1934

The empirical and the rational in Hegel's philosophy of religion

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

THE EMPIRICAL AND THE RATIONAL IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

by

Sylvester Paul Schilling
(S.B., St. John's College, 1923; A.M., Boston University, 1927;
S.T.B., Boston University, 1929)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

~~1933~~
1934

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Chapter Two

A SUMMARY OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Chapter Three

HEGEL'S VIEW OF THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Chapter Four

HEGEL'S VIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

and Amor.

Chapter Five

HEGEL'S VIEW OF THE ABSOLUTE

Chapter Six

HEGEL'S VIEW OF HUMAN PERSONALITY

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

I. The Problem

The purpose of this dissertation is to discover the relative place and significance of empirical and rational factors in Hegel's philosophy of religion. By the empirical is meant that element in a philosophical view which is drawn from and based on the facts of human experience, past or present; by the rational, that element which is derived from and founded on reason. Experience is here defined as the manifold data of consciousness viewed in their raw immediacy and unorganized particularity; reason, as the thinking activity which seeks to establish universal and necessary truth, either by criticizing, relating, systematizing, and interpreting the data of consciousness, or by deduction independent of experience.[1] The problem is then to determine to what extent Hegel's view of religion is derived from and grounded in (1) a survey of the data of the religious consciousness, present and past, or (2) the reflective activity of thought; and to evaluate the significance of both factors in relation to each other.

II. Other Investigations of the Problem

To the best of the writer's knowledge, no detailed research in this specific problem has so far been attempted. Yet the problem is by no means totally new, for various aspects of it have received wide and care-

---

[1] It may be fairly questioned whether reason in the latter sense is ever a reality. However, since it is thought by some critics to be typical of Hegel, its possibility must be allowed pending investigation. The study of the rational element in Hegel's philosophy of religion will seek throughout to determine which use of reason is involved.

ful attention. Some of the resulting treatments are of marked importance, and form a valuable, indeed an indispensable, background for the present inquiry.

A full century of research in Hegel's philosophy of religion has produced a body of criticism and interpretation so extensive as to render inadvisable any attempt in this dissertation to survey separately the work of individual investigators, especially in view of the frequent recurrence of some criticisms. Hegel's critics will therefore be grouped according to the ideas which they represent. In order, however, that the survey may preserve on the whole the chronological sequence of the investigations, it will consider three main periods of research: (1) the period of early criticism carried on by the first generation of Hegelians and their contemporaries, dating roughly from the death of Hegel (1831) to the publication of Rosenkranz's last relevant book (1870); (2) the dark decades of Hegelianism, during which the philosophy was almost dead in Germany, though predominant in Great Britain and active in Italy (1871[1]-1904); and (3) the period of rebirth, dating from the appearance of Dilthey's Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels (1905) to the present time.

A. The Period of Early Criticism (1831-1870)[2]

1. Hegel's interpretation of religion was early characterized as one-sidedly intellectualistic. Hegel, writes Noack, confuses the actual spiritual life with the notion or knowledge of this life;[3] underestimating the

---

[1] It should be noted, however, that this division does not correspond completely with the eclipse of Hegelianism. After enjoying almost complete supremacy in Germany from 1820 to 1850, the Hegelian philosophy began to lose its fascination about the middle of the century.

[2] For the sake of smoothness and brevity in the text, the pertinent works of the investigators are mentioned only in footnotes. All citations of books found in the bibliography use the abbreviations there listed. When cited for the first time, the name and date of each book is given in parentheses. For writings infrequently cited and therefore not in the bibliography, full data are given in footnotes.

[3] Ludwig Noack, RBH (Der Religionsbegriff Hegels, 1845), pp. 68-69.

importance of feeling, intuition, and will, he makes thought the genuine ground of religion, thus identifying being with thought.[1] Haym also holds that Hegel depreciates the heart-content of religion by conceptualizing it. At Hegel's hands the divine dissolves itself in reason and piety in knowing.[2] Trendelenburg and Ullmann protest likewise against Hegel's intellectualism.[3] Ulrici maintains that Hegel makes religion simply a transitional stage leading to philosophy, to which it is subordinate and in which it must be transcended.[4]

At this point Hegel has two defenders. Strauss, representing the Hegelian left wing, contends that Hegel rightly elevates knowledge at the expense of faith, thus showing the unstable mythical foundation of the latter.[5] Rosenkranz, representing the right, holds that Hegel by no means eliminates feeling from religion, but simply protests against deriving religion in general from the feeling of dependence.[6]

2. A second criticism advanced during this early period was that Hegel forces the historical facts of religion to fit the scheme of his notion. He distorts the historical, says Noack, by construing it in terms of his logical dialectic.[7] Hegel is right, says Weisse, in holding that history, though it forms the necessary background of thought, lacks an

---

[1] Noack, RBH, pp. 16-17, 32, 34.

[2] Rudolf Haym, HSZ (Hegel und seine Zeit, 1857), pp. 414, 401.

[3] Adolf Trendelenburg, essay in the Neue Jenaische allgemeine Literaturzeitung, Nos. 92-99; quoted in G. A. Gabler, Die Hegelsche Philosophie (Berlin: A. Duncker, 1843), Bk. 1, p. 109. C. Ullmann, "Zur Charakteristik der holländischen Theologie gegenüber der deutschen." Theol. Stud. u. Krit., 17 (1844), pp. 808-810.

[4] Hermann Ulrici, "Zur Religionsphilosophie" (1853), pp. 240-243. Cf. Haym, HSZ, p. 404, and later criticism, below, pp. 5-6, 10-11.

[5] David Friedrich Strauss, Streitschriften (Tübingen, 1837), Heft 3; cited by Pfleiderer, PRBH, II, p. 130.

[6] Karl Rosenkranz, KEHS (Kritische Erläuterungen des Hegelschen Systems, 1840), p. 335; cf. also HDN (Hegel als deutscher National-philosoph, 1870), p. 211.

[7] Noack, RBH, pp. 40-48, 70-74.

immanent criterion of truth; but he errs in seeking truth only in pure thought.[1] Haym approves Hegel's procedure in passing from the notion of religion to the specific religions, since this shows that the notion in general must gain actuality in concrete historical development. Likewise, thinks Haym, Hegel maintained until the Jena period a dominant interest in the historical pragmatism of Christianity. In his mature philosophy, however, his metaphysical interest triumphs; in his philosophy of religion only fragments of historical comprehension remain.[2]

Rosenkranz and Stirling maintain that Hegel does not proceed in a priori fashion, but simply recognizes the inability of the merely historical to give us truth and connection in religions.[3] Hegel's primary concern, thinks Stirling, is to give philosophical support to the truths of religion,[4] though Eschenmayer and Saintes find that Hegel's logical system perverts the Christian truths which it seeks to restore.[5] Baur finds the essential merit of the Hegelian philosophy of religion in its mediation between the subjective and objective aspects.[6] Strauss, concentrating on Hegel's Christology, holds that Hegel construes not the self-consciousness of a God-man, but rather the consciousness of those who be-

---

[1] Christian F. Weisse, "Strauss und Bruno Bauer" (1843), pp. 76-77.

[2] Haym, HSZ, pp. 417, 48, 397-398, 420. Haym goes so far as to say that Hegel's philosophy of religion contains less of the historical sense than any other branch of his philosophy.

[3] Rosenkranz, HDN, p. 212. James Hutchison Stirling, SOH (The Secret of Hegel, 1865, 1898), pp. 721, 730-732.

[4] Stirling, SOH, p. 750; Stirling's annotated translation of Albert Schwegler's Handbook of the History of Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edmonston, 1879), p. 437. Cf. von Hartmann and McTaggart, below, pp. 8-9.

[5] Eschenmayer, Die Hegelsche Religionsphilosophie verglichen mit dem christlichen Principe (Tübingen, 1834), p. 160; quoted in Strauss, Hegel, and Their Opinions (anon., no date or place, no pagination), p. 8. Amand Saintes, Histoire Critique du Rationalisme en Allemagne (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1841), pp. 325-326.

[6] Ferdinand Christian Baur, Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Tübingen: C. F. Osiander, 1835), pp. 714-715, 717; cf. p. 735.

Hegel's criterion of truth; but he sees in seeking truth only in myth thought.[1] Hans Kohn-Bramstedt's procedure in passing from the notion of religion to the specific religions, also tends to say that the notion in general must gain actuality in concrete historical development. Likewise, Julius Schaxel, Hegel relationship until the time period a document interest in the historical presentation of "relationship". In his review (Schaxel), however, his methodological interest intended; in his philosophy of religion only fragments of historical [illegible] remain.[2]

Schaxel and Stirling maintain that Hegel does not proceed in a critical fashion, but simply recognizes the inability of the merely historical to give us truth and connection in religions.[3] Hegel's primary concern, Stirling [illegible], is to give philosophical support to the truths of religion.[4] Schaxel, Schwegler and Salomon [illegible] that Hegel's logical system restores the Christian truths which it needs to restore.[5] Hegel finds the essential merit of the Hegelian philosophy of religion in its reality, between the subjective and objective aspects.[6] Strauss, concerning Hegel's Christology, holds that Hegel constructs not the self-consciousness of a God-man, but rather the consciousness of those who be-

---

[1] Christian T. Nelson, "Strauss und seine Gegner" (1837), pp. 72-73.

[2] Hegel, op. cit., pp. 417, 42, 327-328, 420. Hegel goes so far as to say that Hegel's philosophy of religion contains less of the historical [illegible] than any other branch of his philosophy.

[3] Schaxel, op. cit., p. 212. James Hutchison Stirling, [illegible] of Hegel, 1865, Lond., pp. 721, 720-727.

[4] Stirling, op. cit., p. 720; Stirling's emphasis on [illegible] of Hegel's [illegible] of the Science of Religion, [illegible] Schaxel, op. cit., p. 427. [illegible] and [illegible], below, pp. 6-7.

[5] Schwegler, Die Hegelsche Philosophie [illegible] der christlichen Religion (Tübingen, 1854), p. 183; quoted in Strauss, Der Christ [illegible] (no date or place, no pagination), [illegible] Salomon, Letzte Grundlage zu Religionslehre [illegible] (Leipzig: [illegible] Schwegler, 1857, pp. [illegible]-326.

[6] Ferdinand Christian Baur, Die christliche Gnosis oder die christlich-religiöse Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Tübingen: [illegible], 1835, pp. 714-715, 717; cf. p. 720.

lieved that a certain individual was the God-man.[1]

3. From Hegel's identification of being with thought, holds Noack, flows naturally also an underestimate of the significance of individuality, the kernel of which is will. Treating the development of religion as the development of God, Hegel smothers the individual religious consciousness.[2] J. H. Fichte and Weisse also charge that in Hegel the abstract necessity of the notion destroys all free individuality.[3] But Rosenkranz maintains that such writers overlook the Hegelian principle that only the result yields the full truth. The truth of finite spirits is found only in their relation to the Absolute Spirit.[4]

B. The Period of Obscurity (1871-1904)

Strangely enough, the years in which Hegel's star shone most dimly witnessed a considerable amount of research in his philosophy of religion. It is true that most of this occurred about the end of the century. Yet even earlier there were loyal friends of Hegel who, while by no means accepting his philosophy _in toto_, recognized in him great insights and showed their interest in sympathetic interpretation and criticism of his views. Former criticisms were scrutinized and new ones advanced.

1. Hegel's intellectualism continued to draw fire.[5] Though Hegel is "im vollen Recht," says von Hartmann, in pointing out the lack in feeling alone of any claim to truth-content, he is prevented by his one-sided intellectualism from doing justice to feeling.[6] Hegel's theory of religion,

---

[1] Davis Friedrich Strauss, _Die christliche Glaubenslehre_ (1840f.), II, pp. 218-219. For later criticisms see below, pp. 6-9, 12-13.

[2] Noack, RBH, pp. 34, 43; cf. also pp. 22-23.

[3] Cf. Rosenkranz, KEHS, p. 363.

[4] Rosenkranz, KEHS, pp. 363-364. For later criticisms of Hegel's treatment of individuality, cf. below, pp. 9, 13.

[5] Cf. the earlier criticisms of Noack, Haym, Ullmann, and Ulrici, above, pp. 2-4; and later criticisms, below, pp. 10-12.

[6] Eduard von Hartmann, "Mein Verhältnis zu Hegel" (1888), p. 336; RDG (_Die Religion des Geistes_, 1882), pp. 32-33.

holds Pfleiderer, accentuates the religious concept to the exclusion of the emotional elements. He ignores experience by making the emotional side of our spiritual nature a subordinate stage of the rational.[1] Richert and Ott maintain that Hegel also undervalues the moral aspects of religion.[2] Richert and Ott ascribe this suppression of the will to the absence in Hegel of any deep sense of sin or estrangement from God.[3] Drews, Lindsay, and Leighton contend that Hegel overlooks the significance of both feeling and volition.[4]

But Hegel is again not without defenders. Mackenzie points out that the essence of Hegel's doctrine lies in its insistence on the reality of the concrete universal, which is found in feeling and action as well as in thinking.[5] Fickler cites passages in Hegel indicating that for him religion is far more than a logical process.[6] Even Ott finds Hegel recognizing feeling, thought, and will as "gleichberechtigte, konstitutive Elemente" in religion.[7]

2. As before,[8] Hegel is charged with treating the facts of history arbitrarily. His dialectical method, says Ott, forces history out of its

---

[1] Otto Pfleiderer, DT (The Development of Theology, 1887), pp. 73-74, 81; PRBH (The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of Its History, 1893), II, pp. 91, 96.

[2] Hans Richert, HRP (Hegels Religionsphilosophie, 1900), p. 54. Emil Ott, RPH (Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels, 1904), pp. 10, 105-106.

[3] Richert, HRP, p. 50; Ott, RPH, p. 20. Jean Wahl takes precisely the opposite view, holding that Hegel's whole philosophy grows out of his "unhappy" religious consciousness. Cf. below, p. 10.

[4] Arthur Drews, HRP (Hegels Religionsphilosophie, 1905), pp. LXXVI, 462. James Lindsay, "Theistic Idealism" (1905), p. 90. J. A. Leighton, MCG (Typical Modern Conceptions of God, 1901), pp. 68-72.

[5] J. S. Mackenzie, "The Hegelian Point of View" (1902), p. 70.

[6] W. Fickler, "Unter welchen philosophischen Voraussetzungen hat sich bei Hegel die Wertschätzung des Staates entwickelt und wie ist diese zu beurteilen?" Zeit. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., 123 (1904), p. 21.

[7] Ott, RPH, pp. 105, 99. Cf. above, p. 3, and below, pp. 11-12.

[8] Cf. above, pp. 3-5; cf. also below, pp. 10-12.

true proportion.[1] Pfleiderer, McTaggart, and Leighton maintain that Hegel's attempt to explain the historical advance of the religious consciousness in terms of the logical dialectic of the notion must fail because of the number, variety, and complexity of the empirical factors concerned.[2] Drews finds in Hegel's emphasis on the doctrine of the Trinity as central in Christianity, and in his treatment of the life of Jesus, a vain effort to derive facts from the dialectic of the Idea without sufficient regard for historical experience.[3] According to Seth (Pringle-Pattison), Hegel makes no adequate provision for the transition from the Idea *per se* to the world of real difference.[4]

The most distinctive thing about the research of this period, however, is the emergence of a recognition that Hegel's results are based on an empirical procedure. Adolf Lasson,[5] von Hartmann,[6] Seth,[7] and Ritchie[8] all conclude that the content of Hegel's exposition has been gained only through a profound study of the facts of religious history, and only subsequently arranged deductively in the system of notions. McTaggart and Leighton are in general agreement.[9]

Such writers point out, however, that Hegel adds to his respect for empirical study of historical religion the profound insight that it alone is not enough.[10] He insists, says Vera, that such study must be supple-

---

1 Ott, RPH, p. 117.

2 Pfleiderer, PRBH, pp. 101-102. J. M. E. McTaggart, SHD (*Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, 1896), pp. 236-258. Leighton, MCG, p. 68.

3 Drews, HRP, pp. 399-400, 466.

4 Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison), HP (*Hegelianism and Personality*, 1893), pp. 171-179; DKH (*The Development from Kant to Hegel*, 1882), pp. 168-169.

5 Adolf Lasson, "Über Gegenstand und Behandlungsart der Religionsphilosophie." *Phil. Monatsh.*, 15 (1879), pp. 168-169.

6 von Hartmann, "Mein Verhältnis zu Hegel," p. 317.

7 Andrew Seth, SP (Scottish Philosophy, 1885), p. 196.

8 David G. Ritchie, "Philosophy and the Study of Philosophers," p. 12, n. 1; "Hegel's Early Studies---a Correction," p. 568.

9 McTaggart, SHD, p. 237. Leighton, MCG, pp. 43, 46.

10 Cf. Rosenkranz and Stirling, above, p. 4; and below, pp. 12-13.

mented by a truly philosophical investigation which demonstrates how all religions proceed from one fundamental principle.[1] Werner, A. Lasson, and Seth likewise stress Hegel's emphasis on the need of going behind historical facts to rational content.[2] It is precisely this disclosure that religion can be both historical and rational, this treatment of the history of religion as a developing process which reason underlies a priori, which constitutes in Pfleiderer's opinion "the imperishable achievement of Hegel."[3] Vowinckel,[4] Sterrett,[5] and Leighton[6] also laud Hegel's reconciliation of reason and history. Richert, on the contrary, charges that this reconciliation is not an actual one, since Hegel begins, without admitting it, by presupposing what is to be proved.[7]

Those who find in Hegel an inductive approach do not always commend him for it. In Drews' opinion, though Hegel claims to proceed according to the logical necessity of the notion, his construction is throughout determined by his contingent knowledge of the history of religion.[8] Other critics accuse Hegel of being too empirical. Because of an exaggerated respect for the existent forms of religion, holds von Hartmann, Hegel makes the mistake of regarding Christianity as the absolute religion, instead of as merely a stage in the development of the human religious consciousness.[9] McTaggart, however, opposes the claim that Hegel seeks to provide the dog-

---

[1] A. Vera, Introduction to his French translation, Philosophie de la Religion de Hegel, II, pp. CXXIV, CXXV.

[2] A. Lasson, Review of Werner, HO (Hegels Offenbarungsbegriff, 1887). Phil. Monatsh., 24 (1888), p. 354. Seth, DKH, pp. 158-164, 227-228.

[3] Pfleiderer, PRBH, pp. 80, 82, 114.

[4] Ernst Vowinckel, RRSH (Religion und Religionen bei Schleiermacher und Hegel, 1896), pp. 56-57; cf. also pp. 44, 62.

[5] James MacBride Sterrett, HPR (Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, 1890), pp. 233-240.

[6] Leighton, MCG, pp. 101-102.

[7] Richert, HRP, p. 57.

[8] Drews, HRP, p. 409.

[9] von Hartmann, "Mein Verhältnis zu Hegel," p. 325. Cf. below, pp. 149-157.

mas of orthodox Christianity with rational support.[1] Deussen attacks Hegel for not treating the world as illusion, as all good religions should.[2]

3. The writers of this period also charge Hegel with disparaging finite individuality.[3] Because of his abstract monistic epistemology, says von Hartmann, Hegel cannot do justice to the individual subject in religion.[4] Seth, Leighton, Lindsay, and Ott agree that Hegel makes finite selves only moments, however essential, in the life of the Absolute, thus destroying their true uniqueness.[5] Ritchie, however, contends that Hegel does not wipe out finite selves, but simply opposes viewing them in isolation from the Absolute.[6] According to Sterrett also, Hegel maintains the full content of personality, but protests against the atomic individualism which renders universal truth impossible.[7]

4. According to Seth, Hegel deprives God also of true individuality, making him a mere logical concept.[8] Drews holds that Hegel's God, as the eternally self-moving notion, does not satisfy the religious consciousness, which demands in its God a fixed, unchangeable ground of events, a quiet refuge where the soul may rest.[9] Rogers thinks that Hegel carries his appeal to experience too far in attributing to the Absolute himself progress through struggle and the need of <u>attaining</u> full self-consciousness.[10]

---

[1] McTaggart, SHC (<u>Studies in Hegelian Cosmology</u>, 1901, 1918), pp. 197-251.

[2] Paul Deussen, Review of Werner, HO. <u>Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil.</u>, 3(1890), p. 155.

[3] Cf. above, p. 5, and below, p. 13.

[4] von Hartmann, "Mein Verhältnis zu Hegel," p. 336.

[5] Seth, HP, p. 171; SP, pp. 216-217; Leighton, MCG, pp. 66-68; Lindsay, "Theistic Idealism," p. 87; Ott, RPH, p. 103.

[6] Ritchie, DH, pp. 74-75. Cf. Rosenkranz, above, p. 5.

[7] Sterrett, HPR, pp. 169-170.

[8] Seth, HP, pp. 164, 156.

[9] Arthur Drews, DSK (<u>Die deutsche Spekulation seit Kant</u>, 2d ed., 1895), I, p. 279.

[10] Arthur Kenyon Rogers, "The Absolute of Hegelianism" (1900), p. 340. Cf. later criticisms of Hegel's view of God, below, p. 13.

C. The Period of Rebirth (1905-1933)

1. The appearance in 1905 of Dilthey's Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels, based on the hitherto unutilized manuscripts of the University of Berlin, marked the beginning of a new epoch in the understanding of Hegel. The light thrown on the development of Hegel's early thought by this work and the investigations of Nohl, Adams, Wahl, and Haering, all of whom are partly indebted to Dilthey, has colored a large part of the research of this latest period, and forms the most distinctive contribution to it.[1]

These investigations are significant for our present purposes mainly in three respects: (1) they reveal at the heart of Hegel's philosophy a dominant religious interest; (2) they show Hegel's dialectic to be less a method than an experience which centers in his struggle with the religious problem; and (3) they show his mature religious thought to be based on a close study of historical religions.

The remaining investigations of the period follow in the main the lines of earlier study, though the influence of the new knowledge of Hegel's empirical religious interests is of course often apparent.

2. Georg Lasson points out with approval that Hegel makes thought central in religion; reason must guide if objective truth is to be won.[2] But with Troeltsch and Griffiths, Lasson holds that Hegel's specifically logical conception of religion gives insufficient recognition to feeling, which for Troeltsch is prior.[3] Lasson, though opposing those who charge Hegel with not taking sin seriously, finds that Hegel does not do full

---

[1] Herman Nohl, ed., TJS (Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, 1907); George Plimpton Adams, MEH (The Mystical Element in Hegel's Early Theological Writings, 1910); Jean Wahl, MCPH (Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel, 1929); Theodor L. Haering, HWW (Hegel: sein Wollen und sein Werk, 1929).

[2] Georg Lasson, EHR (Einführung in Hegels Religionsphilosophie, 1930), pp. 5, 14, 18, 20, 33, 35-37, 44, 47-50.

[3] Lasson, EHR, p. 147. Ernst Troeltsch, "Die Stellung des Christentums unter den Weltreligionen" (1924), p. 71. Rees Griffiths, GIE (God in Idea and Experience, 1932), p. 32.

c. The Period of Kabirek (1908-1923)

1. The appearance in 1908 of Hilbert's *Die Grundlagen der Geometrie*, based on the hitherto unutilized manuscripts of the "University of Berlin," marked the beginning of a new epoch in the understanding of Hegel. The light thrown on the development of Hegel's early thought by this work and the investigations of Nohl, Dilthey, Wahl, and Haering, all of whom are partly indebted to Hilbert, has colored a large part of the research of this latest period, and forms the most distinctive contribution to it.[1]

These investigations are significant for our present purpose mainly in three respects: (1) they reveal at the heart of Hegel's philosophy a dominant religious interest; (2) they show Hegel's dialectic to be less a method than an experience which centers in his struggle with the religious problem; and (3) they show his mature religious thought to be based on a close study of historical religions.

The remaining investigations of the period follow in the main the lines of earlier study, though the influence of the new knowledge of Hegel's religious and political interests is of course often apparent.

2. George Lasson points out with approval that Hegel makes thought central in religion; reason must make it objective truth is to be won.[2] But with Fichte and Griffiths, Lasson holds that Hegel's specifically logical conception of religion gives insufficient recognition to feeling, which for Fichte is prior.[3] Lasson, though opposing those who charge Hegel with not taking sin seriously, finds that Hegel does not do full

---

[1] Herman Nohl, ed., *Der Geschichte Theologischer Jugendschriften*, 1907; George Wilhelm Wahl, *Die Entwicklung Hegels in Frankfurt* (1915); Wilhelm Dilthey, *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels und andere Aufsätze zur Geschichte des Geistes* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1921); Theodor L. Haering, *Hegel: Sein Wollen und sein Werk*, 1929.

[2] George Lasson, *Hauptstücke in Hegels Religionsphilosophie*, 1920, pp. 9, 14, 19, 20, 27, 34-37, 44, 47-50.

[3] Lasson, *ibid.*, p. 147. Ernst Troeltsch, "Die Religion des Geistes und der Wert der Aufklärung" (1924), p. 71. Jean Griffiths, *Die Idee in Idee und Ideenlosigkeit*, 1928, p. 80.

justice to ethical realities.[1] Hessen, impressed by the horrible experience of the World War, finds next to thought at the heart of reality something irrational and often brutal, which Hegel does not recognize.[2]

But Hegel admits, says Lasson, that the fullness of religious experience includes not only thought, but faith, meditation, volitional activity, and obedience as well.[3] The whole, not the parts, is for Hegel the determining factor.[4] Glockner joins with Lasson in maintaining that Hegel does not oppose immediate knowledge of God, but only the subjective view that this immediate knowledge is the only kind possible.[5]

A recognition of irrational aspects in Hegel's religious philosophy emerges in Glockner[6] and Kroner,[7] who regard Hegel as the great synthesist of the rational and the irrational, of knowledge and faith. Kroner, for example, points out that Hegel is distinctly a rationalist, for he seeks to comprehend experience in thought; but he is also the greatest irrationalist of history, for he makes the dialectic of contradiction the basic principle of his thought.[8] But Hegel's panlogism, says Glockner, obscures the irrational element, so that his philosophy inevitably appears as extreme rationalism.[9] Glockner is also skeptical as to the success of

---

[1] Lasson, EHR, pp. 30, 7-8, 147.

[2] Johannes Hessen, HT (Hegels Trinitätslehre, 1922), pp. 39-40, 43.

[3] Lasson, EHR, pp. 10, 25, 37, 47. Cf. Mary Whiton Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 3d ed. (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1915), p. 394.

[4] Lasson, EHR, p. 96.

[5] Hermann Glockner, "Hegel und Schleiermacher im Kampf um Religionsphilosophie und Glaubenslehre" (1930), p. 251; G. Lasson, EHR, p. 47.

[6] Glockner, op. cit., pp. 242, 246, 256-259. "Robert Vischer und die Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften im letzten Drittel des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts," pp. 315, 316. "Hegelrenaissance und Neuhegelianismus," p. 169.

[7] Richard Kroner, KBH (Von Kant bis Hegel, 1921-1924), II, pp. 233, 238, 239, 260-262, 271-272.

[8] Kroner, KBH, II, pp. 271-272.

[9] Glockner, "Hegelrenaissance und Neuhegelianismus," p. 169. Kroner (KBH, p. 272) rejects the term "panlogism," regarding Feuerbach's term, "rationelle Mystik," as the best characterization of Hegel's system.

Hegel's synthesis.[1]

3. Contemporary research also deals with Hegel's relation to religious history. Hegel's philosophy of rational necessity, holds Troeltsch, excludes contingency and novelty and damages the original factuality of historical religion.[2] Baillie and Georg Lasson also find the latter fault in Hegel,[3] but both believe Hegel's view to be grounded largely in a close observation of historical fact.[4] In fact, Lasson thinks that Hegel relies too much on his experience in linking Spirit inseparably with a particular manifestation of it, Christianity.[5] Hammacher regards Hegel as too empirical in finding the ideal already realized.[6]

Both Troeltsch and Lasson, however, laud Hegel for combating historical relativism and transcending it by treating the history of religion as the unfolding of divine reason.[7] Kroner holds that Hegel reconciles history and reason by viewing the historical aspect of Spirit as itself a thought-aspect.[8] Baillie likewise points out that for Hegel the evolution of the notion of religion necessarily involves the evolution of a historical reality.[9] Hammacher, while unwilling to admit reason in everything, approves Hegel's procedure in trying to work out a reasonable connection

---

[1] Glockner, "Hegel und Schleiermacher," pp. 256-259. On Hegel's treatment of religious experience, cf. above, pp. 2-4, 5-7.

[2] Troeltsch, GS (Gesammelte Schriften, 1913), II, pp. 775, 394, 481, 484; III, p. 276. Cf. earlier treatments, above, pp. 315, 6-9.

[3] James Black Baillie, "Hegel." ERE (1914), VI, p. 585. Georg Lasson, EHR, pp. 100-102.

[4] Baillie, "Hegel," p. 586. G. Lasson, EHR, pp. 37-38, 93-95. Cf. S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (London: Macmillan, 1920), I, p. 204.

[5] G. Lasson, EHR, pp. 146-148. Cf. von Hartmann, above, p. 8.

[6] Emil Hammacher, BPHG (Die Bedeutung der Philosophie Hegels für die Gegenwart, 1911), pp. 56-57.

[7] Troeltsch, GS, II, pp. 482, 747-748; III, pp. 267-277. G. Lasson, EHR, pp. 49, 102. Cf. William Ernest Hocking, MGHE (The Meaning of God in Human Experience, 1912, 1928), p. 155.

[8] Kroner, KBH, p. 254; "System und Geschichte bei Hegel" (1931), p. 248.

[9] Baillie, "Hegel," pp. 586, 587.

Hegel's symbols.[1]

2. Contemporary research also deals with Hegel's relation to religious history. Hegel's philosophy of religion necessarily, calls upon concepts, excludes contingency and novelty and damages the original factuality of historical religion.[2] Baillie and Dodd Larson also find the latter fault in Hegel.[3] But then believe Hegel's view to be grounded largely in a close observation of historical fact.[4] In fact, Larson thinks that Hegel relies too much on his expectations in finding Truth inseparably with a particular manifestation of it, "Christianity."[5] Moreover regards Hegel as too secular in finding the ideal where it realizes.[6]

Both Troeltsch and Larson, however, lack Hegel for overstating historical relativism and transcending it by treating the history of religion as the pedigree of living reason.[7] Kroner holds that Hegel recognizes historical reason by viewing the historical energy of Spirit as itself a [illegible].[8] Baillie likewise points out that for Hegel the evolution of the religious relation necessarily involves the evolution of a historical reality.[9] Hegelian, while avoiding the Kantian reason in everything, approves Hegel's procedure in trying to work out a reasonable connection

---

[1] Stephens, "Hegel and Schleiermacher," pp. 325-32. On Hegel's treatment of religious experience, cf. above, pp. 4-6, 5-7.

[2] Troeltsch, Die Chinesische Philosophie, 1913, II, pp. 773, 634, 401, 444; III, pp. 1-2. Cf. earlier fragments, above, pp. 312, 5-3.

[3] James Dodd Larson, Baillie, "Hegel," JPR (1924), II, p. 380. Cf. Larson, pp. 10-10f.

[4] Baillie, "Hegel," p. 382. Cf. Larson, pp. 27-32, 32-33. Cf. 5. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (London: Macmillan, 1920), I, p. 204.

[5] Larson, pp. 134-140. Cf. von Hartmann, above, p. 2.

[6] Bell Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, Die Entwicklung der Philosophie Hegels für die Gegenwart, 1921, pp. 45-47.

[7] Troeltsch, Cf. II, p. 400, 427-744; III, pp. 329-377. C. Larson, 23, pp. 10f. Cf. William Temple Zoeking, Mind (The Meaning of God in Human Experience, 1919, 1924), p. 184.

[8] Kroner, XXV, p. 254: "Religion und Geschichte bei Hegel" (1928), p. 444.

[9] Baillie, "Hegel," pp. 380, 382.

in the facts of history.[1]

4. Troeltsch and Griffiths, like Seth, Leighton, and Lindsay, hold that at times Hegel merges the individual in the Absolute.[2] Royce, however, finds in this aspect of Hegel simply an insistence that individual selves attain realization only through their relations with other selves.[3]

5. With Seth, Griffiths maintains that Hegel's Absolute is remote from the God of religion.[4] Brightman, however, finds that the patient, suffering, laboring God of Hegel's Phänomenologie is profoundly close to the facts of moral experience,[5] while Hocking believes that the ontological argument for God so much emphasized by Hegel "is the only one which is wholly faithful to the history, the anthropology, of religion."[6]

III. The Sources

A. The Works of Hegel[7]

1. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion

The most complete statement of Hegel's philosophy of religion is found in the lectures on the subject which he delivered at the University of Berlin during the summer semesters of 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831, and which were published after his death. Unfortunately, we have from Hegel's

---

[1] Hammacher, BPHG, pp. 43-44.

[2] Troeltsch, GS, I, pp. 255, 306; III, pp. 130-133, 135n., 274-276. Griffiths, GIE, pp. 213-214, 218. On this problem cf. above, pp. 5, 9.

[3] Josiah Royce, LMI (Lectures on Modern Idealism, 1919), p. 210; The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1892, 1928), pp. 215-216.

[4] Griffiths, GIE, p. 213; cf. p. 64.

[5] Edgar Sheffield Brightman, The Problem of God (New York: Abingdon, 1930), pp. 94-95; cf. pp. 135-136; below, pp. 181-185.

[6] Hocking, MGHE, p. 307. Cf. earlier criticisms of Hegel's view of God, above, p. 9.

[7] For the purpose of this dissertation, the new critical edition of Hegel's works published by Georg Lasson will be regarded as standard. When not otherwise specified, references to Hegel's Werke are to this edition. Such references will begin with volume-numbers, the word Werke being implied. With the exception of Hegel's letters, accessible only in the original edition of the Werke, the works not available in Lasson's edition will be cited in the Jubiläumsausgabe of Hermann Glockner, indicated by the abbreviation JUB.

in the facts of history.[1]

Troeltsch and Griffiths, like Seth, Edgerton, and Lindsay, hold that at times Hegel merges the individual in the Absolute.[2] Some, however, find in this aspect of Hegel simply an insistence that individual selves attain realization only through their relations with other selves.[3] With Seth, Griffiths maintains that Hegel's Absolute is remote from the fact of religion.[4] Edgerton, however, finds that the religious, worship, labouring God of Hegel's Phenomenology is profoundly alive to the facts of moral experience,[5] while Hocking believes that the ontological argument for the existence of God advanced by Hegel "is the only one which is adequate to the dignity, the anthropology, of religion."[6]

III. The Sources

A. The Lores of Hegel[7]

1. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion

The most complete statement of Hegel's philosophy of religion is found in his lectures on the subject which he delivered at the University of Berlin during the winter semesters of 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831, and which were published after his death. Fortunately, we have from Hegel's

---

[1] Kaufmann, Hegel, p. 42-44.

[2] Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 498; Edgerton, op. cit., p. 124-126, 134-135; Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 212-214, 216. On this problem of, above, pp. 6, 8.

[3] Josiah Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism, 1919, p. 210; The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1892, 1922), pp. 212-213.

[4] Griffiths, Op. cit., p. 216; cf. p. 64.

[5] Edgar Sheffield Brightman, The Problem of God (New York: Abingdon, 1930), pp. 94-95; cf. pp. 137-138; below, pp. 181-182.

[6] Hocking, Meaning, p. 307. Cf. earlier criticisms of Hegel's view of God, above, p. 2.

[7] For the purpose of this dissertation, the new critical edition of Hegel's works published by Georg Lasson will be regarded as standard. Where not otherwise specified, references to Lasson's Werke are to this edition. Such references will begin with volume-numbers. The good Werke below is with the exception of Hegel's letters, accessible only in the original edition of the Werke. The works not available in Lasson's edition will be given in the Jubiläumsausgabe of Hermann Glockner, indicated by the abbreviation "J".

own hand only the lecture notebook, 104 pages in length, which he wrote in 1821, and various scattered leaves and fragments. The manuscript of 1821 covers the entire course, but varies greatly in completeness and often only sketches hastily the main outlines which were expanded in the oral lectures. Therefore our knowledge of many details of the lectures of 1821 and of almost all of the later lectures is derived entirely from the notes of Hegel's students. A second source of difficulty is the fact that each of Hegel's courses on the philosophy of religion makes fundamental changes in both the form and the content of his previous lectures. This complicates considerably the problem of an editor who would give a unified presentation of Hegel's religious thought.

Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, including the supplemental lectures on the proofs of the existence of God, have appeared in four editions and three distinct forms.

a. The first edition, edited by Philipp Marheineke and comprising volumes XI and XII of the original edition of Hegel's Sämtliche Werke, was published in 1832. Marheineke left almost completely out of account Hegel's own manuscript of 1821, confining himself to the later lectures as more authentic sources of Hegel's mature thought. Marheineke's sources were (1) several notebooks of hearers of the last three courses of lectures, notably those of Griesheim (1824), Meyer (1827), and Karl Hegel(1831), which were criticized and supplemented by Hegel himself; (2) single leaves and fragments discussing certain aspects in greater detail, found among Hegel's unpublished papers; and (3) Hegel's own incomplete work on the proofs of the existence of God. From these materials Marheineke, as he himself confesses, selected hastily what appeared important to him, and brought it

into rough order.[1]

b. The haste with which the first edition was prepared left unused a considerable amount of material, which was utilized in the second edition published in 1840. This edition, like the first, bears the name of Marheineke as editor, but the essential work was done by Bruno Bauer. The main advance made by Bauer lay in his use of Hegel's own notebook of 1821. In addition, Bauer had at his command the lecture notes of Leopold von Henning (1821), Michelet and Förster (1824), Droysen (1827), and Geyer, Reichenow, and Rutenberg (1831). Bauer inserted the contents of Hegel's own manuscript into the lectures at what seemed the appropriate points, and so built up a more or less unified work.

Because of the new materials used, the second edition is in several respects different from the first: (1) The second is noticeably larger. Exclusive of the supplement, the second edition covers 802 pages, the first only 646. (2) The use of Hegel's manuscript enriches the content of certain parts of the lectures, especially the introduction and the discussions of the notion of religion, of the religions of subjectivity, and above all, of the Christian religion. (3) The second edition, as a result of the comparison of the formerly used notebooks with the new ones, is free of many repetitions found in the first.

For several reasons, however, the second edition is by no means an unmitigated improvement on the first. (1) On the nature-religions the former contains scarcely more material than the latter, and is less loyal to Hegel's own classification. (2) Bauer does not free himself from the arrangement fixed, on the basis of inadequate evidence, by Marheineke. (3) Bauer

---

[1] Vorwort to second edition, JUB, XV, p. 7. This haste was primarily due to Marheineke's desire to convince the world as early as possible of the seriousness of the promise of a society of Hegel's friends to publish his printed and unprinted works in a complete edition.

proceeds with insufficient philological accuracy. (4) While eliminating many repetitions, in adding new material he not only introduces new repetitions but obscures the movement of thought. (5) He subjects Hegel's notes to arbitrary treatment, often paraphrasing rather than quoting Hegel's own words, at times ignoring the original order, and even making changes in content. It is generally recognized, therefore, that both of the early editions present Hegel's lectures in extremely unsatisfactory form.

c. The appearance in 1928 of a facsimile reproduction of the edition of 1840, comprising volumes XV and XVI of Glockner's new Jubilaumsausgabe of Hegel's Samtliche Werke, made Hegel's philosophy of religion, long out of print, once more available, but left the text unchanged.

d. In the publication, from 1925-1930, of Georg Lasson's critical edition of Hegel's lectures, the long-felt need of a thorough critical study of the manuscripts has been met. Lasson's sources were (1) Hegel's own lecture-notebook of 1821; (2) the notebooks of Griesheim, Hotho, von Kehler,[1] and C. Pastenacci[2] on the lectures of 1824 and of Erdmann and an anonymous student on the course of 1827; and (3) the published editions of Hegel's lectures. Lasson makes Hegel's notebook the basis of his work. Since, however, the text is often limited to phrases and key-words, it is often supplemented by Lasson with words which purport to retain the implied meaning. The completed text is printed in large type, Lasson's additions being inclosed within brackets. Much material from other sources has been woven into Hegel's text but distinguished from it by smaller type.[3]

---

[1] von Kehler's notebook includes only the introduction and the beginning of the first part.

[2] Pastenacci's notes were available to Lasson only after the completion of the first part (Begriff der Religion), and break off shortly after the beginning of Hegel's lectures on the absolute religion.

[3] Lasson's edition of Hegel's philosophy of religion forms volumes XII-XIV of his edition of the Samtliche Werke. Each of the three volumes contains two half-volumes, each with its own pagination. To avoid ambi-

The formal and material changes made by Lasson have produced a work vastly different from either of the earlier editions. The following comparison will seek to point out the main points of similarity and difference between Lasson's edition and that of 1840.[1] The primary differences are:

(1) Bauer's edition makes use of three notebooks of 1831 which were inaccessible to Lasson and are probably no longer extant.

(2) Bauer apparently gives no priority in value to Hegel's own notebook, rather adapting it to the other manuscripts which are his chief guide. Lasson, on the other hand, makes Hegel's text the groundwork of his whole edition, judging all else by it.

(3) In his finished edition Bauer distinguishes in no way between Hegel's own words and those of Hegel's students, and often paraphrases the former instead of reproducing them exactly. As a result, inaccuracies have been introduced into Hegel's text which sometimes involve, accidentally or intentionally, actual changes in meaning.[2] Lasson quotes Hegel directly

---

guity, therefore, every reference to this edition will specify, in addition to the volume-number, the abbreviation of the half-volume in question. The arrangement of the volumes, together with the abbreviations to be used, is as follows:

XII: Lasson, Einführung.
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.
1. Teil. Begriff der Religion (BR).
XIII: 2. Teil. Die bestimmte Religion.
1. Kapitel. Die Naturreligion (NR).
2. Kapitel. Die Religion der geistigen Individualität (RGI).
XIV: 3. Teil. Die absolute Religion (AR).
Anhang. Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes (BDG).

[1] The 1832 edition, inasmuch as its relation to that of 1840 has already been discussed, will be mentioned only incidentally.

[2] Hegel writes, for example, "Man sagt nun, die Empfindung ist etwas nur Subjektives, mir eigentümliches Besonderes." (XII, BR, p. 243.) Bauer paraphrases, "Man sagt gewöhnlich, das Gefühl sey etwas nur Subjektives." (JUB, XV, p. 139.) This inadmissible substitution of Gefühl for Empfindung, several times repeated, is accompanied by transformations in both the wording and the order of phrases and sentences.

and carefully distinguishes Hegel's words from those of others. Those passages in Bauer's edition which are found in none of the available manuscripts Lasson prints as footnotes, making exception only for the long sections of the introduction and the conclusion of the section on nature-religion, which are authenticated by the edition of 1832 and necessary to the connection. He also prints as footnotes other passages from the 1832 edition.

(4) Bauer often changes the original order of Hegel's own manuscript. With a few well-grounded exceptions, Lasson strictly preserves Hegel's arrangement.[1]

(5) The thought-movement of Bauer's treatment of the absolute religion is marked by a certain unclearness, which Lasson's close reference to

---

[1] The following instances illustrate the changes in arrangement made by Bauer. In each case, Lasson follows Hegel's original order.

a. Bauer omits the beginning of Hegel's criticism of contemporary agnosticism with which Hegel begins his course (XII, BR, pp. 243-245), and places the body of the passage in an entirely different setting (JUB, XV, pp. 52-54).

b. Bauer places a discussion of the religious sensibility, considered by Hegel in connection with cultus (XII, BR, pp. 243-245), in Hegel's polemic against the theology of feeling (JUB, XV, pp. 139-141), and substitutes, as already noted (cf. above, p. 17, n. 2), Gefühl for Empfindung.

c. Bauer overlooks the fact that Hegel, in his treatment of the three stages of nature-religion, classifies each stage dichotomously. Apparently thinking that Hegel, true to his principle of triplicity, must have given a trichotomous classification, Bauer substitutes such an arrangement for Hegel's own, as follows:

1). Bauer removes the Chinese religion from its connection with the religion of magic, making the latter a stage by itself and treating Chinese religion as the first aspect of the second main stage, which includes also Hinduism and Buddhism (XIII, NR, pp. 77-119; JUB, XV, pp. 279-324, 342-354).

2). Bauer reverses Hegel's order by discussing Hinduism before Buddhism (XIII, NR, pp. 119-185; JUB, XV, pp. 355-416). Though Bauer's arrangement is historically more correct, he is not justified in substituting it for Hegel's. Since notebooks on the course of 1831 were available not only to Bauer, but also to Marheineke in the preparation of the first edition, which follows Hegel's original order, it is not likely that Hegel himself made this change.

3). Between Parsiism and Egyptian religion Bauer inserts a chapter on Syrian religion, "the religion of pain," though nowhere in the extant lecture notes is such a special chapter to be found (JUB, XV, pp. 434-437). It remains a mystery whence Bauer obtained this material.

the original manuscripts has largely removed.

(6) The early editions of the supplementary "Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes" retain unchanged the many imperfections of the original manuscript and print the lectures as though they represented a work fully prepared for the press by Hegel himself. Lasson has sought to correct the defects, and carefully lists all changes made.

The following similarities are worthy of notice:

(1) The discussion of each religion proceeds in both editions by consideration of, first, the notion of religion, secondly, the historical manifestation of this idea, and finally, the cultus of the religion. Other general similarities of form and structure are manifest.[1]

(2) Most of the passages on the religions of spiritual individuality and the absolute religion in the 1840 edition which do not appear in the available notebooks are already published in the edition of 1832, and thus carry the presumption that they appeared somewhere in Hegel's lectures. These passages are also well adapted to the tenor of the lectures. For these reasons Lasson includes them in the text proper, the sources of all parts of which he indicates in appended tables. Passages which he regards as doubtful he consigns to the footnotes.

(3) In the essential content of most of the views advanced, Lasson's edition agrees with the earlier versions. His wording also is in many passages exactly the same as or only slightly different from that of the orig-

---

[1] For example, in the discussion of the absolute religion Lasson preserves the classification into the Kingdoms of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit which is followed in the two early editions but is missing from all known manuscripts. Though it is not certain that this division is original with Hegel, and though it has more the advantage of popularity than of strict accord with the notion, Lasson retains it because its appearance in the first edition argues the possibility that it may have been followed by Hegel in 1831.

inal editions.

(4) With the exception of the differences already mentioned,[1] the text of Hegel's lectures on the proofs of the existence of God is the same in both editions. The alterations made by Lasson are considerably less sweeping than those in the body of the Philosophie der Religion.

Because of its superior accuracy and authenticity, the text of Lasson's edition will form the basis of the present investigation.

Hegel's Philosophie der Religion has been translated into both English (by E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson) and French (by A. Vera). With the exception of the introductions to Vera's translation, however, these works will not be used in the present inquiry.

2. Other Works of Hegel

Hegel's treatment of the philosophy of religion is by no means limited to his lectures on the subject. In fact, he was so deeply interested in religion that he discusses it in almost all of his major works and in many minor ones. In most cases these discussions add nothing distinctively new to what is found in the lectures completely devoted to the subject, but they do clarify certain phases of his thought and indicate his most significant emphases. They comprise, therefore, valuable supplementary material for the purposes of this dissertation.

a. Works Published by Hegel Himself

Of the writings published by Hegel, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) is the earliest major work containing a discussion of religion. It is significant that Hegel's mature lectures are mainly an expansion and enrichment of the essential conception of religion already outlined in the Phänomenologie. Additional light on Hegel's religious philosophy is shed

---

[1] Cf. above, p. 19.

by his Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1817). References to religion occur throughout the "Logik" and the "Philosophie des Geistes." The work is of further and particular significance in that it shows the relative place occupied by religion in Hegel's mature system. The Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821) contains discussions of the relation between religion and morality, church and state which supplement the brief treatments of these problems in the Philosophie der Religion.

In addition to these major publications, several articles and reviews likewise demand consideration. These include Hegel's "Glauben und Wissen" (1802), his "Vorrede" to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie[1] (1822), his article, "Wer denkt abstrakt?" (ca. 1828), and his reviews of Roth's edition of Hamann's Schriften (1828), of Kollman's Über die Hegel'sche Lehre oder: absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus (1829), and of Göschel's Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntniss (1829). Of these, the preface to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie is extraordinarily significant for the insight it affords into Hegel's criticism of the theology of feeling.

b. Posthumously Edited Works

One of the most valuable primary sources is Herman Nohl's excellent historical-critical edition of Hegels theologische Jugendschriften (1907). These early writings of Hegel are significant because of what they reveal concerning the young Hegel's view of the importance of religion and his interest in the historical study of religions.

Of Hegel's posthumously edited lectures other than those on philosophy of religion itself the most important for this investigation are his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. In addition to containing a discussion of the relation between religion and the state and signif-

[1] The exact title of Hinrichs' book is Die Religion im inneren Verhältnis zur Wissenschaft. For the sake of convenience, it will be referred to as Religionsphilosophie, the name which appears in Hegel's Werke.

icant treatments of the main historical religions, these lectures throw important light on Hegel's view of Christianity and his estimate of human personality. Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie command attention for their treatments of Christianity, the Scholastics, the mystics, and the Reformation. The Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik discuss the relation between art, religion, and philosophy, and the esthetic aspects of the various historical religions.

The volume, Philosophische Propädeutik, Gymnasialreden und Gutachten über die Philosophie-Unterricht (1808-1815) contains suggestive references to religion. Hegel's letters, published in Briefe von und an Hegel (1887), edited by Karl Hegel, and Neue Briefe Hegels und Verwandtes (1912), edited by G. Lasson, contain isolated passages on religion, but are of minor worth from the standpoint of the present study.

B. Works of Hegel's Expositors and Critics

The field of investigation includes, in addition to the pertinent works of Hegel himself, all available expositions and criticisms of Hegel's philosophy in German, English, and French which are relevant to the problem. A survey of this literature has already been made.[1]

IV. The Plan of the Inquiry

The method followed throughout is that of personal investigation of the sources named. Following a brief summary of Hegel's philosophy of religion (Chapter II), the relative significance of the empirical and the rational in Hegel's philosophy of religion will be investigated by means of a critical study of four different, though closely related phases of Hegel's thought: his view of the nature of religious experience (Chapter III), his treatment of the historical development of religion (Chapter IV), his conception of the Absolute (Chapter V), and his estimate of human personal-

[1] Cf. above, pp. 1-13.

ity (Chapter VI). A concise statement of the conclusions reached and a summary of the main steps in the argument will conclude the dissertation.

Chapter Two

A SUMMARY OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

I. The Purpose of the Philosophy of Religion

Philosophy of religion is defined by Hegel as "denkende, begreifende Erkenntnis der Religion," "die Erkenntnis Gottes in vernünftiger Form."[1] Religion is present in ordinary uncriticized experience as simple faith, as an immediate consciousness of the divine. It is the task of philosophy to penetrate beneath the surface of religious experience as given and discover its inner meaning for thought. In short, philosophy seeks to understand religion.

Philosophical thought aims to perform this task by showing the relation between religion and the other aspects of human experience, or, more particularly, by reconciling religion with scientific knowledge.

> Auf was es aber ankommt, ist das Verhältnis der Religion im Menschen zu seiner übrigen Weltanschauung, Bewusstsein, Erkenntnis, Zwecken, Interessen. Auf dies Verhältnis bezieht sich und wirkt wesentlich die philosophische Erkenntnis.[2]

Where philosophical insight is lacking, religion is likely to be viewed in abstraction from the remainder of the mental life.

The conscious life of man is an alternation between two related kinds of activity. Man has his workdays, during which he busies himself with his particular interests and finite needs; and also his Sundays, when he lifts himself above his ordinary life and seeks to view himself in his true light, as a part of the higher life that is within him. The same is true of man's specifically scientific activity. Here, too, he has his particular pursuits, such as the study of nature and her laws, and the science of govern-

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 62, 33.
[2] XII, BR, pp. 10-11.

ment; but he is also concerned with the attainment of universal truth, the science of God.[1] Unfortunately, these two aspects of experience, though both are legitimate and important, are not always in harmony. Reason and religion often exist in false separation. On the one hand, thought will not venture on a serious, thoroughgoing investigation of religion; on the other, religion lacks confidence in its ability to know the truth in thought.

It is the purpose of the philosophy of religion to break down this false partition, to show that religion lies within the scope of rational inquiry and to give to religion faith in its power to know.[2] Philosophy seeks to broaden the limited, finite knowledge of science to include genuine knowledge of the infinite, and to elevate the mystical apprehension of God to the status of intellectual certainty.

> [Zwischen diesen beiden Seiten nun ist die] Religionsphilosophie diese Ausgleichung, [das Aufzeigen] des Unendlichen im Endlichen, des Endlichen im Unendlichen, Versöhnung des Gemüts mit der Erkenntnis, des religiösen, des absolut gediegenen Gefühls mit der Intelligenz. Dies ist das Bedürfnis der Religionsphilosophie, [wie] die Notwendigkeit der Philosophie überhaupt.[3]

For Hegel, therefore, the aim of religious thought is to reconcile reason and religion by removing the contradiction between them. Philosophical inquiry attempts to reveal the religion in reason and the reason in religion.

II. Philosophy of Religion and the Theology of Hegel's Day

In so conceiving the relation between thought and the religious life Hegel sets himself deliberately against the dominant theology of his day. The breach which he seeks to remove had been produced by two closely connected tendencies. On the one side was the deism of the <u>Aufklärung</u>, with its metaphysic of the understanding, which indeed presupposed God as

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 3, 11-12.
[2] XII, BR, pp. 22, 28, 53.
[3] XII, BR, p. 22; cf. p. 190; cf. XIV, AR, p. 231.

the highest being, but maintained the impossibility of knowing the essence of this being. Linked with this view in Hegel's mind was the critical philosophy of Kant, with its denial of demonstrable knowledge of the divine.

A natural counterpart of this agnosticism of the understanding was the theology of feeling, which affirmed an emotional premonition of God in his infinity, but regarded knowledge of God as both an impossibility and a temptation to atheism. Pious men who found the path of intellectual knowledge of God closed naturally chose the way of intuition and feeling.[1]

Both of these tendencies Hegel vigorously opposes. With regard to the "Bildung der Reflexion,"[2] he rejects its abstract, atomic, and external view of the relation between religion and knowledge and maintains the essential unity of the mind.

> Wir behaupten eine wesentliche Beziehung der Vernunfterkenntnis und der Religion. Es ist ungegründet, dass der Glaube an dem Inhalt der positiven Religion bestehen kann, wenn die Vernunft sich vom Gegenteil überzeugt hat. Die Vernunft ist ebenso göttliche Offenbarung wie die Vorstellung in der Religion, und es ist falsch, dass Glaube und Vernunft, wenn sie entgegengesetzten Inhalt haben, gleichgültig nebeneinander zu bestehen vermöchten. . . . Der menschliche Geist ist im Innersten nicht ein so Geteiltes, worin zweierlei bestehen könnte, das sich widerspricht.[3]

Since, therefore, the mind is basically one, it is capable of knowing in thought the reality which it feels and represents in religious experience. God not only is, but can be known.

But there is still a further reason for maintaining the knowability of God. According to Hegel, man can attain ultimate truth because he is not a foreigner in the universe, but at home in it. Man is a thinking being, and is therefore essentially one with the innermost nature of reality, which is Reason. "<u>Ein</u> Geist geht durch die Wirklichkeit und durch das

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 55-56; XIV, BDG, p. 23.
[2] Foreword to Hinrichs' <u>Religionsphilosophie</u>. JUB, XX, p. 22.
[3] XII, BR, pp. 54-55.

philosophische Denken."[1] Man can know God because both are Spirit. God is not jealous, but reveals himself to men; he is light, and light communicates itself.[2]

This immediate manifestation of the divine in human life is for Hegel the basic principle of philosophical knowledge: "dass nämlich unser Bewusstsein unmittelbar von Gott wisse, dass das Wissen vom Sein Gottes dem Menschen schlechthin gewiss sei."[3]

Hegel's criticism of Schleiermacher and the theology of feeling in general follows a similar course. As against the despair of knowledge which takes refuge in the "Zufälligkeit und Willkür des subjektiven Gefühls und seines Meinens,"[4] Hegel again maintains the validity of reason. The theology of feeling, he holds, leads to atheism, for it makes God only a product of human weakness, hope, and desire. The world is fundamentally rational, and must therefore be investigated by reason.

> Wie soll die Vernunft untersucht werden? Ohne Zweifel vernünftig; diese Untersuchung ist also selbst vernünftiges Erkennen. Um das Erkennen zu untersuchen, ist kein anderer Weg möglich als das Erkennen.[5]

If we approach the study of religion from the standpoint of the analytical understanding, we must either renounce all knowledge of what God is or take refuge in an intuitive apprehension of God which likewise abandons all hope of intellectual knowledge of truth. For Hegel, however, we are not limited to these two possibilities. There is another way, that of synoptic reason. On this path rational knowledge of God is certain.[6]

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 53.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 225; cf. pp. 226, 229; XIV, BDG, p. 47; below, pp. 159-160.
[3] XII, BR, p. 49.
[4] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 22.
[5] XII, BR, p. 57; cf. pp. 55-56. Hegel's estimate of the place of feeling in religion is discussed in Chapter Three; cf. below, pp. 51-67.
[6] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 20.

III. Religion in Relation to Art and Philosophy

In Hegel's view the whole of reality is Spirit. All aspects of the universe are manifestations of the living, active totality of one absolute Mind. The very nature of this Mind is free development according to dialectical principles. By a process of logical and historical evolution, the Absolute successively negates itself, posits its own other, and thereby advances to a higher affirmation. Beginning as logical Idea, Spirit externalizes itself to produce the complex world of nature and of man, and returns to itself as all-comprehending Absolute Spirit. All the details of nature and human history are thus an unfolding of the varied life of the Absolute, which advances laboriously from stage to stage until it attains its full truth as Absolute Spirit. This process reaches its culmination when Spirit rises in human experience to the free realms of art, religion, and philosophy.

Art, religion, and philosophy have a common content: the object of each is nothing less than the Absolute. All aim to know absolute truth, God. In all alike the contradiction between universality and particularity is broken down. All alike reconcile finite Spirit and Absolute Spirit. The difference between the three spheres consists only in the form in which they exhibit truth. Art reveals absolute truth in the form of immediate perception (unmittelbare Anschauung); religion, in the form of representation or imagination (Vorstellung); and philosophy, in the form of conceptual thought (Denken).[1] In art, the spiritual Idea is presented to consciousness in the external and sensual, and therefore contingent, forms of time and space. In religion, the absolute truth is elevated above external perception and in its universality inwardly revealed to consciousness in

[1] XII, BR, pp. 279-280; cf. pp. 142, 281-302.

the form of figurative thought. In philosophy the truth is fully present to consciousness in speculative thought. The three forms are not, however, exclusive. Rather do they intertwine and imply each other, since each is a property of the whole mind.[1]

Particularly relevant to the present problem is Hegel's distinction between religion and philosophy. While philosophy is for him "die Wissenschaft der denkenden Vernunft," religious faith is "das Bewusstsein und absolute Fürwahrhalten der für die Vorstellung gegebenen Vernunft."[2] The primary distinction depends on the difference between Vorstellung and Denken.

A Vorstellung according to Hegel must be distinguished from a mere mental picture. A mental picture, for example, of the Brandenburger Tor in Berlin, is a purely sensuous image of a particular object in space; it is therefore wholly individual, with no universal element. A representation, however, is an image elevated to the status of universality or thought, a figurative embodiment of a rational truth.[3] Representations may be either sensual or spiritual. Examples of the former are "battle," "war;" of the latter, representations of law, morality, virtue, bravery, the world. Specifically religious representations include the ordinary ideas of creation, the fall of man, the Fatherhood of God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and so on. The representations of religion, moreover, contain genuine objective truth.[4]

But religion falls short of yielding complete truth. It lacks the element of necessity or true connection which only pure thought can pro-

---

[1] Cf. XII, BR, p. 280; PHPR, JUB, III, p. 225.

[2] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 12. Cf. also XII, BR, p. 293.

[3] "Bild [ist] sinnlich aus dem Sinnlichen, Mythos; Vorstellung [ist] das Bild in seine Allgemeinheit erhoben; Gedanke, gedankenvoll, Form auch für Gedanken." (XII, BR, p. 284)

[4] XII, BR, pp. 284-288. The images of art, though objective, are yet sensuous, and therefore unable to grasp the Absolute truly.

vide. The connection attained in representation is that of the abstract understanding. Separate determinations of a spiritual content, each of which is for representation an independent whole in itself, are brought together and externally related by analogy and imagery. True inner connection is therefore impossible, and necessity is out of the question. Only the concrete notion, with its principle of the identity of opposites, can establish true connection or show genuine rational necessity. Truth is not the mere accordance of one's beliefs with principles otherwise regarded as true, but rather "die Wahrheit . . . in der Form der Wahrheit, in der Form des absolut konkreten, schlechthin und rein in sich zusammenstimmenden."[1] Speculative philosophy alone yields truth in this form.

This does not mean, however, that philosophy overthrows religion or renders it unnecessary. Neither does it deny that the content of religion for itself can be true.

> Vielmehr ist die Religion eben der wahrhafte Inhalt, nur in Form der Vorstellung, und die substantielle Wahrheit hat nicht erst die Philosophie zu geben. Nicht erst auf Philosophie haben die Menschen zu warten gehabt, um das Bewusstsein, die Erkenntnis der Wahrheit zu empfangen.[2]

In fact, unlike philosophy, religion is universal in its appeal. It is the sphere of conscious life in which the absolute truth is available and understandable to all. It speaks the truth in a form which the common people hear gladly. Philosophy, on the other hand, is only for those who are capable of sustained conceptual thought. But the masses of men are incapable of thought higher than the figurative type found in religion. Pure thought, shorn of sensuous imagery, is beyond their grasp. Thus the truth must reveal itself to the majority of people not in the

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 295; cf. pp. 293-294; XIII, RGI, p. 199.
[2] XII, BR, p. 299.

pure form of philosophy, but in the more popular form of religion.[1]

There can be no doubt, of course, that Hegel regards the conceptual form of truth as higher than the representative. The very fact that he places philosophy, not religion, on the highest level of dialectical development indicates this. But he is careful to point out that each exists in its own right, that each is necessary, and that both reveal absolute truth. Philosophy itself is for Hegel throughout religious; its object is nothing less than God himself.

> Die Philosophie hat den Zweck, die Wahrheit zu erkennen, Gott zu erkennen; denn er ist die absolute Wahrheit. Insofern ist nichts anderes der Mühe wert gegen Gott und seine Explikation.[2]

IV. Hegel's Philosophy of Religion in Outline

Hegel divides his Philosophie der Religion into three parts. He considers, first, the notion of religion; secondly, the definite religions, the historical manifestations of the notion; and finally, the absolute religion, the unity of the notion and its manifestation.

The principle of dialectical relation adopted by Hegel here, as in his smaller Logik as a whole and the third book of the Logik in particular, is that of growth or development. In the Logik, the Idea advances from being in its immediacy through essence, the sphere of mediation or universal relativity, to the notion, the realm of concrete unity. The notion, in turn, begins as subjective notion, realizes itself in the object, and finally returns to itself as the Absolute Idea. The same principle operates in the Encyclopädie as a whole, where the Absolute, beginning as logical Idea, externalizes itself in the world of nature, and goes on to complete self-realization in the realm of Spirit. The process is paralleled in the Philosophie des Geistes, in which Spirit begins as subjective spirit, moves

---

[1] Cf. V, ENC, pp. 14-15, 486; XII, BR, p. 69.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 225; cf. p. 228; XII, BR, p. 30; below p. 158.

on to become objective, and finally returns to itself as Absolute Spirit. In his Philosophie der Religion, therefore, Hegel applies to religion the principle which governs, in his view, the entire course of philosophy and the concrete development of the whole of reality.

