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The world “In Search of its Soul”: UNESCO, America, and the struggle to build a postcolonial world

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THE WORLD "IN SEARCH OF ITS SOUL": UNESCO, AMERICA, AND THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A POSTCOLONIAL WORLD

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation traces the international, intellectual, and institutional history of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This organization became the intellectual branch of the United Nations and was able to mobilize intellectual resources from around the world. Historians, educators, economists, and communications theorists used the organization's conferences, roundtables, and meetings to forge transnational networks. American and European statesmen exploited these networks to encourage postwar peace and promote their own visions of international society. Third World diplomats and intellectuals embraced the organization but campaigned against its Eurocentric priorities. They pushed it to focus on discrediting the set of ideas and assumptions that underpinned the imperial world order. American diplomats and intellectuals championed UNESCO's anticolonial agenda for decades and assisted such global campaigns as the fight against illiteracy, the preservation of ancient monuments, and the transfer of communications technology. By the 1970s, however, intellectual disagreements about the international economic system sparked a war of ideas and instigated a diplomatic crisis that led to American withdrawal from the organization. The decline of European imperialism and the rise of the Third World led to

decades of economic, diplomatic, and military tension. This dissertation concludes that this sea change in world history also led to profound confrontation in the international realm of information and ideas. UNESCO was not the only forum devoted to the international exchange of information and ideas. But its authority as the intellectual arm of the United Nations made it one of the major battlegrounds in the struggle to create a postcolonial world.

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List of Abbreviations

ADG	Assistant Director General
AG 8	Archive Group 8: Secretariat Records
CDSP	Current Digest of the Soviet Press
CFP	Central Foreign Policy Files
CO	Colonial Office
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CWIHP	Cold War International History Project
CWP	Caroline Ware Papers
DDG	Deputy Director General
DDRS	Declassified Document Reference System
DOS	Department of State
DOSB	Department of State Bulletin
EEC	European Economic Community
ERIC	Education Resources Information Center
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FO	Foreign Office
FRUS	*Foreign Relations of the United States*
LAC	Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Canada
NAI	National Archives of India
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
NYT	*New York Times*
PPP	Public Papers of the President
PUL	Princeton University Library
RG 59	Record Group 59: State Department Records
SCHM	Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind Papers
SNF	Subject Numeric Files
SWJN	*Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*
UA	United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization Archives, Paris, France
UCA	Regenstein Library and Special Collections, University of Chicago
UKNA	National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization
UNESDOC	UNESCO documentation database
USNC	United States National Committee for Cooperation with UNESCO
WBP	William Benton Papers
WPFC	World Press Freedom Committee
WPFCR	World Press Freedom Committee Records
YUL	Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut

Introduction

Two dozen intellectuals and academics from across the world met in a boardroom in the heart of Paris in April 1947. They were among the most prestigious and revered intellectual figures in the world. Former French Prime Minister Léon Blum attended their meetings and supported their efforts to confront the issue of war and peace. It had been barely two years since the end of the Second World War and the problems of reconstruction remained a pressing issue. A year earlier, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had declared that an Iron Curtain had fallen across Europe. One year later, American President Harry S. Truman pledged to support "free people" against "totalitarian regimes." These tensions shaped their discussions of international intellectual cooperation. British biologist Julian Huxley believed they should attack ignorance and illiteracy in order to promote international understanding.[1] Belgian historian Louis Verniers proposed that historians should collaborate in order to emphasize the world's common humanity rather than national narratives of war and conquest.[2] American Poet Laureate Archibald MacLeish emphasized that mass communications could help to foster understanding between peoples.[3] All shared

[1] Summary Report of the Executive Board, Third Meeting, Second Session, 11 April 1947, CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC, 7.
[2] Summary Report of the Executive Board, Fourth Meeting, Second Session, 11 April 1947, CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC, 5.
[3] Summary Report of the Executive Board, Seventh Meeting, Second Session, 13 April 1947, CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC.

a common belief that intellectual cooperation could relax the "tension and ideological warfare" that threatened to engulf the world.[4]

