

2020

Population management: the origins, implementation, and breakdown of localized population policy in Tanzania (1948-1999)

<https://hdl.handle.net/2144/41302>

"Downloaded from OpenBU. Boston University's institutional repository."

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Dissertation

**POPULATION MANAGEMENT: THE ORIGINS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND
BREAKDOWN OF LOCALIZED POPULATION POLICY IN TANZANIA
(1948-1999)**

by

KRISTEN CAREY

B.A., University of Montana, 2010
M.A., Boston University, 2016

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

2020

© 2020 by
Kristen Marie Carey
All rights reserved

Approved by

First Reader

James McCann, Ph.D.
Professor of History

Second Reader

Diana Wylie, Ph.D.
Professor of History

Third Reader

Priya Lal, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of History
Boston College

Fourth Reader

Benjamin Siegel, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of History

DEDICATION

*For Elise, mother of four,
and for Lauren, Haley, and Freida – may you remain forever curious*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My academic trajectory has been guided by serendipity and strong role models. John Marks sparked my interest in history, while Paul Gordon Lauren mentored my senior honors thesis and first foray into African studies.

Boston University provided me with an institutional home-base throughout this project. I thank everyone at the African Studies Center for their intellectual support, members of the history department for their comradery, and staff at the Pardee Center for expanding my intellectual boundaries. I'd particularly like to thank Jim McCann and Diana Wylie for their unwavering guidance and faith in my growth as a scholar. This project benefited from the insights of Priya Lal and Ben Siegel, whose teaching and research inspired my continued perseverance. I also benefited from close work with Tim Longman and John Thornton, who serve as beacons of Africanist scholarship.

I owe a heartfelt thanks to my many friends and colleagues. Nina, Julie, and Agnes, I genuinely would not be here without you. Cheers to dock nights, Menocchio, and full-teeth smiles getting us through. My fellow Africanists guided me along this journey, with special thanks to Lilly, Dima, Chris, Phil, Josh, and Ben. I am forever grateful to the intellectual and moral support of my writing group; the insights of Beth Ann, Caity, Janet, Jodie, and Jess are sprinkled throughout this project in fundamental ways. To everyone else, thank you for the joys of Shakespeare, writing workshop, and Cornwall nights.

In Tanzania, I received support from COSTECH, the State University of Zanzibar, and the University of Dar es Salaam. I'd especially like to thank Yusuf Lawi for his continued service to Boston University and its students. Jasmine, your logistical help was

a godsend. Mama Frieda, Mama Rachel, and Violet, thank you for keeping me grounded and fed. Marc E., thank you for your friendship, home, and nurturing demeanor. Many Tanzanians improved my Swahili over the years, with special thanks to Mwalimu Judith, Mwalimu Fatma, and Mwalimu Nunuu. To Davis, Girish, Abeid, Marc S., and Chris, our conversations sparked joy and curiosity that settled into the foundations of this project.

I received support from various grants and institutions throughout the research process, including Boston University's Graduate School of Arts and Science, FLAS fellowships, and a Boren fellowship. I thank the staff at the Tanzanian National Archive, Zanzibar National Archive, British National Archive, Bodleian Library, US National Archive, Hoover Institute Archive, and Boston University's African Studies Library for their help throughout the course of my research.

This project would not have been possible without the love and encouragement of my friends and family. I feel blessed to have continued support from those of you in Montana, which will always be my home. Thank you to my Friendcation crew and their seven years of companionship. I am especially grateful to Brooke for her mentorship and our fun-filled history adventures. Chi, thank you making me a better person and being supportive during the rough patches. Linda, thank you for being my editor, and having wine and cheese ready after long days at the archive. Michelle, I cherished our sister trips and twiga-themed hair styles. Dad, thank you for emboldening me to explore the world and giving me the support to do so. Mom, thank you for all your nurturing and making me feel at home in Boston (I think it was the curtains that did it).

To everyone who made graduate school the best years of my life, asante sana.

**POPULATION MANAGEMENT: THE ORIGINS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND
BREAKDOWN OF LOCALIZED POPULATION POLICY IN TANZANIA
(1948-1999)**

KRISTEN CAREY

Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2020

Major Professor: James McCann, Professor of History

ABSTRACT

Panic over human population growth became a near-global phenomenon in the second half of the twentieth century. International networks encouraged governments to adopt population control methodologies that used state power and national policy to incentivize, and sometimes coerce, lower fertility rates. By the end of the century, the failures and draconian nature of population control led to a rebuke of broad demographic interventions. Population policy shifted toward a reproductive rights framework that privileged individual prerogative over any national agenda. My research introduces a conceptual middle ground that allows for coordinated state programming in the face of undesirable demographic trajectories, while also upholding a spectrum of individual liberty – what I call “population management.”

The model for population management is not hypothetical, but materialized in Tanzania during the Ujamaa era that lasted roughly two decades from 1967 to 1986. Through robust leadership, a sense of imagined kinship, moral nuance, and an active policymaking coalition, Tanzania nurtured an approach to changing demographics that centered population within its broader postcolonial development project. Population

management encouraged reciprocal state and community action to assuage problems brought on by an increasing population, including education reforms, diversified family planning, and public health campaigns. The flexible concept of “responsible parenthood” kept varying groups of government actors, religious authorities, women’s organizations, community leaders, and health practitioners on the same page, as their multiplicity of lived experience helped define and inform policy.

Tanzania’s population management agenda reframes the historical narrative away from a binary of state control versus individual rights, and provides a model for future policymaking. Combating the attendant problems of population change requires broad networks working together, which makes collaboration and flexibility key to maintaining collective action. As global demographic agendas diverge with rapid population growth in regions of Africa and depopulation in high-income countries, governments will need to adopt contextualized population policies that acknowledge unique historical, personal, and local sensitivities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication	iv
Acknowledgements	v
Abstract	vii
Table of Contents	ix
List of Abbreviations	x
Introduction: Population Management as Middle Ground	1
Chapter 1 – Meager Measurements: Colonial Demographic Inquiry in British East Africa (1948-1961).....	30
Chapter 2 – Counting the Nation: How Ujamaa Nationalism Created an Alternative to Population Control (1962-1973).....	65
Chapter 3 – Bogeys and Misconceptions: Making Sense of Population Policy during the Statist Decade (1974-1983).....	112
Chapter 4 – Transposed Frameworks: Changes to Tanzanian and International Population Policy (1984-1999)	161
Conclusion: Population Management in the Twenty-First Century	195
Bibliography	202
Curriculum Vitae	225

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASP	Afro Shirazi Party
BRALUP	Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
IDA	International Development Association
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KCMC	Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Center
NEC	National Executive Committee
TAMWA	Tanzania Media Women's Association
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TNA	Tanzania National Archive
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
UMATI	Chama cha Uzazi na Malezi Bora / Tanzanian Family Planning Association
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UWATA	Umoja wa Waganga wa Tanzania
UWT	Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania

INTRODUCTION: POPULATION MANAGEMENT AS MIDDLE GROUND

“It appears to me that, among the millions of unique individuals in this society, there has been created a spirit of cooperative endeavor, a spirit of working together for the good of the community and the country.” - Julius Nyerere, 1974 ¹

The President of Tanzania offered these words at a state banquet in Peking in March 1974, four years before China would implement one of the most radical population control policies of the twentieth century. The two countries had been allies since Julius Nyerere’s first visit a decade earlier. Nyerere campaigned for China’s acceptance into the United Nations, was known to wear a “Mao suit,” and credited the country for its strong socialist ideology.² Tanzania would not, however, follow in China’s footsteps when it came to population policy. The One-Child Policy represented an extreme, but exemplary, manifestation of population control principles. Tanzania’s approach seemingly fell on the other end of the spectrum, as it did not adopt a national population policy until 1992. Scholarship has largely functioned on this binary; governments either adopted population control policies or they did not. As draconian efforts like China’s One-Child Policy made population control pejorative, there was little room for nuanced discussion concerning the merits of alternative national demographic agendas.

My research introduces a conceptual middle ground that accounts for coordinated state programming in the face of undesirable demographic trajectories, while also

¹ Julius Nyerere, speech at state banquet in Peking, 29 March 1974, in “Second Year Reader Vol. 6,” for the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, East Africana Collection, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

² Peter Häussler, *Leadership for Democratic Development in Tanzania: The Perspective of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere During the First Decade of Independence* (Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, 2009), 83.

upholding a spectrum of individual liberty – what I call “population management.”³ The model for population management is not hypothetical, but materialized in Tanzania during the Ujamaa era, which lasted roughly two decades from the Arusha Declaration in 1967 to the end of Nyerere’s presidency and the start of structural adjustment in 1986. Before its politicization, the Swahili word ‘*ujamaa*’ denoted familyhood. Its incorporation into national rhetoric placed a normative idea of the family, including its reproduction, literally at the center of postcolonial nation-building. Tanzania’s population management framework emerged in response to its unique development priorities and domestic circumstance. Strong leadership, a sense of imagined kinship, moral nuance, and an active policymaking coalition nurtured an approach to changing demographics that centered population within broader development projects. Instead of seeking to achieve a singular predetermined goal, like lower fertility rates, the government worked to integrate demographic considerations into other development priorities, such as healthcare, education, and village life.

Population control was a well-known concept in the second half of the twentieth century, among both activists and the general public. It became synonymous with population policy writ large, which unnecessarily narrowed the conceptual framework surrounding population intervention. Population control overwhelming applied to low-income countries, whether they were deemed “Third World,” “Developing,” or part of the

³ Richard White elevated the concept of “middle ground” to prominence in historical literature, but his conception does not entirely apply here. White emphasized a middle ground situated in space, which works as the setting for two or more groups to make meaning through mutual misunderstanding of one another. I offer a more standard definition of between two poles. See Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), xi, xii.

“Global South.” Its proponents invariably sought to lower fertility rates and overall population growth rates through a single, unified document that functioned as the foundation of national population policy. But many government policies implicitly affected (and were affected by) population change, including immigration policy, marriage law, education systems, health schemes, and social security benefits. I argue that what made quotidian policy into population policy was not listing the agenda in a single document, but having a unified demographic mission.

In Tanzania, the population ethos centered on “responsible parenting,” which encouraged people to have only the number of children that they (and the state) could provide for. The mission was translated into local vernacular. In Swahili, family planning (*uzazi na malezi bora*) meant better parenting and childrearing. The guidelines for what “better” meant were flexible and could accommodate a variety of norms and desires, which necessitated a sense of communal, rather than state, oversight. Groups that were usually disenfranchised by state population control programming, including women, religious leaders, community networks, and local health practitioners, were welcomed as part of a population coalition that used its multiplicity of lived experiences to help define and inform action.

Tanzania’s approach to population policy stood in stark contrast to the population control framework that was popular throughout the world in the second half of the twentieth century, including in China. The One-Child Policy’s architect, Song Jian, was heavily influenced by international communities and their ideas about global population

control.⁴ China's policy aligned with international guidelines, which encouraged statistical goals and promised economic growth if those goals were met.⁵ The government was willing and able to use coercive power to enforce demographic change, often in politicized ways that targeted certain ethnic and regional constituencies. In part because of the atrocities committed under the guise of population control in China and other parts of the world, international networks began moving away from the population control agenda at the turn of the twenty-first century.

In recent decades, the global consensus surrounding population policy has shifted to a reproductive rights framework, which inherently opposes any national population strategy. Although granting women more control over their bodies and fertility decisions is an overwhelming beneficial move, unbridled individual prerogative has reckoned with its own unintended consequences. In Asia and Eastern Europe, the intersection of technological innovation and a lack of government oversight has led to sex-selective abortion and dramatically skewed sex ratios, which affect the well-being of future generations by putting extreme pressure on elderly welfare systems, marriage opportunity, and gender equality.⁶ Within the individual rights framework, it is nearly impossible for societies and governments to engage in sophisticated conversations that weigh the

⁴ Specifically, the "Club of Rome." See Susan Greenhalgh, "Missile Science, Population Science: The Origins of China's One-Child Policy," *The China Quarterly*, no. 182 (2005): 253–76; Matthew James Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Harvard University Press, 2008), 340.

⁵ Susan Greenhalgh, *Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng's China* (University of California Press, 2008).

⁶ Mara Hvistendahl, *Unnatural Selection: Choosing Boys over Girls, and the Consequences of a World Full of Men* (Public Affairs, 2011).

detrimental effects of population change against potential parameters to autonomy; choice trumps government intervention.

My research into Tanzanian population management offers a solution for governments that want to respond to demographic trends and anxieties, while still acknowledging the personal, social, and planetary sensitivities that have accompanied population policy. The fact that an African country served as the model is significant. Between now and the end of the century, the United Nations projects 82 percent of world population growth will occur in Africa.⁷ The demographic boom will likely have serious consequences. Countries with limited state capacity will struggle to keep up with already strained social service systems, imbalanced job opportunities could lead to substantial increases in migration, and large youth cohorts with deteriorating prospects could spur political upheaval.⁸ John Iliffe, a prominent historian of Tanzania, has suggested that the most important task for population studies in Africa is to identify local patterns and define their characteristics, rather than to reify borrowed theories that work to generalize an entire world population.⁹

By bringing an African country into the vanguard of population management, this dissertation works as a corrective to global population histories that tend to elide African actors. The current historical narrative credits international women's movements of the

⁷ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, "World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables," ESA/P/WP248.

⁸ Ragnhild Nordås and Christian Davenport, "Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 4 (2013): 926–940.

⁹ John Iliffe, "Review: The Origins of African Population Growth," *The Journal of African History* 30, no. 1 (1989): 169.

1980s and 1990s with moving the policy agenda away from population control.¹⁰ Showing that population management emerged in Tanzania as part of the Ujamaa nation-building framework, decades before the international population establishment imagined an alternative, invites a closer look at the agendas of governments who fell outside the population control paradigm. In particular, it questions whether African countries have been emblematic of world systems and not simply derivative of them.¹¹

Population Control: The Problem, Solution, and Pushback

This dissertation draws on both global and local perspectives. For the most part, the Tanzanian experience represents the population management model and international discourse represents the population control model. Elements permeated the conceptual boundary throughout the scope of this project, but I argue that the two sides are more distinct than they appear in the historical record. The distinction blurs in the late 1980s, as individual rights entered global discourse and Tanzania underwent significant changes to its political economy. The change over time helps explain the elements of Tanzanian governance and society that allowed for population management to emerge in the late 1960s and breakdown by the early 1990s.

¹⁰ For example, see Ruth Dixon-Mueller, *Population Policy & Women's Rights: Transforming Reproductive Choice* (ABC-CLIO, 1993); Marge Berer, "Introduction: Population and Family Planning Policies: Women-Centred Perspectives," *Reproductive Health Matters* 1, no. 1 (1993): 4-12; Saul E. Halfon, *The Cairo Consensus: Demographic Surveys, Women's Empowerment, and Regime Change in Population Policy* (Lexington Books, 2007); Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 270.

¹¹ Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving toward Africa* (Routledge, 2015).

During the second half of the twentieth century, population control was the dominant paradigm in which discussion of demographic problems and interventions occurred. A community of scholars, bureaucrats, medical professionals, and philanthropists, largely from the United States and Europe, worked through transnational networks to form an “international population establishment” that set the terms of debate. Calling population control “top down” is an oversimplification of its more diffuse nature, but its policies were largely dictated by this small group of experts.¹² They came to see population control as the process of altering demographic trends in historically underdeveloped regions of the world for the purpose of achieving socio-economic “progress” of some kind or another.

Population control’s conceptual framework came into maturity in an environment where its prescriptions made sense. People had been thinking about the relationship between population and resources throughout human history, but anxieties coalesced in the early twentieth century around the emergent idea of a single, world-wide human population.¹³ Concerns over global population change became embedded in peace movements, environmental activism, economic development schemas, agricultural production equations, and more. The underlying concern was that there were too many

¹² James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*.

¹³ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, Translated by Franz Rosenthal and Edited by NJ Dawood (Princeton University Press, 1967); William Petty and John Graunt, *The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty*, vol. 1 [1662] (Cambridge University Press, 1899); Thomas Robert Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population, as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers* (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1798); Alison Bashford, *Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth* (Columbia University Press, 2014).

human beings on the planet, which contributed to warfare over more territory, environmental degradation, lower per capita economic growth, and overburdened food supplies.

Activists talked openly and positively about controlling population to help alleviate socioeconomic problems, including those as grand as global poverty and the future of the planet. Their primary theoretical framework was the “demographic transition,” which documented a correlation between lowering fertility rates and economic growth.¹⁴ A leading demographic transition theorist charged his colleagues with understanding the “interplay of evolving technology, socioeconomic institutions, and population change as major determinants of the human condition.”¹⁵ For the most part, these were benevolent aims. Matthew Connelly has written in his history of the international population establishment that “many were no less well intentioned or well received than those who nowadays speak of human capital, sustainable development, and the quality of life.”¹⁶ Their “fatal misconception” came instead from an overestimation of expertise and a belief in the universality of demographic theory.

The international population establishment’s hubris hinged on uneven power dynamics, separating them from the most disenfranchised groups within their own borders and across the globe.¹⁷ By the time population control ramped up in public discourse in the 1960s and 1970s, it had become entrenched in narratives of development. The “fertility

¹⁴ Dudley Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” *Population Studies* 50, no. 3 (1996): 361–387.

¹⁵ Frank W. Notestein, “Demography in the United States: A Partial Account of the Development of the Field,” *Population and Development Review* 8, no. 4 (1982): 652.

¹⁶ Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 8.

¹⁷ For an example within the United States, see Alexandra Minna Stern, *Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America* (University of California Press, 2015).

gap” between regions with high and low fertility rates mapped almost directly onto the regions of the world with high and low economic indicators.¹⁸ Thus, the regions that appeared most in need of population control were also most in need of development. The international population establishment used the correlation to encourage “Third World” governments to adopt population control policies as a means of improving their socioeconomic outlook.

Fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration formed the holy trinity of demographic data. To change demographic trajectories, policies aimed to alter at least one of the three variables. The idea of raising mortality rates to lower population growth, however, was politically and morally unviable.¹⁹ Moreover, migration typically had too little effect on national growth rates to be a primary point of intervention. Thus, the majority of research and policy efforts in the twentieth century focused on fertility rates. The most obvious way to control fertility was birth control.

Women have practiced birth control through social and technological means in virtually all known societies. Our contemporary understanding, however, emerged in the later decades of the nineteenth century with “voluntary motherhood” movements, grew with Margaret Sanger and the opening of the first birth control clinics in the early twentieth century, and moved through biomedical innovations of the mid-twentieth century.²⁰ Birth

¹⁸ Note that the fertility gap phenomenon was most clear in the middle of the twentieth century and has been lessening throughout the rest of the century. See Chris Wilson, “Understanding Global Demographic Convergence since 1950,” *Population and Development Review* 37, no. 2 (2011): 375–88.

¹⁹ Some scholars, however, have put forth the idea. For example, see Alwyn Young, “The Gift of the Dying: The Tragedy of AIDS and the Welfare of Future African Generations,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 2 (2005): 423–466.

²⁰ Linda Gordon, *The Moral Property of Women: A History of Birth Control Politics in America* (University of Illinois Press, 2002).

control has been both a tool and a foil for feminist movements, providing a potential source of women's liberation and a means of masculine state control.²¹ The majority of population studies in Africa have homed in on the latter, highlighting the relationship between controlling fertility and controlling women.

Debates surrounding the treatment of women's bodies as objects of control have almost always invoked Michel Foucault's conception of biopolitics, the ordering of human beings that has "taken control of life in general – with the body as one pole and the population as the other."²² Foucault's critique of modern power made sense for corresponding critiques of population control. The most comprehensive analysis of Tanzanian population politics took this approach, expanding the idea to include intersections of gender and development. "I would like to suggest modern contraceptives as the ultimate technologies of sex," writes Lisa Ann Richey, "and the international population discourse as a regulating apparatus that operates in Tanzania constructing, controlling, and regulating bodies."²³ In particular, the regulation of black, female bodies.²⁴ Of course, where there are attempts at control there are usually attempts at resistance. Matching a broader historiographical trend to add "agency" back into stories of victimhood, a body of ethnographic literature began to push back against representing

²¹ Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control* (Penguin Books, 1977).

²² Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, An Introduction*, Trans. Robert Hurley (Pantheon, 1978), 252–53; Caroline H. Bledsoe, Fatoumata Banja, and Anthony T. Carter, *Contingent Lives: Fertility, Time, and Aging in West Africa* (University of Chicago Press, 2002), 51.

²³ Lisa Richey, *Population Politics and Development: From the Policies to the Clinics* (Springer, 2008), 9.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 9–11.

women as objects of population intervention by emphasizing individual and societal forms of resistance.²⁵

Regardless of where Foucauldian analyses fell on the pervasiveness of population power, their arguments were limited by the population control framework and its primary tools of national policy and family planning. More recent scholarship, however, has worked to broaden the scope of study. As one historian has written, “Population has always been more than the politics of sex, reproduction, birth control, and women’s bodies. It touched on almost everything: international relations; war and peace; food and agriculture; economy and ecology; race and sex; labor, migration, and standards of living.”²⁶ So far, the expanding arena of population intervention has focused on the Euro-American networks at the heart of international institutions. The idea that population referred to more than just fertility rates, however, was voiced much earlier from the periphery of the population establishment.²⁷

As soon as population control became the guiding paradigm for demographic intervention in the 1960s, scholars and activists outside of the international population establishment argued that its policies were out of touch with the societies they were trying to control. Mahmood Mamdani, for example, explored how demographic theory

²⁵ Jean Comaroff, “Bodily Reform as Historical Practice: The Semantics of Resistance in Modern South Africa,” *International Journal of Psychology* 20, no. 3–4 (1985): 541–567; Brad Weiss, Arjun Appadurai, and Judith Farquhar, *The Making and Unmaking of the Haya Lived World: Consumption, Commoditization, and Everyday Practice* (Duke University Press, 1996), 90; Steven Van Wolputte, “Hang on to Your Self: Of Bodies, Embodiment, and Selves,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 33, no. 1 (2004): 251–69.

²⁶ Bashford, *Global Population*, 5.

²⁷ The arena metaphor comes from Connelly, who argues population control was more than just an activist agenda. See Matthew Connelly, “Population Control Is History: New Perspectives on the International Campaign to Limit Population Growth,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 1 (2003): 147.

continuously misunderstood why poor people tended to have larger families. As one of his interlocutors claimed, population interventions had become “enemies of the smile” on a child’s face.²⁸ Others effectively argued that the European experience of fertility decline and economic growth during the Industrial Revolution was a product of a particular time and place, not a universal ideal.²⁹ The pushback came to a head at the 1974 Third World Population Conference, when delegation after delegation came to the podium to declare that “development is the best contraceptive,” in an attempt to make broader development goals more primary to the international population agenda.³⁰ Through these arguments, “Third World” governments rejected the arrow of causality from demographic transition to economic growth, which lay at the core of population control’s mandate. They implied a potential alternative framework, but lacked the vocabulary to articulate it.

Conversations continued to revolve around population control until the international population establishment eventually abandoned it as a conceptual framework at the end of the twentieth century. That move was in response to a variety of factors. In some regions, particularly East Asia and Latin America, it appeared that the population control mission had succeeded in significantly lowering fertility rates.³¹ In others, including most of Africa, neo-colonial rhetoric and ineffective programming had made

²⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, *The Myth of Population Control: Family Caste and Class in an Indian Village* (Monthly Review Press, 1972), 147.

²⁹ J. M. Blaut, *The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History* (Guilford Press, 2012), 66–68.

³⁰ Fred T. Sai, “Changing Perspectives of Population in Africa and International Responses,” *African Affairs* 87, no. 347 (1988): 267–276.

³¹ David E. Bloom and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia,” *The World Bank Economic Review* 12, no. 3 (September 1, 1998): 419–55; Alan M. Taylor, “Debt, Dependence and the Demographic Transition: Latin America in to the next Century,” *World Development* 23, no. 5 (May 1, 1995): 869–79.

population control politically unviable.³² In the background, changes within the Euro-American leadership of the international population establishment altered the nature of funding and institutional structures.³³ A new framework emerged out of the breakdown.

Population Management: A Definition and Example

What replaced population control had no pithy phrasing, but has instead gone by a variety of monikers, including integrative, community-based, and holistic population policy. The international population establishment has situated the origins of its new paradigm in the 1980s and 1990s, citing feminist critiques of population control and women's empowerment movements. Although population programming clearly started to center around women's reproductive rights, rights discourse proved to be rather hostile to any overarching framework that might restrict individual prerogative. The term "population policy" went underground and became pejoratively linked to the previous era of population control.

In practice, population remained an integral part of policy programming, as changing demographics continued to impact nearly all aspects of governance. Population

³² Donald P. Warwick, *Bitter Pills: Population Policies and Their Implementation in Eight Developing Countries* (Cambridge University Press, 1982); Monica Bahati Kuumba, "Perpetuating Neo-Colonialism through Population Control: South Africa and the United States," *Africa Today* 40, no. 3, (1993): 79–85. For a more recent example, see Yoweri K. Museveni, "Address on National State of Affairs," 9 September 2019, Republic of Uganda. Available at <https://www.yowerikuseveni.com/address-national-state-affairs>

³³ Betsy Hartmann, "Population Control I: Birth of an Ideology," *International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, Evaluation* 27, no. 3 (1997): 523–40; Betsy Hartmann, "Population Control II: The Population Establishment Today," *International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, Evaluation* 27, no. 3 (1997): 541–57. The United States has been the primary donor for population control programs, for more on the evolution of its funding apparatus, see Susan A. Cohen, "The United States and the United Nations Population Fund: A Rocky Relationship," *Guttman Report on Public Policy* 2, no. 1 (1999).

intervention simply became more “integrated” with development goals that were also beneficial in their own right, like girls’ education and improved healthcare. Echoing the language of postcolonial critiques, the privileging of development over demographic outcomes required iterative and adjustable policymaking. In short, population should be managed rather than controlled.

The phrase “population management” has been used before, but not in any uniform way. In this dissertation, I propose it as a conceptual alternative to population control. Population control has a specific end goal, such as lowering fertility rates to replacement value, while population management involves ongoing decision-making to adjust to changing needs and desires. It addresses demographic issues, but situates them within broader development schemes, including health, education, and environmental conservation. Management implies flexibility and adjusting to contingency.³⁴ Any group or country could implement population management – from village councils to governments in high-income countries. It does not come with the stigma associated with “developing” countries in need of assistance.

Defining population management allows us to fully explore its origins and correct the flawed chronology posited in population studies literature.³⁵ Instead of placing the seeds of the paradigm shift in international women’s rights movements of the late twentieth century, I offer an alternative genealogy that includes the experience of postcolonial

³⁴ For an example of how these terms fit more closely with manifestations of Africans’ fertility decisions, see Bledsoe, Banja, and Carter, *Contingent Lives*.

³⁵ It also comes with a risk of reifying certain family values as normative, though the flexibility of Tanzania’s population management framework helped preempt the problems found in previous studies. For more, see Paula Treichler, “What Definitions Do: Childbirth, Cultural Crisis, and the Challenge to Medical Discourse,” in *Rethinking Communication*, Eds. Dervin, et al. (Sage, 1989), 424–453.

Tanzania. Doing so moves the supporting elements of population management programming away from universal individual rights and toward more contextualized analysis. Four key elements supported population management in Tanzania: strong leadership, a unifying sense of nationalism, moral motivations, and a diverse policymaking coalition. The thread running through them all was social responsibility.

President Nyerere and his Ujamaa nation-building project instilled robust communal awareness in Tanzania. To have a national population policy with national goals, Tanzania needed a sense of the nation. It also needed “unique individuals,” in Nyerere’s words, “working together for the good of the community and the country.”³⁶ As such, I have found a version of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” to be more generative than Foucault’s theory of biopolitics for exploring population management.³⁷ Recent scholarship has contended that the idea of a universal, statist, or homogenous “imagined community” does not directly translate to postcolonial contexts.³⁸ It certainly did not in Tanzania. Instead, nationalism was more of a political feeling, which engendered inventive and transitional qualities more apropos to the complex dimensions of decolonization and its diverse political communities.³⁹

³⁶ Julius Nyerere, speech at state banquet in Peking, 29 March 1974, in “Second Year Reader Vol. 6,” for the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, East Africana Collection, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

³⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 1991).

³⁸ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton University Press, 2008), 149.

³⁹ Christopher J. Lee, *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* (Ohio University Press, 2010), 26.

Feeling unified under the banner of an independent Tanzania did not preclude debates from arising, particularly over whose idea of “national culture” prevailed when fault lines formed along gendered, regional, or age-set lines. Unlike the very public confrontations over music and miniskirts in the decades after independence, population management brought Tanzania’s diverse communities together to try to solve demographic problems.⁴⁰ A multiplicity of interested parties, largely at the grassroots level, created and implemented population policy. Individual priorities entered into a larger patchwork agenda that revealed itself as responsive to community needs and varying desires. To accommodate the differing perspectives, the government adopted flexible programming that included a variety of family planning options, better maternal and child health, education opportunities, tax incentives, maternity leave, and community support. People could lean on the programs that best matched their individual circumstance – continuing the iterative cycle of policymaking.

Tanzania’s population management framework was held together by the moral principle of responsible parenting. In 1968, American ecologist Garrett Hardin had pushed back against this principle in his account of the “Tragedy of the Commons,” which together with Paul Ehrlich’s *The Population Bomb* symbolized the height of global population panic.⁴¹ Hardin did not believe that moral incentives were enough to mitigate the potentially apocalyptic effects of human population growth. “When we use the word

⁴⁰ Kelly Askew, *Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania* (University of Chicago Press, 2002); Andrew Ivaska, *Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar Es Salaam* (Duke University Press, 2011).

⁴¹ Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” *Science* 162, no. 3859 (Dec 1968): 1247; Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb: Population Control or Race to Oblivion* (Ballantine Books, 1968).

responsibility in the absence of substantial sanctions,” he asked, “are we not trying to browbeat a free man... into acting against his own interest?”⁴² He was prescient of a world where population control pinned individual prerogative against government action, but in his mind moral arguments were not enough to save the planet. In addition, there had to be an element of “mutual coercion mutually agreed upon.”⁴³ His vocabulary of population control fell short of understanding how strong leadership, a shared sense of community, moral arguments, and a diverse policymaking coalition could arise in an East African country at the same time as his writing, and do so based on shared responsibility instead of state coercion.

“Population bomb” rhetoric was famously apocalyptic. To some extent, population management as outlined in this project has moved toward the other extreme. In highlighting the positive elements of Tanzania’s population management ethos, I do not wish to mask the individuals and communities that experienced population policy in the Ujamaa decades in a negative or apathetic way. The line between state control and nationalism is often blurry. True narratives of governance are hardly ever entirely “good” or “bad,” but embody the messiness and complexity of the human condition. Yet, Hardin and his contemporaries displayed how the binary of government action and individual rights was inherently antagonistic, leaving little room for negotiation and nuance. By introducing a conceptual middle ground through Tanzania’s experience with population management, I offer that

⁴² Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 1247.

⁴³ Ibid.

population policy has the ability to foster inclusive discussions that take demographic challenges seriously, and in doing so discover innovative solutions.

Historical Debates

This project engages most thoroughly with literature on Tanzanian population policy, though that literature is quite small. International institutions like the United Nations and World Bank provided reports that served as chronologies of government policy throughout the twentieth century.⁴⁴ In the early 1990s, Tanzania began to appear in larger comparative social science studies and more targeted ethnographic examinations of fertility norms.⁴⁵ The most extensive analyses were by Lisa Ann Richey, who brought the ethnographic research and institutional reports into conversation.⁴⁶ Her main argument was that Tanzania approached population policy with “strategic ambiguity” toward external actors and its own development priorities.⁴⁷ She focused on political expediency, arguing that state authorities accepted population control and associated funding so long as it fit into Tanzania’s larger development agenda.⁴⁸ Development was primary to – not integrated with – issues of population.

⁴⁴ United Nations, “National Experience in the Formulation and Implementation of Population Policy, 1960-1976: United Republic of Tanzania,” (United Nations, 1978).

⁴⁵ For example, see Ingrid Palmer, *Gender and Population in the Adjustment of African Economies: Planning for Change* (ILO, 1991); Denise Roth Allen, *Managing Motherhood, Managing Risk: Fertility and Danger in West Central Tanzania* (University of Michigan Press, 2009).

⁴⁶ Lisa Richey, “Family Planning and the Politics of Population in Tanzania: International to Local Discourse,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 3 (1999): 457–487; Lisa Ann Richey, “Women’s Reproductive Health & Population Policy: Tanzania,” *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 96 (2003): 273–92; Richey, *Population Politics and Development*.

⁴⁷ Richey, *Population Politics and Development*, 30.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 43, 87.

The corollary to Richey's argument is that when the government adopted population policy, it came from foreign sources, which in turn allowed outsiders to become scapegoats for disagreeable programming and unfulfilled promises of development. It is clear that Richey's interlocutors pointed her in this direction, as did many of my own Tanzanian conversation partners. For example, a respondent at the Ministry of Health's Family Planning Unit complained that the majority of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding went to technical assistance because "they must pay for US consultants."⁴⁹ When examined from the conceptual frame of population management, however, the story changes.

The Tanzanian government had originally dictated that foreign organizations could only perform technical assistance and "training of trainers" in order to preserve the integrity of Tanzanian family planning principles and provide local job opportunities.⁵⁰ It was not misguided foreign actors prompting the administrator's angst, but well-intentioned homegrown policy. Changes in political and economic circumstance at the turn of the century likely transferred some of the blame to USAID and other international organizations, but focusing on outside actors as the source of policy led to antagonistic narratives and more emphasis on "geopolitical struggles" than sophisticated discussion about how demographic considerations affected individuals and the country.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ibid, 69.

⁵⁰ Pauline W. Muhuhu, "Program for International Training in Health, Trip #108," May 1982, 12. No. 80192, Box 103, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, USA.

⁵¹ Richey, *Population Politics and Development*, 68.

Instead of highlighting the failures of international population programming in Tanzania, I have focused my research on understanding why nearly every study of Tanzanian population policy has ultimately conceded that beneath the dissention, a sturdy framework endured. Indeed, Richey herself argued that the government's stance toward population was similar from independence to the present, despite her emphasis on "strategic ambiguity."⁵² Another study from the height of the population management period in 1979 acknowledged that while varying policymaking groups prioritized different demographic problems, there remained a "degree of continuity in the concern about numerous aspects of population."⁵³ This coherence does not fit with the current view that Tanzanian population policy was reactive and externally oriented. Instead, the continuity came from Tanzania's internal population management framework and formative domestic context, which became the focus of this dissertation.

Apart from Tanzanian population policy, my project engages with two broad bodies of literature: postcolonial Tanzanian history and global population studies. Tanzania's foray into population management occurred alongside its Ujamaa nation-building project, and their trajectories are tied together. A plethora of research has sought to identify and analyze various expressions of Ujamaa. In the decade after independence, a new "Dar es Salaam school of history" created a strong nationalist narrative to match Nyerere's push for a strong nation.⁵⁴ When the optimism and hope surrounding Ujamaa soured in the late

⁵² Ibid, 30.

⁵³ Ian Thomas, "Population Policy in Tanzania," Development Studies Discussion Paper No.51 (March 1979), 8.

⁵⁴ Donald Denoon and Adam Kuper, "Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation: The 'New Historiography' in Dar Es Salaam," *African Affairs* 69, no. 277 (1970): 329–349; Terence Ranger, "The

1970s, many scholars transitioned to exploring what went wrong with the postcolonial experiment.⁵⁵ The next wave of scholarship broke apart the idea of a homogenized and all-encompassing state apparatus, exposing fault lines among governing bodies and core-periphery relationships.⁵⁶ The shift opened the door for investigations into what happened when varying factions disagreed over what it meant to be “Tanzanian,” highlighting both oppressors and resisters in the search for cultural legitimacy.⁵⁷ Drawing everything together, recent literature has offered the idea of coinciding Ujamaa(s), whose inconsistencies were not between theory and practice, but internal representations of “the dialectical friction at the heart of processes of state formation, socialism, and national development across postcolonial contexts.”⁵⁸

Population growth played a latent role throughout the changing historiography, especially concerning rural-urban migration, generational tension, land tenure, and ecological change.⁵⁹ My introduction of the population management framework

‘New Historiography’ in Dar Es Salaam: An Answer,” *African Affairs* 70, no. 278 (1971): 50–61; Horace Campbell, “The Impact of Walter Rodney and Progressive Scholars on the Dar Es Salaam School,” *Social and Economic Studies* 40, no 1 (1991): 99–135; Gregory H. Maddox, “The Dar Es Salaam School of African History,” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History*, 20 November 2018.

⁵⁵ For a review of the historiography, see Paul K. Bjerk, “Sovereignty and Socialism in Tanzania_The Historiography of an African State,” *History in Africa* 37 (2010): 275–319.

⁵⁶ Jeannette Hartmann, “Development Policy-Making in Tanzania 1962-1982: A Critique of Sociological Interpretations” (PhD dissertation, University of Hull, 1983); Goran Hyden, “Local Governance and Economic-Demographic Transition in Rural Africa,” *Population and Development Review* 15 (1989): 193–211; James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998).

⁵⁷ Kelly Askew, *Performing the Nation*; James Leonard Giblin and Blandina Kaduma Giblin, *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania* (James Currey Publishers, 2005); Andrew Ivaska, *Cultured States*; James R. Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania* (Ohio University Press, 2012).

⁵⁸ Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 11.

⁵⁹ For example, see Helge Kjekshus, “Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History,” *The Case of Tanganyika 1850-1950* (University of California Press, 1977); Meredith Turshen, “Population Growth and the Deterioration of Health: Mainland Tanzania 1920-1960,” in *African*

contributes more directly to literature highlighting the inherent tensions of Ujamaa. For example, the coercive turn toward forced villagization in the 1970s threatened the population management framework by prescribing settlement patterns and family norms, but it also worked to widen the network of Tanzanians interested in issues of population and to strengthen their ability to enact beneficial population programs in the villages where they lived. Tanzania is one of the only African countries that has successfully conducted a census every decade since independence, a feat that was not possible through state willpower alone. The government's limited capacity mandated at least some popular participation and many Tanzanians took pride in "performing the nation" on census day, showing that the line between nationalism and state control was often blurred.⁶⁰

Being in the vanguard of population management also brought Tanzania into conversation within broader global movements. Nyerere famously preached non-alignment during the Cold War, saying that the position had never been "a matter of neutrality, or threading a delicate tightrope between contending forces," but was instead "a process of involvement in world affairs."⁶¹ Because the non-alignment movement achieved few concrete results, Nyerere's words have often been seen as rhetorical posturing. Yet, his push for a creative and sustaining third way did emerge within the realm of population policy, a development that remains undervalued in the broader field of population studies.

Population and Capitalism: Historical Studies, Eds. D.D. Cordell and J.W. Gregory (Westview Press, 1987); John Iliffe, "The Origins of African Population Growth," *The Journal of African History* 30, no. 1 (1989): 165–169; Gregory H. Maddox, James L. Giblin, and Isaria N. Kimambo, *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania* (Ohio University Press, 1996).

⁶⁰ My terminology is inspired by Askew, *Performing the Nation*.

⁶¹ Preparatory Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries, 13 April 1970, Nyerere Opening Address, Nyerere Speeches 1-5F, FCO 21/685, British National Archives.

The study of population began within the siloed arenas of demography, medicine, ecology, and economics. Recently, however, historians have worked to bring them all together in an interdisciplinary way that better reflects the multi-faceted conception of population. This gestalt has breathed new life into the field of population studies, making its “history all the more interesting, but also challenging, to explain.”⁶² One of the challenges is the sheer breadth of material. Until the end of the twentieth century, most studies focused on demographic change within individual countries. The growing recognition that population constituencies did not fit within national borders extended the scope of study to complex transnational networks.⁶³ Analyzing a larger group of actors, spread across borders, and with an interdisciplinary methodology has dramatically expanded the number of relevant archives.

Like many iterations of “global” history, the vast majority of research on transnational population networks has focused on American and European actors. Their political machinations and financial purse strings significantly affected population intervention throughout the world, but as a team of population historians has observed, “the scope in many of the studies of the transnational population control movement has precluded researchers from adequately capturing the important role that local and national subjects made in the transnational population control movement.”⁶⁴ Conspicuous population control networks have extended global analyses to Asia and parts of Latin

⁶² Bashford, *Global Population*, eBook location 7279.

⁶³ Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 12; Bashford, *Global Population*.

⁶⁴ Aya Homei and Yu-Ling Huang, “Population Control in Cold War Asia: An Introduction,” *East Asian Science, Technology and Society* 10, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 344.

America, but Sub-Saharan Africa has remained a lacuna.⁶⁵ Scholars have pointed to the lack of available and accurate quantitative data in Africa as a reason to largely talk around the continent or use models imported from more data-rich regions.⁶⁶ Although a dearth of accurate census data afflicts the majority of African countries, there are ample sources that speak to qualitative aspects of population and scholarly attention would no doubt reveal new methodologies for uncovering statistical data.⁶⁷

By exploring the elements of Tanzanian society and governance that led to population management, my research contends that population policy is inherently contextual. It is true that in the second half of the twentieth century, demographic transition theory spread through international networks, wealthy donors influenced the programming of development organizations, and uneven power dynamics led governments to adopt standardized population policies that garnered legitimacy on the world stage. Yet, how people implemented and perceived population policy depended on who those people were and the environment in which they lived. Tanzania placed population within a wider development framework during Ujamaa, which was co-produced and inclusive. Its leadership emphasized a united demographic mission based on moral principles and responsible parenthood.

⁶⁵ Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham, *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁶⁶ For example, see Morten Jerven, *Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It* (Cornell University Press, 2013), 55–72.

⁶⁷ Parish records have played a key role in filling in gaps of data and understanding in European demographic history. They are largely available in Tanzania and other African countries, but only a few historians have begun to document and analyze them. For example, see Sarah Louise Walters, “Fertility, Morality and Marriage in Northwest Tanzania, 1920-1970: A Demographic Study Using Parish Registers” (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2009).

Population management did not belong exclusively to Tanzania. Its tenets would get picked up by the international population establishment, inserted into universal narratives of women's empowerment, and recycled back into various global and national population policy agendas. Similarly, the idea of population management did not resonate solely in the Ujamaa era of Tanzanian history. Colonial administrators based in East Africa had early inclinations that viable population policy would look different in the region than it did elsewhere, so that is where this dissertation begins.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter 1, "Meager Measurements: Colonial Demographic Inquiry in British East Africa (1948-61)," highlights early discrepancies between the "global" experience of Britain in the aftermath of the Second World War and the situation on the ground in colonial Tanganyika. It opens with a description of the real anxieties surrounding population growth's impact on economic, social, and environmental systems in the postwar period. An international network of activists, bureaucrats, and scholars came to believe in the power of demographic intervention to alleviate those problems and spur socioeconomic progress in under-developed regions like British East Africa. Thus, the Colonial Office conducted the first serious attempt at a colony-wide census in Tanganyika in 1948. In response to the census results and growing population pressure in neighboring Kenya, the Crown authorized further study of colonial population issues through a Royal Commission.