A. The Notion of Religion

1. The Simple Definition of the Notion

"Die Religion in ihrem Begriff," says Hegel, "ist die Beziehung des Subjekts, des subjektiven Bewusstseins auf Gott, der Geist ist."[1] There are, therefore, two sides. Religion involves, on the one hand, the human consciousness which is elevated to God, and on the other, the self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit himself. Religion is present only when the subjective or human and the objective or divine factors are present in relation. "Die zwei Momente in ihrem Begriff des Gegensatzes sind: absolute Allgemeinheit, reines Denken,---und absolute Einzelheit, Empfindung."[2]

The subjective human consciousness is not, however, foreign to God, but is itself spirit. Religion may also be defined, therefore, as "die Beziehung des Geistes auf den absoluten Geist;"[3] or, speculatively considered,[4] it is "der Geist, der seines Wesens, seiner selbst bewusst ist,"[5] "die Idee des Geistes, der sich zu sich selbst verhält, das Selbstbewusstsein des absoluten Geistes."[6] Human consciousness is itself a moment or aspect in the life of the absolute consciousness.

> In der höchsten Idee ist so die Religion nicht die Angelegenheit eines Menschen, sondern sie ist wesentlich die höchste Bestimmung der absoluten Idee selbst. Indem sich der Geist an sich selbst unterscheidet, tritt die Endlichkeit des Bewusstseins ein. Aber dies endliche Be-

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 66.
[2] XII, BR, p. 154; cf. p. 182.
[3] XII, BR, p. 150.
[4] That is, from the standpoint of the absolute unity which differentiates itself.
[5] XII, BR, p. 66.
[6] XII, BR, p. 150.

> wusstsein ist Moment des Geistes selbst; er ist das sich Unterscheiden, das sich Bestimmen, d. h. sich als endliches Bewusstsein Setzen.[1]

According to its highest notion, therefore, religion is the life of the Absolute Spirit himself. In this life there are three main phases: (1) the moment of universality, God as the universal mind; (2) the moment of particularity, the self-differentiation of God to produce finite minds; and (3) the moment of individuality, the restoration of the unity of God and man in worship.[2]

Hegel develops the notion of religion from two standpoints, the theoretical and the practical, that of intellectual representation and that of worship. On each level the notion passes through three stages which parallel those found in the simple definition of the notion. Theoretically, mediation between God and man is accomplished in the so-called proofs of the existence of God. Practically, reconciliation between God and man is effected in worship.[3]

2. The Theoretical Development of the Notion: Knowledge of God

a. In the first stage, Spirit exists as pure thought, undifferentiated universality, spirit in general, the consciousness of God in his absolute unity.[4]

b. But thought, which is essentially consciousness, cannot remain on this level. Spirit which reposes in its own barren unity is not spirit. Its very nature is to be active, to manifest itself. "Der Geist, der sich nicht manifestiert, ist ein Totes."[5] Manifestation means becoming for an-

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 150-151.
[2] XII, BR, p. 149.
[3] XII, BR, pp. 187-278, especially, p. 225; V, ENC, pp. 383-418.
[4] XII, BR, pp. 65-69, 154, 156.
[5] XII, BR, p. 65; cf. p. 200; XIV, AR, p. 35.

other, that is, entry into opposition or difference. Spirit communicates itself, gives itself determinate being or finitude, becomes Spirit for spirit.[1]

As a result of this differentiation, Spirit has over against itself finite consciousness. There are two sides, the object and the subject for which the object is, or the Spirit as object of knowledge and the knowing spirit.[2] This is the point at which religion appears. Only when a differentiation of the original universality has made possible this relation between subjective consciousness and God can there be any genuine religion.[3]

c. But while this self-objectification of Spirit is essential to religion, it cannot be final. Religious knowledge is not only a simple relation of the finite mind to its divine object, but something much more concrete.

> Dies Wissen von Gott ist eine Bewegung in sich, näher eine Erhebung zu Gott. Die Religion sprechen wir wesentlich aus als eine Erhebung, ein Übergehen von einem Inhalte zum andern, vom Endlichen zum absolut Unendlichen.[4]

In appearing to the human knower in religion, God actually appears to himself. Likewise, in relating himself to God, the human individual is elevated to his own true nature. The differentiation is therefore transcended in "absolute Affirmation," in the elevation of the finite mind to God. It is "ein Erscheinen, das sich ewig zur Wahrheit der Erscheinung erhebt." From the estrangement between finite consciousness and itself, Spirit returns

> zum Wissen seiner selbst und zur substantiellen Einheit . . ., indem das Wissende, ihn erkennend, zu ihm selber und er dadurch zur Einheit seiner als des Wis-

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 65; XIV, AR, p. 7.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 4.
[3] XII, BR, pp. 65-69, 199-202; cf. pp. 156-157.
[4] XII, BR, p. 206.

sens und des Gegenstandes wird.[1]

This mediation between Absolute Spirit and finite spirits appears in the form of the so-called proofs of God's existence.[2] According to Hegel, the proofs presuppose an immediate consciousness of God. Their great significance, therefore, lies not in their proof of God's existence, but in the fact that they demonstrate the course followed by reason in its advance from the finite to the thought of God, "den Gang der Erhebung des Menschen zu Gott."[3]

3. The Practical Development of the Notion: Worship

The mediation between God and man which occurs in the abstract notion is not sufficient. The objective and subjective sides of the relation remain separate. Between them is only a general reference, an unspiritual relation. Over against the subject is a foreign power; to knowledge this object may appear as wholly other, in this world unknown. Furthermore, since the human individual knows God as absolute subject, it knows itself only as an accident or predicate of this subject. But the relation is also positive. The opposition must therefore be reconciled; man must come to feel and know God in himself.

> [Das] Subjekt [ist] an sich [mit dem absoluten Wesen] identisch, jenes ist seine Substanz, sein Subjekt, es ist in ihm, sein Wesen, nicht das Wesen eines andern. Diese Einheit, diese Versöhnung, Wiederherstellung seiner, das positive Gefühl des Teilhabens, der Teilnahme an jenem, Einssein sich zu geben aus jener Entzweiung und seiner Positivität zu geniessen, sich [zu] erfüllen, dies ist mein Tun, Handeln, zugleich mehr äusserliches oder inneres, göttliches Wissen, überhaupt der Kultus.[4]

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 202; cf. p. 224.

[2] One of Hegel's primary philosophical interests was the rehabilitation of these proofs. He not only devotes to them a whole series of public lectures, but deals with them repeatedly in his Philosophie der Religion and other works, defending them against the Kantian criticisms which had placed them in disrepute. Cf. below, pp. 160-174.

[3] XII, BR, p. 69.

[4] XII, BR, pp. 158-159; cf. p. 161.

Thus the new relation in which Spirit returns to itself takes place in worship. Here man lifts himself to God, wins the certainty and joy of having God in his heart and of being united with him.

In the knowledge of God I have God as my object and have given myself to him. I have God before me, am certain of him. I have planted myself on the spiritual ground which is divine. But this relation is merely theoretical; it lacks the practical element. This practical factor, which is necessary to complete the notion of religion, is provided in worship. Worship is "nicht nur Verhältnis, Wissen, sondern Tun, Handeln, sich diese Vergewisserung zu geben, dass der Mensch von Gott aufgenommen, zu Gnaden angenommen ist."[1]

Only on the volitional plane is a true reconciliation between my object and myself possible.[2] Here I have not only to know of him who is truth and to be filled by him, but to know him as in me and myself as in him, that is, to know myself as in the truth. "Diese Einheit hervorzubringen ist das Tun oder die Seite des Kultus."[3]

There are, then, two aspects of the notion of religion. The first is the theoretical side, that of representation, which refers to the manner in which the divine object appears. It involves an ideal relation between God and man, finite consciousness of God. The second is the practical side, that of worship, which concerns mainly the activity of the human subject. It involves an active transcendence of the relation of opposition, self-consciousness of man in God and God in man.[4]

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 69.

[2] In fact, this practical aspect is essential to the moment of separation. In pure knowledge I am so absorbed in my object that I know nothing of myself. The fact that my object and I are different is obscured. Only in the practical relation am I for myself, free. Only on the plane of volitional activity do I stand truly over against my object and at the same time realize my unity with God. Cf. XII, BR, pp. 226-228.

[3] XII, BR, p. 227; cf. pp. 226-228, 237.

[4] XII, BR, pp. 202-203, 224-225, 227-228.

The two aspects of the notion exist in inseparable connection. The stages of worship, accordingly, correspond throughout to those of the theoretical aspect of the notion. In worship are (1) the moment of presupposed unity, (2) the sphere of separation, and (3) the moment of restored unity and reconciliation.[1] Worship involves, therefore: (1) contemplation, "das ganz allgemeine, unentwickelte subjektive Denken und Erhebung in dies ganz allgemeine, abstrakte Element;"[2] (2) sentiment or feeling, in which the subject is "ganz Besonderes, ganz durch und durch in die Bestimmtheit versenkt und . . . im eigentlichen Sinne subjektiv, nur subjektiv ohne Objektivität, ohne Allgemeinheit;"[3] and (3) faith, feeling objectified through advance to representation and doctrine, "der Begriff des Kultus, die Gewissheit von der Wahrheit des absoluten Geistes in seiner Gemeinde, das Wissen der Gemeinde von ihrem Wesen."[4]

Faith marks the culmination of worship and of religion. In it is realized the complete reconciliation of finite spirit and Absolute Spirit. This union is the result of a two-sided activity, the grace of God and the sacrifice of man.[5]

4. Synthesis: the Reality of Religion

The attainment of reconciliation between God and man in worship is the final step in Hegel's detailed development of the notion of religion. Having treated what are for him the two aspects of the notion, he closes his discussion. There is thus no synthesis in the usual Hegelian sense. A synthesis is implied, however, in the entire discussion. The theoretical relation and the practical reconciliation of God and man constitute "die Seite der Realität der Religion," the "Realität des Begriffs Gottes,"

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 232-234.
[2] XII, BR, p. 239.
[3] XII, BR, p. 243.
[4] XII, BR, pp. 251-252.
[5] XII, BR, p. 258.

that which, according to the notion, "überhaupt zur Realität der Idee zu rechnen ist."[1] Apparently, therefore, Hegel regards the concrete reality of religion itself as the synthesis. The two aspects, interrelated in living, organic unity, make up what religion really is. In one place he expresses this specifically:

> Das erste Verhältnis . . . war das des Wissens, das theoretische Verhältnis. Das zweite ist das praktische, das Wissen dieser Erhebung, und die Erhebung ist selbst Wissen. Das dritte Moment ist das Wissen dieses Wissens. Das ist wirkliche Religion.[2]

Hegel's dialectical development of the notion of religion may be diagrammatically summarized somewhat as follows:



B. The Definite Religions

1. General Characteristics

Religion as notion alone is not true religion. It is the very nature of the notion to realize or objectify itself.

> Der Geist . . . ist nur, insofern er sich setzt, für sich ist, sich selbst hervorbringt,---er ist nur als Tätigkeit. Gott, der Begriff, urteilt; erst innerhalb dieser Kategorie der Bestimmung haben wir existierende Religion. . . . Der Geist aber ist eben dies, weil er lebendig überhaupt ist, zuerst nur an sich oder in seinem Begriff zu sein, dann in die Existenz zu treten, sich zu entfalten, sich hervorzubringen, reif zu werden, den Begriff seiner selbst, was er an sich ist, hervorzubringen, so dass das, was an sich ist, sein Begriff jetzt für sich sei.[3]

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 278, 202, 224.
[2] XII, BR, p. 237.
[3] XII, BR, pp. 70-71; cf. pp. 64-65.

It is essential to religion, therefore, to exist not only potentially, as idea, but actually, in human consciousness. The notion must determine itself and become manifest in the definite or ethnical religions. Consideration of these makes up the second part of Hegel's Philosophie der Religion. At this stage Spirit has not yet reached its goal; it is, as it were, under way. Its aim is to become für sich, to attain perfect knowledge of itself. But in the process of doing this, it expresses itself partially and imperfectly in the particular religions. The result is the history of religion. The historical religions are not accidental growths, but rather the necessary objectification of the determinations already contained in the notion of religion.

> . . . Was durch den Begriff bestimmt, im Begriffe notwendig ist, hat auch existieren müssen. . . . Die Religionen, wie sie aufeinander folgen, sind determiniert durch den Begriff, nicht äusserlich bestimmt; sie sind bestimmt durch die Natur des Geistes, der sich gedrängt hat in der Welt, um sich zum Bewusstsein seiner selbst zu bringen.[1]

The conceptual order of the various religions is governed by the rule that the idea of God and the self-consciousness of man always correspond to each other. "Wie sich der Inhalt, Gott, bestimmt, so bestimmt sich auf der andern Seite der subjektive, der menschliche Geist, der dies Wissen hat." On the other hand, "Die Vorstellung, welche der Mensch von Gott hat, entspricht der, welche er von sich selbst, von seiner Freiheit hat."[2] This correspondence between the two sides is due to the fact that both are aspects of the same notion.

In the definite religions, the notion advances in accordance with the three major determinations of the logical Idea: Sein, Wesen, and Begriff.[3] The movement begins with the moment of being or immediacy found in nature-

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 72-73.
[2] XIII, NR, p. 7.
[3] V, ENC, pp. 106-205. Cf. XIII, NR, pp. 19-21.

religion. Here Spirit and nature are still abstractly identical; Spirit is "noch in der Einheit mit der Natur."[1] Immediacy gives way, however, to differentiation, and therewith to the religion of essence. Although in essential inner connection, Spirit and nature are here distinguished. This differentiation appears in the religions of sublimity and beauty. Finally, religion rises to the plane of the notion, as the religion of utility. But the notion is still finite and limited and the utility external.

Inasmuch as the definite religions are determinations of Spirit, and therewith of the notion of religion, they are characterized by the same three aspects as those found in the notion of religion as such. In dealing with each religion Hegel considers: (1) its metaphysical notion; (2) its definite representation, the form in which its notion appears; and (3) its particular type of worship, its church, as the unification of its notion and its representation.[2]

2. The Nature-religions

Though nature-religion is the religion of undifferentiated being, it already has a certain spiritual character. The being involved is already <u>conscious</u> being, and the relation to God is a relation of consciousness.[3] But consciousness is not clear about its own spirituality or that of universal being. Spirit is not yet master of nature. God is all things, ἓν καὶ πᾶν, without distinction:

> Himmel, Gestirne, Erde, Pflanzen, Tier, Mensch ist <u>ein</u> Himmelreich, <u>ein</u> göttliches Leben,---nicht [aber] eine Liebe, [denn] Liebe [ist] Unterschiedene sich vereinend in einem Bewusstsein.[4]

Historically, nature-religion is manifest mainly in the Oriental religions,

---

[1] XIII, NR, p. 11.
[2] XII, BR, p. 74.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 37.
[4] XIII, NR, p. 39.

and appears in three chief forms.

a. The Religion of Magic

1). Direct magic: Eskimo and African religion.[1] The chief characteristic of direct magic is the immediate mastery over nature by the human will.[2] This rule is not, however, that of Spirit in its universality, but only that of the particular, contingent human consciousness. The main object at this stage is the fulfillment of physical desires.

2). Indirect magic: Chinese state-religion.[3] Here the self-consciousness of man still controls, but through instruments. It recognizes, moreover, its dependence on the object, and reverences power as free being. But the will of the subject remains dominant.

b. The Religions of Substantiality

1). The religion of being-in-itself: Buddhism.[4] On the next higher level self-consciousness becomes absorbed in itself and conceives being as being-in-itself. This is the beginning of objective universality and of a true definition of God. The highest power, the absolute, is conceived as substance or being. This being, however, is without qualities, and therefore also non-being. Substance, moreover, is still immediate in that it is sensually present in one or more human individuals. In them it is absolute power, the creation and preservation of all things.[5]

2). The religion of fantasy: Hinduism.[6] According to the religion of

---

[1] XIII, NR, pp. 77-86.
[2] XIII, NR, p. 78.
[3] XIII, NR, pp. 86-119.
[4] XIII, NR, pp. 119-137.
[5] XIII, NR, p. 122. Western research in Buddhism had only begun in Hegel's day. Hegel's knowledge of Buddhist religion is therefore very deficient; he apparently knew it only in its Chinese form, as the religion of Fo. As a result, his treatment of Buddhism is notably unsatisfactory, though his interpretations of several actually characteristic features are surprisingly accurate.
[6] XIII, NR, pp. 137-185.

fantasy, there is one formless, all-inclusive substance, Brahma. All apparently individual entities are but accidents or predicates of the One, rising out of it and returning to it. But the One is abstract. Particular things are therefore external to it and actually independent. They thus constitute a multiplicity without unity, a fantastic chaos of disconnected, uncontrolled beings, lacking order or reason. Everything is abandoned to the vagaries of unbridled imagination.[1]

c. The Religions of Abstract Subjectivity

On the final level of nature-religion appear the first traces of differentiation in immediate being. Again there are two forms.

1). The religion of the good or light-religion: Parsiism.[2] Here God is conceived as self-determined, as existing independently, in and for himself. As such he is the good. But the good itself is still natural and abstract. Over against it is its opposite, evil. There is thus an abstract dualism of two principles, good and evil, represented by light and darkness. The good struggles eternally with an external principle.

2). The religion of riddle: Egyptian religion.[3] In the next phase a subjectivity develops which unites in itself the opposing principles. The negative becomes a determination within the subject.[4] Spirit negates itself and then negates the negation; God dies, but returns to life. This universal subjectivity does not, however, completely transcend its other, and is therefore full of inconsistency and mystery; it is not yet perfectly free or purely spiritual, but infected with the sensuous. This is seen in the prevalence of sensuous symbolism among the Egyptians.

3. The Religions of Spiritual Individuality

Already in the nature-religions thought is superior to the merely nat-

---

1 XIII, NR, p. 147.
2 XIII, NR, pp. 186-199.
3 XIII, NR, pp. 200-233.
4 XIII, NR, p. 203.

ural powers. But this superiority is developed inconsistently. As a result, the content of the nature-religions is a confused mixture of the spiritual and the natural. In the second main phase, however, in the religions of spiritual individuality, the spiritual is definitely supreme. Spirit becomes conscious of itself as free spiritual subject, which replaces substance and exists for itself. Thought becomes dominant and determinative. The purely material is reduced to mere appearance.[1]

a. The Religion of Sublimity: Judaism[2]

At first, Spirit's elevation above nature involves the negation of the latter. In Judaism there is <u>one</u> God, who is power, wisdom, and righteousness. This God is absolutely exclusive, and tolerates no independent being beside him. The world, including man, is completely dependent on the free subjectivity of God. All natural or finite beings are only his attributes, servants, or messengers.[3] Hence, though this power is infinite in itself, in objectifying itself it produces only particularity and limitation. Man's relation to God is one of external obedience to fixed laws, not one of freedom.[4]

b. The Religion of Necessity or Beauty: Greek Religion[5]

In the next form, Spirit is "friendly" to particularity and grants to nature its own existence. The natural, however, is subordinate, as the organ or instrument of the spiritual, the finite form in which Spirit manifests itself. God appears sensuously in beautiful works of art and penetrates the daily life of men. Greek religion also avoids the abstraction of the one; it has many gods. These gods are real persons, spiritual individualities. The human subject, moreover, stands in a free, moral relation

---

[1] XIII, NR, pp. 12-13.
[2] XIII, NR, pp. 13-14; RGI, pp. 51-52, 55-110.
[3] XIII, RGI, p. 73.
[4] XIII, RGI, pp. 104-105.
[5] XIII, NR, pp. 13-15; RGI, pp. 52-53, 111-191.

to them. Greek religion is a human religion.[1] But since Spirit has not yet transcended the opposition of good and evil, both gods and men are infected with natural being. Spirit is not yet truly universal; though particular, it has not returned to unity.

Moreover, above all stands unconscious, selfless, undetermined universality: Fate. Above the beautiful, above all particulars, above the gods themselves hovers a blind, empty, absolute necessity. The freedom of the Greeks consists ultimately in acquiescence in Fate, and is thus only an abstract freedom.

c. The Religion of Utility: Roman Religion[2]

The Jewish God had one end, himself. The Greek gods, on the other hand, were finite beings with many finite ends. The Roman religion synthesizes these two extremes. In it, as in Judaism, is one universal end; but this end, as in the Greek religion, is finite and particular. Roman religion seeks to maintain the universal dominion of the Roman state. It is the religion of a practical, selfish people intent on gaining its own limited end. In keeping with this imperialistic goal, the highest reverence is paid to the Roman emperor. All other persons are subject to him.

The Roman religion is thus a practical, utilitarian religion, its gods practical gods. The human individual sees in the divine powers means of satisfying his own subjective interests. Although, therefore, an end is posited in the objective powers, it is not yet an end which is purely spiritual or absolute. It is universal, but likewise finite and human. Universality on this level means simply abstract agreement among the particular ends of finite individuals.

---

[1] XIII, RGI, pp. 122-123.
[2] XIII, RGI, pp. 192-242; cf. especially pp. 195-197, 207-209, 213, 215, 218, 220, 238, 241.

C. The Absolute Religion[1]

The objectification of the notion in the definite religions is a necessary stage, but it is not enough. The complete realization of Spirit requires that the determination be adequate to the notion. In the definite religions this demand is not met. The determinateness of the notion is limited, abstract, and defective.[2] A third stage is therefore necessary: the absolute religion, positively represented by Christianity. Only here does Spirit's appearance correspond to its notion and so fulfill the Idea of religion.[3] Here Spirit transcends its first manifestation and becomes its own object. It returns, as it were, to itself, attains complete freedom and self-knowledge.[4] The absolute religion is "die Religion, in welcher der Begriff der Religion sich selbst objektiv geworden ist," "zu sich zurückgekehrt ist,---wo die absolute Idee, Gott als Geist nach seiner Wahrheit und Offenbarkeit für das Bewusstsein der Gegenstand ist."[5] Here God is free and concrete Spirit; having passed from universality to particularity, he now attains true individuality.

The absolute religion, since it corresponds perfectly to the notion of religion, passes through the same stages as those traversed by the notion itself. Concrete Spirit, the Absolute Idea, is

> erstens an und für sich: Gott in seiner Ewigkeit vor Erschaffung der Welt, ausserhalb der Welt; zweitens, dass Gott die Welt erschafft, dass er die Trennung setzt. Da erschafft er teils die Natur, teils den endlichen Geist. . . . Das Dritte ist, dass durch diesen Prozess der Versöhnung der Geist das, was er von sich in seiner Diremtion, in seinem Urteil unter-

---

[1] It should be noted that Hegel omits consideration of Babylonian religion, and more seriously, of Islam. His works contain numerous references to Mohammedanism (including one in XIII, RGI, p. 100), but he gives it no place in his classification of religions.

[2] XII, BR, pp. 74-75.

[3] XII, BR, pp. 65, 206.

[4] XII, BR, pp. 65, 71-72.

[5] XIV, AR, p. 3; XII, BR, pp. 74-75.

> schieden hat, mit sich versöhnt hat und so der heilige Geist, der Geist in seiner Gemeinde ist.[1]

These three spheres are designated as the Kingdoms of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.

1. The Kingdom of the Father

Here God exists in the form of universality, as eternal being-in-and-with-itself: in relation to the subjective consciousness, God is pure thought; with reference to space, he is spaceless, outside the world; with respect to time, he is timeless, as Eternal Idea.[2] As such, God is the notion, and therefore three-fold, as expressed in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In the absolute religion, the universal which particularizes itself and returns to concrete individuality is God the Father who begets the Son and in love returns to identity with himself as the Holy Spirit.[3] But just as each element of the notion is not a mere part but rather itself the entire notion, so is each of the persons of the Trinity itself the entire Godhead. Spirit is the concrete unity of its three aspects.

2. The Kingdom of the Son

Here Spirit has the form of appearance, of particularization, of being-for other: with regard to the subjective consciousness, God is in the element of representation; with respect to space, he appears as the world, the divine history as real, God in perfect determinate being; with reference to time, he is the divine history as past.[4] This appearance of the Idea as nature is represented in Christianity as the creation of the world. The thought behind this is that it is God's very nature to create, to particularize himself. This self-externalization gives rise to a separation or

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 30; cf. pp. 28-29.
[2] XIV, AR, pp. 65-66.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 57.
[4] XIV, AR, pp. 65-66.

estrangement between God and the world which, with regard to man as a part of nature, is represented in the doctrines of the fall and original sin. Though this estrangement, like the creation, is represented as a definite event in time, it is eternally true, and involved in the very notion of man.

But separation requires reconciliation, the return of man to God, of the particular to the universal. Man, even in his separation from God, is identical with him. This essential unity is represented in religion by the doctrines of the incarnation and the death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ. In these doctrines the popular mind has before it man's kinship with God as a sensuous, given fact. God enters the world in human form, suffers, and dies, but rises again to ascend to his glory. That is, the particularized universal returns to itself. The reconciliation between God and man becomes a reality.

3. The Kingdom of the Spirit

The third form of the Idea is that of its return out of appearance into itself, absolute individuality: with reference to subjective consciousness, God is here subjectivity as such; with respect to space, he is the Spirit in his community, his Church; with regard to time, he is the present, the spiritual nowness of immediate subjectivity.[1]

The reconciliation of God and man is a reality not only for a particular man, but for all men. The Spirit of God is therefore represented in Christianity as dwelling in a <u>community</u> of men, the Church, "Gott in seiner Gemeinde wohnend."[2] In the Church, as the kingdom of God on earth, is achieved the complete reconciliation of Spirit and nature, of God and man, of the universal and the particular. Here Spirit has attained the level of concrete unity and true individuality.

---

[1] XIV, AR, pp. 65-66.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 180.

Chapter Three

HEGEL'S VIEW OF THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

The previous chapter has sought to outline, without attempting to criticize, the dominant features of Hegel's philosophy of religion. The present chapter will begin the detailed investigation of the empirical and the rational factors in Hegel's thought by considering his view of the nature of religious experience. What, according to Hegel, is the psychological locus of man's religious life? What are for him the distinctive marks of that aspect of man's conscious activity which may be called religious? To what extent is his account of the essence of religious experience based on psychological data, and how far is it governed by the activity of reason? Such are the questions which we have now to consider.

I. The Importance of Personal Experience in Religion

One of the first things to strike the careful reader of the Philosophie der Religion is Hegel's insistence that the philosophy of religion deals with what it discovers in experience. Philosophical inquiry seeks not to awaken or produce religion, but rather to understand the religion which it finds. Moreover, religion cannot be understood without being experienced.

> Zunächst muss [nun] dies das bestimmte Bewusstsein über unsern Zweck [sein], dass die Religion [ein] in jedem Vorausgesetztes und Vorhandenes, der Stoff ist, den wir nur begreifen wollen. Es ist nicht darum zu tun, diese Grundlage hervorbringen [zu] wollen, sondern sie ist die Sache, die in jedem für sich vorhanden sein muss. [Es handelt sich] nicht [darum], ein der Substanz nach Neues, Fremdes in den Menschen hinein[zu] bringen; es wäre ebenso, als wenn man in einen Hund Geist hineinbringen wollte dadurch, dass man ihn geistige Erzeugnisse sehen oder Witziges fressen oder gedruckte Schriften kauen liesse, oder als wenn man einen Blinden damit sehend machen wollte, dass man ihm von Farben vorspräche. Wer nicht seine Brust auch aus dem Treiben des

> Endlichen ausgeweitet und in den reinen Äther der Seele geschaut, ihn genossen, wer nicht das frohe und ruhige Gefühl des Ewigen, sei es auch nur getrübt in der Form der Sehnsucht, gehabt hat, der besässe den Stoff nicht, von dem hier die Rede ist. Er kann etwa eine Vorstellung davon haben, aber der Inhalt ist nicht seine eigene Sache; es ist ein Fremdes, um das er sich bemüht.[1]

No merely external historical knowledge of religion suffices. One may, says Hegel, know which dogmas have been proclaimed by the various church councils and for what reasons, understand the origin of religious beliefs, and know intimately the other facts of church history, yet have no genuine knowledge of religion whatever. No amount of familiarity with the convictions which have been held about God can fill the place of personal experience of God. He who would understand the inner truth of religion must do more than study the religion of others; he himself must have religion.

> Ein Blinder kann mit dem Rahmen, der Leinwand, dem Firnis eines Gemäldes sich zu tun machen; [er kann] die Geschichte des Malers, das Schicksal des Gemäldes, [seinen] Preis, in welche Hände [es gekommen ist, wissen] usf. und nichts vom Gemälde selbst sehen.[2]

In his discussion of religion in the Phänomenologie, Hegel clearly asserts that

> nichts gewusst wird, was nicht in der Erfahrung ist, oder wie dasselbe auch ausgedrückt wird, was nicht als gefühlte Wahrheit, als innerlich geoffenbartes Ewiges, als geglaubtes Heiliges, oder welche Ausdrücke sonst gebraucht werden,---vorhanden ist. Denn die Erfahrung ist eben dies, dass der Inhalt---und er ist der Geist---an sich, Substanz und also Gegenstand des Bewusstseins ist.[3]

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 8-9.
[2] XII, BR, p. 28; cf. pp. 71, 289.
[3] II, PDG (3d ed.), p. 558. (Except where the third edition is specified, references to PDG are to the second edition. Italics in all quotations from Hegel, when not otherwise indicated, are Hegel's.) Cf. also V, ENC, pp. 43-44; XII, BR, p. 20; JUB, III, PHPR, p. 30. "Die erste Quelle unserer Erkenntnis," writes Hegel in the last-named passage, "ist die Erfahrung."

The philosophical study of religion, therefore, deals with what is given in experience. We must ask what, in Hegel's view, is the nature of this experience.

II. The Basis of Religion: Thought

What, asks Hegel, is the seat of religion in man, the peculiar activity of the mind through which God is experienced? His answer is implied in his definition of religion as the relation of the human spirit to the Absolute Spirit,[1] or as "das Bewusstsein . . . des an und für sich Seienden, unbeschränkt ganz allgemein Wahren," "Bewusstsein von Gott überhaupt."[2] From this conception of religion it follows that its proper sphere is thought (though in the figurative form of Vorstellung). Only for thought can there be that elevation above the limited and sensuous to the truly universal which is religion.[3] This is true whether we view religion from the standpoint of God or from that of man:

> Denken ist allein der Boden dieses Inhalts, die Tätigkeit des Allgemeinen,---das Allgemeine in seiner Tätigkeit, Wirksamkeit. Oder sprechen wir es aus als Auffassen des Allgemeinen, so ist das, für welches das Allgemeine ist, immer das Denken.[4]

Since the activity involved in the religious consciousness is that of Spirit, the self-differentiating and self-realizing universal, it must center in thought. Thinking is

> das Element, die absolute, ursprüngliche Weise der Tätigkeit oder [der] Zustand . . ., dem das Bewusstsein des Göttlichen zukommt: nur im und für das Denken ist Gott.[5]

At first sight, we seem here to have left the warm, familiar atmosphere of experience for the cold, bleak air of abstract thought. Hegel begins by demanding that philosophy deal with the living experience of reli-

---

1 Cf. above, pp. 32-33.
2 XII, BR, pp. 187, 156; cf. pp. 7, 50, 110, 142.
3 XII, BR, pp. 193-194, 201; XIV, BDG, p. 110.
4 XII, BR, p. 193; cf. pp. 154, 187; JUB, III, PHPR, p. 225.
5 XII, BR, p. 239; cf. p. 154.

gion as found, but when he comes to define the experience which he finds, he seems to have in mind a kind of religion very different from that present in ordinary human life. He selects, one might say, one aspect of concrete religious experience and makes it the whole of religion. In so doing he overlooks the important part played by feeling and volition. This precise charge has been made repeatedly against Hegel.[1]

As will be seen, however, this criticism is unfair. When Hegel says that God can be known only in thinking, he does not mean that religious experience is exhausted in thought, but rather that religion is possible only where thought is active. A being that does not think, whatever else it may do, cannot be religious. In this sense thought is the condition of religion.[2] This emphasis comes clearly to light in Hegel's criticism of the theology of feeling, and likewise in his discussions of the place of will in religion. Accurate definition of the full meaning of thought and of religious experience for Hegel will be possible, therefore, only after a careful examination of these other aspects of consciousness. We shall consider first his view of the place of feeling in religion.

III. The Place of Feeling in Religion

A. Hegel's Recognition of Feeling

One who, familiar with some of the criticisms advanced against Hegel, approaches for the first time Hegel's own discussions of religion, is impressed by the difference between what Hegel actually says about feeling and what many of his opponents have credited him with saying. For, far from excluding feeling from religion, Hegel repeatedly recognizes its importance and emphasizes its necessity.

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 2-3, 5-6, 10-11.
[2] XII, BR, pp. 103, 155, 238-239.

1. In Hegel's Early Theological Writings

This regard for the emotional side of religion is particularly evident in the theological writings of Hegel's youth. The earlier of these writings[1] offer an interpretation of religion primarily in terms of the Kantian ethics of moral reason. Beginning, however, late in 1795, in the latter part of his Berne residence, Hegel turns away from Kantian rationalism and becomes genuinely mystical in his approach to religion. In "Die Positivität der christlichen Religion" (1795-1796), he declares that religion cannot be torn out of the heart and life of the people "durch kalte Schlüsse, die man sich da in der Studierstube vorrechnet." In the spread of Christianity, he maintains, "eher alles andre als Vernunft und Verstand sind angewendet worden."[2] Here and in the writings immediately following Hegel regards the Infinite to which man is related in religion as incomprehensible to rational thought. Only when reflective conceptions are supplemented by "practical" or "dynamic" ones can man reach God.

Hegel's central conception at this stage is that of Leben. The world is essentially life, an infinity of living beings which is at once a union of the finite and the infinite and the separation of itself in this union. Out of this living whole finite life draws

> das Lebendige, frei vom Vergehenden, die Beziehung ohne das Tote und sich Tötende der Mannigfaltigkeit, nicht eine Einheit, eine gedachte Beziehung, sondern alllebendiges, allkräftiges, unendliches Leben, und nennt es Gott, ist nimmer denkend, oder betrachtend, weil sein Objekt nichts Reflektiertes, Totes in sich trägt.
>
> Diese Erhebung des Menschen, nicht vom Endlichen zum Unendlichen, denn dieses sind nur Produkte der blossen Reflexion, und als solcher ist ihre Trennung

---

[1] That is, those dating from the Tübingen years and the early part of the Berne period; primarily, the fragments on "Volksreligion und Christentum" (1793-1795), and "Das Leben Jesu" (1795). Cf. "Das Leben Jesu," Nohl, TJS, p. 75.

[2] Nohl, TJS, p. 221.

> absolut---sondern vom endlichen Leben zum unendlichen Leben---ist Religion.[1]

Every human individual, then, is part of a rich universal life. This life is characterized by a dialectical movement in which the individual is reconciled with the whole in mystical love. Hegel's characterization of this love not only shows his high regard for religious feeling at this point in his development, but also foreshadows the dialectic which is to play so large a part in his later philosophy. Love, he writes, is

> ein Gefühl des Lebendigen. . . . Sie ist nicht Verstand, dessen Beziehungen das Mannigfaltige immer als Mannigfaltiges lassen und dessen Einheit selbst Entgegensetzungen sind; sie ist nicht Vernunft, die ihr Bestimmen dem Bestimmten schlechthin entgegensetzt; sie ist nichts Begrenzendes, nichts Begrenztes, nichts Endliches; sie ist ein Gefühl, aber nicht ein einzelnes Gefühl; aus dem einzelnen Gefühl, weil es nur ein Teilleben, nicht das ganze Leben ist, drängt sich das Leben durch Auflösung zur Zerstreuung in der Mannigfaltigkeit der Gefühle und um sich in diesem Ganzen der Mannigfaltigkeit zu finden; in der Liebe ist dies Ganze nicht als in der Summe vieler Besonderer, Getrennter enthalten; in ihr findet sich das Leben selbst, als eine Verdoppelung seiner Selbst, und Einigkeit desselben; das Leben hat von der unentwickelten Einigkeit aus, durch die Bildung den Kreis zu einer vollendeten Einigkeit durchlaufen.[2]

In addition to the emphasis on feeling contained in this remarkable passage, it is important to note carefully two related factors. In the first place, both <u>Verstand</u> and the <u>Vernunft</u> which Hegel here rejects are the same abstract, analytic understanding which he censures throughout his entire later work.[3] Secondly, the love which he champions is not at all the individual emotion which he later condemns, but a living unity which, though including particularity and variety, transcends them and attains concrete wholeness of life; in other words, it is something only slightly different from the concrete reason which forms the key to Hegel's mature

---

1 "Systemfragment von 1800." Nohl, TJS, p. 347.
2 Fragment on "Die Liebe" (1797). Nohl, TJS, p. 379.
3 Cf. below, pp. 97-100.

philosophy.

In short, Hegel's early tributes to feeling are neither a glorification of the irrational as such nor an attack on synoptic reason, but rather an assertion of the concrete wholeness of life and a rejection of the abstract thinking which analyzes reality into discrete parts and destroys the living Spirit-bond which gives these parts significance. Hegel attacks reason because reason as he has found it thus far is a cold, lifeless, analytical process which devitalizes and distorts the rich, universal life of true reality. He rejects the abstractly rational in the interests of the empirical. This empirical, however, contains within it the germ of a higher rationality.

This, of course, does not diminish, but rather accentuates, the significance of the high regard for religious feeling which the Jugendschriften reveal. At this stage, religion for Hegel is mystical communion of life with life.

2. In Hegel's Later Religious Thought

But Hegel's recognition of the importance of emotion in religion is not confined to his early writings. On the contrary, it is evident in all of his mature discussions of religion. The introduction to his Philosophie der Religion, for example, is in beauty and depth of feeling unsurpassed in the whole literature of the philosophy of religion.

"Wir müssen und dürfen," writes Hegel,

> selbst ein Leben mit und in dem Ewigen betrachten, und insofern wir dies Leben empfinden, ein Gefühl desselben zugleich haben, so ist die Empfindung Auflösung alles Mangelhaften und Endlichen,---sie ist Seligkeit. . . .[1]

Again he writes,

> Wie wir auf der höchsten Spitze eines Gebirges, von allem bestimmten Anblick des Irdischen entfernt, in

[1] XII, BR, p. 2.

> den blauen Himmel uns hineinsehen und mit Ruhe und Entfernung alle Beschränkungen der Landschaften und der Welt überblicken, so ist es, dass der Mensch in der Religion mit dem geistigen Auge, enthoben der Härte dieser Wirklichkeit, sie nur als einen fliessenden Schein betrachtet, der in dieser reinen Region nur im Strahle der Befriedigung und der Liebe seine Schattierungen, Unterschiede und Lichter zur ewigen Ruhe gemildert abspiegelt. Es ist dem Menschen in diesem Anschauen und Gefühle nicht um sich selbst zu tun, nicht um sein Interesse, [seine] Eitelkeit, [den] Stolz seines Wissens und Ergehens, sondern um diesen seinen Inhalt, um den absoluten Zweck allein, die Ehre Gottes kundzutun und seine Herrlichkeit zu offenbaren.[1]

No one can read words like these and fail to realize that their author has in his own life experienced religion in all its many-sided richness.

Hegel's recognition of feeling in this opening hymn to religion is, it must be admitted, rather general. But specific statements are abundant. It is possible, says Hegel, to know God in various ways.

> . . . Das Zeugnis des Geistes kann auf mannigfache verschiedene Weise vorhanden sein; es ist nicht zu fordern, dass bei allen Menschen die Wahrheit auf philosophischem Wege hervorgebracht werde.[2]

God may be reached not only through reason, but also through faith, authority, and revelation; he may be intellectually known, but he may also be represented, perceived, and felt, as in feelings of reverence, thanksgiving, and love.[3] Regarding faith in particular Hegel declares, in the midst of a sweeping criticism of subjectivism, "Aber es ist unendlich wichtig, diese subjektive Grundlage, welche Luther Glauben genannt hat, so hochgestellt zu haben."[4] The same regard for the affective elements in consciousness appears in Hegel's frequent treatments of love in connection

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 3-4.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 23; cf. pp. 67-68.
[3] XII, BR, pp. 157-158; XIV, AR, p. 75.
[4] XII, BR, p. 161; cf. p. 93.

with the absolute religion.[1]

Yet Hegel is not satisfied with insisting that religion may be present in feeling; he maintains further that it must be felt. ". . . Nicht nur kann aller Inhalt im Gefühle sein, er soll und muss es auch." ". . . Was ich für wahr halten, was mir gelten soll, muss auch in meinem Gefühle sein, zu meinem Sein, Charakter gehören."[2] To be a part of me, religion, like all other conscious content, must be in my heart.[3]

> Die Religion muss gefühlt werden, muss im Gefühle sein, sonst ist sie nicht Religion. . . . Dies muss als richtig zugegeben werden; denn das Gefühl ist nichts anderes als meine Subjektivität in ihrer Einfachheit und Unmittelbarkeit, ich selbst als diese seiende Persönlichkeit.[4]

Everything, to become spiritually alive in me, must be felt, and if it is truly important, it must be felt passionately and deeply. "Es ist nichts Grosses ohne Leidenschaft vollbracht worden, noch kann es ohne solche vollbracht werden."[5] In religion this is expressed by the representation of God as love. "Darin ist eben gesagt, dass Gott präsent ist, dass dies als eignes Gefühl, als Selbstgefühl sein muss."[6]

In fact, it is the very nature of thought itself to manifest itself as perception, representation, and feeling. This it does in religion.

---

[1] Eternal love is simply Spirit returning to itself, expressed in the language of feeling. Hegel's mature conception of love is not essentially different from that of his youth (cf. above, p. 53), though the rational aspect of the dialectic involved is undeveloped in the latter. Cf. XIV, AR, pp. 57, 75, 81, 145-146, 158, 170-171.

[2] XII, BR, pp. 104, 107; cf. pp. 82, 105. Cf. the words of Faust:

Wenn ihr's nicht fühlt, ihr werdet's nicht erjagen,
Wenn es nicht aus der Seele dringt,
Und mit urkräftigem Behagen
Die Herzen aller Hörer zwingt. (Faust, I, 1; ll. 534-537)

[3] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 21.

[4] XIV, BDG, p. 32. Cf. VIII, PWG, p. 20.

[5] V, ENC, p. 413.

[6] XII, BR, pp. 170-171.

> Der Mensch ist nicht nur rein denkend, sondern das Denken selbst manifestiert sich als Anschauen, als Vorstellen; die absolute Wahrheit, die dem Menschen geoffenbart ist, muss also auch für ihn als Vorstellenden, als Anschauenden, für ihn als fühlenden, empfindenden Menschen sein.[1]

Religion, therefore, if it is to exist at all, must be a living reality in the emotional consciousness of man.

B. Hegel's Emphasis on the Inadequacy of Feeling

But while Hegel maintains that feeling is a necessary element in religion, he insists even more vigorously that it is insufficient. It is true that the heart is the source of the content of religion, but after all, he points out, this is not saying very much. For just as the seed is not only the first form of the tree, its origin and potentiality, but also the result of the tree's entire developed life, so also is feeling not only the source and earliest form of appearance of all content, but likewise itself a product in that it is dependent on the content for its meaning.[2] Feeling alone, therefore, is inadequate. It simply holds as enveloped potentiality a content which must justify itself on other grounds.

It was the accepted presupposition of the theology of Hegel's day that feeling is the true and only form in which religion maintains its genuineness. Convinced that this subjective view would ultimately mean the destruction of real religion, Hegel entered the lists as the champion of reason and objectivity. His criticisms of the theology of feeling are frequent and detailed. They may be summarized under four heads.

1. The Subjectivity of Feeling

A sole reliance on feeling, says Hegel, is purely subjective and therefore one-sided, making no provision for the objective, universal ele-

---

[1] XIV, BDG, p. 177.
[2] XII, BR, p. 106.

ment which is essential to religion.[1] Religion is more than an exalted feeling of the subject; it involves a real union of the human individual with an objectively real God.[2] But feeling alone can never establish the reality of God. Subjective certainty, though important, is not enough; delirious people are certain of the images which they see, but they do not have knowledge. Subjective faith by itself is "nichtig und unvollständig;" it lacks the objective moment.

> Die Religion auf die blosse subjektive Richtung---mein Herz alles---zu stellen, hat den Kultus vernichtet und ebenso wie das Herausgehen aus seinem subjektiven Herzen zu Handlungen auch das Herausgehen des Bewusstseins zum objektiven Wissen; eins ist aufs innigste mit dem andern verbunden. Das, was der Mensch mit Beziehung auf Gott zu tun zu haben meint, hängt von seiner Vorstellung von Gott ab, und er kann umgekehrt nicht irgend etwas Bestimmtes in Rücksicht auf ihn zu tun zu haben meinen, wenn er keine bestimmte Vorstellung von ihm als Gegenstand, der als objektiv an und für sich seiend gilt, hat oder haben zu können meint.[3]

To say that I feel religion is simply to say that it is mine, that it belongs to me as a particular individual, not that it is true.[4] ". . . Darin, dass etwas gewiss ist, ist es noch nicht wahr."[5] If, therefore, religion is to retain its claim to a content of objective truth, it must rest on reason.

Furthermore, a religion of feeling without reason not only surrenders all claim to knowledge of the object of religion, but also removes all basis of understanding between religious subjects. The individual who shuts himself in his own particularity "bricht die Gemeinschaftlichkeit mit andern ab;---man muss ihn stehen lassen."[6] Common ground can be found only

---

1 XII, BR, p. 243; XIV, AR, p. 200.
2 XIV, AR, p. 5.
3 XII, BR, p. 161.
4 XII, BR, pp. 56, 97.
5 XII, BR, p. 95; cf. p. 85; XIV, BDG, pp. 29-30.
6 XIV, BDG, p. 36.

where there is mutual confidence in and use of reason, an appeal to the universal.

Actually, feeling contains in itself the need of being transcended. The very fact that it exists in spirit drives it on to representative thought. It is the nature of man as spirit, consciousness, to have an object, an opposite over against himself; therefore his feelings are at the same time representations. In his feeling, then, he is forced on to consciousness of an object which is the content of his feeling. Religion is therefore

> nicht nur Gewissheit, subjektive Empfindung, Identität meines empirischen Ich, sondern Wahrheit an und für sich, also religiöse Lehre, [die in] Kunst, Bildung, sonstige Vorstellungen [sich ausbreitet].[1]

2. The Selfishness and Pride in the Emphasis on Feeling

In consequence of its subjectivity, a religion based on feeling is in danger of deifying the selfish, particular desires of human beings. God, far from being objectively real, becomes a mere product of the weakness, joy, fear, and hope of man.[2] When feeling is made central, it is left to the subject to say what feelings he will have. This absolute indetermination allows the individual to reject the guidance of reason, to take as his standard and justification his own arbitrary will to be and do what pleases him, and to make himself the oracle of what kind of religion is noble and good.[3] This, says Hegel, is religious vanity. The religious humility which denies the possibility of knowing God is really pride, for those who have it affirm themselves to be absolute and infinite and make their own desires the supreme realities. Thus Demut refutes itself and

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 247; cf. pp. 244-246.
[2] XII, BR, p. 56.
[3] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 21. XII, BR, p. 291.

becomes Hochmut.[1] True humility, however, "besteht darin, den Geist in die Wahrheit zu versenken."[2] Genuine religion involves complete self-renunciation, absolute self-forgetfulness in dedication to God. The religious man is conscious of his true self only in so far as he gives up his "beschränkte, endliche Interessen, Wünsche, Hoffnungen. . . ."[3] To make contact with the Infinite, I must surrender my particularity.[4]

> Der Mensch liebt das Gefühl, weil er darin nur seine Partikularität vor sich hat; es ist die stete Reminiszenz des Ich, während, wer in der Sache selbst lebt, sei sie Wissenschaft, Kunst, Recht, Religion, sich selbst vergisst. Deshalb appelliert die Eitelkeit, die Selbstgefälligkeit, die stets im Genusse ihrer selbst sein will, gern an das Gefühl. So aber kommt sie nur zu sich und nie zur Sache und deshalb auch nicht zum objektiven Handeln. Ein Mensch, der noch mit seinem Gefühl zu tun hat, ist noch nicht fertig, ist ein Anfänger im Wissen, Handeln, usf.[5]

In brief, the person who takes feeling as his guide is still a child; he is not yet grown up. The mature man subordinates his own particular desires in the interests of objective truth. This is essentially what is meant by love in religion. "Die Liebe überhaupt ist das Ablassen von der Beschränkung des Herzens auf seinen besonderen Punkt."[6] Such love is the essence of religion.

> Das Wesen der wahrhaften Religion ist die Liebe. Sie ist wesentlich Gesinnung als Erkenntnis der Wahrheit des menschlichen Willens. Die religiöse Liebe ist nicht nur die natürliche Anhängigkeit; oder nur moralisches Wohlwollen; nicht eine unbestimmt allgemeine schwachsinnige Empfindung, sondern bewährt sich im Einzelnen mit absoluter Aufopferung. . . . Der Grund der Liebe ist das Bewusstsein von Gott und seinem Wesen als der Liebe und sie daher die höchste Demuth. Ich soll mir nicht die Objektivität in der Liebe sein,

---

1 XII, BR, pp. 137-138; cf. p. 148.
2 XIV, BDG, p. 177; cf. XII, BR, p. 138.
3 XIII, RGI, p. 230.
4 XII, BR, p. 258.
5 XII, BR, pp. 109-110; cf. p. 237.
6 XIV, BDG, p. 38.

> sondern Gott, aber in seinem Erkennen soll ich mich selbst vergessen.[1]

At this point Hegel's insight into religion and life is profound. The very heart of all high religion is precisely this spirit of self-forgetfulness and self-devotion which Hegel so eloquently demands. Religion at its best has always said, "Not my will, but thine, be done."

Here it may be fairly asked whether Hegel is altogether just to feeling in linking it so intimately with egotism and vain pride. Is feeling always selfish? Love is a feeling, yet is not genuine love the most unselfish thing we know? In fact, Hegel himself offers love as the supreme example of self-forgetfulness.[2] In view of the beautiful, unselfish piety of a Schleiermacher, is it not clear that religious emotion may involve the very self-forgetfulness which Hegel requires? All of this he would admit. He means simply that to base religion on feeling unguided by reason places religion in danger of becoming, like the Bible in the hands of some theologians, a mere wax nose which each individual may fashion to suit his own convenience.[3] A primarily emotional emphasis which suppresses the rational element opens the way to all sorts of aberrations and fanatical extravagances in religion.[4] This view is abundantly confirmed by experience and history. It cannot be denied that Hegel, in the heat of conflict, is sometimes more extreme, as when he says that the view which grounds religious truth in feeling originates in the very feelings of selfishness and pride which it encourages. But such a statement does not fairly represent his true emphasis. Feeling, Hegel would say, may be nobly religious, but it may also be selfish and vain. Therefore it cannot be the fundamental thing in

---

[1] JUB, III, PHPR, p. 225; cf. p. 97; XIV, AR, p. 81; XIV, BDG, pp. 37-42.

[2] Cf. above, p. 60.

[3] XII, BR, p. 38.

[4] The lofty religious feeling of Schleiermacher himself, Hegel might add, is noble not because it is feeling, but because it has a thought content which is noble.

religion. This suggests a third objection made by Hegel to the theology of feeling.

3. The Dependence of Feeling on Thought-content

Feeling is a mere form into which any content may be poured, the worst as well as the best. It is therefore ethically and religiously neutral.

> Es kann kein Zweifel dagegen Statt finden, dass das Gefühl ein Boden ist, der für sich unbestimmt, zugleich das Mannigfaltigste und Entgegengesetzteste in sich schliesst. Das Gefühl für sich ist die natürliche Subjektivität, ebenso wohl fähig gut zu seyn, als böse, fromm zu seyn, als gottlos. . . . Es ist nichts, was nicht gefühlt werden kann, und gefühlt wird.[1]

All human conditions and circumstances, irrespective of their content, are felt. "Das Gefühl ist die gemeinschaftliche Form für den verschiedenartigsten Inhalt."[2] We feel God, truth, beauty, love, and joy, but also evil, injustice, envy, hate, vanity, pain, enmity, and sorrow.

> Gott, insofern er in unserm Gefühl ist, hat in Hinsicht der Form vor dem schlechtesten Inhalte nichts voraus, sondern sprosst, die königlichste Blume, auf demselben Boden neben dem wuchserndsten Unkraut auf.[3]

It is true, Hegel might have added, that the pure in heart shall see God, but it is also true that the fool hath said in his heart, "There is no God." We feel the natural as well as the spiritual, the unreal and imagined no less than the real and existing, the lowest and most contradictory as well as the highest and noblest. I can feel in anticipation something which does not yet and perhaps never will exist, and in imagination something which never has been. Hegel adds, rather humorously,

> Ich kann mir einbilden, ein tüchtiger, ein grosser Mensch zu sein, fähig, alles für das Recht, für meine Meinung

---

[1] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, pp. 18, 20.
[2] XIV, BDG, p. 35; cf. p. 34.
[3] XII, BR, p. 101.

> aufzuopfern, kann mir einbilden, viel genützt, viel geschaffen zu haben; aber es ist die Frage, ob es wahr ist, ob dem auch so sei, wie wir fühlen.[1]

A thing is not true, therefore, simply because we feel it.

> Wenn das, was im Gefühl ist, darum schon wahr wäre, so müsste alles wahr sein, der Apisdienst usf. Die Vorstellung hingegen enthält schon mehr das Objektive, das, was den Gehalt, die Bestimmtheit des Gefühls ausmacht. Und auf diesen Inhalt kommt es an, er muss sich für sich berechtigen.[2]

The meaning and truth of a feeling depend entirely on its content, which can be tested only by thought. Feeling as such is contingent; it lacks the element of universality which thought alone can provide. "Der wahrhafte Nerv ist der wahrhafte Gedanke; nur wenn er wahrhaft ist, ist das Gefühl wahrhafter Art."[3] Feeling is religious, therefore, only when it involves a certain thinking relation between finite spirit and the objectively real universal Spirit. As Hegel expresses it,

> Religiös ist die Empfindung, insofern sie einen eigentümlichen Inhalt, <u>die Bestimmtheit als unmittelbares Denken des schlechthin Allgemeinen</u> und <u>als ganz empirische Subjektivität</u>, und <u>das spekulative Verhältnis</u> derselben.[4]

Once again it is clear that Hegel's criticism is firmly grounded in experience. He himself recognizes this fact and uses it as an argument for his view. After pointing out the purely formal character of feeling as feeling, he adds, "Das wissen wir aus der Erfahrung."[5] On the other hand, the view that a given content finds its attestation in feeling "widerspricht unser sonstiges Bewusstsein aufs bestimmteste."

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 100; cf. pp. 101, 102.
[2] XII, BR, p. 107.
[3] XIII, NR, p. 54. Cf. XII, BR, p. 101; XIV, BDG, pp. 34-35.
[4] XII, BR, p. 244.
[5] XII, BR, p. 100.
[6] XII, BR, p. 102.

4. The Limitation of Religion to Thinking Beings

A fourth Hegelian criticism of feeling is based on a comparison of man with the animals. Man, observes Hegel, is distinguished from the lower animals mainly by his power of thought. Animals do not think, but neither do they have religion. From this Hegel concludes that the central, determining factor in religion is thought. His formulation of the argument is as follows:

> Das Tier hat Gefühle, aber nur Gefühle; der Mensch ist denkend, und nur der Mensch hat Religion. Daraus ist zu schliessen, dass die Religion den innersten Sitz im Denken hat.[1]

Here Hegel commits the obvious logical fallacy of having more in his conclusion than his premises allow. The premises that all men think and that all religious beings are men lead perfectly logically to the conclusion that all religious beings are beings who think, but they do not demonstrate that religious beings are such primarily because they think. In other words, the argument (if its premises be granted) proves that thought is indispensable to religion, but not that thought is the innermost seat of religion. There may be other essential elements.[2]

Yet the argument is not without significance. The proof that thinking is essential to religion is all that is necessary to overthrow a theology of exclusive reliance on feeling. But while the major premise may be taken as axiomatic, the minor premise is not self-evident. The assumption that no animals have religion is at least, in the lack of definite

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 193; cf. p. 239; XIV, AR, p. 67; XIV, BDG, p. 34; V, ENC, pp. 32, 342, 348; JUB, XX, p. 26.

[2] From the inductive standpoint the result is the same. Here Hegel would have to show that religious beings and non-religious beings have all other circumstances in common save one, thought, which occurs only in the former. But even this would do no more than establish a causal relation between religion and thought, without showing which is the condition of the other. It may be added that Hegel himself mentions at least one other point which he thinks distinguishes man from the animals, the fact that man works. (XIV, AR, pp. 126, 128.)

evidence, open to question.[1] The argument therefore lacks conclusiveness, and is certainly the weakest offered by Hegel in criticism of the theology of feeling. Since he shows, on other grounds, the great importance of thought in religion, he does not need this additional argument, and only weakens his cause by including it.

Another argument drawn by Hegel from a comparison of man with the animals is highly significant, though seriously marred by extravagance of language. He writes,

> Gründet sich die Religion im Menschen nur auf ein Gefühl, so hat solches richtig keine weitere Bestimmung, als das Gefühl seiner Abhängigkeit zu seyn, und so wäre der Hund der beste Christ, denn er trägt dieses am stärksten in sich, und lebt vornehmlich in diesem Gefühle. Auch Erlösungsgefühle hat der Hund, wenn seinem Hunger durch einen Knochen Befriedigung wird. Der Geist hat aber in der Religion vielmehr seine Befreiung und das Gefühl seiner göttlichen Freiheit; nur der freie Geist hat Religion und kann Religion haben; was gebunden wird in der Religion, ist das natürliche Gefühl des Herzens, die besondere Subjektivität; was in ihr frei wird, und eben damit wird, ist der Geist.[2]

It is manifest that Hegel is grossly unfair to Schleiermacher when he places religion according to the latter's view on a level with the satisfaction of animal hunger. The baldness of expression and the misinterpretation are highly regrettable, for they not only meant the final alienation of Schleiermacher's friendship, but have also been the cause of much misunderstanding of Hegel himself. Critics who have accused Hegel of ruling out feeling have fixed their attention on passages like this, which aroused their ire, and overlooked the places in which his real arguments are found.

---

[1] Cf. E. v. Hartmann's discussion of this point in Das religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit, (Ausgewählte Werke, V) pp. 3-11.

[2] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 20. Cf. XII, BR, p. 119.

Yet even in this passage Hegel's essential point is altogether sound. The basing of religion on feeling, he holds, involves a primarily negative emphasis and overlooks the aspect of freedom in religion.[1] Religion is fundamentally not a sense of dependence, but an elevation of man to God, and thus an affirmative, expanding, freeing, uplifting experience. Even in religions in which servitude and superstition are most prominent, man is lifted to the realm in which he feels, perceives, and enjoys his freedom, infinity, and universality. In stressing this fact Hegel becomes once more a keen interpreter of what religion actually is in human life. Furthermore, it cannot fairly be charged that he overlooks the undeniable element of dependence in religion. This is shown by the introduction to his lectures on the philosophy of religion and, more clearly, by his whole emphasis on the incompleteness of the individual in isolation from God. For Hegel, however, man's dependence is the charter of his freedom.

C. Summary

Two things are now clear with respect to Hegel's attitude toward feeling in religion. He recognizes, first, that feeling is indispensable; secondly, he insists that it is not enough. He retains to the end the regard for the mystical side of religion which is so evident in his early writings, but he sees clearly that feeling without thought content is meaningless, that religion to be objectively true must be grounded in reason. The feeling recognized by Hegel is therefore rationally criticized feeling, feeling inseparably bound up with thought and thereby raised to the status of objective knowledge.

It is evident that such a view does not destroy feeling, but rather

---

[1] Where the satisfaction of selfish desire rules, as in Roman religion, the feeling of dependence is dominant, and religion is unfree. Cf. XIII, RGI, pp. 209-210, 229.

enriches it by giving it a genuine content of truth.

> Das Gefühl als solches ist nicht von der Philosophie ausgestossen. Es ist die Frage nur, ob der Inhalt des Gefühls die Wahrheit sei, sich im Denken als der Wahrhafte erweisen kann. Die Philosophie denkt, was das Subjekt als solches fühlt, und überlässt es demselben, sich mit seinem Gefühl darüber abzufinden. Das Gefühl ist so nicht durch die Philosophie verworfen, sondern es wird ihm durch dieselbe nur der wahrhafte Inhalt gegeben.[1]

This attitude reveals no trace either of the empiricism which treats experience as such as the sole source of knowledge or of the rationalism which constructs theories in scornful disregard of the facts.[2] In a broader sense, however, Hegel's view of feeling is both empirical and rational. Resting solidly on the observable data of religious life, it recognizes the need of rational interpretation of those data.

For Hegel, then, the important question is not whether feeling shall be present in religion; this is admittedly necessary. The question is rather whether God, truth, and freedom have their ultimate ground and justification in feeling or whether, on the contrary, such objective content, valid in and for itself, gives to feeling whatever determinateness and justification it may have. "Auf diesen Unterschied der Stellung kommt alles an."[3]

IV. The Moral, Volitional Element in Religion

Hegel's estimate of the moral and volitional elements in religion is more difficult to discover than his view of the place of feeling. Criticisms of will comparable in detail to the ever-recurring discussions of feeling are notably lacking. Nevertheless, passages relating directly or indirectly to the practical side of religion are frequent and significant; carefully appraised, they make possible a fairly clear account of Hegel's attitude toward the volitional factors.

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 229; JUB, XVI, pp. 353-354. Cf. XII, BR, p. 288.
[2] Such rationalism, it may be noted, is largely a myth.
[3] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 21.

A. The Moral Emphasis in Hegel's Early Writings

In his earliest writings,[1] as already indicated,[2] Hegel makes morality absolutely essential in religion. Until 1796 his chief problems lie exclusively in the practical sphere, and concern such phenomena as religion, the church, morality, the state, and their relations. From the specifically religious standpoint, Hegel is seeking to discover the characteristics of a true, living Volksreligion, that is, a religion which would permeate and enrich the total active life of a people. Such a religion, he finds, must necessarily be moral; otherwise it could have no part in the life of a people as a whole. Hegel therefore emphasizes the close relation between religion and morality, though he does not identify them.

In an early fragment, for example, he defines objective religion as "dies ganze System von dem Zusammenhange unserer Pflichten und Wünsche mit der Idee von Gott und der Unsterblichkeit der Seele."[3] In "Das Leben Jesu" Hegel's stress on the ethical is such that he appears on the surface as a representative of an outspoken rationalistic moralism in the Kantian sense. Everything centers in the moral effect of the teaching and the living example of Jesus.[4] All supernatural elements are eliminated. In a fragment from this period Hegel describes Christianity as the religion "wo Sittlichkeit mit Religion zusammenhängt."[5] In "Die Positivität der christlichen Religion" he contrasts instructively the ethical and religious teaching of Jesus with the "positive" faith which succeeded it.[6] In Jesus' teaching it is free, autonomous, unselfish obedience to the will of God and the moral

---

[1] Mainly the fragments on "Volksreligion und Christentum" (1793-1795), "Das Leben Jesu" (1795), and "Die Positivität der christlichen Religion" (1795-1796).

[2] Cf. above, p. 10.

[3] "Volksreligion und Christentum." Nohl, TJS, p. 48.

[4] Cf. Nohl, TJS, p. 125.

[5] Nohl, TJS, p. 365.

