hope viewed as "having come" or "realized" and as "yet to come" it would seem that a third position is necessary. Falling somewhere between the poles of the two previous positions is a combined view of hope that declares hope, that is expectation of the good, to be both fulfilled and future. This position is based upon that eschatological position which would hold that the eschatological vision includes past, present and future, and that eschatological thought is concerned with the beginning and the end.

This view contends that Christian eschatology cannot be directed toward the future only because the salvation for which the Christian hopes has already been given him in part. Paul says that the Christian has already received an earnest or a guarantee of the future life by the presence of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the Christian.<sup>1</sup>

Jesus made it clear that he thought the reign of God was approaching and, if nothing more, his own presence was for the purpose of drawing men to consider his presence as indicative of the present as a time of decision.

Jesus clearly believes that the present age is ebbing out. Mark's summary of his preaching ("The time is fulfilled, and the reign of God has drawn nigh," Mark 1.15) is a fair representative of numerous sayings of Jesus which point to a new future and characterize the present as the time of decision. . . .The unique feature of his teaching is the assurance with which he proclaims that now has the time come. The Reign of God is breaking in.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>II Corinthians 1:22. Ephesians 1:14.

<sup>2</sup>Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

Though the time for God's reign may be considered to be breaking into this age, it is perceived as something yet to come. The New Testament sees the Christian person as having passed from death into life and as having become a child of God when he has responded to Christ's love with a similar love for his "brother."<sup>1</sup> The Christian's salvation is not made complete, however, until Christ returns at the end of the age, and at which time he will make all of the redeemed persons completely "like him."<sup>2</sup> The children of God or the Church may be seen as already in the kingdom of God, but they continue to hope for the coming of the kingdom at the end of the "age" at which time the kingdom will be complete.

In essence this third view combines the first two views of hope, which were based upon the eschatological positions that the "end has come" or that the "end is yet to come." This third viewpoint contends that the two former views do not, as it were, contradict but actually complement each other. In respect to hope as the expectation of the good, this viewpoint would hold that the fulfillment of that expectation is both present and future.

Essentially it is this position which was adopted by the biblical scholars who made pre-Evanston preparations for the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1954. These

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<sup>1</sup>I John 3:14.

<sup>2</sup>I John 3:2.

biblical scholars agreed that the concept of the Kingdom of God in the New Testament is presented as both present and future.

It is to this third eschatological view of hope that this study will subscribe, adding the supplementary caution of Walter Horton and J. E. Fison that the "mystical, spiritualizing tendency to rejoice in Christ's presence" is no complete "substitute for the hope of his parousia."<sup>2</sup> Mysticism and eschatology seem to complement each other in the New Testament's concept of hope.

At the mystical level of love the end can be both expected imminently at any minute and also experienced or realized immanently as having already occurred. The parousia can be the presence too; indeed it must be, or else the future reality is merely phantasy.<sup>3</sup>

### 3) Some Christian Writers

The theme of hope as the expectation of the future good is continued by numerous Christian writers. Some of the historically important writers are considered here for the purpose of indicating the continuation of this theme of hope to the present time.

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<sup>1</sup>Report of the Zetten Conference on the "Meaning of Hope in the Bible," Ecumenical Review, IV (July, 1952), 424.

<sup>2</sup>Walter Horton, Christian Theology: An Ecumenical Approach (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 267.

<sup>3</sup>Fison, op. cit., p. 197.

Saint Augustine quoting from Romans 8:24, which says that "we are saved by hope," adds:

As, therefore, we are saved, so we are made happy by hope. And as we do not as yet possess a present, but look for a future salvation, so it is with our happiness, and this "with patience"; for we are encompassed with evils, which we ought patiently to endure, until we come to the ineffable enjoyment of unmixed good; for there shall be no longer anything to endure.<sup>1</sup>

Elsewhere he argues that hope will not be deceived and that the saints are blessed in hope in this life. Possession of happiness in this life is seen as false unless it is related to a hope in what is beyond this life.<sup>2</sup> For "hope deals only with good things, and only with those which lie in the future, . . ."<sup>3</sup>

For Thomas Aquinas hope is a necessary virtue because it meets the qualifications of causing its owner to be good and because its works are good. It is a theological virtue because its object is God. In consequence of this virtue and a belief in it, hope stirs the believer to expect that through God's help he may gain possession of the goods he naturally desires.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Augustine, City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Modern Library, 1950), p. 680.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 698-99.

<sup>3</sup>Augustine, Confessions and Enchiridion, vol. VII of the Library of Christian Classics, trans. Albert C. Outler (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1955), p. 340.

<sup>4</sup>Thomas Aquinas, Compendium of Theology, trans. Cyril Vollert (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), p. 313.

Before a thing can be hoped for it must first be a desired good. Things that are not desired are not objects of hope but rather they are feared or despised. It is also true that what one already has he does not hope for, because the expectation in hope is for that which is still future.<sup>1</sup>

Apparently scholastic theologians continue generally to emphasize hope as a movement of the appetite towards a future good, which is considered to be possible of attainment through difficult means. In its widest acceptance, hope is described as the "desire of something together with the expectation of obtaining it."<sup>2</sup>

Martin Luther stresses that hoping is man's expecting the passing of evil and the coming of good things.

Though they are uncertain of the future, yet they hope with certain hope and hereby they are meanwhile buoyed up, lest falling into the further evil of despair, they should break down under their present evil and do some worse things.<sup>3</sup>

The "coming of good things" is often embodied by Luther in his treatment of eternal life. The hope of attaining eternal life is the expectation of the good things being

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 324.

<sup>2</sup>Joseph F. Delany, "Hope" The Catholic Encyclopedia, VII (New York: Encyclopedia Press, 1913), p. 465.

<sup>3</sup>Martin Luther, The Works of Luther, vol. I of the Philadelphia Edition (Philadelphia: Muhlenburg Press, 1943), pp. 146-47.

fulfilled.

Moreover, this is also written that we might preserve in our minds a sure hope of the future and eternal life. All the things God wants done on the Sabbath are clear signs of another life after this life. Why is it necessary for God to speak with us through His word if we are not to live in a future and eternal life? If we are not to hope for a future life why do we not live like people with whom God does not speak and who do not know God?<sup>1</sup>

John Calvin dealt with hope as it related to faith.

In summation of an exposition on the relationship of hope and faith he concluded:

So that in one word hope is nothing more than the expectation of those things which faith previously believes to have been truly promised by God. Thus, faith believes that God is true; hope expects that in due season he will manifest his truth.<sup>2</sup>

Modern day theologians continue the theme of hope as the expectation of the good. Karl Barth defines hope by contrasting the eternal and the temporal hope. Hope is really only one for Barth. But in this one hope there is a great hope and a small hope. Hope is the expectation of the good in this life and also the temporal expectation of the great hope of eternal life.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Martin Luther, Luther's Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Vol. I (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), pp. 80-81.

<sup>2</sup>John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge, vol. I (London: James Clarke Co., 1953), p. 506.

<sup>3</sup>Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. IV: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, trans. G. W. Bromiley from Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, IV: Die Lehre von der Versöhnung, (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1956), p. 120.

Emil Brunner sees hope as one of the ways in which what is merely future and potential is made present and actual to us. The hope of the Christian is both "closely bound up with the present" and the ultimate. The former is considered to be more necessary to human life than the latter, though he contends that it becomes increasingly difficult for immediate hope to survive where ultimate hope no longer exists. He asks how can personal hopes be "nourished in an atmosphere of general hopelessness?"<sup>1</sup> Both immediate and ultimate hope express an expectation of good for Brunner.

Hope as expectation of the future good, becomes most clear in Brunner's discussion of the personal and universal aspects of hope. In either case, whether personal or universal, Brunner sees the expected good as embodied in the perfection of God's kingdom and in eternal life. Uncertainty, as to whether that which is to come will be good or bad, causes anxiety. Hope is able to overcome any such anxiety by its expectation of future good based on the belief that Christ has overcome the uncertainty of death.<sup>2</sup>

Rudolf Bultmann bases his concept of hope on the contention that Christ understood his present days to be decisive ones

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<sup>1</sup>Emil Brunner, The Eternal Hope, trans. Harold Knight (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), pp. 12-13.

<sup>2</sup>Emil Brunner, Faith, Hope and Love, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), p. 54.

because the time had arrived when the old promises and hopes would be fulfilled. In addition Jesus made no promises about the splendid future of Israel and the restoration of the house of David, but instead promised only salvation and a life that would be like that of the angels in heaven.<sup>1</sup> Bultmann makes it clear that he believes that each man anticipates the future and is continually "stretching forth" into the future. Hope is one of the devices used by men to stretch forward into the future in expectation of the approaching good.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, it may be said that hope has been viewed from two historical positions in respect to hope as expectation. Either of these positions may be understood to be present when the word "hope" is used. However, the most predominant position presently is that of hope expressed as the expectation of future good.

This view of hope has long been supported by the Judaeo-Christian tradition in at least three ways: (1) hope as realized, (2) hope as yet to be fulfilled, and (3) hope as fulfilled both presently and future. This study proposes that the most universal concept of the nature of hope is: that hope is the expectation of future good, partially being fulfilled presently and partially to be fulfilled at some future time.

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<sup>1</sup>Rudolf Bultmann, The Presence of Eternity: History and Eschatology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 32-33.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 140-41.

#### 4. The Limitations of This Study

The brief survey of this chapter of the prevailing concepts of hope raises many theological questions. Some of the problems raised are: (1) the variety versus the unity of biblical eschatology, (2) the problem of true and false hope, (3) the transformation occasioned in passing from earlier to later forms of hope, (4) the relationship of hope to faith, and (5) personal versus universal aspects of hope. But because these questions raise problems that are not covered in the scope of this dissertation, they will be referred to only when they are related to the development of the purpose of this dissertation.

This study will be limited to Gabriel Marcel's definition of hope and a descriptive analysis based upon Marcel's work. From this descriptive analysis certain implications will be drawn and applied to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister. This study now moves to Marcel's analysis of hope in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER II

### GABRIEL MARCEL'S ANALYSIS OF HOPE

Gabriel Marcel's analysis of hope provides the theoretical basis for the descriptive analysis of the hoping process to be discussed in later chapters. It is therefore necessary to examine Marcel's analysis.

#### 1. The Process of Hope

Hope is seen by Marcel as a process, an activity. This concept of hope as process confirms Marcel's emphasis upon "being" that necessarily means "being on the way."<sup>1</sup> Hope is understood to be "on the way" as well. "Hope is not a kind of listless waiting; it underpins action or it runs before it, but it becomes degraded and lost once the action is spent."<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps the best indication of Marcel's intentions to make hope a process, is his usage of "hope" and "hoping"

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<sup>1</sup>Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope, trans. Emma Craufurd (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951), p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, trans. Manya Harari (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 20.

interchangeably. In any case, he states that process and activity are involved whenever anyone is engaged in "hope" or in "hoping." Hope is vital and energetic. It is like knowledge that becomes more than a matter of having past information concerning a condition, it is present knowing. Hope is more than having completed an act; it is acting. Marcel claims that hope "is for the soul what breathing is for the living organism."<sup>1</sup> Where this hope is lacking, the soul will dry up and wither and become no more than a function fit only as an object of study.<sup>2</sup>

Hoping is a process that involves more than the individual person, for "hope is only possible on the level of the us, or we might say of the agape, and that it does not exist on the level of the ego, . . ."<sup>3</sup>

He who hopes, inasmuch as his hope is real and not to be reduced to a mere platonic wish, seems to himself to be involved in some kind of process; and it is only from this point of view that it is possible to realise what is specific, and, I should add super-rational, perhaps also super-relational, in hope.<sup>4</sup>

Hope is engaged in the weaving of experience now in process. In other words, hope is engaged in an adventure now going forward.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, pp. 10-11.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

As an activity or process, hope performs in various fashions. Hope is the being's active and veritable response to any sense of captivity or trial that may arise. Such captivity may be in the form of sickness, separation, exile, or slavery. Existence itself is seen as captivity by Marcel.<sup>1</sup>

From this it would appear that at the back of hope lies some sort of tragedy. To hope is to carry within me the private assurance that however black things may seem, my present intolerable situation cannot be final; there must be some way out. . . . The first and perhaps the main point is that the assurance cannot just be overlaid on something inert. The being who hopes is putting forth a sort of interior activity, even though it may not be easy to define the nature of that activity.<sup>2</sup>

Hope as a process also transcends the particular objects to which it at first seems to be attached.

Hope, by a nisus which is peculiar to it, tends inevitably to transcend the particular objects to which it at first seems to be attached.<sup>3</sup>

Marcel sees hope as a process engaged in an adventure directed towards the future. Hope appears to pierce through time and thereby to become prophetic.

Hope appears as piercing through time; everything happens as though time, instead of hedging consciousness round, allowed something to pass through it. It was from this point of view that I previously drew attention to the prophetic character of hope. Of course one cannot say that hope sees what is going to happen; but it affirms as if it saw.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 30-32.

<sup>2</sup>Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, vol. II: Faith and Reality, trans. Rene Hague (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951), p. 160.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

Hope is not seen by Marcel to be a kind of listless waiting, but rather it is hope that underpins actions and runs before them. Hope is the prolongation into the unknown of an activity that is central and rooted in being.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. The Context of Hope

For Marcel, there is a particular time at which hope can and does occur. Marcel describes these specific times or situations as those perceived by the individual to have the nature of captivity.

### i. The Nature of Captivity

This state of captivity, so perceived by the individual, may be described by such terms as illness, separation, exile, or slavery. Whatever description is used, the individual is considered to be in a captive state whenever he finds himself forced by external constraint into a compulsory mode of existence. This existence involves restrictions of every conceivable nature, and consequences, which may touch any of one's personal activities, result.

The climate in such a situation is that of impossibility. There is a pervading feeling that there is no possibility of moving or acting in a manner that is relatively free. More importantly, in this state of captivity, it is not considered possible to gain the freedom necessary to ascend to a

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, p. 20.

"certain fullness of life, which may be in the realms of sensation or even of thought in the strict sense of the word."<sup>1</sup>

It is quite clear, for instance, that the artist or writer who suffers from a prolonged sterility has literally a sense of being in prison, or if you prefer, in exile, as though he had really been taken out of the light in which he normally has his being. We can, therefore, say that all captivity partakes of the nature of alienation.<sup>2</sup>

#### ii. The Relationship of Hope to Captivity

Hope is not seen as something that is outside the struggle of captivity. Indeed, it is to these "tragic" and "impossible" situations that hope is invited and in which hope participates. For Marcel, it is impossible to separate hope from the framework of the trial.

For the purposes of illustration, let us suppose that an individual or the group to which the individual belongs is going through a time of trial. The individual would long for some deliverance, either for himself alone or for the group. In this case, Marcel would see the "I hope" as directed towards salvation, and would see the liberated individual as "coming out of a darkness" in which the individual had been plunged previously.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

It is obviously impossible in such cases to separate the "I hope" from a certain type of situation of which it is really a part. Hope is situated within the framework of the trial, not only corresponding to it, but constituting our being's veritable response.<sup>1</sup>

The situation where the tragic element seems to be absent does not invite the presence of hope. The dwelling-place of hope is at the very center of captivity.

By a paradox which need surprise only the very superficial thinker, the less life is experienced as a captivity the less the soul will be able to see the shining of that veiled, mysterious light, which, we feel sure without any analysis, illumines the very centre of hope's dwelling-place.

There is no hope except where the feeling of captivity is so great that the temptation to despair exists. Hope is the act by which this temptation is actively and victoriously overcome.<sup>3</sup> But hope first accepts the trial as an integral part of the self while at the same time it considers the trial to be destined to transmutation through "the inner workings of a certain creative process."<sup>4</sup>

"It seems strangely enough, that, in hoping, I develop

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

in connection with the event, and perhaps above all through what it makes of me, a type of relationship, . . ."<sup>1</sup>

Precisely when human existence takes on the appearance and form of captivity, this human existence then becomes subject to hope. Conversely, those situations, in which the tragic element seems to be absent, do not invite but rather seem to reject the presence of hope.

Everything goes to show that hope does not bear upon what is in me, upon the region of my interior life, but much more on what arises independently of my possible action, and particularly of my action on myself: . . ."<sup>2</sup>

### 3. The Object of Hope

Marcel's theory concerning the object of hope appears to offer one of the more valuable contributions to the understanding of hope, because it is here that one can begin to make distinctions between Marcel's theory of hope and such terms as wishing, illusions, and delusions. This theory of hope equally provides a difficulty in description due to the emphasis upon the "mystery" of hope concerning the object.

#### i. The Nature of the Object

Marcel's approach, at this point, is very similar to the one taken by the Apostle Paul who writes, "For we are

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

saved by hope: but hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it."<sup>1</sup>

The similarity of Marcel's theory of hope to Paul's description of "hope for that we see not" is most predominant in Marcel's claim that hope "tends inevitably to transcend the particular objects to which it at first seems to be attached."<sup>2</sup> This distinction is indicated through the usage and comparison of the absolute statement "I hope . . ." and the particular and concrete statement "I hope that . . .".

The expression "I hope" is directed in all its capacity towards salvation.<sup>3</sup> Salvation in this sense becomes a global or universal object rather than a particular object. In sensory terms, at least, salvation as object is seen as abstract rather than concrete.

"I hope" is opposed to "I hope that" because, for Marcel, real hope transcends the imagination of a specific and concrete object.

The individual does not allow himself to imagine a concrete object of his hope. To "hope that" a particular

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<sup>1</sup>Romans 8:24-25.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 32.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

thing will occur or that a particular thing will happen at a specific time, is to reduce hope to self-made conditions that attempt to bind a future that is without one's control. To Marcel, the formation of such conditions actually becomes an obstacle that limits the process of hoping.

Let us say again, to fix the meaning of the word obstacle more precisely, that in so far as I make my hope conditional I myself put up limits to the process by which I could triumph over all successive disappointments.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to becoming an obstacle to hope, such conditional setting of limits may lead to and increase the possibility of despair. This would be due to the fact that the individual's expectations failed to materialize in a specific fashion or at a specific time. Marcel would conceive it possible on the other hand, that one, who sets no relative conditions and who abandons himself in absolute confidence, could transcend all possible disappointment.<sup>2</sup>

#### ii. The Mystery of Hope in Relation to the Object

This process of hoping is not seen by Marcel as a problem but rather as a mystery. As a mystery hope is super-rational and super-relational. However, hope as a mystery does not imply or allow for such a statement as: "I am in the secret, I know the purpose of God or of the gods, whilst you

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

are a profane outsider; and moreover it is because I have the benefit of special enlightenment that I say what I do."<sup>1</sup> It is meant by Marcel that mystery communicates a fundamental insufficiency in any attempt to reduce the process of hope to rationalistic interpretations. The object of hope is one of these portions of the hoping process that remain such a mystery.

Hope consists in asserting that there is at the heart of being, beyond all data, beyond all inventories and all calculations, a mysterious principle which is in connivance with me, which cannot but will that which I will, if what I will deserves to be willed and is, in fact, willed by the whole of my being.<sup>2</sup>

According to Marcel the treatment of hope as a mystery is to understand the very essence of hope. One of the major arguments directed against hope is that based on past experience. This past experience of specific cases and instances may lead to the individual's denial of any different possibilities that may form the unspecified object of hope. The essence of hope, which remains mysterious, is to exclude subservience to such cases. In addition, hope is to rise to a plane, which transcends but does not deny, the level of all possible empirical disproof of the object of hope.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, p. 16.

It is quite useless to tell me of discouraging cases or examples; beyond all experience, all probability, all statistics, I assert that a given order shall be reestablished, that reality is on my side in willing it to be so. I do not wish; I assert; such is the prophetic tone of my true hope.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, Marcel considers any attempt to be tragic that judges or condemns the object of hope through the usage of past experiences. It is tragic in the sense that such an attempt causes whatever may be specific in hope to vanish from proper perspective.

But postulated at the very basis of hope is the non-validity of such assertions, the truth that the more the real is real the less does it lend itself to a calculation of possibilities on the basis of accepted experience.<sup>2</sup>

Because the object of hope is not specific and concrete, hope is not interested in the technical question of how the end or the object is to be achieved. "He who hopes says simply: 'It will be found'"<sup>3</sup> The one who relies on past experiences only will eventually deny the possibility of change except when it repeats the patterns of past experience.