A small group of experts were charged with examining potential colony-wide population policies, but they concluded that there were not enough viable demographic

data in the region to make sweeping conclusions about East African population growth and its attendant effects, let alone enact a comprehensive population control strategy. They claimed that population concerns stemmed from development discourse and anxieties circulating around the Colonial Office in London, but that those anxieties did not always reflect the reality of Britain's colonial territories. The lack of direction and policy precedent left Tanganyikan officials free to address population as they saw fit after independence in 1961.

Chapter 2, "Counting the Nation: How Ujamaa Nationalism Created an Alternative to Population Control (1962-73)," establishes the conceptual framework for population management and explores the elements of Tanzanian governance and society that allowed it to emerge in the late 1960s. Tanzanian state authorities started paying attention to population growth in response to the 1967 census. Instead of continuing with the colonial population control approach, which by this time had become the paradigm of Euro-American academics and policymakers, the Ujamaa framework nurtured an alternative approach to population policy. Strong leadership, a nationalist sentiment, and moral nuance allowed for a latent, but extensive, support system of family planning and population intervention to emerge. The second half of the chapter highlights various segments of this coalition, which helped create, implement, and embody population policy in Ujamaa-era Tanzania, including women, religious authorities, NGOs, health practitioners, multiple factions of government, and community leaders.

Chapter 3, "Bogeys and Misconceptions: Making Sense of Population Policy During Tanzania's Statist Decade (1974-1983)," continues from the preceding chapter with

further exploration of the Ujamaa-era's population management framework. It covers the decade between the Third and Fourth World Population Conferences, which also encompasses the more coercive turn in Ujamaa development politics. While the government instituted forced villagization and increasingly cracked down on nonconforming expressions of citizenship, the population policymaking coalition engaged in a diverse range of education, health, regional, and state-wide programming that focused on the well-being of the people behind demographic statistics. The continued programming points to the resiliency of the population management approach and its embeddedness in Ujamaa development schemas.

Chapter 4, "Transposed Frameworks: Changes to Tanzanian and International Population Policy (1984-1999)," highlights the breakdown of population management in Tanzania. Amidst economic crisis in the mid-1980s, Tanzanian state authorities began planning and implementing a singular national population policy that matched international standards. The pivot ushered in a variety of population control practices, including statistical targets, prioritizing biomedical forms of contraception, and instituting an economic calculus for fertility decisions. As a result, the policymaking coalition splintered into siloed agendas concerned with women's rights, family planning, and development. Tanzania's turn toward population control accompanied the implementation of structural adjustment programs, which spread across African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The growing influence of international organizations and foreign funders no doubt affected the country's changing population agenda. Interestingly, however, at that time the international

population establishment was moving away from the population control paradigm that had been its guiding beacon throughout the twentieth century.

The transposition of Tanzanian and international population strategies prompts an analytical dilemma. If foreign intervention was primarily responsible for the change in Tanzanian population policy, why would it enact an outdated paradigm? Instead of looking to changes in global discourse for answers, Tanzania's own history is more illuminating. What was it about Tanzania from 1967 to 1992 that made the country fertile grounds for developing the population management approach? More importantly, what had changed by 1992? The evidence in this chapter points to the end of Nyerere's presidency and the abandonment of Ujamaa development ideals as primary factors, which disrupted the core elements of support for population management. Examining the mutual demise of Ujamaa and population management reinforces the role that leadership, nationalism, policymaking coalitions, and morality played in supporting Tanzania's population management ethos. Overall, my research relocates the origin and turning points of Tanzanian population policy away from international trends and toward internal machinations.

The conclusion connects Tanzania's history of population management with twenty-first-century policymaking. Was Tanzania's experiment with population management a historical coincidence, contingent on the specific circumstances of Nyerere and Ujamaa nation-building, or are there lessons to apply on a global stage? I explore how population anxiety is returning on both ends of the "fertility gap." On the one hand, Africa has yet to go through its demographic transition and is experiencing exponential population growth. Increasing populations put pressure on already compromised social service

schemes, institutions, and food security, to say nothing of the potential demographic impact of climate refugees and public health crises.⁶⁸ On the other hand, mid-to-high-income countries are beginning to worry about the potential problems that below-replacement fertility and increasingly skewed sex ratios put on social security and economic markets, which are predicated on a growing consumer class.⁶⁹

If governments want to respond to these increasing anxieties, as they have done in the past, population management offers a middle ground between too much and too little government control. It also provides a vocabulary that works to destigmatize population policy and separate it from the more maligned history of population control. The Tanzanian model will not be directly transferrable to other countries and twenty-first-century contexts, but strong leadership, a sense of imagined kinship, moral nuance, and building a policymaking coalition are flexible enough to accommodate varying situations. Population change affects the entire planet and is a long-term phenomenon, which necessitates a broad framework, but it also affects people around the world differently, which makes collaboration and flexibility key to maintaining collective action.

⁶⁸ Jack Gladstone, "Africa 2050: Demographic Truth and Consequences," Hoover Institution working paper, no. 14 January 2019. Available at <https://www.hoover.org/research/africa-2050-demographic-truth-and-consequences>

⁶⁹ Hvistendahl, *Unnatural Selection*; Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson, *Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline* (Hachette UK, 2019).

CHAPTER 1

MEAGER MEASUREMENTS: COLONIAL DEMOGRAPHIC INQUIRY IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA (1948-1961)

“A census should never again take place in February.”

- J.S.M. Vinter, letter to Senior Provincial Commission, 7 April 1952¹

I read the above statement on a February afternoon, 65 years after Tanganyika's dreary attempt at a colony-wide census.² The barrage of rain hitting the tin roof in Morogoro proved the commentator's point. The seasonal rain would not let up for months, as streets became knee-high rivers and bare feet came to look like prunes. It is difficult to imagine many census documents surviving the deluge in 1950s rucksacks, and there were further plights awaiting demographic data collectors in colonial Tanganyika. Census enumerators barely penetrated the 364,000 square miles of territory. They held census documents prepared in foreign lands, where people tended to speak one language and know their age from birth certificates or birthday celebrations. Locals, on the other hand, might speak one of many languages and were more concerned with counting progeny than reconstructing their own age. Semantic confusion between the Swahili words '*kaka*' and '*ndugu*' led men living under the same roof to tell enumerators they were indeed brothers, in the latter sense of comrade if not the former sense of kin.³ Enumerators resorted to

¹ Report from J.S.M. Vinter to Senior Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province, Lindi, 7 April 1952, 1952 Census File, H2/I60/4129, Tanzania National Archive, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

² Mainland Tanzania was called Tanganyika during the colonial era and first three years of independence, before the merger with Zanzibar in 1964.

³ Report from Vinter to Senior Provincial Commissioner, TNA H2/I60/4129

offering their best guess of the demographic milieu, but the variability was “so great as to cast doubt on the validity of any use of the data for descriptive or analytical purposes.”⁴

The colonial census debacle would be an informative and entertaining history in its own right, but the impetus behind the endeavor was no laughing matter. Real anxieties surrounding population growth’s impact on ecological systems emerged across the globe in the twentieth century. Moreover, a growing body of literature connected a society’s demographic characteristics with its economic performance. A vocal contingent of scholars, bureaucrats, and activists came to believe in the power of population control to alleviate social problems and maximize economic gains, particularly in under-developed regions like British East Africa. The Colonial Office began conducting the first serious attempt at a colony-wide census in the late 1940s and authorized a Royal Commission to study population issues soon thereafter.

The Commission’s conclusions, however, were surprising. Relying on testimonials and their first-hand experience in East Africa, the research team concluded that the Colonial Office’s prevailing approach to population rested upon “an over-simplified and, in some cases, fallacious assessment of the basic questions at issue and are not supported by the statistical material which is available.”⁵ In short, armchair policy experts in London did not have accurate data to advise on East Africa’s demographic trends and their *a priori* models had proven incompatible with local contexts. The Royal Commission offered an alternative approach to addressing population problems in the colonies, which eschewed

⁴ Irene Barnes Taeuber, *The Population of Tanganyika* (United Nations, Department of Social Affairs, Population Division, 1949), 81.

⁵ “East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report” (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955), 31.

an overreliance on flimsy data, included local collaboration, and looked at demographic trends in a more holistic manner. But their voices were largely drowned out, and not by February monsoon rains.

This chapter highlights the discrepancy between British perspectives on population in the metropole, from administrators in the Colonial Office to scholars gathered in London cafés, and the experience of their counterparts in Tanganyika. The former had become increasingly embedded in the burgeoning international population establishment. Their population control framework relied on experts to formulate comprehensive policies that aimed to alter undesirable demographic trends. Because population control was most necessary in “under-developed” regions, their policies were often paternalistic and sometimes coercive. Forcing changes to social mores was for the good of the people, whom they believed did not know any better. The Royal Commission, meanwhile, emphasized that local knowledge and informal networks provided a fairly robust framework for managing population growth among colonial subjects. Its empirical scrutiny broke down, or at least damaged, the general theories coming out of academic circles.

When members of the Colonial Office turned their attention to the particulars of East Africa, their eyes were drawn to Kenya, where population growth and land pressure were adding to an already fraught political milieu. Kenya’s problems in the 1940s and 1950s were very real, but creating a general population strategy based on an acute and particular set of problems was not a valid policymaking practice. It was triage. Moreover, Tanganyika was not Kenya. Its population growth rate was half that of its northern

neighbor, its population density was one of the lowest in the region, and land tenure was not overly contentious outside of a few cultivating regions.⁶

Throughout Britain's quest for a more thorough understanding of, and control over, its East African populations, authorities in Tanganyika questioned its applicability to their particular circumstance. They pushed for a shift in attention away from population and land tenure concerns, to more general region-wide economic collaboration.⁷ In effect, they saw population as part of a broader socioeconomic web of development, not worthy of isolated and targeted policy in itself. Attempts at data gathering and creating population policy in colonial Tanganyika would be remembered as futile, resulting in more directives of what not to do – such as conduct a census during the rainy season – than any positive precedent. The lack of direction would allow Tanganyikans to formulate a different approach to population policy after they achieved independence in 1961, while the population control framework continued to gain momentum around the world.

The Demographic Transition: A Theoretical Foundation

Anxieties and prescriptions for unbridled population growth dominated global discourse in the mid-twentieth century, but some voices “counted more than others.”⁸ British and French empires ruled over much of the world at the time, fascist regimes were particularly ruthless in their approach to “living space,” Scandinavian countries saw their

⁶ John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge University Press, 1979), 458.

⁷ “Briefs for Debate on Royal Commission Report,” 31 May 1957, CO 822/1614, British National Archives, London, England.

⁸ Matthew James Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Harvard University Press, 2008), 10.

welfare system as a model of sustainable growth vis-à-vis government service provision, and Americans invested large amounts of time and money creating institutional structures that were dedicated to issues of population. The list of actors appeared extensive, but in reality a small group of scholars, bureaucrats, medical professionals, and philanthropists from the United States and Europe worked through transnational organizations and networks to form a tightknit “international population establishment.” The group promulgated much of twentieth-century population control discourse and policy, which came to center on one overarching theory.

In the interwar years, demographers Warren Thompson, Adolphe Landry, and A.M. Carr-Saunders documented a similar pattern among diverse demographic datasets, which would eventually be called the demographic transition.⁹ In the millennia between the agricultural revolution and seventeenth century, most societies had high fertility rates and high mortality rates, resulting in a gradual population increase that often appeared to those living through it as population stasis. As societies began to develop better medical practices and understand the intricacies of hygiene at varying points throughout the seventeenth to twentieth centuries, mortality rates fell quite swiftly, producing a period of pronounced

⁹ Warren Simpson Thompson, *Danger Spots in World Population* (AA Knopf, 1929); Adolphe Landry, *La Révolution Démographique: Études et Essais Sur Les Problèmes de La Population* (Ined, 1934); Alexander Morris Carr-Saunders, *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends* (Frank Cass & Co., 1936). The most comprehensive study of the demographic transition came decades later in 1963, with the European Fertility Project. Ansley Coale and his team of demographers began a decades-long study that aimed to quantify fertility in “several hundred provinces of Europe during the time of major decline [1880-1970], and to determine the social and economic conditions that prevailed when the modern reduction in the rate of childbearing began,” see Ansley Johnson Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds., *The Decline of Fertility in Europe* (Princeton University Press, 1986), 32.

population growth. Eventually, fertility rates fell in line with the drop in mortality and a general population stasis returned, completing the society's demographic transition.

Demographic transition theorists typically called the process that led to lower mortality rates "modernization," but they rarely defined what they meant by the term.¹⁰ It entailed various processes of urbanization, medical advancements, industrialization, and changing society and family mores. Demographic transition theory's originators used European datasets as their model, as that was where the data were most complete and the transition happened earliest, so the European experience became the theory's guiding framework. Later demographic transition theorists would go so far to say "Westernization" was the primary impetus for the transition, recycling the language of modernity in their explanation.¹¹ Similar to other prominent theories of "progress," which denoted a linear evolution from "savage to civilized" or "traditional to modern," theorists believed that societies would inevitably move through their demographic transition to population stasis. It was unclear, however, how long it would take for that to happen. By the 1950s, members of the international population establishment had come to see the slow evolution in some parts of the world as increasingly problematic.

In 1952, Alfred Sauvy, a French demographer and historian, coined the term "Third World" to denote a contrast between the socioeconomic conditions in most of Africa, Latin America, and Asia compared to its "First World" American and European counterparts. Many scholars point to the Cold War as the impetus for Sauvy's theory, but it had

¹⁰ Dudley Kirk, "Demographic Transition Theory," *Population Studies* 50, no. 3 (1996): 361–387.

¹¹ John C. Caldwell, "Toward a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory," *Population and Development Review* 2, no. 3/4 (1976): 321–366.

demographic underpinnings that were more fundamental than the reading imbued by Cold War values years later.¹² An echo from the annals of the French Revolution and the Third Estate, Sauvy's Third World embodied the idea of poor and swarming masses. The idea of two distinct worlds, therefore, incorporated two distinct demographic profiles. The First World had low birth rates and economic prosperity; the Third World had high birth rates and poverty. Sauvy believed the massive increase in population growth hindered the ability of Third World societies to enter and thrive in the postwar global economy.

In the first decades of demographic transition theory's articulation, the general consensus among demographers was that economic prosperity caused a fall in fertility. Looking at the European model, child labor became less critical to family incomes at the same time that childrearing became more expensive, which altered the parent-child relationship and social values surrounding fertility. As demographers became more enmeshed with state actors and philanthropists, their models became less descriptive and more prescriptive about how to encourage a quicker demographic transition. Yet, economic development was a complex goal to attain, which made it a thorny necessary condition. If the causal apparatus could in fact work the other way, with lowered birth rates triggering economic growth, then elevating the world economy would be a much simpler prospect. The potential panacea created an uptick in population activism.

"Social scientists tend to be reformers," wrote demographer Frank Notestein, who saw his colleagues' work "as requiring a complicated set of timing adjustments that can be

¹² Leslie Wolf-Phillips, "Why 'Third World'?: Origin, Definition and Usage," *Third World Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (1987): 1311–27.

addressed by scientific attention and policy programming.”¹³ In 1952, the Ford Foundation, Population Council, and International Planned Parenthood Federation all offered their first grants explicitly aimed at addressing population growth. That same year, the US National Academy of Sciences passed a resolution to form an unofficial international council to monitor the relationship between population growth, world resources, and standard of living.¹⁴ In 1954, a group of demographers, social scientists, and “responsible citizens of the United States and of the world” met at the University of Chicago to discuss population and world politics.¹⁵ At the roundtable, a participant commented that their concern “flows not from vague humanitarianism, special ideological interest, preoccupation with power politics, or even from a hope of future markets, but rather from conviction that it is in our interest to make the world a good neighborhood in which to live.”¹⁶ In short, this self-anointed group of experts had become missionaries of science, with an inherently humanist agenda.¹⁷

Writing with hindsight, scholars have highlighted the harmful effects of scientific experts’ heightened faith in their knowledge and expertise in the postwar era.¹⁸ It led to

¹³ Frank W. Notestein, “Demography in the United States: A Partial Account of the Development of the Field,” *Population and Development Review* 8, no. 4 (1982): 652.

¹⁴ National Academy of Sciences, “Resolution Adopted by the Members of the Conference,” Conference on Population Problems, 20-22 June 1952, de Castro Review folder, Box 40, Call No. 83035, Kingsley Davis Papers, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, United States.

¹⁵ Philip Morris Hauser, *Population and World Politics* (Free Press, 1958), 19.

¹⁶ Quincy Wright, “Population and United States Foreign Policy,” in *Population and World Politics*, Ed. Philip M. Hauser (The Free Press, 1958), 270.

¹⁷ Notestein, “Demography in the United States,” 652; Marcos Cueto, *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America* (Indiana University Press, 1994); Saul Dubow, *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa* (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹⁸ For example, see Diana Wylie, *Starving on a Full Stomach: Hunger and the Triumph of Cultural Racism in Modern South Africa* (University of Virginia Press, 2001); Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars* (University of Chicago Press,

cases of mismanagement in the best scenarios, and serious harm in the worst. When it came to population, the effects were exacerbated by the confluence of more precise demographic data becoming available at the same time that imperial powers began to lose their grip over colonial territories.¹⁹ Yet, discussing population control as a universal paradigm implies that its implementation had similar outcomes and effects throughout colonial territories. British authorities were never able to obtain reliable demographic data in Tanganyika, so their population experts pleaded prudence.

Early Census Attempts in Tanganyika

That which is measured is managed. As 19th-century Scottish physicist Lord Kelvin, and likely originator of the oft-cited axiom saw it, “when you cannot express [something] in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind... you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be.”²⁰ The phrase lies at the heart of demographic data collection in East Africa. The Colonial Office prioritized collecting statistical information as the necessary precursor to crafting and assessing population policy. Measure, then manage. In reality, the limited scope of demographic data collection in Tanganyika was more exemplary of the meager and unsatisfactory kind of knowledge.

2005); Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*; Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950* (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

¹⁹ Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 120.

²⁰ W. T. Lord Kelvin, “Electrical Units of Measurement,” *Nature* 28, no. 708 (1883): 91–92.

By the time European countries began to colonize Africa in the late 19th century, the field of demography was beginning to professionalize into something resembling a codified science. It was standard practice that nations would attempt to gather demographic statistics within their own borders and colonial territories, using the information to bring demographic profiles in line with governing edicts. The census was one of three tools that Benedict Anderson laid out as fundamental in shaping what we consider to be the modern nation-state, alongside the map and museum.²¹ Societal myths had brought humans together throughout history, but distinct borders and counting everyone within them as part of the same community marked an important shift in social consciousness. Citizens of a state tended to be more amenable to government intervention that was theoretically better for the nation than a ruler's arbitrary whim.

Of course, the non-white residents of Tanganyika were not citizens, but subjects.²² Colonial administrators used demographic tools to delineate boundaries, document and expand pools of potential labor, create systems of taxation, and recruit soldiers within defined colonial territories. In fact, many emerging biomedical technologies were first implemented in African settings. The bureaucrats overseeing those processes, however, were not seeking a deep state in the Foucauldian sense or undertaking intimate interventions.²³ "Government in Africa, which scholars have variously described as a

²¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 1991).

²² For more on the British creation of subjects through indirect rule, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton University Press, 1996).

²³ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (Pantheon, 1978); Rachel Sullivan Robinson, *Intimate Interventions in Global Health: Family Planning and HIV Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

gatekeeper state, as centralized despotism and as hegemony on a shoestring,” writes Keith Breckenridge, “has been defined much more by the absence of information than by its presence.”²⁴ For better or worse, a want of demographic data in colonial territories did not make collection efforts any easier.

German authorities had difficulty measuring the local population with any accuracy in the early years of Tanganyikan colonialism.²⁵ Their administrative infrastructure lacked the means to infiltrate the majority of territory outside of the northeast coastal region that housed the capital, first in Bagamoyo and then in Dar es Salaam. German officials resorted to extrapolating population data from existing sources. They multiplied the number of men who paid hut-and-poll taxes by an estimated number of dependent women and children. The result was an estimated total population.²⁶ Tax collection had its own set of documentation issues that made it an unreliable benchmark, so German demographic collection efforts were little more than rudimentary guesses.²⁷

Moreover, connecting demography and taxes had an unintentional effect. Many Tanganyikans began conflating vital registration systems with taxation. To be counted in one was to be counted in the other. Naturally, the conflation created a disincentive for locals to cooperate with demographic data gathering attempts. Colonial administrators and

²⁴ Keith Breckenridge, *Biometric State* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 24–25.

²⁵ German rule over Tanganyika lasted from 1885 to 1919.

²⁶ The 1913 census documented roughly four million people living in the colonial territory. See United Nations, Department of Social Affairs, Population Division, “The Population of Tanganyika,” 1 September 1949.

²⁷ Taeuber, *The Population of Tanganyika*, 13.

medical practitioners documented difficulties in soliciting demographic information, and local resistance would outlast Germany's tenure as colonizer.²⁸

Britain took over trusteeship of Tanganyika following Germany's loss in the First World War. Tanganyika settled in the administrative periphery as the "backward brother of Kenya," providing resources to strengthen the economic and industrial growth of its metaphorical older sibling.²⁹ Given British Tanganyika's *raison d'être*, British authorities often viewed its demographic milieu through an economic lens. A report from Nzega district in 1934 stated, "What is required in the future of Tanganyika, is an increase of its only economic asset—Native—not a decrease. An increase in other words of potential tax payers."³⁰ Unfortunately for the Colonial Office, anecdotal evidence and the Germans' rudimentary demographic data suggested that the African population had been declining for decades due to ecological factors and a breakdown in local political structures.³¹ Disruption in colonial administration during the First World War had been particularly devastating, as it accompanied a smallpox outbreak and major drought, which resulted in "the worst famine in human memory" according to historian John Iliffe.³² The British administration sought to confirm and reverse declining population growth by turning to medical personnel who could, in theory, do both.

²⁸ Sarah Walters, "'Child! Now You Are': Identity Registration, Labor, and the Definition of Childhood in Colonial Tanganyika, 1910–1950," *The Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth* 9, no. 1 (2016): 66.

²⁹ "White Settlement in East Africa," 1 February 1944, Hansard Transcripts, HL Deb, vol. 130, cc589; Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 104, 128.

³⁰ "Nzega District Annual Report," 1934, cited in Walters, "'Child! Now You Are,'" 68.

³¹ The 1921 census showed no increase in population from 1913, with the population still around four million. For more on possible explanations for the lack of population growth, see Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History* (Ohio University Press, 1977); Gregory H. Maddox, James L. Giblin, and Isaria N. Kimambo, *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania* (Ohio University Press, 1996).

³² Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 251.

The nefarious connection between healthcare and colonial rule has been well documented, but in this case the use of physician-enumerators was a rather benign problem-solving attempt.³³ Medical personnel could overcome the problem of administrative reach, highlighted by Germany's feeble attempts at enumeration. "Geographically the spatial distribution of population is one of the most striking features of the human condition in East Africa," wrote Simeon Ominde in a 1975 retrospective treatise on East African demography.³⁴ To document the vast majority of the population, census enumerators would have to traverse a territory larger than France and the United Kingdom combined, and do so mostly on foot as there were few major roadways. Medical personnel had more experience than any profession, other than missionaries, in traveling outside of the administrative capital to perform routine duties.³⁵ Many were eager to help gather demographic data, as they believed it could augment their understanding of disease patterns and local conceptions of health.

Integrating the intimate realms of birth and death into the demographic record could have encouraged a more holistic understanding of population change. In the 1930s and 1940s, colonial rhetoric was moving away from extraction and toward "welfare

³³ For a Tanzanian case study on the problems of colonial health policy in Tanzania, see Meredith Turshen, "Population Growth and the Deterioration of Health: Mainland Tanzania 1920-1960," in *African Population and Capitalism: Historical Studies*, Eds. D.D. Cordell and J.W. Gregory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

³⁴ Simeon Hongo Ominde, *The Population of Kenya, Tanzania & Uganda* (Heinemann, 1975), 73.

³⁵ Parish records have played a key role in filling in gaps of data and understanding in European demographic history. They are largely available in Tanzania and other African countries, but few historians have begun to document and analyze them. For an exception, see Sarah Louise Walters, "Fertility, Morality and Marriage in Northwest Tanzania, 1920-1970: A Demographic Study Using Parish Registers" (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2009).

colonialism,” which encouraged policymaking to take on a genuine development tenor.³⁶ Standard of living considerations had been part and parcel of colonialism from the outset, but the welfarist turn increasingly embedded the concept within a genuine desire to “better” Africans and their societal structures by bringing them into the “modern” era.³⁷ Given demographic transition theory’s purported connection between economic development and population growth, demographic interventions could play a role in improving both Tanganyikans’ wellbeing and colonial economies.

Yet, colonial administrators in Tanganyika continued to overlook population trends that fell outside the scope of labor or taxes. Husbands, chiefs, and social taboos were believed to have a firm hold on African women’s sexuality and biological reproduction, so the government could focus their policy efforts elsewhere. The same report that referred to Tanganyikans as the primary economic asset of the colony noted, “It is encouraging to think that each year the number of maternity cases, etc., has risen.”³⁸ Women were not bearers of rights so much as bearers of the next generation. It is unlikely that increased oversight would have done much to change that viewpoint, but it is possible that using medical enumerators could have planted the seeds for colonial population policies that prioritized the wellbeing of colonial subjects, including women, over simply counting men for tax purposes and agricultural labor.

³⁶ The term ‘welfare colonialism’ is often credited to William Beinart, “Agricultural Planning and the Late Colonial Technical Imagination: The Lower Shire Valley in Malawi, 1940–1960,” in *Malawi: An Alternative Pattern of Development*, Centre of African Studies, Seminar Proceedings, 1985.

³⁷ For a general description of the policy turn, see Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present*, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2002); For Tanganyika-specific analysis, see Michael Jennings, “Building Better People: Modernity and Utopia in Late Colonial Tanganyika,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 94–111.

³⁸ “Nzega District Annual Report 1934”

In practice, physician-enumerators did not have a significant impact on demographic collection efforts or colonial understandings of population change in Tanganyika. They continued to use hospitals and clinics as their primary collecting ground, which tended to be near urban centers or easily accessible roadways.³⁹ Thus, the new methodology did not drastically alter the scope of enumeration. British administrators' best attempt at a colony-wide census in their first decades of Tanganyikan rule largely mirrored the German hut-and-poll extrapolation method, estimating the total population from birth and death records taken at urban medical facilities and enumerators' best guesses.⁴⁰

Colonial Population Management? A Counter-Current (1948-49)

British authorities oscillated between a desire for population control in East Africa and an absence of any coherent population policy. The fluctuation came in large part from the interplay between region-wide mandates and local scrutiny. Many of the voices opposed to population intervention were not overly preoccupied with problems of execution, however, which revealed a more complex set of issues than the often troubled relationship between theory and practice. Instead, they offered a different approach to population policy altogether. The first clear articulation came in response to improved census data in the late 1940s.

³⁹ Samuël Coghe and Alexandra Widmer, "Colonial Demography: Discourses, Rationalities, Methods," in *Twentieth Century Population Thinking* (Routledge, 2015), 37–64.

⁴⁰ Taeuber, *The Population of Tanganyika*, 18.

In 1948, the Colonial Office commissioned the United Nations to help conduct the first serious attempt at a colony-wide census in Tanganyika, as part of a broader project to enumerate all of East Africa.⁴¹ The concerted effort was an improvement over previous attempts at enumeration, but the survey team in charge of the census encountered similar roadblocks. A follow-up report noted that demographic study in Tanganyika was “severely handicapped by the lack of reliable statistics,” primarily due to the difficulty in documenting such a dispersed population.⁴² The census data were too “defective” to even measure the three pillars of demographic study – fertility, mortality, and migration.⁴³ To improve their demographic knowledge base, the East Africa High Commission established an Institute of Social Research at Makerere University in Uganda. It charged the research team with analyzing viable census data and suggesting the best way forward for colonial population policy.⁴⁴

Dr. William Stanner, an Australian anthropologist, was the Institute of Social Research’s first director. He argued that demographic inquiry in East Africa had been too narrowly focused on the connection between population and agricultural production. “Symbolically, politically, economically, and literally, soil was the substrata of the population problem,” writes historian Allison Bashford. “It makes sense, then, that

⁴¹ In 1948, R.R. Kuczynski published the first major demographic survey of the British sphere of influence in West Africa, followed by analysis of Southern and Eastern Africa in 1949.

⁴² East African Statistical Department, “East African Population Census 1948 Some Problems of Planning,” *The American Statistician* 2, no. 4 (Aug 1948): 13; Taeuber, *The Population of Tanganyika*, 13.

⁴³ Taeuber, *The Population of Tanganyika*, 19.

⁴⁴ The East Africa High Commission was comprised of the governors from Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. It helped coordinate the administration of region-wide processes like transportation and postal services.

agricultural science was the expertise base for many population commentators.”⁴⁵ But Stanner was an exception. He advocated for a more integrated approach that focused on the relationship between demographic, economic, medical, administrative, legal, and social data, especially in informal social groupings that tended to evade the purview of enumeration attempts.⁴⁶ Stanner believed that demography formed a complex web with myriad other socioeconomic configurations. Discussing population trends in isolation failed to account for their complexity.

Stanner also acknowledged that an increase in substantive scope would be a big task for a colonial government that had repeatedly failed to enumerate the majority of the territory with even a simple headcount. He leaned into the weakness, homing in where enumeration had been most thorough in the past and where he thought the biggest population concerns were concentrated – the capital city of Dar es Salaam.⁴⁷ Heavy rural-urban migration after the Second World War saw the city’s population double in just a decade. ⁴⁸ Colonial administrators’ preoccupation with urban migration and city “hooligans” has been well documented, and scholars have adeptly analyzed how racist anxieties worked their way into the historical record.⁴⁹ But when it came to demographic

⁴⁵ Alison Bashford, *Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth* (Columbia University Press, 2014), 181.

⁴⁶ “Note on the Proposed Social Survey of Dar es Salaam,” 1949, CO 892/11/5, British National Archives, London, England.

⁴⁷ Tanga and the Great Lakes region also saw population growth in the post-WWII era, but Dar es Salaam had four times the population of Tanga at independence in 1961. See Larry Sawers, “Urban Primacy in Tanzania,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 37, No. 4 (July 1989): 841-859.

⁴⁸ James Brennan and Andrew Burton, “The Emerging Metropolis: A Short History of Dar es Salaam, Circa 1862-2005,” in Brennan, Burton, and Lawi (Eds.), *Dar es Salaam: Histories from an Emerging African Metropolis* (Mkuki na Nyota, 2007), 42-44.

⁴⁹ For example, see Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, Crime and Colonial Order in Dar Es Salaam 1919-61* (James Currey, 2005).

analysis, Stanner's move made sense. A demographic survey had the greatest likelihood of completion in the relatively accessible urban center.

Stanner modeled his study after Edward Batson's 1948 social survey of the island archipelago of Zanzibar.⁵⁰ Batson was able to evaluate two percent of the islands' total population, a significant sample size for the time period. Dar es Salaam's population was around 50,000, significantly less than the 300,000 in Zanzibar, which encouraged Stanner's assessment that a thorough study of the city's demographics was a viable undertaking. Unfortunately, a lack of trained enumerators created a series of delays, which in turn led to talk of cutting the social survey questions that Stanner saw as crucial to understanding demographic data in its proper context.⁵¹ As a result, he resigned in 1949. On the way out, Stanner reportedly recommended disbanding the entire Institute of Social Research unless the Colonial Office invested both money and manpower in expanding the scope of demographic study.⁵²

Stanner's outlook had kernels of the population management approach that would become the guiding framework in Tanzania two decades later. He saw population policy as integral to wider frameworks of health, education, and social development. Demographic statistics were nuanced and necessitated nuanced analyses, which he

⁵⁰ Edward Batson, *Report on Proposals for a Social Survey of Zanzibar* (Zanzibar, Govt. Printer, 1948); "Social Services, Education, Medical Services, Social Development," n.d., CO 892/11/5, British National Archives, London, England.

⁵¹ Charles Mkalawa and Pan Haixiao, "Dar Es Salaam City Temporal Growth and Its Influence on Transportation," *Urban, Planning and Transport Research* 2 (January 2014): 429. J.A.K. Leslie would eventually conduct the social survey in 1956 and 1957, but the results would not be published until after independence in 1963, see John Arthur Kingsley Leslie, *A Survey of Dar Es Salaam* (Oxford University Press, 1963).

⁵² David Mills, "British Anthropology at the End of Empire: The Rise and Fall of the Colonial Social Science Research Council, 1944-1962," *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences Humaines* no 6, no. 1 (2002): 161-88.

admitted produced hazy and complex conclusions. But they were rooted in the situation on the ground in Tanganyika, which was an improvement over the limited understanding of foreign datasets and white papers. Stanner was not pushing back against colonial population policy writ large, as he believed proper study and manipulation of Tanganyika's population could have benefited colonial subjects and promoted the administration's welfarist mission. His ideas were innovative and stationed to fit East Africa, but when he resigned the Colonial Office had a more established framework for thinking about colonial population policy at its disposal.

The Population Problem in British East Africa: International Institutions, Food, and Land

Amidst the Institute for Social Research's fitful beginnings, British authorities fell back on international population establishment discourse to guide their approach to colonial population policy. Britain had been nurturing a collection of nascent international organizations since the end of the Second World War and increasingly leaned on their expertise to contextualize global models in East Africa. The interchange continued until 1952, when more pressing problems re-centered Britain's attention firmly on the particularities of East Africa's demographic milieu.

Demographer Irene Taeuber had joined a cadre of second-wave demographic transition theorists at their academic home in Princeton University's Office of Population Research soon after its formation in 1936.⁵³ She contributed a series of landmark studies

⁵³ "Irene Barnes Taeuber, 1906–1974," *The American Statistician* 28, no. 3 (August 1, 1974): 109–10.

on the demographic transition in the United States, Japan, China, and Turkey, before authoring a 1949 UN report on Tanganyika's population situation. Taeuber's report concluded that Tanganyika was likely in the early stages of demographic transition, with lowering mortality rates and high fertility rates leading to pronounced population growth.⁵⁴ Similar to Stanner's position, she contended that "the population problem of Tanganyika is not fundamentally one of numbers, either now or in the foreseeable future."⁵⁵ Whereas Stanner took that to mean that future studies should look at how population integrated with other local development indicators, Taeuber used the opportunity to relate Tanganyika's situation to global development trends. She believed, "The economic future of Tanganyika is closely bound up with the future prosperity of the world as a whole, and especially of the industrial countries which provide the market for its raw materials."⁵⁶ The colony was simply a pawn within the larger world system.

For example, population trends in Tanganyika could affect the centuries-old Malthusian worry of food supply. The UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was founded in 1945 with a mission statement to solve the world food problem, and population had a role to play.⁵⁷ A 1949 UN report emphasized that individual territories needed census data not just for their own policymaking efforts, but also "for the objective consideration of certain important problems, such as the conservation and development of resources on

⁵⁴ Taeuber, *The Population of Tanganyika*, 26.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 58.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 57.

⁵⁷ "The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations," *International Organization* 1, no. 1 (1947): 121.

a global scale.”⁵⁸ Delineating Tanganyika’s demographic situation was important for global food supply because the vast territory could potentially increase yields.

In 1946, Britain had enacted the First Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika. The ten-year development strategy centered on a series of soil conservation schemes, cash crop production, and attempts to manage animal husbandry – all of which relied on productive land use. The Groundnut Scheme, which aimed to cultivate millions of acres of land for peanut harvesting, headlined the plan. In the spirit of global cooperation, the British administration lauded the scheme as a way to confront the serious worldwide shortage of fats.⁵⁹ As a bonus, and in line with the welfarist turn in colonial policy, adding groundnuts and cooking fat to the Tanganyikan diet could improve their standard of living, as nutrition and food availability had increasingly become an index for changing quality of life. Unfortunately for all involved, the Groundnut Scheme neither added much cooking fat to the British and Tanganyikan reserves nor contributed to a world food supply. Scholars have adeptly covered the plan’s failures, from minimal and misguided preparation to its role in extending the breadth and depth of nationalist sympathies.⁶⁰

Although the Groundnut Scheme is considered a failure of colonial agricultural policy, it also speaks to the problems of Britain’s triage approach to issues of population.

⁵⁸ United Nations, *World Population Trends, 1920-1947*, Population Studies, no. 3 (New York: United Nations, 1949), 1.

⁵⁹ For more on Britain’s domestic motives, see Matteo Rizzo, "What was Left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development Disaster and Labour Market in Southern Tanganyika 1946–1952," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 6, no. 2 (2006): 205-238. For more on Britain’s role in global discourse, see "Development and Communications," n.d., xii, CO 892/12/1, The British National Archives, London, England.

⁶⁰ For example, see James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998), 227, 253.

Because their policy framework lacked any real underpinnings, it tended to shift with the political winds. First, colonial officials put all of their efforts into demographic research and data production. When those efforts failed to produce concrete results, they transferred responsibility to the United Nations and outside experts to explain how colonial population growth affected global trends. When the policies that emerged from those studies failed to bear literal fruit, they moved on again. This time, however, the problem facing British colonial administrators was more acute.

Much of the British colonial apparatus dealt collectively with its East African holdings in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika, but when it came to population concerns Kenya held a distinct position. Many members of parliament and the aristocracy, often one and the same, saw Kenya as an outlet for excess British populations to settle and establish a node of economic growth in the region.⁶¹ The confined space of the “island race” had preoccupied residents of the British Isles throughout its history, including T. Robert Malthus centuries earlier.⁶² One of the simplest solutions to overcrowding was moving excess populations to other territories within the Empire. Migration emerged from an image of British colonies as relatively “empty,” though none of the territories where white settlers moved were uninhabited.⁶³ Compared with the British Isles, however, many colonies had low population densities and thick wilderness, which sparked a sense of

⁶¹ Not all agreed and contentious debates occurred over British settlement in East Africa, see Diana Wylie, “Confrontation over Kenya: The Colonial Office and Its Critics 1918–1940,” *The Journal of African History* 18, no. 3 (July 1977): 427–47; Hansard Transcripts, “White Settlement in East Africa.”

⁶² Kathleen Wilson, *The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century* (Psychology Press, 2003); Alison Bashford and Joyce E. Chaplin, *The New Worlds of Thomas Robert Malthus: Rereading the “Principle of Population”* (Princeton University Press, 2016), 150–51.

⁶³ Hansard Transcripts, “White Settlement in East Africa.”

adventure for settlers and contributed to the “empty” imagination for those who remained back in Britain.

More often, the motif implied an economic emptiness.⁶⁴ British settler populations almost always exceeded the native population’s embeddedness in global economic systems given their connections to the metropole and colonial entitlements. In the first decades of colonial rule in Kenya, the Crown took 20 percent of the most fertile land and leased it to white settlers.⁶⁵ As a result, African residents became “squatters” or moved to areas formally reserved for them within the changing land tenure system. In the 1930s and 1940s, increased migration, natural population increase, changing landlord-squatter relations, and the postwar push for agricultural production led to increasing tensions among and between various Kenyan communities. Much has been written about the roots of Mau Mau, but a major point of contention was the “serious, complex, and controversial” problem of population growth and land use.⁶⁶

Kenya’s governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, enacted a series of policies to try to alter demographic trends in the colony, including population distribution, land use, and African fertility.⁶⁷ He was quickly reminded that what appeared on the surface as a population problem was an intransigent social and political movement. Stanner’s prescience that population growth in East Africa was intrinsically linked to other factors had materialized in a concrete way, but his efforts for holistic population policy had not. The complexities

⁶⁴ Bashford, *Global Population*, 144.

⁶⁵ Charles Hornsby, *Kenya: A History Since Independence* (I.B.Tauris, 2013), 26.

⁶⁶ Dispatch from Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Kenya office, 16 Nov 1961, FO 371/96707, British National Archives, London, England.

⁶⁷ Colonial Papers 191 and 210. For more, see Richard A. Frost, “Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya,” *African Affairs* 78, no. 313 (1979): 541.

of Kenyans' sociopolitical grievances would have been difficult to mitigate through existing channels. The purported connection between population growth rates and economic prosperity, on the other hand, had the potential to relieve growing pressure. Less people meant less congestion. In 1952, Mitchell asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to conduct a large-scale demographic study of East Africa to confirm the troubling trends and investigate ways to alter them.⁶⁸ A year later the Crown granted a warrant for a Royal Commission to do just that.

The East Africa Royal Commission (1953-1957)

The Royal Commission was the most comprehensive study of Tanganyikan demography during the British colonial period. Its team of experts included Sir Hugh Dow (who spent most of his career in the Indian civil service), Sally Herbert Frankel (professor of economics), Arthur Gaitskell (chairman of Sudan Gezira Board), Rowland Skeffington Hudson (colonial administrator in Central Africa), Daniel Thomson Jack (professor of economics), Chief David Kidaha Makwaia (of the Sukumu Federation), and Frank Sykes (colonial administrator in Central Africa). The group had extensive experience in colonial territories to match their status as British civil servants, and the contrasting identities would come to bear on their task at hand. Global discourse concerning population growth and its effect on socio-economic development prompted the commissioning papers' two goals: to

⁶⁸ Sir Philip Mitchell, "Land and Population in East Africa, Colonial No. 290" (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952). The Mitchell Report was the culmination of twenty years of growing anxiety in Kenya over land and the people who would populate it, which began with the Morris Carter Commission in 1933. Mitchell was also inspired by the recent Linlithgow Commission on Agriculture in India.

explore “the rapid rate of increase of the African population of East Africa and the congestion of population on the land in certain localities;” and to examine policies that could improve the standard of living throughout the colonies.⁶⁹ But what were the certain localities that the team should focus on and how would they affect the treatment of other areas in the region?

The Royal Commission exposed an enduring problem with the population control model in East Africa – theory, capacity, and context were not uniform throughout the region. It would be reasonable to assume that the research team would focus much of its work on Kenya. It was the only colony in which administrators saw a growing and congested African population as a problem, and its governor requested the study in the first place. Yet, Kenya’s white settler population and deepening Mau Mau crisis stood in stark contrast to the rest of British East Africa. In Tanganyika, low population density and population decline caused more anxiety than high growth rates and overcrowding.⁷⁰ Sir Edward Twining, Tanganyika’s governor, voiced his lack of enthusiasm for the Commission and throughout the study Tanganyikan officials showed “a tendency to look at the problems from a Tanganyika rather than an East African point of view.”⁷¹ Given their colony’s distinct demographic profile, their perspective was unsurprising, but population had become politicized and the Colonial Office mandated Tanganyikan participation in the broader discussion.