[6] Contrast, for example, Mt 7:22 with Mk 16:15-18.

law which leads to blessedness; but in the positive religion propagated by the disciples the obligation to fulfill the will of God is externally grounded in the authority of Jesus, and belief and baptism become the conditions of blessedness. The latter Hegel strenuously opposes.[1] An upright man, he holds, recognizes morality as the highest thing in his faith, and welcomes as a brother every member of another sect who is a friend of virtue. Such a Christian says to such a Jew, as Klosterbruder says to Nathan,

> Ihr seid ein Christ!---Bei Gott, Ihr seid ein Christ!
> Ein bessrer Christ war nie.

Such a Jew, moreover, replies to such a Christian,

> Wohl uns! Denn was
> Mich Euch zum Christen macht, das macht Euch mir
> Zum Juden![2]

Hegel adds,

> Ja! wohl euch! denn Reinheit des Herzens war euch beiden das Wesentliche eures Glaubens, und darum konnte jeder den andern als den Genossen des seinigen betrachten.[3]

The degree of Hegel's moral concern at this stage is well expressed when he writes,

> Ganz allein in Bezug auf die Sache selbst wird hier bemerkt, dass überall der Grundsatz zum Fundament aller Urteile über die verschiedene Gestalt, Modifikationen und Geist der christlichen Religion gelegt worden sei,---dass der Zweck und das Wesen aller wahren Religion und auch unserer Religion---Moralität[4] der Menschen sei.[5]

---

[1] Nohl, TJS, pp. 164-166.

[2] Lessing, Nathan der Weise, IV, 7.

[3] Nohl, TJS, p. 170.

[4] Moralität for Hegel is by no means the morality of the Aufklärung, but rather a living morality grounded in the whole people. Haering suggests that the phrase "Zweck und Wesen aller wahren Religion" must be read with the emphasis on "aller wahren Religion," and that Hegel means here as elsewhere that the criterion of every true religion is the extent to which it is morally active. (Haering, HWW, pp. 190-191.)

[5] Nohl, TJS, p. 153. None of these early utterances, however, is to be construed as meaning that for Hegel religion is exhausted in morality. Hegel himself says emphatically that the reduction of religion to moral conduct alone is not only mistaken, but a direct contradiction, for it robs religion of its unique character and removes all basis of distinction between it and morality. (Nohl, TJS, p. 52) The moral ideas of Jesus "lassen

In the Frankfurt period (1797-1800) Hegel returns to the opposition between purely rationalistic religion and rigoristic, atomistic morality, on the one hand, and inward, practical, living religion and morality on the other. With regard to religion, he maintains, there is a wide difference between regarding God as isolated, transcendent greatness and living daily in moral relation to him. During these years Hegel repeatedly describes the vital union between God and man in terms of the love relationship.[1]

B. The Practical Aspect in Hegel's Mature Religious Thought

In the writings of Hegel's later youth and maturity the speculative interest comes increasingly to the fore. Thus of necessity he devotes a smaller proportionate share of attention to the more practical problems of

---

sich ebensogut aus den Schriften eines Plato, Xenophons, Rousseaus finden. . ." (Nohl, TJS, p. 59) If this were not so, if Christianity did not contain and complete this eternal morality, it would be a priori excluded from being a true, living religion. But this moral quality alone does not make Christianity a religion. "Die Hauptsache ist, in welchem Licht, in welcher Verbindung, in welchem Rang sie [the moral principles] aufgestellt sind." (Nohl, TJS, p. 59; cf. "Die Positivität der christlichen Religion," Nohl, TJS, p. 158.) In other words, a given moral attitude is determined as religious not by its moral content, but by its distinctively religious conception of morality.

As Haering suggests, Hegel is not at this stage concerned with the essence of religion in general. Rather he is seeking to discover what contribution religion, through its sanctification and support of the moral laws, can make to the complete life of a people. In most of the instances cited, he is emphasizing, from the standpoint of what a Volksreligion ought to be, the superiority of a religion in which morality is basically essential over one centering in merely external authoritarian belief. "Vor allem aber," writes Haering, "ist davon, dass, für Hegel selbst, die Bedeutung und das Wesen der Religion nur in der Moral bestanden hätte, in keinem Fall die Rede. Von einem vorübergehenden Kantianismus braucht also hier so wenig wie je . . . für Hegel die Rede zu sein." (HWW, p. 187) "Das Leben Jesu," for example, probably does not aim to be an account of the religious significance of Jesus in Christianity, or even an account of the essence of religion in the Hegelian sense, but rather a defense of the moral emphasis of Jesus as over against a positive, external, dogmatic, authoritarian faith. (Haering, HWW, p. 189)

[1] Cf. above, p. 53; Nohl, TJS, pp. 266-270, 293-296, 374-385.

his earlier years. This of course may, but by no means must imply a lessened concern for the moral aspect of religion. It is therefore our present problem to determine just what effect Hegel's heightened speculative interest in religion exerts on his early emphasis on the moral factor. In his mature philosophy of religion, what is the place of the volitional element?

1. Hegel's Emphasis on and Interpretation of Worship

The question just asked recalls immediately the fact that the final stage in Hegel's conception of religion is that of worship, which centers in volitional activity. Worship is for Hegel, however, a very broad term, and it must be carefully investigated if its true meaning, and especially its implications for the moral, volitional life are to become clearly evident.

a. The Volitional Character of Worship

As has been pointed out in Chapter Two,[1] an intellectual relation to God is for Hegel not sufficient; it must be supplemented by the practical relation involved in worship. "Das Verhältnis des Wissens" finds its completion in "das Verhältnis des Willens."[2] Religion is "nicht nur Verhältnis, Wissen, sondern Tun, Handeln."[3]

In the first place, volitional activity is essential to the moment of differentiation in religion. In pure knowledge man is so absorbed in the religious object that he fails to recognize the difference between himself and God. Only on the volitional, practical level does he stand truly over against his object.[4]

> Das Praktische des Geistes überhaupt ist das <u>Wollen</u>. Als wollende ist das Bewusstsein einzeln, Entschluss aus

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 35-37.
[2] XII, BR, p. 158.
[3] XII, BR, p. 69.
[4] XII, BR, pp. 226-228.

> sich selbst, Vollbringen seiner negativen Beziehung auf sich; erst der Wille macht den Menschen zum Individuum. . . . Im Willen ist der Mensch gegen ein Anderes, verhält sich als Getrenntes vom Andern; hier tritt daher die Endlichkeit ein.[1]

Secondly, however, only in the practical sphere is this estrangement of man from God transcended and true reconciliation effected.

> Der Wille hat einen Zweck und geht auf diesen Zweck; er ist Tätigkeit, diese Endlichkeit, diesen Widerspruch aufzuheben, dass dieser Gegenstand eine Schranke für mich ist. . . . Im Kultus . . . ist Gott auf der einen, ich bin auf der andern Seite, und die Bestimmung ist diese, mich mit Gott <u>in mir selbst</u> zusammenzuschliessen, mich in Gott zu wissen und Gott in mir---diese konkrete Einheit.[2]

b. The Two Aspects of Worship

1). <u>The inner aspect</u>. Worship comprises the entire range of activity, inward and outward, whereby this unity of God and man is restored. From the internal standpoint, it is

> wesentlich eine innere <u>Umkehrung des Geistes und Gemüts</u>. . . . So enthält der christliche Kultus z.B. nicht nur die Sakramente, kirchlichen Handlungen und Pflichten, sondern er enthält auch die sogenannte Heilsordnung als eine schlechthin innere Geschichte und als eine Stufenfolge von Handlungen des Gemüts, überhaupt eine Bewegung, die in der Seele vorgeht und vorgehen soll.[3]

What, then, is the nature of this inner movement of the soul? It is a two-sided activity: "Gottes Gnade und des Menschen Opfer," through which the finite individual is lifted above his isolation and taken into union with the infinite.[4] From the standpoint of man, it involves "die praktische Tätigkeit des Subjekts an sich selbst . . ., seine Subjektivität . . . zu entlassen," the "Aufgeben des natürlichen Willens der Partikular-

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 257.
[2] XII, BR, pp. 227-228.
[3] XII, BR, p. 229.
[4] XII, BR, p. 258.

ität."[1] In such inner, spiritual acts as remorse, repentance, and purification, man gives his heart to God.[2] Through this conscious, voluntary surrender of his particularity, the individual becomes like God in character. "Gott soll ich mich gemäss machen; dies ist meine, die menschliche Arbeit."[3]

Yet this activity is likewise God's. God

> bewegt sich zum Menschen und ist durch Aufhebung des Menschen; was als mein Tun erscheint, ist Gottes Tun, und umgekehrt Gott nur durch meine Tätigkeit. Beides in einem ist die absolute Versöhnung.[4]

This participation of God involves, however, no impairment of, but is rather the condition of human freedom. It is precisely through the surrender of his own will to God that man becomes truly free.

> . . . Die Freiheit des Menschen besteht eben im Wissen und Wollen Gottes durch Aufhebung des menschlichen Wissens und Wollens. Der Mensch ist daher bei der Gnade dieselbe Tätigkeit und weit davon entfernt, nur das passive Material, den Stein zu bilden, ohne mit Bewusstsein dabei zu sein. Es soll vielmehr das Göttliche durch mich in mir werden, und das, wogegen die Aktion geht, die meine Aktion ist, das ist Aufgeben meiner überhaupt, der sich nicht mehr für sich behält. Diese gedoppelte Tätigkeit ist der Kultus, und sein Zweck ist das Dasein Gottes im Menschen.[5]

2). <u>The outward aspect</u>. Worship, however, is not confined to the inward activity whereby the individual consciousness frees itself of its finitude and becomes united with its true ground, God. It is the very nature of worship to develop itself <u>nach aussen</u>, to find expression in the moral life of society. "Dies Hinausgehen in die wirkliche Welt ist der Religion wesentlich."[6] If the purification of the heart is carried through to the end, resulting in an enduring character which corresponds to its

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 259.
[2] XII, BR, p. 236.
[3] XII, BR, p. 258.
[4] XII, BR, p. 258.
[5] XII, BR, p. 258.
[6] XII, BR, p. 231.

universal nature, it finds inevitable completion in morality.[1] Moral conduct, therefore, in so far as it is related to the consciousness of God, is the truest kind of worship.

> Ist Herz, Wille ernstlich durch und durch zum Allgemeinen, Wahren gebildet, so ist das vorhanden, was als Sittlichkeit erscheint. Insofern ist die Sittlichkeit der wahrhafteste Kultus. Damit aber muss dann zugleich das Bewusstsein des Wahren, des Göttlichen, Gottes verbunden sein.[2]

In this way religion passes over into the state and is reflected in the entire political and social life of the people.[3] The highest reconciliation of God and man occurs when the worldly itself is penetrated by the principle of freedom and, so conformed to the eternal truth of reason, becomes rational will. "Die Institutionen der Sittlichkeit sind göttliche Institutionen;" that is, they are not "holy" in the sense in which voluntary chastity and poverty are said to be holy, but divine, in that they involve the free obedience of a rational will to what it recognizes as moral. True religion, therefore, realizes itself in, not apart from or above the world. It involves not world-denial, but world-penetration. "So ist in dem Sittlichen die Versöhnung der Religion mit der Weltlichkeit, mit der Wirklichkeit vollbracht."[4] On the one hand, true religion "geht nur aus der Sittlichkeit hervor;" on the other, it is the substance and basis of the morality of the state.[5]

Like inward worship, morality involves relating one's own life to that of the whole, passing from one's isolated particularity to the sphere of universality. "Sittlichkeit, Liebe ist eben dies, seine [the subject's] Besonderheit, besondere Persönlichkeit aufzugeben, sie zur Allgemeinheit

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 302.
[2] XII, BR, p. 236.
[3] XII, BR, pp. 231, 302.
[4] XIV, AR, pp. 218-219. Cf. VI, GPR, pp. 213-214; Kuno Fischer, HLWL, II, p. 1011.
[5] V, ENC, pp. 463, 464.

zu erweitern."[1] In any given state, this implies the subordination of one's own interests to those of the society as a whole.

The extent of Hegel's interest in the moral aspect of religion should now be clear. Few writers have insisted more emphatically than he that religion must manifest itself in the active life of the world. Yet in this very emphasis, or rather in the particular manner of the emphasis, lies a marked defect in Hegel's view. Paradoxical as it may sound, Hegel relates religion too closely to the life of the world. The morality to which religion leads is for him identified with and exhausted in the political life of the state. It is difficult to avoid the impression that Hegel's standard of what the moral demands of religion ought to be is determined very largely by his empirical knowledge of what the accepted morality actually is. This may be illustrated by his discussion of the teaching of Jesus. Jesus' teaching, he holds, inasmuch as it has the form of Vorstellung, must be at first abstractly universal; lacking the concrete form of thought, it is unable to recognize the particular in the universal. For this reason it holds up the kingdom of God, a universal, as the one thing needful, and sees in it the negation of the particular, the existing world order. Jesus, for example, demands of his disciples the renunciation of their ordinary way of life, disparages all worldly things as worthless, disregards family ties, counsels against providing for the morrow, and advises the giving of everything to the poor. The new religion is thus at first "eine revolutionäre Lehre, die alles Bestehende teils auf der Seite liegen lässt, teils vernichtet, umstösst," because its one all-consuming interest "noch nicht im Zusammenhange mit dem Weltbewusstsein, in Übereinstimmung mit dem Weltzustand ist."[2] A mature religion, however,

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 81; cf. pp. 158, 170, 178, 179; JUB, III, PHPR, p. 98.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 150.

one which has gained concrete form as a Gemeinde or Kirche, is in harmony with the conditions surrounding it.

> Diese Entsagung, dieses Aufgeben, diese Zurücksetzung alles wesentlichen Interesses und der sittlichen Bande ist im konzentrierten Erscheinen der Wahrheit eine wesentliche Bestimmung, die in der Folge, wenn die Wahrheit ihre sichere Existenz hat, von ihrer Wichtigkeit verliert.[1]

From this it would seem that for Hegel developed religion naturally expresses itself in the kind of conduct which is officially recognized as moral in the state concerned. Hegel would, to be sure, trace this harmony to the fact that the moral and political life of society is founded in and the necessary outgrowth of religion.[2] Yet the actual content of the morality involved is drawn not from Hegel's idea of religion, but from his empirical knowledge of the kind of moral life to be found in various states. More particularly, the content of Christian morality is drawn very largely from what he finds in the German state. In other words, Hegel is more empirical than he himself realizes. He is too much overawed by facts. As a result, the penetration of the world by religion[3] involves in actual effect little more than conformity of religion to the world. This is not the kind of moral emphasis which characterizes religion at its best.

In another important respect Hegel's treatment of the ethical aspect of religion is inadequate. In his Philosophie der Religion, as we have seen, Hegel lays great emphasis on the moral factor. Religion is for him throughout ethical. But as Georg Lasson points out, in the construction of his system as a whole Hegel is prevented by his arrangement from giving ethics its rightful place. Whereas art, religion, and philosophy belong in the sphere of Absolute Spirit, morality is a characteristic only of the

---

[1] XIV, AR, pp. 151-152.
[2] XII, BR, pp. 231, 236, 302-303; VI, GPR, pp. 208-209; IX, PWG, p. 882.
[3] Cf. above, p. 74.

objective spirit. It is clear, says Lasson, that it is in the ethical realm that the Absolute realizes the idea of freedom in the self-consciousness of man and thereby manifests itself in its truth. This realization culminates, however, only in the religious devotion of the human self-consciousness to the Absolute Spirit. But according to Hegel the ethical finds its completion in the morality of the state. The notion of freedom cannot, therefore, unfold itself into the idea of the freedom of the self-consciousness in union with God.

The limitation of ethics to the morality of the organized state, the civil law, is unjustifiable and false. Hegel himself realizes that the Spirit and its freedom attain reality not in any one state as such, but in the whole course of world history, involving the successive rise and fall of many states. What Hegel calls morality is therefore continually dissolved by the advance of world history, whereas the idea of freedom which underlies the whole process is really the idea of religion itself. It is true that Hegel makes religion the foundation of the state[1] and treats all historical development as the unfolding of the divine Idea, thereby placing religion above the state and its morality. Yet in his systematic arrangement he puts religion and morality in two different realms. This sharp separation makes it impossible for religion to be truly penetrated with a moral content. For this reason Hegel is always in difficulty when required to determine the relation between religion and what he terms morality, and never satisfactorily solves the problem of the relation between church and state. It must be admitted that, inasmuch as the objective spirit is an aspect of the Absolute Spirit, morality is a phase of religion, but it does not permeate the whole of religion. Only a morality integral to the

---

[1] Cf. above, p. 76.

life of Absolute Spirit itself could fulfill the latter condition.[1] A genuine inner relation of church and state, says Lasson,

> ergibt sich erst dann, wenn man im Staate und seinem Recht zwar eine vernünftige Selbstbestimmung und Ausgestaltung der Freiheit sieht, aber nicht die Abschliessende und umfassende, sondern die grundlegende und für höhere Formen des sittlichen Lebens vorbereitende.[2]

2. The Ought in Hegel's View of Morality

Further light on Hegel's view of the moral life is shed by his frequent discussions of the ought. Repeatedly he takes issue with the subjective moralism of Kant and Fichte.[3] In the Kantian philosophy, says Hegel, is an enduring conflict of the evil principle with the good, a fundamental dualism between the noumenal and the empirical self, between reason and sensuality, the formal moral law and human inclination, the ideal and the actual, Sollen and Sein. In this morality of Zerrissenheit, there is a wide gap between what ought to be and what is. On this plane one can never say more than that the good ought to be realized, that the evil, which stands ceaselessly over against the good, ought to be overthrown. "Da ist ausser mir eine Welt, die, von Gott verlassen, darauf wartet, dass ich den Zweck, das Gute erst hineinbringe."[4] Here there can be only infinite striving toward a goal which is never attained. The good remains a mere ought.

According to Hegel it is necessary to advance beyond this merely abstract standpoint to the insight that the evil is in and for itself conquered, the good already realized. Before the concrete universality of

---

[1] Cf. G. Lasson, EHR, pp. 7-10; Introduction to Hegel's GPR, pp. XXIV-XXVII. Cf. also Hegel, VI, GPR, pp. 207-219, 353-356; XII, BR, pp. 302-311.

[2] G. Lasson, Introduction to Hegel's GPR, p. XXVI.

[3] Cf. XII, BR, pp. 258-259; XIV, AR, pp. 118-119, 205-206; V, ENC, pp. 37, 201-202, 408-409, 411; II, PDG, p. 168.

[4] XII, BR, p. 259. It is possible, as Haering suggests (HWW, p. 193), that the moral dualism of Kant's philosophy of religion is less prominent than Hegel and many others have believed.

thought the false contradiction is broken down and the apparent independence of the evil put to flight. From the standpoint of the Absolute, what ought to be actually is.

This does not mean, however, that the ought has no significance or no validity for human beings. Indeed, Hegel's whole philosophy involves a moral demand on the individual to be rational, to adjust himself to a whole which is the norm of all meaning and value. You ought, says Hegel's system, to view your own particular situation in the light of the Absolute. The natural will ought to be made spiritual. The natural man is

> unangemessen . . . dem, was das Wahrhafte ist, und ebenso ist die Wahrheit des einen Guten unendlich fest in mir. Diese Unangemessenheit bestimmt sich so zu dem, was nicht sein soll. Die Aufgabe, Forderung ist unendlich.[1]

The individual has, therefore, a definite responsibility for making his own will good through relating it to the Absolute Spirit. But this fact, though important, is abstract and one-sided. From the point of view of the Absolute Spirit, the ideal is already realized. It is the very nature of the Idea to be what it ought to be. Hegel does not oppose value or moral obligation. But he does oppose, from the ultimate point of view, the attitude for which the realization of value is a mere possibility or potentiality.

"Wer wäre nicht so klug," asks Hegel,

> um in seiner Umgebung vieles zu sehen, was in der Tat nicht so ist, wie es sein soll? Aber diese Klugheit hat unrecht sich einzubilden, mit solchen Gegenständen und deren Sollen sich innerhalb der Interessen der philosophischen Wissenschaft zu befinden. Diese hat es nur mit der Idee zu tun, welche nicht so ohnmächtig ist, um nur zu sollen und nicht wirklich zu sein, und damit mit einer Wirklichkeit, an welcher jene Gegen-

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 118; cf. p. 119.

> stände, Einrichtungen, Zustände u.s.f. nur die oberflächliche Aussenseite sind.[1]

In the sphere of religion this relation is expressed by the fact that the activity involved in worship is two-sided.[2] My activity is at the same time God's activity. More precisely, Hegel's whole view of the religious ought is summarized in the following passage:

> Der Kreis des moralischen [in the Kantian sense] Wirkens ist beschränkt; dagegen hat in der Religion das Allgemeine den Sinn, zu sein. Das Gute ist in der Religion an und für sich selbst; Gott ist, und es handelt sich nur um mich, dass ich meiner Subjektivität abtue und mir an diesem Werke, dass sich durch sich ewig vollbringt, meinen Anteil gewinne und meinen Teil daran nehme. Das Gute ist demnach nicht ein Sollen, sondern göttliche Macht und ewige Wahrheit.[3]

Behind Hegel's polemic against the ought, therefore, is a profound conviction on his part of the supremacy of God. Spirit, he declares, rules in the universe. In Spirit evil is "an und für sich überwunden."[4] However far short of the ideal individual human beings may be, God is, and is what he ought to be. No power is great enough to thwart his purposes. "Es ist keine Macht, die ihm gleich ist, die ihm gegenüberstehen kann; es ist kein geistloses Verhältnis des Mechanismus."[5] Through this power of the Spirit, moreover, the sins of men are forgiven and men themselves are redeemed.[6]

In this affirmation Hegel penetrates to the very depths of religious faith. The God of ethical religion is at once a mighty fortress and a heart of love. Grounded in the religious consciousness is the conviction that, in spite of the disappointments and failures of men, there reigns a

---

1 V, ENC, pp. 37-38. Cf. II, PDG (3d ed.), p. 168.
2 Cf. above, pp. 35-38, 72-73.
3 XII, BR, p. 259.
4 XIV, AR, p. 205.
5 XIV, AR, p. 207.
6 XIV, AR, pp. 206-207.

King of kings and Lord of lords whose truth fades not away. Again, the religious man who, ceaselessly pursuing an ideal which is ever beyond his grasp, falters and sins, yet knows that on his side is a God who is perfect goodness, through whose forgiving love his own weakness may be redeemed.

From this standpoint Hegel's interpretation of the ought is in complete harmony with the facts of religious experience. Seen, however, in the light of his personalistic pantheism,[1] his conception involves a contradiction which even his own dialectical logic cannot satisfactorily remove. It is impossible to reconcile the point of view of the Absolute Spirit with that of finite spirits. The Absolute, as Absolute, is perfectly good and free from moral wrong; as particular finite self, it is genuinely sinful. In other words, the same act of will which is evil in me is good for the Absolute. Here lies an irreconcilable contradiction: the same person cannot both sin and not sin in the same act; the same experience cannot be at once both evil and good. The Absolute cannot, therefore, experience my sinfulness precisely as I experience it and still remain absolute.[2] It follows that either the Absolute Spirit is not morally perfect or man is not really sinful. Either absolute goodness or finite evil is an illusion. In so far, therefore, as Hegel tends to underestimate the ethical factor in individual human beings, he is simply carrying out, perhaps unconsciously, the logical implications of his own metaphysics.[3]

With regard to the Absolute itself, a further difficulty emerges at this point. Hegel's treatment of the ought, separated from its pantheis-

---

[1] Cf. below, p. 177, n. 1.

[2] The criticism here offered is essentially that of Edgar S. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, (N.Y.: Holt, 1925), p. 244. Cf. below, pp. 94-95, 188, 210-211.

[3] Cf. below, Chapter VI, for further consideration of Hegel's view of individuals.

sing of alone was lord of lords whose lands lodes not many. Again, the religious man who, consciously pursuing an ideal which is over beyond his grasp, finders and sins, yet knows that on his side is a God who is perfect goodness, through whom forgiving love his own weakness may be redeemed.

From this standpoint Hegel's interpretation of the great is in complete harmony with the tenets of religious experience. Some, however, in the light of his peculiarities particular, his conception involves a contradiction which even his rationalist mind cannot satisfactorily reserve. It is impossible to reconcile the point of view of the absolute equity with that of finite minds. The Ideality, as Absolute, is perfectly good and free from moral evil; as particular finite self, it is necessarily sinful. In other words, the same act of will which is evil in one is good for the Ideality. There lies an irreconcilable contradiction. The same person commit both sin and not sin in the same act; the same act cannot be at once both evil and good. The Absolute cannot, therefore, correspond to finitude precisely as I experience it and still remain absolute. It is, very well either the Absolute which is not consciously perfect or man is not really sinful. Either Absolute goodness or finite evil is an illusion. In so far, therefore, as Hegel tries to condescend to the ethical factor in individual human beings, he is clearly contradicting himself unconsciously, the logical implications of his own method. Hegel's treatment of the great, separated from its particular

---

[5] Cf. below, p. 177, n. 1.

The quotations here offered is somewhat illustrative of Hegel's meaning. Cf. Weisheit, "Zu Hegel's Philosophie zu Religionsphilosophie," (N.Y.: Holt, 1899), p. 94. Cf. Weisheit, op. cit., 90-99, 189, 210-211.

[6] Cf. below, Chapter VI, for further consideration of Hegel's view of individuals.

tic background, is adequate so long as the life of the Absolute is conceived as timeless. But the process of self-realization of the Absolute Spirit is for Hegel not only logical but also historical and chronological. In the process of history, however, the good is never completely realized at any one moment. The historical march of Spirit is in Hegel's view one of infinite toil and struggle.[1] Something always remains to be done.[2] Thus although God is at a given moment perfectly good, although at a given time there is nothing which God ought to be and is not, there remains always something which he has not done but at some future time ought to do. This temporal element is not sufficiently recognized in Hegel's treatment of the ought from the standpoint of the Absolute. In fact, Hegel never adequately reconciles the logical and the historical aspects of the Absolute.[3] The gap between the two is all the greater in view of Hegel's stress on the element of conflict and struggle in the life of Spirit, which we have now to discuss.

C. The Principle of Negativity in Religion

1. The Experiential Origin of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion

No aspect of Hegel's thought is more revealing with regard to his view of religious experience than is the principle of negativity, the dialectic which forms the living core of his whole system. As the careful investigations of Dilthey, Haering, and Wahl in Hegel's early writings have shown, the key to Hegel's philosophy is to be found in his own early struggle with the religious problem. The dialectic is less a method than an experience, in which the "unhappy consciousness"[4] of the soul divided

---

[1] II, PDG, p. 13.
[2] See the closing lines of the Encyclopädie.
[3] For further treatment of this point, cf. below, pp. 188-189.
[4] "Das unglückliche Bewusstsein" is one of the aspects of experience in Hegel's Phänomenologie (cf. pp. 139-151). Wahl regards it, "la conscience malheureuse," as the root of Hegel's thought.

in itself and separated from God gives way to reconciliation and profound happiness. This movement of cyclical synthesis, experienced in his own life and thought, becomes for Hegel the key to reality itself. In the very bosom of being, he finds, is an eternal rent which is eternally healed. This movement, rationally formulated as the dialectical process of opposition and synthesis, is applied by Hegel to all aspects of experience.[1]

2. Conflict and Reconciliation in Religion

Already in one of the fragments of the late Berne period (1797) Hegel finds in experience an opposition between subject and object, the transcendence of which is typified in man's relation to God and the love relation among men.[2] In the fragment on "Die Liebe" (1797) he writes, "In ihr findet sich das Leben selbst, als eine Verdoppelung seiner Selbst, und Einigkeit desselben."[3] Two years later he reaches the conclusion that "Freiheit ohne Entgegensetzung ist nur eine Möglichkeit."[4] In 1800 he recognizes the elements of both separation and union in defining religion as an elevation of man "vom endlichen Leben zum unendlichen Leben."[5]

The dialectic which is foreshadowed in the Jugendschriften becomes in the Phänomenologie the center and controlling idea of Hegel's whole interpretation of consciousness. The life of spirit is here depicted as an

---

[1] The experiential origin of Hegel's philosophy of religion and of his philosophy as a whole is obviously significant for the present study. However, a detailed investigation of the psychological springs of Hegel's philosophy of religion lies outside the scope of our inquiry. Accepting as reasonably well established the results of the research by Dilthey, Haering, and Wahl, the dissertation will concentrate at this point on Hegel's own development of the principle of negativity in its bearing on his view of religious experience.

[2] Fragment on "Religion, eine Religion stiften" (1796). Nohl, TJS, pp. 376-377.

[3] Nohl, TJS, p. 379; cf, above, p. 53.

[4] Fragment on "Das Grundkonzept zum Geist des Christentums." Nohl, TJS, p. 395.

[5] "Systemfragment von 1800." Nohl, TJS, p. 347. Cf. above, pp. 52-53.

eternal battle between contradictories in which victory can be won and reconciliation attained only through infinite struggle, patience, and labor. Consciousness finds its completion, Hegel writes, "in der Gestalt des unglücklichen Bewusstseins."[1] To be sure, he describes the life of Absolute Spirit as "a play of love," but by love he means no irresponsible, light-hearted emotion, but the love which bears witness to its genuineness in patient endurance of pain and suffering.

> Das Leben Gottes und das göttliche Erkennen mag also wohl als ein Spielen der Liebe mit sich selbst ausgesprochen werden; diese Idee sinkt zur Erbaulichkeit und selbst zur Fadheit herab, wenn der Ernst, der Schmerz, die Geduld und Arbeit des Negativen darin fehlt.[2]

The elements of opposition and estrangements are central in Hegel's interpretation of religion. At the beginning of his discussion of the speculative notion of religion he declares "die unendliche Negativität" to be the "Grundbestimmung."[3] How deeply he recognizes the division and conflict in human consciousness is even more clearly seen in his description of the difference between finite and infinite Spirit, which closes as follows:

> Ich bin der Kampf; denn der Kampf ist eben dieser Widerstreit, der nicht eine Gleichgültigkeit der beiden als Verschiedenen ist, sondern der das Zusammengebundensein beider ist. Ich bin nicht einer der im Kampfe Begriffenen, ich bin beide Kämpfende, ich bin der Kampf selbst. Ich bin das Feuer und Wasser, die sich berühren, und die Berührung, Einheit dessen, was sich schlechthin flieht; und eben diese Berührung bald Getrennter, Entzweiter, bald Versöhnter, Einiger ist selbst diese doppelt, widerstreitend seiende Beziehung als Beziehung.[4]

---

[1] II, PDG, p. 435.
[2] II, PDG, p. 13; cf. p. 140; XIII, NR, p. 5; IX, PWG, p. 937.
[3] XII, BR, p. 149.
[4] XII, BR, pp. 241-242. Cf. Hegel's definition of the dialectic as given in a conversation with Goethe. Here he says that its essence is "im Grunde nichts weiter als der geregelte, methodisch ausgebildete Widerspruchsgeist, der jedem Menschen innewohnt." (Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe, October 18, 1827.) Hegel would apply to all men the saying used

Hegel criticizes the religion of his day because it fails to recognize and include in its account of experience the reality of pain. One hears no more, he laments, of "die Lehre von Liebe in unendlichem Schmerz, [vom] substanziellen Bande der Welt." Instead, people seek "Genuss, Liebe ohne Schmerz."[1] In Hegel's view, on the contrary, love by its very nature entails pain and sacrifice.[2] In fact, the elements of sorrow, suffering, and conflict run through the whole of experience, characterizing the life of both God and man. True peace of the spirit is possible only after deadly battle. To live spiritually is to struggle incessantly and suffer profoundly. Perhaps the most lucid expression of this idea, so characteristic of Hegel, is found not in his Philosophie der Religion, but in a remarkably illuminating passage in his Aesthetik. Here he writes,

> Selbst die ewigen Götter des Polytheismus leben nicht in ewigem Frieden, sondern sie gehen zu Parteiungen und Kämpfen mit entgegenstrebenden Leidenschaften und Interessen fort, und müssen sich dem Schicksal unterwerfen, ja selbst der christliche Gott ist dem Übergange zur Erniedrigung des Leidens und Schmach des Todes nicht entnommen, und wird von dem Seelenschmerze nicht befreit, in welchem er rufen muss: "mein Gott, mein Gott, warum hast du mich verlassen;" seine Mutter leidet die ähnliche herbe Pein, und das menschliche Leben überhaupt ist ein Leben des Streits, der Kämpfe und Schmerzen. Denn die Grösse und Kraft misst sich wahrhaft erst an der Grösse und Kraft des Gegensatzes, aus welchem der Geist sich zur Einheit in sich wieder zusammenbringt, die Intensivität und Tiefe der Subjektivität thut sich um so mehr hervor, je unendlicher und ungeheurer die Umstände auseinandergezogen, und je zerreissender die Widersprüche sind, unter denen sie dennoch fest in sich selber zu bleiben hat. In dieser Entfaltung allein bewährt sich die Macht der Idee und des Idealen, denn Macht besteht nur darin, sich im Negativen

---

by one writer to characterize the apostle Paul (Adolf Deissman, Paulus. Tübingen: Mohr, 1925, p. 14):

> Ich bin kein ausgeklügelt Buch,
> Ich bin ein Mensch mit seinem Widerspruch.

[1] XIV, AR, p. 230.
[2] XIV, AR, pp. 162-163.

seiner zu erhalten.[1]

Nowhere in the literature of the philosophy of religion is to be found a clearer recognition of the tragic character of human life or of the anguish of the soul in religion than in the passages just quoted. Words like these could be written by no armchair philosopher spinning categories out of his own brain, but only by a thinker intimately acquainted through close observation with what religion and life really are.

By this time it is evident how unjust and erroneous is the charge that Hegel never felt or appreciated the element of moral struggle in religion, the fact of evil, or the presence in man of contradictory tendencies.[2] As a matter of fact, he recognized just as clearly and probably experienced just as profoundly as any other writer the terrible reality of moral discord and estrangement from God. But there is an important difference in this respect between Hegel and some others. He recognizes the reality of struggle, but does not stop there.[3] In his view separation is followed by union, suffering by surpassing joy, conflict by peace. The opposition is genuine, but it is not final. It is present, but it is over-

---

[1] JUB, XII, pp. 244-245. In Die Absolute Religion Hegel finds pain and suffering to be the attestation of God's appearance in the world: "Das Leiden der Seele ist das Zeugnis von dem Geist. . . . In dem Schmerz ist die Beglaubigung der Erscheinung Gottes." (XIV, AR, p. 149.)

[2] Ott, for example, writes as follows: "Es war von je her das Charakteristikum eines einseitigen Idealismus, dass kein Verständnis für den Zwiespalt in Natur und Geistesleben vorhanden war. Hegel hat nie die überwältigende Macht der Übel und des Bösen an sich selbst erfahren, und wie er war, so war sein Anblick der Welt. Bei allem Prävaleren des Denkelements war also Hegel eine in sich durchaus geschlossene und einheitliche Persönlichkeit, für welche die Seelenkräfte nicht auseinander fielen, sondern stets in harmonischer Symphonie wirksam waren." (RHG, p. 20.) Cf. also Richert, HR, p. 50.

[3] For example, Glockner points out that Hegel experienced as immediately as Schleiermacher the stringency of the difference between faith in God and rational knowledge of God, but that while Schleiermacher kept this opposition continually before him, Hegel brought his system to a harmonious completion by means of the conceptual reconciliation of the contradictories. ("Hegel und Schleiermacher," pp. 255-256.) Cf. IX, PWG, p. 734.

come. In spite of all their differences, spirit and Spirit are in fundamental unity. Because of this fact, the human individual who will may be, and is already, reconciled with God.

But neither is this reconciliation permanent, in the sense of statically abiding. The achievement of unity is not a mere abstract negation or cancellation of difference, but rather a living unification which yet preserves the elements of difference and enriches itself through them. In short, the religious life, like the life of Spirit in general, is a rhythm, an alternation between opposition and reconciliation.[1] Just as in music the vibrant combination of meter and pitch produces a harmony of the two without destroying either, so the identity of God and man in religion, or of any genuine opposition in the life of Spirit, is a rhythm which does not annihilate the difference between them, but rather preserves while transcending it in a harmonious whole.[2] The opposition is reconciled only to appear again and be once more overcome. The religious life is thus a continual alternation.

> Das Lebendige hat Bedürfnisse und ist so Widerspruch, aber die Befriedigung ist Aufheben dieses Widerspruchs. Im Triebe, Bedürfnisse bin ich mir selbst von mir unterschieden. Aber das Leben ist dies, den Widerspruch aufzulösen, das Bedürfnis zu befriedigen, es zum Frieden zu bringen, aber so, dass der Widerspruch auch wieder entsteht; es ist die Abwechslung des Unterscheidens, des Widerspruchs und seines Aufhebens.[3]

3. Hegel's Theory of Sin

The opposition inherent in human nature appears on its highest level as the consciousness of sin, the recognition that man is naturally evil. Far from overlooking the awful reality of sin, Hegel takes it so earnestly

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 65.
[2] II, PDG, p. 42; cf. pp. 39, 40.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 79. For further treatment of the element of negativity in Hegel, cf. below, pp. 181-186.

as to hold that the doctrine that man is by nature good destroys the Christian religion.[1] The opposition between the divine and the worldly reaches full reality for the first time in Christianity, which actually starts from an absolute estrangement.

> [Die] heidnische Religion enthält [das] heitere Versöhntsein von Haus aus. So heiter ist die christliche Religion nicht; [sie] erweckt selbst das Bedürfnis, fängt von dem Schmerze an, ruft ihn wach, zerreisst die natürliche Einheit des Geistes, [die] Einheit des Menschen mit der Natur, zerstört den natürlichen Frieden. [Hier ist gleich] Erbsünde, [der Mensch ist] böse von Haus aus, also in seinem innersten ein Negatives mit sich selbst.[2]

The basis of this negativity is man's knowledge of the distinction between good and evil, and it is precisely this recognition which makes man spirit. But this knowledge is a two-sided and dangerous gift, for it involves freedom, and a free spirit may choose evil as well as good. If man is to be truly man, he must be exposed to the possibility of sin. The passage from the natural to the spiritual consciousness is that from ignorant, childish innocence to mature, discerning knowledge, which brings with it, however, the possibility of wrongdoing. This paradoxical advance "ist die ewige Geschichte und die Natur des Menschen."[3]

This is according to Hegel the essential truth at the heart of the Genesis narrative of the fall of man. The account is, of course, figurative, and like all imaginative representations expresses its speculative truth only imperfectly. The knowledge of the distinction between good and evil is represented as something which ought not to be attained: Adam and Eve are forbidden to eat of the tree which would yield this knowledge. That the insight into the nature of right and wrong is what makes man spirit is indicated in the promise of the serpent that Adam and Eve will be-

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 23.
[2] XII, BR, p. 23.
[3] XIII, RGI, pp. 86-87.

come like gods if they eat of the forbidden fruit, as well as in the admission by God that "man is become as one of us, to know good and evil."[1] But this profound truth is suppressed by the narrative; man is punished for attaining the very thing which makes him man.

In spite of its defects, however, the account reveals the innermost nature of man himself. It is the knowledge of good and evil which, though it opens up the possibility of sin, makes man the spirit that he is. The representation that the act of Adam and Eve trespassed a divine command is only formal. The important thing is the content, the truth that the knowledge of moral right and wrong, with its attendant freedom, is at once the root of sin and the essence of man's spiritual nature. The Old Testament story thus concerns not merely a particular individual, but the nature of man as man. This is the basic truth in the doctrine of original sin, which simply expresses in figurative fashion the fact that man as man has a fundamental dissonance in his nature, his knowledge of the difference between good and evil,[2] and that he is man precisely because of this opposition.

It is this discord which for Hegel lies at the heart of sin. Sin, according to him, is the will on the part of the individual to pursue his own particular ends out of relation to the rest of the universe, the choice to be a part rather than a whole, estrangement from God.

> Wollen des Natürlichen ist, näher bestimmt, böse, Wille der Trennung, Setzen seiner Einzelheit gegen anderes. [So ist der] Gegensatz in ihm, aber unmittelbar auch [der] seiner Einzelheit und seiner Allgemeinheit. Mensch [ist] Bewusstsein, auch Denken; . . . er unterscheidet Gutes und Böses. . . . Beides [steht] vor ihm; [er hat die] Wahl zwischen beiden, und böse ist sein Wille. [So ist das Böse] seine Schuld. Dies Böse ist seine Selbstsucht. [Er hat] Zwecke nur seiner Einzelheit, insofern [sie] dem Allgemeinen entgegengesetzt

---

[1] Genesis 3:5, 22.
[2] XIII, RGI, pp. 85-86; XIV, AR, pp. 121-129.

> ist, d.i. insofern er natürlicher [Mensch] ist. Dass er natürlicher [Mensch] ist, ist sein Wille, sein Setzen.[1]

While this bad will is a necessary stage, it is not final, but rather transitory. Though the religious life begins with the insight that man in himself is evil, it moves on by way of repentance and remorse to reconciliation with God. The discord of sin is followed by the restored unity of man and God. In this reconciliation man becomes conscious of that which is in and for itself universal as his own true essence, of his own substantial infinity, of his participation in the divine. The individual throws off his partiality and enters into genuine relation with the whole. The good life is therefore a passage from innocence through temptation and sin to virtue, from simple unity through discord to harmony.

However, as previously seen, this reconciliation is not uninterrupted. Instead, it is continually replaced by returning temptation, which in its turn is repeatedly transformed into a higher harmony. Inasmuch as man is a moral being, he is ever open to the possibility of new sin. The religious life is a life of struggle, in which victory and progress are won only through suffering and pain. Fellowship with God seems to come only after estrangement from God. Only after the dark night of temptation and bitter despair does the soul experience the dawn of supreme joy.

In reconciliation, as in separation, knowledge is the basic fact. If man's recognition of the difference between good and evil is that which makes him sinful, it is also that which makes him divine. The very thing which makes evil possible contains also the power of triumph over evil. Only knowledge, the differentiation of the natural will from the infinitely free divine will, makes possible the elevation of the spirit above the state of natural selfishness.[2] As in Wagner's Parsifal, the same spear

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 104; cf. p. 105. Cf. JUB, XX, PHPR, p. 98.
[2] XIV, AR, pp. 130-131.

which inflicts the wound also heals it. "Erkennen heilt die Wunde, die es selber ist."[1]

> . . . Im Erkennen liegt dann ebensosehr das göttliche Prinzip der Wendung, Rückkehr zu sich selbst; es schlägt die Wunde und heilt sie, [weil] das Prinzip Geist und Wahrheit ist.[2]

What happens in reconciliation is, however, more than an attainment by man of an intellectual insight into his relation to God. Hegel makes this plain repeatedly in his discussions of repentance. In remorse, man throws off his particularity and elevates himself to the universal through purifying his heart and will. Repentance is essentially man's sincere dedication of his will to God, the making of God's will his own. The individual renounces his appetites and merely natural instincts, not by suppressing the living activity of his will, but rather by purifying its content and making it moral. The repentant soul destroys its evil act in the sense of renouncing the disposition or attitude which makes the act possible.

> . . . Der Geist kann diese Entsagung leisten, da er die Energie hat, sich an sich zu verändern und die Maximen und Intentionen seines Willens in sich zu vernichten. Wenn der Mensch in dieser Weise seiner Selbstsucht und der Entzweiung mit dem Guten entsagt, dann ist er der Versöhnung teilhaftig geworden und durch die Vermittlung in sich zum Frieden gelangt.[3]

Reconciliation has meaning for God as well as for man.

> Dieses Bewusstsein vollendet die Religion als Erkenntnis Gottes als des Geistes; denn Geist ist er in der Unterscheidung und Rückkehr, die wir in der Idee gesehen, welche enthält, dass die Einheit der göttlichen und menschlichen Natur nicht nur Bedeutung habe für die Bestimmung der menschlichen Natur, sondern ebensosehr der göttlichen.[4]

From the side of God, innocence represents God's undifferentiated

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 124.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 105; cf. p. 126.
[3] XII, BR, pp. 276-277; cf. pp. 162, 236, 247, 259, 273; XIV, AR, p. 206.
[4] XII, BR, p. 131.

unity; sin, his self-differentiation; and virtue, his return to himself. Man's anguish of soul is God's anguish, his attainment of harmony, God's return to unity with himself. This progress from unity through discord to higher unity is the eternal history of the Absolute Spirit. In the Christian religion it is represented by the life, death, and resurrection of Christ as the God-man. The experience of Christ brings graphically before the consciousness of man the profound truth that Spirit externalizes itself and becomes finite, descending to the uttermost depths of human pain, in order to achieve a richer unification in which man is taken up into God.[1]

It is now evident that Hegel's theory of sin, like his account of the religious life in general, is grounded in a close observation of living religious experience. His emphatic recognition of the facts of temptation, moral struggle, and sin, his insight into the part played by free choice between alternatives,[2] his strong emphasis on the reality of repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation, his insistence that an apprehension of the distinction between good and evil is at once the basis of sin and the condition of true spiritual life, his recognition that reconciliation has a meaning for God as well as for man, all of these aspects of his treatment reveal a profound insight into the human religious consciousness, its struggles and its triumphs.

But Hegel's view of sin is by no means merely empirical, as indeed no genuine interpretation of sin can be. The rational factor plays a large and important part, especially in Hegel's insistence on knowledge as the

---

[1] XIV, AR, pp. 163-164. Cf. XII, BR, p. 23; XIV, AR, pp. 134, 157, 159. For further treatment of Hegel's view of the significance of opposition and reconciliation in God, cf. below, pp. 181-186.

[2] XIV, AR, pp. 104, 125. Cf. above, pp. 88-89.

necessary condition of moral wrongdoing. A purely empirical investigation could do no more than discover that in the observed instances of sin the recognition of a difference between right and wrong is present. It could not go on from this, however, to the inference that this knowledge is a necessary element in all sin whatever. Only by rational thought can Hegel draw the universal conclusion which forms the center of his doctrine of sin: that sin is possible because of man's progress from moral ignorance to moral knowledge. Hegel's view is therefore distinctly a rational one. Yet it is not a rationalistic construction in isolation from the facts, but rather a rational interpretation of the facts grounded in a careful study of the religious life. Hegel begins with experience, but penetrates beneath it.

In at least one respect, however, Hegel carries this rational treatment of the facts of sin too far. There are actually two kinds of discord or estrangement in his theory of sin: that involved in the recognition by the individual of the difference between right and wrong; and that involved in the choice of wrong which sets up the human individual as a being-for-himself separate from God. The first is the condition of the possibility of evil, the second the actual fulfillment of this possibility. Hegel, however, tends to identify the two.[1] He fails to distinguish between sin and its possibility, and thereby makes sin itself necessary. Now it is evident that a recognition of moral distinctions is a necessary prerequisite of all real sin, but it is not at all clear that the actual choice of evil must of necessity follow. It is profoundly true that all moral development

---

[1] This tendency to regard the appearance in consciousness of a distinction between right and wrong as itself sinful recalls Anaximander's view of the separation and differentiation of things as evil: "Anfang der Dinge ist das Unendliche [ἄπειρον]. Woraus aber ihnen die Geburt ist, dahin geht auch ihr Sterben nach der Notwendigkeit. Denn sie zahlen einander Strafe und Busse für ihre Rüchlosigkeit nach der Zeit Ordnung." (Hermann Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Anaximander, Fragment 9.)

is from ignorance through temptation to virtue, but temptation is not itself sin. It cannot be demonstrated that possible sin must become actual. Yet this is what Hegel implies, in fact, explicitly asserts. Knowledge is for him not only the source of the possibility of evil, but for this very reason itself evil. The fact that man has eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil is not only that which makes sin possible, but is sin itself.[1] The content of the representation of the fall, writes Hegel, consists in this:

> . . . Der Mensch habe sich zur Erkenntnis des Unterschiedes erhoben, und diese Erkenntnis sei die Quelle des Bösen, das Böse selbst. Es wird in den Akt des Erkennens, in das Bewusstsein das Bösesein gelegt. Allerdings liegt . . . das Bösesein im Erkennen; das Erkennen ist die Quelle des Bösen. Denn Erkennen, Bewusstsein überhaupt heisst dies Urteilen, dies sich in sich selbst Unterscheiden. . . . Die Entzweiung ist das Böse, ist der Widerspruch; sie enthält die zwei Seiten, das Gute und das Böse. In dieser Entzweiung nur ist das Böse enthalten, und darum ist sie selbst das Böse.[2]

On this basis, actualized as well as possible evil becomes a necessary stage on the road to virtue. Sin itself becomes a necessity. But here Hegel's theory overthrows itself. The freedom of the human spirit which he prizes so highly altogether disappears. Sin which is necessary is properly no longer sin. He who chooses evil because he cannot choose anything else has no genuine choice at all. His action is perhaps unfortunate and regrettable, even imperfect, but it is not sin. In the last analysis, therefore, Hegel's view undermines the very reality of that which it seeks to interpret.

The reality of sin is endangered also by Hegel's identification of finite spirits and the Absolute Spirit. As already shown,[3] the same act

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 127.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 127.
[3] Cf. above, pp. 81-82; below, pp. 188, 210-211.

of will which is evil for the finite individual must on Hegel's theory be regarded as good for the Absolute. But this involves an insoluble contradiction, for it implies that the Absolute wills both evil (as finite) and good (as Absolute) in the same act. This is impossible. Either, therefore, the Absolute is ethically imperfect, or man sins only in appearance. In the former case, Hegel's conception of an ethical Absolute is overthrown and the ultimate validity of all moral distinctions at least called into question; in the latter, the reality of human sin is completely destroyed.

V. The Concrete Wholeness of the Religious Life

A. Hegel's Broad Use of "Thought" and "Knowledge"

The present chapter began by pointing out that for Hegel thought is the basic thing in religion, then considered in order his treatments of feeling, will, and the principle of negativity in the effort to determine more precisely what his view of religious experience is and what he means by making thought central in it. In spite of certain defects in his conception, it is now clear that he accords a far larger place to the emotional and volitional aspects of religion than is generally supposed. Neither is excluded by his emphasis on reason. For Hegel feeling is constantly present in genuine religion, but it is feeling guided by thought. Will is likewise active in all religion worthy of the name, but it is reasonable will. When, therefore, Hegel calls thought central in religion, he does not exclude other factors, but rather gives them a deeper meaning by relating them to an organizing intelligence. The religious life is for Hegel an affair of the whole man.

Only from this inclusive standpoint can Hegel's use of Denken in the Philosophie der Religion be clearly understood.[1] Thought for Hegel is not

---

[1] As Miss Calkins has shown, Hegel uses "thought" in three main senses: (1) to refer to the mediating process of reason as opposed to in-

mere intellect in the strict psychological sense, not a separate part or function of the human mind, but the all-organizing activity of consciousness, the synoptic comprehension, the organic unification of all experience. It is the conscious apprehension of the concrete universal. As such, thought may include not only discursive intellect, but perception, feelings of awe and reverence, volitional activity, and so on.[1]

In making thought the locus of religion, therefore, Hegel is simply taking into account the rich fullness of religious experience. Religion he treats not as a feeling of God's presence, or as a resolution to perform God's will, or as any other partial aspect of the conscious life, but as the "Erhebung des Geistes zu Gott," the relation of the whole mind to the Absolute Spirit.[2] In short, Hegel's philosophy of religion is not so much intellectualism as synopticism.

Hegel's use of such words as Erkenntnis, Wissen, and Bewusstsein is similarly concrete. Knowledge he interprets broadly to include activity, faith, meditation, trust, and obedience, as well as cognition. It describes, in short, a taking up of the object into subjectivity, a personal appropriation of the object by the whole subject. It cannot be denied that Hegel's aversion to subjectivism leads him at times to emphasize too strongly the

---

tuitive or immediate apprehension; (2) to signify the unifying or relating as opposed to the sense consciousness; and (3) to describe the total consciousness which any individual has of the absolute individual as inclusive of all reality. It is thought in the last-named sense which Hegel finds to be the essence of the religious consciousness. Cf. Mary Whiton Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1915), pp. 388-389, n.3.

[1] "We can feel and act," writes J. S. Mackenzie, "from the point of view of the whole, just as we can think from that point of view. The 'thought' which is emphasized by Hegel is not thought as opposed to feeling and will, but thought as the conscious grasp of the universal, in whatever form it may appear; and it is only in this sense that he seeks to interpret art and religion and morality, and the world as a whole, in the light of thought." "The Hegelian Point of View," p. 70.

[2] Cf. Haym, HSZ, p. 403.

theoretical side of religion and undervalue the unique significance of the other factors. In the main, however, knowledge is for him[1] just as inclusive as it is for the writer of the Fourth Gospel, who finds eternal life to consist in the knowledge of God.[2] Hegel does not oppose intuitive knowledge of God, but only the subjectivistic view that immediate knowledge is self-justifying and the only kind possible.[3] In fact, he admits on one occasion the one-sidedness of purely cognitive knowledge:

> Das Erkennen mag einseitig sein, und zur Religion noch mehr und wesentlich Empfindung, Anschauen, Glauben gehören, sowie zu Gott noch weiteres als sein denkender und gedachter Begriff.[4]

B. Verstand versus Vernunft

Hegel's insistence on the concrete wholeness of the mind in religious experience is nowhere better revealed than in his criticism of the Verstand as opposed to the Vernunft. His attack on the abstract understanding characteristic of the thought of the Aufklärung is no less vigorous and penetrating than that on the theology of feeling to which the Verstandesmetaphysik gives rise.[5]

Hegel's fundamental criticism of the "Bildung der Reflexion"[6] is that it is purely abstract, external, and analytical.

> Das Denken als Verstand bleibt bei der festen Bestimmtheit und der Unterschiedenheit derselben gegen andere stehen; ein solches beschränktes Abstraktes gilt ihm als für sich bestehend und seiend.[7]

Taking as its supreme criterion the law of identity and contradic-

---

[1] As Lasson suggests, EHR, p. 137.
[2] John 17:3.
[3] XII, BR, p. 93. How little Hegel rules out intuitive apprehension from the knowledge of God is shown when he writes, "Die Religion besteht als unbefangener Glaube, Gefühl, Anschauung---überhaupt im unmittelbaren Wissen und Bewusstsein." (XII, BR, p. 62.)
[4] Quoted in Haym, HSZ, p. 403.
[5] Cf. above, pp. 25-27.
[6] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 22.
[7] V, ENC, p. 105.

tion, the Verstand breaks up reality into bits.[1] It need not wonder, therefore, if it finds itself incapable of attaining ultimate truth or, in religion, knowledge of God. Its very method prevents it from apprehending true reality, which is not a collection of separate parts, but an organic, concrete whole. The understanding destroys this original unity at the very outset, then struggles vainly to regain it by means of an external process of joining part to part.

> Die konsequente und selbstständige Entwicklung des Princips des Verstandes führt aber dahin, alle Bestimmung und damit allen Inhalt nur als eine Endlichkeit zu fassen, und so die Gestaltung und Bestimmung des Göttlichen zu vernichten.[2]

The identity of the understanding, which in the Kantian philosophy is advanced as the highest principle of thought, is "das Leere der atomistischen Philosophie."[3] For such a procedure God can have no predicates or qualities, and is inevitably "in das Jenseits des Wissens hinaufgesetzt, oder vielmehr zur Inhaltlosigkeit herabgesetzt."[4] Such a philosophy, Hegel points out, is quite right in holding that the understanding cannot know truth; its error lies in regarding mind as nothing more than this abstract understanding, and therefore in maintaining that man can know nothing of God, "als ob es ausser Gott überhaupt absolute Gegenstände und eine Wahrheit geben könnte."[5]

---

[1] Hegel, no less than Emerson after him, protests against "die Konsequenz seichter Seelen." (XII, BR, p. 26.)

[2] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 14.

[3] Loc. cit. An interesting example of this atomism of the understanding is found in his comment on an excerpt from Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. The quotation is this: ". . . Die kirchliche Lehre vertheilt die Gesamttätigkeit Christi in drei Ämter, das profetische, das hohenpriesterliche und das königliche." (II, p. 268, par. 123.) Hegel comments: "Mit den trockensten, hohlsten, unfruchtbarsten Verstandesdistinktionen lässt sich der Verfasser ein---und ergeht sich in einer ebenso leeren Verstandesdialektik in denselben." (G. Lasson, NBH, p. 39.)

[4] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 14.

[5] Loc. cit.

Life in its concrete fullness is the continually repeated resolution of contradictions, the repeated satisfaction of ever-recurring needs, the continual harmonization of constantly appearing discords. The understanding sees only half of this alternating process. It recognizes the contradictions but is unable to grasp the higher unity in which they are preserved yet transcended.

> Wenn nun der Verstand dahin gekommen ist, so sagt er: dies ist ein Widerspruch, und er bleibt dabei, bleibt bei dem Widerspruche stehen gegen die Erfahrung, dass das Leben selbst es ist, den Widerspruch aufzuheben. . . . Denn das Prinzip des Verstandes ist die abstrakte Identität mit sich, nicht die konkrete, dass diese Unterschiede in einem sind.[1]

Verstand is according to Hegel "endliche Vernunft," "menschliches Denken," and must therefore be carefully distinguished from that other thought

> welches, obwohl im Menschen, doch göttlich ist, von dem Verstand, der nicht das Eigene, sondern das Allgemeine sucht, von der Vernunft, welche nur das Unendliche und Ewige als das allein Seyende weiss und betrachtet.[2]

Thought must rise to the plane of reason, where it sees oppositions not as absolute, but as moments in a totality, as related aspects of a concrete whole. True reason is for Hegel the relating activity of the whole mind.

> Das unbestimmte Wort Vernunft und vernünftige Einsicht reduziert sich darauf, dass mir . . . etwas . . . für sich selbst feststehe, objektiv an und für sich in

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 79. Hegel's polemic against the understanding is at this point in complete harmony with Bergson's attack on discursive intellect. The two thinkers are at one in their dissatisfaction with mere analysis. Both seek to preserve the developing whole of life. As a matter of fact, Bergson's definition of intuition as "instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely" (Creative Evolution. N.Y.: Holt, 1911, p. 177.) makes it essentially the same synoptic intelligence for which Hegel argues so vigorously.

[2] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, p. 6; cf. pp. 9-14. For further significant treatments of the Verstand by Hegel, cf. XII, BR, pp. 41, 62, 299-302; XIV, AR, pp. 71, 217-231; II, PDG, pp. 366, 501; "Wer denkt abstrakt?," JUB, XX, pp. 445-450.

> mir befestigt, d. i. in sich selbst begründet sei. . . . Solches aber ist der reine Begriff. . . . Dies ist das Substanzielle, dass solcher Inhalt so als in sich gegründet von mir gewusst werde, dass ich darin das Bewusstsein des Begriffes habe, d. i. . . . die Wahrheit darin als Wahrheit, d. i. in der Form der Wahrheit, in der Form des absolut konkreten, schlechthin und rein in sich Zusammenstimmenden habe.[1]

This emphasis on the unity of things, on the concrete wholeness of reality, is a Leitmotiv which appears and reappears throughout the writings of Hegel. ". . . Nur das Ganze," he writes in the Phänomenologie, "hat eigentliche Wirklichkeit."[2] Elsewhere he writes, "In einem Satz lässt sich nicht Wahrheit aussprechen."[3] Everything, to be properly understood, must be viewed in its relationship to a larger whole.[4] Nature, life, and Spirit are throughout organic. Every distinct thing is a reflection, an individual manifestation of the one Absolute; it stands, therefore, in integral relation to everything else.[5]

C. Religion an Activity of the Whole Personality

In the sphere of religion, this connectedness of things means not only that religion must be related to other human interests, but also that as religion it is an affair of the total personality. It is impossible to pick out any one side of man's nature and say, "Here is the essence of religion." "Der menschliche Geist ist nicht ein so Geteiltes."[6] Man is religious with his whole being, "in dem ganzen Umfange seines Selbstbewusstseins."[7] When, therefore, Hegel writes that only on the basis of reason can religion be at home,[8] he does not mean intellect as opposed to faith, but rather a broad, synoptic attitude toward reality in which feeling and

---

1 XII, BR, pp. 294-295; cf. XIV, AR, p. 69.
2 II, PDG, p. 496.
3 XIV, AR, p. 38.
4 And ultimately, of course, to the Absolute.
5 XIV, AR, p. 37.
6 XII, BR, p. 55.
7 XII, BR, p. 181.
8 XII, BR, p. 149.

and will, far from being excluded, fulfill an integral and necessary function.

> Alles Geistige ist konkret; hier haben wir dasselbe in seiner tiefsten Bestimmung vor uns, den Geist nämlich als das Konkrete des Glaubens und Denkens; beide sind nicht nur auf die mannigfaltigste Weise, in unmittelbarem Herüber- und Hinübergehen, vermischt, sondern so innig verbunden miteinander, dass es kein Glauben gibt, welches nicht Reflektieren, Räsonnieren oder Denken überhaupt, sowie kein Denken, welches nicht Glauben, wenn auch nur momentanen, in sich enthalte. . . .[1]

The main difference between Hegel and his anti-intellectualistic opponents is not that he fails to recognize the emotional factors in religion, but that he insists that religious experience is also intellectual. In this concrete view of the religious life Hegel is more broadly empirical than Schleiermacher. Religion for him is the elevation of the human spirit, in all the many-sided richness of its life, to God.[2]

VI. Appraisal

It is now possible to draw certain broad conclusions regarding the empirical and the rational factors in Hegel's view of religious experience.

In the first place, there is in Hegel little trace either of the empiricism which uncritically accepts the psychological facts of religion as in themselves complete, or of the rationalism which relies on thought apart from experience.

Secondly, there is nevertheless evident on Hegel's part an earnest effort to base his conclusions on the facts. The rational, he recognizes,

---

[1] XIV, BDG, pp. 8-9. The italics are the present writer's.

[2] At this point Glockner's comparison of Hegel and Schleiermacher is suggestive enough to merit quotation. "Hegel ist," writes Glockner, "am Ganzen seines Systems gemessen, gläubiger als Schleiermacher. Er glaubt an den Geist in der ganzen Fülle seiner Selbstoffenbarung: sowohl in Religion wie in Wissenschaft. Aber Schleiermacher ist frömmer als Hegel. In einer brüchig gewordenen Welt vertraut er auf die unmittelbare Gewissheit seines Gottesempfindens und er bleibt durchaus nicht etwa bei der Sehnsucht stehen." ("Hegel und Schleiermacher," p. 255.)

must be based on the empirical. His discussions reveal at once a deep personal acquaintance with religion and a careful objective study of historical and contemporary religious experience. In some instances rational considerations have produced a certain amount of distortion, but in the main he has preserved the original factuality of religion.

Thirdly, however, there is in Hegel a ceaseless insistence on interpreting the facts in the light of reason. The empirical, he insists, is important, but it is not sufficient; it must be supplemented by the rational. Only when the facts have been organized and evaluated by thought do they take on meaning and significance.

The standpoint of Hegel's philosophy of religion is thus to a surprising degree a genuine harmony of experience and reason. Both factors are essential; neither alone is enough. Experience without reason is neutral and meaningless; reason without experience is fruitless and empty.[1] The concreteness of this approach to religion enabled Hegel to avoid both of the extremes which dominated the religious thought of his day, the irrational emotionalism of the theology of feeling and the barren rationalism of the Aufklärung. In fact, as we have seen, his chief negative criticisms are directed against these two tendencies which, though closely related, stand at opposite poles. He opposes one as vigorously as the other and, by making philosophy of religion the working of synoptic reason on the soil of concrete experience, corrects in large measure the errors of both.[2]

---

[1] Cf. "Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal." Nohl, TJS, p. 332.