In hoping, I do not create in the strict sense of the word, but I appeal to the existence of a certain creative power in the world, or rather to the actual resources at the disposal of this creative power. Where, on the other

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 51.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

hand, my spirit has been as it were tarnished by catalogued experience, I refuse to appeal to the creative power, I deny its existence; all outside me, and perhaps within me also (if I am logical) appears to me as simple repetition.<sup>1</sup>

In a very real sense, Marcel sees hope to be the affirmation of Being as sustaining the worth of whatever deserves one's wholehearted allegiance. Hope is directed toward Being itself and rises above or beyond the plane of empirical eventualities and is directed toward salvation . . . the affirmation that man can be related to Being.

Marcel says for example, when one hopes for a friend who is seriously ill, one's fundamental affirmation is that reality cannot be indifferent to the stricken person. To hope specifically for his recovery is to form an expectation that may or may not be wishful and distorted, depending on how specific the expectation is. From this viewpoint a great deal that is called "hope" is merely desire wrapped up in illusions. But, if one should ask about the value of the ill person's life, he is also asking about the value of his own life. The hope which arises at this point goes beyond both factual information and illusions concerning empirical eventualities. It is not the individual's conviction or words that are essential for hope. The primary thing for the individual is openness toward a reality which is capable of being invoked. The object of hope is liberation understood to be non-specific and non-concrete.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

#### 4. The Subject of Hope

The involvement of the self in the hoping process is one of the most interesting concepts of Marcel's theory of hope. It is interesting because the individual aims are somehow to be transcended if the person is to hope. For hope takes place on the level of the "us" or the "I-Thou." It is at this point that Marcel makes distinctions between the process of hoping and other processes described by such terms as optimism, doubt, fear, and desire. These differences will be discussed later in this study.

##### i. The Nature of the Subject

###### 1) The Subject's Attitude

Hope, for Marcel, does not exist on the level of the solitary self that is somehow induced into concentrating exclusively on individual desires. These individual desires must be transcended if the person is to hope.

To transcend the individual aims and desires is to free hope from being centered upon the subject himself. The subject in "I hope. . ." is in no way identical to the subject in "I myself. . ." which Marcel believes is so prevalent in statements of doubt, certainty, and optimism.<sup>1</sup>

In statements of doubt, certainty, and optimism, Marcel feels that the subject must come to the surface, as it were, to

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 32-33.

answer the challenge presented to the subject by another individual.

The ego, I said, very often, in fact almost invariably, needs to refer to some other person felt or conceived of as an opponent or a witness, or again merely summoned or imagined as an echo or a rectifier. You have your doubts, because you are ill-informed or because you lack inner stability, or for any other reason; as for me, I am sure-- and (be it understood) I am proud of the fact.<sup>1</sup>

However, Marcel feels that the involvement of the ego in such exchanges is in keeping with the nature of such expressions as "I doubt" and "I am sure." In the instance of the hoping process, the circumstances are quite different. The subject in the hoping process cannot be involved in defiance or in provocation, as it is in the cases of "I doubt" and "I am sure," else the process becomes something other than hoping.

What is the cause of this difference? It is surely due to the fact that "I hope" is not orientated in the same way: there is no statement directed towards, and at the same time against, some other person either present or imagined. Of course, there is nothing to prevent me from saying in certain cases, "For my part, I hope, whilst you do not." But there would be none of that suggestion of aggressive self-complacency which, on the contrary, so often characterises "I am sure" or "I doubt."<sup>2</sup>

## 2) The Involvement of the Subject in the Hoping Process

The individual who is hoping, "inasmuch as his hope is real and not to be reduced to a mere platonic wish, seems to be involved in some kind of process; . . ."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

The subject of hope, as the object, is involved in the "super-rational" and "super-relational" that Marcel calls a mystery. There is no claim made by the subject upon special enlightenment. Instead there is stress placed upon the qualities of humility and modesty.

I believe it must be answered that, speaking metaphysically the only genuine hope is hope in what does not depend upon ourselves, hope springing from humility and not from pride.<sup>1</sup>

Pride consists in the individual's drawing of strength and security from himself alone. This pride cuts the individual off from "a certain form of communion with his fellow men" and acts as a "principle of destruction."<sup>2</sup> Creativity ceases and degradation begins at the point where the individual falls into "self-imitation" and "self-hypnotism."<sup>3</sup>

The two internal attitudes expressed by the subject, who is hoping, are the subject's presence and availability. It is admitted by Marcel that these terms are on the levels of the mysterious and the meta-problematical.

Presence is intended to be more than an idea. Presence "corresponds to a certain kind of hold which being has upon us; . . ."<sup>4</sup> It is the ground for relationships between the subject

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 20-21.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

and others, and is revealed unmistakably in "a look, a smile, an intonation, or a handshake."<sup>1</sup> It is a relationship of a subject to subject and being to Being and not subject to object or subject to subject-object.<sup>2</sup>

Availability is simply the subject's williness to give of his presence to another. Presence and availability of that presence are important for hoping in that they aid the individual to escape his self-interest and self-imitation, which tend to hold him captive and make him non-creative.

### 3) The Prophetic Character

There is a prophetic character in hope that seems to reside within the subject who hopes. It is prophetic in the sense that it recognizes no "clear line of demarcation between what it knows for a fact on the one hand and what it wishes or desires on the other."<sup>3</sup>

The subject recognizes the significance of his circumstances, but refuses to limit or presume to limit these circumstances to probabilities based on past experience. Instead the subject is granted and accorded a "knowing that outstrips the unknown,"<sup>4</sup> a knowing which Marcel calls prophetic.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 10.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

The prophetic nature of the subject is to say that this captive situation has an answer, and the hoping subject asserts that the answer will be forthcoming.<sup>1</sup>

ii. The Subject's Acceptance of Captivity

Marcel believes that there is a definite relationship between the way in which the self is centered or not centered in itself and the subject's reaction to the duration of time, which includes the possibility of change in reality. There is an affinity, about which little is known, between hope and patience and between the subject's ability to relax.

Thus, the hoping process means that the subject accepts the trial and its duration "as an integral part of the self," but while so doing the subject also considers the trial "as destined to be absorbed and transmuted by the inner workings of a certain creative process."<sup>2</sup> It means that the subject places confidence in the possibility of change and in a certain process of growth and development. Having confidence implies the embracing of the creative process so that the process is promoted from within the subject.

An example is given by Marcel of an invalid who is at first tempted to exclaim, while naively identifying recovery with

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, The Mystery of Being, p. 159.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 39.

salvation, "Everything is lost for me if I do not get well by a certain time." Marcel sees the invalid as not accepting his captivity and instead as actually setting an obstacle in the way of his hoping. The obstacle is due to the fact that he has obviously set a definite time period for his recovery. To pass this definite time period is to increase his despair due to unfulfilled expectation.<sup>1</sup>

If, however, the invalid hopes, then he accepts his captivity as an integral part of himself and his thoughts rise above the formulations upon which he first was tempted to depend. In accepting his captivity he recognizes the fact that everything is not necessarily lost if there is no cure. It is likely that his attitude toward the possibility of recovery will have changed or will be changed. Marcel contends that he then will be more relaxed and patient, and time no longer will be considered an insurmountable obstacle on the way towards the transcendence of captivity.<sup>2</sup>

This is another way of saying that the subject himself puts limits upon the process of hoping and the transcendence of captivity when the subject makes hope subservient to conditions of time or past experience. Likewise, this is Marcel's manner of comparing and contrasting the security of "being" with the insecurity of "having."

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

## 5. Religious Aspects

Hope has its religious elements for Marcel. These aspects are largely included within the concept of 'mystery.' We have seen that hoping is a mystery and not a problem to Marcel.

Hope is bound to some of the same basic dynamics that are found in faith and love. Like faith, hope must transcend all laying down of conditions, and must involve a response of the creature to the infinite being. This response must be one of surrender to the 'Thou' and one of expansion from a "closed time" to an "open time."<sup>1</sup> To move to "open time" is to "open a credit in favor of" or "to place oneself at the disposal of" the Thou.<sup>2</sup>

Hope is like love in the degree that it involves self-denial. Hope must not remain centered on the self, but must be self-giving in order to bring about true hope on the level of the "us."<sup>3</sup> For hope "does not exist on the level of the solitary ego, self-hypnotised and concentrating exclusively on individual aims."<sup>4</sup>

The process of hoping is always an intimate act of communion for Marcel.<sup>5</sup> The context of hope must provide an inter-

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, The Mystery of Being, pp. 161-62.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 77-78.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 66.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

personal "I-Thou" relationship. This interpersonal relationship is considered by Marcel to be the "only possible source from which this absolute hope springs."<sup>1</sup>

It appears as a response of the creature to the infinite Being to whom it is conscious of owing everything that it has and upon whom it cannot impose any conditions whatsoever without scandal.<sup>2</sup>

The communion of the subject with the "Thou" is a vital aspect of Marcel's theory of hope. It is only in absolute Reality that one finds the answer to his dilemma as a captive, and absolute Reality is identified by Marcel as the absolute "Thou." Despair is the very opposite response for Marcel and is an open "declaration that God has withdrawn himself" from the despairing individual.<sup>3</sup> Despair also represents solitude and an absence of communion.

Hope represents a rise from the "humble forms of communion which experience offers the most despised to a communion which is more intimate and more abundant, . . ."<sup>4</sup> Hope then is regarded as foreshadowing the complete act of communion.

"I hope in thee for us" is the expression chosen by Marcel to represent the dynamics suggested by the verb "to hope"

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 60.

and the mysterious union of the subject and the "Thou."<sup>1</sup> This "Thou" is both the guarantee of the union and the very mortar that binds the "I-Thou" relationship into one. Thus, to say "I despair of myself" is to say "I despair of the Thou" as well.<sup>2</sup>

In essence, this union or bond of the subject and the "Thou" is religious. Any such bond would presuppose the making of a judgment on the existence of God, one's own existence, and the possibility of communion between the two. The establishment and continuation of such a bond is considered to be "spiritual" and "mysterious." It is something which the person knows and to which he responds. Hope contends that a union exists, that Being affirms the individual being, and that Being cannot help but will what I will if what I will is the "Good," according to Marcel. Not knowing the total good, the hoping subject does not presume to determine the concrete answer to his captivity, but instead only asserts that there is an answer. The result of the union is preservation and renewal.

This aspiration can be approximately expressed in the simple but contradictory words: as before, but differently and better than before. Here we undoubtedly come once again upon the theme of liberation, for it is never a simple return to the status quo, a simple return to our being, it is that and much more, and even the contrary of that: an undreamed-of promotion, a transfiguration.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 60-61.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

## 6. Some Other Aspects of Hope

### i. Courage

Marcel's discussion on courage is of importance primarily due to the fact that he uses courage in hope as an argument against the usage of or the need for denial in hope. For Marcel, there is no deluding of oneself or denial where courage is concerned. The summit of courage is reached "when the situation is most clearly appreciated."<sup>1</sup>

Courage is seen as the "driving force behind hope."<sup>2</sup> The hoping person can only begin to hope after he has completely recognized and accepted his captive situation. Hope is an active reaction against a state of captivity, and hope begins in the realization that one is a captive. Courage seems to be the ability of the individual to look tragedy squarely in the face and say that this intolerable situation cannot be final. It is the direct opposite of capitulation within despair, whereby the individual disarms before the seemingly inevitable and appears to fall apart under the sentence of captivity. Courage is only a portion of the hoping process, but it plays an important part in providing the necessary energy to both recognize the captive situation as it is and to direct

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, The Mystery of Being, p. 159.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 160.

hope's response to the situation.

ii. Patience

Marcel discusses patience when he is seeking an answer to how one can refuse to accept his captive situation as final and at the same time avoid tightening and stiffening up oneself. The need is that one be able to relax while refusing to accept situations as necessarily inevitable as they presently stand.

The key to this discussion for Marcel is his contention that:

There exists a secret and rarely discovered connection between the way in which the ego is either centred or not centred in itself, and its reaction to the duration of time, or more precisely to the temporal order, that is to say to the fact that change is possible in reality.<sup>1</sup>

There is an affinity between hope and relaxation. Hope accepts the trial and also considers it destined to be absorbed and changed. The hoping person then actively awaits this transmutation. This awaiting is patience.

Patience is neither weakness nor complacency. These are considered to be degradations of patience by Marcel. Instead, patience seems to be "a certain pluralisation of the self in time."<sup>2</sup> The patience that is in the hoping person

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 39.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

places confidence and belief in a certain process of growth and development. The patient, hoping person does not despair of either himself or of the other person.

It is radically opposed to the act by which I despair of the other person, declaring that he is good for nothing, or that he will never understand anything, or that he is incurable. That is, of course, the same despair which makes me proclaim that I shall never be cured, that I shall never see the end of my captivity, etc.<sup>1</sup>

In the same fashion that the patient person recognizes and respects the different "rhythm" of life within another person and that person's need for time to preserve his vital rhythm, so hope through patience awaits the vital rhythm of absolute Being.<sup>2</sup>

This patience is not quietism. The idea of inert hope is contradictory to Marcel's notion of hope. The patience of the hoping person is not a kind of "listless waiting," but rather it is that which "underpins action."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, p. 20.

## 7. Hope Distinguished From Other Processes

### i. Wishing, Daydreaming, Illusions

#### 1) Marcel's Distinctions

Marcel distinguishes hope from wishing, daydreaming, illusions and like states and processes. A special emphasis is made in his handling of the object of hope.

The object of hope is seen as non-concrete and non-specified. Marcel illustrated his position by the usage of the phrase "I hope. . ." to indicate a non-particular and even diffuse effect; and he used the phrase "I hope that. . ." to indicate specificity of an object and to introduce a process other than hoping.

In psychiatry the term "wishing," viewed psychodynamically, is foremostly associated with psychoanalysis. When defined in the lay sense as desire or want, it includes within the definition the forces in the unconscious that strive to become external. A wish could be described as an impulse, a tendency, a desire, a striving. More broadly, wishing may be understood as a process that tends toward tension satisfaction or discharge.<sup>1</sup>

These unconscious wishes strive for gratification through the cathexis of psychic energy to some object outside the individual, it is thought, or to the object's representation

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<sup>1</sup>Leland E. Hinsie and Robert J. Campbell, Psychiatric Dictionary (3rd. Ed.; New York: Oxford University, 1960), p. 779.

in the mind of the individual. Dynamically understood then, wishing, it is felt, represents repressed mental material, which formulates a tendency towards gratification by the cathexis of psychic energy to a concrete object or to a conscious representation of a specific object.

If I wish ardently for a certain thing, it will be said, I shall represent it to myself very distinctly, I shall realise it in my imagination and immediately, by the same process, I shall believe it is actually going to happen.<sup>1</sup>

Marcel indicates that when hoping is true hope and not wishing then the object of hope is less than specific and concrete. Instead, the object is diffuse and abstract. It is as if Marcel proposed a continuum on which he placed, at opposite ends, the expressions "I hope. . ." and "I hope that. . .". The more "I hope. . ." tends toward the exclusion of a specific object the more likely it is that this is true hope and the less likely it is wishing. Conversely, the more concrete the object intended by the phrase "I hope that. . ." the more likely it is wishing and the less likely it is true hope.

Daydreaming usually implies an idle indulgence of the imagination during the waking hours and may be called wishful thinking. These dreams may take on the value of reality, as in certain forms of psychoses, but thereby become symptoms

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 44.

and more than what is usually understood to mean daydreaming.

Generally, daydreams include some pleasurable memories of past experiences that are revived by some present experience or thought. These memories cause the individual to attempt to recreate and relive these past experiences in the mind, with the notion of some future fulfillment. The forces that cause the daydreaming are thought to be some unsatisfied and undisguised wish.<sup>1</sup> Again the cathected object is specific and concrete, and thus, daydreaming is also a process distinct from hoping, for Marcel.

An illusion is an erroneous perception of sensory data by definition. An object of the environment has been falsely responded to by the individual. Marcel sees hope's object differently in the sense that the more true hoping is involved the less possibility there is of a specific and concrete object being falsely perceived.

On the contrary, the more hope transcends imagination, so that I do not allow myself to imagine what I hope for, the more this objection seems to disappear.<sup>2</sup>

## 2) Marcel and Menninger Compared

It appears that Marcel would differ with Karl Menninger's approach to wishing and hoping, which suggests that "hope is a

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<sup>1</sup>Leland E. Hinsie and Robert J. Campbell, Psychiatric Dictionary, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 45.

consciousness of the realizable wish."<sup>1</sup> In Marcelian terms, a realizable wish would have a more definite object than would hope. The former would only be a matter of goal-directed behavior until the object is obtained. With hope there is no such definite and concrete object for Marcel, therefore, no goal-directed behavior in a sense similar to the process of wishing. Hoping and wishing are thus distinct and different processes.

Menninger contends, in addition, that the psychological motive forces of both wishing and hoping are the same.<sup>2</sup> Marcel would quite possibly agree with this though he would more specifically identify the motive for hoping as a captive situation. Wishing can also be a response to a captive situation, but Marcel would add that such a situation is necessary in order for hope to occur.

As an additional attempt to identify hoping with wishing, Menninger points out that the delusions of schizophrenics, like the daydreams of children, are hopes. Such hopes, for Menninger, are true hopes because the objects of these hopes are real for the schizophrenic, whether they are for anyone else or not. Maturity is an indicator of the development of

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<sup>1</sup>Menninger, Love Against Hate, p. 215.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

hoping because the individual becomes "more and more practical, which is to say that he begins to test reality and finds out which hopes can be realized and what restrictions the external world places upon them."<sup>1</sup>

Marcel agrees that this is true for wishing but not for hoping. Wishing is in reality "merely a calculation concerning certain chances I am considering, a practical little problem of probabilities."<sup>2</sup> Hoping is something different again. The process of hoping is not dependent upon past experience in the determination of its object. In fact, hope stands in contradiction to any such calculation of probabilities based on past experience alone.

We have arrived then at the important conclusion that what is specific in hope is lost sight of if the attempt is made to judge and condemn it from the point of view of established experience. . . . The truth is much more that hope is engaged in the weaving of experience now in process, or in other words in an adventure now going forward.<sup>3</sup>

Futhermore, Marcel feels that to accept the perspective of established experience is to imply that time will bring nothing new beyond an added confirmation of previously engraved experiences.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 218.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

Hope is different from wishing in that it asserts prophetically that there is something to know beyond the "known."

Hope is a knowing which outstrips the unknown--but it is a knowing which excludes all presumption, a knowing accorded, granted, a knowing which may be a grace but is in no degree a conquest.<sup>1</sup>

Marcel would quite likely agree with Menninger's statement that there are differences between hoping and wishing such as a "difference in the fate of the impulse, the degree with which it is correlated with reality, inhibited by internal fears, supported by other motives, . . ."<sup>2</sup>

It is the contention of Marcel that there are different results for hoping than for wishing. Wishing may bring the additional result of disappointment if the specific object of the wish is unobtainable. If the patient's wish, say for a specific kind and time of recovery from his illness, remains unfulfilled then the result may be additional disappointment. But, hope sees that everything is not necessarily lost if a specific cure is not obtained at a particular time. Marcel suggests that such a hopeful attitude may result in an entirely new inner security and a new faculty for relaxing, patience, and forbearance.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>2</sup>Menninger, Love Against Hate, p. 217.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 46.

Hoping and wishing differ in the way in which they deal with reality. Hope, as seen by Marcel, does not deny reality as wishful thinking might because hope is a response of the individual to tragedy that has been faced squarely and clearly. Any departure from reality would result in illusion and delusion and no longer be true hope for Marcel. For hope means accepting the trial as an integral part of oneself while at the same time considering it ordained to be absorbed and transmitted.<sup>1</sup>

Internal conditions support both wishing and hoping for Marcel. However, courage is a part of hope, while fears are a part of despair. Hope reacts to a captive situation with courage and not with fear as hope clearly recognizes and accepts the real situation. Another internal condition of hoping, but not of wishing, is patience. Wishing seeks immediate gratification. Hoping will wait with patience while permitting no departure from reality to alter its response.<sup>2</sup> It is expected that hope will transcend imagination, which breeds wishing, and thus expose itself to critical reflection.

#### ii. Desire and Fear

Desire, like wishing, generally is described as a term which indicates some conscious or unconscious impulse. There

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 30, 39.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 29-30.

remains some controversy over whether there is any actual identity of the unconscious impulses with the conscious "desires"; and also whether or not wishing and desiring, at least psychologically, are only different terms for the same activity.<sup>1</sup>

Fear has a twofold nature, namely real fear based on actual experiences, and neurotic fear that arises, according to psychoanalysis, whenever a libidinal excitation is aroused, but is neither discharged nor satisfied. In psychoanalysis, however, there is no basic difference in what one fears either neurotically or objectively. Both are actually fears of one's own libido.<sup>2</sup>

Desire and fear are treated separately from wishing because this is the fashion employed by Marcel in treating these subjects, though he makes no direct reference to their distinctive differences in relation to wishing. All of these processes, like hope, are looked on as possible responses to a given situation of captivity.