⁶⁹ “Terms of Reference for Royal Commission,” in “East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report.”

⁷⁰ The East Africa Statistical Department documented Tanganyika’s annual population growth rate at one percent from 1931-48, compared with Uganda’s 1.4 percent and Kenya’s 1.9 percent. “Population,” CO 893/3/10, British National Archives, London, England.

⁷¹ “Royal Commission Report on Land and Population Policy,” CO 822/1112, British National Archives, London, England.

The Royal Commission thoroughly studied Tanganyika with regard to its second goal: to “examine the measures necessary to be taken to achieve an improved standard of living.”⁷² This charge was rather vague, which gave the research team full scope to examine any area that appeared to have a bearing on population.⁷³ They gathered reports from subject-matter experts, solicited briefs from local chiefs and administrators, and in 1953 and 1954 took two trips to the region in three and four month stints.⁷⁴ The final report was published in June 1955 and totaled nearly 500 pages.

In a notable turn of events, the Royal Commission largely dismissed the rationale behind its own formation. The overarching theme of the final report was that an extreme lack of viable data precluded any sweeping conclusions about population growth or its attendant effects in East Africa. The investigation uncovered that many available statistics were inaccurate to begin with and riddled with clerical errors during processing, to the point of being “dangerous and misleading.”⁷⁵ Statistical Advisor, C.J. Martin, noted in his expert brief that the situation lent itself to cherry-picked data. “One often hears in East Africa the phrase ‘the figures are not accurate but they are good enough for planning purposes.’”⁷⁶ A handful of bureaucrats had become the proverbial hammer, selecting certain colonial problems to turn into population-related nails.

⁷² “Terms of Reference for Royal Commission.”

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ “East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report,” xii.

⁷⁵ Anderson et al. “Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Position of Statistics in East Africa,” February 1953, Colonial Office: East Africa Royal Commission (Dow Commission): Correspondence and Papers, Memoranda from official East African sources: Statistical Department, CO 892/1/3, British National Archives, London, England.

⁷⁶ C.J. Martin, “A Brief Resume and Appraisal of East African Statistics,” Colonial Office: East Africa Royal Commission (Dow Commission): Correspondence and Papers, Memoranda from official East African sources: Statistical Department, CO 892/1/3, British National Archives, London, England.

For example, the research team reported an extreme lack of information when it came to issues of urbanization and labor migration. Citing a 1953 memo from the East Africa Statistical Department, they found that the colonial administration tended to overestimate juvenile populations precisely because of its preoccupation with them.⁷⁷ In turn, the Royal Commission dismissed the purported connection between urban population growth and crime.⁷⁸ They did not contest that East African cities had high population densities, but they stressed a difference between density and the nebulous concept of “overcrowding.”⁷⁹ Equating them was simply bad science. In a move that showed awareness for the lived experience in Dar es Salaam and other urban centers, the authors noted that economic and employment statistics in East Africa were inherently flawed because they failed to include the informal sector where a majority of African labor occurred.⁸⁰

The Royal Commission claimed that population anxieties stemmed from development discourse and anxieties circulating around the Colonial Office in London, not the situation on the ground in the colonies. As a result, they questioned whether their underlying demographic theory should be more flexible. Probing the causal connection between population and economics, the final report asked whether a growing population

⁷⁷ “Notes on Accuracy,” Colonial Office: East Africa Royal Commission (Dow Commission): Correspondence and Papers, Memoranda from official East African sources: Statistical Department, CO 892/1/3, British National Archives, London, England.

⁷⁸ “Preparation of the Report, Chapter 3: population,” CO 892/3/10, British National Archives, London, England.

⁷⁹ “Notes on Accuracy.”

⁸⁰ “Preparation of the Report. Chapter 3: population.” Scholars in the twenty-first century are still fighting this fight with economic data standards like GDP, which fail to account for the booming informal economy in African urban centers.

could be “the impetus for new techniques altering the environment or changing established practices so that there emerges a new stage of development not merely able to support a larger population but finding a larger population necessary for the achievement of higher living standards.”⁸¹ In short, population growth could potentially benefit East African laborers and economies. Their commentary was ahead of its time and would be enshrined in the annals of demographic theory a decade later with Ester Boserup’s theory of intensification.⁸² Boserup was an economist who studied agricultural development. She argued that population growth and food supply were dynamic systems, not the exponential and linear projections offered by Malthus at the end of the eighteenth century. Boserup documented that population growth could, and often did, drive innovation in agricultural methods, which allowed food production to keep up with increasing consumption.

Moreover, the Royal Commission posited that the demographic transition model was not a given in the East African colonies. “Much of the discussion of the problem of population in East Africa has been unduly influenced by the belief that there is some one optimum or proper rate of population growth.”⁸³ They pointed out that the ideal population growth rate came from the European experience and “the parallel with the pre-industrial populations of Europe should not be pushed too far,” particularly when it came to forecasting future growth rates.⁸⁴ Perhaps East Africa and its individual colonies had different demographic trajectories that merited a different policy approach. The Royal

⁸¹ “East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report,” 35.

⁸² Ester Boserup, *The Condition of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure* (Allan and Urwin, 1965).

⁸³ “East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report,” 35.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 33.

Commission was pushing back against heedlessly using a European model half a century before scholars would question whether Africa had become emblematic of world systems and trends, not simply derivative of them.⁸⁵

Even if population control continued to be a priority in East Africa, the Royal Commission cited evidence that many African women already used family planning methods, including child spacing and pregnancy prevention techniques.⁸⁶ Modern biomedical technology had yet to become mainstream, but prescient as ever, the investigating team acknowledged the rapidly changing technological milieu and condoned increasing the availability of new technologies like oral contraception for local women who wanted it.⁸⁷ Chairman Dow wrote, “It is important that this external help, in so far as it is forthcoming, must be regarded by the African as assisting, not competing with him.”⁸⁸ The Royal Commission emphasized the importance of collaboration and solicited ample feedback from Native Authorities in Tanganyika.⁸⁹ The majority of respondents offered critiques of colonialism, requests for agricultural technology, or explicit denials that East

⁸⁵ Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving toward Africa* (Routledge, 2015).

⁸⁶ The Royal Commission Report did not go into specifics about existing family planning methods, but contemporary ethnographic and missionary accounts emphasized the prevalence of prolonged breastfeeding and postpartum abstinence as a means to space out births. For example, see Sarah Walters, “Counting Souls: Towards an Historical Demography of Africa,” *Demographic Research* 34 (January 15, 2016): 88.

⁸⁷ “East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report,” 40.

⁸⁸ “Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies: Territorial Sub-Committee: A,” 8 September 1955, Colonial Office and other departments: Papers of Sir Christopher Cox, Educational Advisor. Report of Royal Commission on East Africa (Dow Report): land and population problems in East Africa, CO 1045/398, British National Archives, London, England.

⁸⁹ “Colonial Office: East Africa: Original Correspondence, Report of the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa, Policy on Report: preliminary observations by Tanganyika Government on major recommendations and conclusions,” CO 822/1113, British National Archives, London, England.

Africa had a population problem.⁹⁰ Their commentary showed that the investigation's espoused goals were generally out of touch with the concerns of local leadership. There were, however, a few exceptions.

A handful of chiefs who were educated abroad voiced concerns similar to those coming from the international population establishment. For example, Chief Abdullah S. Fundikira III of Unyanyembe, who graduated from Makerere University with a degree in agriculture and would serve as the Minister of Water after Tanganyikan independence, voiced anxieties over how quickly Tanganyika's population would double.⁹¹ The doubling trope had been ubiquitous in population circles. If a population doubled in less than 25 years, alarm bells rang for much of the international population establishment and their forebearers.⁹² Fundikira emphasized in his commentary, however, that population growth was only a problem vis-à-vis the government's ability to provide services. He worried that producing enough food and raw materials, providing enough jobs, and meeting the increasing demand for social services in a growing society constituted "some of the pressing problems with which East Africa as a whole will be faced in the next few decades."⁹³ The concern for African leadership in Tanganyika was how to govern and provide for a growing community, not how to monitor and dictate demographic outcomes.

⁹⁰ "Colonial Office: East Africa Royal Commission (Dow Commission): Correspondence and Papers, Tanganyika. Memoranda from the public: individual African submissions," CO 892/10/3, British National Archives, London, England.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Benjamin Franklin, T.R. Malthus, Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and John Maynard Keynes were just a few of the maxim's propagators. See Bashford, *Global Population*, eBook location 716.

⁹³ "Colonial Office: East Africa Royal Commission (Dow Commission): Correspondence and Papers, Tanganyika, Memoranda from the public: individual African submissions," CO 892/10/3, British National Archives, London, England.

Local leaders sought to know how data and statistics translated into a framework that they could understand, and one that provided for the needs of people under their governing purview.

The Royal Commission's study of East African demographics shows that there were alternative voices to the population control paradigm in the mid-twentieth century. The team dismissed unfounded anxieties surrounding population growth and discounted the ability of colonial officials to intervene in demographic trajectories based on their existing knowledge base. Like Stanner and Governor Twining before them, those most familiar with the demographic milieu in East Africa were the first to question the usefulness of population control and its directives. Instead, they promoted an approach that had seeds of population management – flexible frameworks, collaboration with local authorities, a healthy skepticism of creating policy from incomplete demographic data, and the desire to integrate population with other socioeconomic trends. When it came time to disseminate the Royal Commission's commentary, however, debates over the proper course of action led the report to be pigeonholed.

Transitions: Of the Political, not Demographic, Sort (1957-1961)

In his expert brief for the Royal Commission, Martin foresaw trouble for any conclusion that contradicted the idea of an East African population problem. “These authorities adore to think that their population is growing enormously,” said the statistical advisor, “they will never believe the census records because the increase has not been big

enough.”⁹⁴ Indeed, upon receiving the final report from the Royal Commission, governors of all three East African colonies agreed to not widely distribute it. Showing the politicized nature of the population question, Ugandan officials wanted to wait to publicize the report until after they had decided on a policy agenda and probed “those who could reasonably be regarded as leaders of public opinion” about possible public responses.⁹⁵ After some cajoling from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to do something with the report, Kenya published summaries in newspapers and booklets, though they repeatedly complained that “a complicated report such as this cannot effectively be summarized...”⁹⁶ In Tanganyika, authorities emphasized that distributing the report would be cumbersome and expensive, particularly if translated into Swahili.⁹⁷ They eventually decided to publish just an English version of the executive summary. It sold a total of 75 copies.⁹⁸ As one observer wrote, there was a “far greater danger that the Report will be shelved than that it will be implemented.”⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Martin, “A Brief Resume and Appraisal of East African Statistics.”

⁹⁵ Memo from W.A.C. Mathieson to Mr. Gorell Barnes, 7 September 1955, Printing, Distribution & Translation, CO 822/1108, British National Archives, London, England.

⁹⁶ Inward Telegram from Sir E. Baring (Kenya) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 October 1955, Printing, Distribution & Translation, O 822/1108, British National Archives, London, England.

⁹⁷ Newspaper articles covering the summary’s main points did appear in the Swahili newspaper *Mambo Leo* and the *East African Standard*. See Letter from W.L. Gorell Barnes, 26 September 1955, Colonial Office: East Africa: Original Correspondence, Report of the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa, Printing, distribution and translation of Report, CO 822/1108, British National Archives, London, England.

⁹⁸ J.H. Robinson, “Summaries and Translations of the Royal Commission’s Report: Publication in East Africa,” Colonial Office: East Africa: Original Correspondence, Report of the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa, Printing, distribution and translation of Report, CO 822/1108, British National Archives, London, England.

⁹⁹ Letter from J.H. Robinson, 21 July 1955, Colonial Office: East Africa: Original Correspondence, Report of the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa, Printing, distribution and translation of Report, CO 822/1108, British National Archives, London, England.

The Colonial Office rejected the rather timid response. The Crown had commissioned the research project to develop policy solutions that could alter the trajectory and effects of East African population change. The Royal Commission's nuanced arguments, paired with administrative foot dragging, brought the Crown's investment into question. Moreover, the varied administrative responses did not speak to a united front. In a request for clarification, the Colonial Office asked the three governors to indicate "what reasons the Secretary of State can give for defending in public the decision of some Governments not to publish summaries which it has been found possible and desirable to publish in other territories."¹⁰⁰ It stressed the need for "a coherent story," but it was increasingly apparent that there was not a singular story to tell. The problems and potential solutions surrounding population in the colonies were inherently different, and detaching from administrative oversight.

The protracted Mau Mau conflict in Kenya and the rise of nationalist organizations throughout the colonies pushed the population debate into the background. Organized political groups had been active in Tanganyika since the 1920s, but a concentration of power occurred when the Tanganyika African Association became the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954, under Julius Nyerere's leadership. The new organization's principal focus was to achieve independence from Britain. Nyerere visited the United Nations twice to petition the Trusteeship Council for a target date of independence. In 1960, the colonial administration agreed to expand local elections and

¹⁰⁰ Memo by W.L. Gorell Barnes of the Colonial Office, 6 October 1955, EAF. 210/211/02, British National Archives, London, England.

TANU won 70 of 71 seats. In 58 of those districts, its candidates ran unopposed.¹⁰¹ After the landslide victory, Governor Sir Richard Turnbull appointed Nyerere chief minister of the self-governing territory, which officially gained independence on December 9, 1961.

The new nation adopted a parliamentary system, with Nyerere as Prime Minister. He stepped down after serving just a month, however, to do what various colonial governments had failed to accomplish during their tenure, fully tour the country. Rumor had it Nyerere remembered the license plate of his safari vehicle for the rest of his life.¹⁰² The desire and ability to traverse Tanganyika, meeting people who previously lived on the periphery of governance, was important to Nyerere. It showed him that many Tanganyikans were uncounted, literally and figuratively, under the colonial regime. During the road trip, Nyerere drafted the political treatise *Ujamaa*, which would become the basis for the country's nation-building project. He resumed governing duties in 1962, but this time as president. During his inaugural address he spoke of prioritizing building a nation "in the truest sense," starting with the character of its people.¹⁰³ The moral ethos at the heart of Nyerere's politics would become the basis of the government's population management approach in the decades to come.

¹⁰¹ Rodger Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* (Westview Press, 1982), 21.

¹⁰² Bryson Rash, "Anecdotal Material and Stray Thoughts Concerning Nyerere," 1963, Nyerere visit to New York and Boston 1963, Record Group 59, A1 3110G, 3741615-17 (C4), US National Archive, College Park, Maryland, United States.

¹⁰³ Peter Haussler, *Leadership for Democratic Development in Tanzania: The Perspective of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere During the First Decade of Independence: A Hermeneutical Dialogue with Mwalimu* (Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, 2009), 78.

CHAPTER 2

COUNTING THE NATION: HOW UJAMAA NATIONALISM CREATED AN ALTERNATIVE TO POPULATION CONTROL (1962-1973)

“It is important for human beings to put emphasis on caring for children and the ability to look after them properly, rather than thinking only about the numbers of children and the ability to give birth” - Julius Nyerere, 1969¹

In an obituary for Nyerere upon his death in 1999, retired British doctor Simon Barley writes, “To work as a doctor in Julius Nyerere's Tanzania in the late 1960s was to share in a hopefulness for the future. One aspect of health and development that Nyerere encouraged was family planning.”² Nyerere’s support for family planning was not a given. Barley tells a story about how he and other members of the Tanzanian family planning association met with the president in 1968. He describes the well-dressed delegation nervously entering the meeting, some wearing “that rare sartorial extra in tropical Africa, the necktie.” They understood that limiting family size could be a controversial issue in what Barley calls a comparatively underpopulated country. Moreover, Nyerere was a devout Roman Catholic. He had taught at a Catholic secondary school before his rise to political prominence. “The deputation's spirits fell further when they saw Nyerere's unsmiling face and heard his opening words: ‘You're late, you know, too late.’”³ He then laughed and quipped that he already had twelve children.⁴ It might have been too late to

¹ United Republic of Tanzania, “Tanzania Second Five-Year Development Plan,” 1969-74, Volume I, xii.

² Simon Barley, “Julius Nyerere,” *The Guardian*, 18 October 1999.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Nyerere had seven children, so the reference to twelve children is either an exaggeration or a mistake by Barley.

influence the Nyereres' fertility decisions, but Barley's delegation walked out of the meeting with the president's support for expanding family planning services in Tanzania.⁵

Tanzania's foray into family planning was part of a global zeitgeist that emerged in the late 1960s, which politicized and moralized nearly every aspect of life.⁶ Interactions between humans and the environment, the environment and drugs, drugs and bodies, and bodies and human rights, all fell into the realm of popular discussion and came under political purview. Paul Ehrlich's bestselling book *The Population Bomb*, and his over 20 appearances on the *Tonight Show with Johnny Carson*, brought population anxieties into the public domain in the United States, which had become the leader of international development programming.⁷ Demographic transition theorists added fuel to the fire by connecting growing population with stalled development. Public pressure and increasing politicization of the personal provided an imperative for world leaders to do something about the human explosion.

By the late 1960s, nearly all governments, especially those on the lower end of the economic spectrum, promoted the idea that intervening in demographic trajectories could benefit both individuals and national development. How those interventions would look, however, varied in individual contexts. European and American institutions acted as incubators for global population control standards, but there was room for governments to engage with questions of population on their own terms. In Tanzania, the result of this

⁵ Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania. To avoid confusion, I refer to the country as Tanzania for the remainder of the dissertation.

⁶ Duco Hellema, *The Global 1970s: Radicalism, Reform, and Crisis* (Routledge, 2018).

⁷ Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (Ballantine Books, 1968).

process was a new approach to population policy, better characterized as management rather than control.

This chapter explores how the Ujamaa nation-building project in Tanzania, with its moral foundation and emphasis on communal processes, fostered the population management framework. It was not entirely clear at independence what policy direction the government would take, so I begin with a discussion of standard population control practices in the 1960s, including their implementation in Kenya. The population control movement had a relatively simple formula, encourage governments to adopt national population policies to lower fertility and national growth rates. If the policies succeeded, it would help “diffuse the population bomb” and trigger economic growth.

In Tanzania, state authorities adopted a more relational view of population policy. They believed that demographic trends intersected with other socioeconomic factors as part of a broader development framework. They did not articulate a single, national population policy, but encouraged the state, society, and individuals to monitor and manage demographic issues as they arose. The second part of the chapter lays out key elements of population management and underlines the factors that led to Tanzania’s more holistic approach, including robust nationalist ideology, limited state capacity, and a diverse cast of characters involved in the policymaking process.

After the adoption of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, Ujamaa became the country’s general governing philosophy. It was predicated on the values of freedom, self-reliance, equality, and unity. These nebulous concepts meant different things to different people and changed over time. To accommodate their varying understandings, Nyerere’s

government and the ruling Party promoted a more flexible and diffuse approach to population policy, which fit with limited state capacity and the Ujamaa principle of reciprocal democracy.

Invoking the “we” in policymaking did not belie opposing perspectives, but reflected and fostered a trust in Tanzanians to raise responsible families in a way that was compatible with personal initiative and national development. The last part of this chapter highlights the primary actors involved in population policy dialogues during the first five years of Ujamaa. State authorities did not look solely to “experts,” who believed in a hierarchy of knowledge and often saw local experience as a hindrance to demographic change. Instead, a coalition of actors negotiated population policy, including ministry officials, party members, medical personnel, and ordinary women and men. Their diverse perspectives contributed to a more versatile approach to population intervention, which acknowledged Tanzanians’ lived experience and local conceptions of family planning.

Foreign Experts, the National Population Policy, and Kenya’s Warning

Today, historians promote the breadth of population studies by pointing to its overlap with nearly every political agenda in the twentieth century.⁸ In the 1960s, however, scholars, philanthropists, and bureaucrats who made up the international population establishment shunned a complex conception of population. They felt that affecting piecemeal policy, across a broad spectrum of subject matters, and in dozens of unique

⁸ Alison Bashford, *Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth* (Columbia University Press, 2014), 5.

contexts would be a difficult and costly task.⁹ Instead, the international population establishment relied on experts to evaluate the most effective measures for altering demographic trends and encouraged states to adopt those measures in a single, streamlined document – the national population policy.

Bureaucrats defined a national population policy in a variety of ways, but most definitions shared two components. First, its immediate goal was to reduce national fertility rates and overall population growth rates. Second, the policy needed to be explicit and singular. Many government policies indirectly affected demographic processes (for example, immigration quotas, parental leave, and maternal health campaigns), but a national population policy brought the demographic elements of those projects into a single document and prioritized altering demographic trends over adjacent policy goals.

Tanzania did not adopt a national population policy until 1992, but more than 50 world governments did so in the decade after Tanzanian independence, almost all of which self-identified as part of the “Third World.” Adopting a national population policy allowed them to garner aid money from population-conscious institutions and legitimacy on the global stage.¹⁰ But more than that, if a national population policy was the best way to change demographic trends, and doing so could help alleviate economic woes, it would be considered malfeasance for governments not to participate in the global movement. “On the other side of the Malthusian balance, which once looked so forbidding, there has also

⁹ Paul Demeny, “Population Policy: The Role of National Governments,” *Population and Development Review* 1, no. 1 (1975): 147–61.

¹⁰ Deborah Barrett and Amy Ong Tsui, “Policy as Symbolic Statement: International Response to National Population Policies,” *Social Forces* 78, no. 1 (September 1, 1999): 213–33.

been a remarkable change,” wrote Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy in 1972.¹¹ “More and more countries are now soberly and rationally facing the need to control population growth.”¹² Writing with hindsight, his approbation turned out to be premature. Population control movements around the continent were mostly unsuccessful in lowering growth rates. Population Council members were promoting “simple program[s], standardized, like the Model T Ford,” while critics were documenting the inability of their efforts to garner local support.¹³ Sometimes, public backlash was strong enough to derail the programs all together.

Kenya was the first Sub-Saharan African country to adopt a national population policy. When it achieved independence in 1963 after the Mau Mau uprising, many of the remaining white settlers left the country. American and European news outlets widely covered the exodus, prompting racially charged anxieties among foreign investors who feared that the Kenyan economy would crash.¹⁴ Kenya’s official demographer, J.G.G. Blacker, saw a way forward. He believed a national population policy would win back investors’ confidences by signaling that Kenyans would do their part to encourage economic growth by lowering birth rates.¹⁵ The government agreed, commissioning the

¹¹ Ford Foundation, “Annual Report 1971-72,” ix.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Quoted in Matthew James Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Harvard University Press, 2008), 234. For an example of the critiques, see Mahmood Mamdani, *The Myth of Population Control: Family, Caste, and Class in an Indian Village* (Monthly Review Press, 1973).

¹⁴ Donald P. Warwick, *Bitter Pills: Population Policies and Their Implementation in Eight Developing Countries* (Cambridge University Press, 1987).

¹⁵ Kivuto Ndeti and Cecilia Ndeti, *Cultural Values and Population Policy in Kenya* (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1980); Deborah Barrett and Amy Ong Tsui, “Policy as Symbolic Statement: International Response to National Population Policies,” *Social Forces* 78, no. 1 (September 1, 1999): 213–33.

Population Council to consider potential policy solutions. The Population Council's final report became the basis for Kenya's 1967 National Family Planning Policy.

Kenya's Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, alongside the Ministry of Health, took the lead in implementing the plan to lower national population growth rates. They asked politicians to make firm policy declarations, set up an analytical unit, trained personnel, invited the public to use new services, and analyzed feedback data.¹⁶ The strategy relied heavily on experts who would be placed within the two ministries responsible for its implementation. Thomas Mboya, the Minister of Labor, was one of the policy's most vocal proponents. "Family planning in the context of development cannot be overemphasized at the present state of the country's development... People need to be aware of the direct link between population growth and economic development."¹⁷ His emphasis and repetition of the word 'development' showed a strong connection to population establishment rhetoric and demographic transition theory. Economic experts claimed that the effects of the population policy would trickle down to Kenyan citizens by increasing per capita economic gain and social service provision, but many members of the public either did not receive the message or were dubious of it.

State authorities excluded from the policymaking process, including Vice President Oginga Odinga, increasingly spoke out against the national population policy.¹⁸ Few of their laments discussed the plan's merits, offered alternative approaches, or questioned the

¹⁶ N. R. E. Fendall and John Gill, "Establishing Family Planning Services in Kenya: A Review," *Public Health Reports (1896-1970)* 85, no. 2 (1970): 131, 138.

¹⁷ Speech reproduced in the *East African Standard*, 6 September 1967.

¹⁸ Chiweni Chimbwete, Susan Cotts Watkins, and Eliya Msiyaphazi Zulu, "The Evolution of Population Policies in Kenya and Malawi," *Population Research and Policy Review* 24, no. 1 (2005): 85–106.

state's capacity to achieve the desired demographic outcome. Instead, opponents argued that population policy was a tool of foreign manipulation and not in the best interest of most Kenyans. In this particular case, they had a point. There was direct evidence that the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development had passed the population policy to appease foreign investment firms.¹⁹ President Jomo Kenyatta remained notably silent on the subject, tacitly acknowledging the concession.

Prominent Kenyan clergymen and opinion leaders led public protests. Some used their religious pulpits and the presence of foreign actors as fuel for arguments that birth control was leading to moral corruption.²⁰ Many opposition members, however, simply bemoaned the imposition of a policy that they had no say in creating. Foreign experts' population control measures failed to fully account for the personal fertility decisions that lay behind statistical evaluations. A member of the University Women's Association summed up the opposition by saying, "For heaven's sake stop telling people that you want to 'control' their reproductive powers."²¹ Whether she was talking about the language of control itself or the policy's attempts to limit women's fertility became a moot point, as Kenyan authorities retreated from their plans in the early 1970s. The country continued to garner attention from the international population establishment, but as one of the fastest growing populations on earth instead of a model for population control in Sub-Saharan Africa.

¹⁹ Warwick, *Bitter Pills*, 13, 74.

²⁰ Ibid, 160. For more on the nuance behind the Catholic Church's stance toward family planning at the time, see J. Mugo Gachuhi, *Family Planning in Kenya: Program and Problems* (Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1973).

²¹ Quoted in Warwick, *Bitter Pills*, 76.

Countries that did not adopt a national population policy during the zenith of population control were shrouded in language of misunderstanding, inaction, and apathy. Tanzanians, however, were not lying dormant when it came to addressing population issues in the decades after independence. Their experiences offer an alternative to population control and its national population policy toolkit. A 1970 report from the International Development Association (IDA) characterized the Tanzanian government's approach to population policy as "cautious, but constructive."²² State authorities' reason for caution was readily apparent. They were influenced by the difficulties experienced in Kenya, learning a valuable lesson about foreign influence and unilateral policymaking. A 1971 USAID mission acknowledged government support of population interventions in Tanzania, but noted it needed to keep a "low profile."²³

The more innovative elements of Tanzania's population program went largely unrecognized at the time. Foreign observers lacked the language to fully process population interventions that stood outside the defined boundaries of population control, but they also had trouble understanding that Tanzania's pushback was more than just a reaction to foreign meddling. The population management framework arose organically out of Tanzanian domestic circumstance, as Nyerere's leadership and Ujamaa's moral ethos put a real emphasis on inclusive and co-produced development policy. Collaborative efforts,

²² International Development Association, "The Economic Development and Prospects of Tanzania," 17 March 1970, 16.

²³ Joseph Cavanaugh, "Consultation Report – Laboratories for Population Statistics," 1971, International Program of Laboratories for Population Statistics 1969-1975, Record Group 286, P 606, 6120207 (C6), US National Archives, College Park, Maryland, United States.

integrative programming, and non-statistical policy goals were features of Tanzania's agenda decades before they would become best practices in global population planning.

A New Nationalist Vision in Postcolonial Tanzania (1961-67)

The rupture between colonialism and self-government was far from a clean break in Tanzania. Amidst the transition, the government's approach to population policy took some time to develop. Britain had officially handed over power, but colonial structures remained in place, bureaucrats left behind reports on virtually every aspect of governance, and expatriates continued to work in the postcolonial administration. Sir Ernest Vasey, a former colonial official, became the country's first economic advisor and primary author of its first development plan. He had moved from Britain to Kenya in 1936, serving two stints as the Mayor of Nairobi before becoming Tanganyika's Minister of Finance in 1960.

Vasey based the country's First Three-Year Development Plan (1961-63) on two reports that were researched and published before independence. The United States funded one report, which mostly addressed industrial development.²⁴ The second came from the World Bank and focused largely on agricultural production.²⁵ Similar to the conclusions of the Royal Commission a decade earlier, but with a new point of reference, the World Bank report said, "It is a fair generalization that Tanganyika has no problem of population

²⁴ Arthur D. Little Consultants and Tanganyika Ministry of Commerce, *Tanganyika Industrial Development: A Preliminary Study of Bases for the Expansion of Industrial Processing Activities* (Government Printer, South Africa, 1961).

²⁵ The World Bank, "The Economic Development of Tanganyika" (The World Bank, January 1, 1961), available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/231391468760788974/The-economic-development-of-Tanganyika>.

pressure analogous to that of many Asian countries.”²⁶ As such, the government ignored a 1963 UN inquiry asking about problems related to population growth and responded to a 1965 British Commonwealth survey by saying that the country could in fact benefit from a larger population.²⁷

The most prominent population-related issue plaguing Tanzania in its early years was food security. From 1961 to 1964, the International Cooperation Administration (USAID’s predecessor) provided the country with approximately 40 million dollars in development grants and loans, making it the second largest donor after Britain.²⁸ Fifteen million dollars of the aid came in emergency relief through the Food for Peace program, which provided food and rebuilding assistance during a series of harsh droughts and floods.²⁹ Lyndon Johnson, who had been elected president of the United States in 1963, strongly believed in population control as a precondition to food aid, saying “I’m not going to piss away foreign aid in nations where they refuse to deal with their own population problems.”³⁰ Increasingly, members of the population establishment were speaking out against “crash programs” like emergency food relief and promoting the more targeted national population policy approach.³¹

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ United Nations, “National Experience in the Formulation and Implementation of Population Policy, 1960-1976: United Republic of Tanzania,” (United Nations, 1978), 12.

²⁸ Britain provided the vast majority (nearly 70 per cent) of external aid to its former colony from 1960 to 1964, totaling 172 million dollars. See “Nyerere visit 1963,” Record Group 59, A1 3110G, 3741615-17 (C4), US National Archives, College Park, Maryland, United States.

²⁹ Register to the Winifred Armstrong Papers, Box 41, No. 2012C52, Hoover Institute Archive.

³⁰ Cited in Ian Angus and Simon Butler, *Too Many People?: Population, Immigration, and the Environmental Crisis* (Haymarket Books, 2011), 90.

³¹ Philip Morris Hauser, *Population and World Politics*, (Free Press, 1958), 18.

Tanzania, however, refrained from passing a national population policy. Instead, Nyerere and leadership in the country's lone political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), unveiled their overall vision for independent Tanzania in February 1967. The Arusha Declaration launched the Ujamaa era of "African socialism," which would last until Nyerere stepped down from the presidency in 1985. In general, African socialism professed a belief in human equality, which rejected class systems and the Marxist conviction that capitalism (and thus inequality) was a necessary precursor to socialism.³² The Arusha Declaration was more wide-ranging in scope. On top of the socialist creed, it expressed citizens' rights, national priorities, a commitment to African unity and international agreements, an economic development platform, and Party guidelines. Coinciding with the document's publication, Nyerere nationalized numerous aspects of the Tanzanian economy, including banks, insurance companies, sisal and large-scale agriculture estates, import-export businesses, and some multi-national corporations. To many Tanzanians, Ujamaa seemed like the start of a fully realized independence process. They had a rhetorical blueprint that outlined what it meant to be Tanzanian, the direction their country was moving in, and the role of citizens in nation-building.

The Arusha Declaration did not specify particular population problems or policies, but the extent of its proposed welfare state necessitated a better understanding of the country's demographics. Tanzania's official statistician, Gunnar Jacobsson, began organizing a new census in 1967 to help usher in the Ujamaa era. His team published a

³² For more see Andrew Coulson, *African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience* (Spokesman, 1979); Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 39.

preliminary report of its findings, which documented a drastic increase in the country's population growth rate.³³ Prior to the 1967 census, demographers believed Tanzania's population was growing at a "comparatively modest rate," between 1.75 percent and 2.2 percent per year.³⁴ The new census put that number at 2.7 percent. The preliminary report also documented fertility rates on the mainland at 7.3 children per woman, which was "relatively high even for African standards."³⁵ The revised statistics worried government officials. Nyerere commented in simple, but accurate, language that the census revealed "many more Tanzanians than we imagined."³⁶

The revised projections meant that the country of approximately thirteen million people would likely add over one million more in just three years. Nyerere noted that the additional Tanzanian citizens "will be babies in arms, not workers...they will have to be fed, clothed, given medical attention, schooling, and many other services for very many years before they will be able to contribute to the economy of the country through their work."³⁷ Given the purported connection between population growth and economic growth, it would have made sense for the Tanzanian government to pursue policies that could lower the national population growth rate. The Arusha Declaration clearly stated, "It is the responsibility of the State to intervene actively in the economic life of the Nation so

³³ UN, "National Experience," 8; United Republic of Tanzania, "1967 Census, Preliminary Results," August 1967.

³⁴ "Prospects for Economic Development in East Africa," 31 August 1967. Preliminary Inventory to the International Council for Educational Development records, Box 101, No. 80192, Hoover Institute Archives.

³⁵ The analysis stipulates that this number is likely inaccurate, as the census data documented high fertility rates in older women generally passed child-bearing age. See R.A. Henin and B. Egero, "The 1967 Population Census of Tanzania," BRALUP Research Paper No. 19, (1972).

³⁶ URT, "Tanzania Second Five-Year Development Plan," Volume I, viii.

³⁷ *Ibid*, xii.

as to ensure the well being of all citizens.”³⁸ But a main tenet of Ujamaa was that African socialism required a different approach to governance than those that emerged in foreign contexts.

For Nyerere and many other leaders of “Third World” countries, their designation as somehow “less-than” was not always pejorative, but also a reflection of hope. The Third World offered an alternative trajectory to the imperialist past and Cold War binary.³⁹ Giving the McDougall Memorial Lecture at the FAO in Rome in 1963, Nyerere offered “A World Plan” that took into account the “view of those at the wrong end of the standard of living statistics.”⁴⁰ He avoided the common questions about what economically-hindered governments could do to ensure their citizens had enough food. Instead, he asked his audience to reflect on how the current world economic system was responsible for food-availability imbalances. “We recognize indeed the problem of feeding, clothing, housing 14 million people out of a GDP which is just about \$13 billion,” said Nyerere, “but the problem of feeding our people is not a problem of our numbers, it is the result of the inequitable economic relationships that exist today.”⁴¹ He argued that the capitalist global system was inherently incompatible with the aspirations of newly independent African states.⁴² The international population establishment’s history of racial panic, eugenics, and

³⁸ United Republic of Tanzania, *The Arusha Declaration and TANU'S policy on socialism and self-reliance*, (Dar es Salaam, 1967), I(i).

³⁹ Christopher J. Lee, *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* (Ohio University Press, 2010), 15.

⁴⁰ Julius Nyerere, “McDougall Memorial Lecture on F.A.O” 15 November 1963, Tanganyika Information Division of the Vice President’s Office, 1.

⁴¹ UN, “National Experience,” 17.

⁴² Bonny Ibhawoh and J. I. Dibua, “Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa,” *African Journal of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (2003): 62.

geopolitical maneuvering helped bolster his point.⁴³ Moreover, nearly every world power that had risen to economic hegemony had done so while experiencing pronounced population growth.

Defining Tanzania's alternative path to development was not always a clear process. Ujamaa's language was notoriously ambiguous, as it needed to apply to a variety of policy realms and contexts. The Swahili word "*bora*," for example, which invoked a sense of good, better, or excellent, was ubiquitous in Tanzanian development literature. Family planning translated to "*uzazi na malezi bora*" – better parenting and childrearing.⁴⁴ Scholars who have analyzed the rhetorical ambiguity of Tanzanian population policy point to a target audience outside of the country, for example, offering that officials used ambiguous language to secure aid from population-conscious institutions while still maintaining their own localized development agenda.⁴⁵ Yet, Ujamaa also directed conceptual ambiguity inward to accommodate the myriad individuals participating in the nation-building project.

In his introduction to the Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1969-1974), the first major policy outline for Ujamaa, Nyerere said, "It is important for human beings to put emphasis on caring for children and the ability to look after them properly, rather than thinking only about the numbers of children and the ability to give birth."⁴⁶ Instead of focusing on a statistical ideal, the open-ended concept of

⁴³ For more, see Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*; Bashford, *Global Population*.

⁴⁴ More recently, the phrase has begun to be translated as *uzazi wa mpangilio*.

⁴⁵ Lisa Ann Richey, *Population Politics and Development: From the Policies to the Clinics* (Springer, 2008).

⁴⁶ URT, "Tanzania Second Five-Year Development Plan," Volume I, xii.

responsible parenting inspired the government's official position on population size, structure, and growth for the next five years.⁴⁷ It offered normative guidelines, rather than strict parameters. Nyerere continued, "For it often happens that man's ability to give birth is greater than their ability to bring up the children in a proper manner."⁴⁸ State authorities did not define what "proper" meant, which allowed for flexibility based on individual circumstance and desire.

A flexible framework for managing population fit with the government's limited capacity to support programming and monitor personal fertility decisions. Nyerere repeated the mantra "to plan is to choose" nearly a dozen times in his introductory remarks to the Second Five-Year Plan, making it clear that Tanzanians would have hard choices to make in their endeavor to properly raise the next generation. Government officials would have to choose to allocate limited funds toward one policy over another, even when both held merit. Parents would have to choose between having another child or giving more opportunities to the ones they already had. Kinship networks would need to negotiate raising the next generation in line with both their own idiosyncratic practices and the Ujamaa vision. Individuals would be in charge of making those decisions, yet Nyerere made clear that their choices had a bearing on national development.

Tanzania's nation-building project was one of the most far-reaching in postcolonial Africa. Nationalism provided a sense of imagined kinship, and Nyerere worked to make sure that everyone within the new nation's borders, regardless of gender, ethnic affiliation,

⁴⁷ UN, "National Experience," 14; Richey, *Population Politics*, 34-35.

⁴⁸ URT, "Tanzania Second Five-Year Development Plan," Volume I, xii.

or religion, felt like they belonged. His leadership and principled tenor led two contemporaries to claim that he was “perhaps the best example of the moral agent in political history.”⁴⁹ The moral framework offered a strong counter to population control practices. It necessitated going beyond demographic statistics, to care about the wellbeing of those affected by population policies and include them in the policymaking process. In general, Nyerere trusted Tanzanians to live a life that was harmonious with Ujamaa values, because the values themselves were intrinsic to East African people.⁵⁰ But he also believed in the importance of education and intervention.⁵¹ The tension between trust and coercion in Ujamaa Tanzania was one of myriad contradictions inherent within Nyerere and the national blueprint.

Contested Spaces

Historians of Tanzania have homed in on the blurry line between nation-building and social control. At the heart of their work is the question of whose idea of nationalism prevailed as individuals, groups, and the state employed varying methods of meaning-making in the post-independence era.⁵² Given Ujamaa’s unprecedented attempt to engage citizens in the nation-building process, tensions often played out in the public sphere.⁵³

⁴⁹ Robert H. Jackson and Carl Gustav Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (University of California Press, 1982), 220.

⁵⁰ Julius Kambarage Nyerere *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (Oxford University Press, 1968), 26.

⁵¹ Julius Kambarage Nyerere, *Freedom and Development: Uhuru Na Maendeleo. A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1968-1973* (Oxford University Press, 1973), 138.

⁵² Kelly Askew, *Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania* (University of Chicago Press, 2002); Andrew Ivaska, *Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar Es Salaam* (Duke University Press, 2011).

⁵³ Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, 10-11.

The visible clashes led to questions about the existence of a singular “imagined community” in Tanzania. Similarly, scholarship increasingly questioned the applicability of universal, statist, and homogeneous models in postcolonial contexts.⁵⁴ In her historical ethnography of the politics of musical performance in Tanzania, Kelly Askew writes, “There must be some degree of mutual engagement for nationalism to flourish, but this very element of mutuality, of sharedness, of common participation, admits the possibility of dissension from those excluded from state activities.”⁵⁵

How states dealt with dissension on demographic matters varied based on their approach to population policy. Under the population control framework, government authorities relied on expert opinions to adopt and formulate policy. Experts, and by extension consulting members of the government, believed they were higher up on the hierarchy of knowledge. They took a paternalistic stance, thinking that ordinary people had trouble understanding and behaving in ways that were in their best interest, especially when it came to fertility decisions.⁵⁶ National population policies, therefore, worked to bring the interests of the government and citizenry in line with expert analyses. The results of this process could be rather draconian or simply ineffective, depending on the state’s capacity to police its citizenry.

⁵⁴ For example, see Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton University Press, 1993); Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (University of California Press, 2005); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton University Press, 2008); Lee, *Making a World after Empire*.
⁵⁵ Askew, *Performing the Nation*, 12.

⁵⁶ For more on rational fertility decisions and alternative models, see Icek Ajzen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 50, no. 2 (1991): 179–211; S. Philip Morgan and Christine A. Bachrach, “Is the Theory of Planned Behaviour an Appropriate Model for Human Fertility?” *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* 9 (2011): 11–18; Jennifer Johnson-Hanks et al., *Understanding Family Change and Variation: Toward a Theory of Conjunctural Action*, vol. 5 (Springer Science & Business Media, 2011).

Demographic and family planning experts in Tanzania did not escape the hierarchy of knowledge trap. Education and training remained a key part of the policy agenda, but given the real desire to include citizens in nation-building and policymaking processes, the inputs were more democratic. A diverse cast of characters contributed to Tanzania's population ethos.⁵⁷ Their lived experiences counted as knowledge production and influenced policy. They formed coalitions, and at times opposing factions, which cultivated the collaborative and inclusive processes that supported the population management framework.

The Population Coalition: Individuals, Institutions, and Networks

The collection of people who supported the population management framework in Tanzania was vast and fluid. This section provides a starting point to understanding the key players and their motivations, but it is far from comprehensive. The discussion jumps around in time, as different elements of the coalition ebbed and flowed throughout the early years of Ujamaa's population programming. It begins by examining Nyerere's unifying presence and continues with state authorities whose relationship to the international population establishment provided the impetus for Tanzania to enact a population policy framework. It then turns to women and local healers who were imbedded in various organizations and communities, providing the reach to extend population discussions throughout the country. When disagreements broke out across or within the varying

⁵⁷ For more on the group model of policy formation in Tanzania, see Ian Thomas, "Population Policy in Tanzania," Development Studies Discussion Paper No.51 (March 1979).

groups, negotiations tended toward the most inclusive option, which spoke to population management's ability to provide space for dissident voices.