One intellectual who attended the meeting had a different perspective and different priorities. Indian philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan agreed that "ideological harmony" could "diminish tensions" and encourage peace. But he had a broader vision of intellectual cooperation. The Indian Interim Government was in the final stage of negotiations with the British government and was preparing to gain its independence by the end of the summer. Less than a month earlier, New Delhi had hosted the Asian Relations Conference - the first attempt to forge a Third World international movement. Radhakrishnan had just arrived from New Delhi, where he delivered a rousing speech about Asia's rebirth and postcolonial future.[5] He shared his countrymen's pride in Asia's cultures, historic achievements, and prospects in the future. He urged his colleagues in Paris to focus on "non-European countries" and the equality of the world's cultures. "The world was not only multi-national, but also multi-cultural," he declared. On the third day, he delivered a speech imploring European countries to acknowledge the accomplishments of India, China, and the Islamic world. The "greatest thinkers in different parts of the world," people like themselves, could cooperate and create a more unified and equitable world order. "The world to-day had found itself as one

[4] Archibald MacLeish comments in Summary Report of the Executive Board, Second Session, First Meeting, 10 April 1947, CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC, 11; John Maud and R. Seydoux comments in Summary Report of the Executive Board, Second Session, Second Meeting, 10 April 1947, CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC, 5, 6, 9.
[5] *Asian Relations: Being a Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April 1947* (New Delhi: Asian Relations Organization, 1948), 67; G. H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London: Farrar and Faber, 1966), 51-75.

body; it was now in search of its soul."[6] They could only do this, however, if they recognized the rise of a postcolonial world.

The organization this handful of intellectuals represented was the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Even more than the United Nations, this organization embodied the most idealistic hopes of the immediate postwar years.[7] It fostered intellectual and academic exchanges across borders, spread access to international communications, and stimulated international understanding and mutual respect between different states and societies. The wartime generation of world leaders and policymakers believed that intellectual cooperation was a crucial part of international security. "Do not wars, after all, begin in the minds of men?" British Prime Minister Clement Attlee asked in 1945. "One of the evil things against which we fought in the war was the totalitarian practice of drawing a curtain around the minds of the people to prevent them knowing what others thought."[8] The Cold War and the specter of nuclear war quickly made these visions of cultural understanding and international peace seem quaint but did not doom the organization to insignificance.

[6] Summary Report of the Executive Board, Second Session, Second Meeting, 10 April 1947, CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC, 9; Summary Report of the Executive Board, Sixth Meeting, Second Session, 12 April 1947, CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC, 13-15.
[7] Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 147.
[8] C. R. Attlee, "Welcoming Address by the British Prime Minister," 1 November 1945, Second Plenary Meeting, *Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Held at the Institute of Civil Engineers, London, from the 1st to the 16th November, 1945* (London: Preparatory Commission UNESCO, 1945), 22.

UNESCO evolved into the intellectual arm of the United Nations. It played an important role in facilitating the international exchange of information, inspiring states to adopt certain social and economic policies, and legitimizing new ideas and international norms of behavior. As one of the organization's staff members recalled, the organization's "crucial role" was to "be a field of creation for new ideas" or "like a laboratory of new experiences." One senior official believed that UNESCO was the world's "switchboard" for information and ideas. "We believed in the power of ideas with stunning naivety," another official conceded years later.[9] The conviction that intellectuals and the circulation of ideas could play an important role in the postwar world did not fall on deaf ears. The organization was "like a telephone system," one member of the French Foreign Ministry observed, "transmitting information and opinions in all directions." French diplomat Henri Bonnet believed that it would become responsible for the international "education of public opinion."[10] American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr believed that it had potential. UNESCO should "integrate the world community" by avoiding platitudes and "shallow generalities" about peace, Niebuhr believed, and instead stimulate discussion about the soul of the world

[9] Georges Kutukdjian, "Leur Application dans l'UNESCO," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens* (Paris: UNESCO, 2006), 49; Jean Thomas as cited in Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Clarence E. Beeby, "Aux Sources des Programmes d'éducation," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 72. For UNESCO's standard-setting activities, see Vincenzo Pavone, *From the Labyrinth of the World to the Paradise of the Heart: Science and Humanism in UNESCO's Approach to Globalization* (Lexington Books, 2008); J. P. Singh, *United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Creating Norms for a Complex World* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

[10] Memorandum of Conversation, "German and Japanese Membership in UNESCO," 9 November 1950, Box 1606, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA; Henri Bonnet, "UNESCO: Spearhead of the UN," *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* (Winter 1946), 611.

community.[11] This vision of international intellectual cooperation appealed in particular to the colonial world.