[2] An instructive example of the significance of this synthesis is found in the influence of Hegel on the British clergy, as reported by J. A. Smith. Through the translations of Wallace and the teaching and writing of Green and Caird, says Smith, Hegel's main doctrines were made accessible and even familiar to many generations of English students, and

strongly attracted them. "In particular they formed the minds of most thoughtful young men in their attitude to Religion, and to this is due the very remarkable diffusion among them of a dislike to the resting of the claims of Religion upon mere feeling or emotion and of a conviction of its essential reasonableness. In this connection it may be noted that even among the better educated clergy in Great Britain there has till recently been exceptionally little tendency to any form of either emotional Irrationalism or of dry and sterile Rationalism. Hegelianism has there worked constructively, but has not been much used either in defense of traditional orthodoxy or, on the other hand, subversively." ("The Influence of Hegel on the Philosophy of Great Britain." Verhandlungen des ersten Hegelkongresses vom 22. bis 25. April 1930 im Haag. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931, p. 63.)

Chapter Four

HEGEL'S VIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

I. The Dual Development of Religion

In its deepest meaning, the relation of man to God which for Hegel constitutes religion is not a static condition, but a living process which involves, on the one hand, the elevation of the human spirit to the Absolute Spirit, and on the other, the attainment by the Absolute of full consciousness of itself.[1] This process, moreover, is something far more than a movement of abstract thought; essentially two-sided, it is not only logical and notional, but chronological and historical.[2] As we have seen,[3] it is the very nature of Spirit to objectify or manifest itself. It is essential to religion to exist not only potentially, as idea, but actually, in human consciousness. The notion of religion, therefore, must determine itself and become manifest in the history of religion, which in turn advances ever forward in the effort to become adequate to its notion.

> Die verschiedenen Formen, Bestimmungen der Religion sind einerseits als Momente des Begriffs Momente der Religion überhaupt oder der vollendeten Religion. . . . Aber zweitens haben sie die Gestalt, dass sie für sich in der Zeit und geschichtlich sich entwickeln. Wenn wir die Reihe der Religionen determiniert nach dem Begriffe betrachten, so geht uns zugleich die Reihe der historischen Religionen daraus hervor, und wir haben die <u>Geschichte der Religion</u> vor uns.[4]

Hegel's religious thought is therefore intimately concerned with the history of religion. His presentation of the historical development of religion, from its earliest beginnings to its complete manifestation in the absolute religion, as a dialectical movement in the self-consciousness of

---

[1] II, PDG, p. 437; XII, BR, pp. 66, 150.
[2] Cf. II, PDG, pp. 485, 520-521.
[3] Cf. above, pp. 33-34, 38-39.
[4] XII, BR, p. 72; cf. pp. 64-65, 70-71.

the Absolute Spirit involves frequent reference to the facts of religious history.[1] It is our present task to discover the relative parts played by empirical and rational elements in this interpretation. Does Hegel, as has been charged,[2] distort the empirical facts of history by forcing them into an artificial arrangement determined by a preconceived theory? Or does he take history as he finds it and base his rational conclusions on a careful observation of the facts? In other words, does Hegel work out *a priori* what the history of religion ought to be to accord with the notion, rationally arrived at, and then apply this theory to historical religion, or does he rather derive the notion itself from empirical study of the actual history of religion? If his approach is a combination of these two methods, which preponderates?

II. Hegel's Regard for Historical Data

Even a cursory reading of the second and third parts of the *Philosophie der Religion* reveals in Hegel a high regard for the facts of history. This is shown both by the frequency of his references to historical sources and by the usual accuracy of his descriptions of the historical religions as known in his day.

A. Hegel's Interest in Historical Research

Hegel's writings on religion manifest a deep interest in and reliance on the results of the best historical research of his own and previous generations. He makes constant use of the best available knowledge of the his-

---

[1] In two of the three main phases of his philosophy of religion the historical element bulks large. Properly speaking, the phrase *historische Religion* refers only to "die bestimmten, die ethnischen Religionen" (XII, BR, p. 72), as the finite manifestation of the notion. But inasmuch as the absolute religion is in Hegel's view the unity of the notion and its manifestation, it also has its historical side, the difference between it and the definite religions being that in it the manifestation fully expresses the notion, while in the finite religions the notion is only imperfectly and inadequately realized.

[2] Cf. above, pp. 3-4, 6-7, 12-13.

tory of religions. He appeals frequently to such ancient authorities as Josephus, Herodotus, and Eusebius, as well as to the Germans Neander and Creuzer. In Die Naturreligion alone there are no less than twelve citations by name of historical sources and twelve indirect references.[1]

Hegel's interest in historical investigations in religion is particularly well illustrated by his relations with Friedrich Creuzer, probably the outstanding historian of religion in the first half of the nineteenth century.[2] In a letter dated October 30, 1819, thanking Creuzer for his recent gift of two books,[3] Hegel writes as follows:

> Zuerst also meinen vielfachen Dank für die beyden schönen Werke, die mir höchst wichtig sind, und aus denen ich schon viel gelernt habe; Ihre neue Darstellung wie Ihre Behandlungsweise der Mythologie überhaupt, hat unendlich viel Interesse für mich und die Welt.[4]

Hegel then goes on to praise Karl Ritter's Die Erdkunde im Verhältnis zur Natur und zur Geschichte des Menschen (Berlin, 1817-1818); mentions that he has a sixteen-page advertisement of Ritter's Vorhalle europäischen Völkergeschichte von Herodotus um den Kaukasus und an den Gestaden des Pontus (Berlin, 1820), in which the author traces a marked Buddhist influence in Greek religion; and expresses his eagerness to know what Creuzer's opinion

---

[1] For sample references to historical sources, cf. TJS, pp. 244, 245, 253, 372; XII, BR, p. 283; XIII, NR, pp. 43, 70, 83, 85, 90, 99, 100, 101-102, 117, 125, 152, 153, 155, 157, 161, 165, 170, 171, 173, 181; XIII, RGI, pp. 175, 190, 191, 211, 217, 218, 221; XIV, AR, p. 63.

[2] Creuzer's most famous work is the Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen, 1810-1812; 2d ed., 6 vols. with atlas, 1819-1823 (the edition known and used by Hegel); 3d ed., 4 vols., 1837-1842. Writes George Foot Moore, "The discredit into which Creuzer's theory of 'symbolism' has fallen . . . should not lead us to ignore the fact that his volume furnished a useful and comprehensive collection of what was then known about the principal religions of the world." ("The History of Religions in the Nineteenth Century," p. 434.)

[3] Probably the first volume of Creuzer's Symbolik, 2d ed., 1819; and Abbildungen zu Friedrich Creuzer's Symbolik der alten Völker, auf 60 Tafeln, 1819.

[4] Georg Lasson, NBH, p. 22.

of this theory will be.[1]

No less interesting and significant is Creuzer's own testimony concerning Hegel and his knowledge of history. Creuzer writes:

> Mit dem Meister der neuesten Schule [of German philosophy] hatte ich keine Mühe, mich über . . . meine Stellung und Stimmung [that is, Creuzer's renunciation of systematic philosophizing] zu verständigen. Bei seiner Kenntnis und Achtung der Altertumskunde und bei der grossartigen Weise, Menschen und Dinge zu würdigen, entschuldigte er freundschaftlich das Beschränken meiner Studien auf die Philosophie des Altertums und war mir darin förderlich.[2]

Such evidence reveals a mind completely at home in the known history of religion and eager to learn the results of the latest historical research. On the basis of the external evidence, one can only conclude that Hegel gathered his facts as all philosophers of religious history must who lack opportunity for direct observation, namely, by going to the works of the best historical authorities. His philosophy of religion is based on a careful, painstaking study of the empirical facts as reported by the most competent investigators.[3] No merely rationalistic apriorist would be so concerned as is Hegel with ascertaining the historical data.

B. The General Accuracy of Hegel's Historical Accounts

It is now clear that Hegel conscientiously sought to make the descriptions in his philosophy of religion historically accurate. We have now to ask how far he succeeded. To what extent do his religious writings reflect faithfully the facts of religious history?

---

[1] Georg Lasson, NBH, pp. 22-23.

[2] Foreword to 3d ed. of Creuzer's Symbolik und Mythologie (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1837), I; quoted in Lasson, NBH, p. 22, n. 5.

[3] For a convincing argument that Hegel's philosophy in general grew partly out of a laborious study of history and of Greek literature and philosophy, cf. David C. Ritchie, "Philosophy and the Study of the Philosophers," p. 12, n. 1; and "Hegel's Early Studies---a Correction," p. 568.

1. Historical Inaccuracies

Hegel's presentation of the development of religion is at several points marred by historical inaccuracies. He makes the mistaken assertion that in the East religion is always connected with nationality.[1] In Hegel's scheme, Buddhism antedates Hinduism, which is the reverse of the truth; and his treatment of Buddhism is highly inadequate. He makes no mention whatever, in his Philosophie der Religion, of Babylonian religion,[2] which today is regarded as the fundamental type of all Oriental religion, and passes over Syrian religion with only seven words. He grossly underestimates the significance of Jewish religion in general and of the Hebrew prophets in particular. In Hegel's dialectical classification of religion, moreover, Roman religion stands higher than Judaism, and Christianity is treated as springing not from Judaism, but from Roman imperialism. Finally, Hegel offers no adequate account of Mohammedanism, treating it as merely a modification of Judaism.[3]

2. Interpretation of These Defects

a. The Influence of Hegel's Purpose and the Limitations of His Knowledge

In interpreting these inaccuracies several things must be borne in mind. In the first place, it must be remembered that Hegel communicated his philosophy of religion only in university lectures and never published it in book form. This fact, involving as it does definite limitations of time and the consequent need of restriction in the scope of the material covered, may partly explain some of the gaps noted.

---

[1] XIII, RGI, p. 95. Buddhism and Mohammedanism are notable exceptions.

[2] In his lectures on the philosophy of history, however, Hegel does consider the Babylonians and their cultus.

[3] In his Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Hegel devotes eight pages to Mohammedanism. (VIII, pp. 789-797.)

Secondly, it would be unjust to Hegel to expect from him a detailed account of the history or even of the teachings of all the world's religions. He is from first to last a philosopher, not an historian. He expressly states that it is not his aim to give an historical survey.[1] Hegel's primary purpose is the philosophical interpretation of historical religion; he seeks primarily not to describe religion, but to understand it. He is not thereby committed to giving a thorough account of all the details of religious history. He is not concerned with painting a complete picture of every individual religion, but rather with selecting certain typical examples and tracing in them the broad outlines of the history of religion in order to show the connection which runs through it and the rational meaning which underlies it.

Finally, some of the defects in Hegel's account of the various religions are easily understood when the state of historical knowledge in his day is borne in mind. In Hegel's lifetime the science of the history of religion, begun only at the end of the eighteenth century, was still in its infancy. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, says George Foot Moore,

> the religions of Greece and Rome, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam were the only religions which were known through native sources or their own sacred books, unless we make a partial exception of Chinese texts translated by Jesuit missionaries. For Egypt and Babylonia, India and Persia, the chief or only sources of information were the fragmentary and often conflicting reports in Greek and Latin authors. . . . On all sides the authentic knowledge of the chief historical religions of the world has been immeasurably enlarged by the discoveries and investigations of the nineteenth century.[2]

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 164. At the beginning of his discussion of the Christian Gemeinde, Hegel says, "In konkreter Gestalt, mit Geschichte und empirischen Dasein verbunden [sie zu betrachten] , führt uns zu weit, so verführerisch es sein könnte." XIV, AR, p. 175.

[2] Moore, "The History of Religions in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 435, 436.

These researches have brought to light and rendered accessible to the West a mass of religious literature which has revolutionized our knowledge of Eastern religions, while the discovery and methodical use of monuments and other remains have gone far to enlarge and correct the information gained from literature alone. Sheer lack of knowledge accounts largely for Hegel's identification of Oriental religions with nationality, his unsatisfactory presentation of Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism, and his omission of Babylonian religion, and partly for his inadequate treatment of Mohammedanism.

b. Rationalistic and Empirical Influence

1). Hegel's underestimate of Hebrew religion. There remain, however, other defects which are not explained by any of the above factors. Foremost among these is perhaps Hegel's lack of appreciation of Jewish religion. From the beginning he shows a marked misunderstanding of the Hebrew spirit. In the introduction to "Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal," he portrays the Hebrew religion as that of a people in conflict with itself and with nature, a nation not at home in the universe, and lacking the capacity for love and harmonious life. The flood story, Hegel points out, reveals a clear-cut disruption of man and nature which is not healed by what follows.[1] Abraham's first recorded act, which made him ancestor of the nation, was an act of estrangement. Abraham was so lacking in the desire for love and freedom that he was willing to sacrifice the only love he ever had, that for his son.[2] Moses, it is true, freed his people, but straightway laid on them a new burden. The Old Testament contains no truth about God,

---

[1] This Hegel contrasts with the Greek story of Deucalion and Pyrrha. (Nohl, TJS, p. 245.)

[2] This, too, stands in contrast with a Greek story, that of Cadmus and Danaus. (Nohl, TJS, pp. 245-247.)

but only commands.[1] All the misfortunes of the Jewish people were simply consequences of their early estrangement from nature, their slavish dependence on a God who should have embodied the ideal of freedom and fullness of life.[2]

Essentially the same view is revealed in Hegel's later writings. Nature, he holds, was regarded by the Jews as undivine.[3] The world and man are altogether dependent on the free subjectivity of God. Though God as power is infinite, in objectifying himself he produces only limitation and particularity. God is creator, but as such, only the Lord or ruler of his creation.[4] Man's relation to God is therefore not one of freedom, but one of obedience to fixed, external laws.[5] Both God and man are spirit, but they still stand over against each other in unreconciled particularity. "Jüdische Religion [ist so] Religion des hartnäckigsten totfesten Verstandes."[6]

In all of this Hegel gives a fairly accurate account of an important aspect of Jewish religion, its ceremonial, legalistic emphasis. But the religion of the Hebrews is far more than legalism. Hegel gives almost no consideration to the great literary prophets,[7] with their profound ethical and religious message, or to the lofty spiritual insights found in the Psalms and Job. Yet these are precisely the highest and most significant

---

[1] Nohl, TJS, p. 254.
[2] Nohl, TJS, p. 260.
[3] IX, PWG, pp. 453-454.
[4] XIII, RGI, p. 107.
[5] XIII, RGI, pp. 73, 104-106.
[6] XIII, RGI, p. 201.
[7] When he does mention the prophets, Hegel usually betrays a radical misunderstanding of them. For example, in "Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal" (Nohl, TJS, p. 259), he says that in their mixing in politics the prophets were only limited, ineffective fanatics, who could only recall past times and thereby confuse the present, but were unable to usher in other and better conditions.

but only conscious.[1] All the adherents of the Jesuit people were simply consequences of their early estrangement from nature, their physical degeneracy as a lot who should have embodied the ideal of freedom and fulness of life.[2]

Essentially the same view is revealed in Yeats's later writings. The Law, in Yeats, was regarded by the Jews as sensitive.[3] The world and its ways altogether dependent on the free sensitivity of God. Though God as power is intense, is objectifying himself in nature only intuition and sensitivity. God is creator, but as such, only the lower half of his creation.[4] Yeats's relation to God is therefore not one of tension, but one of oneness in flesh, natural love.[5] Both God and man are objects, but they still stand over against each other in personalized sensitivity. "Christ's Religion [for us] religion due particularized sensitivity stands."[6]

In all of this Yeats gives a fairly accurate account of an important aspect of Jewish religion, its personal, sensitive aspects. But the religion of the Hebrews is far more than Jewish. Yeats gives almost no consideration to the great literary prophets,[7] with their personal ethical and religious message, or to the fully spiritual Judaism found in the Psalms and Job. Yet these are already and always a very, very significant

---

1 Ibid., VIII, p. 204.
2 Ibid., VIII, p. 205.
3 IX, 290, pp. 223-224.
4 XIII, 301, p. 107.
5 XIII, 301, pp. 73, 104-105.
6 XIII, 301, p. 300.
7 When he does mention the prophets, Yeats usually betrays a realistic misinterpretation of them. For example, in "The Cult of the Christians and Pagan Religions" (XIII, 332, p. 224), he says that in their writing in pulpitic the prophets were only literal. Incorporeal (Ezekiel), the Lord only recall past plans and already realized the present, but more frequently to repent in order and better conditions.

elements in the civilization of the Jews. Estrangement there is in the Old Testament, but there is genuine reconciliation too. Disruption there is, but there is healing also. Hegel apparently forgets the tender words of Hosea, "When Israel was a child, then I loved him."[1] He overlooks the Psalmist's intimate trust in the mercy and love of God: "The Lord is gracious and full of compassion; slow to anger, and of great mercy."[2] "As the heaven is high above the earth, so great is his mercy toward them that fear him. As far as the east is from the west, so far hath he removed our transgressions from us."[3] He ignores Ezekiel's message of inner reconciliation: "I will seek that which was lost, and will bring back that which was driven away, and will bind up that which was broken, and will strengthen that which was sick."[4] "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you."[5] Obedience to the law, moreover, is not always the external compliance which Hegel justly opposes. The Old Testament includes, to be sure, the codes of Leviticus and Deuteronomy,[6] but it contains also the new covenant of Jeremiah: "I will put my law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people: . . . they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest of them, . . . for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I remember no more."[7] Furthermore, in regarding nature for Judaism as undivine and foreign to man, Hegel overlooks the oft-repeated idea of the Psalms, "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handiwork."[8]

---

[1] Hos 11:1.
[2] Psa 145:8.
[3] Psa 103:11, 12.
[4] Ezek 34:16.
[5] Ezek 36:25. Cf. also Hos 3:1; Psa 46:1.
[6] Yet even in Deuteronomy love prevails.
[7] Jer 31:33-34.
[8] Psa 19:1. All of this leaves unmentioned Hegel's undervaluation of the high moral teachings of the Old Testament prophets. Probably Hegel placed their moral teaching in the same class with that of Kant and Fichte,

In his treatment of Judaism Hegel clearly disregards his own principle of concrete wholeness. He judges the religion of the Jews on the basis of one aspect of it. Even the fact that this legalistic side was often typical, and in the Roman period predominant, does not excuse Hegel for his failure to recognize the significance of that prophetic stream which, if displaced by ceremonialism, remained by all odds the greatest thing in the Jewish religion.

Hegel's failure to appreciate the true greatness of Hebrew religion cannot be laid to ignorance of the facts: the Hebrew scriptures lay before him in complete form. His error is probably due to one or both of two factors: the operation of personal or national prejudice against Judaism, or the intrusion of rationalistic considerations. It is difficult to estimate how large a part prejudice has played, though in view of Hegel's marked Prussianism and his conviction that Christianity was the absolute religion,[1] it is possible that he shared to some extent the low regard of many of his countrymen for the Jews. In so far as this factor operated Hegel may be said to be too empirical, failing to penetrate beneath the prejudices of his time concerning the Hebrews to the real significance of the Jewish religion.[2] At the same time, he was probably led by his theory, arrived at on other grounds, to overlook in Judaism some of the facts which ran counter to the theory. Such rationalistic influence appears especially probable when Hegel's view of Jewish religion is regarded in the light of his theory of the genesis of Christianity.

---

which to him was inadequate because it centered in a mere unrealized Sollen. (Cf. above, pp. 78-82.)

[1] Cf. below, pp. 149-157.

[2] This circumstance affords an excellent example of how mere empiricism may actually stand in the way of a true account of the empirical facts. Seen through the colored glasses of uncriticized prejudice, facts appear as other than they actually are. Cf. below, p. 116.

2). Hegel's view of the genesis of Christianity. According to Hegel's arrangement, not Judaism, but Roman religion is the forerunner of Christianity. The Christian religion grew out of the unhappy social and political conditions of the age, the negation of the spirits of the peoples by the fate embodied in Roman imperialism. Greek and Roman religion was basically a religion for a free people; with the loss of freedom under the Roman empire the power and suitability of the Greek and Roman religions was also lost. Hence the time was ripe for the appearance of the religion of universal freedom.[1]

The unhappiness of the age was undoubtedly an important preparation for Christianity, but no merely negative condition affords an adequate explanation of so influential a phenomenon. Hegel says nothing concerning the fact that Christianity sprang directly out of the Hebrew religion and is truly to be understood only in the light of the Jewish Messianic hope. Judaism, and not Roman emperor-worship, was the cradle of Christianity. Hegel's error at this point, as Pfleiderer has shown,[2] is a clear instance of the substitution of the dialectic of the notion for historical insight. Hegel's rational scheme requires him to derive the religion of universal freedom from the negation of free self-consciousness. This negation he finds not in Hebrew, but in Roman religion. In thus following the dictates of his logic, however, he distorts the facts of history. Hegel's regard for dialectical formulation overcomes his respect for history.

3). Hegel's inadequate treatment of Mohammedanism. Hegel's treatment of Mohammedanism is regrettably sketchy. He discusses it in a brief section of his Philosophie der Weltgeschichte,[3] characterizing its intel-

---

[1] Nohl, TJS, pp. 220-224.
[2] Pfleiderer, PRBH, p. 103. Cf. Rosenkranz, HDN, p. 216.
[3] VIII, PWG, pp. 789-797.

tectual and spiritual foundations with masterful accuracy. For Hegel, however, Islam is basically no more than the negation of the Christian principle of free and infinite subjectivity, and abstraction and fanaticism are its essential features. Hence he gives it only brief attention. In his Philosophie der Religion Hegel almost completely overlooks Mohammedanism; four scattered references to it are the only sign that he knew of its existence. He first mentions it in a few sentences as a modification of Judaism,[1] and later speaks briefly of its formalism and abstractness while criticizing the abstractions of the Aufklärung.[2] Such passing mention falls far short of doing justice to a religion whose native strength and vigor have won it dominance over half of two continents.

What is the reason for this failure to give Mohammedanism its just due? Lack of information may have played a part, but this alone is not sufficient explanation. Georg Lasson is perhaps right in suggesting that a personal antipathy to the rationalistic rigidity, abstractness, and artificiality of Mohammedanism may have interfered with Hegel's usual objectivity.[3] Hegel's deficiency at this point may be likewise partly due to his dialectical arrangement, which leaves room for three "religions of spiritual individuality," but hardly for four. It is also possible that Hegel regarded Mohammedanism as enough like Judaism to render unnecessary any special treatment. How far any one of these factors was responsible is impossible to trace.

Two factors now bulk largest as possible explanation of the historical inaccuracies in Hegel's religious thought not accounted for by simple lack of knowledge: on the one hand, the operation of personal prejudice;

---

[1] XIII, RGI, p. 100.
[2] XIV, AR, pp. 147, 152, 222-223.
[3] G. Lasson, EHR, pp. 101-102. Lasson points out, too, that Islam's mysticism alone would have been well worth closer study by Hegel.

and on the other, the unjustified intrusion of rationalistic considerations growing out of the nature of the dialectic. As previously indicated,[1] to the extent to which the former element is active Hegel is actually over-empirical, while in so far as the latter prevails he is over-rational. The latter tendency is perhaps the stronger in the instances studied.

It may be questioned whether reaching conclusions on the basis of subjective prejudice may properly be termed empiricism. However, if to be empirical in the strict sense is to derive knowledge from experience and not from reason, any acceptance of the immediate data of consciousness, unaccompanied by rational criticism, may be called empirical. This remains true whether such uncritical procedure springs from prejudice or from something else. To the extent, therefore, that Hegel through personal antipathy overlooks Mohammedanism and underestimates Judaism, he is over-empirical. Unwittingly, he illustrates the fallacy of all thorough-going empiricism. For the facts as given are not always the significant facts. He who unreflectively accepts as valid the data afforded by his own immediate experience is strictly empirical, but by this very procedure he is often prevented from knowing the facts as they actually are. In short, mere empiricism,[2] which entirely excludes the rational, stands in the way of what might be called true empiricism, which insists on loyalty to the facts but invites the coöperation of reason in discovering what those facts are and mean. The only way to be truly empirical is to be rational.

---

[1] Cf. above, p. 113.

[2] The term "over-empirical" used in this and in the preceding paragraph denotes an approximation to the extreme of "mere empiricism" as here defined. Both terms imply an insufficient use of reason, the difference being purely one of degree. The term "over-rational" bears the same relation to the phrase "merely rational," both denoting, in less or greater degree, the exaggerated rationalism which proceeds without due regard for the facts of experience. Cf. above, p. 113.

3. Hegel's Habitual Loyalty to History

The historical defects just considered must not obscure, however, the more important fact of Hegel's general loyalty to the actual history of religions. Such defects are the exception rather than the rule. In the main, Hegel's accounts of the various religions are remarkably accurate. He is usually true to the facts as known in his day, and often succeeds amazingly well, even on the basis of inadequate knowledge, in bringing to light the characteristic features of a given religion. This appears in the case of the Chinese state religion, the only one of the "nature-religions" considered by Hegel for which detailed information was available in his time. Though later researches have greatly added to our store of knowledge concerning the Chinese religion, certain Catholic missionaries, notably the Jesuits, had published fundamental studies of it. As well-known investigators of Chinese history have since recognized, Hegel used these materials conscientiously and grasped the Chinese spirit with remarkable discernment.[1] The same can be said for Hegel's treatment of the history of Christianity, and for his discussions of Buddhism and Hinduism as they were known to him.

We may conclude, therefore, that in spite of certain important defects, Hegel is for the most part faithful to the empirical facts of the history of religion.

---

[1] IX, PWG, pp. 320-331; and Lasson's foreword to XIII, NR, p. VIII. The testimony of D. Witte, director of the German Ostasien-Mission, is significant. In an essay, "Hegel's religionsphilosophische Urteile über Ostasien, beleuchtet durch die Ergebnisse der neueren China-Forschung" (Zeitschrift für Missionskunde, 37 (1922), pp. 129-151), written on the basis of Hegel's Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Witte concludes not only "dass Hegel sich sehr gründlich unterrichtet hat und in allem Wesentlichen durchaus auf dem Boden des Besten steht, was seine Zeit von Ostasien wusste," and that "sein stolzes Wort, dass wir jetzt durchaus über China Bescheid wissen," is "durch die neuere Forschung, wenn man von Einzelheiten und einzelnen Gebieten absieht, als zu Recht bestehend erwiesen;" but also that Hegel "kraft seines Genies aus den Kenntnissen über China die Grundzüge seines innersten Wesens so fein herausgearbeitet hat, wie das vorher noch nicht geschehen war und auch bisher nicht wieder geschehen ist." (Quoted by Lasson, EHR, p. 98.)

III. The Philosophical Interpretation of the Historical Data

A. The Limitations of Historical Study

1. The History of Religions as a Rational, Unitary Development

To say that Hegel is generally loyal to the facts of religious history is far from saying that he is content with reproducing those facts. As already indicated,[1] his primary concern is not to record the history of religions, but to show how that history is the expression of divine reason, the ongoing, many-sided development of a unitary principle. Each stage of religious history grows naturally and logically out of the preceding one, "either as a reaction from its one-sidedness, or as a reconciliation of its contradictions."[2] The successive stages exhibit a rational connection, and express with increasing adequacy the notion of religion, the true nature of the Absolute Spirit. The world's religions are not unrelated, accidental growths, but essentially the work of a God who is immanent, ceaselessly active in human life and history. "Es geht vernünftig zu."[3]

> . . . Der Geist, insofern er Geist Gottes ist, ist nicht ein Geist jenseits der Sterne, jenseits der Welt, sondern Gott ist gegenwärtig und als Geist im Geiste und in den Geistern. Gott ist nicht der Gehaltlose, sondern ein lebendiger Gott, der wirksam und tätig ist. Eine Religion ist Erzeugnis des göttlichen Geistes, nicht Erfindung des Menschen, sondern Produktion des göttlichen Wirkens, Hervorbringens in diesem. Diese Überzeugung müssen wir zuerst festhalten, sonst ist der Ausdruck Vorsehung sinnlos.[4]

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 108-109.
[2] McTaggart, SHD, p. 237.
[3] JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 48. Cf. further.
[4] XII, BR, pp. 43-44. Elsewhere Hegel says that his conception of rational movement in history is "nichts Anderes, als der Glaube an die Vorsehung, nur in anderer Weise. Das Beste in der Welt ist, was der Gedanke hervorbringt." (JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 65.) This conviction that the world is the rationally ordered work of God is all that Hegel means in his oft-quoted words, "was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig." Cf. V, ENC, pp. 36-37; VI, GPR, p. XIX; XII, BR, p. 73; VIII, PWG, p. 15.

Here, of course, Hegel is simply applying to the history of religion the principle which in his view holds for general history.

> Nur die Einsicht kann den Geist mit der Weltgeschichte und der Wirklichkeit versöhnen, dass das, was geschehen ist und alle Tage geschieht, nicht nur von Gott kommt und nicht ohne Gott, sondern wesentlich das Werk Gottes selbst ist.[1]

> Die Weltgeschichte ist . . . überhaupt die Auslegung des Geistes in der Zeit, wie sich im Raume die Idee als Natur auslegt.[2]

Hegel's thought, therefore, leads him to the magnificent affirmation that God is in history, that the events of the human as of the natural world are the realization of divine reason. In fact, everything that occurs is part of the struggle of Spirit for complete self-fulfillment.[3] This, of course, is a rational judgment. No mere recounting of empirical data could yield such a conclusion. According to Hegel, we cannot find the actual until we see the realm of fact in the light of thought. The application of this principle to religious history constitutes perhaps Hegel's greatest contribution to the philosophy of religion. In treating the history of religion as an unfolding of divine reason, the diversified forms of religion as connected manifestations of a central principle, he opened the way for a new understanding of religion and brought to light a meaning which must remain hidden as long as attention is confined to the empirical alone.[4]

---

[1] VIII, PWG, p. 938. Cf. JUB, XVII, GDP, pp. 48, 52; Vera, PDR, II, pp. CXXIV and CXV; Hammacher, BPH, p. 44; Vowinckel, RRSH, pp. 56-57; Troeltsch, GS, II, pp. 747-748. This "grosse Präsumption" of a rational development in history is also the only thing which makes the history of philosophy truly interesting. (JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 65.)

[2] VIII, PWG, p. 134.

[3] JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 52. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 937.

[4] It is significant that leading recent historians of religion are at one with Hegel in finding this unity and rational connection in religious history. Harnack, after maintaining that a "complete understanding of one religion cannot possibly be obtained without a knowledge of others," quotes with approval the words of an unnamed poet:

2. The Necessary Function of Historical Manifestation in Religion

Hegel's view of historical religion can be best understood, perhaps, if we recall his dialectical formulation of the notion of religion, which comprises three stages: (1) the abstract idea of religion; (2) the determinate historical embodiment of this idea; and (3) the concrete union of the idea and its manifestation in the faith of the religious community. Religious history is thus the second of three phases in the dialectic of religious truth. This appearance of truth in historical form is necessary, but transitory. It is an Ausgangspunkt for faith,[1] a point of departure and transition, through which truth must pass if it is to become the universal property of mankind. It sets forth the idea of religion

> wie die ewige Idee für die unmittelbare Gewissheit des Menschen geworden, d.h. wie sie erschienen ist. Dass sie Gewissheit für den Menschen werde, dazu ist notwendig sinnliche Gewissheit, die aber zugleich in das geistige Bewusstsein übergeht und ebenso in unmittelbar Sinnliches verkehrt ist, so aber, dass man darin sieht die Bewegung, Geschichte Gottes, das Leben, das Gott selbst ist.[2]

But religion is something more than a conviction on the part of the subject that others have entered into a relationship with God. The individual must apprehend divine truth for himself, must know God in his own

---

> Ehe es sich rundet in einem Kreis
> Ist kein Wissen vorhanden;
> Ehe nicht Einer Alles weiss
> Ist die Welt nicht verstanden.

(Adolf Harnack, "The Relation between Ecclesiastical and General History." Congress of Arts and Science. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906. II, p. 628.) George Foot Moore also agrees: "Between the religions of the lowest peoples and those which have reached the highest level in intelligence and spirituality there is an unbroken connection; not only do survivals and superstitions persist in the most advanced religions, but the germs of their own loftiest conceptions may sometimes be recognized in barbarous surroundings. The field, wide as it is, is one; the history of religions points onward to a history of religion." ("The History of Religions in the Nineteenth Century," p. 437.)

[1] Cf. below, pp. 121, 129.

[2] XIV, AR, p. 174.

inner experience. In genuine religion, therefore, knowledge of particular facts in the history of religion is essentially a bridge leading the religious consciousness to a direct personal awareness of the eternal truth of God.

> Um was es zu tun ist, das ist die Gewissheit des Subjekts von der unendlichen, unsinnlichen Wesenhaftigkeit des Subjekts in sich selbst, das sich unendlich, das sich ewig unsterblich weiss. Das Weitere ist, dass dies Subjekt erfüllt wird mit der Wahrheit, dass diese Wahrheit sei im Selbstbewusstsein als Selbstbewusstsein und sei nicht als äusserliche, sondern als in sich seiende Wahrheit des Gedankens, die Vorstellung der Innerlichkeit überhaupt.[1]

This does not mean that on the third level the historical appearance of the idea is no longer important. On the contrary, truth and its historical manifestation are here welded into a aynthesis in which the latter is simply <u>aufgehoben</u> in typical Hegelian fashion: it is transcended, yet preserved as a necessary moment in the reality of religion. Knowledge of the sensuously present content of religion is

> der Ausgang, bei dem es nicht bleibt, eine Form, die aufgehoben werden soll, die nicht nur als vergangene sich bestimmt, sondern als ewig der geistigen Natur Gottes angehörig.[2]

3. The Inadequacy of History and Historical Investigation

However, while thought thus grants to the historical form in which truth is clothed a legitimate and essential function, it likewise recognizes "die Schranken der Form."[3] A purely historical investigation of religion is in Hegel's view highly inadequate as a means toward a true knowledge of God. History is not self-sufficient or self-explanatory. Therefore the study of history, though valuable and necessary, must be supple-

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 182.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 182; cf. p. 228. Cf. above, p. 120, and below, p. 129.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 228.

mented by philosophical inquiry. History is deficient, thinks Hegel, in two main respects.

a. Its Externality

In the first place, historical inquiry is external. It concerns only truths known to other people, not truths which are our own inner possession. It deals only with the religion which others have had in the past, not with that of the investigator in the present. It is concerned not with infinite thought in and for itself, but only with thought as a finite fact, opinion, or representation.[1] The most elaborate historical study may still fail to yield a true knowledge of religion. Just as a blind man may know to the last detail the history of a picture and its painter and yet see nothing of the picture itself,[2] so may a historian be perfectly familiar with the events of church history, the formulations of the various councils, and the origin of these views, and still come short of the knowledge of God.

> Was diese geschichtliche Behandlung betrifft, so hat sie es zu tun mit Gedanken, Vorstellungen, die andere gehabt, aufgebracht, bekämpft haben, mit Überzeugungen, die andern angehören, mit Geschichten, die nicht in unserm Geiste vorgehen, nicht das Bedürfnis unsers Geistes in Anspruch nehmen, sondern bei denen das Interesse dies ist, wie es sich bei andern gemacht hat, die zufällige Entstehung.[3]

The revelation of God is not something which occurred at one particular time in history, but an eternal occurrence. "Es kommt dem Glauben auf das sinnliche <u>Geschehen</u> gar nicht an, sondern auf das, was <u>ewig geschieht</u>, Geschichte Gottes."[4]

> . . . Gott ist als Geist wesentlich dies, für ein anderes zu sein, sich zu offenbaren; er erschafft nicht <u>einmal</u> die Welt, sondern ist der ewige Schöpfer, dies ewige sich Offenbaren. Dies ist er, dieser <u>actus</u>; das ist sein Begriff, seine Bestimmung.[5]

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 27, 28.
[2] XII, BR, p. 28. Cf. above, p. 49.
[3] XII, BR, p. 27. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 738.
[4] JUB, III, PHPR, p. 226.
[5] XIV, AR, p. 35.

Revelation is a present, eternally repeated experience. History of religion must therefore be supplemented by philosophy of religion, which deals not with past events, or with the empirical origin of religious ideas, but with the absolutely, eternally present, with content in and for itself.

> Die empirische Weise solcher Hervorbringung durch Kirchenversammlungen, Konzilien usf. geht uns hier nichts an. Für uns handelt es sich darum: Was ist der Inhalt an und für sich? Dieser Inhalt ist zu rechtfertigen durch die Philosophie, nicht durch die Geschichte; was der Geist tut, ist keine Historie. Es ist ihm nur darum zu tun, was an und für sich ist, nicht Vergangenes, sondern schlechthin Präsentes.[1]

God constantly speaks to the human mind. The main evidence of the truth of Christianity, therefore, is not any information transmitted either orally or in writing, but rather the Spirit himself bearing witness to my spirit. Our religion, our knowledge of God, is not dependent on the often accidental transmission of correct historical records, which themselves must have their claim to truth tested at the bar of reason, but on a direct and eternally possible contact between man and God, spirit and Spirit, a contact which is made especially when man thinks and cannot be made unless he thinks.[2] No amount of historical knowledge of religion can take the place of this direct inner relation between the individual and God.

> Though Christ a thousand times
> In Bethlehem be born,
> If he's not born in thee,
> Thy soul is still forlorn.[3]

b. Its Lack of a Criterion of Truth

Secondly, historical study lacks an immanent criterion of truth.

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 198; cf. also pp. 194, 196, 230.
[2] VIII, PWG, p. 849.
[3] Johannes Scheffler, "The Cherubic Pilgrim." Caroline Miles Hill, The World's Great Religious Poetry. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1926. P. 755.

Fact and truth are not identical. The difference appears in Hegel's discussion of the Christian religion:

> Wenn von Wahrheit der christlichen Religion [in dem Sinne gesprochen wird], dass es richtig geschichtlich ist, [so ist] dies hier nicht [gemeint], sondern das Wahre ist ihr Inhalt; denn sie hat, weiss das Wahre, erkennt Gott, wie er ist.[1]

Questions of fact can often be readily settled by history, but no appeal to historical origin or development can solve problems of truth or value. History may set forth with unerring accuracy the changing panorama of religious events, but it cannot penetrate behind these events to their truth-content or their meaning, in short, to the reason in them.

> Die Geschichte der Religion . . ., so viel sie gesammelt und bearbeitet ist, lässt vornehmlich so nur das Äussere, Erscheinende sehen. Das höhere Bedürfnis ist, den Sinn, das Wahre und Zusammenhang mit Wahrem, kurz, das Vernünftige darin zu erkennen.[2]

"Das Interesse des trockenen Phänomens," writes Hegel to Goethe, "ist für mich weiter nichts als eine erweckte Begierde, es zu verstehen."[3] But this understanding is possible only through thought. "Die Geschichte erhält erst im Gedanken die Form, durch die sie das absolute Interesse für den Geist hat."[4] Only when the bare facts of the history of religion are subjected to concrete thought do they take on significance; only then does their rational connection, their ideal meaning appear. It is self-evident that a certain historical appearance is a necessity in religion. True religion must exist in time and space if it is to become the common property of humanity as a whole. Yet the sensuous appearance gains significance only as it embodies or expresses an eternal truth. No mere reciting of his-

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 34.
[2] XII, BR, p. 164; cf. XIV, AR, p. 230.
[3] Feb. 24, 1821. Werke (orig. ed.), XIX, BVAH, II, p. 34.
[4] XIV, AR, p. 197; cf. p. 27.

torical facts, however correct, can bring to light this truth-element. Philosophical thought alone is equal to the task.

It is for this reason that Hegel, while eager to learn the results of the latest historical research,[1] is unwilling to give to history the final word. No verdict rendered by historical study, either for or against the truth of religion, can be regarded as final. Thus the church is right, says Hegel, in opposing investigations into the factual data of Christianity carried on with an anti-religious bias.

> Was die empirische Weise betrifft und die Untersuchungen, welche Bewandtnis es mit dem Erscheinen Christi nach seinem Tode habe, so tut die Kirche insofern recht daran, wenn sie solche Untersuchungen nicht anerkennen kann; denn sie gehen von dem Gesichtspunkt aus, als ob es auf das Sinnliche der Erscheinung ankomme, auf dies Historische, als ob in solchen Erzählungen von einem als historisch Vorgestellten nach geschichtlicher Weise die Beglaubigung des Geistes liege.[2]

Such investigations tacitly assume that the truth of the gospel depends on its sensuous origin and transmission. But this assumption is false.[3] Even if the opponents of Christianity were able to remove every shred of historicity from the miracles of Jesus, his physical resurrection, and his reported post-resurrection appearances, they would still have said nothing vital as to the truth of Christianity.

It also avails nothing, as an argument against Christianity, to point out the earlier and lowly origin of some of its features. The historical origin of an idea decides nothing whatever as to its truth.

> Man hat die christliche Religion [damit] verkleinern wollen, dass diese ihre Bestimmungen schon älter [seien], dass sie dieselben da oder dort hergenommen [habe]. Dies Geschichtliche entscheidet ohnehin gar nichts über die innere Wahrheit.[4]

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 105-107.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 196. Cf. TJS, pp. 292, 334.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 194. Cf. also above, pp. 121, 122.
[4] XIV, AR, p. 59. Cf. also above, p. 123.

We must admit, for example, that the church fathers were influenced by Greek philosophy, but this fact cannot determine whether their ideas are true or false. It is "gleichgültig, woher jene Lehre gekommen sei; die Frage ist allein die, ob sie an und für sich wahr ist."[1]

"Ebensowenig ist es das rechte Verhältnis," writes Hegel,

> wenn wir uns Christi nur als einer gewesenen historischen Person erinnern. Man fragt dann: Was hat es mit seiner Geburt, mit seinem Vater und seiner Mutter, mit seiner häuslichen Erziehung, mit seinen Wundern usf. für eine Bewandtnis? d.h. was ist er geistlos betrachtet? Betrachtet man ihn auch nur nach seinen Talenten, Charakter und Moralität, als Lehrer usf., so stellt man ihn auf gleiche Linie mit Sokrates und anderen, wenn man auch seine Moral höher stellt. Vortrefflichkeit des Charakters aber, Moral usf., dies alles ist nicht das letzte Bedürfnis des Geistes, dass nämlich der Mensch den spekulativen Begriff des Geistes in seine Vorstellung bekomme. Wenn Christus nur ein vortreffliches, sogar unsündliches Individuum und nur dies sein soll, so ist die Vorstellung der spekulativen Idee, der absoluten Wahrheit geleugnet. Um diese aber ist es zu tun, und von dieser ist auszugehen. Macht exegetisch, kritisch, historisch aus Christus, was ihr wollt, ebenso zeigt, wie ihr wollt, dass die Lehren der Kirche auf den Konzilien durch dieses und jenes Interesse und Leidenschaft der Bischöfe zustande gekommen, oder von da oder dorther flossen,---alle solche Umstände mögen beschaffen sein, wie sie wollen; es fragt sich allein, was die Idee oder die Wahrheit an und für sich ist.[2]

More important than the origin and history of Christianity is the significance of the historical phenomena as apprehended by the consciousness of the Christian church at any given time.

> Geschichtliches, ob die Sätze so in der Bibel oder in Tradition sich finden, ist nicht die Hauptsache; die Gemeinde hat die unendliche Macht und Vollmacht zu ihrer Fortbildung, zur Fortbestimmung ihrer Lehre.[3]

If men are truly to find God, the attention of Christians must be fixed

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 47. Cf. VIII, PWG, p. 742: "Wo etwas hergekommen ist, das ist vollkommen gleichgültig; die Frage ist nur: ist es wahr an und für sich?"

[2] IX, PWG, p. 737. Cf. Glockner, Hegel, I, pp. 138-139.

[3] XIV, AR, p. 201.

not on the first sensuous manifestation of their religion, but on their own direct apprehension of the eternal truths of the Spirit. Too often the former is allowed to take the place of the latter. The Fourth Gospel recognizes this in the words of Jesus, "It is expedient that I go away, for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you."[1] Only when interest is diverted from the vehicle of truth, the letter that killeth, to the truth itself, the spirit that giveth life, only then can "the Spirit of truth" guide us into all truth.[2]

Hegel's attitude is now clear. In his treatment of historical religion, he is primarily concerned not with mere factual accuracy, but with the truth and meaning which the facts express. To discover this he finds that he must transcend the merely historical or empirical and utilize the rational, philosophical approach.

4. Estimate of Hegel's View

a. The Extent to which He Underestimates the Historical Element

With Hegel's fundamental thesis regarding the inadequacy of the purely historical treatment of religion the open-minded student can hardly fail to agree. It is nevertheless true that Hegel, in his eagerness to place the emphasis where it belongs, sometimes seems to underestimate the importance of the historical aspect of religion. If it is part of the very nature of the idea of religion, as Hegel maintains, to express itself in historical form, it is inevitable that the appearance should afford some clue to the idea which appears. If thought is the ultimate cause or ground of a historical manifestation, is it reasonable to suppose that the empirical phenomenon is wholly without meaning as to the nature of the thought behind

---

[1] John 16:7.
[2] John 16:13.

it? Are historical origins, then, totally without significance? Granting that the judge of truth must always be the rational living mind, this mind must consider not only its own experience, but also the entire past experience of the race. Does this racial history reveal nothing concerning the ultimate reality which expresses itself through it? For example, is not a world which can produce a Jesus and a Buddha ultimately different from one which lacks such characters? We have more reasonable grounds for belief in a good God if at a given time in history a perfectly good man really lived, and if many other human beings of exalted character have lived, than we have if such persons are pure fictions. Were there no good men, belief in a fatherly God of perfect love and goodness would have little foundation indeed. The empirical circumstances in which truth appears do make a difference. They may not be constituted "wie sie wollen"[1] and reflect accurately the truth which is in them. On the contrary, "die Wahrheit an und für sich" must not be separated from its empirical appearance, but is immediately connected with it. If we wish to know the truth, we must seek it in its relation to the psychological, sociological, and historical facts of human life. Objective truth cannot be separated from its historical manifestation.

This real bearing of historical fact on truth Hegel does not make sufficiently clear. This undervaluation is, however, more apparent than real. There is good ground for believing that Hegel would admit everything that has just been said.[2] In all probability, he is so much concerned with exposing the fallacy of mere historicism in questions of truth and value that he falls easily into over-statement of the primary claims

---

[1] Cf. above, p. 126.
[2] Cf. above, pp. 105-107, 117.

of philosophical thought and under-statement of the importance of empirical fact. His true attitude toward the latter is found less in verbal statements than in his earnest effort to master the known facts of the history of religion[1] and in the prominence which he gives to religious history in his treatment as a whole. In his general philosophy and in his philosophy of religion in particular Hegel proceeds as one who takes history seriously.

b. The Importance of Hegel's Insight into the Insufficiency of History

Only through misapprehension can Hegel be taken to mean that the way in which a phenomenon has arisen tells nothing concerning its nature. He would probably admit that historical origins are significant in revealing accurately a certain aspect of a given reality, its earliest manifestation. What Hegel opposes is the practice of taking the beginning, or any phase of development, as telling the whole story. Reality is progressive, forward-moving, developmental. More important than how a thing arose is what it is moving toward, its ultimate origin, the truth which it expresses. Thus everything must be seen in its entirety, as a whole, if its true meaning is to be understood. This whole view requires that each phenomenon be viewed not only historically, in the light of its chronological development, but also philosophically, in the light of eternity. History does undoubtedly reveal something regarding the truth which breathes through it, and furnishes a necessary key to that truth. It is an Ausgangspunkt which cannot be avoided.[2] But no mere recounting of historical data, whether they concern either beginnings or later development, can ever bring to light the true significance and value of the data or make of them anything

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 105-107.
[2] Cf. above, pp. 120, 121.

more than a collection of discrete, unrelated units. To historical description must be added the unifying activity of concrete, critical thought. It is not history, but reflection on history, which is decisive in all considerations of truth.

This insight constitutes one of Hegel's greatest contributions to human thought. Its fundamental correctness is amply attested by experience. Were historical origins determinative in questions of value, not only religion, but also science and art, in fact, every phase of modern human activity whatsoever, would stand discredited. Religion would be dismissed because of its early connections with mythology and magic, astronomy because it grew out of astrology, painting because it began with crude markings on the walls of caves, industrial civilization because it sprang out of an era of hand labor. The gyroscope is an evolution from the spinning top, a mere child's toy, but is not therefore relegated to insignificance. Rockets, which are beginning to prove useful in propelling automobiles and airplanes, were originally a mere means of amusement, but are not thereby deprived of value. In all these instances it is clear how misleading would be a value-judgment reached on the basis of historical origins alone. No less dangerous is such a standard in the field of philosophy in general. The significance of a phenomenon can never be determined by its empirical origin, but only by its fundamental and essential reasonableness.

The purely empirical method offers no standard by which a phenomenon might be philosophically evaluated. Such a method is always inevitably dependent on other methods, which provide the decisive norms and criteria of judgment. Empirical observation can only collect the relevant facts, and is unable to criticize and evaluate these facts. Indeed, it alone cannot

even determine which are the relevant facts. Philosophical thought must accompany observation from the very beginning. While, therefore, historical study is absolutely necessary as a first step, it is philosophically insufficient.[1] At this point Hegel is clearly, and inevitably, a rationalist.

c. Hegel's Synthesis of the Historical and the Rational

It must be pointed out, however, that this rationalism seldom involves disloyalty to the empirical facts. To a remarkable degree Hegel does justice to both factors. He recognizes that thought about religion must deal with what religion is psychologically and has been historically. But this very pursuit demands something more than the mere collection of facts: the mind must bring to its work of observation some conception of what it is that it wishes to observe. Historical study and critical philosophizing must therefore move forward together, constantly supplemrnting one another. Only where the historical and the rational interpenetrate can the study of religion yield the maximum of fruitfulness.[2]

---

[1] This is the reason why Paul Tillich, in his classification of the forms of western philosophy of religion, mentions three types, the rationalistic, the critical, and the intuitive, but recognizes no empirical method as such. Empirical philosophy of religion, he says, accompanies all three types, "kann aber hier ausser Acht bleiben, da sie konsequenterweise nur über die Verwirklichung der Religion im seelischen und geschichtlichen Leben, nicht über sie selbst etwas aussagen kann. Sobald sie es versucht, macht sie Anleihen bei einer der anderen Methoden." ("Die Überwindung des Religionsbegriffs in der Religionsphilosophie." Kant-Studien, 27 (1922), p. 450.)

[2] Indeed, in consistency with the notion of religion with which he begins, he cannot avoid relating the historical and the rational in this integral fashion. (Cf. above, pp. 32-40, 45-47, 104-105, 120-122). The idea of religion and its manifestation, it will be recalled, are not separate entities, but two aspects of one and the same reality. It is the very nature of the notion to externalize itself and appear in history. In the course of history, moreover, this manifestation fulfills more and more nearly its basic idea. Side by side with the development of the idea as idea moves the historical development of its manifestation, until both are united and the manifestation becomes "adequate" to its notion. On the one hand, the notion is nothing apart from its objectification in history; on the other, the historical phenomenon is meaningless apart from the idea which it expresses. This being the case, it is inevitable that for Hegel

How clearly Hegel recognized the need of this synthesis is illustrated in his view of the Gospel of John. The Fourth Gospel, he maintains, contains a deeper conception of Christianity than the synoptic gospels, for

> der tiefste Gedanke ist mit der Gestalt Christi, mit dem Geschichtlichen und Äusserlichen vereinigt. Und das ist eben das Grosse der christlichen Religion, dass sie bei aller dieser Tiefe leicht vom Bewusstsein in äusserlicher Hinsicht aufzufassen ist und zugleich zum tieferen Eindringen auffordert. Sie ist so für jede Stufe der Bildung und befriedigt zugleich die höchsten Aufforderungen.[1]

B. The Relation of the Notion to the Facts of History

1. Hegel's Seeming Apriorism

At first sight Hegel's whole approach to religion seems to belie all that has been said regarding his loyalty to historical fact. For though he prefaces his Philosophie der Religion with a brief and penetrating discussion of empirical religion, he devotes the first and most fundamental of the three divisions of his work to an exposition of the notion or idea of religion in general. Only later does he consider the successive historical embodiments of the idea.

> . . . Die ganze Abhandlung, selbst auch die unmittelbare Religion, ist nichts anderes als die Entwicklung des Begriffs und diese nichts anderes als Setzen, was in demselben enthalten ist, und dies Setzen macht die Realität des Begriffs aus, erhebt, vollendet denselben zur Idee.[2]

Likewise, in dealing with each individual religion, Hegel always discusses first its characteristic idea, then the temporal manifestation of this idea. In his consideration of the religion of magic, for instance, he passes from its basic concept to its historical appearances with the following remark:

> Die erste Religion ist also, wie gesagt, die roheste, einfachste Form der Naturreligion, und die Frage ist nur

---

historical description of religion should proceed in closest connection with philosophical interpretation.

[1] Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. In Glockner, Hegel, I, p. 143.

[2] XII, BR, p. 63.

> nach dem Orte, wo sie, das zunächst nur geistig Vorausgesetzte, zu suchen sei, und nach der Form ihrer Existenz.[1]

Hegel's usual procedure is perhaps best summarized in his own words regarding the approach to the absolute religion:

> Indem wir nun diese Religion betrachten, gehen wir nicht historisch zu Werke nach der Weise des Geistes, der vom Äusserlichen anfängt, sondern wir gehen vom Begriff aus.[2]

In short, in his lectures Hegel appears to build up the general idea of religion and the logical system of the religions demanded by this idea, after which he learns from observation that the empirical religions, as he confidently expected, actually do correspond to the conception which he has worked out. He then fits these religions into the scheme of the notion, and the structure is complete. Some of Hegel's critics have so interpreted his procedure; recalling the inaccuracies which are evident in Hegel's historical accounts, they have accordingly charged him with an indefensible attempt at a priori construction of the facts of religious history.[3]

2. The Actual Empirical Foundation of the Notion

This view is far from the truth. Though Hegel's exposition of religion does repress, as it were, the reference to experience, every step of his reasoning is profoundly influenced by his knowledge of the empirical facts. This empirical influence is indicated by several considerations.

In the first place, Hegel's concern for and intimate knowledge of history preclude in him all possibility of a merely a priori approach to religion. His early writings show that he was from his youth a painstaking student of history, and especially of the history of religion.[4] His later utter-

---

1 XIII, NR, p. 80; cf. p. 200.

2 XIV, AR, p. 27.

3 Cf. above, pp. 314, 6-7, 12; particularly Drews, HRP, p. 409; Pfleiderer, PRBH, pp. 101-102; Troeltsch, GS, III, pp. 133-134.

4 Cf. above, pp. 10, 107, n.3. In Hegel's dialectical method, writes Seth, "we have a principle, not of arbitrary invention, but drawn from the heart of things,---from the nature of the self-conscious spirit itself. . . . Barely logical as the principle seems, it is a matter of biography

ances reveal a mind eager to know the facts of history before forming judgments about it. "Die erste Quelle unserer Erkenntnis," he writes, "ist die Erfahrung."[1]

> Die Geschichte hat nur das rein aufzufassen, was ist, was gewesen ist, die Begebenheiten und Taten. Sie ist um so wahrer, je mehr sie sich nur an das Gegebene hält und . . . je mehr sie dabei nur das Geschehene zum Zwecke hat. . . . Die Geschichte aber haben wir zu nehmen, wie sie ist; wir haben historisch, empirisch zu verfahren.[2]

The principle of dialectic which Hegel applies so fruitfully to the history of religion he derives not from a priori thought, but from life itself. It is Erfahrung, he writes, "dass das Leben selbst es ist, den Widerspruch aufzuheben."[3]

For a mind so concerned about experience and history any effort to carry on thought about religion in isolation from experience would have been most unlikely. Furthermore, such a pursuit would have been impossible even if Hegel had attempted it. His mind was already too well stocked with historical knowledge of religion to allow him to think his way clear of it.[4] Once attained, this knowledge was bound to influence all his thinking on religion.

Secondly, Hegel's speculative development of the idea of religion corresponds too accurately with the actual historical growth of religion, as known in his day, to have been deduced from any root-idea without reference to the empirical facts. His beginning with the religions contain-

---

that Hegel formulated it in its breadth only after the profoundest study of man and history, and, in particular, of the religious consciousness." SP, p. 196. Cf. also Haering, HWW, passim.

[1] JUB, III, PHPR, p. 30.

[2] VIII, PWG, pp. 3, 7.

[3] XIV, AR, p. 79. Cf. also above, pp. 49-51.

[4] Cf. above, pp. 105-107.

ing a large element of magic is completely in accord with modern scientific scholarship.[1] His characterization of Chinese religion we have seen to be remarkably accurate.[2] His sections on Greek and Roman religion are penetrating accounts of what these religions actually were.[3] In regarding Christianity as the highest religion and treating it last, Hegel adopts the classification of nearly all historians of religion.[4] Perhaps more significant than these positive agreements is the fact that Hegel, in accord with the accepted practice of the historians of his day, erroneously places Buddhism before Hinduism.[5] He who would argue that these agreements are all accidental coincidences of concepts arrived at *a priori* with facts later ascertained assumes a tremendous burden of proof. Significant ideas never arise in this way. No philosopher of account has ever been able to deduce from a mere idea the world of fact.

3. Hegel's Lectures as Results, not Processes

What, then, is the actual relation of the notion to the historical facts which which it deals? This relation is not hard to discover. The idea of religion which Hegel expounds in his *Philosophie der Religion* is not the starting-point for his consideration of historical religion, but rather the result of long, hard thinking about facts empirically ascertained. Hegel does not read his theory into the facts, but arrives at it in an earnest attempt to explain the facts. The *Philosophie der Religion* is thus essentially product, not process. Hegel simply states in synthetic form what he has gradually arrived at by analytic means. Out of con-

---

[1] Cf. above p. 41.
[2] Cf. above, pp. 41, 117-118.
[3] Cf. above, pp. 43-44
[4] Cf, above, pp. 45-47
[5] Cf. above, pp. 41-42, 108.

centrated reflection on the facts of religious history, especially of Christian history,[1] he has attained his conception of the history of religion as the progressive, unfolding self-revelation of the Absolute Spirit. This central idea he then seeks to apply to the actual development of human religion, fitting each particular religion into that stage in the conceptual structure to which he finds it corresponding. It is this last which appears in Hegel's lectures. He simply leaves behind the mental processes which have led up to his view and seeks to present to his hearers the results of his thought.[2]

In lecturing on the philosophy of religion Hegel does essentially what a company of actors does when, after months of private rehearsing, it presents its drama in public; or, to draw on an illustration of Hegel himself, what the great pianist does when, after long and arduous practice in the studio, he gives a public recital. "Ein schweres Klavierstück," writes Hegel,

> kann leicht gespielt werden, nachdem es oft wiederholt einzeln durch gegangen ist, es wird gespielt mit unmittelbarer Thätigkeit als Resultat so vieler vermittelnder Actionen. Dasselbe ist der Fall mit der Gewohnheit, die uns als zur zweiten Natur geworden. Das einfache Resultat der Entdeckung des Columbus ist Resultat vieler vorhergegangener, einzelner Thätigkeiten, Überlegungen.[3]

---

[1] Hegel's fundamental idea of religion is evidently drawn primarily from the Christian conception of it. Taking as his norm this religion in which, as he thinks, the actual really expresses the ideal, he arranges the other religions in an ascending scale leading up to it. Cf. below, pp. 149-157.

[2] Essentially the same view as the one here advanced is held by Seth and Romang regarding Hegel's philosophy in general, and by Alexander regarding Hegel's treatment of religion. Even William James, arch-enemy of Hegel and rationalism, came near at the close of his life to substantially the same view of Hegel's method. Cf. Seth, DKH, pp. 166-167; Romang, "Über die Abgrenzung des Christlichen und der christlichen Gemeinschaften." Theol. Stud. u. Krit., 45 (1872), p. 399; S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, I, p. 204; W. James, "Hegel and His Method." Hibb. Jour., 7 (1908-1909), p. 67.

[3] JUB, XV, p. 207.

It would be absurd to expect a lecturer in philosophy to set forth his thought precisely in the order in which it arose in his own consciousness. Such a procedure would be just as tedious and distasteful to the listener as would attendance at a concert in which the artist preceded his hour of delightfully rendered music with several hours of finger exercises, or at a theater where the play was presented only after the actors had staged several laborious rehearsals to show the audience how it was all done. Hegel's primary concern, therefore, and quite rightly, is to present the conclusions of his mature thinking, together with their logical grounds, in systematic form. This does not commit him to retracing with his hearers the steps which led up to his conclusions.

If in the Philosophie der Religion the particular religions actually conform to the development of the Begriff of religion, it is simply because they themselves are the raw material out of which the idea was fashioned. Hegel's philosophy of religion is nothing more or less than his reading of the facts of religious history, his interpretation of the empirical subject-matter. It is none the less so because he has chosen to exclude from his university lectures an account of their psychological origin.

Whether Hegel himself was fully aware of the empirical origin of his view of religious history is not altogether certain. It is possible that here, as in his treatment of religious experience,[1] he does not realize how empirical he is. Yet there are indications that he understood full well the important part played by his empirical knowledge. For example, he writes that the Phänomenologie des Geistes is

> die Wissenschaft des Bewusstseins, die Darstellung davon. . ., dass das Bewusstsein den Begriff der Wissenschaft, d.i. das reine Wissen, zum Resultate hat. Die

---

[1] Cf. above, p. 76.

> Logik hat insofern die Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Geistes zu ihrer Voraussetzung, welche die Notwendigkeit und damit den Beweis der Wahrheit des Standpunkts, der das reine Wissen ist, wie dessen Vermittlung überhaupt, enthält und aufzeigt. In dieser Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Geistes wird von dem empirischen, sinnlichen Bewusstsein ausgegangen; und dieses ist das eigentliche unmittelbare Wissen.[1]

Regarding the notion of religion in particular, Hegel writes,

> Dieser Begriff [wird von uns] α) aus der Vorstellung zunächst [übernommen], um damit bekannt zu werden und näher mit dem [Gange], wie unsere Abhandlung angestellt werden wird.[2]

In considering the necessity of the development of religion from the previous stages of the natural and spiritual world, says Hegel, "fangen wir selbst wieder mit der Form der Erscheinung an und betrachten zunächst das Bewusstsein."[3] Elsewhere he writes, quoting the Fourth Gospel, "Als die Zeit gekommen war, sandte Gott seinen Sohn," and immediately adds, "und dass die Zeit gekommen war, ist nur aus der Geschichte zu erkennen."[4]

There is therefore good ground for concluding that Hegel was well aware of the empirical basis of his religious thought, but intentionally adopted, for the purpose of presenting most effectively in the classroom the results of his mature thinking, the approach which we find in the Philosophie der Religion. The appearance of apriorism in the lectures as delivered, as Brightman has suggested concerning Hegel's Logik,[5] is mainly due to Hegel's confidence in his conclusions reached by empirical means.

Again it becomes clear that Hegel's actual procedure is both empirical and rational, historical and philosophical. He is neither a mere empiricist of religion nor an a priori expositor. To a close study of the

---

1 III, WDL, p. 53.
2 XII, BR, p. 80.
3 XII, BR, p. 173.
4 XIV, AR, p. 149.
5 E. S. Brightman, Seminar in Hegel, October 2, 1929.

facts of religious history he brings the creative, critical, organizing activity of rational thought.[1] The keynote of his approach is well expressed in the sentence: "Wir müssen in der Geschichte einen allgemeinen Zweck aufsuchen;"[2] especially when the emphasis is laid alternately on the phrase, in der Geschichte, and on the words, einen allgemeinen Zweck. History is barren apart from the universal purpose which it expresses, but this eternal meaning is nothing apart from history.