Nyerere: Leadership, Language, and the Census

Nyerere preached horizontal leadership under Ujamaa, but he was also a beloved leader who was firmly positioned at the top of evolving government structures. He played a paternalistic role, as he was called *Mwalimu* (the Swahili word for teacher), even in official settings. His father was a chief of the Zanaki people, a relatively small and marginalized ethnic group sandwiched between Lake Victoria and the Serengeti in Northern Tanzania. As the son of a chief, Nyerere had privileges growing up, but he did not try to elevate the Zanaki to a position of power vis-à-vis larger ethnic groups when he was elected to the presidency.⁵⁸ Instead, he worked toward unification. Nyerere famously decreed Swahili as the national language after independence, placing the language itself in the vanguard of nation-building.⁵⁹ By translating elements of population policy into the local vernacular, such as family planning as “better parenting and childrearing, he worked to embed the concepts within the Ujamaa framework.

Nation-first policies bolstered the sincerity of Nyerere's equality rhetoric and allowed demographic inquiry to thrive. Tanzania is one of the few African countries that has been able to consistently conduct a census every decade since independence. Its ethnic complexion, cosmopolitan history, and unifying leadership made the country unique in

⁵⁸ Viktoria Stöger-Eising, "'Ujamaa' Revisited: Indigenous and European Influences in Nyerere's Social and Political Thought," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 70, no. 1 (2000): 118-43.

⁵⁹ Andrew Simpson, *Language and National Identity in Africa* (Oxford University Press, 2008), 259.

Africa's postcolonial demographic milieu. Nearly every other African country has experienced accusations of politically motivated census skewing, especially where resource allocation has been tied to population distribution and ethnic tensions have run high. In perhaps the most blatant example, Nigeria conducted a census in 1962 that impacted regional revenue sharing. President Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was strongly aligned with his home territory in the north, was not satisfied with the results of the census and triggered a do-over in 1963, which "discovered" millions of previously unrecorded people in the northern provinces.⁶⁰ Understandably, demographic data collection and population policy lost legitimacy.

Conducting a census was important to the Ujamaa development project, but Nyerere advocated for population policy that went beyond demographic data and statistical manipulation. Instead of being a tool of presidential entitlement, demography became integrated into general governance and broader development schemas, which gave government officials more freedom to address demographic trends as they related to issues of health, education, and service provision. Nyerere functioned as a rhetorical leader and encouraged more inclusive policymaking, but he allowed other branches of government to help formulate population policy.

Ministry, Party, and Partnerships

⁶⁰ Samuel Adepoju Aluko, "How Many Nigerians? An Analysis of Nigeria's Census Problems, 1901–63," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 3, no. 3 (1965): 371–392; Feyi Fawehinmi Commentary, "The Story of How Nigeria's Census Figures Became Weaponized," Quartz Africa, accessed March 12, 2019,

The Tanzanian government was not a homogenous entity during Ujamaa. The 1965 constitution split power between two factions – the Party and the Ministry. The Ministry was comprised of the Prime Minister and his cabinet, who were in close contact with the popularly elected Parliament. All ministers and the vast majority of MPs were members of TANU (which later merged with the dominant political party on Zanzibar to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi – CCM), but members of the Party also organized through more official channels.⁶¹ Local Party branches would elect members to attend national meetings where they debated policies and elected a National Executive Committee (NEC). The NEC would ratify policies and send them to the Ministry for implementation.

The Ministry and Party often took antagonistic positions in the early years of Ujamaa, with Nyerere and the Prime Minister fluctuating between sides.⁶² Members of the Ministry tended to support a “rising tide lifts all boats” view of development, where increasing national and per capita economic indicators took priority. The Party, on the other hand, emphasized redistributive economics, similar to other twentieth-century socialist regimes. Their competing views often resulted in heterogeneous policy, especially concerning issues that engaged global networks and broader discourses, including population.

Many Tanzanian civil servants were educated in the British education system, including Nyerere who received advanced degrees from Makerere University and the University of Edinburgh. Most of them would have been familiar with the population

⁶¹ Jeannette Hartmann, “Development Policy-Making in Tanzania 1962-1982: A Critique of Sociological Interpretations” PhD Dissertation, (University of Hull, 1983), 75.

⁶² Ibid, 50-51.

establishment cornerstones of demographic transition theory and population control. If the Ministry had secured full control of the policymaking apparatus, they likely would have adopted a national population policy similar to other postcolonial governments. The early cohort of cabinet ministers prescribed demographic knowledge and manipulation as a means of nation-building. Some of them even voiced a desire to lower national fertility and population growth rates, amidst increasingly vocal demands from the international population establishment.⁶³ Their familiarity with population control programs fostered a desire to develop national policies, but unlike other governments that worked closely with the international population establishment to develop policy, the Ministry had their own support team closer to home.

The Ministry had a close working relationship with faculty at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), which separated from the University of East Africa's other campuses in Makerere and Nairobi to become an independent Tanzanian institution in 1970. At its inauguration, Nyerere asserted that "the aim of the university of Dar es Salaam must be service to the needs of developing socialist Tanzania."⁶⁴ He charged faculty and students with taking steps to improve the quantity and quality of demographic information at planners' disposal.⁶⁵ Nearly all demographic study in the country ran through the university, making its faculty the first filter for policymaking and implementation.

⁶³ UN, "National Experience."

⁶⁴ Found in Bhekithemba Richard Mngomezulu, "A Political History of Higher Education in East Africa: The Rise and Fall of the University of East Africa, 1937—1970," PhD dissertation, (Rice University, 2004), 266.

⁶⁵ URT, "Tanzania Second Five-Year Development Plan," Volume I, viii.

The government had plans to increase the country's manpower and human resources through secondary and university education, but in the late 1960s a large segment of its university faculty were expatriates.⁶⁶ The Population Council helped set up and fund the Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning (BRALUP), which included a demographic unit headlined by Roushdi Henin. Henin's team performed a thorough analysis of the 1967 census and conducted a supplemental demographic survey in 1973. The director of the geography department, Adolfo Mascarenhas, was also a member of the census team. In his introduction to the census report, Mascarenhas ascribed to demographic transition theory by saying that declining mortality and rising fertility rates were a direct result of economic and social development, and that population growth had important implications for development goals.⁶⁷

Although many visiting faculty adhered to population control tenets, they were also invested in the Ujamaa project. Mascarenhas' colleague, Irene Brown, observed, "faculty members are, almost without exception, sympathetic, even enthusiastic about Tanzanian social and political ideals."⁶⁸ Many were socialists themselves. Nyerere commented that some of them worked "26 hours a day" implementing the Arusha Declaration, because "a country like this which tries to be socialist, is a wonderful opportunity for a socialist who is frustrated in a non-socialist country."⁶⁹ Thus, while the university team of population

⁶⁶ Idrian N. Resnick, "Manpower Development in Tanzania," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 5, no. 1 (1967): 107–23.

⁶⁷ Henin & Egero, "The 1967 Population Census of Tanzania," Introduction.

⁶⁸ Irene Brown, "Adopting Education to Tanzanian Needs," in *Venture* 19, no. 6 (June 1967): 13-17, Register to the Winifred Armstrong papers, Box 41, No. 2012C52, Hoover Institute Archives.

⁶⁹ Meeting transcript from University College, Dar es Salaam, 4 February 1970, "Nyerere Speeches," FCO 21/685, British National Archives, London, England.

planners was largely expatriate in the early years of Ujamaa, they privileged national development goals over international ideology.

The History Department's nationalist sentiments culminated in a "Dar es Salaam School of history" during this time period.⁷⁰ With Terence Ranger leading the charge, history faculty tried to create a "usable past" that could also contribute to Ujamaa development.⁷¹ Population played a role in their emerging narrative. Helge Kjekshus addressed the role of ecology and demographic change in Tanzanian history prior to independence, while John Iliffe commented that population growth was "the most important problem in modern African history."⁷² Their emphasis drew attention to population issues in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, but they were less useful to Party members who were drawing up plans to reorient Tanzania's future trajectory.

The Party developed the majority of Ujamaa policy statements in the aftermath of the Arusha Declaration, working as the primary vessel for establishing an African socialist regime in Tanzania. The majority of its ranks lacked the overseas education and professional training of their Ministry counterparts. Many had worked in the informal economy or trades such as farming, trading, transportation, and teaching.⁷³ Much of the

⁷⁰ For more on the Dar es Salaam School, see Donald Denoon and Adam Kuper, "Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation: The 'New Historiography' in Dar Es Salaam," *African Affairs* 69, no. 277 (1970): 329–349; Terence Ranger, "The 'New Historiography' in Dar Es Salaam: An Answer," *African Affairs* 70, no. 278 (1971): 50–61; Olivier Provini, *The University of Dar Es Salaam: A Post-Nyerere Institution of Higher Education? Legacies, Continuities and Changes in an Institutional Space (1961-2010)*, 2015; Gregory H. Maddox, "The Dar Es Salaam School of African History," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History*, November 20, 2018.

⁷¹ Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "African Historical Studies Academic Knowledge as 'Usable Past' and Radical Scholarship," *African Studies Review* 32, no. 3 (1989): 1–76.

⁷² Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History* (Heinemann, 1977); John Iliffe, "Review: The Origins of African Population Growth," *The Journal of African History* 30 1 (1989): 165.

⁷³ Hartmann, "Development Policy-Making in Tanzania," 78.

leadership prioritized touring the country, similar to Nyerere's safari in the year after independence.⁷⁴ Their excursions would have made clear that Tanzania, like many other countries at the time, was experiencing rapid urban migration and growth.

Cities fostered economic opportunity throughout postcolonial Africa and they consistently marked the front lines of changing family mores, but they also brought real challenges. Kingsley Davis, a prominent demographic transition theorist, commented on the continent's "overurbanization" problem in May 1969, following a three-month, multi-country tour.⁷⁵ He wrote that although scholars and policymakers were accustomed to the idea of an impoverished peasantry, the degree of individual poverty present in Africa's urban citizenry was new and startling. Urban centers were riddled with "helter skelter" settlement plans, squatters, a lack of services, inadequate transportation, and a dearth of schools for the rapidly increasing and young populace.⁷⁶ Davis documented that governments had a natural "do-something desire" to try to control the situation.⁷⁷ In Tanzania, the Party's major policy solution was simply to move people out of urban centers.

The Second Five-Year Plan explicitly addressed the effects of Tanzania's scattered population on agricultural production, noting that it made farmers' efforts inefficient. It also made it difficult for the government to provide social services and border security

⁷⁴ Emma Hunter, "'The History and Affairs of TANU': Intellectual History, Nationalism, and the Postcolonial State in Tanzania," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 45, no. 3 (2012): 373-74.

⁷⁵ Kingsley Davis, Africa Diary, October - December 1952, Kingsley Davis Papers, Box 40, No. 83035, Hoover Institute Archives.

⁷⁶ Lecture Notes, Kingsley Davis Papers, Box 43, No. 83035, Hoover Institute Archives.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

amidst increased political instability in neighboring countries. Nucleated rural settlements were not the norm in Tanzania outside of long-standing missionary communities and a handful of ethnic groups who used villages to isolate age sets, so the government had to create them.⁷⁸ In 1967, the Party launched “Operation Vijiji” in an attempt to design more hospitable rural villages, which would theoretically keep farmers close to their fields and attract urban dwellers back to the countryside.

From 1967 to 1973, Ministry and Party officials organized or repurposed approximately 5,000 rural and peri-urban villages to redistribute the country’s population.⁷⁹ Approximately two million Tanzanians moved to the villages during this time period, which was fifteen percent of the total population. Nyerere and Party leaders often referred to this number as a mediocre accomplishment – *only* fifteen percent of the population lived in Ujamaa villages. If you remove the lens of Ujamaa ideals, however, it was a drastic demographic shift and one of the most effectual population policies of the era.

Villagization was a common practice among twentieth-century socialist regimes, and British administrators had attempted it in colonial Tanganyika as part of their large-scale development projects. Colonial villagization attempts, however, overwhelmingly failed to achieve their stated goals. Nyerere believed the reason for their failure was not that the plans had no merit, but because the colonial regime did not have the backing of the

⁷⁸ Helge Kjekshus, “The Tanzanian Villagization Policy: Implementational Lessons and Ecological Dimensions,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 11, no. 2 (1977): 269–82.

⁷⁹ Like other demographic data collection efforts in Tanzania, the statistics on villagization vary. No source has emerged as definitive. I have chosen to use averages when sources offer similar numbers and ranges when they vary widely.

people.⁸⁰ Ujamaa villagization would be different from its failed precursors, he thought, because the nation-building mystique would encourage popular participation. And he was not alone in that belief. The international community generally supported Tanzania's early villagization schemes. A UN mission wrote that villagization was the "most significant recent development strategy with implications for the well-being of the family."⁸¹

Villagization was never wholly about the economics of agricultural production and service provision – it was also about prescribing family norms. Each Ujamaa village was home to a minimum of 250 families. Unlike extended kinship networks that made up the majority of family units at the time, Ujamaa villages were theoretically structured around nuclear families.⁸² Demographic transition theory argued that one of the problems delaying African fertility decline was that kinship ties were stronger than the nuclear family, which caused flows of wealth to continue from child-to-parent instead of parent-to-child.⁸³ Reversing the trend would make childrearing more expensive and often coincided with lowering fertility rates.

As a population policy, villagization resembled some of the more draconian population control efforts of the twentieth century. As the next chapter will discuss, it took on an increasingly coercive tenor starting in 1973. People living in disparate communities could be impervious to the all-encompassing development framework, which many

⁸⁰ Julius Kambarage Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity: Uhuru Na Umoja: A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1952-65* (Oxford University Press, 1967), 183.

⁸¹ United Nations Population Fund, "United Republic of Tanzania: Report of Mission on Needs Assessment for Population Assistance" (UNFPA, 1979), 70.

⁸² Priya Lal, "Militants, Mothers, and the National Family: Ujamaa, Gender, and Rural Development in Postcolonial Tanzania," *The Journal of African History* 51, no. 1 (2010): 3.

⁸³ Ingrid Palmer, *Gender and Population in the Adjustment of African Economies: Planning for Change* (International Labor Office, 1991), 55-66.

government officials saw as hindering the Ujamaa mission. But prior to 1973, moving to the state-run villages was primarily voluntary.⁸⁴ Rural Tanzanians had been coming together in more centralized Ujamaa villages for years before Operation Vijiji, and many welcomed the potential for better yields and easier access to services with the increase in government support.⁸⁵ Moreover, the village framework helped to support the population policymaking coalition by extending their reach. The implementing teams who helped set up villages included university faculty, foreign organizations like the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), community groups, and the family planning association.⁸⁶ Although the first two elements already had strong ties to the government, villagization provided community groups and the family planning association with more direct channels to influence policy, and many of their members were women.

Heterogeneous Women: Politicians and Party Wives

As the sex that bore future generations, women's voices mattered in matters of population. The fields of social demography and demographic anthropology have worked to document the intersections of biology, psychology, society, and the state that produced individual and collective fertility decisions in African contexts.⁸⁷ The scope of this project

⁸⁴ Dean McHenry offers three stages of Ujamaa Villagization – persuasion, inducement, and coercion. Dean E. McHenry Jr, *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy* (Institute of International Studies, 1979).

⁸⁵ The most notable being the Ruvuma Development Association. For more, see David M. Edwards, *Matetereka: Tanzania's Last Ujamaa Village* (Centre of African Studies, 1998).

⁸⁶ UNFPA, "Report of Mission," 70.

⁸⁷ Caroline H. Bledsoe, Fatoumata Banja, and Anthony T. Carter, *Contingent Lives: Fertility, Time, and Aging in West Africa* (University of Chicago Press, 2002); Jennifer Johnson-Hanks et al., *Understanding Family Change and Variation: Toward a Theory of Conjunctural Action*, vol. 5 (Springer Science & Business Media, 2011); Jennifer Johnson-Hanks, "Demographic Anthropology," *The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology*, 2018, 1–5.

merits a more targeted focus on the women whose decisions and discussions surrounding fertility occurred in the public eye. Tanzania's single-party system and village networks worked to bring women into the policymaking sphere. Many were initiators of development, whose choices carried weight and affected the national consciousness.⁸⁸ As half of the population, however, they were not homogenous. Negotiations played out within and between varying groups that had differing political agendas, socioeconomic origins, religions, and professions. Their diversity enabled them to create extensive networks throughout the country, while a sense of shared womanhood united them around a common thread of childrearing.

The women who rose to political prominence in 1950s and 1960s Tanzania had very different upbringings from their male counterparts. On top of being women in a largely patriarchal society, the majority of them identified as Muslim, illiterate, and of mixed Swahili heritage.⁸⁹ In TANU's early days and the fight toward independence, the Party's diverse membership was an asset. It bolstered numbers and signified a united front against the colonial regime. The organization included large segments of Christians and Muslims, and at its first conference in October 1955, TANU had more female card-carrying members than male.⁹⁰

In Susan Geiger's thoughtful exposé of TANU women, former activists described what attracted them to the independence movement during the waning years of colonial

⁸⁸ Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965* (Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1997), 204.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Cited in Susan Geiger, "U Moja Wa Wanawake Wa Tanzania and the Needs of the Rural Poor," *African Studies Review* 25, no. 2-3 (1982): 48.

rule. They pointed to notions of freedom, dignity, and self-determination, from both colonizing authorities and African men who tended to dictate social and family norms.⁹¹ Their values closely resembled what would become the moral basis of Ujamaa. Freedom (*uhuru*) became synonymous with Tanzanian independence and women adopted the slogan of self-reliance (*kujitegemea*) for their own gendered initiatives. The shared expressions showed that many women bought into the nation-building project and Geiger argued that TANU women were “a major force in constructing, embodying, and performing Tanzania nationalism.”⁹²

Ujamaa discourse commonly pointed out a woman’s double duty as both nation-builder and mother.⁹³ Motherhood was a sacred concept across East Africa, functioning as a social institution, ideology, and primary sense of identity across time and space.⁹⁴ Moreover, it could take metaphorical and literal forms. Many TANU stalwarts shrouded themselves in language of motherhood, referring to Nyerere as a son and claiming to have “given birth to these men” who made up the first generation of political leaders.⁹⁵ But many of them did so at the expense of biological progeny.

In stark contrast to social norms of the time period, when the average Tanzanian woman had around seven children, many TANU women had zero or one child in their peak

⁹¹ Geiger, *TANU Women*, 90.

⁹² *Ibid*, 14.

⁹³ Lal, “Militants, Mothers,” 6; Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*, 30.

⁹⁴ Rhiannon Stephens, *A History of African Motherhood: The Case of Uganda, 700-1900* (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Introduction.

⁹⁵ Geiger, *TANU Women*, 58, 79.

childbearing years.⁹⁶ The lack of fecundity was too ubiquitous and atypical to be random. The rationales for why they had fewer children than their peers are difficult to determine and would inevitably be far from uniform, but at the time their decisions were extremely visible. In Tanzania, much of a child's life was lived outside the home, under the watchful gaze of the entire community. A lack of children would have been readily apparent. Moreover, in Swahili culture a woman's name changes once she has had a child; she becomes Mama, followed by the name of her first-born.⁹⁷ Yet, Tanzanians largely knew TANU women by their given names. Iliffe writes that Nyerere and Bibi Titi Mohamed (who was not called Mama Halima, after her first-born daughter) were probably the only leaders known throughout the country at independence.⁹⁸

By the late 1960s, however, women and Muslims like Bibi Titi Mohamed had become increasingly disenfranchised from positions of power.⁹⁹ As the government became a largely male, Christian space, women found other ways to organize. By 1971, there were nearly 3,500 registered women's groups in Tanzania, with an official

⁹⁶ Ibid, 68. Geiger's exposé is the most complete record of TANU women's biographies, which she compiled later in their lives. It appears that many of them did not make up for their lost childbearing years after their exit from politics. Geiger's questions are more focused on women's political lives than personal fertility decisions. Further oral history in this regard would be useful.

⁹⁷ The first-born child's name is typically used in the moniker, but there are circumstances where younger children's names will be substituted. This practice is common across Africa and known as teknonymy, see Deborah Durham, "Population," *Critical Terms for the Study of Africa*, Desai & Masquelier, Eds. (University of Chicago Press, 2018), 274-287.

⁹⁸ John Iliffe. *A Modern History of Tanganyika*. (Cambridge University Press, 1979), 572.

⁹⁹ The issue of religion will be addressed at further length in chapter three. For more information on Muslims' changing role in TANU politics, see Mohamed Said, *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968): The Untold Story of the Muslim Struggle against British Colonialism in Tanganyika* (Minerva, 1998); and for a partial rebuttal of Said's biases, see Jonathon Glassman, "Muslim Nationalists in Tanganyika," ed. Mohamed Said, *The Journal of African History* 42, no. 1 (2001): 164-66.

membership of around 230,000.¹⁰⁰ Many of them rallied around the cause of development, often putting the Swahili word “*maendeleo*” in their names. Women’s groups offered certificates in “domestic science,” which entailed a variety of activities including home management, childcare, gardening, cooking, livestock raising, literacy, law, and family planning.¹⁰¹

The most prominent organization was the women’s wing of TANU, *Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania* (UWT), which formed after independence in 1962. Bibi Titi Mohamed was the organization’s first president, showing the crossover between the two groups. Yet, by the end of the 1960s, UWT’s leadership was also shifting. Party officials’ wives rose up the ranks and filled primary positions in the organization, including Maria Nyerere and the wives of both vice presidents. The new leadership came to see UWT’s role as enabling women to “play their fullest part as wives and mothers.”¹⁰² The shift from metaphorical to literal motherhood created a tension among politically active women, which was not lost on observers. A 1968 *Nationalist* editorial lamented that women’s commitment to their own families had begun to take priority over the nation as a whole, overturning UWT’s revolutionary mission.¹⁰³ An American observer commented that women would sit together at the back of Party rallies and meetings, nursing their children

¹⁰⁰ United Nations Children’s Fund, “Recommendation of the Executive Director for Assistance to United Republic of Tanzania,” 15 March 1971, Document E/ICEF/P.L.1409, 2.

¹⁰¹ Ibid; Magdalene K. Ngaiza and Bertha O. Koda, *The Unsung Heroines: Women’s Life Histories from Tanzania* (WRDP Publications, 1991), 31.

¹⁰² “UWT’s plans for national development: putting Tanzanian women in picture,” *The Nationalist*, 2 March 1965.

¹⁰³ “U.W.T.,” *The Nationalist*, 20 September 1968.

and talking among themselves instead of actively participating.¹⁰⁴ He contrasted them with the “really active women,” whose “peculiarities of personal and family life” led to their more proactive agenda.¹⁰⁵

Party-wives, however, were in the privileged position to define what raising children in the “proper” Ujamaa manner meant. More than just the proximity to their husbands, UWT women were generally upper class. The majority of their programming targeted disenfranchised groups, such as poor rural women who were not falling in line with UWT ideals.¹⁰⁶ Training seminars followed the Christian domestic vision of women as mothers and homemakers.¹⁰⁷ They centered on educating women about various aspects parenting, including maternal health and child nutrition.¹⁰⁸

The organization also worked closely with the government to develop a national policy agenda, campaigning for various marriage and employment laws that would help women. In the early 1970s, the government required businesses to provide up to three months maternity leave to women who were salaried or received an hourly wage, but it was unpaid. Members of UWT actively campaigned for an amendment that would require paid maternity leave – with the proviso that the benefit should only be provided to married women. A slew of letters to the editor publicly questioned the position, with headlines such

¹⁰⁴ Gene Andrew Maguire, *Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation* (Cambridge University Press, 1969), 319.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Geiger, “U Moja Wa Wanawake,” 50.

¹⁰⁷ The Vatican’s 1968 ban on contraception did little to alter Catholic programming in Tanzania. The Catholic Church generally bought into Tanzania’s national development project and aligned itself with government policies. See David Westerlund, *Ujamaa Na Dini: A Study of Some Aspects of Society and Religion in Tanzania, 1961-1977* (Almqvist & Wiksell, 1980).

¹⁰⁸ “UWT’s plans for national development: putting Tanzanian women in picture,” *The Nationalist*, 2 March 1965.

as, “Is UWT for Married Women Only?”¹⁰⁹ The refrain was quite common when political groups were falling short of the inclusive expectations of Ujamaa.¹¹⁰ Leadership within UWT may have embodied Christian domestic values, but public opinion argued that their policy agenda should allow for a more diverse understanding of motherhood, especially since having a baby out of wedlock was quite common. In this case, the government agreed. It began drafting legislation that would provide female civil servants with paid maternity leave for up to 85 days, regardless of marital status, so long as they waited at least three years between births.¹¹¹ The policy was the result of collaborative negotiation between women’s groups, the public, and the government – and the requirement of three years between available benefits indicated that the family planning association had also entered the discussion.

The Family Planning Association: Overlap and Dissention

Chama cha Uzazi na Malezi Bora (UMATI) was one of the first family planning associations to form in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹¹² Its name reflected the Swahili vernacular of family planning and Ujamaa, “the party of better parenting and childrearing.” Its founding members were largely foreign doctors and urban elite who organized before independence in 1959. Membership expanded in the post-independence period, as the group registered as a national organization in 1967. It requested permission to offer child

¹⁰⁹ *The Nationalist*, 15 July 1971.

¹¹⁰ For example, a similar headline read “Is the Party a rural affair only?” *Daily News*, 19 December 1978.

¹¹¹ UN, “National Experience,” 30. The Employment Ordinance (Amendment) Act would officially be enacted in 1975.

¹¹² I use UMATI and the family planning association interchangeably.

spacing services, accelerate demand for contraception, and train personnel as part of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1969. Private donors provided the majority of UMATI's funding, especially after it became a member of the International Planned Parenthood Federation in 1973, but its staff was overwhelmingly Tanzanian-born, young, Protestant women.¹¹³ Christina Nsekela became the leader of the organization in 1969. She was born in rural southwestern Tanzania and, like many young people after independence, moved to Dar es Salaam. She became a teacher and social worker, volunteering with the family planning organization in her spare time before moving up the ranks to full-time employment.

Nsekela and her colleagues may not have been Party wives but UMATI had allies throughout the government, particularly in the Ministry. The Minister of Justice was an active UMATI member and the Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, A.C. Tandau, functioned for a time as the organization's president.¹¹⁴ Tandau addressed participants at a University of Dar es Salaam workshop on population and development in 1974, saying "If family planning services are not part of the set of health services available to all the people, then family planning will continue to be a facility available only to the well-to-do families who are already converted to the idea. And this will continue to perpetuate existing social inequalities."¹¹⁵ He believed that family planning was a key tool that the nation could use to advance Ujamaa development and its core values.

¹¹³ Emily Callaci, "'Injectable Development' Depo-Provera and Creation of the Global South," *Radical History Review* 2018, no. 131 (2018): 97.

¹¹⁴ Register to the Winifred Armstrong papers, Folder 1, Box 41, No. 2012C52, Hoover Institute Archives.

¹¹⁵ UN, "National Experience," 22.

In 1973, the Ministry of Health officially incorporated the family planning association into its Maternal and Child Health (MCH) program. The relationship increased UMATI's institutional reach, as its services became available at all government health facilities. A UNICEF study published in 1973, which included five field sites and a national survey, commented that UMATI had been "instrumental in popularizing modern methods of contraception. Family planning is routinely taught in basic medical and para-medical courses, and in in-service training for all categories of staff."¹¹⁶ Villagization had worked as a boon for the organization's outreach. It had approximately 100,000 members down to the village level and generally popular support.¹¹⁷

A concurrent study, however, countered that while UMATI was well known throughout the country, rural Tanzanians typically considered it an urban phenomenon.¹¹⁸ The association's close ties with the Ministry in the early years of Ujamaa had provided for an emphasis on more formal programming. For example, it worked with the Ministry of Finance to provide child spacing incentives through a tax credit, whereby Tanzanians could claim a maximum of four children as dependents and civil-service employees would receive a housing subsidy for a living space that could accommodate up to four children.¹¹⁹ The family planning association also worked with the national labor union to host a seminar about population and family planning, where participants discussed the advantages and

¹¹⁶ David P.S. Wasawo, *The Young Child in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: UNICEF Liaison Office and Tanzania National Scientific Research Council, 1973), 5.

¹¹⁷ UNFPA, "Mission of Needs," 61.

¹¹⁸ I.M. Omari, *Socio-cultural Studies in Population Education in Tanzania* (E. Mellon Press, 1983).

¹¹⁹ UNFPA, "Mission of Needs," 24; Memo from USAID's Gary Merritt, 8 November 1978, Record Group 286, P 641, 6124364, US National Archive, College Park, Maryland, United States.

usefulness of family planning.¹²⁰ The majority of both civil servants and organized laborers lived in the capital city of Dar es Salaam.

One of UMATI's broader programming efforts was to increase the use of biomedical contraception, which had become widely available in the 1960s. Of Tanzanian women who used biomedical contraception during the Ujamaa era, the majority opted to take the pill.¹²¹ Many women, however, reported adverse side effects associated with oral contraception, and rumors surrounding its link to cancer, infertility, and myriad other ailments ran rampant. The second most common method of biomedical contraception was IUD implants, with diaphragms, vaginal rings, spermicide foam/jelly, condoms, and vasectomy services also available. In 1969, another alternative entered Tanzanian markets, the injectable Depo-Provera.¹²²

Depo-Provera quickly became one of the most widely used forms of biomedical contraception, as it was easy to administer, each dose lasted for months, and it required no further action outside of the clinic.¹²³ But in 1972 the Food and Drug Association denied approval of Depo-Provera in the United States, deeming it "not proven to be safe."¹²⁴ Tanzania's family planning association subsequently pulled it from clinics. Nsekela

¹²⁰ UN, "Mission of Needs," 29.

¹²¹ Upwards of 95 percent was cited in UMATI Program Request 1982, Record Group 286, P 607, 6231491 (C5), Folder 1, US National Archive, College Park, Maryland, United States.

¹²² For a full account of Depo-Provera use in Tanzania, the 1972 controversy, and its aftermath, see Emily Callaci, "'Injectable Development' Depo-Provera and Creation of the Global South," *Radical History Review* 2018, no. 131 (2018): 82–104.

¹²³ Between January and November 1973, the Dar es Salaam branch of UMATI reported 647 new users and gave 4,133 follow-up injections, see RAC/PC, Box 357, Folder 3445, Montague - Country File – Tanzania - Institutional Development - University of Dar es Salaam, 1973–1974) found in Callaci "Injectable Development." For more, see Bonnie Pedersen, "Program for International Training in Health, Trip #101," (April-May 1982), 16.

¹²⁴ Callaci, "Injectable Development," 82, 96.

claimed the primary reason for discontinuing the injection was an inability to properly follow up with patients, and not a response to the U.S. regulation, but the Tanzanian public did not accept her explanation. Newspaper editorials and cartoons made claims to racially motivated sterilization of black women, published stories of horrendous side effects, and made links between contraception and witchcraft.¹²⁵ Journalist Benjamin Mkapa, who would later become Tanzania's third president, asked Nsekela in an interview about being "controlled by the financial purse strings of people in Britain and America who [did] not have the interest of Tanzanians at heart."¹²⁶ His commentary echoed the public backlash in Kenya five years prior and exposed latent suspicion surrounding biomedical contraception in Tanzania. But the Depo-Provera scandal also revealed an extensive support system for the general practice of family planning.

Many of the most vocal critics of Depo-Provera were not opposed to other family planning methods. Patricia Rodney, the wife of University of Dar es Salaam historian Walter Rodney, published an article in the *Nationalist* criticizing the use of potentially unsafe products on black women, citing historical legacies of racist tactics in the United States and elsewhere.¹²⁷ As a nurse and public health practitioner, however, she remained an advocate of family planning and safe methods of birth control. The moral underpinnings of Tanzania's population management approach gave credence to Rodney's censure and provided her with a platform to voice her more nuanced views.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 87.

¹²⁶ "Mrs. Nsekela Talks to Ben Mkapa: Umati Does Not Want to Control Birth Rate," *Daily News*, 19 February 1973.

¹²⁷ Cited in Callaci, "Injectable Development," 91-92.

Some men responded to the discussion with outrage, spurred by fear of changing gender norms and women's liberation. As UMATI public relations officer Adam Simbeye observed, however, men had "the least practical experience of the real problems that women encounter during pregnancy and particularly at the time of delivery." He believed that citizens should be able to voice their concerns, but unlike the population control model that privileged the opinions of predominantly male decision-makers, what women thought about family planning and other population policies mattered as well. Women weighed in with discussions of sex education, the role of government and institutions in regulating population, women's liberation, and how contraceptive use benefitted socialist societies.¹²⁸ The open dialogue provided space for diverse perspectives and invited a deeper understanding of what managing a population might mean for the nascent country. One through line that emerged in the discussion was a return to the East African roots of family planning. As a headline offered, "...The pill is not all there is to it."¹²⁹

Mixed Methodologies: Healers, Midwives, and (In)Fertility

Members of the family planning association were well-educated on the use of biomedical contraception, but they were also influenced by local conceptions of family planning. "Child spacing, as we call it in Tanzania, has been practised from time immemorial," wrote Nsekela.¹³⁰ It was not a controversial opinion. The idea that

¹²⁸ For example, see Mama Mohamed, "sex education should begin at home," *Daily News*, 28 May 1972; Claire Cunningham, "the truth about that one child," *Sunday News*, 16 July 1972; Ndimara Tegembwege, "women's role in society," *Daily News*, 21 July 1972; and Rosita Sweetman, "the key to true women's liberation," *Sunday News*, 23 July 1972.

¹²⁹ "... The pill is not all there is to it," *Sunday News*, 27 May 1973.

¹³⁰ Christina M. Nsekela, "Family Planning in Tanzania," *Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs*, no. 6, (July 1978).

Tanzanians engaged in social mechanisms of family planning was a common refrain. Ujamaa philosophy offered that “traditional” African values and social practices were a valid complement to the “modern” biomedical family planning model, especially where the latter was slow to develop.

The colonial regime failed to adequately establish medical infrastructure in Tanzania and the slow start continued after independence. In 1972, the ratio of doctors to patients was estimated to be somewhere between 1:23,000 and 1:33,000, which was significantly worse than similarly-situated countries.¹³¹ A 1973 *Sunday News* editorial commented, “Many of us would become psychologically sick if we bothered our minds about this odd fact.”¹³² As a result, the vast majority of Tanzanians went to local healers (*waganga*) for their ailments. Local healers had duties beyond simply providing medical care. They often acted as diviners and conducted rites of passage ceremonies, making them important members of any community.

The Ministry of Health recognized the association of *waganga*, Umoja wa Waganga wa Tanzania (UWATA), as an integral part of the national health system.¹³³ The organization’s national chairman was a botanist and lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam, which would establish a traditional medicine research unit in 1974.¹³⁴ When asked

¹³¹ The average ratio of doctors to patients for similarly-situated countries at the time was estimated to be 1:10,000 according to Guido Magome, “Training of ‘bare-foot doctors’ must be given priority,” *Sunday News*, 22 April 1973; the low range in range was found in C.K. Omari, “The Mganga: A Specialist of his own Kind,” (University of Dar es Salaam, 1972), 3; the high range was found in in Richard Blue and James Weaver, “A Critical Assessment of the Tanzanian Model of Development,” International Council for Educational Development records, Box 100, Hoover Institute Archive.

¹³² Magome, “Training of ‘bare-foot doctors’ must be given priority,” *Sunday News*, 22 April 1973.

¹³³ Halima Shariff, “Traditional healers,” *Daily News*, 5 December 1982.

¹³⁴ Omari, “The Mganga,” 18.; Petersen, “Intrah Trip #101.”

about the country's investment in herbal medicine, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the Minister of Health and the man who would replace Nyerere as the second president of Tanzania, responded, "The main aim of our endeavor in this respect is to preserve for Tanzanians and for humanity, what is beneficial in our heritage, rather than do away with imported medicines."¹³⁵ The two could work in tandem, as herbal remedies supplemented limited pharmaceutical supplies and kept hospitals from becoming overcrowded.

Because local conceptions of masculinity almost universally included an aspect of virility and the identity of many women was entwined with motherhood, infertility was the most pressing concern for many couples.¹³⁶ Gary Merritt of USAID commented in 1978 that Tanzanian infertility rates were "considered by some to be among the highest in the world (I have read estimates that go as high as 10% of couples)."¹³⁷ Anecdotal evidence and available life histories backed up his claim. Among the seven interlocutors in Magdalene Ngaiza and Bertha Koda's *Unsung Heroines: Women's Life Histories from Tanzania*, three women highlighted problems of infertility.¹³⁸ "Child bearing was one big obligation for women," said Paulina M., "If a long time passed before a married woman gets pregnant some traditional medicines were applied to her."¹³⁹ Another option was to go to the local healer "for fear that perhaps she had been bewitched."¹⁴⁰ Healers used ritual,

¹³⁵ Joseph Mapunda, "Building a Healthy Nation," Interview with Ali Mwinyi, *Sunday News*, 21 May 1972.

¹³⁶ For East Africa, see Margrethe Silberschmidt, "Poverty, Male Disempowerment, and Male Sexuality: Rethinking Men and Masculinities in Rural and Urban East Africa," in *African Masculinities: Men in Africa from the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present*, ed. Lahoucine Ouzgane and Robert Morrell (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 189–203. For West Africa, see Caroline H. Bledsoe, et al. *Contingent Lives*.

¹³⁷ Memo from USAID's Gary Merritt, 8 November 1978, Record Group 286, P 641, 6124364, US National Archive, College Park, Maryland, United States. It is unclear why infertility rates are so high, particularly on the coasts of East Africa. The phenomenon merits further study,

¹³⁸ Ngaiza and Koda, *Unsung Heroines*.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 179-180.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

advice, and herbal treatments to guide fertility practices and desires.¹⁴¹ Contemporary reports suggest that they could help a significant portion of patients, perhaps around one third, especially if the problem was related to the perceived presence of evil spirits or disrupted relationships.¹⁴²

For specific family planning and childrearing advice, most women would also visit a midwife (*wakunga wa jadi*).¹⁴³ The Ministry of Health guessed that at least one midwife was present in every village.¹⁴⁴ They tended to be older women, who were highly regarded in their communities. They almost all had children of their own, as they would use personal experience in childbirth to guide their work. As Mama Koku, a midwife and mother of six commented, “Much of what I learned was from my own experience. Traditional midwifery began with bearing my own children – I hid in the bush and delivered some of my own alone, with no assistance.”¹⁴⁵

Midwives would lead expecting mothers through protocols relating to manners, health practices, social taboos, and nutrition. They encouraged child spacing by recommending abstinence until a child could walk, living with in-laws for three years, not smiling or showing charm toward a husband until the wife wanted to get pregnant again, advising a husband to take another wife, not shaving pubic hair for four years, and tying a

¹⁴¹ Sydney S. Katz and Selig H. Katz, “An Evaluation of Traditional Therapy for Barrenness,” *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (1987): 398.

¹⁴² Ibid; Margaret Lock, Patricia Alice Kaufert, and Alan Harwood, *Pragmatic Women and Body Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 129.

¹⁴³ Katz and Katz, “An Evaluation of Traditional Therapy for Barrenness.”

¹⁴⁴ Pedersen, “Intrah Trip #101,” 4, 12.

¹⁴⁵ Ngaiza and Koda, *Unsung Heroines*, 111.

string of herbs around the stomach (*kuweka pigi*) to ward off pregnancy.¹⁴⁶ Child spacing was not just about the health and desires of the mother and child, but also for the benefit of older siblings. Kwashiorkor, a Ghanaian (Ga) word that translates as “the first-second,” was understood to be a form of malnutrition caused by weaning a child too early after another child was born.¹⁴⁷ By connecting family planning to other aspects of development and broader social practices, midwives helped integrate local expressions with national population programming.

Walter Rodney wrote in 1972 that ideology can be found in human action combined with statements of principle and policy.¹⁴⁸ When it came to population considerations in Tanzania, human action varied greatly and the multiplicity of interested groups prompted diverse policies and programming. The result was a flexible population ethos, which encouraged open dialogue and experimentation with mixed methodologies. A 1973 UNICEF study highlighted the varying practices. In Bagamoyo, for example, “the traditional and modern concepts and practices related to pregnancy, child birth and child care [did] not form two antagonistic ways of living.”¹⁴⁹ In Moshi, women usually had at least four children, but would “close up” (*kufunga*) using long-term birth control methods like an injection or loop when their first daughter started having her own children.¹⁵⁰ In

¹⁴⁶ Bonnie Pedersen, “Program for International Training in Health, Trip #249,” (February-March 1984), 19-20.

¹⁴⁷ Yusuf Halimoja, “Arguments in favour of planned families,” *Sunday News*, 28 May 1972.

¹⁴⁸ Walter Rodney, “Tanzanian Ujamaa and Scientific Socialism,” *African Review* 1, no. 4 (1972): 61–76.

¹⁴⁹ Wasawo, *The Young Child*, 37.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 27, 32.

Singida, social embarrassment encouraged women to space births out at least four years, which was more than the government recommendation of three years.

It was difficult for state authorities to articulate the variety and flexibility of Tanzanian population policy in official documents. They often accommodated the multiplicity through “strategically ambiguous” statements, but sometimes they were forced to take a stand. For example, the methods of healers and midwives sometimes came into conflict with the Ujamaa principle of “progress.”¹⁵¹ There were clearly benefits to encouraging local methodologies of health and family planning. They appeased elements of the Ministry who were worried about population growth rates and Party members who promoted self-reliance at the village level, while giving individuals more options for planning their families in socially supported ways. Moreover, the state had limited financial and institutional capacity. Local healers provided medical services that would otherwise fall to the government and they would often do so free of charge or for a small token payment.¹⁵²

On the other hand, Nyerere was one of the biggest proponents of Tanzanians’ ability to change their behavior in the name of development and to push back against a “resignation to the kind of life Tanzanian people have lived for centuries past.”¹⁵³ Members of the government were particularly outspoken against the “talisman” practices

¹⁵¹ Richey, *Population Politics and Development*. For an example of Ujamaa rhetoric on “progress,” see URT, “Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development,” xviiy; Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, 137.

¹⁵² Ngaiza and Koda, *Unsung Heroines*, 182.

¹⁵³ Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, 137.

of midwives, even going so far to deny their prevalence in official media.¹⁵⁴ By the end of 1973, changing economic circumstances and frustration with the slow pace of Ujamaa implementation shifted the general tenor of government policy toward a more prescribed objective.

As statements of principle and policy became increasingly more authoritative, they threatened the nascent population management approach that was beginning to blossom in Tanzania. But the networks that had developed among the population coalition were not shallow or willing to step aside in the name of political expediency. They had taken root below the surface of government action and embedded themselves in the daily lives and practices of Tanzanians: Ujamaa and Nyerere's leadership had united the population coalition around a communal sense of imagined kinship; early efforts at counting and redistributing people had invested citizens in the machinations of demographic policy; family planning debates had stimulated public conversation and programing; and couples had turned to various elements of the integrated healthcare system to find a balance between having too few and too many children. The mosaic at the heart of Tanzanian population policy had changed the sensibilities of its participants and started a paradigm shift that would not only outlast Tanzania's more coercive turn, but eventually push population management onto the global stage.