Intellectuals, academics, and diplomats from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and increasingly from Latin America came to similar conclusions about UNESCO's international role. They believed that it could mobilize intellectual resources from around the world to address the challenges of decolonization and the rise of the Third World. According to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, UNESCO was a "liberating force" in the colonial world's struggle to gain independence.[12] The organization, for example, could help to develop new ideas and strategies to fuel economic growth in the Third World. But more importantly, it could deconstruct the intellectual world views and hierarchical conceptions of international society that had justified Europe's imperial world order. These were problems rooted in the nineteenth century.

The Inheritance of the Nineteenth-Century World

The last decades of the nineteenth century were years of global integration. The upheaval of the Napoleonic Wars compelled Europe's leading statesmen to develop closer ties and cooperate to resolve political and diplomatic problems. The new Concert system brought a period of international stability to

[11] Reinhold Niebuhr, "Illusion of World Government," *Foreign Affairs* (April 1949), 379; Reinhold Niebuhr, "Theory and Practice of UNESCO," *International Organization* (February 1950), 6. See also Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 2.
[12] Jawaharlal Nehru, "Unesco as a Liberating Force," *SWJN* 24, Part II, 441-442.

European diplomacy and stimulated efforts to improve international cooperation.[13] West European and North American scientific and technical developments also created a more unified world. New transportation technology like the steamship and railroads led to the "annihilation of space and time." The telegraph and the spread of transoceanic cables led to near-instantaneous communication between distant lands. Industrialists and scientists launched efforts to standardize time across countries and continents. Even in the realm of sports and leisure, activists like the French nobleman Baron Pierre de Coubertin standardized sporting rules and established the modern Olympics as a symbol of global community. This great age of integration shaped all facets of people's lives. Nineteenth-century thinkers developed a "global imagination" that pictured the world as an interconnected community.[14]

The late nineteenth-century world was both more interconnected and more unequal. New technologies integrated the world but also created new tensions, conflicts, and hierarchies. The unification of the United States and Germany, which used railways and telegraphs to unify their dispersed and fragmented territories, destabilized the Concert system and led to growing tensions on the

[13] Paul W. Schroeder, 'Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?', *American Historical Review* 97, no. 3 (1992), 683-706; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 3-13.

[14] Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, "Empires and the Reach of the Global," in Emily S. Rosenberg, ed., *A World Connecting, 1870-1945* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2012), 379; C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914* (Blackwell, 2004); Barbara J. Keys, *Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Society* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2006); Jurgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Emily Rosenberg, "Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World," in Emily S. Rosenberg, ed., *A World Connecting, 1870-1945* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2012), 815-999. For the emergence of a "global imagination," see Vanessa Ogle, *The Global Transformation of Time* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2015), 5.

continent.[15] European capitals extended their own territorial empires. The great powers put their differences aside and agreed on plans to partition and annex the African interior in 1884.[16] New infrastructure around the world was reoriented towards Europe. Britain controlled two-thirds of the world's telegraph lines, blocked the transfer of telegraphic technology, and maintained a global communications system in which traffic traveled through London. Imperialists like Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain focused on infrastructure projects - railways, roads, harbors - that would integrate underdeveloped parts of the world into the global economy. Europeans and Americans reorganized agricultural and industrial activities of countries throughout the world to accommodate European and American industrial demands.[17]