C. Exceptions to Hegel's General Synthesis of History and Reason

The fact that Hegel's philosophy of religion in general is characterized by this relation of mutual supplementation between experience and reason does not mean that he always preserves the balance in all the details of his thought. Occasionally, as has already been shown, he errs on one side or the other.[3] Two such instances, which have not been mentioned heretofore, are important enough to demand consideration at this point. The first is his emphasis on necessity, the second his view of the relation between Christianity and the absolute religion.

1. Hegel's Emphasis on Necessity

a. The Necessity in Religion

From beginning to end Hegel emphasizes the element of necessity in religion. The appearance of religion as an activity in the total life of Spirit and the various phases in the development of religion itself are alike construed by Hegel as logically necessary. Philosophy, he writes,

> hat wohl die Notwendigkeit der Religion an und für sich selbst zu entwickeln und vorzustellen; [sie hat] zu be-

---

[1] Georg Lasson points out that it is possible for thought to grasp the notion of religion "von sich aus, aber selbstverständlich auf Grund der gemachten Erfahrungen." (EHR, p. 91.) This is precisely what Hegel has done.

[2] VIII, PWG, p. 5.

[3] Cf. above, pp. 109-117.

> greifen, dass der Geist von den andern Weisen seines Wollens, Vorstellens und Fühlens zu dieser seiner absoluten Weise fortgeht und fortgehen muss, dass sie das Schicksal, die Notwendigkeit, die Wahrheit des Geistes ist.[1]

This necessity, Hegel thinks, is adequately demonstrated by his philosophy as a whole, as set forth in the Phänomenologie and the Encyclopädie.[2] The dialectical advance of the Absolute to the religious standpoint is not merely accidental, but necessitated by the very nature of Spirit.[3]

The same necessity characterizes the development of religion itself. The task of the philosophy of religion, it will be recalled, is according to Hegel to understand religion, to discover the reason and meaning in it.[4] With reference to the history of religion, however, this is essentially synonymous with showing the necessity in each historical form. Reason and necessity seem to be for Hegel largely interchangeable terms, as shown when he writes of the historical religions, "Es muss also Vernunft darin sein, in aller Zufälligkeit eine höhere Notwendigkeit."[5]

The movement of the notion of religion from stage to stage is a necessary movement, and the development of the historical religions is deter-

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 9. Likewise, immediately after indicating the empirical origin of the notion of religion, Hegel goes on to say, "Aber β) [ist] die Notwendigkeit dieses Begriffs, d.i., des religiösen Standpunktes überhaupt [zu entwickeln]." (XII, BR, p. 80; cf. above, pp. 137-139.)

[2] XII, BR, pp. 174, 185.

[3] Cf. above, pp. 28, 30-32; XII, BR, pp. 164-186. Hegel is careful to point out that by the necessity of religion he means not mere external, practical necessity, but an inner, metaphysical, absolute necessity grounded in the nature of the Absolute. Considering that reverence for God or the gods secures and preserves individuals, families, and states, while contempt for God or the gods destroys law and duty and leads to the downfall of human institutions, one may conclude that religion is therefore necessary. But this is a purely external inference, and though true, is in danger of being misinterpreted to mean simply that religion is useful for the purposes of individuals and governments. Thus to make religion a mere means, and thereby a mere contingent condition of something else, is to pervert its true significance. Such a necessity is not what Hegel has in mind. (XII, BR, pp. 176-180.)

[4] Cf. above, p. 24.

[5] XII, BR, p. 164.

mined by the nature of the notion. The whole course of religious history, from the objectification of the idea of religion in the definite religions to its return to itself in the absolute religion, is subject in no way to contingency, but fully determined from within.

> Was durch den Begriff bestimmt, im Begriffe notwendig ist, hat auch existieren müssen, und die Religionen, wie sie aufeinander gefolgt sind, sind nicht auf zufällige Weise entstanden. Der Geist ist es, der das Innere regiert, und es ist abgeschmackt, nach Art der Historiker hier Zufälligkeit annehmen zu wollen. Die Religionen, wie sie aufeinander folgen, sind determiniert durch den Begriff, nicht äusserlich bestimmt; sie sind bestimmt durch die Natur des Geistes, der sich gedrängt hat in der Welt, um sich zum Bewusstsein seiner selbst zu bringen.[1]

The very nature of Spirit demands that it attain full self-consciousness. This happens only in the absolute religion, but it cannot happen there unless Spirit makes the long, laborious journey through the successive imperfect religions. This course is necessary in order that religion may come to its absolute truth.[2]

> Diese bestimmten Religionen sind bestimmte Stufen des Bewusstseins, des Wissens vom Geiste. Sie sind notwendige Bedingungen für das Hervorgehen der wahrhaften Religion, für das wahrhafte Bewusstsein des Geistes.[3]

Hegel's classification of the definite religions, therefore, is "durch den Begriff an und für sich notwendig; sie folgt dem objektiven Begriff, gemäss der Natur des Geistes."[4]

The same applies, of course, to the revealed or absolute religion. Even the time of its appearance is determined.

> Das ist nicht eine zufällige Zeit, ein Belieben, Einfall, sondern im wesentlichen, ewigen Ratschlusse Gottes gegründet, d.h. es ist eine in der ewigen Vernunft, Weisheit Gottes bestimmte Zeit, und nicht auf zufällige Weise bestimmt, sondern es ist Begriff der Sache, göttlicher Begriff, Begriff Gottes selbst.[5]

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 72-73.
[2] XIII, NR, p. 8.
[3] XIII, NR, p. 8.
[4] XIII, NR, pp. 16-17.
[5] XII, BR, p. 76.

The course of religion as a whole, as plotted in the Philosophie der Religion, is the true theodicy; for it "zeigt alle Erzeugnisse des Geistes, jede Gestalt seiner Selbsterkenntnis als notwendig auf."[1]

It is also objectively necessary that God appear to human beings in one man, Christ. The idea of religion demands that man become conscious of the unity of divine and human nature. For the great majority of human beings this consciousness can come not through philosophical thought, but only in the form of certainty. However, this can happen only if the unity of God and man is given external existence and presented to man's immediate sensual view. Hence arises the necessity of God's appearance in the flesh.

> Gewiss ist nur, was auf unmittelbare Weise ist, in innerer oder äusserer Anschauung ist. Dass es dem Menschen gewiss werde, musste Gott im Fleisch auf der Welt erscheinen. Die Notwendigkeit, dass Gott im Fleisch auf der Welt erschien, ist eine wesentliche Bestimmung,---es ist nach dem Vorhergehenden notwendig abgeleitet, aus dem Vorigen bewiesen---; so nur kann es dem Menschen zur Gewissheit werden, so ist es die Wahrheit in der Form der Gewissheit.[2]

Moreover, this unity of God and man had to appear "in einem Menschen." We are not dealing with the idea of universal man, but rather with sensual certainty; therefore the unity must be visible to all in one particular human individual.[3]

b. The Difficulties in This View

Nowhere in Hegel's philosophy of religion is the rational element more prominent than in this doctrine of necessity. Moreover, it is probably also true that no element of his religious thought rests on shakier foundations. Critical study reveals several defects.

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 76.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 141.
[3] XIV, AR, pp. 141-142; cf. p. 137.

1). It makes necessary "facts" which have not existed. In the first place, the circumstance that Hegel was actually mistaken regarding the character of some of the facts which he describes as necessary casts serious doubt on the validity of the whole doctrine. According to Hegel's account, religion in the East has always followed national boundaries; Buddhism antedated Hinduism; the Hebrews treated nature as undivine; the prophets were narrow fanatics; obedience to law among the Hebrews was mere external compliance; and Christianity sprang primarily from Roman emperor-worship, not from Judaism.[1] On the basis of Hegel's theory, the facts involved in these judgments were not only as he describes them, but necessarily so. But history shows that he was actually mistaken in each case cited. Thus Hegel is placed in the absurd position of insisting on the necessity of facts which never existed. It helps not at all to point out that some of the errors are due to the imperfect state of historical knowledge in Hegel's day, for this only accentuates the fallacy in his procedure. When the available information is so meager, he who says, "This is the way it had to be," is treading on dangerous ground.

This, of course, serves to confirm the conclusion previously reached,[2] that Hegel's religious philosophy is the product of thought about facts empirically ascertained. It becomes increasingly clear how dependent Hegel was on his empirical knowledge, how large a part that knowledge played in determining his conclusions,[3] and how little he actually deduced historical facts from the notion.

2). It overlooks the hypothetical character of all knowledge. Yet nothing that has been said thus far renders untenable the necessitarian interpretation of religious history. Hegel might reply, and probably

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 108, 111-114.
[2] Cf. above, pp. 132-139.
[3] Cf. Arthur Drews, HRP, pp. 409, 471.

would: "I may be mistaken as to some of my facts, but that doesn't overthrow my fundamental view. My theory does not compel me to show what are facts and what are not (this is the task of the historian), but only to demonstrate that whatever the facts may be, they spring necessarily from the idea of religion and, ultimately, from the nature of Spirit. This demonstration is given in general by my Encyclopädie, and in particular by my Philosophie der Religion." Here is the crux of the matter: has Hegel actually given this demonstration or not?

It may help if we distinguish between two kinds of necessity. The one we may call practical or circumstantial necessity; the other, rational necessity.[1] It was practically necessary that Greek and Roman polytheism should be replaced by Christianity; polytheism was dead, the people were spiritually dissatisfied with it, and Christianity, the only other non-ethnical religion on the scene, was very much alive and aggressively missionary. It is rationally necessary that air be a material body, provided that it be admitted that air gravitates and that only material bodies gravitate. In the first case it is impossible to offer any logically conclusive argument to show that Christianity must follow polytheism: Why must there be any religion at all? On the other hand, in the second case circumstantial factors have no bearing whatever; that is to say, given the premises, the conclusion is absolutely inevitable.

Now it is probable that at various stages of religious history certain developments, such as idol-worship, polytheism, sin, the crucifixion of Jesus, religious persecution, and the like were necessitated by the sheer force of circumstance, just as such things as crime, civil law, industrial injustice, and racial oppression are to a certain extent inevita-

---

[1] Hegel, it will be recalled, distinguishes between external and internal or absolute necessity. (XII, BR, pp. 176-184; cf. above, p. 140, n. 3.)

ble, the present imperfections of human nature being what they are. Likewise, if God is to be revealed increasingly to man and man is to be lifted up to God, the ethnical religions must give way to Christianity; and if the unity of God and man is to become real for the masses, it must be in the form of imagery, such as in the personality of Christ. But it is a different thing to ascribe to these events rational necessity. No empirical event can be shown to be rationally necessary; such demonstration is possible only in the realm of formal logic and mathematics. There is no demonstrable logical reason why Christianity should supersede the earlier religions, or even that God should be revealed to man. True, if we assume a reasonable world and a reasonable and good God, it is certainly rational to hold, as Hegel does, that revelation is inevitable.[1] But there is no a priori reason why this must be a reasonable world with a rational and good power behind it. That it is such is an affirmation which we must make if there is to be any science, or if life is to have any meaning at all. But why must there be any science, and why must life have meaning? Simply because we find meaning in experience, and in general it is more reasonable to suppose that the universe is favorable to the realization of values than that it is unfavorable. The great weight of experience and reason seems to be on the side of meaning and rationality as having ultimate grounding, but there is no complete rational proof of this. Demonstration is possible only where a premiseis given and accepted as valid. When we deal with the nature of the world, our first premise is not a proven fact, but must be an affirmation of faith. While, therefore, we can regard many developments in the history of religion as necessitated by the circumstances, we

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 32-37; V, ENC, pp. 480-481.

can never ascribe to them an ultimate rational necessity. The limited facts at our command do not justify this further step.

Hegel nowhere clearly recognizes this hypothetical character of knowledge. In fact, he frequently and explicitly denies to presuppositions all place in true philosophy. When we have advanced to philosophical thought, he holds, we have reached "die letzte Analyse, wo keine vorausgesetzten Prinzipien mehr sind."[1]

> Das Zeugnis des Geistes in seiner höchsten Weise ist die Weise der Philosophie, dass der Begriff rein als solcher aus sich ohne Voraussetzungen die Wahrheit entwickelt und entwickelnd erkennt und in und durch diese Entwicklung die Notwendigkeit der Wahrheit einsieht.[2]

The only thought which philosophy brings to the study of history is

> der einfache Gedanke der Vernunft, dass die Vernunft die Welt beherrscht, dass es also auch in der Weltgeschichte vernünftig zugegangen ist. Diese Überzeugung und Einsicht ist eine Voraussetzung in Ansehung der Geschichte als solche überhaupt. In der Philosophie selbst ist dies keine Voraussetzung; in ihr wird es durch die spekulative Erkenntnis erwiesen.[3]

In religion, likewise, "der wahre, richtige Geist" which comprehends the true meaning of the Bible

> kann nur der sein, der in sich selbst nach der Notwendigkeit verfährt, nicht nach Voraussetzungen. Dieser Geist, der auslegt, muss sich für sich selbst legitimieren, und diese Legitimation ist die Sache selbst, der Inhalt, das, was der Begriff dartut.[4]

Anselm's ontological argument, holds Hegel, suffers from the defect that in it the unity of Begriff and Sein is bloss Voraussetzung,[5] whereas this unity is really involved in the very nature of Spirit. Similarly, Fichte and Kant's view that human morality is possible only on the assump-

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 264.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 22.
[3] VIII, PWG, p. 4.
[4] XII, BR, p. 39.
[5] XII, BR, pp. 222-223.

tion of a moral order represents the standpoint of an abstract subjectivity which fails to see concretely the unity of idea and reality.[1]

This disavowal of presuppositions is one of the weakest points in Hegel's philosophy. As already indicated,[2] all knowledge, whether based on ordinary formal logic or Hegel's synoptic logic, is ultimately hypothetical. Hegel's contention "dass die Vernunft die Welt beherrscht" is itself a presupposition. Nothing in his philosophy demonstrates it. In the last analysis, neither Hegel nor anyone else can be cognitively certain that his reason yields objective truth or that man finds a real God in religion. Our best reason may create a strong presumption in favor of these judgments, but this presumption is based finally on faith in the trustworthiness of reason. Hegel, like every other thinker, must assume at the outset that his mind can be depended on to yield truth. Occasionally he himself seems on the verge of admitting this, as when he writes, "Der Mut der Wahrheit, Glauben an die Macht des Geistes, ist die erste Bedingung des philosophischen Studiums."[3] But to the end he firmly believes that he has demonstrated his conclusions.[4]

Two further difficulties in Hegel's view may be mentioned at this point, though a more detailed consideration of them must be reserved until later.

3). <u>It leaves no room for human freedom</u>. In treating the history of religion as a development whose stages are completely determined by the nature of the Absolute, Hegel rules out the element of free spontaneity and novelty which seems to characterize religion. If the various religions are what they are wholly because the <u>Begriff</u> is what it is, there is no room for free determination on the part of individuals. The simultaneous affirmation of some degree of freedom in human beings and of complete control by the Abso-

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 136-137.
[2] Cf. above, pp. 144-146.
[3] V, ENC, p. LXXVI; cf. XII, BR, pp. 42, 57; below, p. 197.
[4] For further discussion of this point, cf. below, pp. 173-174.

lute involves an irreconcilable contradiction.[1]

4). It makes the Absolute non-moral. Finally, Hegel's conception raises very serious doubts as to the morality of the Absolute. If all that has happened in the history of religion is alike necessary, demanded by the nature of the Absolute, there is no genuine distinction between right and wrong. The history of Christianity includes not only such events as the life of Christ, the missionary activities of Paul, and the magnificent work of St. Francis, but also such things as the wars of religion and the Inquisition. If Hegel is right, the latter events were just as necessary as the former. If this is true, Spirit is neither good or bad, but ethically neutral, neither moral nor immoral, but non-moral. Such a Spirit is not the good God which Hegel himself, as a Christian, affirms.[2]

c. Hegel's Abiding Insight

In view of the objections raised, the necessitarian element in Hegel's interpretation of religious history must be rejected. This does not mean, however, that his basic insight is overthrown. What Hegel is primarily concerned with saying is that God is in the history of religion, that the long, slow growth of religion in human experience has not been merely a blind groping of man after a shadow, but a purposive seeking after a God who is actually there, and who in fact takes the initiative in reconciling the world to himself. The history of religion has been, on the one hand, the growing discovery of God by man; on the other hand, and even more truly, it has been God's increasing revelation of himself to man.

God is in control of the universe. Providence is a reality, not in the superficial form of intervention by God at exceptionally critical times,

---

[1] Cf. below, pp. 213-217.
[2] Cf. below, pp. 187-188.

but as an abiding, purposive plan increasingly working itself out in history.

> Den Glauben und Gedanken muss man zur Geschichte bringen, dass die Welt des Wollens nicht dem Zufall anheimgegeben ist. Dass in den Begebenheiten der Völker ein letzter Zweck das Herrschende, dass Vernunft in der Weltgeschichte ist . . . ist eine Wahrheit, die wir voraussetzen; ihr Beweis ist die Abhandlung der Weltgeschichte selbst: sie ist das Bild und die Tat der Vernunft.[1]

The history of religion is not an accidental growth, but the product of the immanent activity of God. This is the abiding insight in Hegel's account. His mistake consists in thinking that that which is not all accident must be wholly necessitated. Fortunately, we are not confined to a choice between these extremes. Human history may be ultimately in the rational control of and increasingly a fulfillment of the reasonable purpose of God, yet also subject to modification for good or ill by human choice. By conceiving the history of religion in this way, we avoid the shortcomings of Hegel's determinism, yet remain true to his fundamental insight.

2. Hegel's View of the Absoluteness of Christianity

a. Christianity as the Absolute Religion

In his necessitarianism Hegel's departure from his customary balance between history and reason is on the side of the rational. His religious thought reveals another such departure, but in the opposite direction. In treating Christianity as absolute, Hegel seems to lay undue weight on the empirical and accept the status quo as final.

"Die christliche Religion," he writes, "wird sich uns als die absolute Religion zeigen;"[2] and his whole treatment of the absolute religion fulfills this prediction. In Christianity Spirit has attained full self-conscious-

---

[1] VIII, PWG, p. 5. Cf. JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 48; above, pp. 118-119.
[2] XII, BR, p. 75.

ness; in it notion and manifestation have become one.

> Der bestimmte Übergang der Idee bis zur sinnlichen Gegenwart [ist im Christentum] herausgebildet worden. Eben dies [ist] das Ausgezeichnete des Christentums und der Religion des Geistes. Alle Momente [sind hier] entwickelt bis zur ihrer Vollständigkeit.[1]

The basic ideas of the absolute religion, moreover, are essentially the central doctrines of historical Christianity, especially of the Lutheran Christianity of Hegel's day.

> Das Denken hat sich frei in sich zu bewegen, wobei jedoch sogleich zu bemerken ist, dass das Resultat des freien Denkens mit dem Inhalt der christlichen Religion übereinstimmt, da diese Offenbarung der Vernunft ist.[2]

In the Christian doctrines of creation, sin, and the fall, and of the reconciliation of God and man through Christ, God's incarnation of himself, Hegel finds expressed the very dialectical movement of abstract unity, estrangement, and reconciliation which is the essence of absolute religion. The whole process of religion Hegel finds summarized in the doctrine of the Trinity, the "Grundbestimmung der christlichen Religion."[3]

Because of this fundamental agreement of his religious thought with church doctrine, Hegel regards himself and his philosophy of religion as the primary defender of Christianity in his day. Regarding the views of many contemporary theologians, such as Tholuck, who treated the Trinity as a scholastic doctrine and in whose theology Hegel detected the mere morality of the <u>Aufklärung</u>,[4] Hegel writes,

> Durch solch endliches Erfassen des Göttlichen, dessen, was an und für sich ist, durch dies endliche Denken des absoluten Inhalts ist es geschehen, dass die Grundlehren des Christentums aus der Dogmatik grösstenteils verschwunden sind. Nicht allein, aber doch vornehmlich die Philosophie ist es, die jetzt wesentlich orthodox ist; die Sätze, die immer gegelten haben, die Grundwahrheiten des Christentums werden von

---

1 XIV, AR, p. 175; cf. p. 106.
2 JUB, VIII, SDP, p. 113.
3 XII, BR, pp. 41-42. Cf. below, pp. 179-180.
4 Cf. V, ENC, pp. 16-17n.

ihr erhalten und aufbewahrt.[1]

There can be no doubt that Hegel identifies the Christian religion with the absolute religion. In it he finds that reconciliation of nature and Spirit, man and God, toward which the whole history of religion moves. As Lasson suggests, the Protestant faith contains for Hegel the universally valid knowledge of absolute truth.[2]

b. Hegel's Attitude toward Further Development

Here a question arises. The empirical Christian church is not a perfect institution. In fact, it has often contradicted the notion of the absolute religion. At times it has been the agent of intolerance and persecution which have actually hindered the elevation of man to God. Excessive other-worldliness, far from reconciling nature and Spirit, has sometimes separated them. Denominational divisions have rent Christianity so that the very existence of such a body as "the Christian church" is open to serious question. Such facts indicate the real possibility of a decline even of what was to Hegel the absolute religion and its replacement by a higher religion. Does Hegel's thought leave room for such development? In what sense, for him, is Christianity "absolute"? Does he regard it as the final religion, beyond which no further progress can be made?

There are frequent indications that Hegel does regard Christianity as ultimate. The Christian religion, he writes, is "die Religion der Offenbarung," for "in ihr ist es offenbar, was Gott ist, dass er gewusst werde, wie er ist."[3] It is, further, the Religion der Wahrheit. . . . Das Wahre ist ihr Inhalt; denn sie hat, weiss das Wahre, erkennt Gott, wie er ist."[4]

---

1 XIV, AR, pp. 26-27; cf. p. 70n.; and below, pp. 179-180.
2 XIV, AR, p. 10.
3 XIV, AR, p. 32.
4 XIV, AR, p. 34.

> Die geoffenbarte Religion ist die offenbare, weil Gott in ihr ganz offenbar geworden ist,---est ist nichts Geheimes mehr an Gott. Es ist hier das Bewusstsein von dem entwickelten Begriff des Geistes.[1]

In the church universal truth is vorhanden, vorausgesetzt.[2]

> In der bestehenden Gemeinde ist die Kirche die Veranstaltung überhaupt, dass die Subjekte zu der Wahrheit kommen, die Wahrheit sich aneignen und dadurch der heilige Geist in ihnen auch real, wirklich, gegenwärtig werde . . ., dass die Wahrheit in ihnen sei und sie im Genusse, in der Betätigung der Wahrheit des Geistes seien.[3]

At the close of his lectures Hegel treats explicitly the question of the finality of the Christian religion;

> Formell [besteht für geschichtliche Bildungen das Schema:] Entstehung, Erhaltung und Untergehen; letztes reiht sich daran. Sollte hier davon gesprochen werden, [da ein] ewiges Reich Gottes etabliert [worden ist]? So wäre das Untergehen---ein Übergang zum Himmelreich---nur für die einzelnen Subjekte, nicht für die Gemeinde. [Der]heilige Geist als solcher lebt ewig in seiner Gemeinde. Christus [sagt]: die Pforten der Hölle werden meine Lehre nicht überwältigen. Vom Vergehen sprechen, hiesse mit einem Misston endigen.[4]

In short, a passing away of the absolute religion is for Hegel unthinkable. Individual Christians disappear from the sensual world and particular groups pass through times of decline, but the religious community and its religion go on as the eternal habitation of the Spirit.

Yet there are also evidences that Hegel leaves room for further development in religion. "Die Gemeinde," he declares, "ist innerhalb ihrer ein ewiges Werden."[5] The absolute religion is a present reality as the body of Christian thought which forms the basis of Christian life and action. But the empirical church does not always express fully the notion of the Chris-

---

1 XII, BR, p. 75.
2 XIV, AR, p. 208.
3 XIV, AR, pp. 207-208.
4 XIV, AR, p. 231.
5 XIV, AR, p. 202.

tian religion.[1] There is therefore need of an ever closer approximation of the actual church to its true idea. In this sense growth within the absolute religion is inevitable.

For example, individual Christians may progress toward greater freedom. The religious subject often does not fully realize the idea of his religion. Many believers are prevented by an over-emphasis on feeling from attaining true objectivity. They are therefore not free, but bound by their own subjective desires. The notion of the absolute religion

> enthält, dass Religion nur die ist, die sich objektiv, dass die Religion das Objektive ist. Aber das ist nur der Begriff der Religion; ein anderes ist dieser Begriff und ein anderes das Bewusstsein dieses Begriffes. Es kann also auch in der absoluten Religion der Begriff dies Ansich, dabei aber das Bewusstsein ein Anderes, es kann unfrei sein.[2]

This lack of freedom and objectivity affords wide opportunity for further development in religion.

Hegel goes even farther than this. "Die Gemeinde," he writes, "hat die unendliche Macht und Vollmacht zu ihrer Fortbildung, [zur] Fortbestimmung ihrer Lehre."[3] Moreover, this right seems to be implied in all that Hegel says, in opposition to mere historicism, about the constant availability of God and the eternality of Spirit's self-revelation.[4] Here Hegel seems definitely to admit the possibility of change and growth in the absolute religion.

Yet it is important to note that the development which Hegel recognizes occurs only within the absolute religion itself. He nowhere admits that a new and higher religion may arise which will reveal God more completely. In this sense the absolute religion is final.

Indeed, in view of Hegel's assertions that in Christianity all moments

---

[1] XIV, AR, pp. 230-231.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 17.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 201.
[4] Cf. above, pp. 121-123.

of religion are completely developed,[1] and that in it God is revealed "wie er ist,"[2] it is difficult to accept literally his statement concerning the right of the Gemeinde further to develop its doctrines.[3] Here Hegel probably has in mind simply the personal appropriation by successive generations of Christians of the eternal and changeless content of the Christian religion.[4] This is indicated by the passage which immediately follows the description of the Gemeinde as an ewiges Werden. Hegel goes on:

> Geist ist Sicherkennen im Selbstbewusstsein, sich Ausscheiden zum endlichen Lichtpunkte des endlichen Bewusstseins und die Rückkehr in das, was er wirklich ist, die Rückkehr, in der das göttliche Selbstbewusstsein hervorbricht. Das Nähere ist, dass in dem Bestehen der Gemeinde die Lehre schon fertig ist und dass das Individuum nur zur fertigen Lehre herangezogen wird.[5]

The idea of eternal progress in religion, involving an ever richer idea and an ever fuller revelation of God, is foreign to Hegel. For him there can be no real advance beyond the absolute religion, but only a growth in individual apprehension within the established framework of Christian thought.

c. Criticism

With regard to Hegel's view of the absoluteness of Christianity two main criticisms may be passed:

1). Hegel overlooks the values in other religions. Modern investigations have made increasingly clearer the fallacy of regarding any one religion, as over against others, as containing complete truth.[6] The great re-

---

[1] Cf. above, p. 150.
[2] Cf. above, p. 151.
[3] Cf. above, p. 153.
[4] In fact, the point he is making concerns the ability of every individual to have a direct present experience of God, and has no direct bearing on the question of the finality of the Christian religion.
[5] XIV, AR, p. 202.
[6] As Troeltsch writes, "Der ganze Gedanke der Konstruktion einer historischen Religion als der abschliessenden, vollendenden, alle anderen über-

ligions of the East, for example, far from being mere nature-religions, are not only in many respects similar to Christianity, but also have their own peculiar ethical and religious values. The true relation between Christianity and the other world-religions seems to be not that of superior and inferior, but that of supplementary agencies working side by side in search of the truth about God.[1]

2). Secondly, Hegel arbitrarily limits the very development which plays so large a part in his religious thought. His emphasis on advance from lower to ever higher forms of religion should have led him to allow at least the possibility that a still higher religion than Christianity might emerge. Open-minded interpretation of the fact of development up to Christianity would seem to indicate the probability of continued growth beyond it. But this Hegel denies.[2] In Lutheran Christianity at its best he finds the full and final revelation of God, the highest possible form of religion. All the development recognized by him takes place within the absolute religion itself; and even here it involves no actual attainment of new truth, but only more complete assimilation of the truth already delivered to the saints. Already, in its modern emphasis on the social gospel, the church has transcended the absolute religion of Hegel's philosophy. There is, of

---

windenden erscheint fraglich und bedenklich." ("Die Dogmatik der religionsgeschichtlichen Schule." GS, II, p. 508.)

[1] This criticism is obviously not a condemnation of Hegel. Considering the knowledge of other religions available to him, it would have been a miracle if he had achieved an attitude toward these religions which is only very slowly winning acceptance among Christians today and is even now held by comparatively few. Cf. Re-thinking Missions, W. E. Hocking, ed. (N. Y.: Harpers, 1932), pp. 29-59.

[2] Hegel's view here stands in marked contrast to his words at the close of his Geschichte der Philosophie, where he writes, "Diess ist nun der Standpunkt der jetzigen Zeit, und die Reihe der geistigen Gestaltungen ist für jetzt damit geschlossen." He also points out that "die letzte Philosophie einer Zeit" is the result of all preceding stages, and contains the truth in the highest form given to it by Spirit. (JUB, XIX, p. 690. Italics mine.) Though Hegel does claim, with more certainty than any other philosopher, that the truth of his system is identical with truth in and for itself (cf. V, ENC, p. 202), he here opens the way to the emergence of a higher philosophy. But in his treatment of religion the path to a fuller revelation is closed.

course, evidence that this social concern is simply a return to a neglected side of the teachings of the prophets and Jesus. It is, nevertheless, a distinct advance over the Christianity which Hegel had in mind,[1] an advance the possibility of which his view would deny.

In behalf of Hegel it must be said that if the finality of the Christian religion cannot be proved, neither can its surpassibility be demonstrated. Many non-Hegelian philosophers of religion would agree with Hegel in regarding Christianity as the highest religion known to man, and therefore normative.[2] No religion seems to offer a truer conception of God than that of the fatherly God of redemptive love revealed in Christ. To him who has found in the Christian religion the power for living radiantly the eternal life in the midst of time, it is inconceivable that his religion should some day prove to be incompletely true. For such a person Christianity is for all practical purposes absolute.

Hegel may be right. No one can say what the future may bring forth in the realm of religion. There can be no decisive proof either for or against the finality of Christianity. However, the weight of the evidence points to continued development. There is no good ground for thinking that the Spirit has already revealed all that is to be known concerning himself. Since there has been marked progress in the past, there is every reason to expect it in the future. Hegel gives insufficient recognition to this possibility.

Hegel's conviction that Christianity is absolute and final is perhaps partly due to his idea of religion: the nature of the notion forces him to look for an empirical religion in which Spirit has attained full self-consciousness, and this he naturally finds in Christianity. In all probability, however, empirical considerations have a much larger influence. As we have

---

[1] Cf. XIV, AR, p. 201.

[2] Cf. Kurt Kesseler, "Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie." Zeit. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., 158 (1915), pp. 38-39.

already discovered, his notion of religion itself is not an a priori construction, but the result of a profound study of religious experience and history. In treating Christianity as absolute Hegel merely carries to extremes his normal respect for the empirical. It is not through accident, still less through the processes of cold, impartial logic, that he accords finality to the religion of his own day and country. He is simply yielding to the tendency, natural to all men, to regard as best, and even as absolutely final, the religious beliefs most familiar to himself. Hegel's error is only the exaggeration of his sound belief that philosophy must deal with what already exists. From this belief it is only a short step to the view that the best that exists is final. Hegel has made this step. His critical acumen and the developmental nature of the dialectic should have guarded him against it, but in this instance the force of empirical fact is too great for him to resist. Here again Hegel is too empirical.

Chapter Five

HEGEL'S VIEW OF THE ABSOLUTE

I. The Importance of the Idea of God

At the center of Hegel's general philosophy stands his conception of the Absolute. All other aspects of his thought are but outgrowths of his idea of God. Since the purpose of philosophy is the discovery of truth and God is absolute truth, no other task of thought can compare in importance with the effort to unfold the nature of God.[1] The field of philosophy is the whole of human experience and history, which is essentially the development or manifestation of the life of God: "so ist Gott der eine und einzige Gegenstand der Philosophie."[2]

Naturally this emphasis appears with particular force in the philosophy of religion. Hegel never tires of exposing the one-sidedness of the Verstandestheologie which, holding that we can know nothing of God, confines itself to the subjective side of religion. This subjective emphasis, thinks Hegel, deprives religion of its holy of holies, its central reality, leaving it empty and meaningless.[3] In his estimation God is the very heart of religion. Apart from a clear idea of God, therefore, there can be no adequate conception of what religion is or of what it means to live a religious life.

> Was der Mensch in Beziehung auf Gott zu tun zu haben meint, hängt mit seiner Vorstellung von Gott zusammen, seinem Bewusstsein entspricht sein Selbstbewusstsein, und er kann umgekehrt nicht irgend etwas Bestimmtes in Rücksicht auf Gott zu tun zu haben meinen, wenn er keine Kenntnis, überhaupt keine bestimmte Vorstellung von ihm als Gegenstand hat oder zu haben meint.[4]

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 225; cf. above, p. 30.

[2] XII, BR, pp. 29-30. Hegel continues, "Die Philosophie ist daher Theologie, und die Beschäftigung mit ihr oder vielmehr in ihr ist für sich Gottesdienst."

[3] XII, BR, pp. 159-160; cf. p. 157, n.1.

[4] XII, BR, p. 231. Cf. V, ENC, p. LXXV.

II. The Way to God

A. The Knowableness of God

Implicit in this insistence on the importance of a clear conception of God is the belief that such an idea is possible, and further, that it truly describes the nature of God. The Absolute is not a barren being about which nothing can be affirmed, but is knowable to the human mind. Man's religious life is not a vague search for something he knows not what, but a living fellowship with the real God.

> So viel soll die Religion doch sein, dass sie ein Ankommen unseres Geistes bei diesem Inhalte, unseres Bewusstseins bei diesem Gegenstande sei, nicht bloss ein Ziehen von Linien der Sehnsucht ins Leere hinaus, ein Anschauen, welches Nichts anschaue, nichts sich gegenüber finde.[1]

If all that we can say about God is that he exists, we are in precisely the same situation as the Athenians who long ago erected an altar "to an unknown god!"[2] If, moreover, as the Verstand maintains, we are limited to knowing that God is but cannot know what he is, we do not even know that he is. We know only "das Ist; denn das Wort Gott führt eine Vorstellung und damit einen Gehalt, Inhaltsbestimmungen mit sich,---ohne solche ist Gott ein leeres Wort."[3]

He who holds consistently that God cannot be known must speak exclusively of our relation to God, never of God's relation to us. ". . . Ein einseitiges Verhältnis ist aber gar kein Verhältnis." For the understanding, therefore, God loses all independent reality and dissolves into a mere subjective projection of the human mind. If religion means anything, it means at least this, "dass nicht nur wir in der Beziehung zu Gott stehen, sondern auch Gott in der Beziehung zu uns stehe."[4] If this relation between man and

---

[1] XIV, BDG, p. 46.
[2] V, ENC, p. 100. Cf. Acts 17:23.
[3] XIV, BDG, p. 47.
[4] XIV, BDG, p. 46.

II. The Cry to God

A. The Transitness of God

Reality is this relationship in the language of a close encounter in
God's the belief that God as Idea is possible, and further, that it truly
describes the nature of God. The Absolute is not a Power, being some which
nothing can be efficient, but is accessible to the human mind. Man's relation
ship is not a power search for something he knows nor what, but a living fel-
lowship with the real God.

> So vital a reality God is, that, dare we say,
> Human reason fain would claim, He is, whose face it
> Might not discern for reasoning. I, itself alone shown
> Was living. Or rehearsed his heavenly glories, his dwelling
> Rainbow floats around me, mists with sapphire tint.[1]

All that we can say about God is that he exists, we are in presence
of the same situation as the Thomists who long ago arrived by altitude to an
unknown point.[2] If, however, as the Lonergan existentiers, we are interested in
knowing what God is for whom we do in, we should know that he
is. We know only the Infinite Man Christ, Jesus, after much investigation and
all else doubt. Impossibleness all else, reason avails let not his
Lorna Sort.[3]

He who holds consistently that God cannot be known must remain
slavish in his relation to God, never of God's relation to me. "... the
absolutizing Transitive let alone Immanentists." For the relativistic
thinker, God loses all independent reality and dissolves into a mere sub-
jective projection of the human mind. If relation means anything, it means
at least this. "Some might say why is Jay Gatsbyness so dear to Nick Carraway, perhaps
even not in the Gatsbyness as we know it." If this relation between man and

---

[1] LIV, 7ff., p. 40.
[2] [illegible], p. [illegible]. Cf. John 14:24.
[3] LIV, 8ff., p. 41.
[4] LIV, 9ff., p. 42.

God is real, knowledge of each by the other is also real. God is not jealous, but communicates himself to man.[1] He is not, like Schelling's Absolute, the night "worin . . . alle Kühe schwarz sind,"[2] but a Spirit with definite and knowable characteristics. Of all who deny man's knowledge of God Hegel asks the pointed question which he answers himself:

> Was wäre die christliche Gemeinde noch, ohne diese Erkenntnis? was ist eine Theologie ohne Erkenntnis Gottes? Eben das, was eine Philosophie ohne dieselbe ist, ein tönend Erz und eine klingende Schelle![3]

On the side of God nothing hinders man's knowledge of God.

> Wenn dem Erkennen Gottes von seiner Seite nichts entgegensteht, so ist es menschliche Willkür, Affektation der Demut, oder was es sonst sei, wenn die Endlichkeit der Erkenntnis, die menschliche Vernunft nur im Gegensatze gegen die göttliche, die Schranken der menschlichen Vernunft als schlechthin fest, als absolut fixiert und behauptet werden.[4]

If man does not know God, it is not God's fault but man's own.

Hegel is not content with affirming the possibility of knowing God. It is the basic principle of philosophical knowledge, "dass das Wissen vom Sein Gottes dem Menschen schlechthin gewiss sei."[5] In the absolute religion, moreover, this knowledge is complete and exhaustive. "Die geoffenbarte Religion ist die offenbare, weil Gott in ihr ganz offenbar geworden ist,---es ist nichts Geheimes mehr an Gott."[6]

B. The Arguments for the Existence of God

1. Man's Immediate Awareness of God

Hegel is sure that God can be found. The question arises, then, How is he to be found? What is the path from man to God? To him who reads He-

---

[1] XIV, BDG, pp. 46-48; XIV, AR, pp. 225, 226, 229. Cf. Nohl, TJS, pp. 289-313; above, p. 27.

[2] II, PDG (3d ed., 1928), p. 19.

[3] Foreword to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie. JUB, XX, pp. 26-27. Cf. XIV, AR, p. 34.

[4] XIV, BDG, p. 49.

[5] XII, BR, p. 49. Cf. above, p. 27.

[6] XII, BR, p. 75. Cf. below, p. 173.

God is real, knowledge of God by the other is also real. God is not real-

ness, but consciousness directly to man.[1] He is not, like Schleiermacher's

the mighty "Power . . . who [illegible] alone," [2] but a spirit with definite

and knowable characteristics. Of all who discussed's knowledge of God Tarad

asks the various questions which he answers thus with:

> Are there die certainties Theologie noch, some clear
> fundamental, are let also theologie dies Erkenntnis neither
> than dies, was also philosophie some dienstbe let, ein-
> and its and also religiously Tobsucht?
>
> On the also of God nothing, [illegible] knowledge of God.
>
> Were the Kirchen [illegible] relative about Zeit, Ortes und
> Gesellschaft, so let es ewiglich Wirklichkeit, Aufgabe der
> Tiefe, etwa wie es wäre rel, wenn die Unbedingtheit der Ge-
> bundenheit, die Ewigkeit/Zeit Tiefe, die Unendlichkeit gegen
> die Endlichkeit, die Sehnsucht/Ewigkeit nur in Gegensatz gegen
> die Endlichkeit, die Sehnsucht der Ewigkeit Tiefe, die
> Unbedingtheit rel, die absolut Einheit und Gesetzes wären.[3]

If man does not know God, it is not merely really but man's fault.

Tarad is not content with affirming the possibility of knowing God.

It is the basic principle of religious thought, there due [illegible]

sic. Otto die Gewissen unbedingtes gültiger Gut.[4] In the beginning reli-

gion, however, this knowledge is conscious and subjective. "Die religiöse

Tatsache ist die Gottesbeweis, weil Gott in ihr eine [illegible] gewissen

ist,---es ist eigentlich Gottesbeweis nur an Gott."[5]

3. The arguments for the existence of God.

1. Man's immediate knowledge of God

Tarad is aware that God can be found. The question arises, then, how

is he to be found? What is the path from man to God? In this we find de-

---

1 XIV, 292, pp. 44-45; XIV, 4, pp. 299, 444, 320, 327, 321, 12, pp. 319-321; above, p. 97.
2 I, 275 (34 ed., 1908), p. 19.
3 Preface to Christlehre: Zeitschrift [illegible], 1907, 24, pp. 24-27, 27, XIV, 24, p. 24.
4 XIV, 32, p. 24.
5 XIV, 32, p. 24. Cf. above, p. 97.
6 XIV, 32, p. 24. Cf. [illegible], p. 173.

gel and notices the frequency with which he discusses the traditional arguments for God, the seemingly obvious answer is, Through thought alone, and particularly by way of the so-called "proofs" of the existence of God. Yet Hegel himself expressly states that it is a misunderstanding to regard reflection as the only way "auf welchem wir zur Vorstellung und Fürwahrhalten des Ewigen und Wahren gelangten," or the arguments in question as the only means whereby a conviction of the existence of God may be produced.[1] Such a view, he declares, would be just as foolish as to maintain that we cannot eat until we are familiar with the chemical, botanical, or zoölogical characteristics of our food, and that we must delay our digestive processes until we have completed the study of anatomy and physiology.[2] God is not limited to one form of self-revelation. He can be found not only in speculation, but in feeling and imagination as well. Man has an immediate awareness of the Absolute.

> Die Erhebung des Geistes zu Gott in dem Gefühle, im Anschauen, Phantasie und im Denken,---und sie ist subjektiv so konkret, dass sie von allen diesen Momenten in sich hat,---ist eine innere Erfahrung.[3]

2. The Function of the Arguments

Quite apart from speculative thought, therefore, man may be subjectively certain of God. With this subjective certainty, however, contingency and arbitrariness are mingled. Hence it is necessary, by the methodical processes of thought, to bring the stages of man's elevation to God to clear consciousness, and so to purify it from all contingency by revealing the objective truth in the subjective <u>Vorstellung</u> of God.[4] This the arguments for the existence of God seek to do. The fundamental meaning of these proofs is for Hegel simply that they chart for thought the course followed by the hu-

---

[1] V, ENC, p. 33.
[2] V, ENC, p. 33.
[3] XIV, BDG, p. 55.
[4] XIV, BDG, pp. 55-56.

and notions in harmony with which to determine the traditional standards for such the essentially optimum answer is, through thought alone, and particularly by way of the so-called "proofs" of the existence of God. The moral dilemma arrives when that is a misunderstanding of moral revelation as the only way that nature and our relationship and responsibilities are judged and formed adequates, or the statements in question as the only means whereby a revelation of the existence of God may be produced. From a view, be tolerant, would be just as foolish as to contend that we cannot act until we are familiar with the chemical, biological, or mechanical structure of our food, and that we must delay our activity pending until we have completed the study of nutrition and physiology. God is not limited by our form of self-realization. He can be found not only in speculation, but in feeling and imagination as well. But see an investigation of the problem.

> The Kingdom has delayed as dost in low depths, in
> darkness. Therefore are in danger,---and sin lost amplifi-
> cation, cause sin you also lifeless Kingdom is sick
> and,---lost also lovers behaviour.

The Question of the Argument

Quite apart from speculative thought, therefore, man may be satisfactorily certain of God. With the objective criterion, however, consistency and evidence are simply. Hence it is necessary, by the methodical procedure of thought, to bring the stages of man's elevation could be clear conclusiveness, and so to verify it from all consistency by revealing the subjective truth in the subjective certainty of God.[4] This the argument for the existence of God seek to do. The traditional reasons of these grounds in for Hegel, clearly that they cover for thought the course following the be-

---

1 [illegible], [illegible], [illegible].
2 [illegible], [illegible], [illegible].
3 [illegible], [illegible], [illegible].
4 [illegible], [illegible], [illegible].

man spirit in its rise to God, "dass sie die Erhebung des Menschengeistes zu Gott enthalten und dieselbe für den Gedanken ausdrücken sollen."[1] When man thinks of God, "enthält sein Geist eben die Momente, die in diesem Gange ausgedrückt sind."[2]

The arguments presuppose, therefore, an immediate consciousness of God. But this does not mean that they are superfluous. They perform the important function of explicating the implicit, of mediating the immediate, of objectifying the subjective.

Hegel agrees with Kant that the arguments for God's existence, viewed as chains of inference in the manner of traditional logic, are not valid. For Hegel, however, they have a much higher significance: transcending all merely formal logic, they demonstrate the totality of the Spirit, in which finite and infinite are both moments of a concrete whole. To prove means simply to become conscious of the connection and necessity in things and, in intention, to become conscious of the particular content of that which is in and for itself universal, as well as of the absolute and final truth of all particular content.[3]

So conceived, proof becomes identical with knowledge.

> Dieser vor dem Bewusstsein liegende Zusammenhang soll nicht ein subjektives Ergehen des Gedankens ausserhalb der Sache sein, sondern nur dieser selbst folgen, nur sie, ihre Notwendigkeit selbst exponieren. Solche Exposition der objektiven Bewegung, der inneren eigenen Notwendigkeit des Inhalts ist das Erkennen selbst, und ein wahrhaftes als in der Einheit mit dem Gegenstande.[4]

Proof, therefore, is essentially the same as the knowing process. In neither does the mind stand outside its object, but rather places itself within its object and follows the necessary movement and connection in the

---

[1] XIV, BDG, p. 13. Cf. XII, BR, p. 219; XIII, NR, p. 43; XIV, BDG, pp. 156-157.
[2] XII, BR, p. 69.
[3] XIV, BDG, p. 42.
[4] XIV, BDG, p. 42; cf. pp. 12-13, 43; below, pp. 211-212.

objective order itself. This it can do because it is actually one with the object.[1] Idea and object are but different aspects of the same reality. In the case of religion the human mind simply traces the steps whereby it becomes conscious of the divine mind with which it is ultimately one.[2]

3. Hegel's Formulation of the Arguments

The traditional arguments for the existence of God approach the problem from two complementary angles.[3] We may begin with the being of the world and argue from it to a necessary Being behind it. This is the general procedure in the cosmological and the teleological arguments. Or we may begin with the idea of God and argue from it to his existence. This occurs in the ontological proof.

a. The Cosmological Argument[4]

In its traditional form the cosmological argument reasons from the contingency of the world to an absolutely necessary essence. What is contingent, it is argued, is not self-supporting, but presupposes as its essence, ground, or cause an existence which is in itself necessary. The world is contingent, since it is only an aggregate of contingent particulars.[5] Therefore it must have a self-supporting and necessary being as its ground. The finite presupposes the infinite. The finite is. Therefore the infinite must also be.[6]

Hegel is not satisfied with this statement of the argument. The affirmation of being involved in both premises is self-contradictory, one-sided, and untrue.

---

[1] Hegel points out, "dass die Betrachtung des Erkennens von der Betrachtung seines Gegenstandes nicht verschieden sei." XIV, BDG, p. 13.

[2] XIV, BDG, pp. 42-43.

[3] XIV, BDG, p. 75.

[4] Cf. V, ENC, pp. 76-78, 96-97, 463; XII, BR, pp. 207-215; XIII, NR, pp. 40-56; XIII, RGI, pp. 20-28; XIV, BDG, pp. 1-157.

[5] XIV, BDG, p. 88.

[6] XIII, NR, p. 43.

[illegible] under itself. This it was do because it is actually one with the [illegible].[1] Iam and [illegible] are two different aspects of the same reality. In the case of religion the human mind already grasps the [illegible] already in [illegible] human knowledge of the divine nature only which it is [illegible].[2]

b. Hegel's Formulation of the Argument

The traditional arguments for the existence of God proposed the proof from the [illegible] to [illegible] to God.[3] We may begin with the [illegible] of the world and argue from it to a necessary being behind it. This is the cosmological argument, in the ontological and the teleological arguments. Or we may begin with the idea of God [illegible] from it to the existence. This occurs in the ontological proof.

a. The Cosmological Argument

In the traditional form the cosmological argument reasons from the contingency of the world to an absolutely necessary cause. What is contingent, it is argued, is not self-sufficient, but depends for its existence, or cause of existence which is in itself necessary. The world is contingent, since it is only an aggregate or contingent particulars. Therefore it must have a self-sufficient and necessary being as its ground. The finite presupposes the infinite. The finite is. Therefore the infinite must also be.[4]

Hegel is not satisfied with this statement of the argument. The difficulties of being involved in both problems is self-contradictory, unresolved and untrue.

---

[1] Hegel, Lectures [illegible], "Does this Determination [illegible] Reason [illegible] Immediately Going Beyond Mere Representation and [illegible]," XIV, [illegible], 9, 13.
[2] XIV, [illegible], [illegible], 22-23.
[3] XIV, [illegible], 16.
[4] [illegible], 27, [illegible], 38-39, [illegible]; XIV, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]; XIV, [illegible], [illegible], 22-23; XIV, [illegible], [illegible], 1-10.
[5] XIV, [illegible], 7, 22.
[6] XIII, [illegible], 22.

> Das Zufällige, Endliche wird als ein Seiendes ausgesprochen, aber die Bestimmung desselben ist vielmehr, ein Ende zu haben, zu fallen, ein Sein zu sein, das nur den Wert einer Möglichkeit hat, das ebenso gut ist, als nicht ist.[1]

The basic defect here is the type of connection involved in the ordinary syllogism. The relation between the major and minor terms is external and finite; each is thought of as existing for itself quite apart from its relation to the other. But this is a false separation. In truth, both terms of the argument in question constitute together "eine Bestimmung, . . . das absolut Notwendige,"[2] which alone is truly real. It is the nature of this necessary being to mediate itself by producing its own other and thence to return to itself. The finite world of contingency, therefore, has no positive existence of its own, but is simply the self-differentiation, the negative or other of the one absolutely necessary and infinite being in which its being is negated, <u>aufgehoben</u>, and only ideally preserved. "Das Sein des Endlichen ist nicht sein eignes Sein, sondern vielmehr das Sein seines Andern, des Unendlichen."[3] Contradictory and untrue by itself, the finite does not exist independently over against the infinite, but mediately as an aspect of the infinite. Absolute necessity does not merely make up one side of the relation; it alone has any real being at all. On this concrete foundation Hegel reconstructs the cosmological argument as follows:

> Nicht weil das Zufällige ist, sondern vielmehr weil es ein Nichtsein, nur Erscheinung, sein Sein nicht wahrhafte Wirklichkeit ist, ist die absolute Notwendigkeit; diese ist sein Sein und seine Wahrheit.[4]

So stated, the cosmological argument leads to belief in an absolutely necessary being. Such a being, however, is far from adequate to the full thought of God. The cosmological proof provides the general, abstract foun-

---

[1] XIV, BDG, p. 102. Cf. XIII, RGI, pp. 27-28.
[2] XIV, BDG, p. 103.
[3] XIV, BDG, p. 153.
[4] XIV, BDG, p. 103. Cf. XII, BR, p. 213; XIII, NR, p. 46.

> Das Vorzüglichste, Erhabene wird die Seele des Menschen, aber die Vorstellung Unendlichen ist Finsternis, die Sonne zu nahen, sie zu nehmen, sie zu fassen, zu fassen, sie zu nehmen, sie zu nehmen, das vielmehr Unbegreifliche ist, das Ungemessene ist, sie zu fassen.

The basis defect here is the type of connection implied in the relation, the relation between the major and minor terms is external and logical; each is thought of as existing for itself quite apart from its relation to the other. But this is a false supposition. In truth, both terms of the argument in question constitute together "being determinate, ... the Absolut Notwendige," which alone is truly real. It is the nature of this necessary being to mediate itself by positing its own other and to return to itself. The finite world of contingency, therefore, has no positive existence of its own, but is simply the self-differentiation, the negative or other of the one absolutely necessary and infinite being in which its being is negated, aufgehoben, but only ideally preserved. "Das Sein des Endlichen ist nicht rein negative Sein, sondern vielmehr das sich seines Nichtsein Aufhebende."[3] Contradictory and unstable by itself, the finite does not exist independently over against the infinite, but mediately as an aspect of the infinite. Absolute necessity does not merely make up one side of the relation; it alone has any real being at all. In this connection Fichte[4] reconstructs the cosmological argument as follows:

> Nicht weil das Unendliche ist, rechne vielmehr weil es ein Endliches, nur Erscheinung, mein Sein nicht wegbeweist nicht-Sein ist, ist die absolute Notwendigkeit; diese ist mein Sein und meine Gegenwart.

As stated, the cosmological argument tends to belief in an absolutely necessary being. Such a being, however, is far from adequate to the full idea of God. The cosmological proof provides the general, abstract form-

---

[3] XIV, 200, 1. 10ff. cf. XIII, 201, pp. 27-28.
[4] XIV, 20, p. 10.
[5] XIV, 20, p. 18.
[6] XIV, 200, 1. 10ff. cf. XIV, 20, p. 27; XIII, 20, p. 22.

dation of religion, but only this. To call God "das schrankenlose Sein, das Unendliche, das Ewige, Unveränderliche," "Wesen und Grund, Ganzes, Kraft, Ursache," and so on is accurate as far as it goes, but it does not exhaust his nature. God is much more concrete, "noch tiefer und reicher in sich . . . . als diese Bestimmungen ausdrücken."[1] The cosmological argument must therefore be supplemented by others.

b. The Teleological Argument[2]

The traditional physicotheological or teleological argument reasons from the signs of purposeful order in nature to the reality of an intelligent, purposing cause. The world of nature, especially organic nature, is characterized throughout by purposive adaptation of its parts to each other. This purpose, however, does not inhere in the diverse parts themselves, which alone are mutually indifferent and incapable of harmonizing so many different means to realize definite ends. There must exist, therefore, a powerful, wise, and purposive cause whose activity transforms the world from a mere aggregate of contingent parts into a unity of purposeful relations. This purposive cause is God.[3]

Hegel criticizes this argument from the standpoints of both form and content. As regards form he finds that it, like the traditional cosmological argument, is too abstract. God is represented as shaping to his own ends a world which is external to him. The argument thus carries over to ultimate reality the same sharp separation of means and end which characterizes human purpose. That is no true purpose, however, in which the purposer deals with

---

[1] XIV, BDG, pp. 80-81, 84-85; cf. pp. 74, 100-101, 124, 157; XIII, RGI, pp. 26-27.

[2] Cf. V, ENC, pp. 78-79, 96-97, 463; XII, BR, pp. 210, 215-218; XIII, RGI, pp. 28-48; XIV, BDG, pp. 158-171.

[3] XIV, BDG, pp. 159-160; XIII, RGI, pp. 42-47. Hegel here reproduces Kant's formulation of the argument, which he regards as typical. Cf. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Philosophische Bibliothek edition. Leipzig: Meiner, 1926), pp. 592-593.

tation of religion, but only into. "So soll das schauende Leben, im Unendlichen, das Ewige, Unvergängliche," "Wesen und Grund, Gegen, Kraft, Substanz," und so von in konkreten an Tor an ist ewig, und ist doch auch ewig. Das in sich ewig ewigen, "noch aller und enthält in sich . . . . sich also Vielfältigen enthalten."[4] The conclusion argument must therefore be supplemented by other.

3. The Teleological Argument[5]

The traditional physiotheological or teleological argument reasons from the signs of purposeful order in nature to the reality of an intelligent, purposing cause. The world of nature, apparently organic as are, is characterized throughout by purposive adaptation of its parts to each other. This purpose, however, does not inhere in the diverse parts themselves, which alone are actually indifferent and incapable of harmonizing in any different manner to realize definite ends. There must exist, therefore, a powerful, wise, and purposive cause which actively transforms the world from a mere juxtaposition of unintelligent parts into a unity of purposeful relations. This purposive cause is God.[5]

Kant criticizes this argument from the standpoints of both form and content. He regards form as first, like the traditional cosmological argument, is too abstract. God is represented as adapting to old due such a world which is external to him. The argument thus carries over to ultimate reality the same dualistic conception of means and end which characterizes human purposes. That is, in true purposes, however, in which the purposes death with

---

[4] KRV, SWW, pp. 90-91, 94-95; cf. pp. 74, 100-101, 128, 137; KUrl, SW, pp. 24-27.

[5] Cf. KRV, pp. 70-73, 98-99, 618; KUrl, SW, pp. 310, 313-318; KUrl, pp. 24-26; KPV, pp. 163-167.

[6] KRV, pp. 619-620; KUrl, SW, pp. 42-44. Kant's treatment of the argument, which he regards as typical. Cf. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Philosophische Bibliothek edition, Raymond Meiner 1930), pp. 502-507.

a material outside himself. On the contrary,

> die Wahrheit der Zweckbestimmung ist die, dass der Zweck an ihm selbst sein Mittel und ebenso das Material habe, worin er sich vollführe; so ist der Zweck der Form nach wahrhaft, denn die objektive Wahrheit liegt eben in dem, dass der Begriff der Realität entspreche.[1]

For Hegel the passage from finite purpose to God is not an external connection of two unrelated things, but a dialectical Erhebung, a passage from one moment to another within a fundamental unity. This elevation involves the negative moment,

> dass dieses Lebendige in seiner Unmittelbarkeit, diese Zwecke so, wie sie sind, in ihrer endlichen Lebendigkeit nicht das Wahre sind, sondern ihr Wahres ist vielmehr jene eine Lebendigkeit, der eine Nus.[2]

The finite thing with which we start, instead of grounding and conditioning the existence of God, is itself grounded in and conditioned by God. When thought about, it reveals itself as incomplete and untrue, mere negative particularity which demands its own negation and elevation to the system of which it is a part. In this elevation the finite Lebendigkeit disappears, and the object of consciousness becomes the systematic whole, "der Nus der einen Lebendigkeit, die allgemeine Seele."[3]

In its true form, therefore, the teleological argument moves from finite purposive activity to absolute, universal purpose. It makes the world a cosmos, a harmonious system of living activity in which everything is in mutual and essential relation to everything else, each part contributing to the life of the whole yet existing and having meaning only through the whole.

Yet even this idea of a living, unifying, organising activity does not express the full notion of God. God appears here as the activity which works

---

[1] XIV, BDG, p. 163. This, says Hegel, is "die unendliche [in contrast to the endliche] Tätigkeit des Zweckes."
[2] XII, BR, p. 217.
[3] XII, BR, p. 217. Cf. XIV, BDG, pp. 162-163.

a material matter-of-fact. On the contrary,

> die Wahrheit der Wirklichkeit ist die, dass der Geist an der Welt sein Mittel und ebenso das Material hat, wenn er mit vollkommen so ist der Geist der Welt, dann die objektive Wahrheit liegt eben in dem, was der Geist der Welt ist.[1]

For Hegel the unveiling from finite process to God is not an abstract contemplation of two unrelated things, but a dialectical Entwicklung, a process from one moment to another within a fundamental unity. This dialectic involves the negative moment.

> dass Dinge identisch in seiner Unterschiedenheit, Dinge sind, wie sie sind, die Dinge verschiedene Momente, nicht etwas ohne andere, sondern ist jedem das andere, das andere.[2]

The finite thing with which we start, instead of excluding and denying the existence of God, is itself produced in and sublimated by God. Hegel thought about it, it really itself as immediate and entire, exists negatively while derived its own negation and relation to the negative of which it is a part. In this dialectic the finite individual disappears, and the object of consciousness becomes the spiritual whole. "Das Ganze dieser Individualität, die allgemeine Macht."[3]

In its true form, therefore, the philosophical argument moves from finite pure positive reality to absolute, universal process. It moves the world a tension, a harmonious system of living activity in which everything is in mutual and essential relation to everything else, each part contributing to the life of the whole yet existing and being vivified only through the whole.

Let even this idea of a living, unfolding, correlating activity also overcome the full reality of God. Not suggests here as the activity which

---

[1] Kiel, Ibid., p. 165. "Dieses, dass Gott, in dieser unendlichen Bewegung [multiple] vereinigt ist zwischen."

[2] Ibid., p. 167.

[3] Kiel, op. cit., p. 111, Ibid., p. 112.

in organic and inorganic nature, uniting them in interdependence;[1] he is the truth of the relation of purpose. But living activity is not yet God. "Gott ist mehr als lebendig, er ist Geist."[2] The Greek Νοῦς is not the self-differentiating Absolute Spirit. "Eine nach Zwecken wirkende Macht ist ebenso die Lebendigkeit der Natur, noch nicht das, was man Persönlichkeit Gottes nennt und Geist."[3]

Hegel finds the proof defective also with respect to content. It is inevitable that any argument which attempts to pass from Sein to God should yield a God afflicted with all the limitations of Sein as known to man. Human perceptions and experiences "geben nur endliche Zweckmässigkeit, nicht den freien Begriff überhaupt."[4] If God's purposes are as limited as those of nature and of man, God is hardly worthy of worship. Human purposes are more often frustrated than realised, sometimes through the very vice of man himself.[5] It is true that there is Zweckmässigkeit in experience, but there is also Unzweckmässigkeit.[6] To find the true God, therefore, we must go beyond the purpose observable in experience. In fact, we must adopt an entirely different method of approach.

c. The Ontological Argument[7]

The preceding arguments begin with finite being and argue from it to the reality of true and infinite being, conceived as absolute, necessary power which is also wise and purposive. The ontological argument moves in precisely the opposite direction; beginning with the pure notion of God, it in-

---

[1] The organic is the end and meaning of the inorganic, but in turn depends on it for life. Cf. XIV, BDG, pp. 166-169.

[2] V, ENC, p. 79.

[3] XIII, RGI, p. 41. Cf. XII, BR, pp. 217-218; XIV, BDG, pp. 168-169; V, ENC, pp. 79-80.

[4] XIII, RGI, p. 42; cf. p. 41; XIV, BDG, pp. 170, 171.

[5] XIV, BDG, p. 170.

[6] XIII, RGI, p. 41.

[7] XII, BR, pp. 218-225; XIV, AR, pp. 39-53; XIV, BDG, pp. 172-177; V, ENC, p. 80; I, ED, p. 252.

in organic and inorganic matter, nothing here is interdependent;[1] it is the truth of the relation of matter. But living activity is not yet God. "God let more ais inhoodie, or let Gelat."[2] The Greek Mind is not the self-differentiating Idealistic Spirit. "Ring such Deaths wrinkle Yeast let sheep die Lobenhiglott for Ears, Book made Ass, we see Fearfullsight Coffee Moot and Gelat."[3]

Hegel finds the proof deductive also with respect to content. It is impossible that any argument with attempts to move from Being to God should hold a lost efficiency with all the limitations of Being as known to man. Immanence temporality and contingency "gaben nur unvollkommenheit, nicht den Grund Bestimmt Wesenheit."[4] If God's purposes are as limited as those of nature and of man, God is hardly worthy of worship. Human purposes are more often frustrated than realized, suggesting through the very idea of man limited.[5] It is true that there is Immanent in experience, but there is also Transcendentalism.[6] To find the true God, therefore, we must go beyond the purpose observable in experience. In fact, we must adopt an entirely different method of approach.

c. The Ontological Argument[7]

The preceding arguments begin with finite being and argue from it to the reality of true and infinite being, conceived as absolute, necessary, perfect which is also wise and powerful. The ontological argument moves in precisely the opposite direction; beginning with the pure notion of God, it im-

---

1 "An organism is God and reading of the Inorganic, for in turn depends on it for life. Cf. XIV, BWC, pp. 164-165.