¹⁵⁴ Letter from Dr. Olomi to Chris Daniell, 26 March 1986, MS. Oxfam PRG/6/3/5/22, Oxford University Archives, Oxford, England; Pedersen, "Intrah Trip #101."

CHAPTER 3

BOGEYS AND MISCONCEPTIONS: MAKING SENSE OF POPULATION POLICY DURING TANZANIA'S STATIST DECADE (1974-1983)

“A population policy cannot be based on a bogey in the minds of some, born out of the fear to lose what they now hold” - Tanzanian Delegation, Third World Population Conference, 1974¹

In August 1974, the Third World Population Conference assembled in Bucharest, Romania.² The meeting brought together over one thousand government representatives from 139 countries, 1,400 members of non-governmental organizations, and 900 journalists.³ The conference's purpose was to formulate an international strategy to combat undesirable population growth. One of the recommendations in the ensuing World Population Plan of Action was that governments should adopt their own national population policies.⁴ In Tanzania, a *Daily News* article called the recommendation a “concrete expression of [the] propaganda effort during Population Year.”⁵ The commentator pointed out that while the country did not have a unified national population policy, its portfolio was “quite impressive.”⁶ The population management framework that had emerged in 1967 as part of the Ujamaa development project continued to flourish in the decade after the Third World Population Conference. Tanzania's policymaking

¹ United Nations, “National Experience in the Formulation and Implementation of Population Policy, 1960-1976: United Republic of Tanzania,” (United Nations, 1978), 16.

² The use of the term ‘Third’ in the conference title refers to the third in a series, not a conference for “Third World” countries.

³ Delegates came from 136 countries, four national liberation movements (two of which existed within the borders of sovereign states represented at the meeting, the Palestine Liberation Organization and Liberation Front of the Somali Coast), and Papua New Guinea as an observer. For more, see Matthew James Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Harvard University Press, 2008), 310.

⁴ United Nations Population Information Network, “World Population Plan of Action,” 19-30 August 1974, E/CONF.60/19.

⁵ “A healthy nation: that must be the goal of population policy,” *Daily News*, 30 October 1974.

⁶ Ibid.

coalition worked to expand education and health services, improve demographic collection efforts, and integrate population concerns with changing socioeconomic circumstances.

Yet, this period of Tanzanian history is not well known for its collaborative nature. Broader scholarship refers to the period from 1973 to 1982 as the “statist decade.”⁷ The government adopted increasingly coercive policies to speed up Ujamaa development, including one of the most all-encompassing population redistribution efforts of the era. Adding to the urgency was a growing economic crisis. State authorities allowed foreign organizations into the country to supplement diminished state capacity, particularly in the health sector where they helped with family planning training and an expansion of the maternal and child health system. Between more coercive population redistribution campaigns and an influx of population-control activists, it looked like Tanzania might transition toward a more controlling population ethos.

On the world stage, Tanzanian officials continued to oppose the idea of “population policy.” Although it seemed like domestic action belied their refrains, I begin the chapter by highlighting the continuity in thought surrounding Tanzania’s population management position during the “statist decade.” The Tanzanian delegation at the 1974 World Population Conference, with all its strong words and vitriol, was opposed to the population control paradigm that privileged national population policies and altering demographic statistics. It did not oppose population policy writ large. The delegation further articulated

⁷ For varying accounts of what led to centralized control and increased intervention in economic and social affairs in Tanzania, see Goran Hyden, “Local Governance and Economic-Demographic Transition in Rural Africa,” *Population and Development Review* 15 (1989): 193–211; Kjell J. Havnevik, *Tanzania: The Limits to Development from Above* (Nordic Africa Institute, 1993); Michael Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Kumarian Press, 2008).

population management principles like responsible parenting and integrating demographic concerns into broader development frameworks. I offer that instead of being a site of contestation over the efficacy of population policy, the 1974 Third World Population Conference displayed the difference between population control and population management.

The chapter continues by exploring villagization through the lens of population management. Forced relocation in the name of national development threatened the genuineness of Ujamaa imagined kinship, which had united the country around a shared population ethos. Scholars have shown how many Tanzanians sought “refuge from the nation” and its barrage into their personal lives.⁸ They have also shown, however, that Ujamaa policies were full of contradictions.⁹ Villagization clearly had the demographic goal of moving the vast majority of citizens into state-run villages, but it also expanded population coalition networks and further integrated population within national education and health campaigns. As more people participated in demographic data gathering, they began to wonder about the results of their efforts. For one, it revealed a rapidly expanding youth cohort, and government authorities responded by adopting a plan for universal primary education. Village-based seminars and discussion groups showed that maternal and child mortality were serious concerns among the rural citizenry, which led to an increase in MCH clinics and training courses. Members of foreign organizations conducting health programs in the villages joined, instead of usurped, the population

⁸ James Leonard Giblin and Blandina Kaduma Giblin, *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania* (James Currey Publishers, 2005), 263.

⁹ Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 10.

management coalition. In sum, the continued programming during Tanzania's "statist decade" showed the resiliency of the population management approach and its embeddedness in Ujamaa development schemes.

The chapter ends with a discussion of population policy at the edges of Ujamaa. Villagization and its attendant programming did not penetrate the entire country with the same force. I discuss two examples from the late 1970s and early 1980s where regional governments veered away from the national model and towards statistically-oriented population control policies. First, in the archipelago of Zanzibar less control over financial purse strings and foreign partnerships enticed the government to consider the potential economic benefits of population control interventions. Second, acute land shortages in Arusha spurred a regional population program that focused on lowering population growth rates quickly, including an emphasis on biomedical contraception and singling out particular communities as primary sites of intervention.

The different experience in Zanzibar and Arusha worked to underscore the elements of Ujamaa development that supported population management at the national level. The outliers did not have the full extent of Nyerere's leadership, a moral rather than economic lens of population growth, or an inclusive sense of community. They also brought into question the role that state capacity, governing autonomy, and levels of population anxiety played in defiance of the population management framework. In many ways, 1984 marked the highpoint of Tanzanian population management, but with compounding economic crisis, mounting pressure from international organizations to abandon socialist development policies, and increasing population growth rates, it was possible that the

regions on the edge of Ujamaa were on the frontlines of a coming policy shift that would end Tanzania's population management era.

The Misconception: Reframing Bucharest

The early vanguard of the international population establishment had organized the first World Population Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1927.¹⁰ After the founding of the United Nations, population conferences convened in Rome in 1954, Belgrade in 1965, and Bucharest in 1974.¹¹ The meetings were intended to bring attention and further study to the problems of global population growth. According to one account from Bucharest, however, representatives from 106 countries considered their population growth rates to be satisfactory or below an ideal trajectory.¹² The line was clearly drawn between countries that made up the international population establishment and “Third World” countries that had become the target of population policy interventions in the late 1960s.¹³ Nation after nation in the latter bloc declared that population control was not the best way to solve their economic problems and that birth control was not a substitute for the global inequities at the root of their poverty. The head of the Tanzanian delegation stated clearly, “We reject... the suggestion that we have a population problem.”¹⁴

¹⁰ For more on who comprised the vanguard of the international population establishment, see Alison Bashford, *Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth* (Columbia University Press, 2014), 1-2.

¹¹ The original conference was not given an ordinal number, so the First World Population Conference was the 1954 conference in Rome.

¹² M. F. Franda, “The World Population Conference: An International Extravaganza,” *Southeast Europe Series* 21, no. 2 (September 1974): 1.

¹³ Jason L. Finkle and Barbara B. Crane, “The Politics of Bucharest: Population, Development, and the New International Economic Order,” *Population and Development Review* (1975): 87–114.

¹⁴ UN, “National Experience,” 16.

Commentators have latched on to the delegation's words to support arguments that Tanzania had a development policy, but not a population policy, in the mid-1970s.¹⁵ The two approaches, however, were only mutually exclusive if population policy was synonymous with population control. The conference agenda included a discussion over the relationship between population and development, but the purveyors of population control remained committed to focusing interventions on lowering national population growth rates and fertility rates. The head of the Bucharest conference, Antonio Carrillo Flores, emphasized in his opening address that the meeting was a population conference, not an economic conference.¹⁶

The international community fell short of accepting more holistic and demographically-aware development plans as population policy, but the Tanzanian delegation continued to advocate for the alternative model. They offered that population control stemmed from establishment powers' historical positionality. "A population policy cannot be based on a bogey in the minds of some, born out of the fear to lose what they now hold, rightly or wrongly."¹⁷ They were asking for an acknowledgement of population control's fraught history of racism and uneven power dynamics.¹⁸ The delegation continued, "nor can [population policy] be born out of a misconception as to the capacity of third world countries to deal with their populations, given conditions of fair-play and

¹⁵ For example, see UN, "National Experience," 21; Richey *Population Politics and Development*, 35; H. Mkini, "Current Population Policy in the URT" in "Final Report on the National Seminar on Population and Development in the United Republic of Tanzania" February 1980, Sponsored by ILO, ECA, 64; Juhani Koponen, "Population growth in historical perspective – the key role of changing fertility" in *Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle for Survival*, Eds. Boesen, et al. (SIDA, 1986), 31.

¹⁶ Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 311.

¹⁷ UN, "National Experience," 16.

¹⁸ Ibid.

equitable economic relationships.”¹⁹ Their comments were reminiscent of Nyerere’s expositions at the FAO a decade earlier, which documented the privileges inherent within the world economic system.²⁰ Tanzanian authorities believed that they were in a better position than international organizations to formulate their own domestic population policy.

Because the population management approach had yet to be acknowledged as an alternative to population control, the Tanzanian delegation at the World Population Conference did not possess the vocabulary to fully articulate their policy platform. But they tried. They explained the problem with population policies that idealized population stasis. “The solution cannot be in keeping with our number (unchanged), for we shall not be richer by that token. We will have perhaps only succeeded in distributing our poverty among fewer and fewer, and no more.”²¹ In the 1967 Arusha Declaration, Nyerere had offered a similar metaphor; ten hunters dividing up one rabbit did not need less hunters, but more rabbits.²²

The Tanzanian delegation at Bucharest surmised that even if family planning programs were successful in lowering population growth rates, they would have a smaller impact on per capita economic growth rates than stable world markets or improved agricultural technology.²³ They added, however, “we are not cynics that would prefer children born just anyhow,” echoing the underlying Ujamaa principle of responsible

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Julius Nyerere, “McDougall Memorial Lecture on F.A.O.,” 15 November 1963, Tanganyika Information Division of the Vice President’s Office.

²¹ UN, “National Experience,” 16.

²² Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (Oxford University Press, 1968), 219-20.

²³ Ibid, 15.

parenting.²⁴ They pointed to Tanzania's dynamic child spacing programs and educational efforts on family planning as proof of the country's proactive agenda. In short, Tanzanian authorities did not ignore demographic variables, but couched them within the larger development framework.

The Bogey: Increasing Foreign and State Intervention

The first five years of Ujamaa programming had not materialized in substantial national development, and factors outside of the government's control were making matters worse. Home-grown food supply, which had kept up with population growth in the first decade of independence, began declining as a series of droughts hit the region.²⁵ Oil price hikes shocked global markets and led to a sharp decline in revenue for Tanzania's largest exports, coffee and tea. Tanzania was in economic crisis, which would compound at the end of the decade when another oil shock, poor import/export balances, war with Uganda, and breakup of the East African community brought the beginnings of structural adjustment to Tanzania.²⁶ Given its increasing financial troubles, the government's reliance on international aid doubled in the first decade of Ujamaa.²⁷ In 1977, about half the country's budget came from foreign sources, which loomed as a constant reminder of the

²⁴ Ibid, 17.

²⁵ Jeannette Hartmann, "Development Policy-Making in Tanzania 1962-1982: A Critique of Sociological Interpretations," PhD Dissertation, (University of Hull, 1983), 277.

²⁶ For a more extensive discussion, see Brian Van Arkadie, "Economic Strategy and Structural Adjustment in Tanzania" (The World Bank, September 30, 1995), available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/649601468765032908/Economic-strategy-and-structural-adjustment-in-Tanzania>.

²⁷ Cited in Hartmann, "Development Policy-Making in Tanzania," 5.

failure of its guiding principle of self-reliance.²⁸

Nyerere had famously stated at the outset of Ujamaa, “It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development.”²⁹ He spoke out against taking aid from foreign sources in particular, but it was clear that Ujamaa’s robust development programming required a steady supply of money. Nyerere clarified that although Tanzania would not alter its policies to appease donors, foreign aid and expertise were welcome if they melded with Ujamaa values.³⁰ Fielding aid from socialist countries like the Soviet Union and China would be relatively easy in that regard. State authorities often invoked their development models, for example, lauding China’s cadre of “barefoot doctors” as a better means of implementing socialist healthcare policy than providing fewer, but more highly trained, medical professionals.³¹

More striking perhaps is that many Western countries and international organizations also provided aid in the midst of the contentious Cold War climate.³² Major Ujamaa-era donors included USAID, the Ford Foundation, Scandinavian development agencies, Oxfam, the World Bank, and the United Nations. Funding for population control was at its heyday in these organizations, but official reports from Tanzania showed little push in that direction.³³ For the most part, international organizations followed the lead of

²⁸ Oxfam, “Annual Report 1976/77,” Folder 2, MS Oxfam PRG/3/4/21, Oxford University Archives, Oxford, England.

²⁹ Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa* (Oxford University Press, 1968), 22.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ J. Ulimbenge, “All we need is a cadre of bare foot doctors,” *Daily News*, 20 April 1973.

³² “Question and answer session held at the University College, Dar es Salaam, on 4 February 1970, at which President Nyerere was the target,” Nyerere Speeches, FCO 21/685, British National Archives, London, England. For more on the issue of population policy in the Cold War, see Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 152.

³³ Donald P. Warwick, *Bitter Pills: Population Policies and Their Implementation in Eight Developing Countries* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 45.

Tanzanian state authorities and supported the Ujamaa development framework.³⁴ Ford Foundation's Douglas Ensminger, who oversaw the opening of family planning clinics and food-security programs in Southeast Asia and Tanzania commented in 1973, "there was the possibility, yes the high probability Tanzania may be the first of the developing countries to bring off its development without leaving behind the forty percent, in mass poverty."³⁵ With the financial and ideological backing of foreign partners, the government could continue speeding up its Ujamaa development plan, starting with mandatory villagization.

Forced Villagization as Population Control?

The President, Prime Minister, and Party leadership believed that Tanzania's economic problems could be solved by intensifying Ujamaa programming, which centered on the redistribution of people and resources. They wanted to use state-run villages as the centerpiece of their strategy. The ten-cell units at the heart of each village would be the building blocks for governance, with Party leaders organizing the various cells within their district and regional jurisdictions.³⁶ The villagization programs that had been in effect since 1969, however, had failed to attract many new residents. Even with incentives and

³⁴ Jennings, *Surrogates of the State*, 64.

³⁵ Interview of Paul Bomani, Ambassador to US from Tanzania, by Dr. Douglas Ensminger, May 1973, sponsored by International Center for Dynamics of Development, 4.

³⁶ For more on the process of decentralization, see Paul Collins, "Decentralization and Local Administration for Development in Tanzania," *Africa Today* 21, no. 3 (Summer 1974): 15-25. For more on how decentralization led to a stronger centrally-located bureaucracy, see Idrian N. Resnick, *The Long Transition: Building Socialism in Tanzania* (Monthly Review Press, 1981), 235.

political restructuring, people were still flocking to urban centers.³⁷ To quell the trend, Nyerere issued a series of orders in 1973 that made living in villages mandatory and moved the country's capital from Dar es Salaam to the more central (and less-populated) Dodoma.³⁸

Many members of the Ministry were not on board with the plan.³⁹ Compulsory villagization would be an expensive endeavor and its potential economic benefits had yet to bear much fruit, despite Party leadership claiming that economic self-reliance in villages would transfer to a national scale. To circumvent the division, the National Executive Committee declared Party supremacy in November 1974 and Parliament passed a constitutional amendment that stated, "The functions of all the organs of the State of the United Republic shall be performed under the auspices of the Party."⁴⁰ The Party's consolidation of power marks the apex of statism according to many Tanzanian scholars, whereby Nyerere and Party elite came to represent the impersonal actor represented by "the State."⁴¹

Compulsory villagization put Tanzania on the radar of population control advocates. The country had not adopted a national population policy, but state authorities had ordered one of the most extensive population interventions of the twentieth century. The number of Tanzanians living in villages jumped from around 2.5 million at the

³⁷ The population of Dar es Salaam rose from approximately 270,000 in 1967 to 700,000 in 1977, see Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford University Press, 2013).

³⁸ "To live in villages is an order – Mwalimu," *Daily News*, 7 November 1973.

³⁹ Hartmann, "Development Policy-Making in Tanzania," 303.

⁴⁰ Bismarck U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt, *Towards Socialism in Tanzania* (University of Toronto Press, 1979), 170.

⁴¹ James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998), 74 fn 36.

beginning of 1974 to over 9 million in June 1975.⁴² In 1979, Nyerere claimed that 13 million people, or 90 percent of the population, lived in state-sponsored villages.⁴³ The accounts may have been exaggerations, but in 1978 a team from the United Nations documented that 93.8 percent of the population lived in villages, making Tanzania one of the least urbanized countries in Africa.⁴⁴

Tanzanians were generally amenable to a nationalist ethos in the early years of Ujamaa, but that did not mean that they wanted to be told where and how they must live. Mandatory villagization put their allegiance to, and digression from, Ujamaa principles under government purview. Scholars have shown that Tanzanians took refuge from the omnipresent national rhetoric, especially once villagization became compulsory, by erecting or solidifying whatever barriers they could muster between their public and private lives.⁴⁵ In many ways, villagization was formulated to break those barriers down. It was up to local leadership and militarized youth groups to decide the course of action for citizens who did not follow Party prescriptions. Some turned a blind eye, while others

⁴² Jennings, *Surrogates of the State*, 50.

⁴³ "Progress of village programme 'good,'" *Daily News*, 3 May 1979. This is likely a flawed statistic. Villagization was not as extensive and complete as the numbers indicate, particularly around urban centers, see Geoffrey Ross Owens, "From Collective Villages to Private Ownership: Ujamaa, Tamaa, and the Postsocialist Transformation of Peri-Urban Dar es Salaam, 1970–1990," *Journal of Anthropological Research* 70, no. 2 (2014): 214; Taimi Sitari, "Settlement Changes in the Bagamoyo District of Tanzania as a Consequence of Villagization," *Fennia-International Journal of Geography* 161, no. 1 (1983): 81. The estimations vary from 5 million in Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 223; to 11 million in Louise Fortmann, *Peasants, Officials and Participation in Rural Tanzania: Experience with Villagization and Decentralization* (Cornell University Center for International Studies, 1980), 33. Compulsory villagization ended in 1982 with the Local Government and Finances Act.

⁴⁴ United Nations Population Fund, "United Republic of Tanzania: Report of Mission on Needs Assessment for Population Assistance," (New York: UNFPA, 1979), 1.

⁴⁵ Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (University of California Press, 1980); James Leonard Gibling and Blandina Kaduma Gibling, *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania* (James Currey Publishers, 2005); Priya Lal, "Militants, Mothers, and the National Family: Ujamaa, Gender, and Rural Development in Postcolonial Tanzania," *The Journal of African History* 51, no. 1 (2010): 1–20.

resorted to destruction and coercion to achieve desired levels of cooperation. State attempts at hegemony, however, manifested in different ways depending on the policy priority. Government efforts to control agricultural production and commerce, for example, resulted in more strict enforcement mechanisms than its promotion of nuclear family norms.⁴⁶ Party officials rarely enforced single-family dwellings and never policed the number of children per household.⁴⁷

The differing agendas also became apparent in the government's use of propaganda. Party officials recruited famous musicians to promote Ujamaa philosophy and villagization, censoring those who failed to comply.⁴⁸ In the song "Masudi" by popular recording artist Marijani Rajabu, the titular male protagonist was unable to successfully navigate the trials and tribulations of urban life.⁴⁹ The song clearly worked to justify semi-regular forced removal programs that the government had begun in Dar es Salaam, with two big pushes in 1976 and 1983.⁵⁰ Yet, the elements of the song that engaged with family norms invoked a more collaborative and inclusive sentiment.

Masudi's parents were central to the song's refrains. They raised Masudi in a loving manner and were especially saddened by the way his life turned out because he was their

⁴⁶ For more, see Michael McCall, *Environmental and Agricultural Impacts of Tanzania's Villagization Programme* (Cambridge University Press, 1985); James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998); Leander Schneider, "Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa Vijijini, and Villagization," *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 38, no. 2 (2004): 344–392.

⁴⁷ For more, see Lal, "Militants, Mothers," 10-15.

⁴⁸ Ruth Finnegan, *Oral Literature in Africa* (Open Book Publishers, 1970), 289; Kelly Askew, *Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania* (University of Chicago Press, 2002).

⁴⁹ Marijani Rajabu and Dar International, "Masudi," n.d. Vol. 2, Audiocassette.

⁵⁰ Larry Sawers, "Urban Primacy in Tanzania," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 37, no. 4 (1989): 841-859.

only child. Having a single child was rare at the time, showing a clear endorsement of nuclear family norms. Yet, the song also acknowledged that familyhood could look different to different people. Rajabu offered a Swahili saying in his closing lines: “*Ukizaa ni taabu / ugumba pia nao ni taabu.*” To give birth is trouble, but infertility is also trouble. A song ostensibly about the problems of urban migration and troubled youth, ended with a nod to more nuanced expressions of parenthood. Prescribed family norms were not imbued with the same sense of coercion as the resettlement campaigns or agricultural production quotas. Moreover, the song couched parenting within Ujamaa’s broader development framework. Doing the right thing in one realm, in this case being doting parents, did not guarantee success in life. Childrearing was inherently related to other elements of society and decision-making, like education, urban migration, and greed. Responsible parenting depended on an integrated development agenda.

Democratizing Data and the 1978 Census

Claims that Tanzanian villagization was a population control policy have been heavily informed by observations of foreign actors. Many members of the international population establishment saw villagization as a way to allay Tanzania’s more worrisome demographic trends, for example, increasing agricultural production per capita, promoting lower fertility rates, and lowering population density in cities. The first step to changing statistics was better data collection. Villagers were expected to monitor family size, intervals between births, infant and maternal health, geographical distribution, rural/urban migration, population density, and dependency ratios. Staff from various United Nations

organizations showed awareness for Tanzania's responsible parenting ethos, couching data collection "within the overall consideration of responsibility in parenthood and family and community well-being."⁵¹ But however they spun it, imposing data collection on uncooperative citizens sounded more like population control than management.

During the era of Party supremacy in Tanzania, quantifying became a key component of governance. "[S]o many people moved to new villages, so many new villages formed, so many acres of crops sown, such and such percentage of a district rehoused, so many plots of land allocated, etc." writes James Scott.⁵² And the statistics were not round numbers. Government sources continually reported on the exact – or at least *an* exact – number of Tanzanians living in villages. Records had listed the number of people in state-run villages as 5,000 in 1967 and 300,000 in 1969, but in 1972 records showed 2,028,164 village residents.⁵³

Tanzanian citizens increasingly participated in the data collection process, voluntarily or otherwise. In 1976, a University of Dar es Salaam study found that 30 percent of sampled villagers did not use any data to plan village schemas and 64 percent used guessed statistics.⁵⁴ By 1979, all villages sampled used some data for development projects, with 75 percent of those being "carefully collected."⁵⁵ But not all demographic data collections were created equal. Much of the scholarship surrounding villagization has

⁵¹ UN, "National Experience," 19.

⁵²Ibid, 244 fn 81.

⁵³ Jennings, *Surrogates of the State*, 50; Andrew Coulson, *African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience* (Spokesman, 1979), 65.

⁵⁴ Paul S. Maro, "The Impact of Decentralization on Spatial Equity and Rural Development in Tanzania," *World Development*, Vol. 18, No. 5 (1990): 682.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

focused on how the Party's emphasis on quantification led to agricultural failure, for example, by moving farmers away from their fields to be closer to major roadways.⁵⁶ Yet, villagers responded differently to mandates for increasing crop yields than they did toward more benign, and perhaps exciting, demographic projects.

Tanzania's demographic awakening became most apparent during the 1978 census. The National Census Coordinator, Majengi Gwau, claimed the event would be a participatory exercise, not one of experts in a closed environment.⁵⁷ In late August, during dry season but after harvest for most summer crops, over 10,000 enumerators spread out to canvas the country.⁵⁸ Reports claimed that crowded streets in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma went dormant as people "stayed at home with their families ready to stand up with pride and confidence and be counted."⁵⁹ In rural areas where census gathering had proven to be difficult, a director commented, "Our problem is not to get people, but how to count all of them today."⁶⁰ Some enumerators claimed people were in fact "too enthusiastic," inviting the census takers to share tea or continue the conversation over a meal, which their tight schedules did not allow.⁶¹ Enumerator Edwin Lothi voiced annoyance with the conviviality of his interlocutors, but admitted their excitement was understandable, as the census only came around once a decade and served as a major national event.⁶² The census even became a central plot line for Edwin Semzaba's 1980s nationally broadcasted play

⁵⁶ Scott, *Seeing like a State*, 246.

⁵⁷ "Census to yield good results," *Daily News*, 3 September 1978.

⁵⁸ United Republic of Tanzania, *1978 Population Census Preliminary Report* (Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, n.d.).

⁵⁹ Joseph Mapunda, "The Census rolls on smoothly," *Daily News*, 3 September 1978.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

Ngoswe.⁶³

Conducting the census was a group effort, which relied on many elements of the population policymaking coalition. Prime Minister Edward Sokoine chaired the committee, University of Dar es Salaam faculty led the data analysis, the Ministry monitored the process closely, and donor agencies used the data for their programming.⁶⁴ Many enumerators were primary and secondary school teachers who used the ten-cell networks in villages to help canvas. As a result, it was the first time that census data were available at the village level in Tanzania. The government assigned a new team of managers to the Central Bureau of Statistics to analyze the results and update major publications.⁶⁵

Preliminary reports showed 3.8 percent population growth, more than the 3.2 percent that was a call to action after the 1967 census.⁶⁶ For many outside actors, the census results were a sign that the country should adopt a national population policy, specifically aimed at altering the ominous statistical trends. Tanzanian authorities, however, were more concerned with what the increase in population meant for the state and its citizens. Tanzania's population had risen to 17.5 million people, up from 5.2 million just eleven years earlier. Obviously, the vast majority of the surplus population would be young people

⁶³ Edwin Semzaba, *Ngoswe: Penzi Kitovu cha Uzembe*, Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, Education Services Centre, 1988.

⁶⁴ UNFPA, "Report of Mission," 29; Economic Commission for Africa, "Final Report on the National Seminar on Population and Development in the United Republic of Tanzania, Arusha, 17-24 February 1980: Organization, Recommendations and Papers Presented," 143.

⁶⁵ Zanzibar Department of Statistics, "Workbook on Demographic Analysis," 1983, 10.

⁶⁶ Conducting the census at the village level surely led to the counting of more people than the regional-level enumeration of previous census attempts, so it is unclear if this statistic is reliable. For more see Sitari "Settlement Changes in the Bagamoyo District," 16.

born in the intervening years. The government did not ignore the new demographic data, but reframed them within the context of village-based development policy.

Village Initiatives: Education, Family Planning, and Health

State authorities set up a central body in 1974 to coordinate and supervise the activities of Tanzanian organizations dealing with “population planning, family planning, family welfare and social welfare.”⁶⁷ In doing so, they provided institutional backing to the population policymaking coalition. The participating agencies comprised a long list, but included UWT, the family planning association, the Ministry of Health, University of Dar es Salaam faculty, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the UN Population Fund. Given the backdrop of the “statist decade,” the move could have been a way for the government to assert more control over the diffuse network. In practice, however, the central body emboldened non-state elements of the coalition to use the new villages as a launching pad for their policy agendas. The population policymaking coalition launched three major educational directives in the mid-1970s: universal primary education, a village-based population education course, and a series of radio campaigns.

Universal Primary Education: Addressing Age and Gender Disparity

With around half of the population under the age of 15 in the mid-1970s, education policy became population policy in Tanzania.⁶⁸ Government officials saw the problem

⁶⁷ Harry Karokola, “Body to link population activities,” *Daily News*, 22 October 1974.

⁶⁸ URT, *1978 Population Census Preliminary Report*.

through the lens of what to do with a growing number of young people, not how to quell the statistical trend. Echoing Nyerere's mantra "to plan is to choose," they had to decide where to focus their resources to confront the growing number of children. The decision related to other elements of development planning as well, such as choosing between building up human resources through expanding higher education or managing an increasing number of overeducated and underemployed youths. In line with the Ujamaa principle of equality and unity, the government decided to privilege primary school education over more advanced study.

In November 1974, TANU's National Executive Committee announced the "Musoma Declaration," which aimed to achieve universal primary education within three years. The plan included building new schools in every village, providing adequate school supplies, and training teachers. On paper, the program was an overwhelming success. Primary school enrollments went up from 43 percent in 1974 to over 97 percent in 1981.⁶⁹ To combat the problem of a growing number of university graduates for a limited number of civil service positions, the Musoma policy also included a stipulation that students would have to work for at least two years before entering university. Party leadership approved students for further study on the basis of their performance and the requirements of their village.

A primary benefit of universal primary education in Tanzania was to increase the

⁶⁹ UNESCO Institute for Statistics, available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR?locations=TZ&display=graph>. For more on the qualitative aspects of universal primary education in Tanzania, see Daniel N. Sifuna, "The Challenge of Increasing Access and Improving Quality: An Analysis of Universal Primary Education Interventions in Kenya and Tanzania since the 1970s," *International Review of Education* 53, no. 5–6 (2007): 687–699.

number of girls in school. To further encourage gender parity, in 1976 the Party lifted the requirement of university postponement for women.⁷⁰ Historian Matthew Connelly has said, “The only factor that has consistently and convincingly been found to correlate with lower fertility is increasing women’s education.”⁷¹ Tanzania was an early adopter of girls’ education as population policy, coming to the idea from its own demographic milieu instead of borrowing the approach from international women’s rights movements that had yet to fully understand the connection. Girls were more likely to be school leavers than boys in 1970s Tanzania, in large part due to families prioritizing boys’ education and girls dropping out due to pregnancy.⁷²

School-girl pregnancy was a recurring topic of public debate, resting at the prickly intersection of gender, family norms, and social service provision. In September 1981, participants at a workshop on women and child health asked the Ministry of Health to consider providing contraceptives to school-aged girls.⁷³ They argued that the social stigma surrounding early pregnancy was more of a punishment than a solution, which often led to risky at-home abortion and further problems for new mothers. Moreover, they pointed out that the proposal fit with Tanzania’s diverse set of family planning methodologies. Dar es Salaam resident Casimir M. Rubagumya wrote in a letter to the editor that Tanzania had never had a homogenous stance concerning pre-marital sex. He reminded readers, “Incidentally a few years back there was an outcry that allowing paid maternity leave to

⁷⁰ “Women may now enter University after NS,” *Daily News*, 21 October 1976.

⁷¹ Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 23.

⁷² Marjorie J. Mbilinyi, “The State of Women in Tanzania,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 6, no. 2 (1972): 375; I. M. Omari, ed., *Universal Primary Education in Tanzania*, IDRC-TS 42e (International Development Research Centre, 1983), 60.

⁷³ Emma Faraji, “Contraceptives recommended,” *Daily News*, 3 September 1981.

unmarried women would encourage sexual intercourse. Can a benevolent statistician tell us what is happening?”⁷⁴ His implication was that no significant uptick in debauchery ensued. The government had decided to support the extension of maternity leave to unmarried women earlier in the decade, but it rejected the plan to provide contraception to school girls – in large part because it was opposed by prominent members of the Ministry of Health and UMATI, who encouraged a more comprehensive family planning agenda than simple pill provision.⁷⁵

Family Planning Education

Like many arenas of Tanzanian population policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, if you were looking for kernels of population control in family planning programming, you could find them. After the 1978 census, references to educating uninformed citizens became more prominent in government statements. Some scholars have pointed to the shift as an indication that state authorities were narrowing their conception of “appropriate” population policy to match the population control framework, which relied on experts and knowledge diffusion.⁷⁶ Along those lines, the Prime Minister’s Office assembled a group from the University of Dar es Salaam, Food and Agriculture Organization, and UN Population Fund to develop a course on population and family life.

The resulting workbook, however, fully embraced the Ujamaa themes of integrated development, contextualized history, and social fertility norms. Moreover, teachers and

⁷⁴ Letter from Casimir M. Rubagumya, “Legalise contraceptives,” *Daily News*, 21 September 1981.

⁷⁵ Ernest Ambali “Pill proposal turned down,” *Daily News*, 13 September 1981.

⁷⁶ Richey, *Population Politics and Development*, 51.

village elders would lead the courses in their local communities, working as mediators between the written words on paper and spoken words of their peers.⁷⁷ The course was written in Swahili and had four lessons that matched the moral ethos underlying Tanzanian population management: the relationship between population and development, personal growth, family health, and parental responsibility. After each lesson, the pamphlet provided questions and exercises to engage participants in conversation.

The population and family life workbook emphasized the dual role of government and citizens in managing population. It discussed the steps that the government had taken to understand the country's demography and subsequent policy interventions. At the same time, it emphasized how individual family decisions affected national development, saying, "If there is a significant increase in population growth, it won't be matched with wealth production, and the quality of life for all people will continue to diminish."⁷⁸ Imagined kinship linked individual action to broader systems, including issues of environmental sustainability and natural resource conservation.

The team that organized the education project made sure to contextualize population growth in Tanzania. A lesson on the relationship between population growth and development explained how individual farming plots, which were common before Ujamaa, had been inefficient for the families tending them. Child labor was often necessary to increase productivity around the house and farm. Additionally, parents would have many children because infant mortality was high, there was a strong desire for male heirs,

⁷⁷ Jackson Makwetta, ed., "Elimu Ya Idadi Ya Watu / Maisha Ya Jamii: Mawasiliano Na Utafiti Ukiwianishwa Na Maendeleo Vijijini," FPA/URT/701, 1979.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 14.

and families could increase their wealth by marrying off daughters. When Ujamaa agricultural policies brought people together to farm communally, the need for child labor was reduced.⁷⁹ With universal primary education, children shifted their efforts to schooling.⁸⁰

The workbook maintained that children, their families, and the country were better off under Ujamaa, but raising children had become more expensive. In the exercise, “Cost of Each Additional Child,” participants performed an analysis of how much children cost versus how much they increased family income. At the time, it was common for people to assert that activities like collecting firewood and helping to raise siblings contributed to family wealth, but the exercise questioned whether those actions made up for children’s food, clothing, and school costs.⁸¹ The workbook’s authors understood, however, that having children was not simply a rational calculus. Attached to the exercise was a note recognizing that participants would likely push back against strict economic analyses of childbearing. The teachers were asked to steer conversations toward the intangible and social benefits of having children, while also reaffirming that Tanzanians had a responsibility to adequately feed, educate, and provide medical treatment for their children.⁸² The workbook did not prescribe a plan of action, but encouraged Tanzanians to think about their changing circumstances.

The economic crises of the 1970s had increased the burden on Tanzanian families.

⁷⁹ I.S.L. Sembajwe, “Changing Position of Women on Family-size and Child Survival” in “Final Report on the National Seminar on Population and Development in the United Republic of Tanzania,” February 1980, 118.

⁸⁰ Makwetta, “Elimu Ya Idadi Ya Watu,” 14.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, 28.

⁸² *Ibid*.

Women in particular saw a heightened economic workload. Many women recruited children to help generate income in the informal economy.⁸³ Children at work were not going to school, or were dropping out at earlier ages.⁸⁴ Changing labor practices, villagization, and generational change worked together to erode extended family networks and support systems.⁸⁵ Across East Africa, women increasingly turned to gendered dance groups, cooperatives, and religious communities for social support.⁸⁶ The family life workbook asked students to explain how the changing circumstances affected women and emphasized a renewed focus on the Ujamaa concept of self-reliance within women's groups and villages, particularly when it came to maternal and child health.⁸⁷

Village Health Campaigns

Maternal and child healthcare was a key part of the Ministry of Health and family planning association's policy agenda in the late 1970s. Villagization helped bring their efforts to more citizens, particularly in rural communities. One of their major programs was a series of radio campaigns, which incorporated participatory development into the healthcare sector. Discussions surrounding the campaigns brought to light a desire from citizens for the government to expand preventative healthcare, including family planning,

⁸³ Aili Mari Tripp, *Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania* (University of California Press, 1997), xiii, 107.

⁸⁴ Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy*, 217; Tripp, *Changing the Rules*, 128-29.

⁸⁵ Philip Leroy Kilbride and Janet Capriotti Kilbride, *Changing Family Life in East Africa: Women and Children at Risk* (Penn State Press, 1990).

⁸⁶ Megan Vaughan, "Which Family? Problems in the Reconstruction of the History of the Family as an Economic and Cultural Unit," *Journal of African History* 24, no. 3 (July 1983); Oxfam, "Annual Report 1986/87," Folder 2, MS Oxfam PRG/3/4/21, Oxford University Archives, England.

⁸⁷ Makwetta, "Elimu Ya Idadi Ya Watu," 18, 25-27.

and increase the institutional support for maternal and child health.

The Second Five-Year Plan had set aside funds for increasing coverage of radio transmitters throughout the country.⁸⁸ After their installation, radio could reach eight out of the thirteen million people living in Tanzania.⁸⁹ Radio campaigns echoed the Ujamaa ideal of development by the people, helping them to “feel that whoever they are, wherever they live, and whatever they do, [they] are all Tanzanian.”⁹⁰ The earliest campaign, *Kupanga ni Kuchuga* (to plan is to choose), launched in 1969 to explain the ideological context of Ujamaa and the Second Five-Year Plan’s policy agenda. *Wakati wa Furaha* (a time for rejoicing) celebrated Tanzania’s tenth anniversary in 1971. The program included 1,600 study groups and over 20,000 people, which was likely the largest radio-campaign in Africa up to that point.⁹¹

In 1973, the government launched *Mtu ni Afya* (person is health) to increase awareness about important health practices and provide an opportunity for community feedback. Budd Hall, a visiting professor working at the University of Dar es Salaam’s Institute of Adult Education, helped develop the program. He was attracted to the work because of Nyerere’s vision, which built on the knowledge and skills of ordinary men and women. “The Tanzanian approach was one of the earliest examples of participatory

⁸⁸ The radio campaigns were modeled off of prior pilots in Canada and India. See David R. Giltrow, “The Educational Communications Factor in Tanzania’s Rural Development,” Social Science Conference, University of Dar es Salam, December 1970, 2.

⁸⁹ Budd L. Hall, “Revolution in Rural Education: Health Education in Tanzania,” 22 August 1973. Preliminary Inventory to the International Council for Educational Development, No. 80192, Box 101, Hoover Institute Archives.

⁹⁰ Budd L. Hall, “An Evaluation of a Radio Study Group Campaign,” 1972, Preliminary Inventory to the International Council for Educational Development, No. 80192, Box 101, Hoover Institute Archives.

⁹¹ Hall, “An Evaluation,” 5.

development. Over a period of several years, many of us evolved an approach to research that we believed fit the vision, political aspirations, and reality of the Tanzanian context more adequately.”⁹² Hall and his team made a point to immerse themselves in village life rather than sitting in Dar es Salaam “thinking up research topics, gathering data in large-scale field survey, only to make meaning of the subsequent findings based on the logical imagination in the minds of the researchers.”⁹³ The researchers emphasized asking villagers what their primary concerns were and what could be done to help. One recurring plight was infant and maternal mortality.

In 1977, the Tanzanian government cited child mortality as one of the biggest population problems facing the country.⁹⁴ With more children being born, there were more chances for misfortune. Around 60 percent of mothers and children were covered under the MCH framework.⁹⁵ The Ministry of Health wanted to improve that number to 90 percent.⁹⁶ Nyerere announced the goal for at least one trained family planning aide at every dispensary and at least one health worker or midwife trained in family planning in every registered village.⁹⁷ Further, Tanzania would build over 200 new MCH clinics to correspond with the International Year of the Child in 1979.⁹⁸ The effort was part of a larger project from 1972 to 1987 to assemble a comprehensive infrastructure for healthcare

⁹² Budd L. Hall and Rajesh Tandon, "From Action Research to Knowledge Democracy, Cartagena 1977-2017," *Revista Colombiana de Sociología* 41, no. 1 (2018): 228.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ UN, "National Experience," 19.

⁹⁵ UNFPA, "Report of Mission," 2.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 56. The plan made definite headway, as one study showed that in 1984 95 percent of pregnant women were examined in clinics at least once. See Cuthbert K. Omari, *Socio-Cultural Factors in Modern Family Planning Methods in Tanzania* (E. Mellon Press, 1989), 37.

⁹⁷ Charles Rajabu, "Family experts for all," *Daily News*, 13 December 1974; "All registered villages to get health workers," *Daily News*, 1 July 1979; UN, "National Experience," 22.

⁹⁸ "Plan to build 200 clinics," *Daily News*, 1 January 1979.

provision, which included 152 hospitals, 250 health centers, and 2,600 dispensaries.⁹⁹

Trying to expand health services to millions of rural Tanzanians was a difficult job and required a variety of moving parts. The University of Dar es Salaam played a primary role through its Muhimbili medical campus and training hospital, which opened in 1976. The UN Population Fund helped to reorganize and expand Tanzania's civil registration system, which had ineffectively been in place since 1966, using the ten-cell units in villages to register births and deaths in rural areas.¹⁰⁰ The government also relied heavily on UMATI, which had been an official arm of the Ministry of Health since 1973. The family planning association was the only source of training and continuing education for most rural health personnel and family planning aides. It was operating more than 600 branches by the early 1980s.¹⁰¹ One commentator remarked, "The biggest danger to UMATI is being smothered in work."¹⁰² It looked to foreign partners for support.

Foreign Partnerships: Population Management Friend or Foe?

Even with the expansion of healthcare infrastructure, newspapers reported that Tanzania could spend only fractions on healthcare compared to Britain and the United States.¹⁰³ The Ministry of Health and UMATI relied on foreign partnerships to implement

⁹⁹ United Republic of Tanzania, "National Population Policy," 1992, 6.

¹⁰⁰ "Project Agreement between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and United Nations Fund for Population Activities," 1 January 1980, Record Group 286, P 641, 6124364, US National Archive, College Park, Maryland, United States.

¹⁰¹ Pauline W. Muhuhu, "Program for International Training in Health, Trip #108," May 1982, 2.

¹⁰² James Williams, "Program for International Training in Health, Trip #106," April-May 1982, 24.