The differences again between these responses and hope are based on how concrete and specific the object is. "Desire is always to desire something," whereas to hope is essentially not to have a specific object in mind.<sup>3</sup> "Desire and hope are

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<sup>1</sup>Hinsie and Campbell, op. cit., p. 204.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 292.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, The Mystery of Being, p. 162.

to be found in completely distinct spheres of spiritual life."<sup>1</sup>  
 Hope is regarded as a virtue, but it becomes desire whenever  
 what is mystery in it becomes a problem instead.

Hope is then regarded as a desire which wraps itself  
 up in illusory judgments to distort an objective reality  
 which it is interested in disguising from itself.<sup>2</sup>

A further distinction between desire and hoping is that  
 desire is egoistical and self-centered whereas hope strives to  
 escape centering on its subject.<sup>3</sup>

Fear and desire are correlated to each other. Neither  
 can be correlated to hope.<sup>4</sup> Both are bound up with expectation,<sup>5</sup>  
 and the world of fear and desire is the "world of the proble-  
 matical." Fear and desire are inseparable in this respect.<sup>6</sup>

### iii. Optimism and Pessimism

The delineations of the states of optimism and pessi-  
 mism from the hoping process find their ground primarily in  
 the study of the subject within the hoping process.

Optimism and pessimism remain more strictly than hope

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 66.

<sup>4</sup>Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, p. 16.

<sup>5</sup>Marcel, The Mystery of Being, p. 158.

<sup>6</sup>Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, p. 18.

in the realm of the "I myself." They aggressively assert the importance of the "self" or the "I" in all judgments where there is a question of certainty or doubt.

The ego, I said, very often, in fact almost invariably, needs to refer to some other person felt or conceived of as an opponent or a witness, or merely summoned or imagined as an echo or a rectifier.<sup>1</sup>

The optimist may say for example, "You have your doubts, because you are ill-informed or because you lack inner stability, or for any other reason; as for me, I am sure--and (be it understood) I am proud of the fact."<sup>2</sup>

Hope to the contrary does not employ defiance or provocation. Why the difference?

It is surely due to the fact that "I hope" is not orientated in the same way: there is no statement directed towards, and at the same time against, some other person either present or imagined.<sup>3</sup>

Marcel defines the optimist as one "who has a firm conviction, or in certain cases just a vague feeling, that things tend to 'turn out for the best'.<sup>4</sup> He sees the optimist as one who always withdraws a "sufficient distance" from the experience in order to allow "certain contradictions to become alternated or fused into a general harmony."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

In addition, the optimist is "like a spectator with particularly keen sight," who might say something like: "If your vision is as good as mine, you are bound to see. . ." <sup>1</sup>

In contrast, the person who hopes is one who finds himself involved in a process. The character of hope is that of "humility," "timidity," and "chastity." To be optimistic is to be proud and to rely on oneself, while to hope is to be humble and to seek strength in another.

I believe it must be answered that, speaking metaphysically, the only genuine hope is hope in what does not depend on ourselves, hope springing from humility and not from pride.<sup>2</sup>

Pessimism is largely seen by Marcel as only a counterpart of optimism. There is little fundamental distinction between them as "they are like the inside and the outside of the same garment."<sup>3</sup> There is the same pride and ego-centrality in pessimism as in optimism, and as a process pessimism is distinguished dynamically from hope in the same fashion as optimism.

#### iv. Despair

Marcel perceives despair as possible "in any form, at any moment and to any degree, and this betrayal may seem to be

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 34.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, p. 14.

counselled, if not forced upon us by the very structure of the world we live in."<sup>1</sup> Hope is seen as a corollary to despair in the sense that there can "be no hope except where the temptation to despair exists."<sup>2</sup> Hope becomes the process whereby this temptation to despair is actively overcome.

The notion of despair is a comprehensive one for Marcel. One can despair of reality as a whole just as readily as he despairs of another individual or object. Whoever responds to reality with despair is making this affirmation: "There is nothing in the realm of reality to which I can give credit--no security, no guarantee."<sup>3</sup> Hope places itself opposite this affirmation for hope implies credit.

Despair, as a statement of complete insolvency, has several levels of degradation. One level is defeatism which involves putting things at their worst. Another level, which seems to follow the level of defeatism, is one where the individual comes to desire the worst. The absolute level of despair for Marcel would appear to be the state of dejection. Here there is complete immobilization of life. The person in a state of dejection is one "who expects nothing either from himself, or

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 36.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, p. 15.

from others, or from life."<sup>1</sup>

The despairing person sees no promises for the future. It is this same despair that causes one to look at another individual and say that he is "good for nothing" or that he is "incurable." This presence of despair causes the individual to say of himself as well, "I shall never be cured, . . ." or "I shall never see the end of my captivity, . . ."<sup>2</sup>

The hoping person, to the contrary, looks into the teeth of difficulty when he hopes; and the temptation to despair, brought on by one's perceived situation of captivity, is overcome. It could be said that hope and despair are different responses to the same experiences.

It remains true, nevertheless, that the correlation of hope and despair subsists until the end; they seem to me inseparable. I mean that while the structure of the world we live in permits--and may even seem to counsel--absolute despair, yet it is only such a world that can give rise to an unconquerable hope.<sup>3</sup>

Within each captive situation resides an element of the temptation to despair. The temptation is to view the surrounding conditions as stifling and as unchangeable. The individual may see his illness as captivity and say, "Everything is

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, The Mystery of Being, p. 158.

<sup>2</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, p. 16.

lost for me if I do not get well."<sup>1</sup>

Opposite the response of despair is the response of hope. Reality is seen differently by the hoping person. Thus, the hoping individual accepts the trial as an integral part of the self, but in addition, sees the trial as destined to be "absorbed and transmuted."<sup>2</sup> Reality is seen as having the possibility of being greater than what one can perceive at any given moment. There is always a certain possibility of the contradiction of circumstances left to the hoping individual. The one who is ill would say instead, if he hopes, "Everything is not necessarily lost if there is no cure, . . ."<sup>3</sup>

In relation to time, despair is the consciousness of time as closed or as a prison while "hope appears as piercing through time; everything happens as though time, instead of hedging consciousness round, allowed something to pass through it."<sup>4</sup>

#### v. Anticipation and Expectation

Marcel deals only in a very cursory fashion with expectation and anticipation as alternative processes of response.

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 46.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

This is primarily due to the fact that anticipation and expectation are involved to some degree in all modes of response concerning the future.

It is important, however, to treat them separately because of their subtle and dynamic influences upon other modes of response. The study of these is also important to Marcel because he feels that anticipation and expectation unfulfilled become some of the major contributors to disappointment and perhaps despair.

Anticipation and expectation, like many other modes of response, have ordinarily a specific or concrete object. It is at this point again that Marcel finds the primary difference between these states and hope.

Marcel believes, in addition, that there is a tendency for one, whose anticipations and expectations have been disappointed, to personify the experiences that failed. The tendency is first "to count on" the anticipation being fulfilled. When the expected action does not follow the anticipation, then the individual is left with the feelings of a "creditor" to whom experience owed a certain obligation and failed to pay it. Disappointment results from the failure. Marcel describes such activity as presumption on the individual's part to attempt, in advance, to chain down reality to one's own desires.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

Hope acts quite differently when employed by the individual, because for Marcel hoping excludes any presumption to chain reality in advance to any specific demands.

Perhaps, it is simply that hope shows the originality and, I must add, the supreme dignity, of never claiming anything or insisting upon its rights.<sup>1</sup>

Should hope make any attempt to presume such a contractual notion, then Marcel contends that an inevitable degradation will occur in the hoping process. "To anticipate" or "to expect from" can become "to have due to me," that is "to count on." "To count on" can become "to claim" or "to demand."<sup>2</sup> This is not seen as the true nature of hoping.

#### 8. Summary

Marcel indicates a dissatisfaction at having to reduce hope to any kind of definition or summary. For Marcel feels that so much of what is real hope is irreducible to definition because human life is a drama, an ever changing process, which cannot always be enclosed within the "devitalizing method" of thought forms.<sup>3</sup>

Nonetheless, following his dialectical analysis of hope, he allows himself to "attempt" a definition of hope:

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

We might say that hope is essentially the availability of a soul which has entered intimately enough into the experience of communion to accomplish in the teeth of will and knowledge the transcendent act--the act establishing the vital regeneration of which this experience affords both the pledge and the first-fruits.<sup>1</sup>

This hoping process is a mysterious knowing of the unknown, a knowing that is granted and received and which excludes all presumption. This hope never demands or expects a specific answer to a perceived captive situation, but instead the hoping person actively awaits an undertermined and non-concrete answer with patience, humbleness, and "openness" of spirit.

Only those conditions perceived by the individual as captive, where the individual is restricted by external constraint to a compulsory mode of existence, are in need of and subject to hope. Hope is an active response to such captivity. This response accomplishes the "transcendent act" that restores and renews, thereby achieving the aspiration of hope--liberation.

Marcel has provided the theoretical foundation with respect to some conditions of occurrence, distinctive indicators, and dynamic consequences.

The next chapter is an attempt to move from Marcel's abstract and theoretical analysis to a more descriptive one.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

## CHAPTER III

### THE HOPING PROCESS: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Gabriel Marcel's analysis of hope has provided the theoretical ground work. There is now a need for redefining hope in more descriptive terms so that it can be understood better. The intention of this chapter is to present a descriptive analysis of the hoping process based upon Marcel's theoretical work on hope.

There are three basic considerations that primarily determine the principles involved in this descriptive analysis of the hoping process. They are: (1) the conditions of occurrence, (2) the distinctive indicators of the hoping process, and (3) the dynamic consequences related to the hoping process and its occurrence.

#### 1. The Conditions of Occurrence

Of prime concern to any descriptive activity are questions relating to the appearance of the event. One desires to know the answers to such questions as how, when, and where did the event occur. It is to these questions and others that this section is addressed.

The word "hoping," as used in this section, is understood to be equal in meaning to "hope" as interpreted by Marcel. As Marcel suggests, hoping is not a meaningless waiting but is supportive and activating.<sup>1</sup> In this way hoping is understood to be a process or a state of readiness that is capable of being invoked and directed to a given state of affairs.

Hoping equally corresponds to activity involving more than one person. It is interpersonal activity.

I think this is a first step in the psychological direction. Hoping is a process, an activity of persons. It is not an idea, but a real, live occurrence in a concrete and knowable setting.<sup>2</sup>

Through the use of the terms "hoping" or "the hoping process" it is intended that hope be understood as a process or activity involving more than one person.

#### i. Hoping as Response to Captivity

Hoping is a peculiar kind of process because it is directed as a response to a particular type of experience. This experience is called captivity by this study. The hoping person interprets his environment and its connection to himself. He then reacts to the perceived conditions of that environment in a way peculiar to the hoping process.

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, p. 20.

<sup>2</sup>Pruyser, op. cit., p. 4.

The situation, which provides the stimuli to draw the response of the hoping person, has been described by Marcel as a captive one.

Paul Pruyser equates this sense of captivity or the visitation by calamity with the psychological term of "stress."<sup>1</sup> This implies the subjection of the individual to external pressure. Stress is certainly involved in captivity, but it does not mean all that Marcel gave to the situation perceived by the individual as captivity.

The nature of the situation, broadly described as captive, is subject to the following conditions: (1) it is externally produced, (2) it exerts considerable stress, restriction, and influence on the individual involved, and (3) it appears to be formed by circumstances unavailable to alteration by the individual alone.

Captivity, actual or threatened, is externally produced. The individual is confronted by elements of his environment which cause him to feel that he has been or will be incarcerated. No longer does he consider himself free to act and to choose as he was able to do prior to the confrontation.

Not only is the captive condition seen to be "outside oneself," but it is also viewed as being "beyond oneself." It is outwardly perceptible and equally considered to be "out of

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

reach." Those forces of the environment, which create the problem for the individual, are thought to be greater than the forces of the individual. The person does not consider them changeable by himself alone. In this sense they are "out of reach." The conditions called captive are beyond the individual's power to control.

Some occasions that can be included in this category of captivity are contracting a contagious disease, being caught in a severe storm of nature, social codes or laws that are imposed, competitive situations, a physical defect, and approaching death.

The second condition of a captive situation is that it exerts considerable stress, restriction, and influence upon the individual involved.

Stress results from interference with goal-directed behavior. Personal needs go unsatisfied and desires become thwarted. But the situation becomes most captive in nature when the individual understands it as a permanent threat to self-realization.

It should be recognized that no one situation includes the factors of captivity for everyone. Some persons may, due to inborn or early acquired differences, see themselves as threatened by conditions that would not affect others. Ostensibly benign circumstances for one person may be significantly

threatening to another. In each case of confrontation it then becomes a question of how the individual perceives his situation. It is significant to say that the individual sees his experience as captive.

Accompanying the feelings of stress and frustration, is the feeling of restriction in captivity. The individual sees himself as forced into a compulsory state of existence. The avenues open to action and to freedom of choice are threatened from without. Though the menacing event may appear to involve only an area of the person's whole experience, the individual views it as a threat to his total welfare.

Time then becomes an additional factor in the individual's determination of the strength and duration of his captivity. Where once he felt free to act or to choose, he now feels enslaved to the dictates of an external force. The person sees his "being," to be what he wants to be and to do what he wants to do, threatened. The present loses its prior meaning and value because of this restriction.

Not only does the individual believe his "being" to be restricted, but his "becoming" as well. The possibilities for improvement, growth, and development are limited by the environment. Again in respect to time, the future loses some of its promise because it is restricted.

The conditions of the present environment affect the imprisonment; the prospects of the situation changing in the future pronounce the length of sentence. Together they determine how the captive situation will look to the individual.

The feeling of impossibility becomes prevalent in those who perceive themselves caught by time as well as by circumstances. Little or no prospect is seen for changing the restrictive conditions either presently or in the future. As a result, complementary feelings of stress and frustration increase.

With stress and restriction, the question arises concerning the influence of captivity. The influence that the captive situation has upon the behavior of the individual is based on several things. Among them are the person's age level, his environmental background, and his social acceptance.

The age level ordinarily determines the kind of stress that is exhibited when one is confronted by the environment. The infant may give evidence of frustration in the total organism if its vegetative needs are not fulfilled. The young child becomes enraged when he wants something that he is not allowed to have and which has been placed out of his reach. The adult tried by circumstances attempts to control his frustration along complex, predetermined avenues of behavior.

The environmental background helps determine how well the person advances to the more mature and especially to the socially accepted patterns of behavior.

Perhaps most important of all, in relation to the influence of the captive situation upon the individual, is the need for acceptance by society.

The older the child becomes the more important his interpersonal relationships become. Concurrently it is significant that his desires be accomplished because thereby he gains some measure of approval and acceptance from others. Any obstacle in the path to accomplishment is likely to bring frustration. Almost at any age the apparent price for a sense of belonging is to achieve success in one or more areas of activity.

The captive situation is a major obstacle to the accomplishment of a person's desires; consequently, it influences the individual's behavior.

Because of the confrontation of the individual by this kind of setting, the individual may feel lonely and separated from others and from any help they might give him. Other people may seem isolated and inaccessible to the individual's needs. There is also the threat of losing one's self-esteem because the person sees no likelihood of change, and certainly no sufficient power within himself that he may use to alter the external circumstances.

Apart from the benefit of companionship, two individuals perceiving the same situation as captive would add only external validation of the suspected experience. This would increase the sense of being "caught." When the same situation is perceived as captive for one and not for another, it would appear that the latter could be a source of help for the former. When the perception of separate circumstances is involved, there would appear to be little means for one aiding another.

The third condition of a captive situation is that it has the appearance of being formed by unalterable circumstances. The frustrating experience is beyond the individual's power to regulate. He may feel helpless before such conditions.

The unhappy situation is intensified if the person finds that previously acquired behavior patterns are of little or no use. Formerly exercised behavior habits may neither fulfill his desires nor lessen the frustration. This would give rise to a more complete feeling of imprisonment.

During the encounter with the threat of captivity, it is likely that the individual would exercise his previously acquired modes of response in order to ward off imprisonment. Should other modes of response fail to provide relief from the stress of the situation, then hoping may be exercised. There is then an expressed need for the response of hoping.

ii. The Need for the Hoping Response

The need for the hoping response lies precisely at the point of failure in other responses. The need aroused by captivity requires an adequate response. Though not as readily available as some, hoping becomes more accessible as other responses fail.

The individual feels that he is a prisoner and he tries to make his escape by various responses. The person probably will choose first those responses which are most familiar to him in terms of former usage. Should he discover that these familiar responses are unacceptable to the new situation, he may turn to totally different responses. Hoping may be selected.

It is assumed that the individual desires to escape or else he would not take the trouble to exercise the response of hoping. The implicit suggestion is that unless one finds himself confronted by a captive experience, he has no need and, quite likely, no real possibility for exercising hoping.

It is not expected that hoping will be the chosen response to any or all situations perceived as captive. Nor is it likely that all persons would desire release from a captive situation. But hope is an alternative that an individual may select as a response to a captive experience.

For the purpose of illustration, the threat of approaching death may be considered by an individual to be a captive situation. It is certainly a condition to which the person must adjust.

Death, particularly premature death is one of the most important situations in all societies, demanding complex emotional adjustments on the part of the dying person . . .<sup>1</sup>

The possible responses available to the individual facing such a condition as approaching death are many. A group of responses readily available are the defensive attitudes one has used throughout his life to face other difficult circumstances. This is not to suggest that the person will necessarily choose the same ones, but that he will likely, from habit, fall back upon familiar attitudes first.

Daniel Cappon writes of a study made at a general hospital of patients who were dying. These dying patients were compared qualitatively and statistically with other patients suffering from a non-fatal illness. Cappon reports:

Psychologically, the dying differed little from other patients physically ill, or, for that matter, from other patients emotionally ill with respect to their fear of death, motivation, and personality. They died as they lived; their thoughts, feelings, and actions frozen by the buffetings of life in the same too often distorted, ugly patterns. . . .The reaction in those seeing it as a threat was not miraculously different from all the other reactions to threats incurred before. The hostile

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<sup>1</sup>Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, cited by Daniel Cappon, "The Psychology of Dying," Pastoral Psychology, XII (February, 1961), 35.

became more hostile, the fearful more fearful, the weak weaker. They each hung on to their habitual defenses--regressing, denying, withdrawing, projecting, as before.<sup>1</sup>

A possible defensive attitude toward approaching death would be denial of death and its reality by the avoidance of "getting things in order." Another attitude is a counterphobic exposure to extreme danger. Rationalization by use of philosophical and religious systems is yet another defensive attitude used to face approaching death.

Wishing is a possible and accessible mode of response. Sigmund Freud has postulated the aggressive wish to die as one-half of a dual drive theory.

Counterphobic behavior, the nihilism of despair and depression, the psychopathic seeking for destruction at the hands of social authorities, the disintegration and immobilization of schizophrenia, the self-inflicted attempts to destroy oneself by use of drugs and alcohol, and other attempts at suicide appear to lend support to Freud's thanatology. Perhaps, the defensive mechanisms of the individual are really reactions against the wish to die.

But Freud also postulated a wish to live as the other half of the dual drive system. Karl Menninger suggests that hope is an aspect of this life instinct or this drive to live.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Daniel Cappon, "The Psychology of Dying," Pastoral Psychology, XII (February, 1961), 36.

<sup>2</sup>Karl Menninger, "Hope," The American Journal of Psychiatry, CXVI (December, 1959), 485-86.

It may be argued that to wish to live in the case of approaching death is only another ego defense against the fear of yielding to the great unknown of death. However, for the purpose of the comparison of wishing with hoping, it is presumed that wishing is employed as a separate attempt to respond to approaching death by an individual who is not satisfied with the prospect of death.

It is characteristic of the wishing process to strive toward tension satisfaction first through the cathexis of psychic energy to some outside object. If this fails to bring the necessary relief or satisfaction, the psychoanalytic theory holds that the energy is then directed inwardly to the object's representation within the individual's mind. The solution to the tension of approaching death is then to wish it away or to conjure up through wishful thinking an object judged suitable to the attenuation of the forces of death.