2 [illegible], p. 78.

3 XIII, [illegible], p. 44. cf. XIII, BA, p. 217-218; XIV, [illegible], p. 168-169; [illegible], pp. 79-80.

4 XIII, [illegible], p. 68; cf. p. 41; XIV, [illegible], pp. 170, 171.

5 XIV, [illegible], p. 171.

6 XIII, [illegible], p. 41.

7 XIV, [illegible], pp. 210-270; XIV, [illegible], pp. 59-63; XIV, [illegible], pp. 172-173; [illegible], p. 80; [illegible], p. 208.

fers his existence.[1] As formulated by Anselm, the argument is as follows: The idea of God is that of the most perfect being. If, however, God is only an idea, he is not the most perfect being, for that alone is perfect which is not only imagined, but also exists. Therefore God exists.[2]

In content, says Hegel, this argument is "im ganzen richtig;" indeed, it alone is "der wahrhafte."[3] The other arguments, beginning as they do with finite experience, can yield only a God who is still afflicted with finite limitations. The ontological argument, moving in the realm of pure thought, avoids this empirical taint, and so proves the reality of God in his fullness.

Formally, however, the argument is defective. For Anselm nowhere demonstrated that existence is involved in the idea of perfection and truth, but only assumes it.[4] The unity of notion and being on which the argument depends is "bloss Voraussetzung."[5] The most perfect and real being is therefore itself an assumption, and the reality of God remains on the plane of subjective belief.[6]

For Hegel, however, the existence of God is "nicht mehr Voraussetzung, sondern Resultat."[7] It is involved in the very nature of the Gottesbegriff itself. For the Notion is

> dies Allgemeine, das sich bestimmt, besondert, diese Tätigkeit, zu urteilen, sich zu besondern, zu bestimmen, eine Endlichkeit zu setzen und diese seine Endlichkeit zu negieren und durch die Negation dieser Endlichkeit identisch mit sich zu sein. Das ist der Begriff überhaupt, der Begriff Gottes, der absolute Begriff; Gott ist eben dieses.[8]

---

[1] XIV, AR, pp. 44-45; BDG, p. 172.
[2] XIV, AR, pp. 41, 48; BDG, p. 173.
[3] XII, BR, p. 219; XIV, BDG, p. 172. Cf. XII, BR, p. 222; XIV, AR, p. 41.
[4] XIV, AR, p. 43; cf. pp. 50-52.
[5] XII, BR, p. 223.
[6] XIV, BDG, p. 175; cf. p. 176.
[7] XIV, BDG, p. 176.
[8] XII, BR, p. 221. Cf. XIV, AR, pp. 39-43, 50-51. Hegel does not attempt to demonstrate this in his Philosophie der Religion, holding that his whole system, especially as set forth in his Logik, shows it to be true. Cf. XIV, BDG, pp. 63, 150, 155.

[illegible] existence.[1] As formulated by Anselm, the argument is as follows: The idea of God is that of the most perfect being. It, however, has to be only an idea, as is not the most perfect being, for that alone is greater which is not only imagined, but also exists. Therefore God exists.[2]

In modern, pure form, this argument is "the reason rightly understood, it alone is "sur existentiel".[3] The other arguments, beginning as they do with finite experiences, can yield only a God who is still afflicted with finite limitations. The ontological argument, applying to the realm of pure thought, avoids this empirical taint, and so proves the reality of God in his fullness.

Formally, however, the argument is defective. For Anselm does not demonstrate that existence is involved in the idea of perfection and truth, but only assumes it.[4] The unity of motion and unity on which the argument depends is "alone rationalistic".[5] The most perfect and true being is therefore an assumption, and the reality of God remains on the plane of subjective belief.[6]

For Hegel, however, the existence of God is "bloss nur vermittelnd, nicht Resultat".[7] It is involved in the very notion of the Notwendigkeit itself. For the Notion is

> Die Allgemeinheit, die sich Besonderheit, Gegenwart, diese Totalität, in Objektivität, sich zu Bestimmen, diese Subjektivität in seinem und durch seine Identität in mannigfaltiger Realität durch die Tätigkeit dieser Totalität sich zu setzen. Das ist der Begriff Gottes, der absolute Begriff: Gott ist eben dieser.

---

1 [illegible], p. 4-[illegible]; [illegible], p. 172.
2 [illegible], p. 41; [illegible], p. 177.
3 [illegible], p. 172; [illegible], p. 174; [illegible], [illegible], p. 172; [illegible], [illegible], p. [illegible].
4 [illegible], p. 18; [illegible], pp. 30-32.
5 [illegible], p. [illegible].
6 [illegible], p. 172; [illegible], p. 174.
7 [illegible], p. 174.
8 [illegible], p. 291; [illegible], [illegible], p. 32-3, 30-31. Hegel does not attempt to demonstrate this in the [illegible] Kritik, holding that the whole system, especially as set forth in his [illegible], shows it to be true. [illegible], 72, 73, 82, 180, 182.

Being, therefore, is not something added to the notion of God, but is necessarily involved in it as one of its determinations.[1] The idea and the existence of God are two aspects of a concrete whole, the unity of the Notion.

> Die Gestalt der Religion enthält nicht das Dasein des Geistes, wie er vom Gedanken freie Natur ist, noch wie er vom Dasein freier Gedanke ist; sondern sie ist das im Denken erhaltene Dasein, so wie ein Gedachtes, das da ist.[2]

For Hegel, therefore, the ontological argument consists simply in showing how the Notion by its very nature negates its barren subjective unity and attains objective existence. The true transition from thought to being is this, "dass der Begriff seine Bestimmtheit, subjektiv zu sein, negiert, . . . oder vielmehr, [dass] er selbst diese seine Dialektik ist."[3]

> Der Gang ist dieser, dass der Begriff sich objektiviert, sich zur Realität macht, und so ist er die Wahrheit, Einheit des Subjekts und Objekts.[4]

So formulated, maintains Hegel, the argument is immune to Kant's criticisms (1) that, as regards content, existence adds nothing to the completeness or perfection of an idea, and (2) that the idea of an object does not guarantee its existence. It is true that any particular idea, such as that of a hundred dollars, may lack objective reality. But the absolute idea, the notion of God, is in a class by itself. It is its very nature to exist.

> Gott ist nicht <u>ein</u> Begriff, sondern <u>der</u> Begriff; dies [ist] die absolute Realität, die Idealität ist. Gott [ist] alle Realität, also die des Seins, d.h. im Begriff ist enthalten das Sein.[5]

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 221-222.

[2] II, PDG, p. 443. Commenting on this in reply to a critic, Hegel writes: "Also der Gegenstand in der Religion ist weder das Daseyn abstrahirt vom Denken (die Natur als die Idee in der einseitigen Form des Daseyns) noch der Gedanke abstrahirt vom Daseyn, (der Geist als die Idee in der einseitigen Form des Denkens, also der endliche Geist, oder das Denken abstrakt überhaupt, was gleichfalls endliches Denken ist) sondern Daseyn, welches Denken, und Denken, welches Daseyn ist." (In a review of, <u>Über die Hegel'sche Lehre oder: absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus</u>. Leipzig, 1829. JUB, XX, p. 328.) Cf. XIV, AR, p. 42.

[3] XIV, AR, pp. 42-43.

[4] XIV, BDG, p. 176.

[5] XIV, AR, p. 42. Cf. XII, BR, pp. 220-221; V, ENC, p. 80.

Being, therefore, is not something added to the notion of God, but is necessarily involved in it as one of its determinations.[1] The idea then the existence of God are two aspects of a concrete whole, the unity of the notion.

> Die Totalität der Endlichen vermittelt nicht das Dasein des Unendlichen, wie er vom Gedanken frühe bereits ist, noch wie er von Daseln (seiner Gedanken ist) ausgegen sie ist das in gleichen Substanzen Dasein, so wie sie Erscheinen, das ist.[2]

For Hegel, therefore, the ontological argument consists simply in showing how the Notion by its very nature negates its own subjective unity and becomes objective existence. The Idea translated into thought is being, "denn der Begriff eines konkreten, Subjektiv an sich, negiert . . . . sein Vielmehr, Dasein, oder nehmt diese reine Totalität ist."[3]

> Der Begriff ist dieses, dass der Begriff sich objektiviert, sich zur Realität macht, und es ist er die Kategorie, Kindheit des Subjekts und Objekts.[4]

So formulated, resisting Kant, the argument is saying to Kant's critics (1) that, at regress concept, existence also belonging to the conception or particular of an idea, and (2) that the idea of an object does not guarantee the existence. It is true that any particular idea, such as that of a hundred dollars, may lack objective reality. But the absolute idea, the notion of God, is in a class by itself. It is its very nature to exist.

> Dass ist nicht sein Begriff, sondern der Begriff; dies [ist] die absolute Realität, die Identität ist. Dass [ist] alle Realität, also die das Dasein. d.h. in Begriff ist enthalten das Sein.[5]

---

[1] [illegible], [illegible], pp. 291-292.

[2] [illegible], p. 412. Commenting on this is so is to a critic, Trendelenburg writes: "Also der Gegenstand in der Relation ist weder das Dasein absolut von Denken (die Theorie die Idee in der abgeleiteten Form der Begriffe, nach der Gedanke abstrahiert vom Dasein), der Geist als die Idee in der Entwicklung dem Dasein gegenüber, also der endliche Geist, nur das Dasein überhaupt, nur einheitlich endlichen Denken (ist) anderen Dasein, welches Dasein, und Denken, welches Dasein ist." (In a review of, Über die Hegelsche Lehre, nicht absolutes Dasein und Notwendiger Zusammenhang, Leipzig, 1870, pp. [illegible], p. [illegible], [illegible], p. [illegible].

[3] [illegible], p. [illegible].

[4] [illegible], pp. [illegible].

[5] [illegible], p. 174.

[illegible], p. [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], pp. [illegible]; [illegible], p. [illegible].

Assuming that absolute thought is subject to the same imperfections found in the thinking of empirical human beings, with their sense-limitations,[1] Kant seeks to separate Begriff and Sein, content and form. Having erected a barrier between the idea and the existence of God, he concludes that there is no way of surmounting it, and therefore that God cannot be known. When dealing with the Notion, however, this distinction is illegitimate and untrue.[2] Begriff and Sein are absolutely inseparable. Being is actually implied in the Notion. It would be queer, says Hegel, if the concrete totality which is God were not rich enough to contain in itself so poor a determination as being, which is the poorest and most abstract of all.[3]

Hegel believes that his formulation of the ontological argument leads to God in all his fullness, to Geist. For Geist is essentially the spiritual movement, the thinking activity which, while differentiating itself, returns to self-identity, or which, in other words, produces finite spirits and reconciles them to itself.[4]

4. Criticism

Nowhere else, perhaps, does Hegel's essential rationalism appear more clearly and unmistakably than in his discussions of the existence of God. His high estimate of the "proofs" for God, his painstaking efforts to restore their significance, and more particularly, his avowed preference for the ontological argument, the least empirical of the three, stamp him as a rationalist of the deepest dye. There is therefore real ground for the impression that Hegel proceeds to establish the existence of God in disregard

---

[1] XIV, AR, pp. 51-52.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 48; BDG, p. 176.
[3] XIV, BDG, p. 176; V, ENC, p. 80. By itself, being is a mere indescribable abstraction, "ganz bestimmungslose Unmittelbarkeit," "Vermittlungslosigkeit." As a determination in the notion of God, it is "die ganz abstrakte, allerdürftigste, dass er die Beziehung auf sich selbst ist." XIV, AR, p. 45; BDG, p. 175; XII, BR, p. 222. Cf. XIV, AR, p. 40.
[4] XII, BR, p. 221.

Assuming that absolute absurdity is analogous to the same dependencies found in the thinking of empirical human beings, with their means-situations,[1] Hegel seeks to separate Reality and Being, content and form. Having established earlier between the idea and the existence of God, he explains that there is no way of measuring it, and the notion that God cannot be known. When dealing with the Notion, however, this distinction is illegitimate and untrue.[2] Reality and Being are absolutely inseparable. Being is actually implied in the Notion. It would be quite, says Hegel, if the contradictory thing in fact were not distinguishing to consider in itself as a determination as being, which is the natural and most elementary of all.[3]

Hegel believes that his formulation of the ontological argument would do not in all its fullness, to Kant. For Kant is essentially the spiritual servant, the clinging activity which, while differentiating itself, returns to self-identity, or which, in other words, produces finite objects and repossesses them to itself.[4]

A. Criticism

Perhaps also, perhaps, that Hegel's essential rationalism appears more clearly and unmistakably than in his discussion of the existence of God. His high estimate of the "proofs" for God, his painstaking efforts to preserve their significance, and more particularly, his avowed preference for the metaphysical argument, the inner empirical of the three, stamp him as a rationalist of the deepest dye. There is therefore real grounds for the impression that Hegel proceeds to establish the existence of God in disregard

---

1 Ibid., p. 49, pp. 81-82.
2 Ibid., p. 181; Ibid., p. 270.
3 Ibid., p. 270; p. 1[illegible]; p. 50. Mr Hamlin's Being is a more intuitive conception. Hence he characterizes Hegel's "Reality" as "Intellectualist." It is a intellectualization in the notion of God. It is "the substantial, universal, more or less Reality and with which." Ibid., p. 49; Ibid., p. 181; Ibid., p. 270. Cf. Ibid., p. 50.
4 Ibid., p. 2[illegible].

of the facts of experience. When he writes, "Wie könnte sich wohl das philosophische Beweisen besser benehmen, als sich nur auf reine Begriffe zu stützen,"[1] he confirms this impression.

In fairness to Hegel it must be said that much of his rationalism involves not antagonism to the consideration of experience,[2] but simply an unwillingness to stop there. Man can think, and can therefore rise above experience, though on the basis of it. If he is to find God, moreover, he not only can, but must, transcend experience.[3] For instance, Hegel admits that we are immediately conscious of God, but insists that thought alone can raise this subjective certainty to the plane of objective truth.[4] The ultimate ground of our belief in God is not our emotional awareness of him, but our thinking relation to him. We know God not primarily because we feel him, but because thought drives us to him.

Hegel further believes that mere empirical observation of the world around us affords no more adequate support for belief in God than does inner feeling. Man is a thinking being, and as such cannot be content with seeking God "von und aus der empirischen Weltanschauung." The elevation to God "hat nichts anderes zu seiner Grundlage als die denkende, nicht bloss sinnliche, tierische Betrachtung der Welt."[5] As long as we remain on the finite ground of the exact sciences, we need not expect to find the Infinite. Lalande was quite right in saying that he had scanned the whole heaven with his telescope and not seen God.[6]

---

[1] In reply to Kant's criticism that the arguments are grounded not in experience, but in bare principles of reason. XIV, BDG, p. 146; cf. p. 60.

[2] The arguments for God are movements of thought, "die . . . in unserm Bewusstsein vorhanden sind." (XIV, BDG, p. 109.)

[3] Empirically we can say of God three things: (1) that we know him immediately; (2) that he is present in feeling; and (3) that God and the human subject, the Infinite and the finite, are regarded in consciousness as separate existences. All of these statements, says Hegel, are correct, but so trivial that they are not worth expressing. (XII, BR, pp. 82-83.)

[4] Cf. above, pp. 160-162.

[5] V, ENC, p. 75. Cf. XIV, BDG, pp. 144-145.

[6] V, ENC, p. 89.

of the facts of experience. When he writes, "His thoughts with real his philosophies behaves beyond measure, his stoic nor not raise hierarchy or systems,"[1] he continues this interest.

In fairness to Hegel it must be said that much of his rationalism involves not subjection to the consideration of experience,[2] but also a unwillingness to step there. He can think, and can therefore give above experience, though on the basis of it. If he is to find God, however, in reality can, but such, transcend experience.[3] For instance, Hegel admits that we are immediately conscious of God, but insists that to get clear we make this subjective particular to the plane of objective truth.[4] The ultimate ground of our belief in God is not our sentimental awareness of him, but our thinking relation to him. We know God not primarily because we feel him, but because thought drives us to him.

Hegel further believes that more rational observation of the world around us affords no more adequate support for belief in God than does inner feeling. Man is a thinking being, and so much cannot be content with feeling but "has and has experience within consciousness." The direction to God that wholly endures on being introduces air the [illegible] blood-close attachment, therefore determining our belief.[5] As long as we remain on the finite ground of the great sciences, we need not expect to find the infinite. Hegel has one quite right in saying that he had searched the whole heaven with his telescope and not seen God.[6]

---

[1] In regard to Jacobi's criticism that the arguments are grounded not in experience, but in bare principles of reason. (Ibid., p. 146; cf. p. 50.)

[2] The arguments for God are examples of a priori, thus . . . in arrange Cartesian rationalism also." (Ibid., p. 146.)

[3] Logically we can say of God three things: (1) that we come his immediately; (2) that he is present in feeling; and (3) that we come God, the infinite and the finite, are reached in consciousness by comparative relations. All of these statements, more logical, are correct, but we believe that they are not much appearing. (Ibid., pp. 19-20.)

[4] Cf. above, 146-147.

[5] Ibid., p. 20; cf. Ibid., pp. 144-145.

[6] Ibid., p. 20.

In short, Hegel insists that the experimental approach must be supplemented and transcended by rigorous thinking if metaphysical truth is to be won. In Hegel this thinking, as far as the existence of God is concerned, centers in the criticism and reformulation of the traditional arguments. These very arguments are not rational constructs out of relation to experience, but only descriptions of the course of the mind in thinking its experience.[1]

Even in emphasizing the ontological argument Hegel is beginning with the mind as he finds it. "Der Inhalt," he writes, "der ihr [this form of proof] zugrunde liegt, ist der Geist."[2] The defect of the other two arguments is precisely that they start with external nature, something more remote than self-experience. No consideration of living nature alone can yield God in his fullness. For

> Gott ist mehr als lebendig, er ist Geist. Die geistige Natur ist allein der würdigste und wahrhafteste Ausgangspunkt für das Denken des Absoluten, insofern das Denken sich einen Ausgangspunkt nimmt und den nächsten nehmen will.[3]

In approaching God we must begin with what is given, with the mind.

There is therefore evidence that the preference for reason in Hegel's treatment of the arguments for God is to some extent simply a conviction of the inadequacy of mere empiricism. His rationalism, however, goes much farther than this. He begins, indeed, with the mind as he finds it, but the mind which he finds is predominantly intellect. He renders lip service to imagination and feeling,[4] but leaves no doubt that for him the dominant activity of the mind in relation to God is thought. Hence his major emphasis on the ontological argument is quite as rationalistic as it seems. Preoccu-

---

[1] V, ENC, p. 75. In Hegel's words, they are "die Beschreibungen und Analysen des Ganges des Geistes in sich . . . , der ein denkender ist und das Sinnliche denkt."

[2] XII, BR, p. 218.

[3] V, ENC, p. 79.

[4] Cf. above, p. 161.

In short, Hegel insists that the experimental approach must be supplemented and transcended by intuition if philosophical truth is to be won. In Hegel's own words, so far as the existence of God is concerned, nature in its entirety and rationalization of the traditional arguments. These very arguments are not rational constructs but of relation to experience, but only descriptions of the growth of the mind in thinking the concept.[1]

Kant in exploding the ontological argument hoped to replace it by a faith in God. "Our belief," he writes, "for its (this form of proof) accurate fact, has due basis." The reason of the other two arguments is precisely that they start with external objects, a reality more remote than self-experience. To consideration of living beings alone can yield God in all fullness. For

> Gott ist weder die Idee allein, noch ist Gott. Die Idee ist nur für sich allein der Verstand und abstract wie Intellectuelles; Gott hat Dasein das Idealste, hat Form des Seyens sich als ein Anderes gegenstandlich und das Bewusstsein daraus, will.[2]

In proceeding that we must begin with what is given, with the mind.

There is indeed no evidence that the proclivities for proof in Kant's treatment of the arguments for God is to some extent simply a consideration of the inadequacy of mere materialism. His rationalism, however, goes much farther than this. To begin, instead, with the mind as the finite ill, but that mind which has first to be rationalizing instead. In modern life as well as in creation and faith, "but instead of an for him the immanent reality of the mind in relation to God is thought." Kant's big error consists in the ontological argument is quite as rationalistic as it stand. Intuition

---

1. Ibid., p. 75. In Hegel's words, they are "die Bewegung, mit welchen das Denken dort beginnt in sich . . . . . und sich erhebend ist und das allein denkende."
2. Ibid., p. 212.
3. Ibid., p. 77.
4. Ibid., p. 78.
5. Ibid., p. 79.
6. Ibid., p. 101.

pation with the rational side of man's nature prevents him from giving due recognition to the other aspects.

Hegel's exaggerated claim for reason appears even more clearly, perhaps, in his failure to recognize the hypothetical character of knowledge.[1] He is unwilling to admit that he assumes anything. In view of the distrust of reason which prevailed in the early nineteenth century, Hegel's confidence in the ability of human thought to fathom reality is commendable. Nevertheless, he places on reason a greater burden than it can bear. His conviction of the knowableness of God does not commit him to the view that God is completely known, yet he does affirm that in the Christian religion "es ist nichts Geheimes mehr an Gott."[2]

In the last analysis, Hegel's view of the knowableness of God is based on the assumption that his reason can be depended on to yield truth about ultimate reality. This, however, Hegel nowhere admits. He criticizes Anselm for founding his argument on a presupposition, and claims to presuppose nothing himself. To be sure, he points out that the nature of the Begriff to objectify itself and attain reality is simply carried over from the Logik,[3] but he insists that "in der logischen Philosophie" it is erwiesen.[4] In the Logik, however, one looks in vain for a demonstration that the dialectic of thought as there developed applies to the ultimate constitution of reality. This, of course, is not surprising. One can never be cognitively certain that one's judgments are metaphysically valid. In every judgment is the implicit assumption that the laws of the mind are objectively grounded, but this cannot be proved. One might be able to show conclusively what the human mind is in

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 145-147.

[2] XII, BR, p. 75. Cf. above, p. 160.

[3] XIV, BDG, pp. 150, 155. In truth, the ontological argument is the whole Logik in a nutshell.

[4] XIV, BDG, p. 63; cf. p. 176. Note also this passage which Lasson excludes from the text proper: "Hier ist es nicht mehr darum zu tun, zu beweisen, dass das Dogma, dies stille Mysterium, die ewige Wahrheit ist: dies geschieht . . . in der ganzen Philosophie." (XIV, AR, p. 70n,; JUB, XVI, p. 229.)

nation with the rational ally of man's nature prevents his from giving the recognition to the other aspects.

Hardly unprecedented claim for reason appears even more clearly, however, in his failure to reconcile the hypothetical character of knowledge.[1] He is unwilling to admit that he reasons anything. In view of the diversity of reason which revealed in the early dialogues of Plato, Hegel's confidence in the ability of human thought to reach reality is remarkable. Nevertheless, he plays on reason a greater burden than it can bear. His description of the inadequacy of the Cosmological Proof, for the existence of God, is exactly proper, yet he goes astray that in the Ontological Argument "reason does no more than an ass."[2]

In the last analysis, Hegel's view of the knowledge of God is based on the assumption that pure reason can be depended on to yield truth about ultimate reality. This, however, Kant denies exists. He criticizes Anselm for founding his argument on a presupposition, and claims to preserve reason himself. To be sure, he points out that the nature of the <u>reality</u> to which reason and sense reality is slowly carried over from the <u>world</u>, but he insists that "in our logical [illegible] it is <u>reality</u>." In the <u>world</u>, however, one looks in vain for a demonstration that the existence of things as there devolved applies to the ultimate constitution of reality. This, of course, is not surprising. One can never be reasonably certain that man's judgments are authoritatively valid. In every judgment is the implicit assumption that the laws of the mind are objectively grounded, but this cannot be proved. One might be able to show conclusively what the human mind is in

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 140-41.

[2] [illegible], p. 78. Cf. above, p. 30.

[3] [illegible], pp. 100, 102. In truth, the only logical argument is the ontological one [illegible].

[4] [illegible], p. 271; cf. p. 272. Note also this passage which [illegible] from the same present: "Kant let us might [illegible] in [illegible] on, does not [illegible] Kant's critique [illegible] the [illegible] . . . In the [illegible] Philosophy" [illegible], p. 3.

all its activities, yet still be unable to prove rationally that this mind truly mirrors forth the ultimate nature of things. Our knowledge of the existence of God, like that of the reality of other human individuals, is ultimately hypothetical. Hegel can show that if the Begriff is actually self-objectifying, God must exist. Try as he may, however, he cannot abolish this hypothetical basis of his argument and prove that the Begriff is really what he thinks it to be.

If, therefore, Hegel claims to know God, it is because he trusts his own mind. Implicit in all he says, though nowhere admitted, is his unlimited faith in reason. He believes that his own thinking leads him to the very center of reality. For him the whole dialectic is at every stage a description of the Absolute, which he assumes at the outset.[1] He cannot think except in terms of its existence. Every step of his argument presupposes its reality. From this standpoint, far from banishing faith, Hegel is himself the supreme believer of philosophical history.

III. The Nature of God

A. What the Absolute Is

Having considered what for Hegel is the way to God, we have now to ask to what kind of God this way leads. The answer is not easy. Hegel nowhere offers a systematic exposition of the Absolute. He seems to assume that his philosophy as a whole somehow makes clear what God is, thus rendering specific treatment unnecessary. This much is certain: the Absolute is a being of many-sided richness and diversity. Like Bryant's Nature, Hegel's God speaks a various language. Accordingly, we find the philosopher approaching the Absolute from varying points of view.

---

[1] For an interesting statement of this view, cf. I. H. Fichte, "Zur spekulativen Theologie," Zeit. f. Phil. u. syst. Theol. 5(1840), pp. 160-167.

all its activities, yet still he wants to prove rationally that this God truly answers faith by ultimate matters of thinking. The knowledge of the existence of God, like that of the reality of other human individuals, is immediately apprehended. Hegel can show that if the Deeper is actually self-objectivity, he must exist. It can be say, however, he cannot establish this apprehensional basis of his argument and prove that the Deeper is really what he claims it to be.

If, therefore, Hegel's claim to knowledge, it is because he creates his own world. Knowledge is all he sees, though he refuses to admit, in his "finite faith in reason." He believes that his own religious faith is the very center of reality. For him the whole idealistic is at every stage a fantasy of the imagination, which he assumes at the outset.[1] He cannot think except in terms of his assumptions. Every step of his argument presupposes the reality, from this a-priori, for from unfaithing faith. Hegel is simply the supreme believer of philosophical history.

iii. The Nature of God

a. What the Absolute Is

Having considered what for Hegel is the way to God, we have now to ask to what kind of God this way leads. The answer is not easy. Hegel nowhere offers a systematic description of the Absolute. He seems to assume that his philosophy as a whole provides clear what God is, thus requiring specific treatment unnecessary. This much is certain: the Absolute is a Being of super-rational richness and diversity. Like Spinoza's God, Hegel's God presents a various language. Accordingly, we find the philosopher approaching the Absolute from varying points of view.

---

1 See on transcending statement of this view, W. T. M. Tinkle, "Hegel's Speculative Theology," Diss. U. Chic. 1950, p. 9; cf. Hegel, Phil. Hist. (1840), p. 18.

1. The Absolute as Activity

God may be described, for example, as living, creative activity. The Absolute is "Prozess, Bewegung, Leben,"[1] "Tätigkeit, Lebendigkeit, und Geistigkeit."[2] This activity is dialectical in nature; it eternally differentiates itself to produce its own other and eternally resolves the resulting contradictions.[3] God as "das Wahre und Wirkliche" is "eben diese in sich kreisende Bewegung,"[4] "freie, sich auf sich selbst beziehende, bei sich bleibende Tätigkeit."[5]

2. The Absolute as Thought and Love

To characterize God as movement alone, however, is far from sufficient. He is this, but much more. The activity in question is thinking activity. God is essentially thought.[6]

> Eben Denken, alles, was in demselben liegt und seine Wurzel darin hat, als in sich unendlicher Selbstzweck, formell oder objektiv auch dem Inhalte nach, [ist] das Absolute.[7]

With similar meaning God may be called the Absolute Idea, which advances dialectically from abstract oneness through difference to concrete unity.

> Das Absolute ist die allgemeine und <u>eine</u> Idee, welche als <u>urteilend</u> sich zum <u>System</u> der bestimmten Ideen besondert, die aber nur dies sind, in die <u>eine</u> Idee, in ihre Wahrheit zurückzugehen.[8]

This does not mean, however, that God is to be conceived merely as cold, barren thought. For the religious consciousness, or "nach der Weise der Empfindung," he may be just as well portrayed as "die ewige Liebe."[9]

---

1 XIV, AR, p. 74.
2 XII, BR, p. 147. Cf. XIV, AR, pp. 35, 74.
3 XIV, AR, p. 13. Cf. JUB, III, PHPR, p. 226.
4 II, PDG, p. 493; cf. pp. 14, 505, 516, 520.
5 XIV, BDG, p. 27. Cf. II, PDG, p. 439.
6 XIV, BDG, p. 111.
7 XIII, RGI, p. 204.
8 V, ENC, p. 190. Cf. XIV, AR, pp. 47-48, 55.
9 XIV, AR, p. 75; cf. pp. 57, 61, 73; BDG, p. 111.

This characterization, moreover, expresses the same self-differentiating identity which is implied in all terms applied by Hegel to the Absolute.

It becomes clear how difficult it is to describe the Absolute in a single phrase. He is at once Activity, Process, Life, Movement, Thought, Idea, Love. All of these terms mean for Hegel one thing; they express the same truth in varying ways. All are summed up in the account of the Idea which Hegel wrote to Duboc.

> Meine Ansicht ist insofern, dass die Idee nur als Prozess in ihr (wie Werden ein Beispiel ist) als Bewegung ausgedrückt und gefasst werden muss; denn das Wahre ist nicht ein nur ruhendes, seyendes, sondern nur als sich selbst bewegend, als lebendig;---das ewige Unterscheiden und die in Einem seyende Reduktion des Unterschiedes dahin, dass er kein Unterschied ist;---was auch Empfindungsweise aufgefasst, die ewige Liebe genannt worden ist; nur als diese Bewegung in sich, die ebenso absolute Ruhe ist, ist die Idee, Leben, Geist.[1]

3. The Absolute as Spirit

a. The Personality of God

When taken in the Hegelian sense, the qualities so far emphasized are all legitimate characterizations of the Absolute. Yet none of them is altogether adequate to express the full notion of God. For the Absolute is for Hegel no impersonal principle of any kind whatever; in its fullest and highest meaning, it is self-conscious Spirit, Personality. This is suggested by the final word of the passage just quoted, but it appears more clearly elsewhere. God's highest determination, writes Hegel, <u>ist Selbstbewusstsein</u>.[2] God is "nur als Geist zu fassen."[3]

> Das Absolute ist der Geist, dies ist die höchste Definition des Absoluten. . . . Der Inhalt der christlichen Religion ist, Gott als Geist zu erkennen zu geben.[4]

---

[1] <u>Werke</u> (orig. ed.), XIX, BVAH, II, pp. 79-80; <u>Werke</u> (orig. ed.), XVII, VS, p. 523. Cf. V, ENC, pp. 235-236.

[2] XII, BR, p. 156; cf. p. 160.

[3] XII, BR, p. 41. Cf. also the passage already quoted above, p. 177 (V, ENC, p. 79).

[4] V, ENC, p. 335. Cf. XII, BR, p. 159; II, PDG (3d ed., 1928), pp. 22, 532; JUB, V, WDL, pp. 327, 349.

Hegel's insistence on the personality of God appears also in his frequent criticisms of various pantheistic systems, such as those of the Hindus and Spinoza. Such views make God a mere undifferentiated substance, not the personal Spirit which the Absolute really is.

> Der Mangel dieser sämtlichen Vorstellungsweisen und Systeme ist, nicht zur Bestimmung der Substanz als Subjekt und als Geist fortzugehen.[1]

The reason for Hegel's view of the Absolute as personal is not hard to find. In his own experience he finds that thought is dialectical.[2] This same experience, however, reveals that thought is never an isolated, abstract principle, but always the function of a self whose activity manifests the same dialectic. The distinguishing mark of personality is, "seine Isoliertheit aufzugeben. . . . Das Wahre der Persönlichkeit ist eben dies, sie durch das Versenken, Versenktsein in das Andere zu gewinnen."[3] In friendship and love, for example, the self surrenders its particularity and relates itself to the universal.[4] But this is precisely what is meant by the self-differentiating and self-uniting activity of thought. It is thus altogether natural that Hegel, in discussing the nature of absolute thought or the Absolute, should personalise it. In think-

---

[1] V, ENC, p. 494. Cf. XII, BR, pp. 195-198; 254-257; XIV, BDG, pp. 126-130. The question as to whether Hegel himself is a pantheist, which has divided his followers into two camps, is not a problem of this dissertation. He defines pantheism as the view that God is the immediate substance of the existing world, that finite existences such as human self-consciousness, sun, moon, stars, mountains, rivers, and sea are in their abstract immediacy divine, real forms of the divine existence (V, ENC, p. 64; XII, BR, pp. 254-257). He therefore insists that he is not a pantheist, since for him God is concrete, self-mediating Spirit, existing nowhere in abstract separation. However, in maintaining that the world is all one being and that the Absolute alone is real (V, ENC, pp. 36-38), Hegel is undeniably pantheistic. Yet in affirming the personality of God he is at one with theism. It would probably be most accurate to describe him as a personalistic pantheist. Cf. above, p. 81.

[2] Cf. II, PDG, passim.

[3] XIV, AR, p. 81; cf. p. 158.

[4] It is the personal, moreover, which makes itself the object of its own knowledge. Cf. XII, BR, p. 156.

Kierkegaard's insistence on the personality of God appears also in his frequent criticisms of various rationalistic systems, such as those of the Hegelians and Spinoza. Such views make God a mere impersonal substance, not the personal Spirit which the Christian worship is.

> Der Pantheismus, Spinozismus, Hegelianismus und Idealismus überhaupt, nicht nur Rationalismus, die Substanz sind die Idee Gottes fortwährend.[1]

The reason for Kierkegaard's view of the Christian as personal is not hard to find. In his own experience he finds that towards in Christianity, "alle andere Gottesidee", however, reveals that Christianity is treated as intellectual principle, but always the function of a self-seeking activity matters the same that-ness. The distinguishing mark of personality is, "seine Individualität entwickeln, . . . Individuum der Zweck-Idee ist dass Ich, wie durch das Christentum, Gemeinschaft in das Ewige zu machen."[2] In friendship and love, for example, the self overcomes its exclusivity and relates itself to the universal. But this is problematic that is meant by the self-differentiating and self-centering activity of thought. It is this difficulty rather than that Kierkegaard, in discussing the reality of absolute thought or the idea, should personalize it. In thinking

---

[1] Pap. IX A 80, p. 130-132; Dis-Pf; Kierkegaard, pp. 124-130. The question as to whether Hegel's Absolute is a personality, with the ability his followers into two groups, is not a problem of this discussion. He defines personality as the "ego that is the immediate presence of its relative world, that finds with-some and be known self-consciousness, and, hence, there, possibility, always, not has in that a-present immediate divine, real form of the divine relationship (Pap. IX A 80, p. 134-137). So therefore Hegelian does to is not a personality, which for him God is concrete, self-mediating unity, existing wholly in a-present-reflection. However, in maintaining that the world is all one being and that the Absolute alone is real (Pap. IX A 80, p. 134-137), he is inevitably pantheistic. The inability to attribute the reality of God as he is at an with theism. It would probably be most accurate to describe him as a rationalizing pantheist. Cf. above, p. 31.

[2] Pap. X A 80, p. 134.

It is the personal, however, which makes itself the object of its own knowledge. Cf. XI A 80, p. 134.

ing he finds that his finite thought drives him on to universal thought. How natural is the further conclusion that, just as finite thought is grounded in finite personality, so is this universal thought real only as the activity of a universal personality, God! Almost inevitably, therefore, the self-objectifying movement of thought which for Hegel characterizes the Absolute is not an abstract principle, but essentially a personal activity which is nothing apart from self-conscious experience. "Das ewige Beispiel [haben wir] am Selbstbewusstsein."[1]

God is not, however, a single person in the same sense as human individuals; neither is he merely a society of persons. He is rather the absolute individual, the one universal personality who comprehends in himself all particular finite persons, resolving and unifying their contradictions in his own concrete wholeness.[2] Without human society as the object of his thought, God's life would be barren and empty; without God, human life would be hopelessly contradictory and chaotic.

> Indem die Einzelheit als Ich, die Persönlichkeit, insofern nicht ein empirisches Ich, eine besondere Persönlichkeit verstanden wird, vornehmlich indem die Persönlichkeit Gottes vor dem Bewusstsein ist, so ist von reiner, d.i. der in sich allgemeinen Persönlichkeit die Rede; eine solche ist Gedanke und kommt nur dem Denken zu.[3]

In his fullest meaning, therefore, God is the Absolute Spirit. This term is not opposed to the previously discussed determinations of thought and activity, but includes them. Spirit is dialectical movement, which in

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 61. Cf. below, p. 198.

[2] "Gott ist wesentlich in seiner Gemeinde, hat eine Gemeinde, ist sich gegenständlich, und ist dies wahrhaft nur im Selbstbewusstsein." (XII, BR, p. 156.) "God is a Spirit in his own concrete differences, of which every finite spirit is one." (J. H. Stirling, SOH, II, p. 579.) Cf. also J. A. Leighton, MCG, p. 66.

[3] V, ENC, p. 90.

turn is nothing if it is not Spirit.[1] God is for Hegel the Absolute Spirit who eternally objectifies himself in the creation of finite spirits whom he reconciles to himself, thereby realizing his own concrete unity, complete self-consciousness. "Geist ist die göttliche Geschichte, der Prozess des sich Unterscheidens, Dirimierens und dies in sich Zurücknehmens."[2]

b. God as a Trinity[3]

In view of this emphasis on dialectical activity in the Absolute, it is not at all surprising that Hegel should make free use of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in discussing the character of God. Repeatedly he insists that the view of God as a Trinity is the very heart of Christianity.[4] "Nur die Dreieinigkeit ist die Bestimmung Gottes als Geistes;" if God is to be anything more than an empty word, "so muss er als <u>dreieiniger Gott</u> gefasst werden."[5]

> Dieses neue Prinzip ist die Angel, um welche sich die Weltgeschichte dreht. . . . Die Christen wissen von Gott, was er ist, insofern sie wissen, dass er dreieinig ist. . . . Wer von Gott nicht weiss, dass er dreieinig ist, der weiss nichts vom Christentum.[6]

In all religions where God is conceived only abstractly as One, man's relation to him can be only one of servitude and fear. "Im Christentum, [in der] Dreieinigkeit liegt die wahrhafte Befreiung."[7]

Hegel is not, however, so orthodox as he sounds. Verbal similarity cannot obscure the fact that his view of the Trinity is very different from

---

[1] "Das absolute Wesen, das nicht als Geist erfasst wird, ist nur das abstrakt Leere, so wie der Geist, der nicht als diese Bewegung erfasst wird, nur ein leeres Wort ist." (II, PDG, p. 494.) Cf. XIV, AR, p. 166.

[2] XIV, AR, p. 65. Cf. pp. 12, 47, 62-64, 69; XII, BR, p. 156; JUB, XX, pp. 97-98; IX, PWG, p. 734.

[3] Cf. above, pp. 150-151.

[4] XII, BR, pp. 41-42. Cf. above, p. 150.

[5] XII, BR, pp. 42, 41.

[6] IX, PWG, p. 722.

[7] XIII, RGI, p. 91. Cf. also, XIV, AR, pp. 173-174; V, ENC, p. 18n; "Über: <u>Hamann's Schriften</u>." JUB, XX, p. 237.

the traditional Christian conception. Hegel himself declares that the relation of Father, Son, and Spirit is a childish formulation, though it has value if it is clearly understood to be only figurative. Even as a figure, however, "Liebe wäre noch passender."[1] The real meaning of the Trinity is to be found in the three moments of the dialectical movement of Spirit. God as eternal being or Idea is incomplete, mere barren, abstract unity. Only through eternally particularizing himself to produce his own other does he attain reality. But this being-other is itself only an abstract moment. Only, therefore, through returning out of difference to himself, or through remaining identical with himself in difference, does God achieve full self-consciousness, personality; only thus is he truly Spirit.[2] The three-fold nature of God is therefore to be found actually in the abstract, all-inclusive, totale Allgemeinheit of the Absolute Spirit, in the unendliche Besonderheit of the finite spirits resulting from Spirit's self-differentiation, and in the konkrete Einzelheit of the Spirit resulting from his eternal reconciliation of spirits with himself.[3] So conceived, the Trinity expresses for Hegel the innermost essence of the Absolute Spirit.

> Gott ist Geist, d.i. das, was wir dreieinigen Gott heissen. . . . Gott ist Geist, die absolute Tätigkeit, actus purus, d.i. Subjektivität, unendliche Persönlichkeit, unendliche Unterscheidung von sich selbst, sich gegenständliche, sich objektive Göttlichkeit.[4]

B. Corollaries to this View of God

1. The Immanence of God

Certain implications of Hegel's view of the Absolute require further

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 72.

[2] The completion of religion, says Hegel, consists in this, that Spirit "sich als seiner selbst bewusster Geist wirklich und Gegenstand seines Bewusstseins werde." (II, PDG, p. 437; cf. p. 14.) "Es ist der Gott, der sich in sich unterscheidet, aber darin mit sich identisch bleibt." (XIV, AR, p. 69. Cf. XII, BR, p. 221.)

[3] XIV, AR, p. 72; V, ENC, pp. 482-483. Cf. VIII, PWG, pp. 35-36.

[4] XIV, AR, p. 57; cf. p. 69; II, PDG, p. 439.

the specifically Christian concepts. Hegel himself believes that his system of Reason, God, and Spirit is a faithful formulation, though he has never, if it is clearly understood to be only figurative. Then as a figure however, Plato's view much recommends.[1] The real meaning of the Trinity is to be found in the three moments of the dialectical movement of Spirit, not as mental being or like in Incarnation, more barren, abstract unity, but as a vitally vertical relation blended to provide life and form be within reality. But this Sublime-Union is itself only an abstract moment. Truly, however, Spirit remaining one of difference to Nature, or Nature, regularly identified with himself in difference, does not achieve full self-consciousness, remaining: only Nature is by truly Spirit.[2] The three-fold nature of God is therefore to be found actually in the Universal, self-mediative, Totality of the Absolute Spirit, in the Spirit-Nature Transcendental of the finite subjective realizing free Spirit's self-transformation, and in the Concrete Eternity of the Spirit resulting from the eternal reconciliation of opposite with himself.[3] As conceived, the Trinity expresses for-God the inner or essence of the Absolute Spirit.

> God let Spirit, d.i. das, was die Religionen Gott heissen, . . . Gott ist Geist, die absolute Spiritualität, reine Aktivität, d.i. Tätigkeit, unendlich in sich selbst, wendet sich Bewusstsein zu sich selbst, sich gegenständlich, sich objektiv realisiert.[4]

B. Considering the Idea, the of God

1. The Immanence of God

Certain implications of Hegel's view of the Absolute require further

---

[1] LHR, 3, p. 75.

The combination of Trinitarian, more Hegel, emphasis in this, that Christ "with his spirit neither transcendent Deity, strictly and Immanent Nature Immanentism words." (LHR, 3, p. 82; cf. p. 84.) "He is God with in this Universalist, when Christ was with Christ" (LHR, 3, p. 83, 75, 77, 81, 82, 83, 84.)

[2] LHR, 3, p. 77; "Nature has-been, or Nature, God, Spirit, Spirit, p. 83; cf. p. 87; 88, p. 87; 88, p. 87, 88, p. 87.

consideration. In the first place, the concrete relation involved between God and his world should be carefully noted. The Absolute Spirit is not a being beyond or above the world, but immanent, ceaselessly active in it.[1] "Der göttliche Geist muss das Weltliche immanent durchdringen; so ist die Weisheit konkret darin und seine Berechtigung an ihm selbst bestimmt."[2] The world is, in fact, nothing other than the developing life of God.

> . . . Die Entwicklung Gottes in sich und die Entwicklung des Universums sind nicht . . . absolut verschieden. Gott ist die Wahrheit, die Substanz des Universums, nicht bloss ein abstrakt Anderes. Es ist daher derselbe Stoff; es ist die intellektuelle göttliche Welt, das göttliche Leben in ihm selbst, das sich entwickelt. Aber diese Kreise---Tun seines Lebens---ist dasselbe als das Leben der Welt; aber dieses Leben ist nur Erscheinung, jenes Leben ist das ewige.[3]

God, therefore, is to be found everywhere. In every process of nature, every thought or deed of man, the eternal activity of the Absolute Spirit may be seen. Wherever we look with the spiritual eye, whether at the planets in their orbits, the overflowing life of the natural world, the slow, steady advance of world history, or the richly diversified operations of the living human mind, everywhere we find God,[4] "for in him we live and move and have our being."[5]

2. The Problem of Suffering[6]

One of the most distinctive and profound aspects of Hegel's religious thought is his interpretation of suffering, the key to which is his conception of God. The dialectic which he finds in the Absolute provides

---

[1] XII, BR, pp. 43-44. Cf. above, p. 118.

[2] V, ENC, p. 468. This idea of God provides the basis for Hegel's view, already discussed, that worship must eventuate in moral living. Cf. above, pp. 73-78.

[3] XII, BR, p. 186; cf. p. 185.

[4] Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, Hegel, pp. 378-379. A good illustration is the ethical life. It is not enough, says Hegel, to command giving to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's, for this sets up a false separation; actually, Caesar has no rights as opposed to God, for all is God's. (V, ENC, p. 468.)

[5] Acts 17:28.

[6] Cf. above, pp. 82-87.

a ready tool for dealing with the fact of pain, and Hegel uses it with consummate skill.

Why is there suffering in the world? Because, answers Hegel, there is tension and opposition in the very nature of God. God is Spirit, and Spirit eternally negates or differentiates itself. The agony and travail so frequent in human life are no ephemeral appearance; "der Ernst, der Schmerz, die Geduld und Arbeit des Negativen"[1] characterize the very nature of things. In the heart of God stands an eternal cross.

Already in this insight, however, are to be found the germs of a solution to the problem of evil. For if it is true that the negativity in God himself is the ground of pain, it is conversely true that pain is a sign of the presence of God. That there is suffering in God means also that God is in suffering.

> Das Leiden der Seele ist das Zeugnis von dem Geist, indem er die Negativität ist vom Endlichen und Unendlichen, Subjektivität und Objektivität zusammenseiend noch als diese Widerstreitenden. Wäre dieser Streit geschwunden, so wäre kein Schmerz. Der Geist ist die absolute Kraft, diesen Schmerz zu ertragen, d.h. beide zu vereinigen und so zu sein in dieser Einigkeit. In dem Schmerz ist die Beglaubigung der Erscheinung Gottes.[2]

This element of negation and opposition in Spirit is fittingly represented in Christianity in the passion and death of Christ. God particularizes himself, becomes finite. The most extreme degree of finitude and limitation, however, is not mere temporal life, but death;[3] and the most extreme form of death is the dishonorable death of a criminal.[4] Christ, therefore, not only lives among men, but is despised and rejected of men

---

[1] II, PDG, p. 13; cf. p. 140; IX, PWG, p. 937; above, p. 84.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 149.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 157. Death is "diese höchste Negation, die abstrakteste, selbst natürliche, die Schranke, Endlichkeit in ihrem höchsten Extrem."
[4] XIV, AR, pp. 161, 165.

and dies the ignominious death of the cross. The closing events of his earthly life are thus not merely the history of a particular individual, but the history of man as man in his relation to God, and even more deeply, the eternal history of Spirit.[1] They symbolize for the religious consciousness the tension and negation in the very nature of God. So conceived, the death of Christ is "das zeitliche, vollkommene Dasein der göttlichen Idee in der Gegenwart."[2] The fearful, terrifying thought, "Gott ist gestorben, Gott selbst ist tot," expresses for the imagination "die höchste Entäusserung der göttlichen Idee . . . , den tiefsten Abgrund der Entzweiung,"[3] bringing with it the most intense pain, a feeling of complete hopelessness and helplessness. For everything which was deemed eternal and true is itself negated and destroyed.[4]

This very negation, however, carries with it the means of its own defeat. It is the nature of Spirit to pass through self-externalization to self-identity. Beyond estrangement lies harmony, beyond division is reconciling love, beyond suffering supreme peace. Love consists essentially in the spirit of self-sacrifice, in "Aufgeben seiner Persönlichkeit."[5] Pain is thus the expression of a love which triumphs over pain. In fact, love and pain are aspects of the same reality: "Jene ist dieser, der tiefste Schmerz, dieser [jene,] die höchste Liebe, in jenem diese."[6] Estrangement and opposition, far from indicating evil or vindictiveness in the nature

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 156.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 157.
[3] XIV, AR, pp. 157-158. Cf. II, PDG (3d ed., 1928), pp. 523, 545. See also the second stanza of the hymn, "O Traurigkeit, o Herzeleid," by Johann Rist, which begins, "O grosse Not! Gott selbst ist tot."
[4] XIV, AR, p. 167.
[5] XIV, AR, p. 158.
[6] XIV, AR, p. 163. Similarly, Hegel speaks of "Liebe aus unendlichem Schmerz," and of "dem Spekulativen und Negativen des unendlichen Schmerzes der Liebe." (XIV, AR, pp. 179, 178.)

of things, actually reveal the supremacy of love.

The death of Christ, therefore, represents not only the gap between the finite and the infinite, but also their fundamental oneness; not only the pain and travail in the heart of God, but also his triumphant love. In the self-abandonment of the cross, love bursts forth in its full glory. In suffering the most extreme form of death, Christ manifests the highest life,[1] a love which transfigures man and elevates him to God. Popularly it has been said that Christ was sacrificed for us and that his sacrificial death wins satisfaction for all men. This formulation has justifiably aroused the objection that each man must answer for his own acts. In the concrete and speculative sense, however, Christ's death is sufficient for our salvation, for it simply expresses vorstellungsweise the metaphysical truth that Spirit through self-externalization and self-limitation attains concrete unity in a life of abundant love. Reconciliation is not the particular act of one individual, but the universal, eternal history of Spirit.[2]

> Der Tod ist überhaupt ebenso als die höchste Verendlichung ebenso dies Aufheben der natürlichen Endlichkeit, des unmittelbaren Daseins, das Aufheben der Entäusserung, die Auflösung der Schranke, das Moment des Geistes, sich in sich zu fassen. . . . Dieser Tod also, das Leiden, der Schmerz des Todes, der ist dies Element der Versöhnung des Geistes mit sich, mit dem, was er an sich ist, enthält. . . . Dieser Tod ist also genugtuend für uns, indem er die absolute Geschichte der göttlichen Idee darstellt, das, was an sich geschehen ist und ewig geschieht.[3]

The paradox of reconciliation through suffering is perfectly symbolized in the absolute religion by the resurrection and ascension of Christ, which follow his death and would have been impossible without it. Here is

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 158.
[2] XIV, AR, pp. 160-161, 166.
[3] XIV, AR, pp. 158-159; cf. pp. 177-178. Individuals attain anything only because the nature of Spirit, of which they are parts, makes such attainment possible. "Dass der einzelne Mensch etwas tut, erreicht, [ein] Zweck [von ihm] vollbracht wird, dazu gehört, dass die Sache an sich in ihrem Begriffe so sich verhalte." (XIV, AR, p. 159.)

manifested in objective form the death of death, conquest of the grave, triumph over the negative. Here God appears as both reconciler and reconciled. Here human nature is lifted to heaven, where the son of man sits at the right hand of the Father. Man and God are seen to be one, united in divine love.[1]

God, therefore, is the Absolute Spirit who attains self-realization through self-abnegation. He finds himself through losing himself, and gains his highest life by giving it away. He knows in his own experience the bitter pain of the cross, but passes through and beyond it to a triumph of redeeming love. He is a God who suffers, but who through suffering draws all men to himself.

> Was uns also dies Leben Christi zur Vorstellung bringt, und zwar für das empirische, allgemeine und unmittelbare Bewusstsein, ist dieser Prozess der Natur des Geistes, Gott in menschlicher Gestalt. Dieser [Prozess ist] in seiner Entwicklung der Fortgang der göttlichen Idee zur höchsten Entzweiung, zum Gegenteil des Schmerzes des Todes, welcher selbst die absolute Umkehrung, die höchste Liebe, in sich selbst das Negative des Negativen, die absolute Versöhnung ist, das Aufheben des Gegensatzes der Menschen gegen Gott, und das Ende vorhanden als Auflösung in die Herrlichkeit, die gefeierte Aufnahme des Menschlichen in die göttliche Idee ist. Jenes Erste, Gott in menschlicher Gestalt, ist er reell in diesem Prozess, der die Trennung der göttlichen Idee und ihre Wiedervereinigung, erst ihre Vollendung als Wahrheit zeigt. Dies ist das Ganze der Geschichte.[2]

C. Appraisal

1. Hegel's Empirically Founded Rationalism

The critic can hardly fail to be impressed by the way in which Hegel's view of God combines loyalty to experience with a confident use of thought in interpreting that experience. The negativity which Hegel finds

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 163. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 734.

[2] XIV, AR, pp. 163-164; cf. pp. 139, 166, 203, 205. See also II, PDG, p. 503, where Hegel writes of the Spirit, "der in seiner Gemeinde lebt, in ihr täglich stirbt und auferseht;" and Hegel's treatment of sin from the standpoint of God, above, pp. 91-92.

at the heart of things is but another name for the conflict, the frustration, and the sorrow which bulk so large in normal human life. Likewise, the reconciliation which for him harmonizes all contradictions in Spirit reflects faithfully man's experience of God's redeeming love, the deep peace which broods over the soul of him who, rising above his petty cares and clashing finite interests, has found God.[1] At the same time, Hegel's view of God would have been impossible had he not gone beyond experience. There is in his conception a definite and inevitable element of rational construction. No mere description of the content of consciousness would yield a God worthy of the name. Hegel builds up, by reasoning on the basis of experience, the idea of God to which he believes experience points. He argues that the most reasonable interpretation of the kind of world we have, with its dual aspects of conflict and reconciliation, suffering and joy, is that the world is the manifestation of a Spirit whose nature is to harmonize opposition in his own life, to transcend suffering in triumphant love.[2]

This same interplay of empirical and rational factors lies behind Hegel's view of the Absolute as personal. As we have seen, through reflection on the dialectical nature of thought and personality as found in experience, he concludes that ultimate reality itself is dialectical, and best described as thinking Personality, Spirit.[3]

2. Difficulties in Hegel's View

In certain respects, however, Hegel is neither sufficiently empirical nor satisfyingly rational.

In the first place, his exposition of the Absolute leaves much to be

---

[1] Hegel expresses philosophically the same religious experience which is voiced in the line, "Earth has no sorrow that Heaven cannot heal." (Hymn, "Come, Ye Disconsolate," by Thomas Moore and Thomas Hastings. Methodist Hymnal, N.Y.: Meth. Bk. Concern, 1905. P. 371.)

[2] Cf. above, pp. 81-86.

[3] Cf. above, pp. 177-178.

desired. Again and again he returns to the arguments for the existence of God, but nowhere does he offer a clear, detailed treatment of what he thinks this God to be. Only by piecing together scattered and fragmentary passages can one discover what seems to be Hegel's view, but even then one cannot be certain. Otherwise so meticulously systematic, Hegel might reasonably be expected to take particular pains to develop methodically and coherently his thought of the Absolute, which is the very center of his system. His failure to do this is a pronounced defect.

Secondly, Hegel gives no adequate account of the ultimate status of good and evil. It is the universal testimony of Christian experience that God is good. Hegel, however, gives little attention to the place of moral goodness in the Absolute. It is true that he frequently uses the word love to refer to Spirit, but love for Hegel commonly involves either an emotional attachment or an intellectual relation. His mature writings nowhere reveal a clear recognition of the moral character of love. It is also true that he definitely ascribes goodness to God in saying that in the Absolute the good is no mere ought but already realized.[1] Nevertheless, as we have already seen,[2] Hegel is prevented by the structure of his philosophy as a whole from giving morality its due place in the life of God. For while art, religion, and philosophy are found in the realm of Absolute Spirit, morality is limited to that of the objective spirit. The ethical finds its completion in the morality of the state. This artificial separation of religion and morality prevents goodness from being truly integral in the life of the Absolute. Indeed, evil seems to be just as real in God as good. On Hegel's view, evil is a necessary accompaniment of that self-ne-

---

[1] "Das Gute ist . . . göttliche Macht und ewige Wahrheit." (XII, BR, p. 259; above, p. 80. Cf. also XIV, AR, p. 140.)

[2] Above, pp. 76-78; cf. p. 177, n. 1.

gation of Spirit which produces finite spirits.[1] The morally godd, moreover, exists only in conflict with the morally bad.[2] Both are necessary moments in the self-consciousness of God. This, however, runs counter to the witness of the highest religious experience.

On the rational side, as previously shown,[3] this coexistence of good and evil in the Absolute Personality involves an insoluble contradiction. Hegel affirms that the Absolute, as Absolute, is what it ought to be, perfectly good; as particular finite self, however, it is sinful.[4] Any given act is thus at once both good and evil. This is unthinkable. Either, therefore, the Absolute is ethically defective, or human sin is an illusion. Either alternative entails the surrender of a definite element in Hegel's view of God.

A further defect grows out of Hegel's view that the Absolute attains full self-consciousness in man.[5] This process has two sides, the logical and the chronological. From the standpoint of the former, Hegel's meaning is clear: it is the nature of Spirit to exist not only subjectively, but also objectively in finite spirits; apart from this self-objectification, the Absolute is not truly Spirit. The historical aspect, however, is more difficult to conceive. Spirit begins as abstract idea and gradually grows to maturity in the long, slow advance of the evolutionary process, becoming fully conscious only with the appearance of man. From the standpoint of eternity, therefore, the Absolute is perfect, while from the point of view of time it grows with the years, from imperfect abstraction to con-

---

[1] "Dies Negative Gottes ist das Übel, das Böse überhaupt. Diese Bestimmung ist ebenso absolutes Moment in dem Ganzen der Religion." XII, BR, p. 162. Cf. XIV, AR, p. 140; and above, p. 92.

[2] XIV, BDG, p. 171.

[3] Cf. above, pp. 81-82, 94-95, 148.

[4] XII, BR, p. 259.

[5] Cf. above, pp. 83, 178, 179.

crete, self-conscious Personality. In spite of his bold and skillful attempt through the use of the dialectic,[1] Hegel is unable satisfactorily to reconcile the two points of view.[2] The same Absolute cannot be logically perfect and chronologically imperfect.

If the self-realization of the Spirit in history is construed theistically to mean simply the progressive realization of the divine purposes, which find their fulfillment in a society of distinct persons, a kingdom of God, the difficulty is removed. On this view the imperfect primitive minds which gradually emerge are not identical with the Absolute, and God's perfection is unimpaired. But this solution is not open to Hegel. The Absolute <u>is</u> the primitive minds, and so, imperfect.

---

[1] Cf. the general plan of Hegel's philosophy of religion, above, pp. 31-47.

[2] Cf. above, p. 82.

grete, self-consciousness transcendent. In spite of his bold and willing st-
ivity through the use of the dialectic,[1] Hegel is unable satisfactorily
to reconcile the two points of view.[2] The area Absolute cannot be ,ult-
mately perfect and chronologically imperfect.

If the self-realization of the Spirit in history is conceived the-
istically to mean simply the progressive realization of the Divine Pur-
pose, with that their fulfillment is a society of distinct persons, a
kingdom of God, the difficulty is removed. On this view the imperfect
personalities which gradually emerge are not identical with the Absolute,
and God's perfection is unimpaired. But this solution is not open to He-
gel. The Absolute is the potentiality alone, and so, imperfect.

---

1 Cf. the general view of Hegel's philosophy in Vallion, ebure, pp.
29-47.

2 Cf. ebure, p. 95.

Chapter Six

HEGEL'S VIEW OF HUMAN PERSONALITY

"Der Geist," writes Hegel, "existiert nicht als ein Abstraktum, sondern als die vielen Geister."[1] The Absolute by nature particularizes itself into finite spirits, human beings. It is the purpose of the present chapter to inquire into the precise nature and status, In Hegel's view, of these finite individuals.

I. The Nature of the Finite Person

According to Hegel, the religious man may be viewed in two ways, as particular subject, and as a moment in the total life of the Absolute. The finite individual is at once a unique center of conscious life and an aspect of the divine consciousness.

A. Man as Individual Subject

Nowhere in his Philosophie der Religion does Hegel give an adequate account of the individual as such. In his "Philosophie des Geistes," however, under the heading, "Der subjektive Geist," he sets forth in systematic form his view of the particular human mind. Subjective mind has for Hegel three phases: soul, consciousness, and mind, which form respectively the subject-matter of anthropology, phenomenology of mind, and psychology.

Subjective mind an sich, or in its immediacy, is soul or natural mind. The soul has three moments: natural soul, feeling soul, and real soul. The natural soul is soul in general merely as existing, characterized mainly by sensitivity (Empfindung), the primitive movement of the mind by which it partakes of bodily life. The feeling soul is an individualized center of feeling, a particular subject distinguished sharply from other subjects by its own unique and habitual combination of feelings. The real soul is the

---

[1] XIV, BDG, p. 83.

habitual identity of inward self-feeling with the bodily form through which the inner feeling expresses itself.[1]

Consciousness is the mind in its effort to relate the content of the soul and raise its own self-certainty to the status of truth. There are three stages in this process: consciousness as such, self-consciousness, and reason. Consciousness as such is characterized by the fact that it has an object. It includes the sensual consciousness, the immediate certainty of particulars of sense; perception, which relates sense-particulars by means of general thought-determinations; and understanding, which formulates laws of the world of appearance. The truth and foundation of consciousness is self-consciousness, in which the ego is its own object. Consciousness of any object, in fact, is self-consciousness; I know the object as my object, that is, I know myself. Self-consciousness includes desire, recognition of one's self as free and as existing for other selves, and universal self-consciousness, that affirmative knowledge of one's self in others which is the substance of every social and spiritual relation. The unity of consciousness and self-consciousness is reason, through which the mind recognizes the content of its object as identical with itself and itself as self-determined. It rises above the differences of individual conscious subjects to objective and universal truth.[2]

Soul and consciousness find their completion in mind, which has three aspects: theoretical mind, practical mind, and free mind. The theoretical mind is a concrete unity of three ways of knowing: perception, representation, and thought. Perception is intelligence operating under the forms of space and time, thereby discerning itself in the external world and the external world in itself. Representation is remembered perception (erin-

---

[1] V, ENC, pp. 339-369.
[2] V, ENC, pp. 369-380.

nerte Anschauung), intelligence externalizing itself while remaining within itself; it takes the forms of recollection (Erinnerung), imagination, and memory (Gedächtnis). Thought is intelligence knowing in itself its own product, the universal, the identity of the subjective and the objective, reason existing as the activity of the subject. What is thought, is, and what is, is only as it is thought.

As free intelligence, self-determining and self-fulfilling, the mind is practical mind or will. This self-determination of the will takes three forms: that of practical feeling, the immediate and formal determination in which the content, though the same as that of reason, represents only the contingent will of an individual subject; that of free choice between particular inclinations and passions which are also afflicted with contingency and subjectivity; and that of felicity (Glückseligkeit), the universal truth and ideal good of all particular satisfactions, which, however, remains a mere ought because subjective inclinations are still decisive.