¹⁰³ In 1976, Tanzanian spending capacity was at 1/70th of Britain's and 1/200th of the United States'. James Mpinga, "Building a nation of healthy people," *Daily News*, 6 December 1976. In 1980, only six percent of Tanzania's national budget was allocated for the health sector, see "Population/Family Planning Data Sheet," Section VI, 19 May 1980 data entry for "Changes since the July 1979 functional review," Record Group P 792, 7074393 (C16), AID, US National Archives, College Park.

much of their programming. In addition to the larger international organizations that had been active in Tanzania for some time, like USAID and various UN agencies, smaller healthcare NGOs entered the fray between the mid-1970s and 1980s. The influx of foreign public health organizations created a “trojan horse” potential surrounding biomedical contraception, which had become the standard family planning protocol in the United States and Europe.¹⁰⁴ Once again, however, foreign partners were amenable, and in many cases enthusiastic, toward Ujamaa development and the population management framework that promoted a more flexible family planning agenda.

International Training in Health: Midwives and Regional Leadership

The Program for International Training in Health (Intrah) was based at the University of North Carolina in the United States. From 1981 to 1984, its staff ran a series of family planning and health schemes in Tanzania. State authorities understood they would need outside support to achieve their healthcare goals, but they also wanted to preserve the Ujamaa development framework as much as possible. As a result, close surveillance was common across the NGO sector. Occasionally state authorities served as a watchdog, but more often they wanted to put a government face on foreigner-led projects.¹⁰⁵ At an Intrah training seminar in Kilimanjaro, for example, Party Representative Elizabeth Mziray opened the meeting and Party Chairman John Lazaro closed it.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Jennings, *Surrogates of the State*, 91.

¹⁰⁵ For more on the relationship between NGOs and the Tanzanian government, see Jennings, *Surrogates of the State*.

¹⁰⁶ Bonnie Pedersen, “Program for International Training in Health, Trip #242,” May 1984, 1.

Following the Ministry of Health's unveiling of its plan for universal MCH coverage, Intrah agreed to help develop "a cadre of senior level trainers with an expanded knowledge and skills base to meet the official and non-official requests for family planning training in Tanzania."¹⁰⁷ Many MCH aides were young women who had dropped out of primary school, providing the secondary benefit of viable employment for young women.¹⁰⁸ They were required to have a year of training at one of 19 training centers spread throughout the country. Aides were trained across the board in 40-hour units, which meant they received 40 hours of class time on family planning, matching the time spent on topics like antenatal care and labor protocols.¹⁰⁹

The government only allowed Intrah to conduct "training of trainers," who would then directly train MCH aides to serve village communities.¹¹⁰ The training seminars relied heavily on members of UMATI, including Grace Mtawali, who was the family planning association's Chief Training Officer. Intrah credited UMATI with help in navigating its relationship with state officials.¹¹¹ At the training-of-trainer courses, Intrah staff taught biomedical contraception and surgical techniques, but they were well aware of Tanzania's mixed approach to family planning.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Nyerere continued encouraging public conversations around child spacing methods and social mechanisms to prolong time between births, "with the aim of making children aware of their future parental

¹⁰⁷James Williams and Carol Brancich, "Program for International Training in Health, Trip #40," April 1981, 3.

¹⁰⁸Bonnie Pedersen, "Program for International Training in Health, Trip #101," April-May 1982, 8.

¹⁰⁹Ibid, 12.

¹¹⁰Muhuhu "Intrah Trip #108," 12.

¹¹¹Williams, "Intrah Trip #106," 21-23.

responsibilities, instead of mystifying the whole thing.”¹¹² He linked child spacing to mother and child health, making the practice part of the push for better MCH care. In 1982, Nyerere called on the Tanzania Parents Association to spearhead the movement and begin a “child spacing revolution.”¹¹³

Intrah joined the child spacing efforts through midwife training. Its staff generally accepted established midwife methodologies, including ceremonies, herbal remedies, and social taboos, especially for low-risk pregnancies and family planning.¹¹⁴ Training efforts focused on making midwives more aware of high-risk factors around pregnancy, so they could refer patients to a clinic or hospital that might be better equipped to handle serious problems. At the training seminars, midwives mentioned a desire to learn more about biomedical family planning, modern delivery practices, and drugs to prevent bleeding or ease pain during childbirth.¹¹⁵ The willingness of both groups to incorporate a variety of methods into their practice shows that family planning continued to be a collaborative endeavor, even with an influx of population control advocates.

Intrah was not simply toeing the Party line. In 1983 it chose UMATI to lead a family planning skills course for nurses from across Anglophone Africa.¹¹⁶ Intrah staff said that UMATI’s extensive training programs and long-term relationship with the International Planned Parenthood Federation made it a regional leader in family planning, but they were also tacitly endorsing the Tanzanian population management model as likely

¹¹² “Sex education should centre on parental obligation,” *Daily News*, 20 November 1976.

¹¹³ Attilio Tagalile, “Child spacing revolution set to begin,” *Daily News*, 30 August 1982.

¹¹⁴ Pedersen, “Intrah Trip #248,” 8.

¹¹⁵ Bonnie Pedersen, “Program for International Training in Health, Trip #249,” February-March 1984, 20.

¹¹⁶ Pauline W. Muhuhu, “Program for International Training in Health, Trip #213,” September 1983.

to work throughout the region.¹¹⁷ The training included three separate courses, with participants coming from Swaziland, Malawi, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, and Tanzania.¹¹⁸ At the closing of the training, E.E. Zablun, the Chairperson of Tanzania's Registered Nurses Association, encouraged the participants to work closely with influencers in their own countries, including politicians, teachers, women's organizations, traditional healers, youth organizations, religious leaders, and various family planning associations to make sure that family planning was upheld as a basic human right.¹¹⁹ In short, Zablun charged neighboring African countries to adopt Tanzania's population coalition and population management model. The request was not farfetched, as Tanzania's development agenda had attracted a following, even outside the continent.

Oxfam: Shared Values and Male Voices

Tanzania's multi-faceted approach to population policy was able to recruit a variety of international organizations to its cause, but perhaps none were more closely aligned with Ujamaa values than Oxfam. The British-based organization opened a Tanzania office in 1975, after previously working out of Nairobi for all of its East Africa programming. In the Tanzanian office's first Annual Report, Adrian Moyes and Jeremy Swainson commented, "If Oxfam were running a country it would have almost identical aims and for the most part similar policies."¹²⁰ It was clear that Tanzanian state authorities would have

¹¹⁷ Pauline W. Muhuhu, "Program for International Training in Health, Trip #108," May 1982, 2.

¹¹⁸ Pauline W. Muhuhu, "Program for International Training in Health, Trip #220," October 1983, 3;

Pauline W. Muhuhu, "Program for International Training in Health, Trip #248," May-June 1984, 4.

¹¹⁹ Pedersen, "Intrah Trip #248, 11.

¹²⁰ Oxfam, "Annual Report 1976/77," 2.

to do little in the way of performance or carefully constructed ambiguity to convince Oxfam agents to go along with their development agenda. Moyes and Swainson went on to say, “Tanzania’s understanding of development is very similar to Oxfam’s – perhaps because we have borrowed fairly freely from Nyerere’s ideas.”¹²¹

Yet, Oxfam’s staff came from a system fully entrenched in population control narratives and they strongly supported biomedical family planning. At the time of its first Annual Report in 1977, Oxfam was running two family planning programs in Tanzania, out of a total of nine worldwide.¹²² Conversation surrounding the Depo-Provera ban, World Population Conference, and national census had led to statements from some quarters of the Tanzanian citizenry that population control was inherently neo-colonial in nature. Tony Klouda, Oxfam’s in-country medical officer, wrote in 1979, “Unfortunately, Tanzania is in the middle of one of its periodic ‘the world is trying to control our population’ phases, and family planning is a dirty word at the moment.”¹²³ Both public opinion and Oxfam’s programming, however, were more nuanced than Klouda’s phrasing.

Prominent voices continued to distinguish between population control and elements of Tanzania’s population management program, saying things like “family planning is not population control.”¹²⁴ Oxfam understood that Tanzania’s situation appeared different from other areas where they worked. Reports documented that population pressure was not a real issue outside of a couple densely populated areas. Instead, Oxfam’s rationale for family

¹²¹ Ibid, 1.

¹²² Ibid, Appendix I, Table 2, Table 5.

¹²³ Tony Klouda, “1978 Report on Health,” Oxfam Health Unit, MS. Oxfam PRG/6/3/5/22, Oxford University Archive.

¹²⁴ Letter from Mrs. Cecilia J. Mihangwa (Moshi), “Family planning is not population control,” *Daily News*, 3 June 1980.

planning in Tanzania corresponded with the Ujamaa principles of integrated development and responsible parenthood. Child spacing was a way to encourage public health, the rights of children, and motherhood as a means “to lead a full life.”¹²⁵ As such, the organization focused their efforts in villages. In fact, they were often antagonistic toward high-level government officials in written reports and memoranda. The first Annual Report went so far as to call them “foreigners” to people living in villages.¹²⁶

Men almost always assumed the role of village leaders and tended to be the primary decision-makers in a family as well, which made them important allies to Oxfam’s village-based family planning programs.¹²⁷ During an August 1981 visit to Bukumbi, Klouda documented a conversation with village elders in which “talk of sex education and contraceptive availability was put down with righteous indignation, as this would only lead to promiscuity.”¹²⁸ The link between licentiousness and birth control was a common refrain among a certain segment of Tanzania’s male population, who in recent years had also opposed providing women with maternity leave benefits and teaching sexual education in schools. Klouda parsed out the feeling of exclusion behind elders’ strong rhetoric, “Interestingly, when I said that promiscuity could hardly be higher as there was a fantastic rate of venereal disease, a large increase in the number of abortions, and prostitutes in almost every bar, they said they knew this, but perhaps their traditional way of thinking could not keep up with the changes in society.”¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Oxfam, “Annual Report 1976/77,” 8.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 5.

¹²⁷ UNFPA, “Report of Mission,” 76.

¹²⁸ Tony Klouda, “Safari Report,” August 1981, Oxfam Health Unit, MS. Oxfam PRG/6/3/5/22, Oxford University Archive.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

Tanzanian society was evolving, especially when it came to women's place in it. Economic crisis had changed the nature of women's work, a growing women's rights movement was planting roots, and generational change was bringing with it a new era of leadership. Klouda tried to use Nyerere's push for child spacing to link contemporary practices with the "traditional" society at the heart of the men's nostalgia. He noted that customary methods to delay pregnancy, like prolonged lactation and abstinence until a child could walk, were dying out, but they need not have to. Oxfam put together a workshop that acknowledged elders' concerns by including lessons on preventing young women from becoming single mothers, while highlighting community leaders' responsibility to support women and their children.¹³⁰ Klouda included healers and religious leaders in the workshop because of their role in delineating acceptable social practices within village communities. With the breakdown of more established leadership structures, many women and couples turned to their religious communities for guidance.¹³¹

Religious Collaboration and Transnational Networks

One of the strengths of Tanzania's population management program was the applicability of its moral ethos and responsible parenting principle to various ideologies – including Christianity and Islam. Tanzania's heterogeneous makeup also applied to its citizens' religious beliefs. In almost every census since independence, about one third of

¹³⁰ Tony Klouda, "Workshop on Responsibilities for Village Leaders in Health," November 1980, Oxfam Health Unit, MS. Oxfam PRG/6/3/5/22, Oxford University Archive.

¹³¹ Kaivan Munshi and Jacques Myaux, "Social Norms and the Fertility Transition," *Journal of Development Economics* 80, no. 1 (2006): 1–38.

the country adhered to Christianity, one third to Islam, and one third privileged local religions.¹³² The even split lent itself to Nyerere's imagination of unity and equality, but he was not naïve. Religion had divided countries before and had periodically caused contention among Party leadership.¹³³ To preempt discord, the government promoted a dual message toward religious institutions and activities.¹³⁴ First, religion and politics did not mix. Second, religious institutions were expected to do their part for the nation and Ujamaa.¹³⁵

When it came to issues of birth control and family planning, religious leaders were surprisingly amenable to the charge. Most surprising was the Catholic Church.¹³⁶ Pope Paul VI had organized a commission to reconsider the ban on birth control in 1966, but a vocal minority led him to reaffirm the Vatican's ban on contraception with the encyclical *Humanae Vitae* (On Human Life) in 1968. Over two thirds of Tanzania's Christians were Catholic, including Nyerere himself, and they were spread throughout the country.¹³⁷ If they decided to follow the guidance of the Catholic Church over Ujamaa's responsible

¹³² For example, the 1967 census documented 30 percent of the population as Muslim, 32 percent as Christian, and 37 percent as practicing a local religion.

¹³³ David Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini: A Study of Some Aspects of Society and Religion in Tanzania, 1961-1977* (Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1980), 93-96; Mohamed Said, *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968): The Untold Story of the Muslim Struggle against British Colonialism in Tanganyika* (Minerva, 1998); and for a partial rebuttal of Said's biases, see Jonathon Glassman, "Muslim Nationalists in Tanganyika," *The Journal of African History* 42, no. 1 (2001): 164-66.

¹³⁴ Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 57. For more on the relationship between the state and religious groups during this time period, see Ludwig Frieder, *Church and State in Tanzania: Aspects of Changing in Relationships, 1961-1994* (Brill, 1999); Thomas Ndaluka and Frans Wijssen, eds. *Religion and State in Tanzania Revisited: Reflections from 50 Years of Independence* (LIT Verlag, 2014).

¹³⁵ Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 60.

¹³⁶ Though perhaps not all that surprising to those who study the matter, see Charles B. Keely, "Limits to Papal Power: Vatican Inaction After *Humanae Vitae*," *Population and Development Review* 20 (1994): 220-40.

¹³⁷ Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 8, 34.

parenting ethos, it would have been difficult to promote a collaborative population agenda.

The late Bishop Fortunatus Lukanima was a priest in Tanzania for 21 years before becoming the Bishop of Arusha in 1989. His rhetoric strongly matched the principle of responsible parenting and Nyerere's rhetoric. "Nobody should have a single child unless he or she is able to take care of it..." he openly discussed after his retirement, "I say this with a clear conscience to God that it is a sin to have children that you cannot take care of. Let's discuss family planning, condoms, birth control and so on."¹³⁸ Bishop Lukanima's comments are startling in their anti-Vatican tenor, but they are not an anomaly. Myriad other anecdotes of pro-family planning ministry members are scattered throughout the historical and oral record in Tanzania.¹³⁹ Given the sensitive nature of the topic within the Catholic Church, these anecdotes often remain latent, making those that have entered public discourse from Lukanima and Nyerere all the more telling.

For the most part, leadership in the broader Christian Church was also committed to the Ujamaa cause and integrated into the population management framework.¹⁴⁰ Christian churches ran a large portion of Tanzania's medical clinics, and their transnational connections made them attractive partners for foreign aid organizations looking to participate in Tanzania's population programming. One of the largest projects was the Uzazi wa Majira (the Swahili phrase for birth control) program running out of the Evangelical Lutheran Church's Iambi Hospital in Central Tanzania. The clinic was closely

¹³⁸ Knud Vilby, *Independent? Tanzania's Challenges Since Uhuru* (E&D Vision, 2007), 24.

¹³⁹ For example, see Hans Rosling, Ola Rosling, and Anna Rosling Rönnlund, *Factfulness: Ten Reasons We're Wrong about the World—and Why Things Are Better Than You Think* (St Martin's Press, 2018), 217.

¹⁴⁰ Jennings, *Surrogates of the State*, 65-79; Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 123-129.

affiliated with USAID and UMATI. Their mission was to “build up a stronger family planning competence.”¹⁴¹ The group trained hospital staff in administration of family planning services, diverse birth control methodologies, health education, record keeping, and reporting.¹⁴²

The most well-known Church-run hospital and training center was the Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Center (KCMC), which opened in Moshi in 1971. The government had commissioned the medical complex soon after independence to work as the primary referral hospital and training ground for northern Tanzania. The hospital received funding from a variety of sources, including the Ministry of Health, UMATI, USAID, and Oxfam.¹⁴³ It was known to be one of the best clinics in the country and busy enough to function as a day-time town.¹⁴⁴ After the Depo-Provera scandal, it was the only facility able to provide referrals for the injection, given the Ministry of Health’s strict supervision requirements.¹⁴⁵ The hospital provided family planning training for nurses and midwives from throughout the region, as well as individual consultations for family planning for around 30 to 40 women per week.¹⁴⁶ Promoting health and family planning would have had an impact outside of the hospital as well, as patients returned to their communities and shared their experiences with family and friends.¹⁴⁷ Church hospitals reach was

¹⁴¹ Letter from John R. Burdick to Joseph Loudis, 29 July 1982, File 6, Record Group 286/P 641/6124364/C22, US National Archives, College Park.

¹⁴² “Overview of Workplan Chart,” File 6, Record Group 286/P 641/6124364/C22, US National Archives, College Park.

¹⁴³ “TAN 59 FP Training Centre KCMC, Progress Report No. 5,” September 1975, Oxfam Information Department, MS. Oxfam COM/2/9/16, Oxford University Archives.

¹⁴⁴ Omari, *Socio-Cultural Factors*, 47.

¹⁴⁵ Pedersen, “Intrah Trip #101,” 17.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty* (Public Affairs, 2011), 117–18.

geographically limited, however, to the northern and central regions of Tanzania where most of them were located. The majority of people in the coastal region, which was also densely populated, were Muslim.

Muslim leadership was also able to use the principle of responsible parenting and transnational support to join national discussions on population. There had been strong Muslim involvement in the Party since before independence, with Sunni Muslims tending to be some of the most vocal supporters of Ujamaa philosophy.¹⁴⁸ When TANU and the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) on Zanzibar merged to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977, the political alliance added an Islamic perspective on development into the policymaking fray.¹⁴⁹ In general, their outlook amplified Nyerere's moral vision of childrearing.

Nyerere gave a speech to the Parents Association in Zanzibar in 1982 that outlined Islam's edicts of responsible parenting and emphasized the physical, mental, and social responsibilities of raising a family.¹⁵⁰ A Zanzibari respondent voiced a similar sentiment, saying, "God teaches us that we should take good care of our dependents, and we should spend wisely. So if I restrict the number of my children in order to take good care of them with the income I get, I don't believe that I will be offending God."¹⁵¹ Islamic law backed up their pronouncements. Sheikh Jadel Haq Ali Jadel Haq released fatwas in 1979 and 1980

¹⁴⁸ Westerlund, *Ujamaa Na Dini*, 81-91.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 83-84. For more on the influence of Islamic development on Party politics before the merger, see Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton University Press, 2015), 188.

¹⁵⁰ Muhuhu, "Intrah Trip #213," 21.

¹⁵¹ Cuthbert K. Omari, *Socio-Cultural Factors in Modern Family Planning Methods in Tanzania* (Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), 256.

that said there was no prohibition on limiting family size or abortion in Islamic law. Even so, many Muslim communities in Tanzania forbid the sale of contraceptive or abortive technologies.¹⁵² Instead, they emphasized social mechanisms of family planning that were commonly practiced in Muslim communities, including prolonged breastfeeding, child spacing, and polygyny.¹⁵³

Since the colonial era, commentators had pointed to the practice of polygyny as one of the strongest social fertility control measures in Tanzania. Under most Muslim codes of law, men were allowed up to four wives, so long as they could provide for them and their offspring. After a wife had given birth, she would often be sexually abstinent for two to three years while the husband transferred his reproductive attention to new wives.¹⁵⁴ While rates of child spacing due to breastfeeding were going down significantly across Tanzania, particularly in urban areas, rates of polygyny remained fairly high. In 1978, a USAID report documented that one third of Tanzanian women in the 40 to 49 age group (at which time a husband would likely have taken a second wife if he were going to do so) were one of multiple wives.¹⁵⁵

The practice of polygyny was not limited to Muslim communities on the coast, but

¹⁵² For information on contraceptive use in Zanzibar, see Omari, *Socio-Cultural Factors*, 298. For more on Islamic law and family planning, see Issa Ziddy, "Uislam na uzazi wa mpangilio," September 2009. Many North African countries also promoted family planning and population policies at the time, for more see Jennifer Johnson, "The Origins of Family Planning in Tunisia: Reform, Public Health, and International Aid," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 92, no. 4 (2018): 664-693; Laura Bier, "From Birth Control to Family Planning: Population, Gender, and the Politics of Reproduction in Egypt," In *Family in the Middle East* (Routledge, 2008), 71-95.

¹⁵³ Omari, *Socio-Cultural Factors*, 249, 291.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Memo from USAID's Gary Merritt, 8 November 1978, Record Group 286, P 641, 6124364, US National Archive at College Park.

the region was most heavily hit by problems of infertility.¹⁵⁶ In many social circles, having children was linked to male virility and sexual prowess. “When a person obtains many children, he is socially and culturally respected and becomes famous, and the other people have a high opinion of him,” said a Zanzibari man in a 1989 study.¹⁵⁷ As a result, the most urgent family planning problem for many Muslim couples was getting pregnant. The University of Dar es Salaam launched a country-wide research project in 1980 to investigate the prevalence, pattern, and distribution of infertility “in a bid to fight the social malady.”¹⁵⁸ Their attention to citizens on the coast and Zanzibar showed harmony between the coastal regions and national politics, but the relationship was not always so unified.

The Edges of Ujamaa

Ujamaa promoted a nationalist ethos, but it did not penetrate all regions of Tanzania with the same force. When it came to population politics, two regions in particular stood out as following their own policy agenda: the isolated island archipelago of Zanzibar and Arusha in northern Tanzania. The approach to population policy at the edges of Ujamaa showed an understanding of the underlying principles of population management, but governing authorities ultimately moved toward more standardized population control programs that emphasized manipulating demographic trends. In doing so, they offered a helpful contrast to national discourse and underscored why population management emerged in some Tanzanian contexts, but not others.

¹⁵⁶ UN, “National Experience,” 26.

¹⁵⁷ Omari, *Socio-Cultural Factors in Modern Family Planning Methods in Tanzania*, 221.

¹⁵⁸ Ernest Ambali, “Research on infertility soon,” *Daily News*, 24 May 1980.

Zanzibar: Limited State Capacity and Control

Zanzibar's history has been largely distinct from the mainland. The island archipelago had close ties to the Omani Sultanate, which had its own colonial relationship with Britain. Zanzibar's independence came two years after Tanganyika's in December 1963 and led to a revolution one month later.¹⁵⁹ Even after the two sovereign powers united in October 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania, their trajectories remained on somewhat parallel tracks. Under the power sharing agreement, Zanzibar was responsible for its own domestic development, such as health and education, but they were at the mercy of the national government for aid money and programming.

Zanzibari officials did not develop the islands' first post-independence development plan until 1978, in the aftermath of the national census. The country's demographic milieu was more known at that point, a full decade after the Arusha Declaration, and a new statistical department helped supplement Zanzibar's demographic records with a detailed industrial census in 1979 and household budget census in 1982.¹⁶⁰ The results of the data collection efforts startled officials. Its "island mentality" led to anxieties about perceived carrying capacity.¹⁶¹ The 1978 census showed a population of about half a million people, compared to seventeen million on the mainland, but Zanzibar's

¹⁵⁹ In overly simplistic terms, Zanzibaris who identified as African and Persian overthrew the Sultan and Arab leadership. For more, see Laura Fair, *Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890–1945* (Ohio University Press, 2001); Michael F. Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 2015).

¹⁶⁰ Economic Commission for Africa, "Workbook on Demographic Analysis," 1983, Middle level course, Zanzibar Department of Statistics, 11.

¹⁶¹ Kathleen Wilson, *The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century* (Psychology Press, 2003).

overall growth rate was similarly high at 3.2 percent per year.¹⁶² Moreover, many communities needed to live near the ocean for fishing or coastal navigation routes, which further limited available living space.

The Zanzibari government reached out to the population coalition on the mainland for advice. In 1982, Nyerere gave a speech to a Parents Association of Tanzania meeting in Zanzibar encouraging child spacing, while Intrah and UMATI conducted a four-day family planning workshop that resulted in a 40-hour family planning training unit for the Ministry of Health and nursing students.¹⁶³ Intrah staff said the Zanzibari government's request for the meeting was "significant because it was the first official move toward including child spacing services in MCH units in Zanzibar."¹⁶⁴ Yet, Zanzibar did not have the development budget to embark on large-scale health or education interventions.

Based on the power-sharing agreement with the mainland, Zanzibar received about three percent of Tanzania's foreign aid.¹⁶⁵ Additionally, it was not allowed to directly interact with international organizations. The national government arranged for representatives from the UN Population Fund and Economic Commission of Africa to conduct a six-week workshop in Zanzibar in April 1983 that focused on methods, evaluation, and utilization of demographic data statistics.¹⁶⁶ They commented, "since population size, structure, growth and distribution have implications on the economy and

¹⁶² Zanzibar Revolutionary Government, "1981 Statistical Abstract," 19.

¹⁶³ Second African Population Conference, 1984, ST/ECA/Pop/1, 433; Williams, "Intrah Trip #106," 1.

¹⁶⁴ Williams, "Intrah Trip #106," Addendum.

¹⁶⁵ Ulf Engel, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler, *Tanzania Revisited: Political Stability, Aid Dependency, and Development Constraints* (GIGA-Hamburg, 2000), 141.

¹⁶⁶ ECA "Workbook on Demographic Analysis," 166.

society, plans and programmes should take care of these.”¹⁶⁷ It is clear that the workshop’s organizers were promoting a population control narrative. They continued, “Planners want to have things under control, it is their job to control and adjust. So why not control and adjust population size?”¹⁶⁸

Zanzibari officials may not have completely agreed with the underlying rationale, but if demographic interventions could help alleviate socioeconomic problems, it would increase the islands’ budget without mediation from the mainland. The UN representatives claimed that “the implications for the planning are enormous” if Zanzibar could lower their fertility rate from six children per woman down to four.¹⁶⁹ It could lead to an increased food supply, combat nutritional deficiencies at the root of child mortality, and make education goals easier to reach. On the other hand, they warned that if fertility rates remained unchanged, large youth cohorts would put serious demands on Zanzibar’s healthcare infrastructure, education system, food supply, job availability, and housing.¹⁷⁰

The Zanzibari government’s interest in population control showed that economic arguments were intriguing for governments with limited state capacity, but it also made clear that some baseline level of funding was necessary to adopt population control policies. Without the budget or institutional support to enforce a population agenda that was separate from the national government, it was unclear what exactly Zanzibari officials could do to lower fertility rates.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 167.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

One option was to form alliances with groups outside of the government. Islamic networks in particular could have been key partners in adopting a regional population policy in Zanzibar. They had been amenable to the national policymaking agenda on the mainland, but the primary population control tenet of having fewer children was less of a match with Islamic discourse than the flexible concept of responsible parenthood.¹⁷¹ Instead of joining a population policymaking coalition, Islamic leaders used more local systems of education and community building to instill family values. Overall, the experience showed that actionable population policy needed financial and public support. Although those prerequisites did not materialize in Zanzibar at the time, they did on the opposite side of the country in Arusha.

Population Control in Arusha: Land Pressure and Exclusion

The regional government in Arusha began advocating for demographic intervention in the early 1980s in response to increasing anxiety over land availability. “Even by conservative estimates the Arusha Region of Tanzania has one of the highest population growth rates in the world,” stated a USAID report in 1982.¹⁷² Although its fertility and mortality rates were similar to the rest of Tanzania, Arusha’s net migration rate was much higher. The region was home to the country’s major coffee and tea plantations, making it attractive to migrant laborers. Increasing migration, large-scale plantations, an abundance of pastoral communities that used land for grazing, and bordered-off national parks led to

¹⁷¹ Ziddy, “Uislam na uzazi wa mpangilio;” Omari, *Socio-cultural Studies*, 216-28.

¹⁷² USAID, “Arusha Population Project,” 10 February 1982, Record Group 286/P 747/6783476/C7, US National Archives, College Park.

acute land shortages. The region's economy depended on plantations and the labor to work them, while the national government preserved national park and grazing land, so fertility rates emerged as the variable most amenable to change.

In 1982, Arusha's regional government unveiled a plan titled "Development Strategies and Priorities for the Next Twenty Years," which explicitly prioritized lowering the region's population growth rate from 3.8 percent to below 3 percent over a three-year period.¹⁷³ The plan grew out of the region's close relationship with USAID, which had been conducting a village development project in Arusha since 1979. Like other foreign organizations within the population policymaking coalition, USAID staff had close contact with villagers. Reports documented their growing concerns over population growth, migration, and land availability.¹⁷⁴ "The people of the region, acting through their village leadership, have recognized the threat to their environment and their future well-being, have voiced their concern, and have asked that something be done about the problem of too rapid population growth in the region."¹⁷⁵

USAID appropriated nearly one million dollars to develop an educational campaign, increase family planning availability, expand UMATI's services, and assess the role of migration in Arusha's population growth.¹⁷⁶ Their approach resembled state-wide

¹⁷³ "Arusha Region: Development Strategies and Priorities for the Next 20 Years," 1986, Regional Commissioners Office, 9.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷⁵ USAID, "Arusha Population Project," Introduction. Keep in mind that Arusha was excluded from the brunt of Ujamaa policy implementation. Its well-developed cash-crop economy, populated villages, and relatively powerful bureaucracy prompted the Party to simply designate existing villages as part of the Ujamaa scheme instead of creating new communities from scratch, *see* John E. Moore, "The Villagisation Process and Rural Development in the Mwanza Region of Tanzania," *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 61, no. 2 (1979): 68; Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 236.

¹⁷⁶ USAID, "Tanzania Arusha Population/Land Use Planning PID, 1982-85," Record Group 286/P 747/6783476/C7, US National Archives, College Park.

population management, using the region's established medical infrastructure and village system to implement programming. They worked closely with demographers from the University of Dar es Salaam and members of the family planning association.¹⁷⁷ The language and methods used by USAID in Arusha, however, pointed to closer alignment with their population control roots than Ujamaa principles. Supporting documents commented, "So, as the country slides deeper and deeper into economic insolvency, the population clock ticks away, heard but unheeded by Tanzania's senior decision makers who believe themselves fully employed by problems of a more seemingly immediate nature."¹⁷⁸

The project's major intervention was to increase the acceptor rate for biomedical contraception. A USAID report listed the project's beneficiaries as all one million inhabitants of the region and the 300,000 fertile men and women who would have access to increased family planning information and services.¹⁷⁹ The acceptor rate went up from 9.3 percent in 1984 to 51 percent by 1991, which was an unmitigated success.¹⁸⁰ Yet, Arusha's population continued to grow at an even higher annual rate, with the urban center doubling from 70,000 to 140,00 over that same time period.¹⁸¹ Clearly, the desire to have more available land was not the same as the desire to have fewer children. Scholarship has shown that many women who used birth control in African communities did so to prolong

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 5, 12.

¹⁷⁸ USAID, "Arusha Population Project," Introduction.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 6.

¹⁸⁰ "Tanzanians accept family planning," *Daily News*, 20 August 1991.

¹⁸¹ United Nations, World Population Prospects Database.

their child bearing years, not limit the number of births.¹⁸²

Moreover, the push for increased contraception use did not apply to all people of child-bearing age equally. Having a policy agenda that sought to lower growth rates inevitably led to a discussion about who exactly was having too many children. The Arusha project singled out groups where higher acceptor rates could lead to more statistically significant results. The Maasai had slightly higher fertility rates than the national average and used more acre per head than sedentary ethnic groups, so they were a primary target.¹⁸³ A USAID report claimed, “As a traditional and pastoral people many of the Masai are neither very knowledgeable about nor amenable to the benefits that modern health care can provide.”¹⁸⁴ In all of the population policies that came out of Tanzania in the first four decades after independence, the Arusha plan was one of the only instances where a particular ethnic group was singled out.

The land crisis in Arusha led the regional government to adopt policies more in line with population control than national directives. Their plan of action brought into question whether population management was only possible when state authorities and public opinion did not perceive there to be a demographic crisis. The question, however, assumed that population control worked better to alter demographic trends than population management. The Arusha plan neither lowered population growth rates nor matched citizens’ desires for population programming. Moreover, it discriminated against

¹⁸² Caroline H. Bledsoe, Fatoumata Banja, and Anthony T. Carter, *Contingent Lives: Fertility, Time, and Aging in West Africa* (University of Chicago Press, 2002).

¹⁸³ Ernestina Coast, “Maasai Demography” (PhD Thesis, University of London, 2000).

¹⁸⁴ “The Masai Health Services Project of the Lutheran Synod of Arusha Region: Proposal for Financial and Technical Assistance,” 11 January 1981, Masai Health Services Project, Columbia University, Center for Population and Family Health, US National Archive, College Park.

“traditional” types of family planning that were well-established throughout Tanzania and targeted specific ethnic groups that practiced them.

In comparison, the national government’s population management approach continued to offer a diverse range of education, health, family planning, and development programs that responded to input from Tanzanian citizens. State authorities engaged both new and long-standing members of the population coalition to help create and implement policies that focused on the effects of changing demography, rather than prioritizing efforts that tried to alter statistical projections. When debates arose, their policies tended toward inclusion – providing education for everyone in the next generation, offering a variety of family planning methodologies, and assembling forums where marginal factions could voice their concerns.

The Tanzanian delegation at the 1974 Third World Population Conference had warned against making population policy that was based on bogeys and fear. For the most part, state authorities had heeded the advice. A decade later, however, the political winds were shifting. With widespread population growth throughout the continent, imminent changes to Tanzania’s political landscape, and structural adjustment on the horizon, the population coalition would soon lose control of its domestic programming and embrace the potential economic panacea of population control. Perhaps Zanzibar and Arusha were not anomalies within Tanzania’s population management framework, but warning signs.

CHAPTER 4

TRANSPOSED FRAMEWORKS: CHANGES TO TANZANIAN AND INTERNATIONAL POPULATION POLICY (1984-1999)

“Contrary to the thinking and statements in many quarters, Tanzania has done more on population and its other related matters than many countries of comparable resources and development level.” – Tanzanian delegation, Second African Population Conference, 1984 ¹

Population management appeared to be blossoming in Tanzania in 1984. That year, the Second African Population Conference was held in Arusha with representatives from 49 African countries and the Executive Director of the UN Population Fund in attendance. Members of the Tanzanian delegation proudly proclaimed that their country was on the frontlines of population policymaking. They offered a long list of occasions when state leadership had publicly supported population programming, including Nyerere’s maternal and child health campaigns to commemorate the Year of the Child and his address to the Parents Association in Zanzibar, the Vice President’s comments at the opening of a UNICEF facility in Iringa in 1983, and various speeches by the Prime Minister about the importance of family planning and child spacing.²

The speech went on to acknowledge myriad elements of Tanzania’s population coalition, praising the family planning association, staff at over 2000 MCH and family planning clinics, collaborations with various NGOs and church groups, and the central role of women in formulating and implementing successful population policy.³ It emphasized the importance of integrating population within “the context of the human-centered, mass-

¹ UNFPA, “Second African Population Conference,” January 1984, ST/ECA/POP/1, 433.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid; “Population problems outlined,” *Daily News*, 10 January 1984.

based development policy,” which included providing access to clean water, rural health, universal primary education, adult education, and agricultural services.⁴ The delegation concluded that in spite of having no explicit population policy, Tanzania had adopted one of the most comprehensive population programs on the continent.⁵ What the Tanzanian delegation at the 1984 Second African Population Conference did not know was that after a generation of population management policy, the country would fall into the clutches of the population control movement in a few short years.

There is Orwellian irony to the year 1984 functioning as a fulcrum for changing population narratives in Tanzania. In one sense, the country tore down its statist governing apparatus by ending its push for villagization, opening the door for liberalized markets, and seeing Nyerere mark his intention to step down from the presidency after 23 years in office. “The State” abated into the periphery of governance. In its place arose a more decentralized informal economy, a proliferation of non-governmental organizations, and identity politics. The shifting political economy could have strengthened Tanzania’s population management ethos by enlivening its core policymaking coalition through an expanded role and more direct engagement with constituents – but it did not. Without the other supporting elements of population management, including Nyerere’s leadership, a strong nationalist sentiment, and an underlying moral ethos, the population policymaking coalition fractured. In its place arose attempts at a more regulated period of population control.

⁴ UNFPA, “Second African Population Conference,” 434.

⁵ Ibid.

Since independence in 1961, Tanzanian officials had responded to various UN population inquiries by saying their growth rates were satisfactory, but in 1983 they changed their tenor to “lower rates desirable.”⁶ The government began planning and implementing policies to achieve this statistical goal, eventually settling on the adoption of a National Population Policy in 1992. State authorities had been vocally opposed to the international population establishment’s favored tool for spurring demographic change for decades, but amidst economic crisis the potential of population interventions to stimulate economic growth became a policy priority. The pivot ushered in a variety of population control practices: methods for achieving demographic goals became more prescribed and less flexible; public health policies began prioritizing biomedical forms of contraception; an economic ethos replaced the moral spirit of Ujamaa population policy; and the policymaking coalition splintered into siloed agendas concerning women’s rights, family planning, and development.

Tanzania’s turn toward population control accompanied the implementation of structural adjustment programs, which spread across African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The growing influence of international organizations and foreign funders no doubt affected the country’s changing population agenda. Interestingly, however, the international population establishment was moving away from the population control paradigm that had been its guiding beacon throughout the twentieth century. In its wake,

⁶ United Nations, “National Experience in the Formulation and Implementation of Population Policy, 1960-1976,” (UN, 1978), 8; United Nations Population Fund, “United Republic of Tanzania: Report of Mission on Needs Assessment for Population Assistance” (UNFPA, 1979), 21; Lisa Ann Richey, *Population Politics and Development: From the Policies to the Clinics* (Springer, 2008), 48-49.

the international community promoted a more integrative approach to population policy that closely resembled Tanzania's previous decades of programming. The United Nations began removing demographic statistics as the core indicator of population problems and successful interventions. They also encouraged integrating population programs into a more holistic development approach that included universal education and better healthcare.

The transposition of Tanzanian and international population strategies prompts an analytical dilemma for arguments that rely on external drivers of Tanzanian population policy. If foreign intervention was primarily responsible for motivating domestic policy, why would it enact an outdated paradigm? It is true that policy often lags behind scholarship and activism, but it is still unclear why and how Tanzania abandoned population management at the same time that the international population establishment was embracing it. Instead of looking to changes in global discourse for answers, Tanzania's own history is more illuminating. What about Tanzania from 1967 to 1992 made it fertile grounds for developing the population management approach? More importantly, what had changed by 1992?

Previous chapters highlighted the elements of Ujamaa state-building and policymaking that led to Tanzania's early adoption of population management. By examining their mutual demise, this chapter reinforces the role that leadership, nationalism, policymaking coalitions, and morality played in supporting a population management ethos. I begin by analyzing the changes to population policy that accompanied the end of Nyerere's tenure as president. Without Nyerere and the Ujamaa framework supporting a

unified sense of “Tanzania,” the previously integrated population coalition splintered. Having a multiplicity of authorities had led to flexibility and choice in family planning, but they needed a common goal – responsible parenting – to work as the glue. Without it, segments of the coalition, including health practitioners, religious leaders, and women’s rights activists, began pursuing their own agendas in the face of government policy, instead of acting in line with it.

After Ujamaa: Structural Adjustment and the Post-Nyerere Presidency

Ali Hassan Mwinyi was elected to serve as the second president of Tanzania in 1985, but Nyerere remained a national figurehead as chairman of the Party until 1990. The five years that make up the twilight of Nyerere’s political career also reflect the end of Ujamaa. In 1991, the Zanzibar Declaration replaced the Arusha Declaration as the guiding philosophy of Tanzanian governance. When it came to population policy, the shift led to an abandonment of Tanzania’s population management approach, as the government adopted a National Population Policy in 1992. Much like the transition from the colonial era to independence decades earlier, however, the move away from Ujamaa was not a clean break.

Elements of the population coalition and participatory policymaking held on through the first iteration of structural adjustment. Nyerere and his ideas of responsible parenting lingered in the public spotlight, grassroots networks continued to function in villages and the increasingly informalized urban sector, and limited resources necessitated that the government secure buy-in from the same thought leaders who had comprised the

core of Ujamaa's population policymaking coalition in the decades prior. It was clear, however, that the hold would not last forever. Privatization of social services increased the costs of raising children and brought childrearing's economic factors to the forefront, biomedical birth control became more central to family planning agendas, and population anxiety spread across the "Global South." The changes cracked the façade of population management in Tanzania.

Economic Collapse and Privatizing Services (1984-86)

Tanzanian state authorities had kept a semblance of control over domestic policy during economic hardship in the early 1970s, but a decade later their situation was dire. The long-term nature of economic distress and compounding factors like war with Uganda, a fall in agricultural production, import constraints, goods famines, the end of the coffee and tea boom, and the breakup of the East African community led to immense pressure on the government to do something to reverse economic decline.⁷ Nyerere had advocated for self-reliance throughout his tenure and continued to do so in the face of economic crisis, particularly when it came to food production. In the 1984 budget he stressed "burden sharing" between the government and citizens, embodying the principle of reciprocal democracy that the nation had run on since independence.⁸ Yet, numerous public officials and outside critics questioned whether Ujamaa policy itself was causing (or at least

⁷ Michael F. Lofchie, "The Roots of Economic Crisis in Tanzania," *Current History (Pre-1986)*, 84, no. 501 (April 1985): 159-184; Brian Van Arkadie, "Economic Strategy and Structural Adjustment in Tanzania," PSD Occasional Paper No. 18 (September 1995).

⁸ Mkumbwa Ally and James Wakisyala, "Burden Sharing Budget," *Daily News*, 15 June 1984.

significantly exacerbating) economic strife.⁹ It was increasingly apparent that Nyerere would have to choose between Ujamaa philosophy and economic reform.

In the background of the 1984 budget negotiations were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Their representatives urged the Tanzanian government to liberalize markets, privatize major social sectors, and abandon strong centralized economic controls in an attempt to reverse economic decline. Although they were still two years away from an official agreement, the 1984 budget included a handful of IMF recommendations, including raising the minimum wage to encourage trickle-down spending, removing price controls, and abandoning food subsidies.¹⁰ When Mwinyi became president, one of his first major policy changes was to sign agreements with the IMF and World Bank, officially beginning the period of structural adjustment in Tanzania in June 1986.

Structural adjustment crippled Tanzania's population management strategy. For many Tanzanian policymakers, childrearing decisions became couched in economic terms rather than Ujamaa's moral ethos. Removing the ideological basis for population management showed that Nyerere's embodiment and practice of Ujamaa principles had been key for its implementation. In 1969, Nyerere had articulated that Tanzanian population policy would "put emphasis on caring for children and the ability to look after them properly, rather than thinking only about the numbers of children and the ability to

⁹ Frances Stewart and Jennifer Sharpley, *Economic Policies and Agricultural Performance: The Case of Tanzania*, (OECD Development Centre, 1985); Van Arkadie, "Economic Strategy and Structural Adjustment in Tanzania," 15.