Marcel indicated that the tendency for wishing in the case of approaching death would be to wish for a specific solution within or by a specific time.

Unlike wishing, hope has no specific object or time of incidence. Instead, the hoping person discourages the formation of images that can be said to be "the object," but states, rather, that there is an object, though yet unknown, which is the answer to the situation of captivity.

The hoping process is a different approach to the same problem of death, and is obtainable as a response in the same manner as are wishing or the defensive mechanisms. The need for the hoping process as a response is equal to that for wishing or for ego defenses: to combat fear and at the same time prevent the disintegration of the ego. The need for hoping increases as other modes of response prove inadequate.

## 2. The Indicators of the Hoping Process

Identification of the hoping process at work is the next concern of this chapter. Hope has distinguishable characteristics that make it recognizable from other modes of response. These characteristics are to be called "indicators" by this study.

Some of these indicators are themselves "modes of response." Most are included as parts of more general responses. Together they are the hoping process or indicators of its activity.

### i. Acceptance

Because of its apparent adaptive intentions, the hoping process is considered to be within the categories of ego functions and processes. The indicator of acceptance is an adaptive function.

There are aspects of acceptance that are assumed to be peculiar to the hoping process. This is true in the sense that these various functions, yet to be described, are considered necessary to the total response of acceptance in the hoping process.

After confrontation by and perception of the captive situation, the next aspect of acceptance is acknowledgement. By the term "acknowledgement," it is meant that the individual recognizes the situation as fact and thus as pertinent to him and to his experience.

The individual acknowledges the presence of the external forces which present the problem, the need for some kind of response, and the fact that he does not have the necessary equipment within himself to alter the external conditions and their control upon him. The person also recognizes the personal affect which accompanies this confrontation.

In this respect, hope is then situated, as Marcel proposes, within the actual framework of the trial or captivity. The individual accepts the trial as an integral part of the self and as part of the life space in which the self participates.

The hoping person accepts the involvement of the self and reasons that there is no escape available to his own powers alone. In conjunction with this attitude is patience, and

another indicator of hoping is revealed.

ii. Patience

Having accepted the captive nature of his situation, the hoping person waits in patience for a change to occur. Involved within the attitude of patience is the assertion, made firmly and privately by the individual, that the present situation is not necessarily as inevitable and final as it now appears.

This assertion may be criticised as magical wishing because of its expectation of fulfillment by some external agent. In reply, the individual is actively involved in the process of response to the captive situation. He is not sitting passively by and waiting. Patience is an active awaiting that takes command of the hoping response.

When the hoping process is employed by the individual, it activates and mobilizes the energies of the individual to attempt to understand the concrete conditions of reality and to evaluate his own role clearly. The present is not emptied of value, instead the hoping person places as much emphasis upon the present as upon the future.

There is an affinity between the hoping process and relaxation. The hoping person need not hurry his response. Time is no problem because the assertion concerning the limitations

of the captive situation fixes no time boundaries. The hoping individual has exhausted his own possibilities of changing the situation so he waits in patience for an external solution to the problem, or until external conditions allow him to solve the problem.

Patience within the hoping process is not intended to mean either weakness or complacency. It is actively awaiting a solution reinforced by confidence and belief in the acknowledgement and the assertion made concerning the situation.

### iii. Reduced Self-reliance

Marcel suggested that hoping is somehow beyond the individual. First, this is true due to the seemingly unchangeable quality of the situation. The assertion made about the captivity is based on a belief in something more than oneself. The person accepts his own limitations and recognizes his need for help.

The hoping person then seeks a more non-specific and general object, which he feels will provide the solution that he needs.

As a result of the frustration of his experiences of attempting to change the situation by his own action, reliance upon an external object "beyond the self" increases. In the case of Christian hoping, it is signified by an increase in

the individual's reliance upon the omnipotence of God and upon God's ability to bring a solution to the problem of captivity.

A second factor in the reduction of self-reliance is found in the hoping person's preference for the more general and global objects of hope. Because of this preference and the avoidance of specific objects the individual aims and desires are set aside. The effect of this is to free the individual's attention from being centered upon himself and his situation.

The smug assurance of doubt, optimism, and certainty that is directed towards and at the same time against some other person or object is not present in the hoping person.

The emphasis is not so much upon the failure of the individual's own powers to solve his problem as it is upon the humility of accepting one's own limitations in respect to the problem. Self-reliance lessens in proportion to expressed reliance upon an external object. Yet this is not self-depreciation. It is an acceptance of a need for help. It is also a part of the assertion that the necessary help is forthcoming.

#### iv. Alteration of Personal Attitudes

By definition of the captive situation to which the hoping person responds, the individual can neither alter the environment nor choose a more advantageous one, except by flight into fantasy.

The individual is then basically left with the remaining choice, which is no longer a choice if he desires to adapt, of altering his own personal outlook. This includes the alteration of attitudes, expectations, and desires.

Many decisions and activities have taken place prior to the inception of the hoping process. To quote Heinz Hartmann, "A state of adaptedness exists before the intentional processes of adaptation begin."<sup>1</sup> Other modes of response may precede the exercise of hope. Much reality testing will be done before the individual recognizes his situation as captivity. Then as a part of his decision to respond by hoping, the person also acknowledges the need to alter his own attitudes.

This activity of alteration is not new to the individual. As an infant he had to alter his views of himself, others, and his relationships.

The first clue to the development of the hoping process or a tendency to hope seems to be in the oral exploratory stage. Here the infant tries to explore the objects of his environment and to differentiate them through oral incorporation. Perhaps the infant even tries to master the increasing stimuli of his environment through incorporation of various objects of his environment.

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<sup>1</sup>Heinz Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation, trans. David Rapaport, (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1958), p. 26.

The hoping process seems directly related to this when the individual acknowledges the captive situation as a part of himself and his life space. The captivity is considered to be an integral part of the self. The hoping process is an attempt at mastery of the situation by a form of incorporation. As a result of this activity, the individual is able to better evaluate the situation and make his decision of acceptance.

The earlier attempts of the child to incorporate the omnipotence of his parents by identification is similar to the individual's waiting for some external force to master the situation of captivity. Identification with the omnipotence of reality's possibilities or with the omnipotence of God appears in the hoping process.

The mechanism of waiting or patience in hoping seems to have some affinity with what Erik Erikson calls "basic trust."<sup>1</sup> The infant learns to have confidence in the sameness and in the consistent activities of the external environment, which provides and cares for him.

Through introjection the infant begins to feel and act "as if an outer goodness had become an inner certainty."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1950), pp. 219-222.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 221.

Erikson suggests that this basic trust depends more on the "quality of the maternal relationships" than on the "absolute quantities of food."<sup>1</sup> From this maternal relationship come feelings of "belongingness,"<sup>2</sup> which in the hoping process help the individual to assert that the isolation and loneliness experienced in the situation of captivity cannot be final.

The consistency of the environment and its enduring patterns would seem to decrease potential anxiety over time and thus increase the ability to have patience and to relax.

#### v. Anticipation

The activity of anticipation is significant to the understanding of the hoping process because of the hoping person's assertion concerning change.

It is anticipation that aids the formation of future goals at the expense of present ones.

A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its result, is given up, but only in order to gain in the new way an assured pleasure coming later.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>3</sup>Sigmund Freud, "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning," Collected Papers, IV (London: Hogart Press, 1925), p. 18.

The individual who applies the pleasure principle alone sees reality only as a possible source of pleasure. Through the development of the reality principle and its modifications of the pleasure principle, the individual is able to make a judgment concerning the pertinence of the situation to himself and his search for satisfaction.

Immediate gratification is renounced for a greater one in the future. A judgment is made concerning the possibilities in the future and anticipation arises so that activity becomes goal directed.

The hoping individual desires release from his captive position. He acts upon himself by waiting for the future reward of salvation, meaning release from captive situation, expecting it to be a greater pleasure than other available action.

Anticipation is nurtured through the renouncing of immediate pleasure for greater future pleasure. This is similar to the historical Judaeo-Christian emphasis upon hope as the expectation of some future good. In Christian hope God is the source of this better good. And through whatever means of reality testing used in Christian faith, some degree of immediate pleasure has been denounced for the anticipation of greater future rewards.

The hoping person also anticipates change. Based on developmental aspects, it seems that the child is not able to manipulate all frustrations caused by confrontation with his environment into victories. Yet, he also learned that often his par-

ents or other external forces are able to resolve these problems for him when he cannot. Thus, he has learned that it is possible to expect and to anticipate the possibility of change. Even when he himself cannot do the changing, other external forces may be able to do so. Patience is actively awaiting the expected possibility of change.

The criteria for all the senses discussed here are the same: a crisis, beset with fears, or at least a general anxiousness or tension, seems to be resolved, in that the child suddenly seems to "grow together" both psychologically and physically. He seems to be "more himself," more loving and relaxed and brighter in his judgment (such as it is at this stage).<sup>1</sup>

The expression "possibility of change" is used because of the sophistication and maturity of adult reality testing. It would seem that because of the lack of omnipotence and the recognition of this deficiency, even a sophisticated system of reality testing could never indicate with certainty that there can be no change. The reality testing process of the hoping individual still maintains an open recognition of the possibility of change. This recognition, coupled with an assertion based on belief that there is a source capable of making this change possible, lends strong impetus to the choice of the hoping process as a response to a situation of captivity.

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<sup>1</sup>Erik Erikson, "The Healthy Personality," Psychological Issues, I no. i, (1959), 75.

vi. Movement Away From Influence of Captive Situation

Marcel suggests that the hoping process aids in the movement away from "having" toward "being."<sup>1</sup> It is the finding of value within oneself that is important in contrast to what one owns or has. For this reason an indicator of the hoping process at work is a movement away from the influence of the captive situation.

By nature of the captivity, the process of adaptation has been primarily one of alteration of the attitudes of the individual involved in the captivity.

The hoping person seems to promote this self-alteration through his response to the condition of captivity. This change aids the individual in becoming less dependent and more autonomous of the captive environment.

Man can interpose delay and thought not only between instinctual promptings and action, modifying and even indefinitely postponing drive discharge, he can likewise modify and postpone his reaction to external stimulation. This independence of behavior from external stimulation we will refer to as the autonomy of the ego from external reality.<sup>2</sup>

David Rapaport proposes that the "ultimate guarantees" of the individual's autonomy from the environment are instinctual drives. The "proximal or secondary guarantees" of autonomy

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 46.

<sup>2</sup>David Rapaport, "The Theory of Ego Autonomy: A Generalization," Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, XXII (January, 1958), 14.

from the environment are cognitive organizations, ego interests, values, ideals, ego identity, and superego influences.<sup>1</sup>

The possible interferences with the ego's maintenance of autonomy from the environment are:

(1) Massive intrapsychic blocking of the instinctual drives which are the ultimate guarantees of this autonomy; (2) maximized needfulness, danger, and fear which enlist the drives (usually the guarantees of this autonomy) to prompt surrender of autonomy; (3) lack of privacy, deprivation of stimulus-nutriments, memorial and verbal supports, all of which seem to be necessary for the maintenance of the structures (thought-structures, values, ideologies, identity) which are the proximal guarantees of this autonomy; (4) a steady stream of instructions and information which, in the lack of other stimulus-nutriments, attain such power that they have the ego completely at their mercy.<sup>2</sup>

The individual's decision to employ the hoping process is a significant factor in the maintenance of autonomy from the captive situation. This is due to the contributions made by the hoping process toward autonomy. These contributions are: (1) the motivation for autonomy, (2) the provision for the setting of independent goals, and (3) the provision of some means to better appropriate instinctual motivations for autonomy.

#### 1) Motivation for Autonomy

Captivity confronts the person with various external stimuli in unfamiliar dosage. They are not subject to change, except by external forces. The shock of the initial onrush may

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

be so forceful as to deprive the person of any other stimulus-nutriments. Therefore, the verbal supports of others around are unable to have their comforting effect. The traditional stimuli of the presence, opinions, and memories of others, who have always provided a well-known environment, may be hindered by other external stimuli of the captive situation. Such stimuli-nutriments are felt by Rapaport to be necessary to the maintenance of thought-structures, values, ideologies, and ego identity.<sup>1</sup> Because of the stimuli deprivation there is a lack of freedom to act as the individual had prior to experiencing the captive situation.

There may be massive blocking of the instinctual drives because of the constrictive quality of the captivity. Needfulness, fear, and danger, which ordinarily arouse the instinctual drives, instead seem to suggest surrender of autonomy to the environment.<sup>2</sup>

It has been suggested that in the example of approaching death as a captive situation, that massive blocking can cause such severe and complete depression that the ego may become overwhelmed and disintegrate before the onrush of external stimuli. But, despair and depression are not the only ways of responding to such a situation.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

The hoping process is another way to respond to such onrushing stimuli. And the hoping person in so responding, provides some motivation for restoring autonomy from the environment.

The primary response of the hoping process consists of the individual's acknowledgement of the situation as it is, or as suggested, making use of reality testing and secondary process thinking. The energy of the hoping person is focused upon the alteration of the individual attitudes concerning captivity. The process of alteration is forced by external conditions, but decided upon and guided by intra-psychic forces. The internal search for pleasure or the desire for freedom from the external constrictions provide the initiative.

The stimuli from the captive situation is so intense the individual can get little comfort and security from friends or other familiar objects. The initiative must come initially from the instinctual drive for pleasure. In this case, pleasure is release from the captive environment.

For us, it goes without saying that the apparatuses, both congenital and acquired, need a driving force in order to function; and that the psychology of action is inconceivable without the psychology of instinctual drives.<sup>1</sup>

Such liberation is promised by the hoping person's assertion, based on reality testing, that there are external pos-

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<sup>1</sup>Hartmann, op. cit., p. 101.

sibilities for alleviating the problem. Therefore, immediate discomfort is endured under the anticipation of future reward. Anxiety may change to patience, and hostility and bitterness to humility. The trial becomes an integral part of the individual through introjection.

The threats of the environment and their effect upon the organism are softened some by the increase in instinctual drive for pleasure, by the promise of greater pleasure, and by intra-psychic forces which acknowledge the external stimuli, but assert self-confidently that their destructive forces are not final. This softening has the effect of motivating an increase in autonomy from the environment. The sick person who says, "All is lost if I do not get well by a certain time," is overcome by the environment. The equally sick person who says, "All is not necessarily lost if I do not get well by a certain time," is the hoping individual who has begun to move to independence from the environment. The originally external stimuli are not allowed by the hoping person to have their initially crushing effect. The individual has found some freedom from the environment, and thus provides motivation for the seeking of more autonomy.

It is felt that not only biologically but psychologically the organism has simultaneous relative dependence upon and independence from the environment. Though the initial

motivation for autonomy from the environment may be the instinctual drives for pleasure, in this case whatever freedom from a captive situation entails, the heeding of other external stimuli through reality testing seems equally valuable to motivation for autonomy. The hoping person would seem to aid considerably this motivation by his magnification of presently meager stimuli to asserted future promises of reward and pleasure.

2) The Provision for the Setting of Independent Goals and the Means of Attainment

The setting of independent goals and the means of their attainment suggests rational behavior. The individual involved in a situation of captivity is confronted by a situation to which he must respond. Perhaps the first indication of the determination of goals is the decision of the individual to respond or not to respond in a particular fashion. Rational behavior then sets the "orienting-and switching-points of action"<sup>1</sup> and the appropriate means of accomplishing these actions. The hoping process is felt to contribute to the performance of rational behavior in the setting of independent goals and in their attainment. Thus, the hoping process is felt to aid the ego's maintenance of independence from the en-

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

vironment, especially following a situation of captivity where this autonomy seems to have been threatened or decreased.

The contributions of the hoping process to the making of provision for the setting of and the attaining of particular goals are in the forms of adaptation and synthesis. The employment of the hoping process in adaptation to the given environment of captivity has been discussed. It is synthesis or organization that is of particular concern in this section. A situation, which wholly captivates a person, demands as complete and organized response as possible, if the individual is to be successful in appropriate adaptation. The hoping person aids this attempt toward organization and synthesis by preparation for the anticipated environment and by the molding of goals according to his own ideals.

The preparation for the anticipated environment includes several levels of ego activity. In the hoping process these activities are called the acceptance of the captive situation. Through rational behavior the situation is evaluated for what it is.

The next step is the delay of initial motor discharge to a later time, or the exercise of patience as it has been designated in this study. Control of motor discharge indicates some degree of advanced differentiation of the ego, and " the more differentiated an organism is, the more independent from

the immediate environmental stimulation it becomes."<sup>1</sup>

The injunction of patience assumes the function of freeing the individual from the immediate perceptual situation in order to allow better rational evaluation. The choice to alter the individual's attitudes also tends to free the individual from the need for immediate response to the external stimuli.

Causal thinking (in relation to perception of space and time), the creation and use of means-end relations, and particularly the turning of thinking back upon the self, liberate the individual from being compelled to react to the immediate stimulus.<sup>2</sup>

Thus freed from the necessity of an immediate response to the captive situation, the individual can more easily prepare for the anticipated environment. The anticipated environment will probably be judged to be "more of the same" until some future and undesignated time when the conditions are expected to change.

Patience or the control, postponement, and perhaps even the prevention of drive discharge will be continued. Primary process thinking tends to give way to secondary process as the mood is one of anticipation of a greater pleasure in the future. Awareness is broadened and sharpened as the hoping process becomes more rational in its attempt to serve the synthetic and differentiating functions of the ego. The molding of goals

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 60.

then begins to occur. This molding of goals is done by rational behavior as long as this can be objective. At some point in the formation of goals the process of rational behavior must give way to the ideals of a non-rational value system. Reason must give emotions their place as it were.

The very nature of reason is a guarantee that it would not fail to concede to human emotions and to all that is determined by them, the position to which they are entitled.<sup>1</sup>

The ideal within the hoping process that is so conducive to the formation of goals is the assertion that somewhere and somehow in future time there is a solution to this particular problem of captivity. In part, at least, the decisions to wait in patience, accept the captive situation, regulate drive discharge and the anticipation of some future good are related to this value assertion. Also in part, the ability to assert is dependent upon these other decisions. The hoping person, therefore, makes some provision for the setting of independent goals and for the means of their attainment, thereby contributing to the maintenance of autonomy from the environment. The hoping process may very well be turned from a means into a goal in its own right.

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<sup>1</sup>Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1933), p. 234.

3) The Provision of Some Means to Better Appropriate  
Instinctual Motivations for Autonomy from the  
Environment

Rapaport suggests that the most relative ultimate guarantee of the ego's autonomy from the environment is man's "constitutionally given drive equipment."<sup>1</sup> But, there are secondary guarantees as well that can only be regarded as proximal. These secondary guarantees are provided by other ego and superego structures and by the motivations arising from them. The basic caution in the use of these guarantees for autonomy from the environment is that they may be regulated properly so that the ego will not lose its autonomy from the instinctual forces. It is believed that the hoping person makes some provision for the proper appropriation of instinctual motivations for the purpose of maintaining autonomy from the environment.

It is held that the hoping individual tends to appropriate both the ultimate and secondary guarantees for the purpose of maintaining, and restoring if necessary, the autonomy of the individual from his environment.

The hoping person uses the instinctual drive for pleasure and satisfaction, in this case the desire to be free from a captive situation, to help overcome the force of the external stimuli. Through reality testing the prospect of future reward

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<sup>1</sup>Rapaport, op. cit., p. 18.

becomes certain enough that the effects of the external stimuli are lessened without the ego losing autonomy from the id forces. The importance of the anticipated good rises to challenge the importance of information gained from external sources.

The hoping person's appropriation of the secondary guarantees of the ego and the superego structures and motivations pertaining to them is more extensive. By definition the hoping individual turns on and alters his own attitudes concerning captivity. In this circumstance the ego apparatus is called on by the individual to appraise the situation and to make judgments concerning the goals and the means of attaining those goals. It is this intra-psychic action that postpones indefinitely certain kinds of response to the external stimuli and provides the resistance against certain modes of behavior.

Early feelings of bitterness and hostility seem to be channeled into rational reflection. Decisions are made on the possibilities of autonomy and finally the assertion of such an occurrence. This assertion must in the end be a value judgment based on a network of identifications and ideal-formations. The assertion is not made in terms of particular or concrete objects. The assertion does not state how or when such liberation will come. It states simply the belief in the possibility of such liberation without placing it in concrete terms. These

identifications and ideal-formations are supported both by superego and ego functions.<sup>1</sup> By finding such value within himself and his assertion, the hoping individual decreases his dependence upon the environmental stimuli and upon the captivity it implies.

vii. Movement Toward A More Abstractly Held Object

Marcel posits the basis for this point of indication in his comparison of wishing with hoping. He suggests that the distinctions between the two be represented by the expressions of "I hope" and "I hope that . . .". The former represents the hoping process and the latter, wishing. One who wishes is felt to retain quite distinctly an image of the specific and concrete object of the wish.