The opposition of theoretical and practical mind is reconciled in the concrete wholeness of the free mind, the free will which is für sich, in that the merely particular will is purified of all its formalism, contingency, and limitation and elevated to universal determination, true freedom. On this level the will is free intelligence, which through thought has as its end not a purely subjective but a universal content.[1]

B. Man as Spirit in Finite Form

For Hegel, however, man is more than a particular center of free intelligence; he is also and fundamentally a moment in the life of the Absolute itself. According to the structure of the "Philosophie des Geistes," the finite individual is simply Spirit on its first or notional level.

---

[1] V, ENC, pp. 380-418.

[illegible] intelligence determining the will's reaching within itself; it takes the form of recognition (*Erkennen*), deliberation, and memory (*Gedächtnis*). Thought is intelligence acting in itself its own product, the universal, the identity of the subjective and the objective, reason acting as the reality of the subject. What is thought, is, and what is, is only as it is thought.

In free intelligence, self-determining and self-fulfilling, the mind is practical also as will. This self-determination of the will takes three forms: that of practical feeling, the impulses and moral dispositions; in which the content, though it also is that of reason, represents only the sentiment of will of an individual subject; that of free choice between particular impulses and practices which are then affiliated with moral duty and subjectivity; and that of duties (*Pflichten*), the universal ends and ideal good of all particular relations and relations, which, however, remains a mere order because subjective impulsions are still lacking.

The connection of theoretical and practical mind is mediated in the concrete subjectivity of the free mind. The free will which is *for itself*, in that the merely particular will is purified of all its formalism, contingency, and finitude and elevated to universal determination, free freedom. On this level the will is free intelligence, which thought is not as let out in a merely subjective but a universal content.

B. Man as Spirit in Finite Form

For Hegel, however, man is more than a particular center of free intelligence; he is also and fundamentally a moment in the life of the absolute itself. According to the phenomenology of the "philosophia ad hominem," the finite individual is what it exists in the river of national life.

---

[1] E.g., Rh., Sämtliche.

Spirit must externalize itself in human institutions (e.g., the family, the state) as objektiver Geist, and return to itself as absoluter Geist.[1] The same Geist is present in each of the three stages. In the last analysis, therefore, the particular subject is not a unique consciousness, but an aspect of and identical with the Absolute.

Throughout the Philosophie der Religion the same view of man prevails, though the fact that religion falls entirely in the sphere of the Absolute Spirit makes the dialectical scheme somewhat different. Here human personality is "endlicher Geist," "das endliche Bewusstsein," "der Geist in der Bestimmung der Endlichkeit."[2] Human individuals are but the Absolute manifesting itself in finite form. As such, they are not separate entities, but integral parts of the one Absolute Spirit which alone is truly real. The only true idea of man is that which regards him as "Moment Gottes in seinem ewigen Sein, Moment der Manifestation."[3] Reality is ultimately not many, but one, quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Hegel insists

> dass es nicht zweierlei Vernunft und zweierlei Geist geben kann, nicht eine göttliche Vernunft und eine menschliche, die nach ihrem Kern und den Weisen ihrer Tätigkeit schlechthin voneinander verschieden wären. Die Vernunft des Menschen, das Bewusstsein seines Wesens, ist Vernunft überhaupt, ist eben das Göttliche im Menschen, und . . . Gott ist gegenwärtig und als Geist im Geiste und in den Geistern.[4]

C. The Relation of Man and God in Religion

Religion, then, is not so much a communion between two distinct realities, man and God, as a union of two sides or aspects of the same reality, the Absolute Spirit. The two sides are, however, actual. "Einerseits

---

[1] V, ENC, pp. 417-418.
[2] XII, BR, p. 151; XIII, RGI, p. 49; cf. XIV, AR, p. 96.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 102; cf. p. 7.
[4] XII, BR, p. 43.

Spirit must externalize itself in human institutions (e.g., the family, the state) as *objektiver Geist*, and return to itself as *absoluter Geist*.[1] The same *Geist* is present in each of the three stages. In the last analysis, therefore, the particular subject is not a unique consciousness, but an aspect of and identical with the Absolute.

Throughout the *Philosophie der Religion* the same view of man prevails, though the fact that religion falls entirely in the sphere of the Absolute Spirit makes the dialectical scheme somewhat different. Here human personality is "endlicher Geist," "das endliche Bewusstsein," "der Geist in der Bestimmung der Endlichkeit."[2] Human individuals are but the Absolute manifesting itself in finite form. In such, they also not separate entities, but integral parts of the one Absolute Spirit which alone is truly real. The only true idea of man is that which regards him as "Moment Gottes in seinem ewigen Sein, Moment der Manifestation."[3] Reality is ultimately not many, but one, quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Hegel insists

> dass es nicht zweierlei Vernunft und zweierlei Geist geben kann, nicht eine göttliche Vernunft und eine menschliche, die noch ihren Sein und ihr Leben in- or Wahrheit endlichkeitlin vorausgesetzt verschieden wären. Die Vernunft des Menschen, das Bewusstsein seines Wesens, ist Vernunft überhaupt, ist eben das Göttliche im Menschen, und . . . Gott ist gegenwärtig- ig und als Geist in Geiste und in den Geistern.[4]

C. The Relation of Man and God in Religion

Religion, then, is not so much a connection between two distinct realities, man and God, as a union of two sides or aspects of the same reality, the Absolute Spirit. The two sides are, however, actual. "Wirkeeits

---

1 V, XIV, pp. 417-418.
2 XII, 87, p. 183; XIII, 291, p. 48; cf. XIV, 48, p. 96.
3 XIV, 48, p. 102; cf. p. 7.
4 XII, 87, p. 49.

ist der Geist als allgemeiner Geist, und anderseits ist das Fürsichsein des Menschen, das Fürsichsein des einzelnen Individuums."[1] The Absolute is no merely abstract One, but an infinite Spirit who through love particularizes himself into finite spirits whom he reconciles to himself.

> Geist ist dies, nicht unmittelbar zu sein, sondern sich gegenständlich. Geist ist für den Geist, so dass beide unterschieden sind; sie sind bestimmt gegeneinander, der eine als allgemeiner, der andere als besonderer, der eine als innerlicher, der andere als äusserlicher, der eine als unendlicher, der andere als endlicher Geist.[2]

Inasmuch as man is as spirit the image of God, he is an sich good, that is, good according to his inmost nature, his idea. In reality, however, since he is the externalization of God and in this sense separate from God, he is also naturally evil.[3] In so far, therefore, as the individual persists in following his own passions and particular finite interests, he sins, and is estranged from the Absolute Spirit of which he is a part. In this way arises the need of reconciliation,[4] which occurs in religion. Here man becomes conscious of the truth of his relation to God, and knows himself to be not only finite but also infinite.[5] Realizing that as spirit he is truly one with the Absolute Spirit, he annuls the merely limited and particular in his nature and elevates himself to God.[6] Thus the reconciliation of spirit and Spirit is effected.

In the last analysis, however, the whole movement is the work of the Absolute Spirit, whose nature it is to pass through opposition to unity with itself. Spirit is "der lebendige Prozess, dass die an sich seiende

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 207.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 14.
[3] XIV, AR, pp. 114-115.
[4] XIX, AR, p. 29.
[5] XIV, AR, p. 46.
[6] XIV, AR, pp. 207-209.

ist der Geist als allgemeiner Geist, und andererseits ist das Fürsichsein des Besonderen, das Selbstbewusstsein des einzelnen Individuums.[1] The Absolute is no merely abstract One, but an infinite Spirit who through love particularizes himself into finite spirits whom he reconciles to himself.

> Geist ist Glas, nicht undurchsichtig zu sein, sondern sich gegenseitig durchsichtig. Geist ist für den Geist, so dass beide unterschiedene sind; sie sind beziehungsweise gegenseitiger, der eine sie allgemeiner, der andere sie besonderer, der eine sie innerlicher, der andere sie äusserlicher, der eine sie unendlicher, der andere sie endlicher Geist.[2]

Inasmuch as man is an spirit the image of God, he is *an sich* good, that is, good according to his inner nature, his idea. In reality, however, since he is the externalization of God and in this sense separate from God, he is also naturally evil.[3] In so far, therefore, as the individual partakes in finitude his own passions and particular finite interests, he sins, and is estranged from the Idea, the Spirit of which he is a part. In this way arises the need of reconciliation,[4] which occurs in religion. Here man becomes conscious of the truth of his relation to God, and comes himself to be not only finite but also infinite.[5] Declaring that as spirit he is truly one with the Absolute Spirit, he annuls the merely limited and particular in his nature and elevates himself to God.[6] Thus the reconciliation of spirit and spirit is effected.

In the last analysis, however, the whole movement is the work of the Absolute Spirit, whose nature it is to pass through opposition to unity with itself. Spirit is "der lebendige Prozess, dass die *an sich* seiende

---

1 XIV, 42, p. 207.
2 XIV, 43, p. 14.
3 XIV, 45, pp. 22-23.
4 XIX, 46, p. 29.
5 XIV, 47, p. 44.
6 XIV, 48, pp. 207-209.

Einheit der göttlichen und menschlichen Natur für sich, dass sie hervorgebracht werde."[1] What happens in the human subject is really "die Geschichte der göttlichen Idee am endlichen Geist."[2] Man simply enjoys (geniesst) or experiences what God accomplishes in him. It is "der göttliche Geist . . ., der die Wiedergeburt bewirkt."[3] Hence man's knowledge of God is actually God's knowledge of himself in man, or what Hegel calls "common knowledge."

> Dass der Mensch von Gott weiss, ist nach der wesentlichen Gemeinschaft ein gemeinschaftliches Wissen,--- d.i. der Mensch weiss nur von Gott, insofern Gott im Menschen von sich selbst weiss; dies Wissen ist Selbstbewusstsein Gottes, aber ebenso ein Wissen desselben vom Menschen, und dies Wissen Gottes vom Menschen ist Wissen des Menschen von Gott. Der Geist des Menschen, von Gott zu wissen, ist nur der Geist Gottes selbst.[4]

Ultimately, therefore, the human subject of religion is one with its divine object, for it is itself an aspect of God. The Absolute Spirit is his own object. "Der Geist ist identisch mit dem Geiste."[5] The <u>eigene Bestimmung</u> of religion is,

> dass der Geist nur ist für den Geist. Es ist unzertrennlich der allgemeine und der einzelne Geist, der unendliche und der endliche; ihre absolute Identität ist die Religion.[6]

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 38.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 95.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 207.
[4] XIV, BDG, p. 117. Cf. XII, BR, p. 150; XIII, RGI, p. 109; Nohl, TJS, p. 289. As might be expected, Hegel has difficulty in defining the precise relation between God and man in such a way as to preserve both their difference and their unity. Questions arise, he points out, concerning human freedom, the connection between man's individual knowledge and the knowledge which he has in common with God, and so on. However, he makes no effort to answer these questions at the time, since they are not the subject primarily under consideration (the cosmological argument). One looks in vain elsewhere in Hegel's writings for a satisfactory treatment of such problems. Cf. below, pp. 212-213.
[5] XIV, AR, p. 15.
[6] XIV, AR, p. 15.

Einheit der göttlichen und menschlichen Natur für sich, dass sie hervorgebracht werde."[1] What happens in the human subject is really "die Geschichte der göttlichen Idee an menschlichen Geist."[2] Man simply enlarges (enlarges) or supplanates what God accomplishes in him. It is "der göttliche Geist . . . . der die Wahrheit der Welt."[3] Hence man's knowledge of God is actually God's knowledge of himself in man, or what Hegel calls "common knowledge."

> Dass der Mensch von Gott weiss, ist nach der wechselseitigen Gemeinschaft ein gemeinschaftlicher Wissen,--d.i. der Mensch weiss nur von Gott, insofern Gott in Menschen von sich selbst weiss; dies Wissen ist Selbstbewusstsein Gottes, aber ebenso ein Wissen desselben von Menschen, und dies Wissen Gottes vom Menschen ist Wissen des Menschen von Gott. Der Geist des Menschen, von Gott zu wissen, ist nur der Geist Gottes selbst.

Ultimately, therefore, the human subject of religion is one with its divine object, for it is itself an aspect of God. The theologue Gottes is his own object. "Der Geist ist identisch mit dem Geiste."[4] The <u>alienage</u> <u>Entfremdung</u> of religion is,

> dass der Geist nur ist für den Geist. Es ist unendlich vermittelt der allgemeine und der einzelne Geist, der unendliche und der endliche; ihre absolute Identität ist die Religion.[5]

---

1 XIV, 4X, p. 5X.
2 XIV, 4X, p. 9X.
3 XIV, 4X, p. 207.
4 XIV, 4X, p. 11V. Cf. XII, 8X, p. 15V; XIII, 8X1, p. 10V; XIV, 4X, p. 2V5. As might be expected, Hegel has difficulty in defining the precise relation between God and man in such a way as to preserve both their difference and their unity. Questions arise, he points out, concerning human freedom, the connection between man's individual knowledge and the knowledge which he has in common with God, and so on. However, he makes no effort to answer these questions at the time, since they are not the subject primarily under consideration (the cosmological argument). One looks in vain elsewhere in Hegel's writings for a satisfactory treatment of such problems. Cf. below, pp. 212-217.
5 XIV, 4X, p. 1X.
6 XIV, 4X, p. 1X.

This absolute identity is best realized in the religious community, the Gemeinde. Here the true individuality of the divine Idea, typified first in one man, Christ, perfects itself through joining many individuals in the unity of the Spirit.[1]

> [Der] Geist erfüllt seine Gemeinde; dies [kommt hier] zum Bewusstsein, dass jeder Dieser Glied der Gemeinde, d.h. Gott in ihm und er in Gott ist.[2]

II. The Status of the Finite Individual

A view which treats the finite person as a moment in the life of God would seem to deprive the human individual of its own distinctive significance by merging it in the personality of the Absolute. If the Absolute is all that truly is, what remains of man? It is not surprising, therefore, that Hegel has been charged with destroying the uniqueness of the finite self.[3] We have now to inquire how far this conclusion is justified. Is it true that Hegel's universal Spirit swallows up particular finite spirits? What is the precise status of the individual in Hegel's religious thought?

A. Hegel's High Estimate of Human Personality

One of the first things to impress the student of this problem is the abundant evidence in Hegel's works of a high estimate of human personality. Both his world-view in general and his interpretation of religious history in particular reveal an exceptional appreciation of the worth of finite selves.

1. The Significance of Personality in Hegel's Idealism

Strange as it may seem, the very concept which appears to submerge

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 164. "Die Gemeinde sind die einzelnen empirischen Subjekte, die im Geiste Gottes sind." (XIV, AR, p. 194.)
[2] XIV, AR, p. 209; cf. p. 29; II, PDG (3d ed.), p. 542.
[3] Cf. above, pp. 5, 9, 13.

This absolute identity is best realized in the religious community, the Gemeinde. Here the true individuality of the divine idea, typified first in one man, Christ, perfects itself through joining many individuals in the unity of the Spirit.[1]

> Der Geist erfüllt seine Gemeinde; diese kommt hier zum Bewusstsein, dass jeder Dieser Geist der Gemeinde, d.h. steht in ihm und er in dort ist.[2]

II. The Status of the Finite Individual

A view which treats the finite person as a moment in the life of God would seem to deprive the human individual of its own distinctive significance by merging it in the personality of the Absolute. If the Absolute is all that truly is, what remains of man? It is not surprising, therefore, that Hegel has been charged with destroying the uniqueness of the finite self.[3] We have now to inquire how far this accusation is justified. Is it true that Hegel's universal Spirit swallows up particular finite spirits? What is the precise status of the individual in Hegel's religious thought?

A. Hegel's High Estimate of Human Personality

One of the first things to impress the student of this problem is the abundant evidence in Hegel's works of a high estimate of human personality. Both his world-view in general and his interpretation of religious history in particular reveal an exceptional appreciation of the worth of finite selves.

1. The Dignificance of Personality in Hegel's Idealism

Strange as it may seem, the very concept which appears to embarrass

---

[1] XIV, 44, 7, 167. "Die Gemeinde wird die eingelnen mitglieder aufheben, die in einzelne Zeitne sind." (XIV, 47, 9, 192.)
[2] XIV, 43, 7, 163; cf. 5, 49; II, 272 (3d ed.), 5, 542.
[3] Cf. above, pp. 8, 9, 12.

men serves in Hegel's hands to exalt them. A high estimate of human beings is an integral element in his absolute idealism. This estimate he finds to be well grounded both empirically and rationally.

Empirically, it is supported by the observation that personality is the noblest thing in our experience.

> In der ganzen Schöpfung ist vor Allem der Mensch erhaben; er ist das Wissende, Erkennende, Denkende: er ist so in einem ganz andern Sinne das Ebenbild Gottes, als dies von der Welt gilt.[1]

Rationally, belief in the value of personality is based on several considerations, all of which grow out of Hegel's basic world-view. In the first place, not only man, but all reality, is spiritual; nothing exists which is not in consciousness. As conscious persons, human beings partake of the nature of ultimate reality itself. This invests them with immeasurable significance.

> Alles, was das menschliche Leben zusammenhält, was Wert hat und gilt, ist geister Natur; und dies Reich des Geistes existiert allein durch das Bewusstsein von Wahrheit und Recht, durch das Erfassen der Ideen.[2]

Moreover, because of this ultimate spirituality of things, the human mind is capable of attaining truth. Such a mind is possessed of infinite worth.

> Der Mut der Wahrheit, Glauben an die Macht des Geistes, ist die erste Bedingung des philosophischen Studiums; der Mensch soll sich selbst ehren und sich des Höchsten würdig achten. Von der Grösse und Macht des Geistes kann er nicht gross genug denken. Das verschlossene Wesen des Universums hat keine Kraft in sich, welche dem Mute des Erkennens Widerstand leisten könnte: es muss sich vor ihm auftun und seinen Reichtum und seine Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen und zum

---

[1] XIII, RGI, p. 84.
[2] V, ENC, p. LXXVI.

man serves in Fichte's hands to exalt them. A high estimate of human nature is an integral element in his absolute idealism. This estimate he finds to be well grounded both empirically and rationally.

Empirically, it is supported by the observation that personality is the noblest thing in our experience.

> In der ganzen Schöpfung ist vor allem der Mensch erhaben; er ist das Wirkende, Erkennende, Denkende; er ist so in einem ganz andern Sinne das Ebenbild Gottes, als alles von der Welt gilt.[1]

Rationally, belief in the value of personality is based on several considerations, all of which grow out of Hegel's basic world-view. In the first place, not only man, but all reality, is spiritual; nothing exists which is not in consciousness. As conscious persons, human beings partake of the nature of ultimate reality itself. This invests them with immeasurable significance.

> Aller, was das menschliche Leben ausmacht, was Wert hat und gilt, ist relativer Natur; nur dies Relative des Daseins existiert allein durch das Bewusstsein von Wahrheit und Recht, durch das Erkennen der Ideen.[2]

Moreover, because of this ultimate spirituality of things, the human mind is capable of attaining truth. Such a mind is possessed of infinite worth.

> Der Mut der Wahrheit, Glauben an die Macht des Geistes, ist die erste Bedingung zur philosophischen Tätigkeit; der Mensch muß sich selbst achten und sich das Unendliche würdig wissen. Nur der Grösse und Kraft des Geistes kann er nicht genug geben. Das verschlossene Wesen des Universums hat keine Kraft in sich, welche den Mute des Erkennens widerstehen könnte; es öffnet es, wenn sich vor ihm muthig und seinen Reichtum und seine Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen und ihm

---

1 XIII, 301, p. 94.
2 V, 267, p. LXXVI.

Genusse bringen.[1]

A further indication of the significance of personality for Hegel is his recognition that ideas are nothing apart from persons. In apprehending truth, the finite mind begins with immediacy and, passing from the sensual to the infinite, raises itself to the level of universal thought. This does not mean, however, that the mind is subordinate to some impersonal thought. Quite the contrary is true. Thought exists only as a spiritual movement. The finite mind is actually

> nicht das Resultat des Denkens, sondern das Denken ist nur durch die Bewegung des Geistes, durch das Erheben. Der Geist ist an sich die Erhebung.[2]

No idea is more than a barren abstraction if it does not exist in consciousness. "Die wahre Wissenschaft ist . . . auf dem offenen Felde des Bewusstseins."[3] Hegel cites the ideas of religion and law as examples.

> So ist es der Religion wesentlich, nicht in ihrem Begriffe nur zu sein, sondern das Bewusstsein dessen zu sein, was der Begriff ist. Das Material nun, worin sich der Begriff gleichsam als der Plan ausführt, das er sich zu eigen macht und sich gemäss bildet, ist das <u>menschliche Bewusstsein</u>. Ebenso ist z.B. auch das Recht nur, indem es im Geiste existiert, den Willen der Menschen einnimmt und sie von ihm als der Bestimmung ihres Willens wissen.[4]

2. The Christian Recognition of Free Personality

Hegel's specifically religious thought reveals a similarly high conception of man. While for him the history of religion traces, on the one

---

[1] V, ENC, p. LXXVI; JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 22. In "Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal," Hegel expresses essentially the same idea in mystical terms: "In jedem Menschen selbst ist das Licht und Leben, er ist das Eigentum des Lichts; und er wird von einem Lichte nicht erleuchtet, wie ein dünkler Körper, der nur fremden Glanz trägt, sondern sein eigner Feuerstoff gerät im Brand, und ist eine eigene Flamme. . . . Der Glauben an das Göttliche stammt also aus der Göttlichkeit der eignen Natur; nur die Modifikation der Gottheit kann sie erkennen." (Nohl, TJS, p. 313; cf. p. 289.)

[2] XIV, AR, p. 91.

[3] IX, PWG, p. 569.

[4] XII, BR, p. 71. Cf. above, p. 178.

Gaucaas brieven.[1]

A further indication of the significance of personality for Hegel is his recognition that ideas are nothing apart from persons. In apprehending truth, the finite mind begins with immediacy and, passing from the sensual to the infinite, raises itself to the level of universal thought. This does not seem, however, that the mind is subordinate to some impersonal thought. Quite the contrary is true. Thought exists only as a spiritual movement. The finite mind is actually

> Nicht das Denken des Denkens, sondern das Denken ist nur durch die Bewegung des Geistes, durch sein Erheben. Der Geist ist so wird sich Erhebung.[2]

No idea is more than a barren abstraction if it does not exist in consciousness. "Die reine Wirklichkeit ist . . . auf das offenen Reich des Bewusstseins."[3] Hegel cites the idea of religion and law as examples.

> Es ist ein der Religion wesentlich, nicht in ihrem Inhalte nur an sich, sondern der Bewusstsein dessen zu sein, was der Inhalt ist. Das Material nun, worin sich der Inhalt ausbreitet als der Sinn mannigfaltiger, das er sich in einem reichen und vielgestalten Bildnis, ist das Bewusstsein. Dieses ist z.B. auch das Recht nicht nur in seinem entsteht, das sich in der Gesetzgebung ihrer Wirklichkeit und als von ihr als Bewusstsein ihrer Wirklichkeit weiss.[4]

2. The Christian Recognition of Free Personality

Hegel's specifically religious thought reveals a relatively high conception of man. While for him the history of religious events, on the one

---

[1] V. ZEE, E. LOEWI; ZWEI, EVAN, GEN. I. 22. In "Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal," Hegel expresses essentially the same idea in negative terms: "In jedem Menschen leuchtet ist das Licht und Leben, er ist das Ebenbild des Lichtes; und er wird von einem Lichte nicht erleuchtet, wie ein Spiegel Ebenbild, der von fremdem Glanze strahlt, sondern sein eigenstrahlender Geist ist Licht, und ist eine eigene Flamme. . . . Der Menschen an das Geistige erkennt also nur der Geistlichkeit der eigenen Natur; nur die Geistlichkeit der Gottheit kann sie erkennen." (Nohl, op. c., 344; cf. I. 380.)

[2] ZEE, EN. I. 21.

[3] Id., ZWEI. 2. 222.

[4] Id., ZEE. 2. 21. Cf. above, . 178.

hand, the Absolute's attainment of complete self-consciousness, it records, on the other, the gradual emergence of free personality in man. One important respect in which Christianity is superior is its recognition that man as man is a free spirit capable of willing universal ends. Hegel criticizes adversely the low estimate of man to be found in certain non-Christian religions and commends enthusiastically Christianity's recognition of the infinite value of the human soul.

a. The Low View of Man in Non-Christian Religions

In China, writes Hegel, the religion of Fo sets up as the highest perfection contempt for personal existence,[1] and the ancestor-worship and emperor-worship of the native religion involve a humiliating subjection of the individual which expresses itself in such practices as slavery, wife-purchase, child-exposure, and frequent suicide. "Dem Menschen, der kein moralisches Innere hat, ist auch das Leben nichts wert."[2]

Likewise in Indian pantheism man is stripped of free personality. Everything in the world is worshiped as God: sun, moon, stars, beasts, flowers, trees, the Ganges, the Himalayas, human reason, and so on.[3] Man's distinctive worth is destroyed by a view which regards parrots, cows, apes, and elephants also as incarnations of God. Human life in India is "etwas Verachtetes, Geringgeschätztes,---es gilt nicht mehr als ein Schluck Wassers."[4] Suicides, widow-burning, and child-sacrifice are the natural result. Rows of women plunge into the Ganges at festivals, not through bravery, but because life is to them so worthless.[5] "Das Moralische, das in der Achtung eines Menschenlebens liegt, ist bei den

---

[1] IX, PWG, pp. 328-331.
[2] IX, PWG, p. 309; cf. p. 306.
[3] XIII, NR, pp. 161-162, 156.
[4] XIII, NR, p. 180; cf. pp. 169-170.
[5] IX, PWG, p. 392; cf. p. 409.

Indern nicht vorhanden."[1]

In the Socratic dictum, "Know thyself," Greece advances far toward a true estimate of personality. Nevertheless, the Naturelement is still present in the Greek view of spirit, with the result that human subjectivity is "noch nicht in ihrer Tiefe erfasst" and "der menschliche Geist noch nicht absolut berechtigt."[2] The low status of women and the prevalence of slavery show that individuals are not yet judged according to their true worth.

In the Roman world the value of "Persönlichkeit, der unendliche Wert des Individuums,"[3] is recognized in the right granted to all persons as persons to own property. Yet individuals even here are valued only abstractly, i.e., merely as owners. Moreover, they themselves are the property of the emperor, so that their property rights are such only in appearance.[4] Rome's low estimate of individual worth is shown in its acceptance of slavery and child-exposure, but most of all, perhaps, in the ruthless slaughter of human beings involved in the gladiatorical combats, which were held not to serve any ethical purpose, but for the sheer amusement of the populace.

> Dies kalte Morden ist es, was die Nichtigkeit der menschlichen Individualität, und weil diese keine Sittlichkeit in sich hat, die Wertlosigkeit des Individuums anschauen lässt.[5]

b. The Worth of the Individual in Christianity

Only in Christianity is man as man seen to possess infinite worth. In its doctrines of incarnation and redemption Christianity expresses

---

[1] IX, PWG, p. 409.
[2] IX, PWG, pp. 723, 598.
[3] IX, PWG, p. 723.
[4] XIII, RGI, pp. 234-235; IX, PWG, p. 724.
[5] XIII, RGI, p. 232; cf. pp. 231-234; IX, PWG, pp. 680-681.

Indem sich verwandelt."[1]

In the moralic dictum, "Know thyself," Greece advances far toward a true estimate of morality. Nevertheless, the Intellectualist is still wrong in the "new view of spirit," with the result that human activity is "much right in their first effect" and "her responsible value much higher somewhat hereafter."[2] The low status of woman and the atrocities of slavery show that individuals are not yet judged according to their true worth.

In the Roman world the value of "Persönlichkeit," our "unmöglichen Ding der Individuum,"[3] is recognized in the right measure: all persons be treated to one property. Yet individuals even here are valued only externally, i.e., merely as owners. Moreover, they themselves are the property of the emperor, so that their proprietorships are thus only in appearance. Hence the worthlessness of individual worth is seen in the acceptance of slavery and child-exposure, but most of all, perhaps, in the treatment slaughter of human beings involved in the gladiatorial presents, which were held not to have any ethical purpose, but for the sheer amusement of the populace.

Das Volk Roms ist so, was die Individuen
der verschiedenen Individualität, und soll diese Reine
Individuelle in sich tut, die Wirklichkeit des In-
dividuum ausmachen lässt.[4]

b. The Worth of the Individual in Christianity

Only in Christianity is man at last seen to possess infinite worth. In its doctrines of Incarnation and redemption Christianity approaches

---

1 [illegible], p. 300.
2 [illegible], pp. 298, 299.
3 [illegible], p. 123.
4 [illegible], 307, pp. 301-302; [illegible], p. 298.
5 [illegible], p. 228; cf. pp. 280-282; [illegible], pp. 280-281.

the idea that every human soul is both the objectification of God and basically one with God. This relationship imparts an inestimable value to all human individuals.

> Durch die christliche Religion ist also die absolute Idee Gottes in ihrer Wahrheit zum Bewusstsein gekommen, worein ebenso der Mensch nach seiner wahrhaften Natur, die in der bestimmten Anschauung des Sohnes gegeben ist, sich selbst aufgenommen findet. Der Mensch, als endlicher für sich betrachtet, ist zugleich auch Ebenbild Gottes und Quell der Unendlichkeit in ihm selbst; er ist Selbstzweck, hat in ihm selbst unendlichen Wert und die Bestimmung zur Ewigkeit.[1]

In Christianity, in short, man is seen in his true universality, as a being of infinite significance. Man as man is invested with a moral dignity before unknown.[2]

c. Man as Free Spirit

Where man as man is seen to be infinitely valuable, he is also seen to be free. Only free personality can be truly worthful. The idea of freedom, says Hegel, arose in Christianity, in which

> das Individuum <u>als solches</u> einen <u>unendlichen</u> Wert hat, indem es Gegenstand und Zweck der Liebe Gottes, dazu bestimmt ist, zu Gott als Geist sein absolutes Verhältnis, diesen Geist in sich wohnen zu haben, d.i. dass der Mensch <u>an sich</u> zur höchsten Freiheit bestimmt ist.[3]

Practically, therefore, true Christianity condemns all forms of slavery; theoretically it views all men as self-determining agents.

"Wo Christentum wirklich ist, kann Sklaverei nicht stattfinden."[4] In the Christian view all men express the divine idea, and all have equal rights; the enslavement of one by another thus becomes unthinkable and impossible[5] in a genuinely Christian civilization. Man is

---

[1] IX, PWG, p. 745. Cf. XIV, BDG, p. 168.
[2] IX, PWG, p. 745. Cf. V, ENC, pp. 417-418; XIV, AR, pp. 130-131, 178.
[3] V, ENC, pp. 417-418.
[4] IX, PWG, pp. 745-746.
[5] XIV, AR, p. 131.

> auf ganz allgemeine Weise in Gott angeschaut; jeder Einzelne ist ein Gegenstand der Gnade Gottes und des göttlichen Endzwecks: Gott will, dass alle Menschen selig werden. Ganz ohne alle Partikularität, an und für sich hat also der Mensch, und zwar schon als Mensch, unendlichen Wert, und eben dieser unendliche Wert hebt alle Partikularität der Geburt und des Vaterlandes auf. Er gilt nicht als Jude oder Grieche, als Wohl- oder Schlechtgeborener, sondern als Mensch.[1]

Furthermore, where the Christian principle dominates man is recognized as a self-determining agent. The morality of chance and whim gives way before an inward morality, the principle of which is independent subjectivity. When subjective freedom enters, unreflected morality flees. Greek freedom was chance and "genius;" in Christianity true freedom arises. Here

> tritt das Prinzip der <u>absoluten Freiheit</u> in Gott auf. Der Mensch ist jetzt nicht mehr im Verhältnis der Abhängigkeit, sondern der Liebe, in dem Bewusstsein, dass er dem göttlichen Wesen angehört. In Ansehung der partikulären Zwecke bestimmt jetzt der Mensch sich selber und weiss sich als allgemeine Macht alles Endlichen. Alles Besondere tritt gegen den geistigen Boden der Innerlichkeit zurück, die sich nur gegen den göttlichen Geist aufhebt. Dadurch fällt aller Aberglaube der Orakel und des Vögelfluges fort; der Mensch ist als die unendliche Macht des Entschliessens anerkannt.[2]

While the principle of the worth and freedom of personality was in Christianity at the very beginning, its full significance was not realized until the dawn of modern times.[3] It was not until the Protestant Reformation that humanity, emancipated through the influence of Christianity, could exhibit that free universality which is its essence. Into a world in which religion had become external, hypocritical, and corrupt, and in which the remission of sins could be purchased, came the movement

---

[1] IX, PWG, p. 745.
[2] IX, PWG, p. 746.
[3] VIII, PWG, p. 39.

which turned religion and life back to that spiritual inwardness which is implicit in the Christian principle. A simple monk, Martin Luther, was the type of this fulfillment.

> Er hat in seinem Geiste die Vollendung gesucht und hervorgebracht und hat das Dieses, das die Christenheit vormals in einem irdischen, steinernen Grabe suchte, vielmehr in dem tieferen Grabe der absoluten Idealität alles Sinnlichen und Äusserlichen, in dem Geiste gefunden und in dem Herzen gezeigt.[1]

The Reformation attained the insight that man in his very nature is meant to be free.[2] Theoretically, personality here came into its own.

Hegel's recognition of the worth of free personality finds classic expression in his criticism of the Crusades. The main error of the Crusaders, he holds, lay in their external motives; they journeyed to the Holy Land, many of them in blind enthusiasm and disorder, in search of a thing, not of a living spiritual reality. Yet through the Crusades, misguided and disastrous though they were, Christendom learned a lesson. It discovered that the divine was not to be found in such dead objects as cups and sepulchres, but within the personal life of man himself. The ultimatum of Christian truth was not to be found at the grave. At the sepulchre Christianity received the same answer as the disciples who sought there the body of Christ: "Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, but is risen."[3]

> Das Prinzip eurer Religion habt ihr nicht im Sinnlichen, im Grabe bei den Toten zu suchen, sondern im lebendigen Geiste bei euch selbst. . . . Die Christenheit hat das leere Grab, nicht aber die Verknüpfung des Weltlichen und Ewigen gefunden und das heilige Land deshalb verloren. Sie ist praktisch enttäuscht worden, und das Resultat, das sie mitbrachte, war von negativer Art:

---

[1] IX, PWG, p. 878. Cf. Nohl, TJS, p. 194.

[2] "Dies ist der wesentliche Inhalt der Reformation; der Mensch ist durch sich selbst bestimmt, frei zu sein." (IX, PWG, p. 882.)

[3] Luke 24:5, 6.

which opened religion and life-bars to that spiritual innerness which is implicit in the Christian principle. A single work, merely further, was the type of this fulfillment.

> Er hat in seinem Leben die vollkommene Gewalt und Herrschaftsrecht und hat den Tiere, das die Christenheit vorzeits in einen Irrtumer, steinernen Drache erblickte, vielmehr in seinem tieferen Grade der absoluten Identität alles Einzelnen und Besonderen, in dem heiligen Geiste und in den Werken gezeigt.[1]

The Reformation actually the insight that man in his very nature is meant to be free.[2] Theoretically, personality here came into its own.

Hegel's recognition of the work of free personality finds expression in his criticism of the Crusades. The main error of the Crusaders, he holds, lay in their external motives; they journeyed to the Holy Land, many of them in pious enthusiasm and disorder, in search of a tomb, not of a living spiritual reality. Yet through the Crusades, misguided and disastrous though they were, Christendom learned a lesson. It discovered that the divine was not to be found in such dead objects as tomb and sepulchres, but within the personal life of man himself. The criterion of Christian truth was not to be found at the grave. The pagan's Christianity received the same answer as the disciples who sought there the body of Christ: "Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, but is risen."[3]

> Das friedlig ewige Religion kann ihr nicht in Stein-litten, in Grabe bei den Toten zu suchen, sondern im lebendigen Geiste bei sich selbst. . . . Die Christenheit hat das Leere Grab, nicht aber die Verwirklichung des Heiligen und Ewigen gefunden und das heilige Land durch Kreuzzüge. Die ist geschichtlich entstanden worden, und das Resultat, das sie mitbrachte, war von negativer Art:

---

[1] Id., EWG, p. 372. Cf. Ibid., EGG, p. 104.

[2] "Diese ist der wesentliche Inhalt der Reformation; der Mensch ist durch sich selbst bestimmt, frei zu sein." (Id., EWG, p. 382.)

[3] Luke 24:5, E.

> es war, dass nämlich für das Dieses, das gesucht wurde, nur das subjektive Bewusstsein und kein äusserliches Ding das natürliche Dasein ist, dass das Dieses, als das Verknüpfende des Weltlichen und Ewigen, das geistige Fürsichsein der Person ist. So gewinnt die Welt das Bewusstsein, dass der Mensch das Dieses, das göttlicher Art ist, in sich selbst suchen müsse: dadurch wird die Subjektivität absolut berechtigt und hat an sich selbst die Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zum Göttlichen. Auf eine sinnliche Weise kann die Wahrheit der Religion nicht erlangt werden; sie ist ein Geistiges und kann nur im Geiste gefasst werden. Diese Erkenntnis ist das Vorzüglichste, das absolute Resultat der Kreuzzüge. . . . Von hier fängt die Zeit des Selbstvertrauens, der Selbsttätigkeit an. Das Abendland hat vom Morgenland am heiligen Grabe auf ewig Abschied genommen und sein Prinzip der subjektiven unendlichen Freiheit erfasst.[1]

In short, the truth about life and reality is to be found not in the external world of nature, but in the inner life of the soul of man. Nature is bound by necessity, but "das Reich des Geistes ist das Reich der Freiheit."[2] If we would know the truth and be made free, let us look within.

3. Hegel's Belief in Immortality

Further evidence of Hegel's high estimate of human individuality is found in his belief in immortality. Most modern critics, it is true, have denied such a belief in Hegel. In view of the philosopher's own words, however, this denial is untenable. Hegel's conviction that human life is eternal is shown alike in his own positive statements and in his censure of those religions which lack the idea.

For Hegel, belief in immortality is the natural counterpart of belief in the worth of man. Each implies and complements the other. "Diese Absolutheit, Unendlichkeit des Selbstbewusstseins ist in der Vorstellung und Lehre der Unsterblichkeit der Seele."[3] As free and infi-

---

[1] IX, PWG, pp. 849-850.
[2] V, ENC, p. LXXVI. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 32.
[3] XII, BR, p. 162; cf. p. 234.

nitely valuable, the human spirit is also immortal.

The secret of this connection is man's relation to the Absolute. Both the worth and the immortality of man depend on his kinship with God. Concretely, to say that man has "unendlichen Wert" and is "absolut frei" means just this: "Der einzelne Mensch sei der absolute Gegenstand der Liebe Gottes, die Seele sei an und für sich, ewig in sich selber, es sei Gott um das Subjekt zu tun."[1]

Ultimately, therefore, human immortality is grounded in the character of God. As members of the Absolute Spirit, finite spirits are eternal. Man,

> indem er sich in Gott weiss, weiss . . . damit sein unvergängliches Leben in Gott, er weiss von der Wahrheit seines Seins; hier tritt also die Vorstellung von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele als ein wesentliches Moment in die Geschichte der Religion ein. Die Vorstellungen von Gott und von der Unsterblichkeit haben eine notwendige Beziehung aufeinander: wenn der Mensch wahrhaft von Gott weiss, so weiss er auch wahrhaft von sich.[2]

Hegel means essentially the same thing when he says that man is immortal through knowledge. Man's unique relation to God is a conscious relation, resting on his ability as a thinking being to know God.

> Nur als denkend ist er keine sterbliche, tierische, sondern eine reine, freie Seele. Das Erkennen, Denken ist die Wurzel seines Lebens, seiner Unsterblichkeit als Totalität in sich selbst. Die tierische Seele ist in die Körperlichkeit versenkt, dagegen der Geist ist Totalität in sich selbst.[3]

No less conclusive as indicating Hegel's belief in immortality is his criticism of those religions which do not teach it. For example, he points out that immortality in Indian religion is nothing more than a vague metamorphosis in which the individual is ultimately annihilated.

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 264. Cf. XIV, AR, p. 110; IX, PWG, p. 738.
[2] XIII, NR, pp. 7-8.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 129. Cf. XIV, BDG, p. 116.

nitely valuable, the human spirit is also immortal.

The secret of this connection is man's relation to the absolute. Both the world and the immortality of man depend on his kinship with God. Concretely, to say that man has "unmediated Have" and is "absolut frei" means just this: "Der ewige Wesen sei der absolute Grund, aus dem Liebe fliesse, die Seele sei an und für sich, wenn in sich selber, an sich mit nichts behaftet so frei."[1]

Ultimately, therefore, human immortality is rooted in the character of God. As members of the Absolute Spirit, finite spirits are eternal. Man,

> habe er sich in Gott weiter, weiter . . . Denkt sich nur er Unendliches leben in Gott, er weiter von der Welt-heit meines Seines; hier tritt also die Vorstellung von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele als ein wesentliches Moment in die Tendenz der Religion ein. Die Vorstellung von Tod und von der Unsterblichkeit haben eine tiefere Bedeutung aufgenommen: wenn der Mensch wirklich von Gott weiter, so weiss er auch wirklich von sich.[2]

Hegel thus suggestively the early Hebrew when he says that man is immortal through knowledge. Man's unique relation to God is a conscious relation, resting on his ability as a thinking being to know God.

> Der als Geistes ist er seiner eigentlichen, wirklichen, absoluten Seins seine Seele. Die Unsterblichkeit der ewigen Leben, weiter in ewigkeitlich sich Totalität in sich selber. Die wirkliche Seele ist in die Vorstellung verwandt, durch welche ist Totalität in sich selber."[3]

He does sympathetically as indicating Hegel's belief in immortality in his criticism of those religions which do not teach it. For example, he points out that immortality in Indian religion is nothing more than a vague metamorphosis in which the individual is ultimately annihilated.

---

[1] XIII, 124, p. 254. cf. XIV, 42, p. 108; IV, 74, p. 132.
[2] XIII, 124, pp. 7-8.
[3] XIV, 42, p. 254. cf. XIV, 42, p. 116.

> Dies Höchste ist dort nicht eine Affirmation, Fortdauer, sondern Nirwana, ein Zustand der Vernichtung des Affirmativen, ein affirmativ Scheinendes, Ähnlich mit Brahm zu sein. Diese Identität mit Brahm ist aber zugleich das Zerfliessen in jene zwar affirmativ scheinende, doch durchaus in sich bestimmungslose, ununterschiedene Einheit.[1]

Egyptian religion remedies this difficulty. In it

> das Höchste des Bewusstseins ist die Subjektivität als solche; diese ist Totalität und vermag selbständig in sich zu sein. . . . Diese Bestimmung der Subjektivität, die objektiv ist und dem Objektiven, dem Gotte zukommt, ist auch die Bestimmung des subjektiven Selbstbewusstseins in der Weise der Unsterblichkeit. Dieses weiss sich als Subjekt, als Totalität und wahrhafte Selbständigkeit und damit als unsterblich.[2]

In Judaism, God is viewed abstractly as the One. Man's relation to Jehovah is one not of freedom, but of servile obedience to an external power. Because of this lack of freedom the Hebrews did not believe in immortality.[3]

> Die hohe Bestimmung des Geistes ist aber die, dass er ewig und unsterblich ist; doch ist diese Hoheit des Menschen, . . . das Bewusstsein der Unsterblichkeit des Geistes in dieser Religion noch nicht vorhanden.[4]

In Christianity, however, where the individual is seen in his true relation to God to be free and infinitely valuable, he is regarded as immortal. "Die Seele, die einzelne Subjektivität hat eine unendliche, ewige Bestimmung, Bürger im Reiche Gottes zu sein."[5]

Abstractly conceived, immortality is endless duration in time, an elevation above the power and the vicissitudes of change.[6] As a sepa-

---

[1] XIII, NR, p. 219.
[2] XIII, NR, p. 219.
[3] XIII, RGI, p. 97; cf. p. 106.
[4] XIII, RGI, p. 88; cf. p. 98.
[5] XIV, AR, p. 178.
[6] XII, BR, p. 234.

Dies Höchste ist Gott nicht eine Affirmation, Funktionen, sondern Wirkungen, sind Gestaltungen der Fruchtbarkeit der Affirmativen, sind affirmativ Schöpfungen, Abbilder mit Grenze an sich. Diese Identität mit Grenze ist aber zugleich die Zerfallenheit in jene zwei affirmativ schöpferischen, doch dorthin in sich beziehungslosen, wesensverschiedenen Kindheit.[1]

Christian religion transfers this difficulty. In it

> das Höchste des Immanenten ist die Subjektivität als solche; dieses ist Totalität und vermag selbständig in sich zu sein. . . . Diese Bestimmung der Subjektivität, die Objektivität ist und dem Objektiven, den Dingen zukommt, ist auch die Bestimmung des subjektiven Selbstbewusstseins in der Reihe der Unvergänglichkeit. Dieses weiss sich als Subjekt, als Totalität und vollkommene Selbstständigkeit und Kraft als Ewigkeit.

In Judaism, God is viewed absolutely as the One. Man's relation to Jehovah is one not of freedom, but of servile obedience to an arbitrary power. Because of this lack of freedom the Hebrews did not believe in immortality.[2]

> In dieser Bestimmung des Heiden ist aber die Idee er ewig und unsterblich ist; doch ist diese Totalität des Menschen. . . . des Immanenten der Unsterblichkeit des Heiden in dieser Beziehung noch nicht vorhanden.[3]

In Christianity, however, where the individual is seen in his free relation to God to be free and infinitely valuable, he is recognized as immortal. This Self, die einzelne Subjektivität hat eine immanente Bestimmung, Dieser ist welche ewig zu sein.[4]

Abstractly conceived, immortality is endless duration in time, an eternity above the power and the vicissitudes of change.[5] As a rep-

---

[1] XIII, EM, p. 219.
[2] XIII, EM, p. 220.
[3] XIII, EM, p. 27; cf. p. 106.
[4] XIII, EM, p. 28; cf. p. 29.
[5] XIII, AE, p. 174.
[6] XIII, SP, p. 224.

rate, unitary center of consciousness, man is conscious of his freedom, his "ganz abstrakter Freiheit." This consciousness is his "unendliches Beisichsein," "reines Insichsein."[1] The human subject is seen to have absolute importance as an object of God's interest;

> denn es ist für sich seiendes Selbstbewusstsein. Es ist als die reine Gewissheit seiner in sich selbst; es existiert in ihm der Punkt unendlicher Subjektivität: es ist zwar abstrakt, aber abstrakt an und für sich Sein. Dies kommt in der Gestalt hervor, dass der Mensch als Geist unsterblich ist, über die Endlichkeit, Abhängigkeit, über äussere Umstände erhaben, dass er die Freiheit ist, von allem zu abstrahieren.[2]

Human self-consciousness, however, is not only self-identical and separate, but also integrally related to the Absolute. It is

> ewiges, absolutes Moment in dem ewigen Leben. . . , in welches es über die Zeit, dieses Abstraktum der Veränderung, und über das Reale der Veränderung, über die Entzweiung hinaus entrückt wird.[3]

Seen in its concreteness, therefore, immortality is eternal life in unity and reconciliation with the Absolute Spirit.

The words mortal and immortal do not, like combustible and incombustible, refer to a possibility which comes to an object from without, but rather to a condition within.

> Die Bestimmung vom Sein ist . . . affirmativ bestimmte Qualität, die es jetzt schon an ihm hat. So muss bei der Unsterblichkeit der Seele nicht vorgestellt werden, dass sie erst später in Wirklichkeit trete; sie ist gegenwärtige Qualität. Der Geist ist ewig, also deshalb schon gegenwärtig; der Geist in seiner Freiheit ist nicht im Kreise der Beschränktheit. Für ihn als denkend, rein wissend ist das Allgemeine Gegenstand,---dies ist die Ewigkeit.[4]

---

[1] XIV, AR, p. 110; XIV, BDG, p. 116.
[2] XIV, AR, p. 110.
[3] XII, BR, p. 234. Cf. XIV, AR, p. 178.
[4] XIV, AR, pp. 110-111.

rate, unitary center of consciousness, man is conscious of his freedom, his "ens absterminar vrelabit." This consciousness is his "unmittelbes Selbstbewusstsein," "reines Insichsein."[1] The human subject is seen to have absolute importance as an object of Jung's interest:

> denn es ist für sich entweder Selbstbewusstsein. Es ist sich rein Insichsein seiner in sich selbst; es existiert in ihm der Punkt unendlicher Subjektivität; es ist zwar abstrakt, aber abstrakt an und für sich Sein. Dies Sein ist der absolute Herrscher, dem der Mensch sich rein unterwirft. Der die und-lichkeit, Abhängigkeit, Der Endzweck Unendlichkeit erkennen, dass er die Freiheit ist, von allem zu abstrahieren.[2]

Human self-consciousness, however, is not only self-identical and separate, but also intrinsically related to the Absolute. It is

> seiner, absolutes Sosein in dem ewigen Leben. . . . Es wandelt es über sich selbst, dieses Abstrakte, der Verdoppelung, und über das Reich der Verdoppelung, über die Erscheinung dieses entfernt wird.[3]

Man in his consciousness, therefore, immortality in eternal life in unity and reconciliation with the Absolute Spirit.

The words mortal and immortal do not, like combustible and incombustible, refer to a possibility which comes to an object from without, but rather to a condition within.

> Die Sterblichkeit von Sein ist . . . eigentlich bestimmte Qualität, die es jetzt neben an sich hat. Sein kommt bei der Unsterblichkeit der Seele nicht vorausetzt werden. Dass sein erst wieder in wirklichkeit ist: sie ist gegenwärtige Qualität. Der Geist ist sein, sein Denkens schon vorgesetzt; der Geist in seiner Freiheit ist eins in Kreise der Geschichtlichkeit. Für ihn sie Denkend, sein wissend ist das Allgemeine Gegenstand,---dies ist sie Wirklichkeit.[4]

---

1 XIV, Jn, p. 110; XIV, Gn, p. 117.
2 XIV, Jn, p. 110.
3 XIV, Jn, p. 124. Cf. XIV, Gn, p. 124.
4 XIV, Jn, pp. 110-111.

Abstractly, as opposed to finitude and transitoriness, immortality is endless life in the future. Concretely and truly, it is an eternally present quality transcending time and change. Abstractly, it is everlasting self-identity. Concretely, it is constant awareness of the universal, eternal life in union with God.

Of Hegel's belief in immortality no doubt can remain. Moreover, it is clear that the immortality which he affirms is personal and individual. In Indian religion it is the merging of the individual into the undifferentiated unity of the Absolute which precludes, in Hegel's opinion, any true conception of immortality. In Christianity, on the contrary, it is "die Seele," "die einzelne Subjektivität," "der einzelne Mensch" as a "Totalität in sich selbst" who is a citizen of the eternal kingdom of God. In thus proclaiming personal immortality, Hegel carries to its logical conclusion his idea of the infinite value of the human soul.

B. Difficulties in Hegel's View of the Individual

Few thinkers have proclaimed so vigorously as Hegel the worth of personality. His world-view which makes man akin to the Absolute, his enthusiastic support of the Christian exaltation of free personality, and his belief in personal immortality all reveal a clear recognition of the significance of the human individual. Yet there are difficulties in his view of man which cannot be overlooked.

1. The Metaphysical Identity of Man and God

In the first place, Hegel's ultimate identification of man and God prevents him from doing full justice to man. His metaphysics of the Absolute is a two-edged sword. On the one side, it gives to man, because

Abstractly, as opposed to finitude and temporal finiteness, immortality is endless life in the future. Concretely and truly, it is an eternally present reality transcending time and change. Abstractly, it is overcoming self-identity. Concretely, it is constant emergence of the universal, eternal life in union with God.

Of Hegel's belief in immortality no doubt can remain. Moreover, it is clear that the immortality which he affirms is personal and individual. In Indian religion it is the merging of the individual into the undifferentiated unity of the Absolute which prevailed. In Hegel's religion, any such conception of immortality. In Christianity, on the contrary, it is "die einzelne Subjektivität," "der einzelne Geister" as a "totalität in sich selber" who is a citizen of the eternal kingdom of God. In this proclaiming personal immortality, Hegel carried to its logical conclusion the idea of the infinite value of the human soul.

3. Critical Ideas in Hegel's View of the Individual

Few thinkers have proclaimed as vigorously as Hegel the worth of personality. His world-view which makes man akin to the Absolute, his mystical support of the Christian exaltation of free personality, and his belief in personal immortality all reveal a clear recognition of the significance of the human individual. Yet there are difficulties in his view of man which cannot be overlooked.

1. The Metaphysical Identity of Man and God

In the first place, Hegel's ultimate identification of man and God overstepping him from being full justice to man. His metaphysics of the Absolute is a two-edged sword. On the one side, it lifts to man, because

of his spiritual kinship with the Absolute, an infinite value; but on the other, it deprives man of his uniqueness and individual identity by making him one with God. In view of this ultimate identification of finite spirits and the Absolute Spirit, Hegel is inconsistent in treating the former as in themselves worthful. For in the Hegelian metaphysics human beings have value not as individuals with their own characteristic capacities, but as moments in the life of the Absolute Individual.[1] Hegel's whole glorification of Christianity for its insight that man as man is valuable is thus vitiated. Actually, it is not man as man that is significant, but man as the Absolute. Individuals in themselves have no ultimate reality.

In the Philosophie der Religion, the central object of study is not the religious experience of human beings, but the life of the Absolute. Religion for Hegel is primarily an affair not of man but of God. The history of religions is not so much man's growing discovery of God or even God's discovery of man as it is the long, slow progress of the Absolute toward a complete realization of itself, a gradual attainment by the Absolute of full self-consciousness.

> Die Religion ist . . . die Idee des Geistes, der sich zu sich selbst verhält, das Selbstbewusstsein des absoluten Geistes. . . . In der höchsten Idee ist so die Religion nicht die Angelegenheit eines Menschen, sondern sie ist wesentlich die höchste Bestimmung der absoluten Idee selbst. Indem sich der Geist an sich selbst unterscheidet, tritt die Endlichkeit des Bewusstseins ein. Aber dies endliche Bewusstsein ist Moment des Geistes selbst; er ist das sich Unterscheiden, das sich Bestimmen, d.h. sich als endliches Bewusstsein Setzen. Es ist demnach nicht vom Standpunkt des endlichen Bewusstseins, dass wir die Religion betrachten.[2]

---

[1] Cf. above, p. 193.
[2] XII, BR, pp. 150-151. Cf. above, pp. 32-33.

To be sure, finite consciousness has a definite part in religion, but it is transcended in the Absolute; "denn das Andere, wovon der absolute Geist weiss, ist er selbst, und er wird erst zum absoluten Geiste dadurch, dass er sich weiss."[1] It is true that the Absolute attains complete self-knowledge only through the mediation of finite minds, that is, through being particularized into individual human consciousnesses. Nevertheless, this movement is

> wiederum nicht die Angelegenheit des einzelnen Menschen, sondern gerade ist darin das Einzelne aufgehoben und die Religion Wissen des göttlichen Geistes von sich durch Vermittlung des endlichen Geistes.[2]

Hegel believes his view of the relation of man to God to be empirically ascertained. "Wir wissen von unserm Geiste," he writes, that we are Spirit in its estrangement and separation, but ultimately in its reconciliation or return to itself.[3] Something akin to this can be observed in human religious experience. The religious man is alternately conscious of his separation from God through sin and his reconciliation with God through repentance and the forgiveness of sin. But Hegel overlooks another fact which is equally observable. In Christianity, which for him is normative, the religious subject rarely identifies himself with God. With the exception of some mystics, Christians feel themselves to be distinct from God even when in communion with him. The reconciliation of the believer with his God involves not metaphysical union, but a unity of will or purpose.

The defect involved here appears particularly in connection with the fact of sin. If man and God are ultimately one, God sins as well as

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 151.
[2] XII, BR, p. 151; cf. pp. 44, 219, 235; above, pp. 194-195.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 29.

To be sure, finite consciousness has a definite part in religion, but it is transcended in the absolute; "Dann lag Indien, wovon der ohne-hin dort weise, hat er neiber, und er wird erst zum absoluten Heiden werden, dann er rich weise."[1] It is true that the absolute attains consciousness only through the mediation of finite minds, that is, through being particularized into individual human consciousnesses. Nevertheless, this agreement is

> wieferne nicht die ausschliessliche der einzelnen Menschen, sondern vielmehr jene durch das Universum mitgedachten und die Beziehung dieses gegenseitigen Gegebenen zum sich durch Vermittlung des endlichen Geistes.

Hegel believes his view of the relation of man to God to be adequately accordant. "Wir wissen von absoluten Geiste," he writes, "dass wir sein Geist in ihm entgegensetzen und unterscheiden, und eigentlich in ihm vereinigen oder versöhnen zu lassen."[2] Something akin to this can be observed in human religious experience. The religious act is alternately conscious of his separation from God through sin and his reconciliation with God through repentance, and the forgiveness of sin. But Hegel overlooks another fact which is equally observable. In Christianity, which for him is normative, the religious subject merely identifies himself with God, with the exception of some egotism. Christians feel themselves to be distinct from God even when in communion with him. The reconciliation of the believer with his God involves not metaphysical unity, but a unity of will or purpose.

The defect involved here becomes particularly in connection with the fact of sin. If man and God are ultimately one, God also as well as

---

[1] VIII, 28, p. 161.
[2] VIII, 28, p. 161; cf. ibid., 210, 224; above, pp. 141-142.
[3] VIII, 28, p. 29.

man. My sinful act is not mine alone, but God's, for I am a part of God. Yet Hegel affirms also the moral perfection of the Absolute. On his theory, then, the same act which from the finite point of view is bad is from the standpoint of the Absolute perfectly good. As man, I sin; as Absolute, I will the good in the same choice. This cannot be. One act of will cannot be both right and wrong. On Hegelian premises the contradiction is insoluble. The only way out is to regard every individual as in every aspect of his experience other than God.[1]

From Hegel's identification of man with the Absolute one of two conclusions seems necessarily to follow. Either the Absolute is nothing more than the sum of the finite individuals who compose it, and has its only reality in the consciousness of the worshiping community of believers, who then worship only each other; or God is all there is, and finite individuals have no reality of their own whatever. Thus the choice lies between positivism and pantheism,[2] either one of which thought through to the end, deprives human personality of the ultimate value which Hegel believes it to have. In view of his constant emphasis on the Absolute, it is fairly clear that Hegel chose the latter alternative. Against the background of his absolutism, however, he struggles valiantly to preserve the uniqueness of individuals. That he fails is not surprising. No more surprising is it that his left-wing followers took the other alternative and denied the existence of the Absolute altogether.

2. Hegel's Epistemological Monism

A further fundamental defect in Hegel's view of individuals lies in his epistemological monism. In the act of knowing, according to He-

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 81-82, 94-95, 188.
[2] Cf. above, p. 177, n. 1.

man. My object not is not mine alone, but rather, for I am a part of God, that Total affirms also the moral perfection of the Absolute. In his turn, then, the man not which from the finite point of view is bad is from the standpoint of the Absolute perfectly good. As was, I sing; as Absolute, I will the good in the same moment. This cannot be. One act of will cannot be both right and wrong. On Royce's premises the contradiction is inevitable. The only way out is to regard every individual as in every aspect of his experience either true or false.[1]

Thus Royce's idealistic view of man with the Absolute one of two conclusions seems necessarily to follow. Either the Absolute is nothing more than the sum of the finite individuals who compose it, and has its only reality in the consciousness of the worshiping community of believers, who then worship only each other; or God is all there is, and finite individuals have no reality of their own whatever. Thus the choice lies between monistic idealism and pantheism,[2] either one of which thought strongly to the end, deprives human personality of the ultimate value which Royce believes it to have. In view of his constant emphasis on the Absolute, it is fairly clear that Royce chose the latter alternative. Against the background of his absolutism, however, he strongly validates to preserve the reality of individuals. That he fails is not surprising. No more surprising is it that his left-wing followers took the other alternative and denied the existence of the Absolute altogether.

C. Hegel's Epistemological Monism

A further fundamental defect in Hegelian view of individuals lies in his epistemological monism. In the act of knowing, according to Be-

---

[1] Cf. above, IV, 81-82, 94-95, 129.
[2] Cf. above, I, 177, n. 1.

gel, idea and object, man and God are one.[1] Man's knowledge of God is really "Selbstbewusstsein Gottes," God's knowledge of himself.[2] It is the very nature of reason that man's thoughts are also those of the Absolute. When I think, it is not really I that think, but the Absolute thinking in me.

> Das Selbstbewusstsein, so die Gewissheit, dass seine Bestimmungen ebensosehr gegenständlich, Bestimmungen des Wesens der Dinge, als seine eigenen Gedanken sind, ist die Vernunft.[3]

This identification of human and divine knowing involves a contradiction which Hegel's dialectic cannot remove. It is impossible to reconcile the intellectual limitations of finite individuals with the cognitive perfection of the Absolute. On Hegel's view, any given act of knowing yields both partial truth for the finite knower and complete truth for the Absolute. Since, however, the finite knower is really a moment of the Absolute, this means that the Absolute itself knows ignorantly and wisely about the same thing at the same time. This is unthinkable and impossible. The Absolute cannot be as ignorant as I am and yet have perfect knowledge.

Hegel admits that the connection between man's particular knowledge and the knowledge which he has in common with God raises a real question, but evades answering it on the ground that it would take him away from his subject.[4] As a matter of fact, on Hegelian premises the question admits of no satisfactory answer. Only when the Absolute is viewed not as the whole of reality, but as the Supreme Person whose purpose it is that there shall be finite persons whose knowledge, though incomplete, is

---

1 Cf. above, pp. 162-163.
2 XIV, BDG, p. 117. Cf. above, p. 195.
3 V, ENC, p. 380.
4 XIV, BDG, p. 117. Cf. above, p. 195, n. 4.

solely their own, can the problem be solved and human individuality preserved. My thoughts are mine only, not God's. God's thoughts are his only, not mine. Only if this is true can human ignorance be reconciled with divine omniscience.

3. Freedom and Necessity

Difficulties emerge also in connection with Hegel's affirmation of freedom in man. It is impossible to reconcile satisfactorily the freedom which he ascribes to personality with the necessity which he finds in religion and the total spiritual life of man.[1]

a. Hegel's View of Freedom

To avoid misunderstanding at this point, it is important to have clearly in mind what Hegel means by freedom. This appears in his definition of Spirit on its highest level as Beisichselbstsein, or self-contained existence.[2] Spirit's advance from opposition to complete self-reconciliation is equivalent to its attainment of freedom, "denn Freiheit ist, bei sich selbst zu sein."[3] Matter is dependent, having its unity or essence outside itself. Spirit, on the contrary, has its center in itself. It exists in and with itself, and in this characteristic lies its freedom.

> Wenn ich abhängig bin, so beziehe ich mich auf ein anderes, das ich nicht bin, und kann nicht ohne solch ein Äusseres sein. Frei bin ich, wenn ich bei mir selbst bin.[4]

On this basis, freedom belongs not only to the Absolute, but to finite spirits as well. It is true that all men are determined by the Ab-

---

1 Cf. above, pp. 139-149.
2 VIII, PWG, p. 32.
3 XII, BR, p. 65. Cf. XIV, AR, p. 110. "Der Geist ist das Beisichselbstsein, und dies eben ist die Freiheit." (VIII, PWG, p. 32.)
4 VIII, PWG, p. 32.

solute. Truly understood, however, the necessity which governs them is seen to be freedom.