Global integration also stratified the world of information and ideas. Western imperialists developed a series of new arguments to explain and legitimize European empires and the differences between their respective states and societies. European museums and world fairs displayed mankind's cultural diversity but highlighted differences and reinforced global hierarchies between civilized Europeans and weak orientals or uncivilized natives. The theory of organic evolution provided pseudo-scientific justification for the belief that world

[15] A. J .P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954). For the role of railways and telegraphs in mid-nineteenth century state building see Charles S. Maier, "Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood," in Emily S. Rosenberg, ed., *A World Connecting, 1870-1945* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2012), 100.
[16] Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1986), 141-353; Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 312-321.
[17] Jurgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, 722-723; Bernard Porter, *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism*, fourth edition (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2004), 186-191; Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Knopf, 2014).

civilizations could be divided into distinct racial units. Europeans armed themselves with modern science and identified themselves as efficient and natives as profligate and lazy.[18] Europeans transmitted these values and ideals to colonized elites through missionary schools.[19] These visions of world order had profound effects on diplomacy and international relations. The idea that the world's civilizations could be ranked hierarchically shaped international law. A "standard of civilization" helped European statesmen and diplomats to map the world's cultures and assign them different rights and duties. Only those states that were deemed "civilized" - by European standards - were permitted to attend international conferences and congresses. Legal specialists argued that "civilized" states were not bound by international law when dealing with "uncivilized" or "barbarous" peoples.[20] This European world order did have dissenters. Asian intellectuals from Istanbul to Tokyo challenged these hierarchical visions of global society: they found receptive audiences in the colonial world but had a limited impact in the Western world.[21]

[18] Emily Rosenberg, "Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World," 901; John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2008), 339-49; Richard Drayton, *Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the 'Improvement' of the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 229-230.

[19] Michael Adas, "Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology," *Journal of World History* 15, no. 1 (March 2004), 36-38; David B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 299, 332-339.

[20] Mark Mazower, "Paved Intention: Civilization and Imperialism," *World Affairs* 171, no. 2 (Fall 2008), 73-82; Brett Bowden, "To Rethink Standards of Civilization, Start with the End," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 42, no. 3 (2014), 614-631; Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?," *International Affairs* 74, no. 1 (January 1998).

[21] Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 15-93; Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia* (London: Penguin, 2013), 12-184.

The Great War undermined the foundations of the nineteenth-century world. The conflict convinced many diplomats and planners that a new international system could restore stability to the continent. Woodrow Wilson's proposal for the League of Nations made headlines worldwide and inspired messianic hopes about transforming the world. Washington's failure to join the League left the Europeans, the British in particular, to assert leadership. The League initially seemed successful. The Locarno Treaty reintegrated Germany into the European security system, gave it a seat in the League, and strengthened the League's legitimacy.[22] The League also played a role in regulating a range of transnational issues that required international technical cooperation. This was originally a minor part of the League but it grew and became its most successful undertaking. It addressed issues of labor, justice, communications, health, economics, child welfare, prostitution, slavery, and narcotics. These transnational programs were truly global in scope and far more successful than the League's security system. States like Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union worked with the League on a range of technical issues before they formally joined it.[23]

The League also facilitated academic cooperation. The Paris Peace Conference neglected intellectual and cultural matters in 1919. The French philosopher Henri Bergson, however, proposed to his colleagues and political

[22] Susan G. Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations: Review Essay," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (2007), 1091-1093.
[23] Susan G. Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations," 1110; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World*, 141-153.

allies that international security was inconceivable without intellectual understanding and cooperation. He proposed that a committee of intellectuals should "represent the deeper spirit of the League" and "give the League a Soul." The League established an International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation in Geneva three years later. It sought to foster understanding between different cultures and intellectual traditions while also preserving diversity.[24] Alfred Zimmern, deputy director of the affiliated International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, conceived it as an "academic Locarno" that could jumpstart an "international renaissance of intellectual life" in Europe and "insure the peace of the world."[25] The Committee developed a series of successful programs to coordinate European professionals, including academic exchanges, bilateral textbook reviews, and a 1936 broadcasting convention to discourage the use of radio for propaganda purposes.[26]