It is a specific object which permits gratification-discharge, and it is a specific set of ideas (drive-representations) the cathecting of which constitutes wishfulfillment.<sup>2</sup>

To the contrary of wishing, the hoping process "transcends imagination, so that I do not allow myself to imagine what I hope for, . . ."<sup>3</sup> except in such abstract terms as freedom or release.

The relationship between the objects of hoping and wishing is similar to the comparison of the objects of anx-

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<sup>1</sup>Hartmann, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>2</sup>David Rapaport, "Toward a Theory of Thinking," Organization and Pathology of Thought, edited by David Rapaport (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 712.

<sup>3</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 45.

xiety and fear. It is held that anxiety rarely refers to anything definite, while fear has a distinct object.

In the state of fear we have an object before us that we can meet, that we can attempt to remove, or from which we can flee. . . .Anxiety, on the other hand, gets at us from the back so to speak. The only thing we can do is to attempt to flee from it, but without knowing what direction to take, because we experience it as coming from no particular place.<sup>1</sup>

Here the similarity must end, however. Where anxiety rarely has an object, hope always has an object. The distinction between the objects of hoping and wishing is that the object of hoping is more abstractly and less concretely perceived and interpreted by the individual. The movement toward abstract thinking follows the development of thought.

#### 1) The Development of Thought

The development of thought in the individual proceeds through various stages. J. S. Kasanin suggests three stages. The first stage he calls physiognomic thinking in which the child will project his own ego into objects. The second stage is concrete thinking, characterized by literalness and a lack of generalizations. The third stage is abstract thinking, characterized by the use of abstractions and generalizations.<sup>2</sup>

Jean Piaget reconstructs the development of thought in four principal periods. The first period is the development

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<sup>1</sup>Kurt Goldstein, Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 1940), pp. 92-93.

<sup>2</sup>J. S. Kasanin (ed.) Language and Thought In Schizophrenia, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1944), pp. 41-42.

of symbolic and preconceptual thought. Coinciding with and aiding the development of thought is the development of imitation, from which symbolic play, imaginal representation, and verbal thought arise.

The second period in the development of thought for Piaget is called "intuitive thought." This is a state of progressive articulations and conceptualizations. Intuition is an advancement from pre-conceptual or symbolic thought.

Intuition, being concerned essentially with complex configurations and no longer with simple half-individual, half-generic figures, leads to a rudimentary logic, but in the form of representative regulations and not yet of operations.<sup>1</sup>

Concrete operations comprise the third stage. These operations are reached at the upper limit of the intuitive relations, and this upper limit is called "mobile Equilibrium" by Piaget.

A mobile equilibrium is reached when the following changes are simultaneously effected: 1. two successive actions can be combined into one; 2. the action-schema already at work in intuitive thought becomes reversible; 3. the same point can be reached by two different paths without being altered; 4. a return to the starting-point finds the starting-point unchanged; 5. when the same action is repeated, it either adds nothing to itself or else is a new action with a cumulative effect.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 141-42.

The final stage is the perfection of formal thought, which reaches its fruition during adolescence. Formal thought consists of reflection and action upon the operations or on their results.

Formal operations constitute solely the structure of the final equilibrium to which concrete operations tend when they are reflected in more general systems linking together the propositions that express them.<sup>1</sup>

Whether one selects the stages of the development of thought posed by Kagan or Piaget, the central concern of this section is directed to the change from concretism to abstraction and how the learning process is related to this change.

A conceptual model of infant behavior based on the assumption of energy-distribution may be seen in this sequence: "restlessness--appearance of and sucking action on the breast--subsidence of restlessness."<sup>2</sup> It may be stated in this form: tension--seeking and finding of drive-satisfying object--subsidence of tension. This model implies direction in the search for satisfaction.

Based on this first model is a second model, a primary model of thought. This model according to Rapaport is: "mounting drive-tension--absence of drive-object--hallucinatory image"

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>2</sup>David Rapaport, Organization and Pathology of Thought, p. 689.

of it.<sup>1</sup> Memories of gratification are the cathected sources of hallucinatory images. These are exercised in the forms of dreams and wishful thinking.<sup>2</sup>

All of the features of this primary process thinking process are primitive and archaic. It is ruled by emotions and strives for discharge of tensions. Thinking is carried out basically through the development of syncretic and concrete pictorial images. There is little distinction of similarities from identities. It is an illogical and ineffective attempt to master reality. However, it is able to postpone immediate discharge reactions and, thereby, begins to anticipate reality. This kind of preconscious thinking may reappear in the adult as a substitute for unpleasant reality or for a reality that cannot be influenced--a captive situation.

When drive-tension mounts and the object for satisfaction is unavailable, the discharge of tension into ideation may be too small to cause adequate subsidence of tension. The drive-cathexes may then be repressed or transformed from an active and mobile state into a bound state. The energy used for these purposes is called counter-cathexes. Delay,

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 690.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 691.

which has established the counter-cathecting energy-distribution, also serves an important role in the development of the organism's regulatory function, which is conceptualized as the ego. The regulations used by the ego are primarily secondary process thought, bound cathexes, and reality-testing.<sup>1</sup>

Secondary process thought radically and specifically extended becomes intellectualization, which is "capable of binding and neutralizing great amounts of drive-energy."<sup>2</sup>

Intellectualization also:

Provides a means for an often effective compromise between the drives and the ego, wherein prohibited drive-goals are permitted and even pursued in the guise of more or less realistic goal-pursuits.<sup>3</sup>

Intellectualization seems to include, at least, memory, anticipation, and concept formation. Where primary process thinking is used, concept formation is physiognomic. But, in secondary process thinking memory frames of reference, corresponding to reality, formulize into concepts. These concepts are assimilated, in terms of time, space, and matter, and related to every already existing abstract and sensory quality.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 696-702.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 703.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

The residue of conceptual frames of reference are not cathected instead of the single idea.<sup>1</sup>

Memory registers reality-sequences of events, and, thereby, becomes an important factor in reality testing. There are both lower and higher levels of anticipation. The former are composed of drive-anticipations of real or ideational objects. The higher levels of anticipation differ from the lower in that they tend toward action determined by a great variety of interacting motivational forces, they lose the idiosyncratic-individual character and become socially shared anticipations, and they tend toward freedom from restriction to motivations and strivings of socially agreed character.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the development of thought extends from physiognomic animation to concretion, then to abstraction.

## 2) The Objects of Thought

The development of the objects of thought makes a similar progression. An object is generally held by psychoanalysis to be that which is considered adequate for the satisfaction of an instinctual need. It is not originally attached to the instinct but becomes so attached according to its ability to satis-

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 703-09.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 713-14.

fy the need. An object may be an extraneous one or part of the individual's body. The object of a particular instinct may change, and one object may serve to gratify needs of more than one instinct, even simultaneously.

The first drive-satisfying objects, such as the "breast," are not sharply defined, discrete percepts to the infant. Instead they are the nuclei of diffuse and global experiences. It is thought that only later in development are these objects first animated, then concretized in literalness, and finally categorized in abstractions and generalizations. In the building of conceptual abstractions and applying them to certain cases, there is a tendency to fall back upon the concrete facts to which the abstractions refer.

It goes without saying that every set of abstractions may serve as the "concrete material" for higher-order abstractions, and this repeats itself in a hierarchical series.<sup>1</sup>

### 3) The Influence of the Hoping Process

The crux of the influence of the hoping process consists primarily in the "kind" of object toward which the individual is moving in emphasis. It is contended that the "kind" of object that the hoping person seeks is an abstract and global one, and that his seeking parallels, more or less, the direction

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 706-07.

of the development of thought. The importance of this argument is for the purpose of deciding whether the hoping process can be distinguished from other processes of response because of the "kind" of object which the hoping person selects. And, if in the final analysis, the psychoanalyst must continue to hold the hoping process within that of wishing, can the hoping process be considered, at least, a unique aspect of wishing, perhaps mature wishing.

Marcel's contention is that wishing and hoping are separate processes due primarily to the fact that wishing demands a specific object, while hope does not. The more concrete and articulate the content of the object, the more probable it is wishing and the less probable it is hoping.

There is a difference between "I hope" and "I hope that. . ." The more specific the "that" the more likely it is that a wish, an illusion or a delusion is at hand.<sup>1</sup>

This hypothesis, based on Marcel's argument, proposes that the hoping process, as a response to a captive situation, is a general movement of the individual toward a more abstractly held and perceived object.

Rapaport contends that when the organism is confronted by an environment that is void of any adequate object to satisfy the instinctual need, then the organism turns back to

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<sup>1</sup>Pruyser, op. cit., p. 4.

primary process thinking. As a result the organism directs the cathexes toward the memory-trace of gratification, which is characterized by wishfulfillment.<sup>1</sup> These memory-traces or ideas are specific and have, at least, literal content.

The hoping person, by definition, faces a situation void of suitable objects for gratification of the immediate need to be free from the captive stimuli. The choice for the hoping process is not regression toward specific memory-traces of past experiences or objects of gratification. Instead, the movement is toward an object that can be described only in abstract and conceptual terms. In relation to the concrete and specific object, the object of the hoping process must remain diffuse and global in content. There are no concrete referents with which to compare and rely upon. The object of the hoping process is described by such terms as salvation, liberation, and freedom. Secondary process thinking and reality testing are involved in the choice of this kind of object.

Thinking has already been employed to determine the lack of suitable concrete objects in the environment, in perception of the external conditions, and in the choice of response. Reality testing is used also by the hoping person in the determination and anticipation of the global object.

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<sup>1</sup>Rapaport, Organization and Pathology of Thought, p. 690.

Though diffuse and global, the object of the hoping process promises enough possibility of satisfaction to induce the anticipation and acceptance of this kind of object in preference to that of wishfulfillment.

The movement of the hoping response is seen then to be in the same general movement as the development of thought--toward abstraction. When the individual is confronted by a captive situation, which provides no concrete object of satisfaction, it is held that in addition to the regression to wishful thinking there is the choice of a more abstract object.

For this reason it is assumed that the processes of wishing and hoping are different, though not necessarily unrelated. In a rational hierarchy, it is judged that hoping is on a higher level than wishing; and as a process, hoping is a general movement toward an object that is perceived abstractly.

#### viii. An Interpersonal Activity

It has been stated that Marcel considers hope to be possible only when it includes a process involving more than the individual. It is super-relational. It is an experience of the "I" and the "Thou" or of the "Us."<sup>1</sup>

There is a quality of sharing included in the hoping process. The hoping person acknowledges his own limited abilities for escaping. But he has confidence in another and his powers.

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<sup>1</sup>Marcel, Homo Viator, p. 10.

By the hoping person's sharing of his need with the "Thou" he is allowed to share in a relationship that promises ultimately to free him from his captivity.

There are certain, existing, tangential benefits as well. That is to say that all the rewards are not in the future only. Once the individual has committed himself to the hoping process and entered into the relationship with the other person, who he asserts will free him, then he enjoys such compensations as peace, assurance, and companionship.

To the individual involved, it is a real experience with another person and that other person is perceived to have the powers to bring a favorable change to the captive situation. In the meantime, while the hoping person awaits the change, it is a relationship to be enjoyed.

This interpersonal activity is based upon a value judgment of one person in another. It is an assertion that requests more than it demands. It is a request that though it is not deserved or merited it is expected. It is so because of the quality of the relationship. It is agape in character.

The hoping response to an apparently insurmountable and thereby captive situation is to turn to the strength of this interpersonal relationship and to say, in effect, "I hope in Thee." When this occurs it is an indicator that the hoping process is at work.

### 3. The Consequences of the Hoping Process

The result of hoping and its significance to the hoping person are the final concerns of this chapter. These are most directly related to or implicated by the indicators of hoping. These consequences are best dealt with by looking at them separately.

#### i. Realistic Appraisal

The hoping person has a realistic appraisal of his need. This does not suggest that the hoping person's perception of the environmental influence upon himself is accurate. What it does suggest is that the hoping person has a clear idea of his own inability to cope with the situation.

From his perspective the problem is real and it involves him. He accepts the condition as it appears to present itself. It is seen as part of his life space and as something which demands a response from him.

It is likely that by the time he comes to exercise the response of hoping he has already exercised other modes of response. Hoping is a response to a situation that is exercised, not because it is expected thereby to free one from the trial, but because it frees the person from the demand of making any particular response immediately. As a result the person has a better opportunity to appraise the situation, himself and his

needs.

ii. Individual Desires Are Transcended

The hoping person, though he has a realistic appraisal of his needs, does not concentrate on his own individual desires exclusively.

There is no doubt on the part of the individual that he is caught in a web of environmental circumstances. But prior to the exercising of hope he has tried "his way" and it failed. The ordinary ways of response have been tried and found wanting. By hoping the person admits in humility that the necessary power is not his.

Through this admission of his own limitations, the person gives up all claims for demanding how or when he may be freed. He doesn't feel that he can really demand anything, not even that he be set free. Coupled with this admission is the absence of any feeling that he deserves to be free.

The hoping person sets aside his own personal desires in deference to another's desires.

iii. Trust Is Placed In Another

Having recognized and accepted his own limitations in respect to his situation, the hoping person places his trust and confidence in another person. This other person is deemed

powerful enough to change the situation if he so desires.

The hoping person feels that he knows the strengths and the desires of the other person well enough to make an assertion concerning his captivity. He maintains that he can be set free. How or when he does not ask or say. Perhaps later he will state with more assurance but with no less humility, that he will be freed.

The object of hoping then becomes not the need to be freed or the circumstances that lead to freedom. The object is the other person, who is expected to do the freeing. Hoping is as much a response to a person as it is a response to a situation of captivity.

The hoping person becomes aware of the other person's presence and availability. The relationship is a mystery in the sense that any interpersonal activity is mysterious. The process does not have to be understood before the person can know that he is engaged in such a relationship. The hoping person knows of the other's presence and availability, and he participates in the relationship by trust. It becomes a relationship of subject to subject.

As a result of this relationship the person is able to escape some of his own self-interests which tend to hold him captive and make him non-creative.

Acceptance of the relationship by the other person in spite of the expressed limitations of the hoping person, may cause the hoping person to feel that he has become a part of this "creative process" that is going to change things. Confidence is placed in the other person's ability to bring about a certain process of growth and development. Because of the participation in the relationship there is also participation in the growth and development. The creative process then is promoted from within the hoping person.

iv. Time Is Viewed Differently

Because of the person's view of time the duration of a perceived captive situation may actually become another prison. The nature of the hoping person is to view time differently and thereby reduce its unfavorable influences.

The attitude of the hoping person toward time of the past is to refuse to limit the possibilities of change to those based upon past experience. Through his trust in the other person, the hoping individual declares that the possibilities are greater than those possibilities that he has experienced.

The present is not allowed by the hoping individual to add to the strength of the captive situation. Though the answer to the problem is not on hand it is expected at some future time. Neither the past nor the present are allowed to be-

come censors of possibilities.

Time is considered by the hoping person to belong to the other person. Because in admitting his limitations and having turned for help, the hoping person relinquished his hold on time. And in effect, he decides that time is to be trusted to the other person.

#### v. Personality Changes

Perhaps the greatest change in the personality of the hoping person comes as a result of patience in the hoping process.

As a result of patience, the anxiety of the individual is decreased. This may lead to relaxation and to the avoidance of the stiffening and tightening up of oneself that could rob the person of energy needed for resistance, especially in illness.

It would appear that patience in the hoping process could provide for the transference of energy, once expended by hostility, bitterness, denial, and anxiety related to the captive situation; to physical and mental resistance of and response to the captive situation.

The abilities to relax, tolerate anxiety, and manage fear are related to the hoping person's patience. He places confidence in the possibility of change and in the person who is expected to bring about that change. There is an attitude

of waiting in patience for this change.

Resistance decreases as patience increases the individual's ability to accept reality and to wait for a change in circumstances.

The individual becomes more secure as the hoping process takes command. He has had to make independent judgments relating to acknowledgement of the captive situation and to the assertion that this situation does not exhaust all the possibilities.

By declaring that all is not necessarily lost, even though he may not live, the individual finds a sense of security in being a person who humbly and modestly has such expectations. Finding such value within himself, the hoping person feels free enough to respond with increased courage, independence and confidence.

Early personality characteristics of bitterness, frustration, and hostility at being captured by a situation that is not of one's own choice, are changed by hoping to humility.

There is a decline in the moods of aggressive self-complacency or pride in the hoping person. There is also a decrease in defiance and provocation. Even in the assertion that the condition of captivity is not final, the attitude is one of quiet self-assurance.

This completes the descriptive analysis of the hoping process related to its conditions of occurrence, distinctive indicators, and dynamic consequences.

Due to the lack of case material in this analysis, it is felt that the hoping process could be defined more adequately by comparing it with another definition of hope that makes use of case study materials.

To this end, such a comparative study is made in the chapter which follows. Because it is probably the most highly developed system in relation to the use of hope by a psychiatrist, the work of Thomas French has been selected for comparison.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE HOPING PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

One of the ways to understand and evaluate the hoping process is through a comparative analysis whereby the hoping process, as described in the preceding chapter, is examined in relation to another definition of hope.

Thomas French's several volume work, The Integration of Behavior, makes an extensive use and application of the word "hope," and the concept of hope contributes a very important part to his system. French attributes an arbitrary definition to the word "hope" as well as the motivation for the occurrence of hope. Extensive case studies and materials are presented in order to illustrate the major theme, "the integration of behavior" and the place of hope in this theme.

French's work has been selected for comparison with the hoping process because of his extensive use of the term "hope."

It is expected that such a comparative analysis of the hoping process with "hope" as used and defined by French will contribute to a better understanding of the hoping process and its later application to the work of the minister and the psychiatrist.

The approach taken by this chapter is: (1) to present the working methods and intentions of French as outlined in his own study, (2) to present a brief summary of the case materials that provide the basis for French's study, and (3) to present from these case studies "hope" as seen by French.

Having done these things the intention is to compare hope as seen by French with the description of the hoping process as presented in the preceding work. For the sake of clarity, whenever the terms "hoping process" or "the hoping person" are used, they are intended to refer to hope as described in this study.

#### 1. Approach to French's Work

Thomas French is a psychiatrist who attempts a detailed analysis of the thoughts and acts of one person during two years of psychoanalytic treatment. From this explicit case example, French expects to be able to more completely understand the process of integration of behavior. He is interested in how even the elementary human reactions and responses are co-ordinated into a complete pattern of behavior.

As our working hypothesis, we assume that the component factors of rational behavior can be found also, usually in exaggerated form and in greater isolation, in less rational mental products. In our analyses of the patient's dreams and his reactions to conflict, we expect to find reactions that are recognizable as disintegration products of normal integrative process.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Thomas French, op. cit., I, p. 39.

Our aim, really, is not to prove anything. We intend, rather, to illustrate a method by which anyone may check our conclusions on as many cases as he cares to study in this way.<sup>1</sup>

The method employed by French in his study of the integration of behavior is one of successive approximations.

We devise concepts, first, to make intelligible the best-known and most obvious facts. Then we proceed step by step, to test, correct, and refine these concepts by confronting them with other, more detailed observations.<sup>2</sup>

But the concern of this chapter is with French's use of hope, how he interprets it, what claims he makes for it, and especially how it compares with the hoping process as defined in this study.

French begins with the psychoanalytic postulation of "wishes," which are characterized as a subjective state of tension and dissatisfaction that seeks some form of discharge and satisfaction. These "wishes" are separated into positive and negative goals. The negative wishes are considered to be those states of unrest called "needs," which are urges to escape from something. The positive wishes are those states of expectation and longing for future satisfaction, based either upon available opportunities or memories of past experiences of satisfaction. These are seen as "wishes for something, not

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

wishes to get away from something."<sup>1</sup>

Needs and hope both play a significant role in the integration of behavior.

In the integration of goal-directed behavior, needs and hopes play complementary roles. They are the poles, negative and positive, about which all behavior is oriented. Although we try first to escape from painful pressures arising from our needs, our efforts tend to be focused more specifically on positive goals based on our hopes.<sup>2</sup>

But hope has a special function in goal-directed behavior. In goal-directed behavior there is a need for direction as well as for motivation to act. According to French, these circumscribed efforts to obtain a particular goal is the tendency of hope to execute a plan.