> Das Denken der Notwendigkeit ist . . . das Zusammengehen seiner im Anderen mit sich selbst, die Befreiung, welche nicht die Flucht der Abstraktion ist, sondern in dem anderen Wirklichen, mit dem das Wirkliche durch die Macht der Notwendigkeit zusammengebunden ist, sich---nicht als anderes, sondern---sein eigenes Sein und Setzen zu haben. Als für sich existierend heisst diese Befreiung Ich, als zu ihrer Totalität entwickelt freier Geist, als Empfindung Liebe, als Genuss Seligkeit.[1]

What first appears to the individual as necessity is thus really his own will, for it is the will of the Absolute of which he is a part. In being determined by the Absolute Spirit finite spirits are not subject to a foreign power; on the contrary, as one with the Absolute they actually determine themselves. The truth of necessity, therefore, is self-determination, and self-determination is freedom.

The individual realizes this freedom in the moral life when, recognizing his true relation to the Absolute, he subordinates his own particular finite purposes to those of the Absolute. "Die Freiheit des Menschen besteht eben im Wissen und Willen Gottes durch Aufhebung des menschlichen Wissens und Wollens."[2] In knowing his participation in the divine nature, man is free and is "selbst der Prozess . . ., seine besondere Individualität abzuwerfen und sich in diesem Inhalte frei zu machen."[3] This means simply that we are free when we rise above our purely individual and selfish interests and identify ourselves with universal ends.

> Die wahre Freiheit ist als Sittlichkeit dies, dass der Wille nicht subjektive, d.i. eigensüchtige, sondern allgemeinen Inhalt zu seinen Zwecken hat.[4]

---

[1] V, ENC, pp. 155-156.
[2] XII, BR, p. 258.
[3] XIV, AR, p. 183.
[4] V, ENC, p. 408. Cf. Nohl, TJS, pp. 286-287; and the words of Goethe: "Nicht das macht frei, dass wir nichts über uns anerkennen wollen, sondern eben, dass wir etwas verehren, das über uns ist." (Gespräche with Eckermann. Reclam, I, p. 219.)

Hegel here voices a basic principle of life. Freedom is grounded in necessity and impossible without it. Man frees himself by limiting himself, finds his life by losing it. He is most free when he recognizes the laws of the objective order and submits himself to them. Through committing his own will utterly to the will of God, the individual achieves his highest selfhood. He is most truly a self when he is least selfish, when he devotes himself completely to God.[1] In dying to ourselves we truly live.

With this phase of Hegel's thought no one can quarrel. It is firmly grounded in both experience and reason. Difficulty arises, however, when one attempts to harmonize Hegel's conception of freedom with other aspects of his thought.

b. Defects in Hegel's Conception of Freedom

In the first place, in Hegel's view of necessity more seems to be implied than the self-commitment of the individual to universal ends. The total impression of the Philosophie der Religion is not that necessity is the presupposition or condition of freedom, but that everything that happens in religion is in the complete control of the Absolute Spirit, which alone is truly free. The entire historical development of religion proceeds according to dialectical necessity; it is "durch den Begriff bestimmt, im Begriffe notwendig."[2] The individual as such seems to have no part whatever in shaping the course of religious history.

In short, there seem to be in the Philosophie der Religion two divergent views. On the one hand, the growth of religion in man is determined and controlled in all points by the Absolute Spirit. On the other,

---

[1] Cf. XIII, RGI, pp. 92, 94. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 738; above, p. 177.
[2] XII, BR, p. 72. Cf. above, pp. 139-142.

Hegel here voices a basic principle of life. Freedom is grounded in necessity and impossible without it. Man frees himself by limiting himself, finds his life by losing it. He is most free when he recognizes the laws of the objective order and exhibits himself to them. Through submitting his own will unreservedly to the will of God, the individual achieves his highest ideal. He is most truly a self when he is least self, when he surrenders himself completely to God.[1] In dying to ourselves we truly live.

This idea lacks of Hegel's thought on one new quarrel. It is firmly rooted in his acceptance and reason. Difficulty arises, however, when one attempts to harmonize Hegel's conception of freedom with other aspects of his thought.

1. Hegel's Conception of Freedom

In the first place, in Hegel's view of necessity more seems to be implied than the self-abandonment of the individual to rational ends. The total impression of the Philosophie der Weltgeschichte is that necessity is the presupposition or condition of freedom. Not just everything that happens in reality is in the rational course of the Spirit's history, but everything in reality is in the rational course of the Spirit's history, which alone is truly free. The entire dialectical development of philosophy proceeds according to dialectical necessity; it is "pure immanent thought, in Hegelian words, the individual as such seems to have no part whatever in shaping the course of religious history."[2]

In short, there seem to be in the Philosophie der Geschichte two different views. On the one hand, the "rose" of reason in man is determined and controlled in all points by the Absolute Spirit. On the other,

---

1. Cf. Kiel, op. cit., p. 72. Cf. also, pp. 120-122.
2. Kiel, op. cit., p. 72. Cf. also, pp. 120-122.

the individual attains genuine freedom by recognizing the necessity which limits him. Here is an irreconcilable contradiction. If human freedom is real, some events represent the freely directed acts of conscious individuals, and so are not necessary; while if the various religions are what they are solely because the Begriff is what it is, free determination on the part of religious persons is a mere fiction. Either, therefore, the necessity which limits the individual is not absolute, in which case some freedom is actual; or else it is complete, in which case freedom is an illusion.

We must reject one view or the other. Either man is entirely determined or he is to a certain extent, however limited, free. He cannot be both. The same person cannot be both free and determined in the same act. No man can serve two masters. We can affirm necessity alone or freedom alone; we can affirm partial necessity and partial freedom; but we cannot consistently affirm both freedom and complete necessity. If man is really free in but the smallest portion of his life, necessity is not absolute.

The problem is not solved by saying, with Hegel, that we are free in recognizing the necessity which governs us. This is profoundly true if the necessity is regarded as incomplete. But if it is absolute, as Hegel thinks it to be, is our submission to the universal actually a free choice? Is the "Aufhebung des menschlichen Wissens und Wollens"[1] a voluntary Aufhebung? If freedom consists in the recognition that we are in all things determined by the Absolute, is not that recognition itself determined by the Absolute? Hegel seems to be saying, in fact, that man is

---

[1] XII, BR, p. 258. Cf. above, p. 214.

in individual actions results freedom by recognizing the necessity which limits him. There is an irreconcilable contradiction. If human freedom is real, some events represent the freely thought acts of conscious individuals, and so are not necessary; while if the various religions are what they are solely because the Infinite is what it is, free determination on the part of religious persons is a mere fiction. Nevertheless, therefore, the necessity which limits the individual is not absolute. In which sense more freedom is wanted; or else it is conceded, in which case freedom is an illusion.

We must reject both view or the other. Either man is absolutely determined or he is to a certain extent, a never limited, free. We cannot be both. The same person cannot be both free and determined in the same act. We can carry two masters. He can affirm necessarily, alone or together alone; we can affirm partial necessity and partial freedom; but we cannot contradictorily affirm both freedom and complete necessity. If man is really free in our the smallest portion of his life, necessity is not absolute.

The problem is not solved by argument, with Spinoza, that we are free in regulating the necessarily which governs us. This is evidently true if the necessity is considered as internal. But if it is absolute, as Spinoza strives it to be, in our relations to the universal substance, free thought. In the "Ethics" he contradictorily affirms and denies "a voluntary sufficiency." If freedom consists in the recognition that we are all things taken up by the thought, is not that recognition itself determined by the Absolute? Spinoza seems to be saying, in fact, that man is

---

[1] Vit. Sp. p. 266. Cf. above, p. 214.

free when he perceives that he has no freedom.

The extent to which Hegel's doctrine of necessity cancels his affirmation of freedom is seen especially in his treatment of sin. We have seen that for him not only the possibility of sin, but sin itself is necessary to true virtue.[1] On this view, however, freedom disappears. Man's capacity of choice becomes an illusion. He sins not because he chooses to, but because he must.

The implications of this lack of choice for the status of the individual are obvious. Lacking the ability to decide between alternatives, man is not properly speaking a human spirit, but an automaton.[2] He is not an infinitely valuable personality, but a machine. That Hegel emphasizes the worth of the individual cannot be denied. In proclaiming this worth, however, he contradicts the implications of his own doctrine of necessity.

III. Appraisal

In Hegel's view of the individual there are two contrasting strains. On the one hand, he proclaims in unmistakable terms the infinite value of the human spirit. This is shown alike in his idealistic world-view, his adherence to the Christian conception of the freedom and worth of man as the object of God's love, and his belief in immortality. Other factors, however, at least equally integral in Hegel's thought, render inconsistent this high estimate of the individual. Hegel's metaphysics of the Absolute, his monistic epistemology, and his doctrine of necessity tend inevitably to reduce the significance of the individual and destroy its

---

[1] Cf. above, pp. 93-94.

[2] Hegel himself writes that freedom is "das einzige Wahrhafte des Geistes." (IX, PWG, p. 32.)

this case be predicated that he has no freedom.

The extent to which Angelo participates in a sympathetic consciousness of freedom is seen especially in his treatment of sin. He has been that for him not only the possibility of sin, but sin itself is necessary to true virtue.[1] On this view, however, freedom disappears. Sin becomes an illusion. He sins not because he chooses to, but because he must.

The implications of this book I consider for the status of the individual are obvious. Denying the ability to decide between alternatives, man is not properly speaking a human spirit, but an automaton. He is not an intrinsically valuable personality, but a machine. That Dewey considers the worth of the individual central indicates. In presenting this work, I intend to demonstrate the implications of Dewey for the worth of personality.

III. Appraisal

In Dewey's view of the individual there are two contrasting strains. On the one hand, he proclaims in unmistakable terms the intrinsic value of the human spirit. This is shown also in his democratic world-view. His allegiance to the Christian conception of the freedom and worth of man as the object of God's love, was his belief in immortality. Other factors, however, not least equally influential in Dewey's thought, tended increasingly to undermine this high evaluation of the individual. Darwin's emphasis on the continuity, his evolutionary relativism, and his stress on economic and intellectual environment, reduce the significance of the individual and weaken its

---

[1] Dewey, op. cit., 23-24.

[2] Dewey, Dewey writes that freedom is "the element indispensable to the worth of the individual." (Op. cit., 32.)

uniqueness. Nowhere does Hegel reconcile satisfactorily these two conflicting strains of thought. He is forever wrestling with the problem of the relation between the individual and the Absolute and striving to do justice to both, but he never quite succeeds. As long as he deals primarily with one or the other, he encounters little difficulty. But whenever he considers the relation between the two, he must of necessity suppress one. In such cases of conflict the victory goes to the Absolute, and the individual suffers accordingly. For in spite of his effort to exalt man, Hegel is first and last an absolutist. The universe is ultimately not many, but one; it is not spirits, but Spirit.

Hegel's failure to maintain consistently his high estimate of man is due primarily to rational considerations. It is his epistemological and metaphysical thought which prevent him from doing full justice to the individual. This does not mean, however, that his main difficulty is exaggerated rationalism, though this extreme appears in his view of necessity. In fact, it might even be said that Hegel is not rational enough. It is not chiefly observation of experience, but thought, which discovers and corrects the errors in his view. No mere survey of empirical facts can reveal the difficulties in identifying God and man or in treating all human acts as necessary. Only a steadfast effort to be rational can do this. It cannot be said, therefore, that Hegel's view of the individual suffers chiefly from an eclipsing of the empirical by the rational.

In fact, there is every indication that Hegel's theory of man was based on a careful observation of human nature and influenced largely by the environment in which he lived and worked. His insistence on the incompleteness of individuals and their ultimate participation in a whole great-

er than themselves is a natural reaction to the subjective and abstract individualism which prevailed in eighteenth century Europe. Hegel struggled valiantly to restore the claims of objective truth,[1] which the atomistic subjectivism of his day held to be impossible of attainment.[2] In doing so, perhaps inevitably, he over-emphasized the universal, the Absolute, and subordinated the individual. This does not justify his error. It does show how naturally the great exponent of absolute objectivity of thought was influenced by considerations of time and place. In his view of human personality the rational is never divorced from the empirical, but grounded in and directly affected by it.

---

[1] Cf. V, ENC, p. 332.

[2] In a letter to Niethammer, Nov. 22, 1808, Hegel writes that "die Distelköpfe, die Spinotzisten, den Menschen überhaupt vorstellen, wie eine Portion Seewasser in eine Bouteille abgesondert im Ocean schwimmen." (Werke (orig. ed.), XIX, BVAH, I, p. 200.)

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the foregoing inquiry, the following conclusions may be drawn:

I. According to Hegel, philosophy deals with religion as given in experience. The primary essential of religious experience, however, is thought, in the sense that religion is possible only where thought, as the all-organizing activity of consciousness, is active.

II. In Hegel's view religion, to exist at all, must be felt or experienced, but to be objectively true it must be grounded in reason. Thus Hegel is empirical in regarding feeling as indispensable, rational in holding that it is insufficient and in need of thoughtful criticism.

III. Hegel recognizes the importance of the volitional factor in religious experience and insists that religion must manifest itself in moral living, but is too empirical in identifying the morality to which religion leads with the accepted morality of the state.

IV. Hegel is in accord with experience in maintaining that from the divine standpoint the triumph of the good is secure, since Spirit rules in the world; logically, however, his view is defective, for his personalistic pantheism makes it impossible to reconcile moral perfection in the Absolute with sin in finite spirits.

V. Hegel's principle of negativity and his theory of sin, treating the religious life as an alternation between estrangement, discord, and suffering on the one hand and reconciliation, peace, and joy on the other, reveal both an intimate acquaintance with religious experience and a profound use of rational interpretation. He is over-rational, however, in

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing inquiry, the following conclusions may be drawn:

I. According to Hegel, philosophy deals with religion as given in experience. The primary essential of religious experience, however, is thought, in the sense that religion is possible only where thought, as the all-or-nothing activity of consciousness, is active.

II. In Hegel's view religion, if it exists at all, must be fact or experience, but to be objectively true it must be grounded in reason. Thus Hegel is analytical in regarding religion independently, rational in holding that it is institutional and in need of thoughtful criticism.

III. Hegel recognizes the importance of the political factor in religious experience and insists that religion must manifest itself in moral living, but is too analytical in identifying the morality to which religion leads with the accepted morality of the state.

IV. Hegel is in accord with experience in maintaining that from the divine standpoint the triumph of the good is assured, since Spirit rules in the world; logically, however, his view is defective, for his personalistic rationalism makes it impossible to reconcile moral perfection in the absolute with sin in finite spirits.

V. Hegel's rejection of negativity and his theory of sin, breaking the religious life in an alternation between estrangement, discord, and suffering on the one hand and reconciliation, peace, and joy on the other, reveal both an intimate acquaintance with religious experience and a profound use of rational introspection. He is over-rational, however, in

making actual sin a necessity.

VI. Hegel's view of religious experience is not so much intellectualism as synopticism. The religious life is for him an activity of the total personality, the relation of the whole mind, involving feeling, will, and thought, to God.

VII. Though Hegel's historical descriptions reveal several instances of distortion, partly through rationalistic influence, partly through the operation of an exaggerated empiricism, they rest on a painstaking study of the history of religion, and in the main record faithfully the facts as known in Hegel's day.

VIII. Hegel recognizes the importance of historical manifestation in religion, but insists that, since the mere recounting of facts concerning origin or development cannot reveal the eternal truth and meaning which the facts express, the purely historical approach must be supplemented by rational, philosophical inquiry.

IX. Hegel appears to build up a priori the idea of religion and the logical system of religions demanded by this idea, after which he fits the various religions into his preconceived scheme. Actually, however, his idea of religion is founded on knowledge gained through careful study of religious history. In his lectures he simply presents systematically the results of concentrated reflection on facts empirically ascertained, purposely and naturally excluding any account of the psychological and chronological processes by which his conclusions were reached.

X. To a remarkable degree, therefore, Hegel synthesizes historical description of religion and philosophical interpretation; to a factual survey of history he adds the critical, organizing, evaluating activity of rational thought.

matter actual sin a necessity.

VI. Hegel's view of religious experience is not so much intellectualism as symbolism. The religious life is for him an activity of the total personality, the relation of the whole mind, involving feeling, will, and thought, to God.

VII. Though Hegel's historical interpretation reveal several instances of distortion, partly through rationalistic influence, partly through the operation of an exaggerated symbolism, they rest on a laborious study of the history of religion, and in the main record faithfully the facts as known in Hegel's day.

VIII. Hegel recognizes the importance of historical manifestation in religion, but insists that, since the mere recounting of facts concerning origin or development cannot reveal the eternal truth and reality which the facts express, the merely historical approach must be supplemented by rational, philosophical inquiry.

IX. Hegel attempts to build up a <u>priori</u> the idea of religion and the logical system of religions contained by this idea, after which he fits the various religions into his preconceived scheme. Actually, however, his idea of religion is founded on knowledge gained through careful study of religious history. In his lectures he simply presents systematically the results of more detailed reflection on facts empirically ascertained, carefully and rationally analyzing our account of the psychological and chronological processes by which his conclusions were reached.

X. To a remarkable degree, therefore, Hegel systematizes historical knowledge of religion and philosophical interpretation; to a lesser degree of history he adds the critical, organizing, evaluating activity of rational thought.

XI. However, two notable departures from this general synthesis are evident: in treating the development of religion as governed throughout by logical necessity, though he here voices his conviction that God is in history, Hegel is over-rational; in regarding Christianity as final and closing the door to the emergence of further truth about God than he and his time possessed, Hegel is too empirical.

XII. In emphasizing the arguments for God's existence, especially the ontological argument, Hegel is a thorough-going rationalist. His reliance on reason here is partly a conviction of the inadequacy of mere empiricism. However, in denying presuppositions and claiming that his whole philosophy proves the existence of God, Hegel attaches undue weight to pure reason operating independently, and not enough to empirical considerations.

XIII. Hegel's view of God as self-differentiating, self-reconciling Spirit combines loyalty to experience, with its dual aspects of conflict and harmony, suffering and joy, with a penetrating use of reason in interpreting experience. However, in including finite spirits in the Absolute and so making God both good and evil, perfect and imperfect, the conception is true to neither experience nor reason.

XIV. In Hegel's thought a profound appreciation of the significance of the human individual appears in an absolutistic setting which tends to annul this significance. Hegel's high estimate of man is well grounded both empirically and rationally; his failure to maintain it consistently, though partly traceable to extremes of both empiricism and rationalism, is primarily due to neither, but to contradictions in thought which clearer reasoning alone could remove.

XI. However, the notable departures from rigid rational criticism are evident in treating the development of religion as governed by rational necessity. Hegel's history values his conviction that God is in history. Hegel is a re-rational; in regarding Christianity as final and closing the door to the appearance of further truth about God than he had the time possessed. Hegel is too empirical.

XII. In emphasizing the dynamic for God's self-knowing, especially the ontological argument; Hegel is a thoroughgoing rationalist. His reliance on reason here is partly a conviction of the inadequacy of mere revelation. However, in keeping propositions and claiming that his world-view proves the existence of God, Hegel attempts to make reliance on pure reason overtaken independently, and not subject to empirical considerations.

XIII. Hegel's view of God as self-differentiation, self-recognition, spirit combines loyalty to experience, with the dual aspects of reality not borrow, suffering and joy, with a consciousness of reason in interpretation experience. However, in treating finite reality in the immediate and as passing truth both good and evil, particular and universal, the consciousness is true to reality experience nor reason.

XIV. In Hegel's thought a profound appreciation of the of religious of the human finitude of purpose is an unsatisfactory position which tends to reveal evil's significance. Hegel's idealistic of God is well grounded both empirically and rationally; his failure to maintain it consistently, though partly traceable to extreme of both empiricism and rationalism, is authority the to-whatever, but to contradictions in thought which observe or reasoning alone would ignore.

SUMMARY

This dissertation has sought to determine the relative extent to which Hegel's philosophy of religion is derived from and founded on (1) empirical observation and (2) the operations of reason. A review of the work of other investigators and a discussion of the sources and plan of the inquiry are followed by an outline of Hegel's philosophy of religion and an investigation of four major aspects of it.

I. Hegel's Philosophy of Religion

In Hegel's view, philosophy aims to bring out the meaning or reason in religious experience, to understand religion. Its basic principle is that man can know God, since both are Spirit. Religion stands midway between art and philosophy, revealing in the form of representation or imagination the same absolute truth which the former reveals in immediate perception and the latter in conceptual thought.

The first of the three major parts of the Philosophie der Religion deals with the notion or idea of religion. Religion Hegel defines as the relation of the human spirit to the Absolute Spirit, or more truly, the self-differentiating and self-reconciling life of the Absolute itself. The concrete reality of religion is a synthesis of two aspects, the theoretical and the practical, intellectual representation and worship. Both aspects exhibit three phases: (1) the moment of universality, God as the universal mind; (2) the moment of particularity, the self-differentiation of God to produce finite minds; and (3) the moment of individuality, the restoration of the unity of God and man. Theoretically, mediation is accomplished in the proofs of God's existence; practically, reconciliation

SUMMARY

This dissertation has sought to determine the relative extent to which Hegel's philosophy of religion is derived from and founded on (1) empirical observation and (2) the operations of reason. A review of the work of other investigators and a discussion of the scope and plan of the inquiry are followed by an outline of Hegel's philosophy of religion and an investigation of four major aspects of it.

1. Hegel's Philosophy of Religion

In Hegel's view, philosophy aims to bring out the meaning or reason in religious experience, to understand religion. Its basic principle is that man can know God, since both are Spirit. Religion stands midway between art and philosophy, revealing in the form of representation or imagination the same absolute truth which the former reveals in immediate perception and the latter in conceptual thought.

The first of the three major parts of the *Philosophie der Religion* deals with the notion or idea of religion. Religion Hegel defines as the relation of the human spirit to the Absolute Spirit, or more truly, the self-differentiating and self-reconciling life of the Absolute itself. The concrete reality of religion is a synthesis of two aspects, the theoretical and the practical, intellectual representation and worship. Both aspects exhibit three phases: (1) the moment of universality, God as the universal mind; (2) the moment of particularity, the self-differentiation of God to produce finite minds; and (3) the moment of individuality, the restoration of the unity of God and man. Theoretically, mediation is accomplished in the process of God's existence; practically, reconciliation

is effected in worship.

By its very nature the notion manifests itself in history to produce the definite religions, comprising (1) the nature-religions, in which Spirit and nature are still abstractly identical, and (2) the religions of spiritual individuality, where differentiation replaces immediacy and Spirit and nature are distinguished. In all of them, however, the manifestation of the notion is limited and abstract.

Only in the absolute religion, Christianity, does the determination fully manifest the notion. On this third stage religion exhibits the same phases as the notion itself. Beginning as abstract unity, Spirit differentiates itself to produce finite spirits whom it then reconciles with itself. Through reconciling the universal and the particular, God and man, Spirit attains concrete unity and true individuality, complete self-knowledge.

II. Hegel's View of the Nature of Religious Experience

Hegel insists that philosophy seeks to understand the religion which it finds. Though religion is possible only where thought is active, it cannot be known or understood without being inwardly experienced; if it is to exist at all, it must be felt. Feeling alone, however, is inadequate, for (1) its subjectivity prevents it from apprehending objective, universal truth; (2) it deifies the selfish, particular desires of men; (3) its truth depends on its content, which can be tested only by thought; and (4) since religion is found only in thinking beings, its center is not feeling but thought.

In Hegel's early thought morality is essential to religion. In his mature conception of religion also, though the speculative interest assumes greater importance, the final stage, that of worship, centers in the

is effected in worship.

By its very nature the notion manifests itself in history as produce the finite religions, comprising (1) the natural religions, in which finite and nature are still abstractly identical, and (2) the religions of spiritual individuality, where differentiation replaces immediacy and finite and nature are distinguished. In all of them, however, the manifestation of the notion is limited and abstract.

Only in the absolute religion, Christianity, does the determination fully manifest the notion. In this third stage religion exhibits the same phases as the notion itself. Regarding as abstract unity, spirit differentiates itself to produce finite objects, yet it then reconciles with itself. Through reconciling the universal and the particular, God and man, spirit realizes concrete unity and true individuality, complete self-knowledge.

V. Hegel's View of the Relation of Religious Superstitions

Hegel insists that philosophy seeks to understand the religion which it finds. Though religion is possible only where thought is active, it cannot be known or understood without being inwardly experienced: if it is to exist at all, it must be felt. Feeling alone, however, is inadequate, for (1) its subjectivity prevents it from apprehending objective, universal truth; (2) it delivers the selfish, particular desires of man; (3) its truth depends on its content, which can be tested only by thought; and (4) since religion is found only in thinking beings, its center is not feeling but thought.

In Hegel's early thought morality is essential to religion. In his mature conception of religion also, though the emotive interest persists, there greater importance, the final stage, that of morality, centers in the

will. True worship, the volitional activity whereby the unity of God and man is restored, inevitably finds completion in moral conduct. Religion is thus the basis of the morality of the state. Yet Hegel is too empirical in regarding the accepted morality as fully embodying the religious ideal. On the other hand, his logical system compels him to restrict ethics to the organized state, which is unjustifiable. With regard to the moral ought Hegel opposes the subjective moralism of Kant and Fichte, holding that in God the good is secure, being already realized. This is true to experience, but in a pantheistic view illogically requires the Absolute to be both good and bad at once, and also fails to recognize adequately the temporal element in the Absolute. Hegel's regard for the facts of moral experience is further shown in his principle of negativity and his theory of sin, which find opposition, discord, and estrangement at the heart of life, but regard conflict as transcended in man's reconciliation with God. At the same time, he displays a profound use of reason, as in his insistence that sin is possible only through moral knowledge. His view is defective in making evil necessary and in identifying finite spirits and the Absolute, thus endangering the reality of sin and the goodness of God.

Religion is for Hegel an affair of the total personality. Feeling and will are important aspects, but both must be guided by reason as the all-organizing activity of consciousness. The mind which experiences religion is a concrete whole which rises to God in all the many-sided richness of its life.

III. Hegel's View of the Historical Development of Religion

A high regard for the facts of history is evidenced in Hegel both by his frequent references to historical authorities and by the general ac-

will. Thus, morally, the religious activity whereby the unity of God and man is restored, inevitably finds completion in moral conduct. Religion is thus the basis of the morality of the state. Yet Hegel is too capital in regarding the concrete totality as fully embodying the religious ideal. On the other hand, his logical system compels him to restrict ethics to the organized state, which is unjustifiable. With respect to the moral sought Hegel opposes the subjective attitude of Kant and Fichte, holding that in God the good is secure, being already realized. This is true to experience, but in a pantheistic view illogically requires the absolute to be both good and bad at once, and also fails to recognize adequately the temporal element in the absolute. Hegel's regard for the facts of moral experience is further shown in his principle of negativity and his theory of sin, which find opposition, discord, and estrangement at the heart of life, but regard conflict as transmuted in moral reconciliation with God. At the same time, he displays a profound use of reason, as in his insistence that sin is possible only through moral knowledge. His view is defective in making will necessary and in identifying finite activity and the absolute, thus endangering the reality of sin and the goodness of God.

Religion is for Hegel an activity of the total personality. Feeling and will are important aspects, but both must be united by reason as the all-organizing activity of consciousness. The mind which experiences religion is a concrete whole which rises to God in all the many-sided fluidness of its life.

III. Hegel's View of the Historical Development of Religion

A high regard for the facts of history is evidenced in Hegel both by his frequent references to historical authorities and by the general so-

curacy of his historical accounts. In spite of several important defects, due partly to his primarily philosophical purpose and the limited knowledge of his day and partly to influences both over-rational and over-empirical, Hegel is habitually loyal to historical fact.

His chief concern, however, is not to record the history of religions, but to present that history as a rational, unitary development. While historical manifestation is a necessary stage in the self-realization of the Absolute, for Hegel it is not in itself sufficient. Historical inquiry is inadequate because (1) it is external, dealing only with truths known to others, and (2) it lacks an immanent criterion of truth and value. To historical description, therefore, must be added philosophical evaluation, the unifying, interpreting activity of concrete thought. The historical and the rational interpenetrate.

The fact that Hegel's lectures begin with the notion of religion gives the impression that his account is a priori. However, this possibility is precluded by his concern for and intimate knowledge of history, as well as by the accurate correspondence of his speculative development of the idea of religion with the actual historical growth of religion. Hegel's lectures set forth the result of a life-time of thought on religious experience and history, purposely omitting an account of the processes by which these results were obtained.

There are two prominent exceptions to Hegel's general synthesis of history and reason. He is over-rational in treating the steps in the development of religion as logically necessitated. This view makes necessary "facts" which have not existed, overlooks the hypothetical character of all knowledge, leaves no place for human freedom, and makes the Absolute non-moral; but has the virtue of recognizing the immanent control of God

barely of his historical accounts. In spite of several important defects, due partly to his primarily philosophical purpose and the limited knowledge of his day and partly to influences both over-rational and over-emotional, Hegel is basically loyal to historical fact.

His chief concern, however, is not to record the history of religions, but to present that history as a rational, unitary development. While historical manifestation is a necessary stage in the self-realization of the Idea, for Hegel it is not in itself sufficient. Historical inquiry is inadequate because (1) it is external, dealing only with truths known to others, and (2) it lacks an immanent criterion of truth and value. To historical description, therefore, must be added philosophical reconstruction, the unifying, interpretive activity of comprehensive thought. The historical and the rational interpenetrate.

The fact that Hegel's lectures begin with the notion of religion gives the impression that his account is a priori. However, this impression is precluded by his concern for and intimate knowledge of history, as well as by the accurate correspondence of his speculative development of the idea of religion with the actual historical growth of religion. Hegel's lectures set forth the results of a life-time of thought on religious experience and history, purposely omitting an account of the process by which these results were obtained.

There are two prominent exceptions to Hegel's general synthesis of history and reason. He is over-rational in treating the step in the development of religion as logically necessitated. This view makes necessary "facts" which have our existence, overlooks the unrationalized contents of all knowledge, leaves no place for human freedom, and makes the finite non-moral; but has the virtue of reconciliation the immanent control of God

in history. Hegel is too empirical in regarding Christianity as absolute and final. This conception overlooks the values in other religions and arbitrarily limits the development which Hegel himself affirms.

IV. Hegel's View of the Absolute

Hegel vigorously maintains the knowableness of the Absolute. Man is immediately aware of God in feeling and imagination. However, this subjective certainty must be elevated to the status of objective truth. This takes place in the arguments for the existence of God, which exhibit the necessity and connection in things and chart for thought the course followed by the human spirit in its rise to God. In Hegel's formulation, the cosmological argument proceeds from the incompleteness and contingency of the finite world to an absolutely necessary being; the physicotheological, from finite purposive activity to absolute, universal purpose. So conceived, both are valid, but neither yields the full reality of God as Geist. Only the ontological argument can do this, for it begins not with the empirical world, but with the idea of God. Concretely formulated, it shows that the Notion by nature negates its barren, subjective unity and objectifies itself. The idea and the existence of God, the infinite and the finite, are both moments of a concrete whole, the Absolute Spirit. Hegel is here a thorough-going rationalist. In preferring the ontological argument he clearly regards intellect as the essential activity of the mind in relation to God, and again he fails to recognize the place of hypothesis in knowledge.

The Absolute may be variously described as Activity, Movement, Life, Thought, and Love, but most truly it is Spirit or Personality, whose nature it is to objectify or differentiate itself in finite spirits and in them to

in history. Hegel is too emphatical in regarding Christianity as absolute and final. This conception overlooks the values in other religions and arbitrarily limits the development which Hegel himself affirms.

IV. Hegel's View of the Absolute

Hegel vigorously maintains the knowableness of the Absolute. Man is immediately aware of God in feeling and imagination. However, this subjective certainty must be elevated to the status of objective truth. This takes place in the arguments for the existence of God, which exhibit the necessity and connection in things and show forth the course followed by the human spirit in its rise to God. In Hegel's formulation, the cosmological argument proceeds from the insufficiency and contingency of the finite world to an absolutely necessary being; the physicotheological, from finite purposive activity to one infinite, universal purpose. So conceived, both are valid. Not neither plumb the full reality of God as Spirit. Only the ontological argument can do this, for it begins not with the empirical world, but with the idea of God. Concretely formulated, it shows that the bottom by merely measures its barren, subjective unity and objectified itself. The idea and the existence of God, the infinite and the finite, are both moments of a concrete whole, the absolute Spirit. Hegel is here a thoroughgoing rationalist. In preferring the ontological argument he clearly regards intellect as the essential activity of the mind in relation to God, and again he fails to recognize the place of hypothesis in sacred data.

The Absolute may be variously described as Activity, Movement, Life, Thought, and Love, but most truly it is Spirit or Personality, whose nature it is to objectify or differentiate itself in finite entities and in them to

achieve true unity with itself. This view gives Hegel a penetrating answer to the problem of suffering. God himself suffers. Tension, conflict, and discord are involved in his very nature as Spirit. But the pain, though desperately real, is transcended in reconciling, redeeming love. Through self-abnegation Spirit attains self-realization. Suffering opens the way to a triumph of supreme joy.

To a large degree Hegel's view of God, especially in its dual recognition of evil and conquest over evil, combines acute observation of fact with a confident use of reason in interpreting fact. However, his exposition of the Absolute is fragmentary and obscure; he gives no adequate account of the ultimate status of good and evil; and he fails to reconcile satisfactorily the logical and the chronological aspects of the Absolute.

V. Hegel's View of Human Personality

The finite person is at once a particular center of free intelligence and a moment in the life of the Absolute, an individual conscious subject and a finite manifestation of the divine consciousness, spirit and Spirit. The reconciliation of man and God in religion is a union of two aspects of the same reality, the Absolute Spirit.

Though this view seems to deprive the finite individual of distinctive significance, in Hegel's own thinking it is accompanied by a clear acknowledgment of the value of human personality. In his idealistic worldview, which makes man akin to the Absolute, regards man as capable of knowing truth, and recognizes that ideas are nothing apart from persons; in his criticism of the low view of man in non-Christian religions and his commendation of Christianity's recognition of the worth and freedom of personality as such; and in his belief in individual immortality Hegel reveals

achieve true unity with itself. This view gives Hegel a penetrating answer to the problem of suffering. God himself suffers. Tension, conflict, and discord are involved in his very nature as Spirit. But the pain, though necessarily real, is transcended in reconciling, redeeming love. Through self-abnegation spirit attains self-realization. Suffering opens the way to a triumph of supreme joy.

To a large degree Hegel's view of God, especially in its dual recognition of evil and conquest over evil, combines acute observation of fact with a confident use of reason in interpreting fact. However, his exposition of the Absolute is fragmentary and obscure; he gives no adequate account of the ultimate status of good and evil, and he fails to reconcile satisfactorily the logical and the chronological aspects of the Absolute.

V. Hegel's View of Human Personality

The finite personality is at once a particular center of free intelligence and a moment in the life of the Absolute, an individual consciousness subject and a finite manifestation of the divine consciousness, spirit and Spirit. The reconciliation of man and God in religion is a union of two aspects of the same reality, the Absolute Spirit.

Though this view seems to dissolve the finite individual of distinctive significance, in Hegel's own thinking it is accompanied by a clear acknowledgment of the value of human personality. In his idealistic world-view, which makes man akin to the Absolute, reserve man as capable of knowing truth, and recognizes that ideas are nothing apart from persons, in his criticism of the low view of man in non-Christian religions and his commendation of Christianity's recognition of the worth and freedom of personality as such; and in his belief in individual immortality Hegel reveals

an exceptionally high estimate of human individuality.

Nevertheless, his identification of man and God does take from man his unique identity and individual worth. Since, fundamentally, finite spirits are significant only as moments in the divine life, Hegel is inconsistent in treating them as worthful in themselves. Moreover, on a basis of metaphysical absolutism and epistemological monism it is impossible to reconcile sin in man with complete goodness in the Absolute, ignorance in man with the Absolute's cognitive perfection. Furthermore, while Hegel rightly recognizes that freedom, self-determination, comes only through self-limitation and self-commitment to universal ends and so is grounded in necessity, he removes all meaning from freedom as applied to individuals by treating the entire historical development of religion, even the reality of sin, as necessitated by the nature of the Absolute.

an extraordinarily high estimate of human individuality.

Nevertheless, his identification of man and God does take from man his unique identity and individual worth. Since, fundamentally, finite spirits are significant only as moments in the divine life, Hegel is inconsistent in treating them as wrtiral in themselves. Moreover, on a basis of metaphysical absolutism and epistemological monism it is impossible to reconcile sin in man with complete goodness in the absolute, ignorance in man with the Absolute's omniscive perfection. Furthermore, while Hegel rightly recognizes that freedom, self-determinative, comes only through self-limitation and self-commitment to universal ends and so is rooted in necessity, he removes all meaning from freedom as applied to individuals by treating the entire historical development of religion, even the reality of sin, as necessitated by the nature of the absolute.

BIBLIOGRAPHY[1]

I. Works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Werke (original edition). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1832-1887.

XVII. Vermischte Schriften. VS

Letter to Duboc, July 30, 1822.* Pp. 520-524.

XIX. Briefe von und an Hegel (Karl Hegel, ed.). BVAH

Sämtliche Werke (Georg Lasson, ed.). Leipzig: Meiner, 1907-1933.

I. Erste Druckschriften. ED

"Glauben und Wissen." Pp. 222-346.

II. Phänomenologie des Geistes. PDG

V. Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. ENC

VI. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. GPR

VIII-IX. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. PWG

XII-XIV. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.

XII. Begriff der Religion.* BR

XIII. Die Naturreligion.* NR
Die Religionen der geistigen Individualität.* RGI

XIV. Die absolute Religion.* AR
Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes.* BDG

Sämtliche Werke (Jubiläumsausgabe, Hermann Glockner, ed.). Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1927-1930. JUB

III. Philosophische Propädeutik, Gymnasialreden und Gutachten über die Philosophie-Unterricht. PHPR

IV-V. Wissenschaft der Logik. WDL

VIII-X. System der Philosophie. SDP

XII-XIV. Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik. AES

---

[1] Abbreviations used in the text are listed with each book. Books and articles read in their entirety are indicated by an asterisk. Those not so indicated have been read in part.

BIBLIOGRAPHY[1]

I. Werke of Goethe Wilhelm Meisterjahre Novel

Werke (Weimarer edition). Berlin: Hermann & Wagmuth, 1887-1907.

II. Unpublished Correspondence.

Letter to Zelter, July 3, 1832, p. 320-322.

III. Briefe von und an Goethe (Carl Hecker), ed.,

Weimarer Werke (Gesamt Ausgabe, ed. . . Leipzig: Meiner, 1907-1912.

I. Werke Hirschberg.

"Olympischer Frühling." Jr. 295-300.

II. Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft.

V. Zur Morphologie der Pflanzenkunde Einleitung.

VI. Einwirkung der Philosophie Einleitung.

VIII-IX. Zur Farbenlehre Über die Philosophie der Mathematik.

XII-XIV. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Farbenlehre.

XII. Geschichte der Farbenlehre.

XIII. Die Wahrnehmung.

Die Erfahrungen der sinnlichen Individualität.

XIV. Die theoretische Farbenlehre.

Vorlesungen über die Farben von Physiologie Farben.

Weimarer Werke (Jubiläumsausgabe, Hermann Glossner, ed.).
Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1927-1930.

III. Über die Farbe Frommann. Gegenwirkung und Gegenwirkung über die Philosophie-Naturlehre.

IV-V. Naturwissenschaft Lehre.

VIII-X. Farbe der Philosophie.

XII-XIV. Vorlesungen über die Farbenlehre.

---

[1] Abbreviations used in the text are listed with each book. Books and articles read in their entirety are indicated by an asterisk. Those not so indicated have been read in part.

XVII-XIX. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. GDP

XX. Vermischte Schriften. VS

"Vorrede zu Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie." Pp. 1-28.

Review of Wilhelm von Humboldt's Über die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte Episode des Mahabharata. Pp. 57-131.

Review of Hamann's Schriften. Pp. 202-275.

Review of Über die Hegel'sche Lehre oder: absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus (anon.). Pp. 314-362.

Review of Carl Friedrich Göschel's Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis. Pp. 276-313.

"Wer denkt abstrakt?"* Pp. 445-450.

Hegels theologische Jugendschriften (Herman Nohl, ed.).* Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. TJS

Neue Briefe Hegels und Verwandtes (Georg Lasson, ed.). Hegel-Archiv, Band 1, Heft 2. Leipzig: Meiner, 1912. NBH

II. Works of Hegel's Expositors and Critics

A. Writings Immediately Relevant

Anon., Review of Haering, HWW.* Revue Philosophique, 56 (1931), pp. 440-442.

Adams, George Plimpton, The Mystical Element in Hegel's Early Theological Writings.* Berkeley, Calif., 1910. MEH

Baillie, James Black, "Hegel." ERE (New York: Scribner, 1914), VI, pp. 568-587.

Brightman, Edgar Sheffield, Immortality in Post-Kantian Idealism.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 1925. IPI

Deussen, Paul, Review of Werner, HO.* Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil., 3 (1890), pp. 154-155.

Dilthey, Wilhelm,"Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels." Königl. Akad. d. Wiss., Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Abhandlung 4. Berlin, 1905.

Drews, Arthur, Die deutsche Spekulation seit Kant mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das Wesen des Absoluten und die Persönlichkeit Gottes. 2d ed. Vol. I. Leipzig: Gustav Fock, 1895. DSK

----------, Hegels Religionsphilosophie in gekürzter Form, mit Einführung, Anmerkungen, und Erläuterungen. Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1905. HRP

Falkenheim, Hugo, Review of Haering, HWW.* Logos, 20 (1931), pp. 306-310.

Glockner, Hermann, Hegel. 1. Band: Die Voraussetzungen der Hegelschen Philosophie. Stuttgart: Frommann, 1929.

----------, "Hegel und Schleiermacher im Kampf um Religionsphilosophie und Glaubenslehre."* Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, 8 (1930), pp. 233-260.

Griffiths, Rees, God in Idea and Experience. Edinburgh: Clark, 1931.GIE

Hadlich, Hermann, Hegels Lehren über das Verhältnis von Religion und Philosophie. Halle a. S.: M. Niemeyer, 1906. VRP

Haering, Theodor L., Hegel, sein Wollen und sein Werk. Vol. I. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1929. HWW

Hammacher, Emil, Die Bedeutung der Philosophie Hegels für die Gegenwart. Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1911. BPHG

Hartmann, Eduard von, Die Religion des Geistes (Ausgewählte Werke, VI). Leipzig: Wilhelm Friedrich, (1882) 1888. RDG

----------, "Mein Verhältnis zu Hegel." Phil. Monatsh., 24 (1888), pp. 316-341.

Haym, Rudolf, Hegel und seine Zeit. 2d ed., Hans Rosenberg, ed. Leipzig: Heims, (1857) 1927. HSZ

Hessen, Johannes, Hegels Trinitätslehre.* Freiburg i. Breisgau: Herder, 1922. HT

Hocking, William Ernest, The Meaning of God in Human Experience.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1912. MGHE

Kesseler, Kurt, "Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie." Zeit. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., 158 (1915), pp. 27-48.

Kroner, Richard, Von Kant bis Hegel. II: Von der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie des Geistes. Tübingen: Mohr, 1924. KBH

----------, "System und Geschichte bei Hegel."* Logos, 20 (1931), pp. 243-258.

Lasson, Adolf, Review of Werner, HO.* Phil. Monatsh., 24 (1888), pp. 351-354.

----------, Review of Seth, HP.* Phil. Monatsh., 27 (1891), pp. 216-221.

Lasson, Georg, Review of Werner, HO.* Zeit. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., 96 (1889), pp. 146-160.

----------, Review of Brightman, IPI.* Kant-Studien, 34 (1929), p. 186.

----------, Einführung in Hegels Religionsphilosophie.* In Hegel's Sämtliche Werke, XII. Leipzig: Meiner, 1930. EHR

----------, ed., Neue Briefe Hegels und Verwandtes. Hegel-Archiv, Band 1, Heft 1. Leipzig: Meiner, 1912. (Also listed in works of Hegel.) NBH

Leighton, Joseph Alexander, Typical Modern Conceptions of God. New York: Longmans Green, 1901. MCG

Levy, Heinrich, Review of Haym, HSZ.* Logos, 18 (1929), pp. 441-447.

Lindsay, James, "Theistic Idealism."* Arch. f. syst. Phil., 11 (1905), pp. 86-104.

Loewenberg, J., Review of Wahl, MCPH.* Phil. Rev., 40 (1931), pp. 500-501.

Mackenzie, J. S., "The Hegelian Point of View."* Mind, NS 11 (1902), pp. 54-71.

McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1896. SHD

----------, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology. Cambridge: Univ. Press, (1901) 1918. SHC

Moore, George Foot, "The History of Religions in the Nineteenth Century."* Congress of Arts and Science, Howard J. Rogers, ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906. II, pp. 432-442.

Noack, Ludwig, Der Religionsbegriff Hegels. Darmstadt: Leske, 1845. RBH

Nohl, Herman, Hegels theologische Jugendschriften nach den Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek in Berlin.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. (Also listed in works of Hegel.) TJS

Ott, Emil, Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels in ihrer Genesis dargestellt und in ihrer Bedeutung für die Gegenwart gewürdigt. Naumburg a. Saale: Lippert, 1904. RPH

Pfleiderer, Otto, The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of Its History (Allan Menzies, transl.), Vol. II. London: Williams & Norgate, 1887. PRBH

----------, The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant, and Its Progress in Great Britain since 1825 (J. F. Smith, transl.). London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1893. DT

Richert, Hans, Hegels Religionsphilosophie in ihren Grundzügen. Bromberg: O. Grunwald, 1900. HRP

Ritchie, David G., Darwin and Hegel. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1893. DAH

Rogers, Arthur Kenyon, "The Absolute of Hegelianism."* Mind, NS 9 (1900), pp. 332-348.

Rosenkranz, Karl, Kritische Erläuterungen des Hegelschen Systems. Königsberg: Bornträger, 1840. KEHS

----------, Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1870. HDN

Royce, Josiah, Lectures on Modern Idealism. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1919. LMI

Seth (Pringle-Pattison), Andrew, The Development from Kant to Hegel, with Chapters on the Philosophy of Religion. London: Williams & Norgate, 1882. DKH

----------, Scottish Philosophy. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1885. SP

----------, Hegelianism and Personality. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1893. HP

Stace, Walter Terence, The Philosophy of Hegel. London: Macmillan, 1924. PH

Sterrett, James Macbride, Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. New York: Appleton, 1890. HPR

Stirling, James Hutchison, The Secret of Hegel. 2d ed. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1898. SOH

Troeltsch, Ernst, Gesammelte Schriften. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. GS

II. Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik.

III. Der Historismus und seine Probleme.

----------, "Die Stellung des Christentums unter den Weltreligionen."* In Der Historismus und seine Überwindung. Berlin: Heise, 1924. Pp. 62-83.

Friedländer, etc. The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History (Alan Tomlins, transl.). Vol. II. London: Williams & Norgate, 1887.

----------. The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant, and its Progress in Great Britain since 1825 (J. F. Smith, transl.). London: Sampson Low, 1892.

Gilbert, Ewan. Deista Religionsphilosophie in ihren Grundzügen. Bromberg: C. Gronwald, 1900.

Kitchin, David T. Deists and Devils. London: Kegan Paul, 1927.

Sogore, Arthur Kenyon. "The Absolute of Hegelianism." Mind, NS 9 (1900). pp. 332-348.

Schwarzwäre, Karl. Die Idee der Selbstverwirklichung des Sittlichen Prinzips. Königsberg: Von Hübner, 1840.

----------. Kant als Vorläufer Metaphysikkritik. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1870.

Royce, Josiah. Lectures on Modern Idealism. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1919.

Seth (Pringle-Pattison), Andrew. The Development from Kant to Hegel, with Chapters on the Philosophy of Religion. London: Williams & Norgate, 1882.

----------. Scottish Philosophy. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1884.

----------. Theism and Personality. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1897.

Sinnett, Walter Terence. The Philosophy of Hegel. London: Macmillan, 1924.

Stewart, James Moorhead. Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. New York: Appleton, 1907.

Stirling, James Hutchison. The Secret of Hegel. 2d ed. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1898.

Troeltsch, Ernst. Deutsche Schriften. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913.

II. Der religiöse Idee. Religionsphilosophie und Ethik.

III. Der Historismus und seine Probleme.

----------. "Die Stellung des Christentums unter den Weltreligionen." In Der Mensch christ und seine Überlieferung. Berlin: Heise, 1924. Pp. 88-112.

Ulrici, Hermann, "Zur Religionsphilosophie. Auffassung des Verhältnisses von Religion und Philosophie bei Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart und ihren Nachfolgern." Zeit. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., 23 (1853), pp. 240-286.

Vera, Augusto, Introductions to his French translation, Philosophie de la religion de Hegel. 2 vols. Paris: Germer Balliere, 1876-1878.

Vowinckel, Ernst, Religion und Religionen bei Schleiermacher und Hegel. Erlangen: R. Merkel, 1896. RRSH

Wahl, Jean, Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel. Paris: Rieder, 1929. MCPH

Weisse, Christian F., "Strauss und Bruno Bauer." Zeit. f. Phil. u. spek. Theol., 10 (1843), pp. 40-82.

Werner, Johannes, Hegels Offenbarungsbegriff. Ein religionsphilosophischer Versuch. Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1887. HO

B. Writings of Minor Relevance

Bäumler, Alfred, "Hegel und Kierkegaard."* Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, 2 (1924), pp. 116-130.

Caird, Edward, Hegel. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1901.

Caird, John, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1880.

Croce, Benedetto, What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel (Douglas Ainslie, transl.). London: Macmillan, 1915.

Cunningham, Gustavus Watts, Thought and Reality in Hegel's System. New York: Longmans Green, 1910.

Dieter, Theodor, Die Frage der Persönlichkeit Gottes in Hegel's Philosophie. Tübingen: G. Schnürlen, 1917.

Dresser, Horatio Willis, "The Element of Irrationality in the Hegelian Dialectic." Supplementary Essay in The Philosophy of the Spirit. New York: Putnam, 1908. Pp. 385-537.

Fischer, Kuno, Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre. 2 vols. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1911. HLWL

Geissler, Kurt, "Ist die Annahme von Absolutem in der Anschauung und dem Denken möglich?"* Arch. f. syst. Phil., 9 (1903), pp. 417-432.

Glockner, Hermann, "Krisen und Wandlungen in der Geschichte des Hegelianismus."* Logos, 13 (1924-1925), pp. 340-357.

Tirlet, Hermann. "Der Religionsgeschichte. Auffassung des Verhältnisses von Religion und Philosophie bei Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart und ihrem Nachfolgern." Arch. f. Phil. u. Phil. Wiss., 23 (1927), pp. 240-326.

Vare, Ernesto. Introducciones to his French translation, Philosophie de la religion de Hegel. 2 vols. Berlin: Gustav Lahure, 1878-1879.

Vorländer, Karl. Religion und Religionen bei Schleiermacher und Hegel. Wiesbaden: E. Bertel, 1896.

Wahl, Jean. La malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel. Paris: Alcan, 1929.

Walsh, Christian F., "Science and Human Power." Arch. f. Phil. Ges. Wiss. Theol., 10 (1929), pp. 4-27.

Werner, Johannes. Hegels Offenbarungsbegriff. Die religionsphilosophischen Vorlesungen. Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1927.

B. Writings of Minor Relevance

Fischer, Alfred. "Hegel und Eisenhardt." Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, 2 (1924), pp. 116-140.

Caird, Edward. Hegel. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1901.

Caird, John. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1880.

Croce, Benedetto. What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel (Douglas Ainslie, trans.). London: Macmillan, 1915.

Dunlaughen, Frederick Betts. Thought and Reality in Hegel's System. New York: Longmans Green, 1910.

Glockner, Theodor. Die Krise der Persönlichkeit Gottes in Hegel's Philosophie. Tübingen: C. Schmidt, 1911.

Hegner, Horst-Willi. "The Element of Irrationality in the Hegelian Dialectic." Unpublished Essay in The Philosophy of the Spirit. New York: Fordham, 1952. pp. 285-297.

Kirchner, Hans. Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre. 2 vols. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1911.

Schalk, Fritz. "Ist die Analyse von Idealsätzen in der Aussagenlogik und im Denken möglich?" Arch. f. Rechts. Phil., 3 (1909), pp. 417-432.

Schaffner, Hermann. "Kriegen und Verdienen in der Geschichte des Menschlichen." Logos, 13 (1924-1925), pp. 340-357.

----------, "Robert Vischer und die Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften im letzten Drittel des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts." Logos, 14 (1925), pp. 297-343.

----------, "Hegelrenaissance und Neuhegelianismus." Logos, 20 (1931), pp. 169-195.

von Hartmann, Eduard, "Schellings positive Philosophie als Einheit von Hegel und Schopenhauer."* Phil. Monatsh., 3 (1869), pp. 279-284.

----------, "Über die notwendige Umbildung der Hegel'schen Philosophie aus ihrem Grundprincip heraus." Phil. Monatsh., 5 (1870), pp. 387-415.

Hartmann, Nicolai, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. Vol. II: Hegel. Berlin: W. de Gruÿter, 1929.

Hoffmann, Franz, "Hegel, K. Rosenkranz und Baader." Phil. Monatsh., 3 (1869), pp. 1-24, 93-110, 185-202.

Hülsmann, J., "'Was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig, und was vernünftig ist, ist wirklich.'"* Phil. Monatsh., 6 (1870-1871), pp. 306-318.

James, William, "Absolutism and Empiricism."* Mind, 9 (1884), pp. 281-286.

----------, "Hegel and His Method."* Hibb. Jour., 7 (1908-1909), pp. 63-75.

Köstlin, Karl, Hegel in philosophischer politischer und nationaler Beziehung. Tübingen: Laupp'sche Buchhandlung, 1870.

Kröger, Otto, "Reiner Idealismus und empirische Weltansicht."* Arch. f. syst. Phil., 31 (1928), pp. 273-281.

Lasson, Adolf, "Über Gegenstand und Behandlungsart der Religionsphilosophie." Phil. Monatsh., 15 (1879), pp. 1-55.

Levy, Heinrich, Die Hegel-Renaissance in der deutschen Philosophie. Berlin: Pan-Verlag Rolf Heise, 1927.

Mackintosh, Robert, Hegel and Hegelianism. New York: Scribner, 1903.

Marshall, Troward Harvey, A Study of the Origins of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. Unpublished Harvard University thesis, 1910.

Michelet, Carl Ludwig, Hegel und der Empirismus. Berlin: Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1873.

Metzke, Erwin, Karl Rosenkranz und Hegel. Leipzig: Wilhelm Heims, 1929.

Moog, Willy, Hegel und die Hegelsche Schule. München: E. Reinhardt, 1930.

Przywara, Erich, "Thomas oder Hegel?" Logos, 15 (1926), pp. 1-20.

———. "Robert Musil und die Krisis der Intellektualkultur." In Internationale Zeitschrift für Literatur, 14 (1924), pp. 527-544.

———. "Hegel-Renaissance und Neuhegelianismus." Logos, 20 (1931), pp. 169-175.

von Hartmann, Eduard. "Gegenwärtige Stellung der Philosophie." In Archiv für Hegel und Hegelianismus, 1 (1869), pp. 279-294.

———. "Über die notwendige Umbildung der Hegel'schen Philosophie und ihres Verhältnis zu Kant." Phil. Monatsh., 6 (1870), pp. 385-415.

Hartmann, Nicolai. Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. Vol. II: Hegel. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1929.

Hoffmann, Franz. "Hegel, K. Rosenkranz und Haeckel." Phil. Monatsh., 3 (1869), pp. 1-24, 73-113, 186-209.

———. "Was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig, und was vernünftig ist, ist wirklich." Phil. Monatsh., 4 (1870-1871), pp. 306-324.

Jaeger, William. "Aesthetics and Empirical." Mind, 9 (1884), pp. 382-398.

———. "Hegel und die Ästhetik." Ztschr. Ästh., " (1908-1909), pp. 23-73.

Kistler, Karl. Hegel in Zürich-Winterthur mit Winterthur und Zürich. Zürich: Leemann'sche Buchhandlung, 1870.

Kroner, Otto. "Meister Gedanken und ewigliche Zweifel." Arch. f. syst. Phil., 31 (1929), pp. 279-281.

Lasson, Adolf. "Über Gegenwart und Schmelzungsart der Philosophie." Phil. Monatsh., 15 (1879), pp. 1-32.

Levy, Heinrich. Die Hegel-Renaissance in der deutschen Philosophie. Berlin: Van-Verlag Zeit Geist, 1927.

Lichtenberg, Robert. Hegel und Haeckelismus. New York: Zeitgeist, 1908.

Marcuse, Herbert. "Hegel's Ontology. A Study of the Origins of Hegel's Philosophy of History." Unpublished Harvard University thesis, 1932.

Michelet, Carl Ludwig. Hegel und der Pantheismus. Berlin: Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1872.

Mueller, Erwin. Karl Rosenkranz und Hegel. Leipzig: Wilhelm Heinz, 1929.

Moser, Otto. Hegel und die Naturwissenschaft. München: R. Oldenbourg, 1922.

Negvera, Kriel. "Thesen der Hegelei." Logos, 16 (1928), pp. 1-20.

Reese, Heinrich, Hegel über das Auftreten der christlichen Religion in der Weltgeschichte. Tübingen: Mohr, 1909.

Ritchie, David G., "Philosophy and the Study of Philosophers." Mind, NS 8 (1899), pp. 1-24.

----------, "Hegel's Early Studies---a Correction."* Mind, NS 8 (1899), p. 568.

Roques, P., Hegel, sa vie et ses oeuvres. Paris: Alcan, 1912.

Rosenkranz, Karl, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1844.

----------, Apologie Hegels gegen Dr. R. Haym. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1858.

Schubert, Johannes, "Hegels Gottesbegriff."* Zeit. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., 134 (1909), pp. 166-210.

Seth (Pringle-Pattison), Andrew, "Hegel: An Exposition and Criticism." Mind, 6 (1881), pp. 513-530.

Tillich, Paul, "Die Überwindung des Religionsbegriffs in der Religionsphilosophie." Kant-Studien, 27 (1922), pp. 446-469.

Troeltsch, Ernst, "Zur Religionsphilosophie."* Kant-Studien, 23 (1919), pp. 64-76.

----------, "Meine Bücher."* In Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen. Leipzig: Meiner, 1921. Pp. 161-173.

Ulrici, Hermann, "Der Begriff des Unendlichen und sein Verhältniss zum Theismus und Pantheismus." Zeit. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., 22 (1853), pp. 82-115.

Wallace, William, Introduction to The Logic of Hegel. Oxford: Clarendon, 1892. Pp. ix-xxvi.

----------, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and Especially of His Logic. 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1894.

Weisse, Christian F., "Die philosophische Literatur der Gegenwart. 1. Artikel: Schleiermacher, Hegel, Steffens." Zeit. f. Phil. u. spek. Theol., 6 (1840), pp. 267-309.

Cohen, Hermann. Kant über den Aufstieg der christlichen Religion in der Weltgeschichte. Tübingen: Mohr, 1928.

Gibbels, David G., "Philosophy and the Study of Philosophers." Ethos, 26 8 (1929), pp. 1-24.

----------. "Kant's Early Studies--a Correction." Kant, NS 8 (1929), p. 366.

Kupper, F., Kant, ein Sie der neue Europa. Berlin: Ullstein, 1917.

Nassenstein, Karl, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Lehre. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1964.

----------. Friedrich Hegels Lehre Dr. E. Kant. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1966.

Schubert, Johannes, "Kants Gottesbeweis." Kant. F. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., 124 (1929), pp. 166-210.

Toth (Friedle-Mattison), Julius, "Kant: An Appreciation and Criticism." Ethos, 6 (1881), pp. 510-520.

Tillich, Paul, "Die Überwindung der Religionsphilosophie in der Religionsphilosophie." Kant-Studien, 27 (1922), pp. 146-149.

Troeltsch, Ernst, "Zur Religionsphilosophie." Kant-Studien, 24 (1919), pp. 81-76.

----------, "Kulturkrise." in Die Geistige Philosophie der Gegenwart in Einzelbeiträgen. Leipzig: Reiner, 1921. pp. 161-173.

Ulrici, Hermann, "Der Begriff des Übersinnlichen und seine Verwirklichung im Menschen." Kant. F. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., 32 (1858), pp. 32-116.

Wallace, William, Introduction to The Logic of Hegel. Oxford: Clarendon, 1892. pp. lx-xxvi.

----------, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and Reality of the Logic. 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1894.

Weiss, Christian F., "Die philosophische Literatur der Gegenwart. I. Artikel: Schleiermacher, Hegel, Steffens." Kant. F. Phil. u. Krit. Theol., 8 (1840), pp. 347-390.

ABBREVIATIONS OF PERIODICALS AND ENCYCLOPAEDIAS CITED

Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil.:	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
Arch. f. syst. Phil.:	Archiv für systematische Philosophie.
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift:	Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte.
ERE:	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
Hibb. Jour.:	Hibbert Journal.
Königl. Akad. d. Wiss.:	Königlich-preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Phil. Monatsh.	Philosophische Monatshefte.
Theol. Stud. u. Krit.:	Theologische Studien und Kritiken.
Zeit. f. Phil. u. phil. Krit.:	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
Zeit. f. Phil. u. spek. Theol.:	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie.

ABBREVIATIONS OF PERIODICALS AND SERVICE-MANUAL TITLES

Arch. f. Geog. u. Phil.:	Archiv für Geographie und Philosophie.
Arch. f. Rech. Phil.:	Archiv für rechtsphilosophie Philosophie.
Deutsche Literaturzeitung:	Deutsche Literaturzeitung für Literaturwissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft.
Ann.:	Annalen der Physik und Chemie.
Bibl. Zeit.:	Bibliothek Zeitung.
Phil. Jahr. d. Wiss.:	Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Wissenschaften.
Phil. Monatsh.	Philosophische Monatshefte.
Theol. Stud. u. Krit.:	Theologische Studien und Kritiken.
Zeit. f. Phil. u. philos. Krit.:	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
Zeit. f. Phil. u. philos. Forsch.:	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Forschung.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Sylvester Paul Schilling, son of Mr. and Mrs. Sylvester Schilling, was born in Cumberland, Maryland on February 7, 1904. He received his early education in the public schools of Cumberland and graduated from the Allegany High School in 1919. He then entered Saint John's College at Annapolis, being graduated in 1923 with the degree of B.S. During the following year he taught English in Allegany High School, Cumberland, and in the year 1924-1925, English and French in Millersburg Military Institute, Millersburg, Kentucky.

In the fall of 1925 Mr. Schilling became a graduate student in Boston University, studying one year in the School of Religious Education and three years in the School of Theology. In 1927 he received the A.M. degree and in 1929 the degree of S.T.B., summa cum laude. In 1929 he was awarded the Frank D. Howard Fellowship by the School of Theology, and elected a Fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education. As a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. in philosophy of religion, he continued his study during the years 1929-1930 and 1931-1932 in Boston University and Harvard, and in the year 1930-1931 in the University of Berlin.

Mr. Schilling was ordained elder in the Methodist Episcopal Church on June 1, 1930. On June 18 of the same year he married Miss Mary Albright, of Piedmont, West Virginia.

From 1932 to 1933 he was pastor of the Methodist Episcopal churches at Vienna and Oakton, Virginia. He is now associate minister of the Mount Vernon Place Church, Baltimore, Maryland.

Ideal
Double Reversible
Manuscript Cover
PATENTED NOV. 15, 1898
Manufactured by
Adams, Cushing & Foster

28-6½