The League, despite the global reach of its technical programs, did little to foster a true global community. Its failure to grant self-determination to independence movements in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia radicalized anticolonial nationalism. Britain, France and Belgium also supported a Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva, which they used to legitimize their colonial

[24] Joanna Pemberton, "Changing Shape of Intellectual Co-operation: From the League of Nations to UNESCO," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* (2012), 36.
[25] "Institute Serves World's Scholars," *New York Times* (10 January 1926).
[26] F. S. Northedge, "International Intellectual Co-Operation Within the League of Nations: Its Conceptual Basis and Lessons for the Present," Ph.D. Dissertation: University of London, 1953.

authority and the civilizational rhetoric they employed.[27] Although the League's intellectual programs championed cultural diversity and reached out to intellectuals from Latin America and Asia, it remained Eurocentric.[28] Committee leaders like Alfred Zimmern were committed to Europe's imperial world order and were skeptical about working with anticolonial nationalists who threatened both imperial and international stability.[29]

Intellectuals from across the colonial world did challenge the international system. In China, journalist Liang Qichao argued that both East and West could learn from each other -Asian countries could learn from Western political, educational, and scientific achievements while the West could learn from Chinese cultural and spiritual traditions.[30] India became a major center of anticolonial thought. Bengali writer Rabindranath Tagore promoted international cultural exchange in order to strengthen both the anticolonial independence movement and a more just international system.[31] In Turkey, Ahmed Riza and Halil Halid complained that Western misperceptions of Asian cultures and societies undermined the League's legitimacy as an international organization. Riza also

[27] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford, 2007); Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
[28] See F. S. Northedge, "International Intellectual Co-Operation Within the League of Nations," 697-704.
[29] "Democracy Called Obstacle to Peace," *New York Times* (17 December 1930); Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, 2009).
[30] Orville Schell and John Delury, *Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 2013), 113.
[31] Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia* (London: Penguin, 2013), 216-242; Rabindranath Tagore, *Greater India*, as cited in Ramachandra Guha, *Makers of Modern India* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2011), 173.

advocated international cultural exchange as a means to improve mutual understanding between East and West.[32] African poets and artists congregated in Paris, where they developed an anticolonial artistic movement known as *négritude* which championed African cultural traditions.[33] When a League Against Imperialism assembled anticolonial activists in Brussels in 1928, its leaders directly condemned the League of Nations and its complicity with imperialism. The gathering laid the foundations for what a later generation would call Third World internationalism.[34] These intellectual movements shared a common criticism of the imperial world and a common desire for a multicultural order.

Postwar: The UNESCO World Order

The Second World War made the League of Nations building in Geneva a lonely outpost of the international community, which began to gather cobwebs while armies fought throughout Europe and the Pacific, but did create the will to overcome its shortcomings. The Grand Alliance drew upon the success and failures of the League and created a new system that was more successful and more flexible. The United Nations was able to reconcile the great powers like the

[32] Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, 140-141.
[33] Michael Adas, "Contested Hegemony," 56-61.
[34] Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2008), 16-30; Jan F. Triska and Howard E. Koch, "Asian-African Coalition and international Organization: Third Force or Collective Impotence?," *The Review of Politics* 21, no. 2 (April 1959), 420; Mahendra Kumar, *India and Unesco* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974), 16-18.

United States and the Soviet Union.[35] It also drew upon the success of the New Deal in the United States and the League's social and economic programs. The "specialized agencies" brought together transnational networks of professionals and experts to govern global issues like the international economy, food and agriculture, global health, and justice.[36] The United Nations system also leveraged its status as the world's most important international political forum to make pronouncements on a range of international issues. As the political theorist Inis L. Claude described fifty years ago, international organizations are "custodians of the seals of international approval and disapproval." States that had recently gained their independence passed resolutions in the General Assembly legitimizing national sovereignty and condemning colonialism. Diplomats used the United Nations to legitimize certain norms - basic standards of behavior.[37]

UNESCO shared this authority to legitimize certain ideas and international norms. As the intellectual branch of the United Nations, it was able to mobilize intellectual resources from around the world. Anthropologists, historians, educators, archaeologists, economists, and communications theorists used the