Hope tends to activate a plan. By activating the guiding influence of a plan on motor discharge, hope concentrates this motor discharge on efforts to achieve a positive goal.<sup>3</sup>

Thus in summary, French sees the subjective tension of a need arise to such a degree as to demand some form of discharge. The integrative process is held intact due to the hope of satisfaction, which stimulates the integrative mechanism toward the formulation of a plan of action that will accomplish this hope. Then this hope of satisfaction becomes

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 50-51.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

the guiding influence in order to direct motor discharge to the proper execution of the plan.

## 2. Presentation of Case Material

This presentation of case material is not intended to be a fully detailed report. Instead, the purpose is to summarize the material and still retain enough information so as to provide a fairly complete picture of the data with which French worked.

The patient was born in July, 1889, in a small Polish village. The family held some importance in the same village because the patient's father was mayor of the village at one time. The father's main occupation was that of a blacksmith. He apparently did fairly well financially because there was always a maid and a hired man in the household.

The father was very strict with the children, physically strong and powerful, and he allowed no one of the family to question his actions. The patient admits that he was afraid of his father.

The mother was seen by the patient as one who used to help him out of arguments with his father. The patient felt that he got along with his mother. She died when he was thirty-nine and he felt that this was one of the major upsets in his life.

The patient was the oldest of six siblings. His birth was reported as a difficult one by his grandparents. He was

weak and sickly from birth. Between the ages of four and six he had eczema and following this period he had chronic bronchial difficulties and several severe asthma attacks.

He was three years old when his first sibling, a brother was born. Prior to the birth of his brother, the patient had always slept with his mother, but following his brother's birth he could sleep with her only when he was ill. Shortly after the birth of his brother he developed severe eczema of his face and his hands were tied to prevent him from scratching it. He never seemed to get along with this brother, but claims that his relationship with his other two brothers and two sisters was always very pleasant.

Several events in early life were considered to be important by the patient. In relation to his first sibling, he once was wheeling the brother in a carriage when he "accidentally" let it roll down a hill and crash. Another time he was supposed to watch and care for his brother but instead let him wander off so that he was lost for an entire night.

One outstanding event remembered in relation to his father was the time he entered the blacksmith shop, which he had been forbidden to do, and was kicked by a horse. He ran terrified with fear of his father. He remembers his father grumbling about the hospital bill. This accident left a permanent scar.

He had a very difficult time with his father during ado-

lescence. He wanted to be a blacksmith like his father, but was not allowed to do so. His father felt that there was a better kind of life, and thus he forced him to try and do well in school. At fifteen he remembers being beaten by his father for flunking his examinations. He then ran away from home to apprentice himself as a mechanic. He returned home briefly when his parents separated, but when the father returned home the patient left having decided to emigrate to the United States. He was then twenty years of age.

At twenty-six years of age he developed hay fever-like symptoms with coughing, sneezing, and sinus trouble. It seems that these symptoms began while he was interested in some girl, who was more interested in another man. These hay fever symptoms lasted four years. During this time he was in the army. He was discharged after four months because of his hay fever and coughing.

He married at the age of thirty-three. He said he was happy with the marriage for over a year, until the time of his wife's first pregnancy. The patient had bought a school-supply store, which he and his wife ran. He began to be unhappy with his wife. He complained that she was overly critical and quarrelsome, careless about watching her weight and her own personal appearance, and that she neglected the children. Whenever he would engage in a heated argument with his wife he would have an acute asthma attack which would stop him. He thought of

separation but such thought seemed to precipitate severe asthma followed by chills, fever, and nausea.

He came for analysis at the age of forty-six. He was then working in a railroad yard where his job was to clean out cattle and freight cars. His relation with the men in the railroad yard was seen as a dependent one since they often cared for him when he became ill at work. His social life with men was apparently good because he joined lodges and said that he liked the men at work.<sup>1</sup>

This has been a short summary of the case history of the patient prior to his coming for analysis. Other information will be made available as it relates to the interests of this study.

### 3. Comparison Study

#### i. General Differences of Theory

The most evident distinction between the hoping process defined in this study and hope as described by French is whether hoping and wishing are actually the same process or not.

French explicitly places hope within the wishing process as anticipated satisfactions. "Hope of satisfaction implies an unsatisfied wish for real satisfaction."<sup>2</sup> Hope and wish-

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<sup>1</sup>French, op. cit., I, pp. 243-251. II, pp. 333-334.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., I, p. 60.

ing are considered only as two separate aspects of the same state of mind. These anticipations are changed by unabsorbed pressure of underlying need into an incentive to activity in a goal-directed fashion.

The hoping process is claimed to be different from the process of wishing on the grounds that the objects are different; the subjects react differently, particularly in the choice of ego functions; the hoping process is a response to a particular kind of situation; and the hoping process is not goal-directed behavior in the sense that no degree of motor discharge is seen able to bring about the desired goal.

The object or goal of hope for French is specific and concrete in nature. It is based upon past experience and memory of prior satisfaction and upon the present opportunities to again obtain this goal. When the internal need becomes intense enough, it converts the hope into an incentive to action rechanneled through the modifying influence and insight of an integrative field. In comparison, the hoping process has only abstract objects such as salvation or liberation. It too, is based upon past experience, but not tied to it. In fact, the hoping process may be employed by the individual in spite of the evidence presented by experience that implies there is no reason to hope. By definition of the captive experience, the individual has no opportunities available to him or else there would be no need to use the response of hoping. The hoping

process is equally considered to have a modifying effect. However, the hoping process does not modify the unabsorbed pressure so that it will be better directed toward efforts to achieve a goal. Instead, it modifies the unabsorbed pressure to alter the individual's attitudes in order to aid the individual to adapt to the environment and to increase his autonomy from the stimuli of the environment. The hoping person does not try to launch a plan to change the environment, but he acknowledges and accepts the environment.

The subjects of French's hope and of the hoping process react differently. To begin with, in the terms of hope as defined by French, if there are no opportunities or memories of past experiences upon which to base these anticipated satisfactions then there is no hope. In addition, if the goal-directed plan fails to materialize as expected, then the hope fails. Thus, it is subject to a continual possibility of frustration whenever there is a belief that the goal is unobtainable.

In other words, the immediately effective cause of frustration is destruction of the hope of attaining a goal that has previously seemed quite attainable.<sup>1</sup>

In this respect, it seems that the subject loses rather than gains autonomy from the environment. The individual employing the hoping process, in contrast, seeks to avoid being

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

tied to the environment and the frustrations of whether or not he can accomplish a particular goal that he has set. The hoping person sets no goals of attaining a definite and concrete object and sets no time limits, and, thereby, attempts to decrease the possibility of disappointment or frustration. In addition, the hoping person needs no present opportunities or memories of past experiences to stimulate the formation of hope. In fact, it is just the lack of present opportunities that causes one to turn to hope, and the hoping person may look into the face of the situation and the memories of past experience and hope in spite of them. The hoping person does anticipate future satisfaction, but he does not base this anticipation upon present opportunities or memories of past successes. The hoping process is based on a degree of reality testing, which goes as far as this is possible, and then it is based upon a value judgment. That value judgment may be so vague and abstract as to state that, "Somewhere, somehow, there is an answer to this problem of mine." French admits the value of subjective confidence as well:

Confidence of success is the most important factor in maintaining the integrative capacity of a goal-directed striving.<sup>1</sup>

However, while French places the bases of confidence in present opportunities to obtain that goal, the hoping per-

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

son, in contrast, would base his confidence in the probability of change, which would bring future opportunities; in his courage to accept reality; and in his ability to gain more autonomy from his environment.

Related to the subject of hope, is the choice of ego functions. French is not really concerned with ego functions but with integrative functions instead. French expects to be able to substitute the integrative mechanism for the functions of the ego as termed by Freud. In addition, he is concerned not only with motivations for behavior but also with the guiding function of insight. French feels that "integrative mechanism" is a better term than "ego."

In our formulations a guiding integrative field plays the part that Freud ascribes to the Ego. By introducing the concept of a guiding integrative field, we try to reconstruct in detail the part played by insight in the integrative function. We try to determine the exact content of the knowledge or plan that has guided a particular bit of behavior or has helped the dream work in its search for a solution to the dreamer's conflict; and then we try to measure the effectiveness of this knowledge against the disruptive influence of opposing impulses or needs or desires.<sup>1</sup>

It is felt that the hoping process serves equally well in an integrative capacity, but as a part of the ego functions. The response of the hoping person to a situation of captivity is a response intended to integrate the individual and his efforts and to aid in keeping the activities of the organism

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

orderly. But in accepting the captive situation as given, in tending toward more ego autonomy from the environment, and in the general movement toward a more abstract object; the hoping person makes ample use of the available ego functions. It is this kind of usage that causes the hoping process to be considered an ego apparatus.

As an ego apparatus, the hoping process is only one of the many functions available to the choice of the individual. The hoping process is not seen as a whole system of integration on a level with the ego. Instead, it is seen as a pattern of response that is available for selection as are other ego apparatuses.

A closely related difference of hope defined by French and that of the hoping process concerns the situation at which hope occurs. French describes hope as a process continually available for use as wishing in a state of anticipated satisfaction. It would seem that the only conditions needed for hope's presence are present opportunities or memories of previous satisfactions. The circumstances for creating a requirement for hope are the internal instincts in need of satisfaction. By definition of the hoping process, it has been stated that the hoping process is a response to a particular

kind of situation--a captive one. The initial circumstances providing the impetus for the use of the hoping process are the constricting forces of the external situation. These external forces may become so great as to prevent gratification of the internal needs. It seems that both the external forces and the internal needs require that a response be made. The individual must determine if the hoping response is the one to be made.

The discharge of motor activity is another area of disagreement. For French, the goal can be achieved only if the pressure of a need, which is the impetus behind motor activity, is integrated with the guiding influence of hope. The hope of satisfaction or the accomplishment of the goal acts to focus motor discharge on efforts toward obtaining the goal. In contrast, the hoping person tries to delay motor discharge. There are no goals set by the hoping person that are concrete enough to focus motor discharge upon them. Instead, the person involved in the hoping process delays motor discharge through patience or directs it back upon the alteration of his own attitudes through the acceptance of the environmental conditions. The hoping person is not able to employ the necessary energy of motor discharge in the service of goal-directed behavior. This is because the hoping person formulates no goals specific enough to plan for, unless they are the tendencies toward acknowledgement of the situation, more auton-

omy from the environment, and toward a more abstract object.

Finally, the hope as defined by French differs from the hoping process in respect to the tendencies described in the definition of the hoping process. The hoping person has the tendency to acknowledge and accept the situation as unalterable through his own efforts, and instead turns to alter his inner attitudes. The goal-directed behavior of French's hope sets out for the very purpose of altering the environment through the action of the individual upon the environment. The intensity of the goal-directed behavior depends upon the anticipation of completing this goal, which amounts in some degree to alteration.

Another tendency of the hoping person as defined is that movement toward the attaining of more autonomy from the environment. Freedom from the onrush of external stimuli is necessary to independent activity. The hoping process aids the activity of obtaining more autonomy from the environment through the provision of motivation for ego autonomy, provision for the setting of independent though vague goals, and the provision of some means to better appropriate instinctual motivations toward ego autonomy from the environment.

The tendency toward an abstract object by the hoping person has been discussed as differing from the goal-directed behavior of hope defined by French, which determines a specific object and initiates a plan to attain it. "In purposive be-

havior we have a single, dominant end-goal."<sup>1</sup> The hoping person moves in his thinking toward a more abstractly held and perceived object. The object of the hoping process is described by such terms as liberation and salvation.

ii. Comparison of Differences in Application

The intention is now to take some examples of French's use of hope as applied in reference to his case study material, and determine how the hoping process would be used or interpreted differently under the same conditions. French interprets the function of hope largely as it relates to the analysis of the patient's dreams. Therefore, the examples cited here will begin with the presentation of the patient's dream and French's use of hope in the interpretation of the dream. Then the hoping process will be compared with and distinguished from French's use of hope in these examples.

This group of dreams are given by French as examples of the patient's hope of or positive goals of pleasing his mother.

The first dream example is called the "bridge dream."

Dream of school days. On weekend I was going home. We always walked unless someone picked us up. I walked alone until I got to bridge. A girl was there leaning on bridge, watching boats. I stopped and pinched her

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 95.

on back, and then we walked on home. Getting dark. Mother met her and thanked me and asked me in and gave me a glass of milk.<sup>1</sup>

One of the bases for hope, the opportunity for satisfaction, is felt by French to be supplied by the analyst's expressed interest in dreams.<sup>2</sup>

Hope based on this opportunity is reinforced by an adolescent memory of winning a mother by assuming a protective role toward her daughter.<sup>3</sup>

A second dream is called the "railroad station dream."

Last night kind of embarrassing. I was in railroad station with a lot of people. Wife and me. We were separated, she in one end and I in other. Old friends around. They came and asked me why I married her. I dodged her too.<sup>4</sup>

French interprets hope in this case to be the anticipation of winning the analyst's sympathy by complaining about his wife. The present opportunity is provided by the sympathetic listening of the analyst. Memories of how his mother felt about sex are seen as the basis in past experience for this hope.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

The "clinic dream" forms a third example.

Something toward morning about doctors and ladies. I was taking some kind of treatment. Doctors taking culture. Lady comes along and says now we've hit spot.<sup>1</sup>

The hope in this example, as seen by French, is that he will establish a claim to the attention of the analyst through his illness. This hope is thought to be based on special care and attention he received in childhood due to his illness, or so interpreted by French.<sup>2</sup>

In these three dreams the attempt by French has been to show that these "different attempts at solution are hopes."<sup>3</sup> The hopes are positive goals of pleasing the mother. These hopes with their positive goals focus discharge on the efforts to achieve this one particular goal. The general goal is one of pleasing the mother. For French, the first dream reveals this in the receiving of thanks; the second dream shows this by the receiving of sympathy; and the third dream indicates this by the claim on attention.

In the comparison of the hoping process with French's notion of hope, it must first be recognized that these situations in themselves do not provide the necessary captive

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

situation to which hope responds, by definition. It is, therefore, likely that the hoping process would not be employed in these instances. The hoping process is understood, as well, to be a special kind of response to a particular situation and not a trial and error means of finding an adequate response. There is no indication of any tendencies of the hoping person within the dreams interpreted by French, to accept the captivity, to move toward more ego autonomy, or to move toward an abstract object. Thus, it would seem that the necessary conditions are either not recorded or not present in order to make use of the hoping process as it has been defined.

For the sake of comparison, let us suppose that the hoping process could be employed. Let us further assume that the captive situation is the external threat of the mother. Before the hoping process would be applied, the individual in the captive situation would have already explored the possibility of goal-directed behavior. Otherwise, he would not feel captive. He would have exhausted the known present possibilities and feel that it was impossible to change the threat of the external captivity by the mother, at least, by his own actions alone. Then being confronted by this onrush of external stimuli which he, at first, feels constraining him from even relative free action, the individual faces the selection of a response. Among others, the responses of depression, wishing (which French calls hope), and the hoping process are seen to be some available

choices. The response of depression is to disintegrate before the onrush of the external stimuli and to lose the formerly held autonomy from the environment. The response of wishing is to attempt the cathexis of psychic energy to some outside, specific object, or so reasons much of psychoanalysis. This failing, wishing then directs the energy inward toward the object's representation within the mind. This response of wishing largely circumscribes the "anticipated satisfaction," "goal-directed behavior," and "positive goals" that French calls hope.

The hoping process is also considered to be an available response. The hoping person, if involved in such a situation, would first recognize and acknowledge the external threat of the mother as a situation perceived as captive, one which through his own actions he cannot alter. At first, the individual may feel lonely and separated from others and from any help they might give him. Comforting things of past experiences are not accessible to him, or he believes that they are not. He may feel held and forced into compulsory modes of existence so that he does not feel that he has the same freedom to act as he had prior to confrontation by this situation. There may be an accompanying loss of self-esteem due to his inability to change the situation by altering the power of the mother's threat to him.

So the hoping process is selected. The first tendency of the hoping person is to accept the captive situation. The individual acknowledges the presence of the external forces which present the problem, the need for some kind of response to the demands and stress of the situation, and the fact that he can (or thinks he can) alter only his own attitudes. While he accepts the situation, he makes a private assertion regarding the finality of his captive situation. He asserts that though he himself cannot do anything to alter the threat of his mother, this does not necessarily mean that there is no answer whatsoever to his problem. The individual does not allow past experience to become the total criterion for possibilities of change.

The basis for this assertion could be many things. A suggested one is that of childhood where omnipotence is credited to the parents or to some other external force which changed a situation that the child was not able to change. No matter what the basis for this is in past experience, it appears that such an assertion is a value judgment on the part of the individual involved. As a result, it is assumed that the individual will become more patient and relaxed. Time is no real problem because there are no time limits. The possibilities of disappointment decrease because there is no specific object formulated for the purpose of deliverance from the mother's

threat.

There are several personality changes that accompany the hoping process. Earlier hostility, bitterness, denial and anxiety related to the captive situation are transferred by patience into body and mutual resistance, or at least are made more readily available for resistance to the external stimuli of the captive situation. Individual aims and desires are set aside through reduced narcissism. There are new feelings of humility and modesty. There is a decline in the moods of aggressive self-complacency and in defiance and provocation. Patience helps the individual to relax, regulate the effects of anxiety, and to control fear. There is confidence and quiet self-assurance in the assertion that change will come.

The acceptance of the situation as given requires the usage of several ego functions. Judgments are made concerning the perception of reality and reality in relation to the self; memory, thinking, and affects are used in the evaluation and acknowledgement of the situation; attempts are made to reconcile conflicting ideas, unite contrasts, assimilate the external and internal elements, and to adapt to reality.

Through the reality principle and its modifications of the pleasure principle the individual may renounce immediate satisfaction due to the anticipation of some vague and global future pleasure, which promises to be greater. Thus in this

example of a captive situation, the anticipation of some future salvation from the captive threats of the mother may cause the individual to renounce whatever immediate pleasures are available.

Thus, the hoping person would seem to maintain a certain mastery over the influences of the environment through the use of the reality-principle and secondary process thinking; through introjection of and identification with the reality of the situation and with the omnipotence of reality's possibilities for removing the threats of the mother; through the development of tension tolerance and the reconciliation of time through patience; and through a commitment or value judgment concerning a source omnipotent enough to guarantee future liberation from the threat of the mother.

A second tendency hypothesized concerning the hoping person is that of moving toward more ego autonomy from the environment. Hope, based only upon present opportunities or memories of past satisfactions as defined by French, would seem inadequate due to the fact that the captive situation, such as the threat of the mother, may help determine these opportunities and past memories. To hope under these conditions would appear to be losing rather than gaining autonomy. In the dream examples of French, the assumed goals are determined by the dependence on the captive situation. In contrast, the hoping person tends to attempt to gain more autonomy from the environment.

In this hypothetical comparison, the hoping person moves toward more autonomy from the threatening mother. The threatening stimuli coming from the mother may be so intense that familiar aids and means seem inaccessible to the individual. The individual may be deprived of any other stimuli. As a result there may be a decline in the individual's maintenance of thought-structures, values, ideologies, and ego identity. There may be massive blocking of the instinctual drives because of the constrictive quality of the captivity. Needfulness, fear, and danger, which ordinarily have aroused resistance may now be in service of the desire to surrender the autonomy to the environment. The hoping person responds to this threat of the captive situation by moving toward more autonomy and independence from the environment.

The hoping person may turn initially to alter his own outlook. The individual attempts first to master the environment by withdrawing. He acknowledges the captive situation, but also asserts that it is not final. This assertion magnifies the presently meager stimuli of future promises of freedom and, thereby, softens the effect of the stimuli from the captive situation. The hoping process, thus employed, aids the individual in the setting of independent goals based upon the individual's own ideals or value judgments. Through the exercise of patience in the hoping process there is a delay of the initial motor discharge to a later time. Not having to act

immediately helps to free the individual for better evaluation.

Awareness is broadened and sharpened as the hoping process becomes more rational in its attempt to serve the differentiating functions of the ego.

Somewhere in this process, rational behavior gives way to the non-rational value system. The person asserts his independence from the environment. He declares that the captive constrictions are not as final as they seemed initially.