¹⁰ For a more detailed account, see Van Arkadie, "Economic Strategy and Structural Adjustment in Tanzania," 28-29.

give birth.”¹¹ Caring for children “properly” was a collaborative endeavor. Individuals, communities, and the government were in it together.

By the middle of the 1980s, however, the Tanzanian government could not keep up with its end of the bargain. For example, the government had committed to providing an infrastructure for a growing young cohort with universal primary education. On paper, they had achieved the goal, with primary school enrollment nearing 100 percent.¹² In practice, however, the school system was severely crippled. An Oxfam agent reported that its “standards [were] at rock bottom.”¹³ Statistical enrollment said little about teaching qualifications, classroom infrastructure, or absenteeism. Providing universal education also took up a large portion of national and local budgets.¹⁴ Given the ineffective and costly nature of the education sector, World Bank and IMF loans mandated its privatization.

Privatization increased the prevalence of school fees, making school more expensive.¹⁵ Moreover, when private secondary schools opened in 1984 it caused an increase in dropouts for public school students whose families could not afford the “better” education.¹⁶ Even if young adults completed their schooling, job prospects were not great.

¹¹ United Republic of Tanzania, “Second Five-Year Development Plan,” Volume I, xii.

¹² UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “School enrollment, primary (% gross) – Tanzania,” available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR?locations=TZ&display=graph>, accessed 6 January 2020. For more information on primary school enrollment and challenges, see United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Education, *The Primary School Sub-Sector Review*, 1981.

¹³ Oxfam, “Annual Report 1986/87,” Folder 2, MS Oxfam PRG/3/4/21, Oxford University Archives, Oxford, England.

¹⁴ Issa M. Omari, A. S. Mbise, S. T. Mahenge, G. A. Malekela, and M. P. Beshu, *Universal Primary Education in Tanzania* (IDRC:1983), 42, 48-50; Joel Samoff and Suleman Sumra, “Financial Crisis, Structural Adjustment, and Education Policy in Tanzania,” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 4-7 April 1994.

¹⁵ Samoff and Sumra, “Financial Crisis, Structural Adjustment, and Education Policy;” Oka Obono, “Cultural Diversity and Population Policy in Nigeria,” *Population and Development Review* 29, no. 1 (2003): 104.

¹⁶ Oxfam, “Annual Report, 1986/87,” 14-15.

For the first time in 1986, the government was unable to absorb degree students from the University of Dar es Salaam into the wage sector.¹⁷ The formal economy was one of the hardest hit by structural adjustment. It was replaced by a burgeoning informal economy in urban centers, which relied heavily on women and children – and required no formal education.¹⁸

The Ministry of Health also began privatizing health care services and hospitals amidst structural adjustment.¹⁹ On top of implementing service fees, healthcare providers increasingly relied on external organizations for funding. Although foreign entities like Oxfam and USAID had financially supported previous health programming, they had also supported the tenets of Ujamaa and followed its guiding framework. When those same organizations helped usher in the Primary Health Care framework in Tanzania in the mid-1980s, the Ujamaa development framework was being replaced by structural adjustment. Foreign planners, therefore, replaced policy and implementation mechanisms that previously fell under the purview of the Ministry of Health and UMATI with plans developed in their British and U.S.-based offices.²⁰ The family planning association continued to be actively involved in service provision, but input from its overseers became more prescribed, especially with the 1985 National Child Spacing Programme.

¹⁷ Oxfam, “Annual Report 1985/86,” Folder 2, MS Oxfam PRG/3/4/21, Oxford University Archives.

¹⁸ Aili Mari Tripp, *Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania* (University of California Press, 1997), 129; Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy*. (Clarendon Press, 1982), 217.

¹⁹ The Private Hospitals Act was passed in 1977, but entered into effect slowly, beginning in July 1980.

²⁰ Oxfam, “Annual Report 1985/86,” 11; M. Peter McPherson, “International Family Planning,” 25 November 1985, policy no. 772, address before American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.

Changing Family Planning and Birth Control Debates (1985-89)

Unlike UMATI's previous efforts to offer a variety of services under the banner of family planning, the National Child Spacing Programme had the explicit purpose of raising contraception use in Tanzania from five percent to ten percent.²¹ According to the U.S. Center for Disease Control, ten percent was a typical usage rate for women in Africa at the time.²² In theory, the new initiative continued to encourage social mechanisms of family planning as complementary to biomedical contraception. Rashidi Kawawa, Tanzania's former Prime Minister and one of the people considered to replace Nyerere as president in 1985, was a vocal proponent of child spacing. In 1984, he promoted the use of herbs and social practices as "excellent and easy to understand."²³

The majority of Tanzanians still relied on midwives to oversee childbirth. In fact, there had been an uptick of midwife use in urban areas, as the implementation of hospital user fees led people to return to more informal methods of childbearing.²⁴ The rise of the informal economy and disruption of government service provision, however, came with consequences for midwifery. Because midwives had been attending government training courses since the early 1980s, many Tanzanians began to see midwives as government-sponsored practitioners.²⁵ As a result, they deemed midwife services as a citizen's right and not worthy of compensation through customary gifts and supplies, which had been

²¹ Richey, *Population Politics and Development*, 80.

²² Cuthbert K. Omari, *Socio-Cultural Factors in Modern Family Planning Methods in Tanzania*. (Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), 28.

²³ John Waluye, "Kawawa urges child spacing," *Daily News*, 11 May 1984.

²⁴ *Daily News*, 30 May 1988, cited in Tripp, *Changing the Rules*, 13.

²⁵ Tripp, *Changing the Rules*, 18.

common as part of reciprocal obligation in the recent past.²⁶ Indicative of changing circumstance, two years after Kawawa campaigned for child spacing programs, he switched to urging full-fledged population control.²⁷

Citing more than just the disruption in midwifery, public health physician Tengio Urrio wrote in a November 1985 *Daily News* article, “Unfortunately these health-promoting family planning practices have been eroded by modernisation – education, Christianisation, Islamisation, the nuclear family, decreased societal and parental control, decreased polygamy practices, women’s liberation, etc.”²⁸ Urrio’s finger pointing toward a nefarious cloud of “modernization” was common parlance at the time. Tanzania’s changing social, political, and economic circumstances fettered the web of actors and practices that had made up the general patchwork of family planning provision. If foreign values were causing the problem, as many Tanzanians believed, their further encroachment into Tanzanian life should be prevented. Newspaper editorials were adamant that even in the face of crisis, the country should not adopt foreign family planning practices, such as Margaret Sanger’s campaign for universal birth control in the United States, because in Tanzania “the base of a strong nation is strong families, in which love and respect for each other is dominant.”²⁹

²⁶ Marja-Liisa Swantz, "Woman/Body/Knowledge: From Production to Regeneration," in *Feminist Perspectives on Sustainable Development*, Wendy Harcourt, ed. (Zed Books, 1994), 101-3.

²⁷ John Waluye, “Kawawa urges child spacing,” *Daily News*, 11 May 1984; “Kawawa urges population control,” *Daily News*, 21 May 1986.

²⁸ Tengio Urrio, “Traditional family planning,” *Daily News*, 17 November 1985.

²⁹ Ursula Birgitta Schnell, “Boys can’t remember ten rules to wear condoms,” *Daily News*, 12 October 1991.

One solution to deteriorating community networks was to preserve and strengthen them.³⁰ Nyerere gave another widely broadcast speech in 1988 that underscored responsible parenting networks in family planning. A USAID report documented that his speech was “pivotal to placing family planning on the national agenda.”³¹ But without Ujamaa, what exactly was the national agenda? For state authorities, policymaking had become inexorably linked with structural adjustment. They could resist controversial calls for universal birth control, but there was little room amidst explicit and implicit conditionalities to reject the more agreed upon elements of the international population establishment’s platform, including national population policies and biomedical contraception.

In 1989, Mwinyi’s government launched the National Family Planning Programme, which was a decisive shift from Ujamaa-era conceptions of responsible parenthood. The policy acknowledged that consciously planning the number and timing of pregnancies increased the welfare and well-being of Tanzanians. Contrary to previous iterations of the same sentiment, however, it prescribed numerical values for what “proper” family planning looked like. Women should have no more than five births, spaced at least three years apart, and during their childbearing prime between the age of 18 and 35.³² Even the Swahili vernacular was changing from “*uzazi na malezi bora*” (better parenting and

³⁰ Dan Hauli, “Family planning in Tanzania, Part II,” *Daily News*, 4 January 1992.

³¹ John M. Pile and Calista Simbakalia, “Tanzania Case Study: A Successful Program Loses Momentum” (USAID: 2006), vii.

³² United Republic of Tanzania, “National Family Planning Programme,” 1989, 57.

childrearing) to the more standardized “*uzazi wa mpangilio*” that directly translated as planned parenting.

From the late 1980s, Tanzania’s population programming became primarily a function of family planning.³³ Instead of measuring success through holistic indicators, like education and health, the program’s outcome would be measured statistically, through a reduction of national fertility rates. “This is where modern contraceptives come in,” said Urrio.³⁴ Ideally, increased use of biomedical birth control could lower fertility rates from above six births per woman toward the world average of three.³⁵ And Tanzania was not alone in its mission. The 30 countries that topped the fertility rate charts in 1989 were all in Africa and the Middle East, making population growth a mounting issue across the region.

Global Population Growth and the South Commission (1987-90)

In 1987, Nyerere became chairman of the newly minted South Commission. Political leaders in the “Global South” organized the workshop to compare notes on their countries’ most pressing problems and brainstorm solutions. The idea was a vestige of Nyerere’s previous push for Pan-Africanism and non-alignment, uniting countries at the “wrong end of the standard of living statistics.”³⁶ Their epithet had changed over time from “Third World,” to “Developing,” and most recently to “Global South,” but the idea

³³ Richey, *Population Politics and Development*, 71.

³⁴ Tengio Urrio, “Traditional family planning,” *Daily News*, 17 November 1985.

³⁵ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision*.

³⁶ Julius Nyerere, “McDougall Memorial Lecture on F.A.O.,” 15 November 1963, Tanganyika Information Division of the Vice President’s Office, 1.

that certain countries were lower on the economic totem pole, in part because of their demographic profile, remained entrenched in international politics.

The South Commission included representatives from countries that had been stark opponents to global population policy at the Third World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, but their assessment of rapid population growth in poor countries in the late 1980s represented “a forceful restatement of virtually all elements of the ‘orthodox’ position on [population] issues, with no trace of ‘revisionist’ doubts or qualifications.”³⁷ For the European and American members of the international population establishment, 1968 was the apex of population anxiety, but “three quarters of all humanity,” as the South Commission claimed, was experiencing the panic a full two decades later.³⁸ The representatives agreed that there was need for effective population policy in participating countries, or there would be “frightening implications” for development and environmental security.³⁹

As chairman, Nyerere attempted to insert a moral ethos into the largely economic debate. The final report acknowledged that issues of population touched on “some of the deepest human emotions” and would therefore necessitate active involvement of civic and religious leaders in local communities.⁴⁰ It even specifically mentioned a firm commitment to responsible parenting, universal education, and poverty alleviation.⁴¹ Yet, crisis had a way of cutting through the rhetoric. “It takes time before even well-designed policies can

³⁷ The South Commission, “The South Commission Report on Population and Population Policy,” *Population and Development Review* 16, no. 4 (1990): 795.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 281-2.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 282.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

have a material impact on the birth rate,” stated the final report, “It is therefore necessary that countries with high birth rates should act without delay and adopt policies which will have an impact on population growth in a reasonable period of time.”⁴² Political expediency had removed population management from the table. The fertility rate crisis merited a more immediate plan of action; one that had a short-term and concrete solution.

Tanzanian state authorities also moved away from Ujamaa in the last decade of the twentieth century. Nyerere left his post as Party chairman in 1990, returning to his birthplace in Northern Tanzania for a life of farming and fraternizing.⁴³ Without Nyerere in the national spotlight, President Mwinyi’s government passed a series of reforms that further eroded Ujamaa’s legacy. Tanzania established multi-party elections, revamped the shared governing system with Zanzibar, and disbanded the Leadership Code and Party Membership Rules that had guided Tanzanian governance since 1967. In 1991, the Zanzibar Declaration officially ended the Ujamaa era of Tanzanian politics. Nyerere publicly criticized the policy shifts as causing “cracks” in Tanzanian nationalism and sowing discord among its citizens.⁴⁴ “You will find that there is no single thing called ‘we the people of Tanganyika,’” he said, “Not at all.”⁴⁵

Scholars writing years later confirmed his warnings. The reform period included no clear national goals and “is best described as a period in which politics have become less important and political attitudes more cynical.”⁴⁶ When it came to population policy, the

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Paul Bjerk, *Julius Nyerere* (Ohio University Press, 2017), 127-29.

⁴⁴ Nyerere used the Swahili word *nyufa*.

⁴⁵ Transcribed from speech given by Nyerere on 14 March 1995, in Bjerk, *Julius Nyerere*, 134.

⁴⁶ Van Arkadie, “Economic Strategy and Structural Adjustment in Tanzania,” 5, 52.

cracks were most visible in the edifice of the policymaking coalition that had kept population management afloat. In 1992, the government ostensibly established a unified population program for the first time in Tanzanian history, but it functioned more as rhetorical appeasement than a new guiding framework. Religious and women's groups began to splinter off from the national agenda, which increasingly focused on demographic statistics instead of people behind the numbers.

Formulating the National Population Policy (1986-92)

The directive to prepare a national population policy came during a 1986 seminar for government leaders that was part of IMF negotiations. The seminar's commissioning papers acknowledged the population coalition's prior efforts, pointing to Tanzania's long history of census taking, health programs, employment policy, and family planning. But in his forward to the National Population Policy, Prime Minister J.S. Malecela noted that "all these issues have been dealt with in isolation."⁴⁷ The Party's Secretary General called the lack of a unified national population policy a "serious shortcoming" in establishing guidelines for economic and social development.⁴⁸

The international population establishment had been promoting the adoption of national population policies for decades, arguing that the single, streamlined document had more power to change demographic trajectories than patchwork plans. While countries in Asia and Latin America had largely jumped on board by adopting national population

⁴⁷ United Republic of Tanzania, "1992 National Population Policy," Forward, iii.

⁴⁸ Zephania Musende, "We must be serious with population issues, says Sec-General," *Daily News*, 12 September 1991.

policies in the 1970s and 1980s, African countries lagged behind. From 1965 to 1985, Kenya and Ghana were the only Sub-Saharan African countries to adopt national population policies. That changed, however, with structural adjustment and loan conditionalities. From 1985 to 1999, 30 Sub-Saharan African countries launched national programs.⁴⁹

Tanzania's National Population Policy entered into force in February 1992. Increased input from external actors and organizations clearly led to its creation. One government official claimed that policymakers were "forced into a policy by conditionalities which are not written down because donors want to control population if they are to give aid."⁵⁰ A 1999 study showed that a country was 12.5 percent more likely to receive USAID funding if they had adopted a national population policy that fit the narrow definition offered by the purveyors of population control.⁵¹ And immediately upon the policy's adoption, Tanzania received a significant increase in assistance from foreign partners. The UN Population Fund, for example, doubled its financial contribution from approximately seven million dollars from 1987-1991 to thirteen million from 1992-1996.

Besides the obvious financial incentives, adopting a national population policy worked as a "signaling process" to legitimize Tanzania in the normative world order.⁵² The National Population Policy's language echoed global concerns of the time period,

⁴⁹ Rachel Sullivan, "The Global, the Local, and Population Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," in *Managing Modernity: African Responses to Rapid Population Growth*, PhD Dissertation, (UC Berkeley, 2007), 2.

⁵⁰ Richey, *Population Politics*, 43.

⁵¹ Cited in Lisa Ann Richey. "Women's Reproductive Health & Population Policy: Tanzania," *Review of African Political Economy* 30.96 (2003): 273-292.

⁵² Deborah Barrett and Amy Ong Tsui, "Policy as Symbolic Statement: International Response to National Population Policies," *Social Forces* 78, no. 1 (September 1, 1999): 213-33.

including lowering population growth rates, promoting environmental sustainability, alleviating land pressure, and emphasizing urban development. In a nod to the population coalition that came before it, the National Population Policy reiterated the importance of individuals, families, government ministries, non-governmental organizations, and religious bodies to achieve those goals.⁵³ Mwinyi's government needed to secure buy-in from the same leaders who had buoyed population programming in Tanzania for the previous decades, but the "cracks" Nyerere foresaw with the end of Ujamaa were emerging.

The 1989 National Family Planning Programme worked as the implementing arm of the 1992 National Population Policy.⁵⁴ The bulk of the programming, therefore, centered on increasing the prevalence and use of biomedical contraception. With the pivot toward a clinic-based policy and statistical goals, the exact role of the population coalition came into question. Religious leaders provided a clear example of the disrupted alliance. Under the population management framework, Christian and Muslim leaders, as well as local diviners, had largely supported the national mantra of responsible parenthood. Questions of biomedical birth control had entered previous discussions, but they were rarely central, as social methods of family planning and general family wellbeing took precedence. When birth control became the central mission of national policy, some Catholic and Islamic circles in Tanzania became more antagonistic.⁵⁵ Moreover,

⁵³ URT, "1992 National Population Policy," 19.

⁵⁴ Richey, *Population Politics*, 71.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 55.

diminished state capacity and fading nationalist sentiment increased the tendency for people to look to community and religious groups for fertility norms.⁵⁶

The government and its foreign partners increasingly lobbied for religious leadership's support. The Party released its official recommendations for the new national policy at a conference for Christian and Muslim leadership in November 1988.⁵⁷ Two more years of population seminars with religious leaders followed, with Nyerere chairing two of them and Mwinyi and other top leaders in attendance. Nafis Sadik, Executive Director of the UN Population Fund, presented a 590-page book on family planning in Islam, translated into Swahili, to encourage local acceptance of the national policy.⁵⁸

The sales pitch worked for some, but not all. Mwinyi, who was himself a Muslim, publicly "corrected" sheikhs who came out against birth control as a non-Islamic practice, and Nyerere continued to try to assuage the Roman Catholic contingent.⁵⁹ Yet, issues of religion and the state had become more contentious under Mwinyi's presidency and a changing Tanzanian moral economy.⁶⁰ Moreover, and similar to the situation in Zanzibar

⁵⁶ For a general discussion of the role of religion in fertility norms, see Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty* (Public Affairs, 2011), 191-92. For a more recent discussion of the role of religion on fertility decisions in Tanzania, see Frances Vavrus and Ulla Larsen, "Girls Education and Fertility Transitions: An Analysis of Recent Trends in Tanzania and Uganda," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 51, no. 4 (2003): 945-975; Marida Hollos and Ulla Larsen, "Which African Men Promote Smaller Families and Why? Marital Relations and Fertility in a Pare Community in Northern Tanzania," *Social Science & Medicine* 58, no. 9 (May 1, 2004): 1733-49; Dieudonné Ndaruhuye Muhoza, Annelet Broekhuis, and Pieter Hooimeijer, "Variations in Desired Family Size and Excess Fertility in East Africa," Research article, *International Journal of Population Research*, 2014.

⁵⁷ Tiruhungwa Michael, "Seminar calls for policy," *Daily News*, 12 May 1984; Chama Cha Mapinduzi, "Mapendekezo ya sera ya idadi ya watu," 28-30 November 1988, semina ya viongozi wa dini kuhusu masuala ya idadi ya watu makao makuu ya CCM, Dodoma.

⁵⁸ Pudenciana Temba, "Population policy out soon," *Daily News*, 12 July 1991.

⁵⁹ Peter G. Forster, "Religion and the State in Tanzania and Malawi," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 32, no. 3-4 (January 1, 1997): 83.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 65-84.

a decade earlier, lowering fertility rates was not as compatible with religious discourse as Ujamaa's responsible parenting ethos had been. State authorities wanted to preserve elements of the coalition that had contributed to population management in the previous decades, but eliminating its members' role in creating and implementing policy splintered their generally amenable demeanor. As a result, policy became more top-down, number-driven, and prescribed through the National Population Policy – all elements associated with population control.

Population Control in Tanzania

Tanzanian officials were emphatic in their denial that the new policy would result in population control. “No plans for laws to control population,” announced an October 1991 *Daily News* headline.⁶¹ They stressed that even with the adoption of the National Population Policy, the decision to have children would remain with individual families. Despite these rhetorical flourishes, it was clear that the Tanzanian government was in the process of embracing three primary population control principles: economic priorities for demographic intervention, a reliance on statistical indicators, and the belief that population policy could be a potential panacea.

Ujamaa-era population policy had promoted integration between demography and development. For example, villagization worked to redistribute population, but it also aimed to increase the scope and effectiveness of rural service provision, instill a set of cultural values, and improve agricultural production. The National Population Policy

⁶¹ “No plans for law to control population,” *Daily News*, 9 October 1991.

reaffirmed that “development means more than economic statistics,” and the majority of government officials seemed to believe it. Yet, moving population programming under the banner of a single policy elevated economic goals above other development principles.⁶² The document asserted, “The expected outcome of a good and long lasting population policy is therefore the promotion of rapid and sustainable economic growth and national development which in turn facilitates the provision of basic services to all people.”⁶³ Population policy was not expected to aid service provision in and of itself. Instead, it would theoretically increase the state’s budget so it could enact separate policies for health, education, women, and rural development.

Within the economic framework, population policy went from being about responsible parenthood to lowering growth and fertility rates. The United Nations documented Tanzania’s shift from population-responsive policy, like universal primary education and health aide training, to direct attempts to influence growth rates.⁶⁴ An increased emphasis on biomedical contraception was an obvious example of changing priorities, but a demographic denominator also became central to discussions of natural resources and food supply. At a conference convened for the twentieth anniversary of the Arusha Declaration in 1987, a panel on food and environmental policy urged, “The food

⁶² Morice Maunya, “Development means more than economic statistics,” *Daily News*, 2 February 1991. For more on the opinions of individual members of the National Population Policy workshop, see Lisa Richey, “Family Planning and the Politics of Population in Tanzania: International to Local Discourse,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 3 (1999): 462-3.

⁶³ URT, “1992 National Population Policy,” Preface, v.

⁶⁴ Economic Commission of Africa, “An Assessment of the Formulation and Implementation of National Population Programmes in ECA Member States during the 1990s,” (UNECA, 1993), 64.

population equation should be part of an economic policy programme.”⁶⁵ Food divided by population – the old Malthusian staple – had returned and become enmeshed in an economic calculus. Doing so deflected conversation away from the more immediate, yet complex, factors that had led to Tanzania’s agricultural and economic collapse.

The perceived causal connection between birthrates and economic development also revived the demographic transition ideal that a national population policy could be a potential panacea. The final lines of the policy resolve, “An effective implementation of the National Population Policy will mitigate and possibly wipe out socio-economic development problems, caused by rapid increase of the population in Tanzania.”⁶⁶ Yet, the miracle never materialized. Demographic transition theory’s arrow of causation from lower fertility to increasing economic indicators remained empirically murky, especially in low-income countries.⁶⁷ The framing of population policy as a potential cure-all, however, had another benefit. It allowed population growth to become a scapegoat for poor development.⁶⁸ According to the new logic, people and their fertility choices were as much to blame for the country’s economic performance as constraining global markets and poor governance.

⁶⁵ Food and Environmental Policy, Session 7, Conference on the twentieth Anniversary of the Arusha Declaration and 10 Years of CCM, 1987. Compiled by University of Dar es Salaam Library, East Africana Collection, 20-22.

⁶⁶ URT, “1992 National Population Policy,” 19.

⁶⁷ Ansley Johnson Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds., *The Decline of Fertility in Europe* (Princeton University Press, 1986), 32; Dudley Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” *Population Studies* 50, no. 3 (1996): 361–387.

⁶⁸ Kristen Carey, “Demography Is Not Destiny,” *Pardee Center Issues in Brief*, no. 38 (2019): 5.

The codification of population control in Tanzania did little to influence the actions of ordinary people, but it served as a form of ritualized regulation.⁶⁹ “People do not take a social problem to ritual for a solution,” writes religious studies scholar Catherine Bell, rather the regulation of population worked to “shift the very status and nature of the problem into terms that are endlessly retranslated in strings of deferred schemes.”⁷⁰ Making population change an economic imperative allowed individuals to see their own reproductive decision-making as logical, while the lack of tangible results implied that their fellow citizens must not be doing their part. The loss of unity created a dangerous precedent for exclusion, finger pointing, and a sense of fatalism. Given the increased input of foreign actors and economic burden that accompanied structural adjustment, it would be easy to attribute the change to external forces. Interestingly, however, the international population establishment was retreating from the population control narrative at the same time that Tanzania was adopting it.

The International Population Establishment Pivot: From Mexico City and the Global Gag Rule to Cairo and Women’s Rights (1984-1994)

The international population establishment continued organizing conferences to develop and promulgate its global agenda in the 1980s and 1990s. The Fourth World Population Conference convened in Mexico City in 1984. Whereas at Bucharest ten years

⁶⁹ Interestingly for a conversation surrounding population policy, the theory of ritualized regulation emerged among scholars of China. For example, *see* Adam McKeown, “Ritualization of Regulation: The Enforcement of Chinese Exclusion in the United States and China,” *The American Historical Review* 108, no. 2 (2003): 378.

⁷⁰ Catherine Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (Oxford University Press, 1992), 106.

earlier, a bloc of low-income countries, including Tanzania, had pushed back against the idea of population control, this time opposition to the conventional platform came from a surprising corner. The United States sent James Buckley, a well-known opponent to family planning, to head its delegation. In line with Jerry Fallwell's Moral Majority, a large contingent of U.S. politicians had begun to embrace a "family first" vision of population policy. They had become "totally disinterested or hostile to population-control programs," said Marshall Green, former population coordinator for the U.S. State Department, instead favoring something along the lines of "population stabilization."⁷¹ Population stabilization closely resembled the population management perspective that had guided Tanzanian population policy for decades. It de-centered demographic statistics from policy platforms, promoted decentralization to accommodate varying experiences, and emphasized policies that supported family-level decision making.

The United States remained a major donor for population programs in Tanzania and worldwide, though the Reagan administration began to shift funds between organizations and program priorities.⁷² It blamed ineffective population programming on the international population establishment's preoccupation with "voodoo demographics" and an overreaction to demographic trends.⁷³ Green said, "In terms of trying to reduce

⁷¹ Marshall Green interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, 3 March 1989, 9, Marshall Green Papers, Box 25, No., 98066, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, United States.

⁷² Peter J. Donaldson, *Nature Against Us: The United States and the World Population Crisis, 1965-1980* (University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Lisa Ann Richey, "Women's Reproductive Health & Population Policy," 275.

⁷³ Prudence Flowers, "'Voodoo Demographics': The Right-to-Life Movement Confronts the Population Establishment," in *The Right-to-Life Movement, the Reagan Administration, and the Politics of Abortion*, (Palgrave Pivot, 2019).

fertility rates, they are not interested.”⁷⁴ As a result of the shifting politics, international plans of action increasingly removed demographic targets from policy agendas. In fact, a completed draft of the 1992 National Population Policy included numerical demographic targets, but UN Population Fund overseers removed them.⁷⁵

Much like the Reagan administration’s “trickle-down” economic strategy, it believed that free markets would stabilize population growth. Structural adjustment and other economic liberalization policies of the late 1980s would be the invisible hand that steadied demographic trajectories without the need for direct intervention. “More puzzling, perhaps even macabre,” wrote Simon Barber of South Africa’s *Rand Daily Mail* in 1984, “is the White House opposition to any form of international birth control programme on the grounds that free enterprise is the best contraceptive.”⁷⁶ The United States began scaling back funding for family planning programs and contraception provision around the world, ironically, at the same time that many countries, including Tanzania, were opening up to foreign population aid. Peter McPherson of USAID admitted in 1985 that the organization was wedged between two vocal poles on the issue of birth control, but “the experiences in Asia and Africa have something to say about family planning and economic growth...as mutually supportive components.”⁷⁷ Thus, many U.S.-backed population programs continued in the region, but with additional Reagan conditionalities.

⁷⁴ Green interview, 29.

⁷⁵ Richey, *Population Politics and Development*, 54-55.

⁷⁶ Simon Barber, “Anti-abortionists spike child planning budgets,” *Rand Daily Mail*, 1984.

⁷⁷ McPherson, “International Family Planning,” 3.

The Abortion Question and NGOs

The most well-known of the United States' population policy shifts in the mid-1980s happened in Mexico City, where Buckley's delegation announced the Global Gag Rule. The new policy prohibited NGOs outside the United States from receiving any funding from USAID or the State Department if they received funding from organizations that provided referrals for abortions, performed abortions, or lobbied to make abortion legal.⁷⁸ Tanzanian leaders had generally eschewed the topic of abortion in discussions of population, but the proceedings in Mexico City brought the topic into public discourse.

Tanzania legally prohibited abortion, outside of life-threatening health complications to the mother. With increased international attention on the issue, however, studies emerged that showed a much higher prevalence of abortion than many expected. "Induced abortion now rising in Tanzania," stated a November 1991 *Daily News* headline. Of 1,000 plus Dar es Salaam teenage girls sampled, approximately three out of four reported that they had induced abortion.⁷⁹ A majority of them were between the ages of 15 and 29, unmarried, and cited unwanted pregnancy or economic hardship as the reason behind their decision.⁸⁰ Today, many young girls report using laundry detergent or henna

⁷⁸ The Gag Rule followed the 1973 Helms Amendment, which prohibited USAID funds from being directly used to provide abortions. Since 1984, every Democratic president has rescinded the rule, and every Republican president has reinstated it. For more, see Barbara B. Crane and Jennifer Dusenberry, "Power and Politics in International Funding for Reproductive Health: The US Global Gag Rule," *Reproductive Health Matters* 12, no. 24 (January 1, 2004): 128–37; Nina J. Crimm, "The Global Gag Rule: Undermining National Interests by Doing unto Foreign Women and NGOs What Cannot Be Done at Home," *Cornell International Law Journal* 40 (2007): 587.

⁷⁹ "Induced abortion now rising in Tanzania," *Daily News*, 24 November 1991.

⁸⁰ Valerie Msoka, "The problem with abortion," *Sauti ya Siti* no 6 (June 1989):8; "Induced abortion now rising in Tanzania," *Daily News*, 24 November 1991.

to abort pregnancies outside of the public eye, which often threatens their own life.⁸¹ In 1991, doctors at Muhimbili Medical Center reported somewhere between 15 to 40 percent of maternal deaths at their facilities resulted from attempted abortions.⁸²

In response to public discussion surrounding the perils of unregulated abortion, in 1989 the government granted approval for the international NGO Marie Stopes to open clinics. Marie Stopes helped with contraception and post-abortion care, particularly for young girls who felt ostracized by their local communities.⁸³ Government delegation of responsibility for social services was becoming more common. To help fill service provision gaps amidst structural adjustment, the government had opened up to a variety of non-governmental organizations. In 1985, two NGO umbrella organizations were established to coordinate increased programming – one by the government and one by the NGO community.⁸⁴

The Reagan administration aided a global proliferation of NGOs through its belief in the effectiveness of “small government” and local action. When it came to population policy, it acknowledged that a strong national leader was important, but population programs themselves should be “rooted to the maximum extent possible in village life.”⁸⁵ The international population establishment took the doctrine to heart. They increasingly

⁸¹ Field notes and interview with Marie Stopes staff in Stone Town, Zanzibar, 2 October 2017. For more recent analysis of informal abortion in Tanzania, see Karin Ringheim, “Better Together: Linking Family Planning and Community Health for Health Equity and Impact,” 2nd Edition, report by CORE Group, Washington D.C., April 2012, 4-5.

⁸² Henry Muhanika, “In search of safe motherhood,” *Daily News*, 9 September 1990; “Induced abortion now rising in Tanzania,” *Daily News*, 24 November 1991.

⁸³ Marie Stopes interview, 2 October 2017.

⁸⁴ Michael Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Kumarian Press, 2008), 112.

⁸⁵ Green interview, 30, 32.

directed funding for population control through NGOs and community-level projects. At a UN conference in Tunisia on population distribution, migration, and development, the concluding policy recommendations encouraged governments and NGOs to train local medical staff, decentralize bureaucracies, and offer flexible approaches to family planning.⁸⁶ In short, do as the Tanzanians had done under Ujamaa. Given Tanzania's history with population management and villagization, it should come as no surprise that it was one of the first countries where the new "community-operated integrated reproductive health approach" took hold, which would spread throughout the world in the 1990s and 2000s.⁸⁷

While Tanzanian state authorities were preoccupied with adopting and implementing the National Population Policy, NGOs were largely responsible for shifting programming.⁸⁸ For example, UMATI launched the Integrated Project on Family Planning, Nutrition, and Parasite Control in 1984. The program brought together a web of actors, similar to the population policymaking coalition of the previous decades, who worked to respond to a community's welfare needs prior to engaging in family planning counseling. Borrowing language from a bygone era, Urrio wrote that the project was a "more humanistic approach to family planning."⁸⁹ Yet, in practice UMATI's close ties to the government caused problems. International donors and officials from the Ministry of Health intervened to promote a demographic agenda of fertility reduction, which

⁸⁶ United Nations, "Population Distribution, Migration and Development," March 1983, 13.

⁸⁷ T. Fukuda, *Community Operated Reproductive Health* (JOICFP, 2005), cited in Richey *Population Politics and Development*, 100.

⁸⁸ For more on the proliferation of NGOs, see Jennings, *Surrogates of the State*, 91.

⁸⁹ Tengio Urrio, "IP Development in Tanzania," in *The Regional Workshop in the Integrated Project*, (UMATI, 1995).

contradicted the program's original intent.⁹⁰ At its outset, conversations surrounding integrated family planning highlighted the importance of women's empowerment as a key element of population politics, alongside the more established demographic and development narratives.⁹¹ Demographic priorities, however, increasingly took precedence over feminist goals that were at the heart of the project. "Indeed, the principles of the project's philosophy were in the vanguard for promoting a larger agenda," writes Richey, "which would come to be articulated in Cairo as women's reproductive health."⁹²

The Cairo Conference: Population Policy as Women's Empowerment

In the 1980s, women's rights became central to population debates around the world. Women's rights proponents pushed back against the Global Gag Rule as a roadblock to female empowerment and feminist groups reframed state policy that hindered access to birth control as a tool of patriarchy.⁹³ The growing opposition came to a head at the Fifth World Population Conference in Cairo in 1994, which centered entirely on women's rights, reproductive health, and family dynamics. The Cairo Program of Action sought to "preserve the integrity of families" through gender equality, sustainable development, health programs, youth programs, environmental consciousness, and migration.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ For more on the project, see Richey, *Population Politics*, 99-127.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 125-27.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 100.

⁹³ Karen L. Michaelson, *And the Poor Get Children: Radical Perspectives on Population Dynamics* (Monthly Review Press, 1981).

⁹⁴ US State Department, "The United States and the International Conference on Population and Development," June 1994, Marshall Green Papers, Population Crisis Committee file, Box 25, No. 98066, Hoover Institute Archives.

After Cairo, debates in Tanzania took on an increasingly international tenor, as women positioned themselves as part of the broader movement. A special issue of the Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA) magazine in August 1995 featured an article echoing the Cairo platform: "To assert the role of women as subjects not objects of population policies; to take a step toward ending the abuse of women's decision-making and health in fertility-target-driven population programs and to challenge decades of scapegoating women and our fertility as the cause, poverty, lack of development and environmental degradation."⁹⁵ Although the author cited a decades-long struggle, most of the examples she pointed to were fairly recent phenomena in Tanzania. The country did not have a long history with population policy or statistical targets. It was clear that some women in Tanzanian society were beginning to also identify as women of the world, where population policies and fertility targets were more long-standing.

In the midst of second wave feminism and the opening up of opportunities for women outside the home, the central identity of Tanzanian women as mothers also came into question.⁹⁶ Discussion surrounding women and motherhood had been part and parcel of population philosophy under Ujamaa, but in the late 1980s Tanzanians began to push back against the emphasis on mothers, and women more generally, as primary care providers for their children. "Women are all too conscious of their role as mothers and... health should not become too closely identified with the maternal role," warned the Gender and Development Unit of Tanzania's Oxfam office.⁹⁷ Similarly, Fatma Alloo commented

⁹⁵ TAMWA, *Sauti ya Siti*, Special International Issue, (August 1995): 14.

⁹⁶ Judith Evans, *Feminist Theory Today: An Introduction to Second-Wave Feminism* (Sage, 1995).

⁹⁷ Oxfam, "Annual Report 1984/85, Folder 2, "MS Oxfam PRG/3/4/21, Oxford University Archives, iii.

in a TAMWA editorial, “At a national policy level, the woman is equated to a mother and then dealt with.”⁹⁸

Of course, motherhood remained a strong source of identity for many Tanzanian women. Instead of eschewing motherhood as a key area of intervention, Alloo envisioned an updated population coalition to handle population policy moving forward. “The question of reproductive health requires a multi-sectoral approach. It is not a woman’s responsibility alone. Men, women, governmental, non-governmental organizations and the private sector all need to join hands in making reproduction the joyous occasion it is meant to be.”⁹⁹ Tanzanian women mined Ujamaa rhetoric for discourse on gender equality. They repurposed the slogan of self-reliance as a rallying cry for women-supporting-women through various community groups.¹⁰⁰ For the first time, it seemed like Tanzania and the international population establishment were on the same page, and the page was straight from the Ujamaa playbook. Yet, Ujamaa had become a relic of the past. Without it, siloed agendas on both sides of the potential alliance led to ineffectual population policy.

The End of Two Eras

In 1999, Tanzania revised its National Population Policy to match a government and citizenry that was “no longer guided by the Arusha Declaration ideology of socialism.”¹⁰¹ A new president, Benjamin Mkapa, launched the country into a new

⁹⁸ Fatma Alloo, “Reproductive Rights,” *Sauti ya Siti*, no. 20 (July-October 1993): 1.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Tripp, *Changing the Rules*, 127.

¹⁰¹ United Republic of Tanzania, “National Population Policy, 1999 Revision,” Forward, ii.

millennium with more privatization and free market policies. Any remaining fragments of Ujamaa's population ethos retreated to the shadows. The privatization of markets had extended into the population coalition, with women joining international movements, NGOs reverting to the ethos of their parent organizations, religious groups aligning with transnational decrees over national rhetoric, and health practitioners privileging the global standard of biomedical contraception. The only overarching framework that remained was one of numbers and economic analyses, which disconnected people from demographic statistics and encouraged crash programs with small, but measurable outcomes.

In another corner of the world in 1999, the Senior Director of Policy for the Population Council asked scholars whether population policies even mattered moving into the twenty-first century.¹⁰² International organizations were abandoning the long-standing national population policy toolkit and encouraging a more holistic approach to demographic development. Population issues became integrated with the eight Millennium Development Goals adopted at the turn of the century, which aimed to eradicate hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat disease, ensure environmental sustainability, and create global partnerships. Given the new framework, national population policies were relegated below overall development agendas. The phrase "population policy" itself became synonymous with the discarded population control framework and a bygone era.

¹⁰² Anrudh Jain (Ed.), *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico* (Population Council, 1998).

It is difficult to ignore the irony of Tanzania developing a more tempered population management approach in the midst of the global population control frenzy, only to abandon it when the international population establishment came around to a similar strategy. External forces played a role in Tanzania's changing framework, but it is clear that population management came and went with Nyerere and his attempt to place "familyhood" at the center of a nation. Aspects of both the man and his Ujamaa philosophy made population management possible.

To alter nation-wide fertility rates through policy, governments in the twentieth century needed either draconian control and the infrastructure to police it, or the political and moral clout to alter family norms in accordance with a state's demographic and development priorities. Ujamaa encouraged the latter by engaging the average Tanzanian in nation-building at an unprecedented level.¹⁰³ The framework needed a strong and trustworthy leader, as Tanzanian fertility decisions were influenced by individual circumstance and community norms.¹⁰⁴ The government and citizens worked in a reciprocal dance of population management, which necessitated that individuals, community groups, and government actors consider the good of the country alongside their own beliefs and desires. The policymaking coalition that emerged from their negotiations embodied participatory democracy. It included a patchwork of religious groups, women's organizations, health practitioners, academics, and politicians who gave voice to myriad

¹⁰³ Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 5.

¹⁰⁴ Ulla Larsen and Marida Hollos, "Women's Empowerment and Fertility Decline among the Pare of Kilimanjaro Region, Northern Tanzania," *Social Science & Medicine* 57, no. 6 (September 1, 2003): 1099–1115; Susi Krehbiel Keefe, "'Women Do What They Want': Islam and Permanent Contraception in Northern Tanzania," *Social Science & Medicine* 63, no. 2 (July 1, 2006): 418–29.

segments of Tanzanian society and allowed for flexible policy that could accommodate their varying perspectives.

Having a child in Ujamaa Tanzania was a rite of passage. The experience manifested in an infinite number of experiences, yet it was also ineffably universal. It took humility to create population policy that acknowledged those intricacies. Even Nyerere's harshest critics admitted his embodiment of this cardinal virtue.¹⁰⁵ As "perhaps the best example of the moral agent in political history," Nyerere approached population management in the same way that he approached politics.¹⁰⁶ The goal of population management in Ujamaa Tanzania was to consider demographic variables in national governance, but do so in a way that respected citizens and their values. It allowed for knowledge production, not just in universities and government offices, but in lived experience and social norms. It was a middle ground between population control and population apathy. But a question remains: Was Tanzania's experiment the result of historical coincidence, contingent on the specific circumstances of Nyerere and Ujamaa nation-building, or are there lessons to apply on a broader stage?

¹⁰⁵ James R. Brennan, "Julius Rex: Nyerere through the Eyes of His Critics, 1953–2013," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 3 (2014): 165-66.

¹⁰⁶ Robert H. Jackson and Carl Gustav Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (University of California Press, 1982), 220.

CONCLUSION

POPULATION MANAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

“In the context of the [Sustainable Development Goals] population is sometimes called the elephant in the room. It is not mentioned in any of the 169 targets, yet many people think it is a decisive factor for global environmental change and future human wellbeing.”

- Wolfgang Lutz, IIASA World Population Program Director, 2016¹

Throughout the course of this project, one word appeared over and over again. Many purveyors of population policy believed that their programs were encouraging “proper” social norms and behavior. The most famous iteration in Tanzania came from President Julius Nyerere’s assertion in 1969, “It is important for human beings to put emphasis on caring for children and the ability to look after them properly....”² Other Tanzanians echoed the sentiment, from Bishop Fortunatus Lukanima saying, “Nobody should have children that they can’t take care of properly and responsibly” to S.R. Koshuma arguing in a letter to the editor for “proper” sexual education.³ Members of the international population establishment chimed in too. Jimmy Carter’s human rights agenda urged “that couples should only have those children that they could bring up and feed properly and give a proper education to.”⁴ Invoking proper childrearing granted a range of possible behaviors that fit within the scope of the purveyor’s evaluation, without requiring a strict definition. Much like the contrasting concept of obscenity, “one would know it

¹ International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, “Sustainable Development Goals lead to lower population growth,” 20 November 2016, available at www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/11/161129151308.htm, accessed February 25, 2020.