[35] M. Patrick Cottrell," Lost in Translation? The League of Nations and the United Nations," *Charter of the United Nations*, Ian Shapiro and Joseph Lambert, eds. (Yale University Press, 2014), 93-103.
[36] Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2006).
[37] Inis L. Claude, as cited in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), 900. See also Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," *International Organization* 20, no. 3 (Summer 1966), 367-379; Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 143; Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (September 1996), 363-389.

organization's conferences, roundtables, and meetings to forge transnational networks. Many used the organization to expand their own careers and professional interests. Some promoted the national interests of their home countries. Most believed that the organization's authority as the intellectual branch of the United Nations expanded their influence and gave them the power to influence the global flow of information and ideas.[38] These professionals, however, had to cooperate with an international bureaucracy that had its own priorities.

UNESCO's Secretariat developed the organization's projects and implemented them on a daily basis. It is a permanent body composed of a staff of civil servants who live and work in Paris. The Secretariat officially claimed that member states determined its policies. More missionary staff members, however, believed that it was an independent organization with its own opinions and prerogatives and beholden primarily to its constitution.[39] Although the best candidates in each respective field were chosen for each department, efforts were made to hire staff members from as broad a geographical basis as possible. Staff members were assigned to a handful of departments dedicated to Education,

[38] For the role of these "epistemic communities," see Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992), 1-35; Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," *International Organization* 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), 594. See also Erez Manela, "A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History," *Diplomatic History* 34, no. 2 (April 2010), 299-323.

[39] Henry Cassirer, "L'Acte Constitutif de L'UNESCO est Au-Dessus de États," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 32-33.

Culture, Social Science, Philosophy, Science, and Communications.[40] Social life in the Secretariat evolved over time yet remained an intellectual hot house where intellectuals and academics from across the world rubbed shoulders. At the height of its international influence in the late sixties, a senior Secretariat official recalled, its headquarters in Paris resembled a "sort of Coventry Cathedral among UN Buildings... the great high-windowed main lobby is the intellectual Clapham Junction of the world."[41] The Director General dominated the Secretariat. Member states collectively elected the Director General and empowered him or her to implement its agenda and run the organization on a day-to-day basis. They fulfilled a variety of important roles - representing the organization internationally, administering the budget, and fostering an effective environment for the Secretariat to implement its projects.[42]

The General Conference, in which every member state was granted one vote and the power to vote on the organization's budget, met every two years. Tension mounted every fall in the Secretariat as the General Conference approached. Corridors buzzed, phones started ringing, and stacks of paper piled up in the hallways as the start of the Conference loomed. It lasted over a month, usually from late October until late November or early December. Hundreds of diplomats and delegates flooded local hotels, shared meals at cafés and

[40] The best introduction to UNESCO's institutional structure remains, Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson, *UNESCO: Purpose, Progress, Prospects* (Bloomington, 1957), 285-311. See also *What is UNESCO?* (UNESCO: Paris, 1970).
[41] Richard Hoggart, *An Idea and its Servants: UNESCO from Within* (New York: Oxford, 1978), 18.
[42] Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson, *UNESCO: Purpose, Progress, Prospects,* 295-304.

restaurants, discussed the state of the world, sometimes had love affairs. In the main conference room, between its large prestressed concrete walls, delegation heads sat behind plaques bearing the name of their countries and listened to speakers discuss their national priorities and visions for the organization's future. After the plenary sessions, delegates broke off into budget and program commissions to discuss project proposals and hammer out the wording of resolutions. These discussions established the organization's agenda and were the focus of diplomatic negotiations.[43] Peoples around the world had the opportunity to shape these negotiations through "national commissions for cooperation with UNESCO." Each country's national commission incorporated important members of the educational, scientific, and cultural community to advise their government on policies towards the Organization. The national commissions ensured that the "man in the street" could have a voice in the direction of a UN agency and know "that UNESCO exists and is thinking of him."[44]