Independently the individual decides to act to change his own viewpoint, to delay motor discharge, and to deliberate upon the full significance of the external stimuli. He now moves to challenge the finality of his captive situation, to set independent goals of seeking more autonomy and a more abstract object of salvation. The selection of the hoping process as a response is in itself an autonomous decision.

In terms of the case in point, the individual would declare that the threatening mother is not as final a threat as she seems. The decision is made by the individual to change his attitudes rather than change his mother or alter her behavior.

Motor discharge is delayed and the captive situation is evaluated, acknowledged, and accepted. The individual then seeks to gain autonomy from the mother.

Let us suppose that we accept French's interpretation of this man's fear as relating to sexual wishes of which the patient feels his mother will not approve or accept. Hope as described by French at this point is behavior directed to the purpose of winning approval. It is dependent upon the conditions of the captive situation and is directed to the changing of the environment.

The hoping process would show a different response if used by the individual. Should this happen, the hoping person would first act to alter his own outlook. Motor discharge would be delayed and the individual would wait in patience for a change in the captive situation. The change would come in relation to a decrease in the mother's threat of disapproval.

There would be no conditions set by the hoping person as to how or when this change would take place. It would simply be asserted that the change will come. The hoping person would not determine any goal-directed behavior to bring about this change.

No goals such as winning the approval of the mother by a protective role toward her daughter, by assuming a sickly posture, or by complaining, as are described by French as examples of hope in the dreams of this patient, are set by the hoping person.

The hoping person can alter his own attitudes in spite of the environment. All is not necessarily lost even though the mother forever remains disapproving. He can acknowledge and accept the fact that his mother is the way she is, and quite possibly will continue to remain this way.

The awareness of the hoping individual may become sharpened where he strives to differentiate more completely the functions often attributed to the ego. The hoping person learns that he can delay motor discharge and have patience. He is left to make his own value judgment that his mother's attitude will change, or he claims that her attitude may not always have the effect of captivity upon him.

Another tendency of the hoping process is to move in the direction of a more abstractly and less concretely represented object.

As previously explained, the goals that are set out in the dreams of French's case studies and called hope by French are not abstract but concrete. The wishes of the patient are specific with manifest content. The hoping process strives to formulate a more abstract object. By definition of the captive situation the hoping person faces a condition void of suitable objects for gratification of the desire to be free. The hoping person then turns toward the object of salvation, which remains

diffuse and global in content.

French attempts further to demonstrate the function of hope through the study of Freud's, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria," or the case of "Dora."<sup>1</sup>

The dream of "Dora" used by French for the purposes of demonstration is the following:

A house was on fire. My father was standing beside my bed and woke me up. I dressed myself quickly. Mother wanted to stop and save her jewel-case; but Father said: "I refuse to let myself and my two children be burnt for the sake of your jewel-case." We hurried downstairs, and as soon as I was outside I woke up.<sup>2</sup>

Freud interpreted the conflict of this dream as the patient's infantile sexual wish for her father and the fear of yielding to the advances of Mr. K. Dora "summoned up an infantile affection for her father so that it might protect her against her present affection for a stranger."<sup>3</sup>

It is upon this statement of Freud's that French bases his interpretation of the dream quoted above. The interpretation proffered by French is as follows:

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<sup>1</sup>Sigmund Freud, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria," Collected Papers, III (3rd ed.; London: Hogarth Press, 1946).

<sup>2</sup>French, op. cit., II, p. 12.

<sup>3</sup>Freud, Collected Papers, III, p. 104.

Dora's dream is organized about her conflict about yielding to Mr. K; the dream work has utilized, first, the memory of being waked up by her father, and then her recent resolution to leave with her father, in an unsuccessful search for a solution of her present problem. Then the jewel-case episode gives her evidence that the decision to leave with her father is itself in conflict with her desire to cling to her former tender relationship with Mr. K in spite of his sexual advances.<sup>1</sup>

French postulates that dreams like waking behavior are polarized between negative goals (needs) and positive goals (hopes). In this dream of Dora's the negative pole is her conflict over yielding to Mr. K's advances. Hope is illustrated for French by Dora's positive goal of turning to her father for protection, based upon a reassuring memory of her father having awakened her as a child to prevent bed wetting and upon the present opportunity of leaving the house with the father.

In brief comparison, the hoping process would not be considered to be invoked in this setting because the situation is not a captive one. Dora is still able to act on the environment and alter some conditions. There is no indication that she considered the conditions to be captive. This study would hold that it is unlikely that she would select the hoping response due to the other alternatives that are apparently open to her selection.

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<sup>1</sup>French, *op. cit.*, II, p. 16.

In summary, hope as defined by French and the hoping process as defined by this study vary considerably in their presuppositions, intentions, and activities.

It seems that the first outstanding difference in respect to any case, would be the presupposition proffered here that the hoping process is a response to a situation perceived by the individual to be captive. French has no such requirement for the occurrence of hope as he defines it. In fact, the possibility of hope is seen by French to be involved in every situation where there are motivating pressures. The presupposition of French that hope is a positive goal differs measurably from the presuppositions concerning the hoping process. These were outlined under the general characteristics or tendencies of the hoping person toward acceptance of reality, the seeking of additional autonomy from the environment, and the consideration of a more abstract object.

French's interpretation of hope's intentions is the service of the integrative function, which takes the place of the term ego. Hope is seen to stimulate the integrative mechanism into formulating a plan for realizing the goal of anticipated satisfaction. Hope then activates this plan to the point that it acts as an influence in the guiding of motor discharge to the accomplishment of that goal. In comparison, the intentions of the hoping process are seen as serving the ego in the process of adaptation, which by definition is a response to a captive

situation.

In terms of activity, the differences can be grouped basically in the following fashion. For French the activities of hope are primarily goal-directed behavior. The energy of hope is directed against the environment in order to accomplish the desired goal.

In contrast, the hoping process is directed towards changing and altering the personal attitudes and towards establishing and maintaining a personal relationship with another.

The hoping process has been analyzed from many different viewpoints. After having done this the question arises as to the value of the hoping process. It may also be asked for what purposes has the hoping process been analyzed. It is to these two questions that this study now turns. Of primary concern are the implications of the hoping process to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister and their relation to a person caught in a captive situation.

## CHAPTER V

### IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE MINISTER

This chapter is concerned with the more practical applications of the hoping process. The intention is to take the conditions of occurrence, the indicators, and the consequences of the hoping process and to indicate how they are related to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister.

#### 1. Implications of Captivity

The situation of captivity has been described as one in which the individual feels that he is caught. He cannot, by his own efforts alone, change either the environment or his own attitudes related to the captivity by the environment.

The individual conceives himself to be isolated from the help of others. He is lonely. He may feel deserted. He is anxious and frustrated. He may be questioning his own worth. He is looking for a means of escape.

##### i. The Person's Approach

The individual's approach for help from the psychiatrist is basically the same as the approach made to the minister. The most obvious reason for the individual's coming is that he needs help in dealing with his problem.

The person comes believing that there is something special in the psychiatrist and/or the minister that qualifies them as being able to help. He believes that they have special training, skill, and personal preparation from which he can draw the strength that he lacks.

From time immemorial certain individuals have been set apart in every human society as possessing power to assist in the process of personal reparation, the power to relieve pain, to forestall death and promote recovery from injuries--in short, to minister to an individual upon whom the assaults of a hostile environment have fallen more heavily than upon his fellows.<sup>1</sup>

The individual also comes to the psychiatrist or the minister with certain expectations.

He expects, of course, to receive help. He confesses either to the psychiatrist or the minister that he is not equal to the demands of the environment upon him. And he requests assistance.

Depending upon the individual, the person will ask for help to either change the environment or effect a change within himself, perhaps both. He may expect the psychiatrist or the minister to be able to bring about a change in either of the two areas.

Another expectation of the person who comes for help is that he expects to be treated as a person with value. He

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<sup>1</sup>Karl A. Menninger, A Psychiatrist's World, ed. Bernard Hall (New York: The Viking Press, 1959), pp. 378-79.

is a person with an immensely complex problem. He believes that he needs and deserves help. He expects proper concern and respect from the psychiatrist or the minister.

A third expectation is related to the second. It has to do with growth and development. The individual is anxious that he will not continue to grow and develop because of the constriction placed upon him by the captive situation. He expects the helping person to be equally concerned and willing to help him to continue to grow and develop. The psychiatrist or the minister must care whether he is going to rise or fall.

Generally the person's expectations toward the psychiatrist and the minister are favorable or else he wouldn't appeal to them for help.

Even though the expectations are favorable, the individual still may approach the helping person with some fear, hostility, shame, and distrustfulness. His coming may be hampered by some social stigmatization or fear of being laughed at by others. It is quite likely that both internal and external pressures have become fairly severe before he seeks help. Especially is this true when seeking the help of the psychiatrist.

ii. The Response of the Psychiatrist and the Minister

There are boundaries and limitations to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister but each has an interest that overlaps with the other's--that of helping other human beings who are in trouble.

The psychiatrist's and the minister's response to the person coming in need of help will be comparable with the expectations of that person. Within reason and purpose, everything will be done to enhance and mobilize the person's expectancy for help. As little as possible will be done to counteract the person's expectancies. Their own response will be modified within limits so as to meet the person's conceptions as much as possible.

Generally the psychiatrist and the minister make an effort to know and to appreciate the conditions under which the individual comes.

The individual who comes for help is held to have value as a person regardless of who he is or what he is within the community. There is a special sense of recognition by the psychiatrist and the minister for the dignity of the human being who is in trouble.

The individual is seen as one who has potential growth and development. It is recognized that these potentialities can become realities in the life of the individual. In fact,

the psychiatrist and the minister may consider it their responsibility to encourage the realization of these potentialities.

An effort is made by the helping person to remove the person's feeling of loneliness through friendship and an offer of service. The individual's shame, fear, distrustfulness, and anxiety are accepted as a part of the person and his problem.

Though the interests of the psychiatrist and the minister overlap, each also has an unique way in which he works and relates to the various expectations of the person who comes seeking help.

Because of these characteristic qualities the responses of the psychiatrist and the minister will vary. In the first place, there is not as much social stigmatization in going to a minister for help as there is in going to a psychiatrist. Neither is there as much fear of "being locked up." The psychiatrist has these additional factors to consider before he responds.

The individual going to the psychiatrist expects him to take more direct action than is expected of the minister. The psychiatrist is expected to "give him something," or to "take something away," or to "do something to him."<sup>1</sup> The minister is supposed to "do something" too, but the person

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 379-80.

expects more communication than direct action.

Both the psychiatrist and the minister have as their goals the relief of the person's distress and the improvement of his functions. These goals can be expressed in more ambitious terms such as modifying the person's self-concept, enlarging his perspective, and stimulating his internal resources. But the manner in which these goals are brought about, of course, are different.

### iii. The Implications

The psychiatrist and the minister are considered to be a means of escape by the person who believes himself to be enclosed in a captive situation.

The individual comes for help believing that he has exhausted his own personal resources. He comes humbly and dependently. He is expectant. He desires relief, and he is open to suggestion and manipulation. He is more willing than ever before to take measures and accept conditions that are new and different.

This attitude of the individual allows the psychiatrist to take measures that, perhaps, he could not have taken at an earlier time with the individual. He can probe in places that were previously closed to him. He can offer suggestions and provide treatment that he can more reasonably believe will be

accepted and acted upon.

For the minister this attitude of the individual offers an opportunity to bring theological truths to bear upon the person's life in a way that was not possible before. Because of the dimensions of the captive situation to the person involved, the captive person is concerned with ultimate questions, and he comes to the minister expecting to receive ultimate answers.

The most important implication of captivity to the psychiatrist and the minister is the fact that it precedes hoping. This is to suggest that the same grounds that bring the person in desperation and despair to ask for help are also the same grounds for the beginnings of hope. Not only are they the same grounds but they are also the only grounds for hoping.

If reality does not first give us reasons for despairing, it cannot give us grounds for hoping.<sup>1</sup>

The person who comes asking for help from the psychiatrist and the minister is asking also for hope. He is not requesting that they "give" him hope as much as he is soliciting the means whereby he may begin to exercise hope. He wants to be able to make a proper response to the tragedy in which he is involved.

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<sup>1</sup>Pruyser, op. cit., p. 13.

Intuitively the person realizes that despair, bitterness, or extreme anxiety are not the best of responses. He has a feeling that these are negative responses which are detrimental to his own welfare. And when the person asks for relief, he is also asking for a realistic, yet positive and dynamically active process, by which he can respond differently than he is presently.

Christianity has consistently brought man's attention to the fact that it is possible for man to be something other than a despairing creature. It is possible for man to be a hoping being. With this tradition as a background the minister is expected to help people towards the process of hoping.

The psychiatrist is by profession a healer. He applies his healing arts as scientifically as possible. Yet there is a quality in his work that says if this does not work then something else will. He is expected to be a hopeful person. He is expected as well to be a hope-instilling person.

Having considered that it is captivity that brings many people to the psychiatrist or the minister for help, and that this captivity is also grounds for hoping, we now turn to the next section of this study. The next section is directed to the determination of the implications of the hoping process for the psychiatrist and the minister.

## 2. The Implications of the Hoping Process

The hoping process has been demonstrated to be a response of a person who is attempting to free himself from a captive situation. In very broad terms this is also the work of the psychiatrist and the minister. Because of this similarity it is possible to draw some implications for the work of the psychiatrist and the minister from the hoping process.

### 1. The Exposure of Unsound Expectations

The hoping process is valuable to the psychiatrist and the minister because it can be used to support the exposure of unsound expectations.

The hoping process involves acceptance and acknowledgment of the external conditions. The hoping person considers the situation of captivity to be a part of himself. It is something that he cannot avoid and of which he must remain a part. He makes no attempt to put distance between himself and reality, neither does he separate himself from others.

From the perspective of the hoping person, he is caught in a process that is carrying him. Unlike the person who wishes or is optimistic, the hoping person does not imagine or predict a specific means of deliverance will come.

With the encouragement of a realistic view of the situation, the hoping person discourages the formation of unsound expectations. It is true that the hoping person makes a state-

concerning a future change in his predicament. But by keeping it as void as possible of concrete and particular demands, the hoping person moves beyond wishing and unsound expectations.

For the psychiatrist who continually searches for the clear and the relevant evidence, the hoping person's stress upon inquiry and realistic acceptance of conditions can be of help. There is also implied in the distinction between wishing and hoping that hoping may be an advanced stage of a dynamic sequence. Hoping may be seen by the psychiatrist as mature wishing.

The hoping person recognizes his position within the problem and his inability to change things without the help of another. He makes no attempt to fashion unwarranted expectations. He does not delude himself concerning his own powers or the powers of others. He simply takes a hard look at his problem, believes that it is possible for the problem to change, and goes seeking the necessary help. He may then turn to the psychiatrist or the minister for help.

The minister also desires a realistic approach to the problems of life. If the truth he proclaims has virtue, it will also provide some genuine answers to people's problems. The minister realizes that a belief in God's protective love is neither an excuse for unwarranted claims nor an invitation

to engage in unsupported expectations.

The refusal of the hoping person to indulge in wishful thinking and to demand specific requests of time and of action, lends support to a realistic approach. Acceptance on the part of the hoping person reinforces that person's expression of faith in the love of God and of his willingness to wait upon God for a solution to his problem.

ii. Direction for Sound Expectations

In the same fashion that the hoping process wards off unsound expectations, it also helps provide direction for the acceptance of more sound expectations.

Wishing and optimism have been presented as antitheses of hoping because both imply a distance from reality that hoping does not. Both emphasize the importance of "I" while hoping is more modest. Also hoping is not so concerned about the ambiguities of past experience. Instead, hoping acts as a process that probes for some means of escape.

In searching for escape, the hoping person investigates the situation and the possibilities with an eye toward realistic appraisal. The hoping person engages himself in a process that searches for novel but real opportunities which may provide a solution for his problem. Such activity provides direction for the discovery of sound expectations.

The individual who comes to the psychiatrist may very well expect to be healed. This expectation may prove to be unsound. Despair may result if this person is faced with the exposure of his unsound expectation without first being led to discover a sound means of evaluating and accepting reality.

The quality of patience in the hoping process provides a measure of protection against despair while the individual is moving from unsound to sound expectations.

Many who come to the minister for help do so because of unsound expectations that have been revealed to them for what they are. Prayers for specific demands may seem to go unanswered. An expression of faith may be based upon expectations of certain reciprocal benefits. Ordinarily these are based upon theological misunderstandings. But when the person discovers that he has been entertaining unsound expectations concerning theology, he may then come to the minister.

The hoping process provides a means whereby the person may accept his unrealistic expectations and abide in patience while he explores his theology for more realistic expectations. In respect to the captive situation and the need for a change in conditions, it may be said that hoping provides the courage to be while waiting to become.

The person who comes to the psychiatrist or the minister has certain expectations concerning the instruments they use. The psychiatrist is expected to do wonders with

his pills or with his insight into the problems of another. The minister is expected sometimes to use his office to request special favors from God for the person who comes in need of help.

Again there is a period of difficult transition from unsound expectations to the acceptance of realistic explanations concerning the powers of the psychiatrist and the minister. The hoping process absorbs some of the distress and possible despair involved in this transition.

### iii. A Sustaining Quality

There is a sustaining quality in the hoping process. The tendency of the hoping person to endure and not to despair despite all conditions to the contrary serves to support him when he is involved in a captive situation.

It is not a counter-phobic denial of the problem that provides the sustaining quality. It is not memory of parental infallibility, though this might provide some basis for the ability to hope later in life. Hoping is instead, an enduring pursuit of the resolution of captivity accompanied by a belief that such resolution is actually possible.

This quality of the hoping process is similar to the life instincts postulated by Freud. The life instincts were seen by Freud to serve the purpose of individual survival.

They were creative in nature. The hoping process can be seen in a similar way.

The hoping process is supportive. It helps to keep the individual from despair and possible disintegration of the personality while the person pursues reality searching for a solution to his problem. The implication of the sustaining quality of hoping is that it could be a factor in recovery and in remaining alive in extreme conditions.

The choice of responding to perceived captivity indicates some sustaining quality in the act of responding in this fashion. This selection suggests that the individual has some intention of resisting and has not yet fallen into depression in the face of these external conditions.

The sustaining quality of the hoping process is not dependent upon the fulfillment of expectations. All avenues of escape may be closed realistically, the anticipated may not come, and the individual can still be sustained by the hoping process. This is due to the fact that the hoping person sets no specific goals to anticipate and he determines no limitations of time.

The hoping person exhibits a sustaining quality when he takes a realistic view of the perceived captivity. The effect of the situation upon the individual is acknowledged and the person selects the hoping process as his response.

Karl Menninger considers it a sustaining task of the psychiatrist to aid the person in the understanding of the truth about himself and his environment.<sup>1</sup> The hoping person tends to accept the captive situation as it is and thereby sustains himself in the process.

The task of the psychiatrist is also seen by Menninger to include the helping of the individual to determine his own destiny.<sup>2</sup> This task reflects the tendency of the hoping person to seek more autonomy from the environment.

The hoping person seeks to sustain his own autonomy and ego identity by lessening the effects of the external stimuli. He attempts to act more independently when he determines the response he will make in relation to the captive situation. In this respect, the hoping process suggests a sustaining quality.

The minister also finds the hoping process valuable because of its sustaining quality. The gospel of Jesus Christ tells those who would follow the example of Christ to seek first the kingdom of God. As a consequence of his seeking, he will be sustained in all of his other needs. Hoping sustains because it looks beyond itself and seeks first the kingdom. The resolution of ultimate captivity is the pursuit of that which is beyond oneself, or the knowledge of God.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 780.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

For those who come asking for help from present situations of captivity, the minister's ability to help is, at least, partly determined by how well he communicates, and the person accepts, the principle of seeking first the kingdom.

Hoping is a process. It underpins action and sustains the seeking of the kingdom. It supports the person during the uncertain moments of the seeking. Hoping is the "reaching" part of the individual as he tries to stretch beyond his present experience for communion with the Thou, and it is the strength that supports while one reaches.

The hoping process is an answer to the parishioner's request for help in a particular dilemma. Both alternatives of a decision may be unsatisfactory to the point of provoking extreme anxiety. Not to make any decision at all may be equally provocative. To hope is to accept the dilemma and to seek a solution while waiting in patience.

The strength of the hoping process as used by the minister is in its present provisions as well as in its promise of something different and better for the future. The minister and the symbols of his office are the strongest indicators of the present provisions. Hope is realized in the companionship of the minister, who represents God, with the parishioner. It is further realized in their shared efforts to seek the answer, to wait patiently "on the Lord," and to

accept the conditions of the problem.