² United Republic of Tanzania, “Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1969-74,” Volume I: General Analysis, xii.

³ Knud Vilby, *Independent? Tanzania’s Challenges Since Uhuru* (E&D Vision, 2007), 24; Letter from S.R. Koshuma (Dar es Salaam), “Contraceptives unacceptable,” *Daily News*, 15 September 1981.

⁴ Interview of Marshall Green by Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 1989, Box 25, No. 98066, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, United States.

when they saw it.”⁵ But as population growth became a global anxiety, the world needed a common language to decipher whether President Nyerere and President Carter were indeed encouraging the same set of behaviors and outcomes. The solution was to translate various social standards into fertility rates.

The crescendo of population panic in the 1960s overlapped with two historical moments, the postwar rise of American hegemony and the heyday of the nuclear family.⁶ The primary players in charge of creating global population policy overwhelmingly came from places where the average family was already represented by a demographic statistic. In America, it famously included a mom and dad, 2.5 children, and a dog, all of whom stood behind a proverbial white picket fence. In Britain, the popular sitcom *2point4 Children* followed the trials and tribulations of a typical family, which despite the show’s title, had the more physically plausible two (whole) children.

The population establishment codified their statistical representation of “proper” family size around the world by encouraging governments to pass national policies that tried to lower fertility rates. They connected the goal to another attribute of the model family – the white picket fence. Demographic transition theory posited that large families were correlated with poor economic performance, which scaled up to national populations and economic systems. People living in an unplanned Dar es Salaam slum might be leery of the dog, but who would turn down a three-car garage and fenced-in living space? By

⁵ The phrase was made famous by Justice Potter Stewart’s concurring opinion in the United States Supreme Court case *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).

⁶ Steven Ruggles, “The Transformation of American Family Structure,” *American Historical Review* 99 (February 1994): 103–28.

the end of the twentieth century, a majority of low-income countries had adopted national population policies in line with global standards.⁷

Historians of population studies have called the implementation of a one-size-fits-all framework the “fatal misconception” of the population control movement.⁸ The nuclear family and all of its fixings did not mesh with the majority of social norms surrounding proper childrearing.⁹ Scholarship has focused on the myriad failures of population control, which like population growth itself, manifested differently in different contexts. Some citizenries rejected population programming as a tool of foreign manipulation, while others’ pursuit of an ideal demographic trajectory generated significant unintended consequences. Draconian efforts like the One-Child Policy in China and mass-sterilization campaigns throughout the world made demographic intervention into policy *non grata*. Population policy and population control became synonymous, and both became taboo.

Population control and its underlying assumptions were too rigid, but the course correction might have gone too far in the other direction. In recent decades, population policy has shifted from normative state control to a reproductive rights framework that inherently opposes any national agenda. Population concerns did not go away, but they became the “elephant in the room” in international policymaking circles. As a result, they

⁷ The exact percentage depends on how strictly one defines a national population policy, but the number generally falls between 60 and 80 percent. See United Nations, World Population Policies Database, 2001 Revision.

⁸ Donald P. Warwick, *Bitter Pills: Population Policies and Their Implementation in Eight Developing Countries* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), ix; Matthew James Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Harvard University Press, 2008).

⁹ Even, it turns out, in the United States. The nuclear family materialized most prominently from 1950-1965 and has been waning since. See Steven Ruggles, “Patriarchy, Power, and Pay: The Transformation of American Families, 1800–2015,” *Demography* 52, no. 6 (December 2015): 1797–1823.

have become part of siloed and specialized fields. Environmentalists have seen population change in terms of its effect on the planet; agriculturalists have worried about food security; and public health advocates have emphasized the primacy of unmet contraception needs. The inherently holistic nature of population has not only been lost, but has gotten in the way of those discrete agendas. Environmentalists have been perceived as misanthropic, economists as too rationalist, and population policymakers as unsupportive of individual rights.

In short, population policy has become a site of contestation instead of nuanced discussion. We know a lot about its failures, but we know little about its successes. This project has presented a counter-narrative against the full embrace of population control, but also the denial of any unified demographic objectives. By introducing the conceptual framework of population management and highlighting its implementation in Tanzania, I have exposed a middle ground that can account for both coordinated state programming in the face of undesirable demographic trends and an upholding of local contingency. Population management was not a panacea for post-independence Tanzania, but it provided a forum for more sophisticated conversation surrounding demographic change and situated those conversations within local contexts.

Population management allowed Tanzanians to decide what “proper” meant for themselves and their communities. The government did not adopt a national population policy, privilege demography over development, or try to meet statistical goals because Tanzanians did not view those elements as aligning within their lived experience. Instead, a coalition of state and local authorities built a coherent policy web that centered on the

demographic mission of responsible parenting. They addressed population problems as they arose and placed concerns within a broader development agenda. In the early years of Ujamaa, the government prioritized demographic data gathering and research. When those data showed a growing youth cohort, they altered their education and health policies. As budgets shrank amidst economic crises, they used foreign partnerships to train community leaders in various family planning methodologies and expand maternal and child healthcare. There was no statistical end goal, but there was ongoing and iterative policymaking that adjusted to changing demographic and development priorities.

Political ideology led to the emergence of population management in Tanzania during the Ujamaa era. The population management framework was supported by good leadership, a sense of imagined kinship, moral demography, and a strong policymaking coalition. President Nyerere's humility sponsored a sense of trust, rather than authority, as the underlying population ethos. Nationalist sentiment and imagined kinship asked individuals to consider how they, their community, and the state could best support future generations. Moral demography worked as a through line, which decreed inclusiveness and choice as more primary to population policy than per-capita economic indicators.¹⁰ To understand public opinion, state authorities provided forums for discussion about what proper parenting looked like in communities across the country. They collaborated with local women's groups, religious leaders, non-governmental organizations, and community networks to integrate the discussions into various population programming. Their co-

¹⁰ For more on moral demography, see Philip Kreager and Astrid Bochow, *Fertility, Conjunction, Difference: Anthropological Approaches to the Heterogeneity of Modern Fertility Declines* (Berghahn Books, 2017), 74.

produced agenda worked to make sure that when Nyerere promoted proper family planning, Tanzanians would know what he meant.

Population management does not rewrite history, but it does reframe it. Ujamaa Tanzania symbolizes a success story for how governments can acknowledge the detrimental effects of changing demographics, while upholding individual prerogative and local circumstance – and do so with relatively limited state capacity. Population change is a multi-valanced phenomenon, which necessitates broad networks working together to mitigate its attendant problems. Yet, it also affects people around the world differently, which makes collaboration and flexibility key to maintaining collective action. It is not entirely clear what historic moment we are living in, but it is an anxious one. As we continue on a path of rapid population growth in regions of Africa and depopulation in high-income countries throughout the world, governments will likely want to respond to increasing trepidation over demographic trends.¹¹

Population management allows them to do so, in a way that acknowledges unique historical sensitivities and policy priorities. China's concerns over a rapidly aging and sex-skewed population (in large part self-manifested through its One-Child Policy) are very different from Tanzania's disillusioned youth cohorts and strained service provision. Yet, global phenomena that are related to demographic trends, such as climate change and public health crises, have shown that there is still a sense of shared human affinity. The

¹¹ Jack Gladstone, "Africa 2050: Demographic Truth and Consequences," January 14, 2019, Governance in an Emerging World, Winter Series 119, Hoover Institution, available at <https://www.hoover.org/research/africa-2050-demographic-truth-and-consequences>; Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson, *Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline* (Hachette UK, 2019).

way forward from a rigid conception of the nuclear family was not to disband the family all together. Instead, population management sees demographic change as occurring within extended kinship networks. There will be disagreements and cramped quarters at times, but people come together to put food on the table, support individual idiosyncrasies, and do their best to raise the next generation properly.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives Consulted

Tanzania

Tanzania National Archive, Dar es Salaam
East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam
Zanzibar National Archives, Kilimani

United Kingdom

British National Archives, Kew, London
Oxford University Archives, Bodleian Library, Oxford

United States

U.S. National Archive, College Park, Maryland
Hoover Institute Archive, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California
African Studies Library Collection, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts

Newspapers and Periodicals

Daily News (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania)
Nationalist (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania)
Sauti ya Siti (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania)
East African Standard (Nairobi, Kenya)
Guardian (London, United Kingdom)

Online Collections

Hansard Collection, available at <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/index.html>
World Bank Open Data, available at <https://data.worldbank.org/>
United Nations World Population Prospects Database, available at
<https://population.un.org/wpp/>

Published Works

Ajzen, Icek. "The Theory of Planned Behavior." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 50, no. 2 (1991): 179–211.

Allen, Denise Roth. *Managing Motherhood, Managing Risk: Fertility and Danger in West Central Tanzania*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009.

- Aluko, Samuel Adepoju. "How Many Nigerians? An Analysis of Nigeria's Census Problems, 1901–63." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 3, no. 3 (1965): 371–392.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991.
- Angus, Ian, and Simon Butler. *Too Many People?: Population, Immigration, and the Environmental Crisis*. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011.
- Askew, Kelly. *Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.
- Barrett, Deborah, and Amy Ong Tsui. "Policy as Symbolic Statement: International Response to National Population Policies." *Social Forces* 78, no. 1 (September 1, 1999): 213–33.
- Bashford, Alison. *Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
- Bashford, Alison, and Joyce E. Chaplin. *The New Worlds of Thomas Robert Malthus: Rereading the "Principle of Population."* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
- Batson, Edward. *Report on Proposals for a Social Survey of Zanzibar*. Zanzibar: Govt. Printer, 1948.
- Beinart, William. "Agricultural Planning and the Late Colonial Technical Imagination: The Lower Shire Valley in Malawi, 1940–1960." In *Malawi: An Alternative Pattern of Development, Centre of African Studies, Seminar Proceedings*, 1985.
- Bell, Catherine. *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Berer, Marge. "Introduction: Population and Family Planning Policies: Women-Centred Perspectives." *Reproductive Health Matters* 1, no. 1 (1993): 4-12.
- Bienen, Henry. *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.

- Bier, Laura. "From Birth Control to Family Planning: Population, Gender, and the Politics of Reproduction in Egypt." In *Family in the Middle East*, pp. 71-95. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Bjerk, Paul K. *Julius Nyerere*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2017.
- _____. "Sovereignty and Socialism in Tanzania: The Historiography of an African State." *History in Africa* 37 (2010): 275–319.
- Blaut, J.M. *The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History*. New York: Guilford Press, 2012.
- Bledsoe, Caroline H., Fatoumata Banja, and Anthony T. Carter. *Contingent Lives: Fertility, Time, and Aging in West Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- Bloom, David E., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. "Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia." *The World Bank Economic Review* 12, no. 3 (September 1, 1998): 419–55.
- Blue, Richard, and James H. Weaver. *A Critical Assessment of the Tanzanian Model of Development*. Agricultural Development Council, 1977.
- Brennan, James R. *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012.
- Brennan, James R., and Andrew Burton. "The Emerging Metropolis: A Short History of Dar es Salaam, Circa 1862-2005." In *Dar es Salaam: Histories from an Emerging African Metropolis*. Brennan, Burton, and Lawi Eds. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2007.
- Bricker, Darrell, and John Ibbitson. *Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline*. London: Hachette UK, 2019.
- Boserup, Ester. *The Condition of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure*. London: Allan and Urwin, 1965.
- Breckenridge, Keith. *Biometric State: The Global Politics of Identification and Surveillance in South Africa, 1850 to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Brennan, James R. "Julius Rex: Nyerere through the Eyes of His Critics, 1953–2013." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 3 (2014): 459–477.

- Burton, Andrew. *African Underclass: Urbanisation, Crime and Colonial Order in Dar Es Salaam 1919-61*. Oxford: James Currey, 2005.
- Caldwell, John C. "Toward a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory." *Population and Development Review* 2, no. 3/4 (1976): 321–366.
- Callaci, Emily. "'Injectable Development' Depo-Provera and Creation of the Global South." *Radical History Review* 2018, no. 131 (2018): 82–104.
- Callaghy, Thomas, Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham. *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Campbell, Horace. "The Impact of Walter Rodney and Progressive Scholars on the Dar Es Salaam School." *Social and Economic Studies* 40, no 1 (1991): 99–135
- Carey, Kristen. "Demography Is Not Destiny." *Pardee Center Issues in Brief*, no. 38 (2019): 1-8.
- Carr-Saunders, Alexander Morris. *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends*. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1936.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Chama Cha Mapinduzi. "Mapendekezo ya sera ya idadi ya watu." Semina ya viongozi wa dini kuhusu masuala ya idadi ya watu makao makuu ya CCM. Dodoma, 28-30 November 1988.
- Chatterjee, Partha. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Chimbwete, Chiweni, Susan Cotts Watkins, and Eliya Msiyaphazi Zulu. "The Evolution of Population Policies in Kenya and Malawi." *Population Research and Policy Review* 24, no. 1 (2005): 85–106.
- Coale, Ansley Johnson, and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds. *The Decline of Fertility in Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Coast, Ernestina. "Maasai Demography." PhD Thesis, University of London, 2000.
- Coghe, Samuël, and Alexandra Widmer. "Colonial Demography: Discourses, Rationalities, Methods." In *Twentieth Century Population Thinking*, pp. 37–64. Philadelphia: Routledge, 2015.

- Cohen, Susan A. "The United States and the United Nations Population Fund: A Rocky Relationship." *Guttmacher Report on Public Policy* 2, no. 1 (1999).
- Collins, Paul. "Decentralization and Local Administration for Development in Tanzania." *Africa Today* 21, no. 3 (Summer 1974): 15-25.
- Comaroff, Jean. "Bodily Reform as Historical Practice: The Semantics of Resistance in Modern South Africa." *International Journal of Psychology* 20, no. 3-4 (1985): 541-567.
- Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff. *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving toward Africa*. London: Routledge, 2015.
- Connelly, Matthew James. *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- _____. "Population Control Is History: New Perspectives on the International Campaign to Limit Population Growth," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 1 (2003): 122-147.
- Cooper, Frederick. *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
- _____. *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Coulson, Andrew. *Tanzania: A Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- _____. *African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience*. Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979.
- Crane, Barbara B., and Jennifer Dusenberry. "Power and Politics in International Funding for Reproductive Health: The US Global Gag Rule." *Reproductive Health Matters* 12, no. 24 (January 1, 2004): 128-37.
- Crimm, Nina J. "The Global Gag Rule: Undermining National Interests by Doing unto Foreign Women and NGOs What Cannot Be Done at Home." *Cornell International Law Journal* 40 (2007): 587-633.
- Cueto, Marcos. *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

- Demeny, Paul. "Population Policy: The Role of National Governments." *Population and Development Review* 1, no. 1 (1975): 147–61.
- Denoon, Donald, and Adam Kuper. "Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation: The 'New Historiography' in Dar Es Salaam." *African Affairs* 69, no. 277 (1970): 329–349.
- Dixon-Mueller, Ruth. *Population Policy & Women's Rights: Transforming Reproductive Choice*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1993.
- Donaldson, Peter J. *Nature against Us: The United States and the World Population Crisis, 1965-1980*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.
- Dubow, Saul. *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Durham, Deborah. "Population." *Critical Terms for the Study of Africa*. Desai & Masquelier, Eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018.
- Economic Commission for Africa. "An Assessment of the Formulation and Implementation of National Population Programmes in ECA Member States during the 1990s." Addis Ababa: UNECA, 1993.
- _____. "Workbook on Demographic Analysis." Zanzibar Department of Statistics, 1983.
- _____. "Final Report on the National Seminar on Population and Development in the United Republic of Tanzania, Arusha, 17-24 February 1980: Organization, Recommendations and Papers Presented."
- Edwards, David M., and David M. Edwards. *Matetereka: Tanzania's Last Ujamaa Village*. Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, 1998.
- Ehrlich, Paul R. *The Population Bomb: Population Control or Race to Oblivion*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1968.
- Engel, Ulf, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler. *Tanzania Revisited: Political Stability, Aid Dependency, and Development Constraints*. Hamburg: GIGA, 2000.
- Evans, Judith. *Feminist Theory Today: An Introduction to Second-Wave Feminism*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995.
- Fair, Laura. *Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890–1945*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2001.

- Fawehinmi Feyi. "The Story of How Nigeria's Census Figures Became Weaponized." Quartz Africa, Commentary. Accessed March 12, 2019. Available at <https://qz.com/africa/1221472/the-story-of-how-nigerias-census-figures-became-weaponized/>.
- Fendall, N. R. E., and John Gill. "Establishing Family Planning Services in Kenya: A Review." *Public Health Reports (1896-1970)* 85, no. 2 (1970): 131–39.
- Ferguson, James. *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.
- Finkle, Jason L., and Barbara B. Crane. "The Politics of Bucharest: Population, Development, and the New International Economic Order." *Population and Development Review* (1975): 87–114.
- Finnegan, Ruth H. *Oral Literature in Africa*. Vol. 970. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Flowers, Prudence. "'Voodoo Demographics': The Right-to-Life Movement Confronts the Population Establishment." In *The Right-to-Life Movement, the Reagan Administration, and the Politics of Abortion*. London: Palgrave Pivot, 2019.
- Forster, Peter G. "Religion and the State in Tanzania and Malawi." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 32, no. 3–4 (January 1, 1997): 163–84.
- Fortmann, Louise. *Peasants, Officials and Participation in Rural Tanzania: Experience with Villagization and Decentralization*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Center for International Studies, 1980.
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon, 1978.
- Franda, Marcus F. "The World Population Conference: An International Extravaganza." *Southeast Europe series* 21, no. 2 (1974): 1.
- Frieder, Ludwig. *Church and State in Tanzania: Aspects of Changing in Relationships, 1961-1994*. Boston: Brill, 1999.
- Frost, Richard A. "Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya." *African Affairs* 78, no. 313 (1979): 535–53.
- Gachuhi, J. Mugo. *Family Planning in Kenya: Program and Problems*. Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, 1973.

- Geiger, Susan. *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965*. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1997.
- _____. "U Moja Wa Wanawake Wa Tanzania and the Needs of the Rural Poor." *African Studies Review* 25, no. 2–3 (1982): 45–65.
- Giblin, James Leonard, and Blandina Kaduma Giblin. *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania*. Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 2005.
- Giltrow, David R. "The Educational Communications Factor in Tanzania's Rural Development." Social Science Conference, University of Dar es Salam. December 1970.
- Gladstone, Jack. "Africa 2050: Demographic Truth and Consequences." Hoover Institution working paper, no. 14 January 2019. Available at <https://www.hoover.org/research/africa-2050-demographic-truth-and-consequences>
- Glassman, Jonathon. "Muslim Nationalists in Tanganyika." *The Journal of African History* 42, no. 1 (2001): 164–66.
- Gordon, Linda. *The Moral Property of Women: A History of Birth Control Politics in America*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2002.
- Great Britain. Colonial Office. "East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report." London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955.
- _____. East African Statistical Department. "East African Population Census 1948 Some Problems of Planning." *The American Statistician* 2, no. 4 (Aug 1948): 17–18.
- Greenhalgh, Susan. *Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng's China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
- _____. "Missile Science, Population Science: The Origins of China's One-Child Policy." *The China Quarterly*, no. 182 (2005): 253–76.
- Halfon, Saul E. *The Cairo Consensus: Demographic Surveys, Women's Empowerment, and Regime Change in Population Policy*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007.

- Hall, Budd L., and Rajesh Tandon. "From Action Research to Knowledge Democracy. Cartagena 1977-2017." *Revista Colombiana de Sociología* 41, no. 1 (2018): 227-236.
- Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons" *Science* 162, no. 3859 (Dec 1968): 1243-48.
- Hartmann, Betsy. "Population Control I: Birth of an Ideology." *International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, Evaluation* 27, no. 3 (1997): 523-40.
- _____. "Population Control II: The Population Establishment Today." *International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, Evaluation* 27, no. 3 (1997): 541-57.
- Hartmann, Jeannette. *Development Policy-Making in Tanzania 1962-1982: A Critique of Sociological Interpretations*. PhD Dissertation, University of Hull, 1983.
- Hauser, Philip Morris. *Population and World Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1958.
- Häussler, Peter. *Leadership for Democratic Development in Tanzania: The Perspective of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere During the First Decade of Independence; a Hermeneutical Dialogue with Mwalimu*. Dar es Salaam: Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, 2009.
- Havnevik, Kjell J. *Tanzania: The Limits to Development from Above*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1993.
- Hellema, Duco. *The Global 1970s: Radicalism, Reform, and Crisis*. Philadelphia: Routledge, 2018.
- Henin, R.A., and B. Egero. "The 1967 Population Census of Tanzania." BRALUP Research Paper, no. 19 (1972).
- Hollos, Marida, and Ulla Larsen. "Which African Men Promote Smaller Families and Why? Marital Relations and Fertility in a Pare Community in Northern Tanzania." *Social Science & Medicine* 58, no. 9 (May 1, 2004): 1733-49.
- Homei, Aya, and Yu-Ling Huang. "Population Control in Cold War Asia: An Introduction," *East Asian Science, Technology and Society* 10, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 343-53.
- Hornsby, Charles. *Kenya: A History Since Independence*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2013.

- Hunter, Emma. “‘The History and Affairs of TANU’: Intellectual History, Nationalism, and the Postcolonial State in Tanzania.” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 45, no. 3 (2012): 365–83.
- Hvistendahl, Mara. *Unnatural Selection: Choosing Boys over Girls, and the Consequences of a World Full of Men*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.
- Hyden, Goran. “Local Governance and Economic-Demographic Transition in Rural Africa.” *Population and Development Review* 15 (1989): 193–211.
- _____. *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- Ibhawoh, Bonny, and J. I. Dibua. “Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa.” *African Journal of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (2003): 59–83.
- Iliffe, John. “Review: The Origins of African Population Growth.” *The Journal of African History* 30, no. 1 (1989): 165–9.
- _____. *A Modern History of Tanganyika*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- International Development Association. East Africa Department. “The Economic Development and Prospects of Tanzania.” 17 March 1970.
- International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. “Sustainable Development Goals lead to Lower Population Growth.” 20 November 2016. Available at www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/11/161129151308.htm. Accessed February 25, 2020.
- “Irene Barnes Taeuber, 1906–1974.” *The American Statistician* 28, no. 3 (August 1, 1974): 109–10.
- Ivaska, Andrew. *Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar Es Salaam*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.
- Jackson, Robert H., and Carl Gustav Rosberg. *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
- Jain, Anrudh (Ed.). *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: Population Council, 1998.

- Jennings, Michael. "Building Better People: Modernity and Utopia in Late Colonial Tanganyika." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 94–111.
- _____. *Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 2008.
- Jerven, Morten. *Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013.
- Jewsiewicki, Bogumil. "African Historical Studies Academic Knowledge as 'Usable Past' and Radical Scholarship." *African Studies Review* 32, no. 3 (1989): 1–76.
- Johnson, Jennifer. "The Origins of Family Planning in Tunisia: Reform, Public Health, and International Aid." *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 92, no. 4 (2018): 664–693.
- Johnson-Hanks, Jennifer. "Demographic Anthropology." *The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology*, 2018, 1–5.
- Johnson-Hanks, Jennifer, Christine A. Bachrach, S. Philip Morgan, and Hans-Peter Kohler. *Understanding Family Change and Variation: Toward a Theory of Conjunctural Action*. Vol. 5. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2011.
- Katz, Sydney S., and Selig H. Katz. "An Evaluation of Traditional Therapy for Barrenness." *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (1987): 394–405.
- Keely, Charles B. "Limits to Papal Power: Vatican Inaction After Humanae Vitae." *Population and Development Review* 20 (1994): 220–40.
- Kelvin, Lord W. T. "Electrical Units of Measurement." *Nature* 28, no. 708 (1883): 91–92.
- Khaldun, Ibn. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Translated by Franz Rosenthal and Edited by NJ Dawood. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Kilbride, Philip Leroy, and Janet Capriotti Kilbride. *Changing Family Life in East Africa: Women and Children at Risk*. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1990.
- Kirk, Dudley. "Demographic Transition Theory." *Population Studies* 50, no. 3 (1996): 361–387.

- Kjekshus, Helge. *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1977.
- _____. “The Tanzanian Villagization Policy: Implementational Lessons and Ecological Dimensions.” *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 11, no. 2 (1977): 269–82.
- Koponen, Juhani. “Population growth in historical perspective – the key role of changing fertility,” in *Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle for Survival*, Eds. Boesen, et al. Stockholm: SIDA, 1986.
- Kreager, Philip, and Astrid Bochow. *Fertility, Conjuncture, Difference: Anthropological Approaches to the Heterogeneity of Modern Fertility Declines*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2017.
- Krehbiel Keefe, Susi. “‘Women Do What They Want’: Islam and Permanent Contraception in Northern Tanzania.” *Social Science & Medicine* 63, no. 2 (July 1, 2006): 418–29.
- Kuumba, Bahati. “Perpetuating Neo-Colonialism through Population Control: South Africa and the United States.” *Africa Today* 40, no. 3, (1993): 79–85.
- Lal, Priya. *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- _____. “Militants, Mothers, and the National Family: Ujamaa, Gender, and Rural Development in Postcolonial Tanzania.” *The Journal of African History* 51, no. 1 (2010): 1–20.
- Landry, Adolphe. *La Révolution Démographique: Études et Essais Sur Les Problèmes de La Population*. Paris: Ined, 1934.
- Lee, Christopher J. *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010.
- Leslie, John Arthur Kingsley. *A Survey of Dar Es Salaam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Lock, Margaret, Patricia Alice Kaufert, and Alan Harwood. *Pragmatic Women and Body Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Lofchie, Michael F. *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.

- _____. "The Roots of Economic Crisis in Tanzania." *Current History (Pre-1986)*; Philadelphia 84, no. 501 (April 1985): 159-163.
- Maddox, Gregory H. "The Dar Es Salaam School of African History." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History*, 20 November 2018.
- Maddox, Gregory H., James L. Giblin, and Isaria N. Kimambo. *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1996.
- Maguire, Gene Andrew. *Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Makwetta, Jackson, et al. "Elimu Ya Idadi Ya Watu / Maisha Ya Jamii: Mawasiliano Na Utafiti Ukiwianishwa Na Maendeleo Vijijini." Dar es Salaam: Prime Minister's Office, 1979.
- Malthus, Thomas Robert. *An Essay on the Principle of Population, as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers*. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1798.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- _____. *The Myth of Population Control: Family Caste and Class in an Indian Village*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.
- Maro, Paul S. "The Impact of Decentralization on Spatial Equity and Rural Development in Tanzania." *World Development* 18, no. 5 (1990): 673-693.
- Mbilinyi, Marjorie J. "The State of Women in Tanzania." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 6, no. 2 (1972): 371-77.
- McCall, Michael. *Environmental and Agricultural Impacts of Tanzania's Villagization Programme*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- McHenry Jr, Dean E. *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1979.
- McKeown, Adam. "Ritualization of Regulation: The Enforcement of Chinese Exclusion in the United States and China." *The American Historical Review* 108, no. 2 (2003): 377-403.

- McPherson, M. Peter. "International Family Planning." 25 November 1985. Policy no. 772. Address before American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.
- Michaelson, Karen L. *And the Poor Get Children: Radical Perspectives on Population Dynamics*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981.
- Mills, David. "British Anthropology at the End of Empire: The Rise and Fall of the Colonial Social Science Research Council, 1944-1962." *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences Humaines* 6, no. 1 (2002): 161–88.
- Mitchell, Sir Philip. "Land and Population in East Africa, Colonial No. 290." Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952.
- Mkalawa, Charles, and Pan Haixiao. "Dar Es Salaam City Temporal Growth and Its Influence on Transportation." *Urban, Planning and Transport Research* 2 (January 2014): 423–46.
- Mkini, A.H. "Current Population Policy in the United Republic of Tanzania." In *Final Report on the National Seminar on Population and Development in the United Republic of Tanzania*. Ed. Economic Commission for Africa / International Labor Organization. pp. 62-73. Arusha: UNFPA, 1980.
- Mngomezulu, Bhekithemba Richard. "A Political History of Higher Education in East Africa: The Rise and Fall of the University of East Africa, 1937-1970." PhD Dissertation, Rice University, 2004.
- Moore, John E. "The Villagisation Process and Rural Development in the Mwanza Region of Tanzania." *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 61, no. 2 (1979): 65–80.
- Morgan, S. Philip, and Christine A. Bachrach. "Is the Theory of Planned Behaviour an Appropriate Model for Human Fertility?" *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* 9 (2011): 11–18.
- Muhoza, Dieudonné Ndaruhuye, Annelet Broekhuis, and Pieter Hooimeijer. "Variations in Desired Family Size and Excess Fertility in East Africa." *International Journal of Population Research*, 2014.
- Munshi, Kaivan, and Jacques Myaux. "Social Norms and the Fertility Transition." *Journal of Development Economics* 80, no. 1 (2006): 1–38.
- Museveni, Yoweri K. "Address on National State of Affairs." 9 September 2019. Available at <https://www.yowerikmuseveni.com/address-national-state-affairs>.

- Mwansasu, Bismarck U., and Cranford Pratt. *Towards Socialism in Tanzania*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.
- Ndaluka, Thomas, and Frans Wijzen, eds. *Religion and State in Tanzania Revisited: Reflections from 50 Years of Independence*. Münster: LIT Verlag, 2014.
- Ndeti, Kivuto, and Cecilia Ndeti. *Cultural Values and Population Policy in Kenya*. Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1977.
- Ngaiza, Magdalene K., and Bertha O. Koda. *The Unsung Heroines: Women's Life Histories from Tanzania*. Oxford: ABC, 1991.
- Nordås, Ragnhild and Christian Davenport. "Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 4 (2013): 926–940.
- Notestein, Frank W. "Demography in the United States: A Partial Account of the Development of the Field." *Population and Development Review* 8, no. 4 (1982): 651–87.
- Nsekela, Christina M. "Family Planning in Tanzania." *Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs*, no. 6, (July 1978).
- Nyerere, Julius Kambarage. *Freedom and Development: Uhuru Na Maendeleo. A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1968-1973*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- _____. *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- _____. *Freedom and Unity: Uhuru Na Umoja: A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1952-65*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- _____. "McDougall Memorial Lecture on F.A.O." 15 November 1963. Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Information Division of the Vice President's Office, 1963.
- Obono, Oka. "Cultural Diversity and Population Policy in Nigeria." *Population and Development Review* 29, no. 1 (2003): 103-111.
- Omari, Cuthbert K. *Socio-Cultural Factors in Modern Family Planning Methods in Tanzania*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989.
- _____. "The Mganga: A Specialist of His Own Kind." *Psychopathologie Africaine* 8, no. 2 (1972): 217–31.

- Omari, I. M., ed. *Universal Primary Education in Tanzania*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1983.
- Ominde, Simeon Hongo. *The Population of Kenya, Tanzania & Uganda*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1975.
- Owens, Geoffrey Ross. "From Collective Villages to Private Ownership: Ujamaa, Tamaa, and the Postsocialist Transformation of Peri-Urban Dar es Salaam, 1970–1990." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 70, no. 2 (2014): 207-231.
- Palmer, Ingrid. *Gender and Population in the Adjustment of African Economies: Planning for Change*. Geneva: ILO, 1991.
- Peterson, Derek R. *Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and Work of Imagination in Colonial Kenya*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2004.
- Petty, William, and John Graunt, *The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty*, vol. 1 [1662]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899.
- Pile, John M., and Calista Simbakalia. "Tanzania Case Study: A Successful Program Loses Momentum." New York: USAID, 2006.
- Provini, Olivier. *The University of Dar Es Salaam: A Post-Nyerere Institution of Higher Education? Legacies, Continuities and Changes in an Institutional Space (1961-2010)*. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2015
- Rajabu, Marijani, and Dar International. "Masudi," n.d. Vol. 2, Audiocassette.
- Ranger, Terence. "The 'New Historiography' in Dar Es Salaam: An Answer," *African Affairs* 70, no. 278 (1971): 50–61.
- Resnick, Idrian N. *The Long Transition: Building Socialism in Tanzania*. New York: Monthly Review Press 1981.
- _____. "Manpower Development in Tanzania." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 5, no. 1 (1967): 107–23.
- Richey, Lisa Ann. *Population Politics and Development: From the Policies to the Clinics*. New York: Springer, 2008.
- _____. "Women's Reproductive Health & Population Policy: Tanzania." *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 96 (2003): 273–92.

- _____. "Family Planning and the Politics of Population in Tanzania: International to Local Discourse." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 3 (1999): 457–487.
- Ringheim, Karin. "Better Together: Linking Family Planning and Community Health for Health Equity and Impact." 2nd Edition. Report by CORE Group. Washington D.C., April 2012.
- Rizzo, Matteo. "What was Left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development Disaster and Labour Market in Southern Tanganyika 1946–1952." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 6, no. 2 (2006): 205-238.
- Robinson, Rachel Sullivan. *Intimate Interventions in Global Health: Family Planning and HIV Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Rodney, Walter. "Tanzanian Ujamaa and Scientific Socialism." *African Review* 1, no. 4 (1972): 61–76.
- Rosling, Hans, Ola Rosling, and Anna Rosling Rönnlund. *Factfulness: Ten Reasons We're Wrong about the World—and Why Things Are Better Than You Think*. New York: St Martin's Press, 2018.
- Ruggles, Steven. "Patriarchy, Power, and Pay: The Transformation of American Families, 1800-2015." *Demography* 52, no. 6 (December 2015): 1797–1823.
- _____. "The Transformation of American Family Structure." *American Historical Review* 99 (February 1994): 103–28.
- Sai, Fred T. "Changing Perspectives of Population in Africa and International Responses." *African Affairs* 87, no. 347 (1988): 267–276.
- Said, Mohamed. *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968): The Untold Story of the Muslim Struggle against British Colonialism in Tanganyika*. London: Minerva, 1998.
- Samoff, Joel, and Suleman Sumra. "Financial Crisis, Structural Adjustment, and Education Policy in Tanzania." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 4-7 April 1994.
- Sawers, Larry. "Urban Primacy in Tanzania." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 37, no. 4 (1989): 841-59.

- Schneider, Leander. "Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa Vijijini, and Villagization." *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 38, no. 2 (2004): 344–392.
- Scott, James C. *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Sembajwe, I.S.L. "Changing Position of Women on Family-size and Child Survival." In "Final Report on the National Seminar on Population and Development in the United Republic of Tanzania." February 1980.
- Senzaba, Edwin. *Ngoswe: Penzi Kitovu cha Uzembe*. Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, Education Services Centre, 1988.
- Sifuna, Daniel N. "The Challenge of Increasing Access and Improving Quality: An Analysis of Universal Primary Education Interventions in Kenya and Tanzania since the 1970s." *International Review of Education* 53, no. 5–6 (2007): 687–699.
- Silberschmidt, Margrethe. "Poverty, Male Disempowerment, and Male Sexuality: Rethinking Men and Masculinities in Rural and Urban East Africa." In *African Masculinities: Men in Africa from the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present*, edited by Lahoucine Ouzgane and Robert Morrell, pp. 189–203. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005.
- Simpson, Andrew. *Language and National Identity in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Sitari, Taimi. "Settlement Changes in the Bagamoyo District of Tanzania as a Consequence of Villagization." *Fennia-International Journal of Geography* 161, no. 1 (1983): 1-90.
- South Commission. "The South Commission Report on Population and Population Policy." *Population and Development Review* (1990): 795-798.
- Stephens, Rhiannon. *A History of African Motherhood: The Case of Uganda, 700-1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Stern, Alexandra Minna. *Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015.
- Stewart, Frances, and Jennifer Sharpley. *Economic Policies and Agricultural Performance: The Case of Tanzania*. Paris, OECD Development Centre, 1985.

- Stöger-Eising, Viktoria. "Ujamaa Revisited: Indigenous and European Influences in Nyerere's Social and Political Thought." *Africa* 70, no. 1 (February 2000): 118–43.
- Sullivan, Rachel. "The Global, the Local, and Population Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa." In *Managing Modernity: African Responses to Rapid Population Growth*. PhD Dissertation, UC Berkeley, 2007.
- Swantz, Marja-Liisa. "Woman/Body/Knowledge: From Production to Regeneration." In *Feminist Perspectives on Sustainable Development*, Wendy Harcourt, ed. London: Zed Books, 1994.
- Taeuber, Irene Barnes. *The Population of Tanganyika*. New York: United Nations, 1949.
- Tanganyika. Tanganyika Ministry of Commerce and Arthur D. Little Consultants. *Tanganyika Industrial Development: A Preliminary Study of Bases for the Expansion of Industrial Processing Activities*. South Africa: Government Printer, 1961.
- Taylor, Alan M. "Debt, Dependence and the Demographic Transition: Latin America in to the next Century." *World Development* 23, no. 5 (May 1, 1995): 869–79.
- Thomas, Ian. "Population Policy in Tanzania." Development Studies Discussion Paper No. 51, University of East Angalia. March 1979.
- Thompson, Warren Simpson. *Danger Spots in World Population*. New York: AA Knopf, 1929.
- Tilley, Helen. *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- Treichler, Paula. "What Definitions Do: Childbirth, Cultural Crisis, and the Challenge to Medical Discourse." In *Rethinking Communication*, Eds. Dervin, et al. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1989.
- Tripp, Aili Mari. *Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Turshen, Meredith. "Population Growth and the Deterioration of Health: Mainland Tanzania 1920-1960." In *African Population and Capitalism: Historical Studies*, Eds. D.D. Cordell and J.W. Gregory. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.

- United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. "World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables." ESA/P/WP248. 2017.
- _____. "Population Distribution, Migration and Development: Proceedings of the Expert Group on Population Distribution, Migration and Development." Hammamet, Tunisia, 21-25 March 1983. ST/ESA/SER.A/89. New York: United Nations, 1984.
- _____. "National Experience in the Formulation and Implementation of Population Policy, 1960-1976: United Republic of Tanzania." New York: United Nations, 1978.
- _____. United Nations Population Information Network. "World Population Plan of Action," 19-30 August 1974, E/CONF.60/19.
- _____. *World Population Trends, 1920-1947*. Population Studies, no. 3. New York: United Nations, 1949.
- United Nations Children's Fund. "Recommendation of the Executive Director for Assistance to United Republic of Tanzania." E/ICEF/P.L.1409. 15 March 1971. New York: UNICEF, 1971.
- United Nations Population Fund. "Report of the Second African Population Conference: organized in co-operation with the United Nations Fund for Population Activities and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, 9-13 January 1984." New York: UNFPA, 1984.
- _____. "United Republic of Tanzania: Report of Mission on Needs Assessment for Population Assistance." New York: UNFPA, 1979.
- United Republic of Tanzania. *National Population Policy, 1999 Revision*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1999.
- _____. *1992 National Population Policy*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1992.
- _____. *National Family Planning Programme*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1989.
- _____. Ministry of Education. *The Primary School Sub-Sector Review*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1981.
- _____. "1978 Population Census Preliminary Report." Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, n.d.

- _____. *Tanzania Second Five-Year Development Plan, 1969-74*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1974.
- _____. "1967 Census, Preliminary Results." Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967.
- _____. *The Arusha Declaration and TANU'S policy on socialism and self-reliance*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967.
- Urrio, Tengio. "IP Development in Tanzania." In *The Regional Workshop in the Integrated Project*. Dar es Salaam: UMATI, 1995.
- Van Arkadie, Brian. "Economic Strategy and Structural Adjustment in Tanzania." World Bank, September 30, 1995. Available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/649601468765032908/Economic-strategy-and-structural-adjustment-in-Tanzania>.
- Van Wolputte, Steven. "Hang on to Your Self: Of Bodies, Embodiment, and Selves." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 33, no. 1 (2004): 251–69.
- Vaughan, Megan. "Which Family?: Problems in the Reconstruction of the History of the Family as an Economic and Cultural Unit." *The Journal of African History* 24, no. 2 (April 1983): 275–83.
- Vavrus, Frances, and Ulla Larsen. "Girls Education and Fertility Transitions: An Analysis of Recent Trends in Tanzania and Uganda." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 51, no. 4 (2003): 945–975.
- Vilby, Knud. *Independent? Tanzania's Challenges Since Uhuru*. Dar es Salaam: E&D Vision, 2007.
- Walters, Sarah Louise. "'Child! Now You Are': Identity Registration, Labor, and the Definition of Childhood in Colonial Tanganyika, 1910–1950." *The Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth* 9, no. 1 (2016): 66-86.
- _____. "Counting Souls: Towards an Historical Demography of Africa." *Demographic Research* 34 (January 2016): 63–108.
- _____. "Fertility, Morality and Marriage in Northwest Tanzania, 1920-1970: A Demographic Study Using Parish Registers." PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2009.
- Warwick, Donald P. *Bitter Pills: Population Policies and Their Implementation in Eight Developing Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

- Wasawo, David. *The Young Child in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam: UNICEF Liaison Office and Tanzania National Scientific Research Council, 1973.
- Weiss, Brad, Arjun Appadurai, and Judith Farquhar. *The Making and Unmaking of the Haya Lived World: Consumption, Commoditization, and Everyday Practice*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.
- Westerlund, David. *Ujamaa Na Dini: A Study of Some Aspects of Society and Religion in Tanzania, 1961-1977*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1980.
- White, Richard. *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Wilder, Gary. *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Wilson, Chris. “Understanding Global Demographic Convergence since 1950,” *Population and Development Review* 37, no. 2 (2011): 375–88.
- Wilson, Kathleen. *The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century*. London: Psychology Press, 2003.
- Wolf-Phillips, Leslie. “Why ‘Third World’?: Origin, Definition and Usage.” *Third World Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (1987): 1311–27.
- World Bank. “The Economic Development of Tanganyika.” January 1, 1961. Available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/231391468760788974/The-economic-development-of-Tanganyika>.
- Wright, Quincy. “Population and United States Foreign Policy.” In *Population and World Politics*, pp. 260–71. Ed. Philip M. Hauser. New York: Free Press, 1958.
- Wylie, Diana. *Starving on a Full Stomach: Hunger and the Triumph of Cultural Racism in Modern South Africa*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001.
- _____. “Confrontation over Kenya: The Colonial Office and Its Critics 1918–1940.” *The Journal of African History* 18, no. 3 (July 1977): 427–47.
- Yeager, Rodger. *Tanzania: An African Experiment*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.
- Young, Alwyn. “The Gift of the Dying: The Tragedy of AIDS and the Welfare of Future African Generations.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 2 (2005): 423–466.

Zanzibari Revolutionary Government. "1981 Statistical Abstract." Zanzibar: Department of Statistics, 1981.

_____. "Workbook on Demographic Analysis." Zanzibar: Department of Statistics, 1983.

Ziddy, Issa. "Uislam na uzazi wa mpangilio," September 2009.

CURRICULUM VITAE