An Executive Board met at regular intervals, usually two to four times a year for about two weeks, between the biannual sessions of the General Conference. Since the size of the board was considerably smaller than the sprawling Conferences - 18 members met at its first gathering in 1947 and, even after the rapid expansion of member states in the General Conference ten years

[43] Jacques L. Boisson, "On Discute du Programme et Budget," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 39. For a discussion of social life during the General Conference, see Jose Alejandrino, *Journal of an Unknown Knight* (Durham: Eloquent Books, 2009), 41-43.
[44] UNESCO Constitution, Article VII; "National Commissions' Vital Role," *UNESCO Courier* (November 1949); Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson, *UNESCO*, 315-320.

later, the Executive Board had only 34 members by 1968 - discussions were often more intense. The board helped to establish the agenda for the General Conference, prepare proposals for projects, and assess the progress of ongoing projects. Private individuals were assigned as board members to provide disinterested and apolitical guidance for the organization's projects and priority areas. After an amendment to the constitution in 1954, however, individuals were elected to represent their governments and received instructions from them. The change reflected the political interest that member states had in the organization and its role in the world.

The United States was the most influential state in the organization. Americans were the most enthusiastic supporters of an international organization devoted to culture, communication, and education. The State Department had only recently, during the Second World War, adopted cultural diplomacy as a new arm of the country's foreign policy apparatus. The officials who established its Bureau of Public Affairs during the Second World War went on to become UNESCO's founding fathers. They believed it was a means to broadcast American ideas to the world and a mechanism to dismantle international barriers to the flow of information. American academics and intellectuals also flocked to Paris and directed a range of ambitious projects. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson worked with the Secretariat to gain favor with new states in Africa and the Middle East. Washington also contributed over a third of the

organization's annual budget - a commitment which gave it leverage over UNESCO's programs and institutional philosophy.

The Third World emerged as the organization's most dedicated champion. The idea of the "Third World" has been contentious for decades. The term emerged in postwar discussions of demography and economics to describe the poor masses of the world - the global third estate.[45] Geographically, it encompassed the states of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. These countries were divided by immense political, cultural, and linguistic diversity. Many fought open wars against their neighbors over their postcolonial borders. All protected their national interests. Yet they also shared a common experience of subordination to European colonialism. Leaders and political elites leveraged these common memories to form diplomatic alliances and political blocs. These included the Afro-Asian Movement that reached its peak in the mid-1950s and the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of Seventy-Seven that assembled ten years later to resist neocolonialism and reform the international economic system. My use of the term "Third World" includes these geographical designations and diplomatic movements but focuses on the definition developed by the historian Vijay Prashad. The Third World was a project more than a place - it "enabled the powerless to hold a dialogue with the powerful, and to try to hold

[45] Leslie Wolf-Phillips, "Why 'Third World'?: Origin, Definition and Usage," *Third World Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (October 1987), 1311-1327.

them accountable."[46] Third World diplomats supported UNESCO in order to influence the ideas that shaped the international community.

Third World visions of world order evolved over the decades. Chapter 1 explores UNESCO's international origins and early development. European statesmen created the organization during the Second World War in order to foster international intellectual cooperation and encourage postwar peace. They believed that intellectual exchanges could moderate violent nationalism, eradicate fascism, and encourage European cooperation. Third World diplomats and intellectuals embraced the organization but campaigned against its Eurocentric priorities. The organization began to focus on discrediting the set of ideas and assumptions - white supremacy, European cultural superiority, Asian backwardness - that underpinned the imperial world order. It coordinated international intellectual conferences, student exchange programs, and educational campaigns to promote cultural understanding between the Western world and new states in Asia. The second chapter focuses on the most ambitious international intellectual program of the 1950s - a collaborative project to write a multivolume history of mankind. American academics dominated an international team of historians that wrote a new narrative of human history. European historians believed the project could encourage peace by tracing man's common history of peace and cooperation into antiquity. Asian and Middle Eastern historians believed a world history project bearing the United Nation's seal of

[46] Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, xviii-xix.

approval would heal the intellectual legacies of colonialism and legitimize their claims to postcolonial statehood.