Prayer, scripture reading, and exhortation are used by the minister along with certain ritual to reinforce the parishioner's sense of communion with and sense of trust in God. They are also used to strengthen the person's hoping process by encouraging acceptance and patience.

By the reinforcement of the realized aspects of hope, the hoping person is less likely to resort to resignation or despair. He will actively seek the kingdom instead. The promise of hope to be fulfilled is a spur to action and a sustaining quality of life.

#### iv. A Reviving Quality

An individual reacting to a situation of captivity has been described as feeling helpless, caught, lonely, and isolated. His first responses may be hostility and bitterness or they may be disorganization and fear.

The hoping process is constructive and reconstitutive. The consequences of hoping such as patience and relaxation replace earlier bitterness and frustration. There is a suggested decline in defiance and provocation with a corresponding increase in humility and modesty.

A person who comes hoping to the psychiatrist or the minister has attitudes that make it easier for the helping person to respond to the need. In the person who is not hope-

ful, there are attitudes that must first be overcome before the help can be offered or accepted. It is advantageous to all concerned if these negative attitudes are changed as early as possible to positive ones.

The encouragement of the formation of the hoping process in the individual who comes for help serves a reviving function in the individual.

There are several activities that the psychiatrist and the minister perform that are done simply to put the person at ease. But these activities are also contributory to instilling hope. They encourage the formation of the hoping process in the individual.

Both the psychiatrist and the minister maintain certain symbols of their office, other than their own personalities that contribute to a revival of hope in the person.

Their places of work are representative. The psychiatrist usually has a receptionist, an attractive waiting room, diplomas and licenses, book cases, and other symbols of his power to help. The minister has many of the same symbols. They vary slightly, with the place of work for the minister usually located within his church, and perhaps, there are religious pictures or symbols on the wall or desk.

Their personal approach is friendly, courteous, and expresses the wish to be helpful. The invitation is extended for a personal relationship.

These activities do more than serve the purpose of putting the person at ease. They also symbolize some means of the help which the person is seeking. These may start the person to hoping because they symbolize a new set of possibilities in which may lie a new solution.

The person who begins to hope will not expect a particular kind or time of solution. He will begin simply to believe very strongly that there is a solution and says that, perhaps, it will be found here.

Neither the psychiatrist nor the minister desire to communicate unsound expectations or to contribute to the individual's despair. The hoping process is valuable at this point because nothing specific is promised that may later fail and thereby contribute to more despair. It only promises the possibilities of a solution at some future date.

Because of this promise it revives courage to seek a solution, patience to wait for it, and the fortitude to become autonomous of the captive environment. The person is then encouraged by these things to search for possible solutions with the psychiatrist or the minister.

#### v. Modification of Personal Attitudes

Change is an important factor in the hoping process. It has significant value for the work of the psychiatrist and the minister.

For the person who comes requesting relief from a captive situation, change is important. It is true that it may be a circumstance of captivity perceived only by the person, still a change in perception, if nothing else, is needed. A change from unsound to sound expectations is also needed. The most important changes needed are those that concern the person--his personal attitudes of fear, despair, and loneliness.

The psychiatrist and the minister not only contribute to the modification of a person's attitudes but the success of their help may also depend upon such change.

For the individual enclosed in captivity, change or the promise of change is important. Depending upon the person's preparation, change can be helpful or it can be detrimental.

In the case of the psychiatrist and his work, the person may properly look at the mental hospital as a possible means of solving his problem and providing escape from his own form of captivity. On the other hand, the placement in a hospital may result in a feeling of abandonment and cause a return to an attitude of despair.

The psychiatrist must then help the person to modify his attitude of fear to trustfulness and his attitude of loneliness to companionship. The person must be encouraged to see that though this particular treatment may not be the proper

remedy, there are other possibilities to explore. The attitudes of patience, acceptance, confidence in others, and the willingness to keep seeking are encouraged.

Without these modifications of attitudes, changes may prove to be detrimental instead of hopeful. Such changes in attitudes contribute to a disposition favorable to the acceptance of and reaction to the symbols of healing.

It is a change for the person to seek outside help. The psychiatrist continues the atmosphere of change by his probing, empathizing, and helping the person to recover early memories, develop insight, and modify his self-concept. Often just a glimpse of relief from the unbearable quality of captivity can be a change sufficient enough for hoping to begin.

If the person, as a result of these changes, believes strongly enough in the possibilities of other and greater changes, then he begins at once to obtain sufficient moral support with which to face his problem with some degree of equanimity.

The minister attempts to encourage the same kind of changes in personality attitudes, though the means are somewhat different.

The initial approach is the same, but the symbols are different. The person's dependency on others for help is recognized and sometimes used to indicate man's dependency upon

God. It is also used as a starting point of a relationship. After the relationship is solidified then the modification of personal attitudes can be suggested.

As far as the minister is concerned, helping is almost synonymous with the production of attitude change. The person is encouraged to change his feelings about himself in relation to God. He is often exhorted to accept the humble and dependent attitudes toward God, and to make God the abstract, but personal, object of his hoping. At the same time he is taught how he might decrease his dependency upon the environment and modify his self-concept by using the religious resources that are available to him.

Change is important to the minister, whether it means the strengthening of a previous system of faith or the conversion to a new system of faith.

The person's ability to hope is enhanced by his commitments of faith in God and in God's ability to do something about his captivity.

One of the most influential reinforcing agents of hope, employed by the minister, is the use of ritual. Ritual reinforces and validates the person's faith each time it is repeated. Belief is strengthened; patience, autonomy, and humility are practiced; and companionship is enjoyed through ritual.

Perhaps the ability to accept the situation and to assert, despite patterns of past and present failures, that there is a solution to captivity are also reinforced by ritual and the practice of it. The knowledge of previous failures need not diminish the person's belief that he will be helped.

vi. Transmission of Hoping

It has been demonstrated by this study that hoping occurs in the context of interpersonal contacts. This is in direct contrast with the feelings of loneliness and isolation found in the nonhoping person who is also caught by the environment.

The experience of hoping is one of sharing. The person acknowledges his own limited abilities for escaping the situation of captivity. At the same time he places his confidence in another person and his powers. There is an exchange that occurs. The person gives or shares his need with another and at the same time receives an assurance of the possibility of change.

Because the experience is shared the hoping of one person may well be reflected in the attitude of hoping adopted by the other. The response to hope of the hoping person may well be to hope also. Hence the transmission of hoping from one person to another is suggested.

It is possible that if hoping is not started in the doctor-patient or the minister-communicant relation then it is at least continued and promoted. The relation is the key to the process.

Together the person in need and the psychiatrist or the minister explore the possibilities of change and adopt a positive and patient attitude while searching. Together they believe that there is so much novelty in reality which is still unknown or experienced, it's unsound to let past experiences limit the search for the needed answer.

There is an expectation of the person who comes for help that the psychiatrist and the minister have a hopeful attitude. Intuitively the person sees a hopeful attitude on the part of the psychiatrist or the minister as indicative of how well he is going to be helped.

A hopeful attitude is seen as a goad to the searching for new discoveries. The person goes to the psychiatrist or the minister because he expects them to have knowledge of a solution that he does not have, and thereby expects them to be more hopeful than he.

When some of the knowledge is shared, it can serve to encourage the adoption of a hopeful attitude by the person in need of help. From this point the person in need and the helping person begin their search together.

It is more than reassurance or even relief that the person desires from the psychiatrist or the minister. He wants freedom from the situation. He also wants freedom from the state of mind that has made him captive to his own captivity.

The hoping process is generated in the relation. It is beyond the individual and involves a relationship of the I and the Thou. It is not only transmissible from one to another, but it is also experienced one with another.

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The hoping process is an interpersonal response to captivity, characterized by an enduring pursuit of the resolution of captivity and by a belief that such resolution is possible.

The purpose of this study has been to provide some insight into the hoping process and to answer some questions relating to the conditions of the occurrence of hoping, the indicators of hoping's activity, and the dynamic consequences of hoping. The answers to these questions provide the bases for the implications made concerning the hoping process and the work of the psychiatrist and the minister.

#### 1. Conclusions

##### i. The Conditions of Occurrence

The hoping process occurs only as a response to a perceived situation (or real situation) of captivity. Captivity is understood to be that condition where the external environment places the individual in an apparently unchangeable, highly anxiety provoking situation.

There are other modes of response to a captive situation that are both available to the individual and exercised by him.

Among these are despair, fear, hostility, and wishing. Hoping is only one possible means of response.

It is believed that hoping is a response that will not be exercised as often as other modes of response because of its complex nature. The person is more likely to exercise first those modes of response which are simpler and more habitual. Upon the failure of these responses to solve the problem of captivity, the individual may choose to exercise the response of hoping.

The need for the hoping process lies precisely at the point of failure in other modes of response to combat fear and to prevent the disintegration of the personality due to the captive condition.

Because of the complexity of the hoping response, there is the implication that hoping is an advanced stage of a dynamic sequence. This means that hoping is an advanced stage of response generated out of prior dynamic processes. This has been demonstrated through the comparison of hoping with wishing and the preference of the hoping person to select an abstract object against the concrete object of the wishing person.

Hoping is as much a response to the individual's personal feelings relating to the perceived captivity as it is to the captivity itself. The feeling of despair in response

to captivity, for example, may only deepen the sense of being caught in captivity. Hoping is just as much a response to despair as it is to the external conditions that might promote an attitude of despair.

The most important implication of the occurrence of hoping to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister is that the same conditions which bring the individual in desperation to ask for help are also the only grounds for hoping.

ii. The Indicators of Hoping

Hoping is a process that is different than wishing, anticipation, optimism, desiring, and other modes of expectation. This is characterized by several indicators of hoping.

First, hoping is characterized by acceptance of the reality of the situation and its pertinence to the individual. Acceptance also includes the acknowledgement that the individual alone is powerless to alter the circumstances.

Second, patience is involved in hoping. Included in this attitude is the assertion that reality is full of novelty and that there is a power beyond oneself that can bring about a change in the situation. Patience is the attitude of awaiting this change.

Third, hoping is indicated by a reduced self-reliance. The individual humbly recognizes his own limitations and places

his reliance in an external object beyond himself. Self-love is reduced and energy is thereby released for interpersonal love relations.

Fourth, the hoping process includes the alteration of one's own outlook. This includes the alteration of one's attitudes, expectations, and desires.

Fifth, the hoping person anticipates change. There is the added quality in this anticipation of change that says it will be a change for the better. The hoping person believes in the possibility of change, yet some tension remains because he does not know what that change will be. He believes the change will be good but he does not say what that change will be or when it will occur.

Because he is convinced of this change in his own personal future, the hoping person is better able to tolerate his present pain and the reality of the situation.

Sixth, the hoping person seeks personal autonomy from the influence of the captive situation. The hoping process aids the seeking of autonomy by providing motivation for autonomy, by setting independent goals, and by providing some means for better appropriating instinctual motivations for autonomy.

Seventh, the hoping person seeks an abstractly held object of hoping. Though diffuse and global, the object of

the hoping process promises enough possibility of satisfaction to induce the acceptance of this kind of object in preference to that of wishfulfillment. The movement of the hoping process is seen to be in the same general direction as the development of thought--toward abstraction.

Eighth, the hoping process is an interpersonal activity. It is a shared experience. It is a relationship of the I and the Thou. The experience of hoping is also transmissible from one individual to another. It is agape in character.

### iii. The Consequences of Hoping

As a result of hoping several changes occur within the individual.

The individual is able to make a realistic appraisal of his need and his inability to cope with the problem. Because of this appraisal, the hoping person humbly admits his own limitations and he sets aside his own personal desires in deference to the desires of another person.

The hoping individual is able to place his trust and confidence in another person who is either considered to be powerful enough to change the situation or looked upon as one who will help search for the needed change. The object of hoping thereby becomes the other person as the relationship is formed. Because of this relationship, the hoping person feels that he has become a part of a creative process that is going to

change things.

Time is viewed differently. Neither the past nor the present are allowed to limit a belief in the possibilities of the future to provide a solution to the problem. No time is set for the expected change of the problem because the hoping person relinquishes his hold on time and trusts it to the care of the other person.

Several personality changes accompany the hoping process. Because of patience the person is better able to relax, tolerate anxiety, and manage fear. Energy once expended by hostility, fear, anxiety, and despair are released by the hoping process for more advantageous responses that could possibly prolong life or ward off the occurrence of an expected gloomy future.

Resistance to help and interpersonal relationships is decreased. The individual becomes more secure as he moves to make independent judgments and becomes more autonomous of the environment.

Early bitterness, frustration, and hostility are changed by hoping to humility. There is a decline in aggressive self-complacency or pride. There is also a decrease in defiance and provocation. The person is more trustful and personal relations are easier.

Hoping is a safeguard against distorting reality or the accepting of unsound expectations. It both exposes the unsound expectations and provides direction for finding the sound expectations.

There is a sustaining quality in the hoping process. The tendency of the hoping person is to endure despite all conditions to the contrary. It sustains the individual while he searches for a realistic solution to his problem.

The sustaining quality of hoping provides the patience to await a solution and the courage to face captivity and to assert that this intolerable situation cannot be final. These results are the direct opposite of the capitulation found in despair where the individual disarms before the seemingly inevitable and appears to fall apart under the sentence of captivity.

There is also a reviving quality in hoping. It is constructive and reconstitutive. The courage to seek a solution is renewed and the patience to await the solution is fortified.

Hoping provides a certainty in a personal future. Reality is viewed as open-ended and full of novelty. The hoping process becomes a search for that personal future, which actually has its basis in another person. It is at this point that the psychiatrist and the minister become involved as a part of

the hoping process.

iv. In Relation to the Psychiatrist and the Minister

The hoping process, based upon Gabriel Marcel's theory of hope, is relevant to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister.

Many of the indicators and consequences of the hoping process parallel the goals of the psychiatrist and the minister. Others would be helpful to the psychiatrist's or the minister's attempts to fulfill the expectations of the person who comes in need of help. Still others contribute to the individual's own attempts to find a solution to his problem while under the guidance of the psychiatrist or the minister.

The captive situation has been demonstrated to be not only a source of despair but also the source of hoping. The despair of a captive situation brings the person to the point that he seeks help. An opportunity is provided for the forming of a relation. Hoping can be generated in such a relation.

The most direct result of the generation of hoping is the changing of the individual's personal attitudes so that they now include the qualities of modesty, humbleness, patience and courage. It is these changes that enable the psychiatrist and the minister to proceed in their functions of helping others because the person is now willing to accept help, join in the search for a solution, and to believe in the possibilities for a change in his situation of captivity.

## 2. Implications For Future Study

This study has provided some insight in the occurrence of hope and into the indicators and consequences of hoping. Some clarity into the functioning of the hoping process has been provided by the descriptive analysis of hope, which may provide terms that can be more easily adapted to clinical study. But this study must be thought of as only the beginning.

Because of the required scope of this study it was not possible to give adequate attention to clinical data. The conclusions of this study will need to be subjected to further clinical research before the merits of the hoping process can be sufficiently appreciated.

The psychiatrist is probably the best equipped individual to make the necessary clinical applications. Because of his interest in saving lives either from death or personality disorganization, the psychiatrist likely will be most interested in studies relating to the sustaining and reviving qualities of the hoping process.

He will also be interested in studying the distinctions between hoping and other modes of expectation, especially those claiming the possibility of hoping being an advanced stage of a dynamic sequence. Perhaps he also will want to study hoping in relation to the use of placebos, which suggests a possible predisposition to accept and react to symbols of healing.

The minister, perhaps, will be most interested in the implications of hoping to attitude change. He will want to study the place of ritual--including prayer, Scripture reading, and exhortation--in the aspects of sustaining and forming hope.

In addition, the minister will want to research the importance of interpersonal relationships in the fostering of a hopeful attitude. He will be interested to know more about the apparent dependency involved in the relationship and its influence upon hoping.

This writer believes that a program of research that involves both the psychiatrist and the minister would prove to be the most helpful.

The setting for this study could be a hospital where both the psychiatrist and the minister can work with the same persons. Preferably they would work with terminally ill patients because these are judged to be the best examples of a captive situation as set out in this study.

The psychiatrist would bring the necessary scientific objectivity and experience to the study, while the minister would bring the required openness to belief in the personal possibilities of a scientifically undemonstrable future.

Together they can study the implications of the hoping process to their individual work and consolidate their strengthening ministration to the terminally ill person.

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A THEORY OF HOPE BASED UPON GABRIEL MARCEL

WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR

THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE MINISTER  
(Library of Congress No. Mic. \_\_\_\_\_)

Noble Lynch Butler, Ph.D.  
Boston University Graduate School, 1962

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Professor of Psychology and Pastoral Counseling

The problem of this dissertation is to formulate a theory of hoping, based upon Gabriel Marcel's theoretical analysis of hope, and to indicate what implications this theory of hoping has for the work of the psychiatrist and the minister.

To study hope, or the hoping process, necessarily involves the consideration of: (1) the conditions of hope's occurrence; (2) the distinctive indicators of hoping, in contrast to other modes of expectation; and (3) the dynamic consequences of hoping.

Gabriel Marcel's analysis of hope considers these problems, as well as others; and it, therefore, provides a foundation for further study.

The general procedure of the study has been to summarize Marcel's theoretical analysis of hope. Based upon this summary, a descriptive theory of hope was formulated.

Implications were then drawn from this theory and related to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister.

The hoping process, its condition of occurrence, its indicators, and its consequences were further analysed by a comparative study. The hoping process was applied to the same case study material as was used by Thomas French to demonstrate what he called hope in the "integration of behavior." This comparison showed that: (1) hoping and wishing are distinct, (2) hoping is not goal-directed behavior, (3) hoping is a response to a particular kind of situation, and (4) the subjects of the hoping process react differently than the subjects who are expressing other modes of response.

From the descriptive analysis of the hoping process the following implications for the work of the psychiatrist and the minister were determined: (1) the hoping process aids in the exposure of unsound expectations and directs the search for sound ones; (2) it provides a sustaining quality to the person exercising hope; (3) it has a reviving effect upon those persons who have been responding differently to captivity; (4) it aids in the modification of personal attitudes and thereby promotes the positive aspects of the psychiatrist-patient and the minister-counselee relationships; and (5) the exercising of hope promotes the transmission of a hopeful attitude from one person to another.

Summarized, the conclusions drawn from this study are as follows:

1. The hoping process is an interpersonal response to captivity, characterized by an enduring pursuit of the resolution of captivity and by a belief that such resolution is possible.

2. The hoping process occurs only as a response to a perceived or real situation of captivity.

3. The need for hope lies precisely at the point of failure of other modes of response to provide an adequate response.

4. Hoping is an advanced stage of response that has been generated out of prior dynamic processes.

5. The same conditions of the environment which bring the person to ask for help are also the only grounds for the beginning of the hoping process.

6. The hoping process is characterized by (1) acceptance; (2) patience; (3) reduced self-reliance; (4) alteration of one's attitudes, expectations, and desires; (5) anticipation of change; (6) belief in a personal future; (7) seeking of personal autonomy; (8) seeking of an abstractly held object; and (9) establishment of a personal relationship.

7. The consequences of hoping include: (1) an increase in the ability to make a realistic appraisal, to place trust in another, to view time differently, to relax, to tolerate anxiety,

and to manage fear; (2) a decline in earlier bitterness, frustration, hostility, aggressive self-complacency, defiance, and provocation; (3) an increased interest in establishing sound expectations, in reviving and sustaining courage and patience, and in a personal future; and (4) the beginning of a personal relationship which supports the search for a solution.

8. The hoping process is relevant to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister. Many of the indicators and the consequences of the hoping process parallel the goals of the psychiatrist and the minister. Others would be helpful to their attempts to fulfill the expectations of the person who comes in need of help. Still others contribute to the individual's own attempts to find a solution to his problem of captivity while under the guidance of the psychiatrist or the minister.

## AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I was born on April 5, 1934 at Dodge City, Kansas. My parents are Mr. and Mrs. Lester H. Butler. I attended and was graduated from the school system of Dodge City. I entered and graduated from Baylor University in Waco, Texas in 1955 with the degree of B.A. I then attended and was graduated from Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary of Fort Worth, Texas in 1958 with the degree of B.D. I entered the Ph.D. program of Boston University in the second semester, 1958-59.

I am married to Sara E. Butler and have two children, Sara II and Noble II.