African decolonization shifted the organization's intellectual attention towards the cause of economic development. The Secretariat transferred its intellectual resources towards the development of new ideas and strategies to fuel economic growth in the Third World. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on two of the most influential and successful ideas that emerged during the 1960s. First, educators and development planners in UNESCO offices and conference rooms developed the idea that literacy could build nations, train productive laborers, and create world citizens. The organization launched a world campaign to fight illiteracy in 1965 and popularized these educational ideas among world leaders. A second set of ideas about economic development coalesced around efforts to preserve historical monuments. Technical assistance missions poured into developing countries, first in Egypt and then in other countries in the Middle East and Asia, to save ancient temples and historical sites. Many noticed that their efforts to preserve these crumbling monuments and ruins attracted tourists and corresponding flows of hard currency. This phenomenon inspired the Secretariat's cultural officials to "invent" the idea of "World Heritage." The preservation of cultural and historic monuments encouraged millions of affluent Western tourists to visit Third World countries and invest in local business and thereby strengthen both international trade and international understanding. The idea that literacy and World Heritage Sites could accelerate economic development and improve

international cooperation around the world were among the most successful international development strategies of the 1960s and continue to shape international politics into the twenty-first century.

Chapters 5 and 6 explore how the organization became a battlefield in a "war of ideas" in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Secretariat, under the leadership of the assertive Senegalese Director General Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, positioned itself as a spokesman of the Third World. The New International Economic Order (NIEO) - based on a set of proposals to renegotiate international trade, improve commodity prices, and increase foreign aid - dominated this era of confrontation. UNESCO proclaimed itself "the intellectual cutting edge" of the Third World's efforts to reform the international economic system. It launched publicity campaigns, commissioned philosophical and legal studies, and endorsed the idea of a NIEO. The organization also spearheaded a global campaign to develop a complementary New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO) to enhance the Third World's voice in the international media. The organization coordinated a controversial series of discussions and debates between journalists and information ministers about how to balance the international flow of information and empower developing nations to correct misconceptions about themselves. These intellectual campaigns against the inequalities of the international system set the organization on a collision course with Washington and London, which began to view it as a threat to their own visions of world order.

The decline of European imperialism and the rise of our own postcolonial world order led to decades of international economic, diplomatic, and military tensions. This dissertation concludes that this sea change in world history also led to profound confrontation in the international realm of information and ideas. UNESCO was not the only forum devoted to the international exchange of information and ideas. But its authority as the intellectual arm of the United Nations made it a major battleground in the struggle to create a postcolonial world.

Chapter 1: The Power of Ideas: UNESCO and the Postwar World

Asia, Africa, the West,
in fact the whole world are boiling with ideas.

Charles Malik[47]

The end of the Second World War was a time of great hope for many postwar planners. Newspapers and political debates, academic roundtables and international meetings spoke about "one world," "world government," and the United Nations. The world that emerged after the dust of the Second World War had settled, however, appeared to undermine those early postwar hopes. The Soviet Union and United States clashed over a series of geopolitical and ideological disagreements and quickly turned their attention towards rearming and expanding their national security. The destruction of Hitler's Germany removed the central issue that held the wartime Grand Alliance together. Ideological tensions between Bolshevik communism and liberal democracy that had first emerged during the 1917 Russian Revolution began to again dominate policymaking in North American and European capitals. Soviet-American disagreements over the status of Germany and Poland's postwar government reinforced these tensions. The outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula in June 1950 raised the specter of World War Three and globalized the Cold War conflict. Both Washington and Moscow built up their alliance systems and drew lines in the sand. American leaders supported the creation of a North Atlantic

[47] Caroline F. Ware, "Charles Malik," n.d., Folder: "Lebanon Interviews," Box 7, CWP, YUL.

Treaty Organization with their West European allies and tried to establish regional alliance systems in Asia and the Middle East. The Soviet Union established a parallel Warsaw Pact to unite their European sphere of influence.[48] The Cold War therefore undermined the idealistic rhetoric of the United Nations' founding fathers. Soviet-American confrontation, especially Soviet diplomats' use of their veto power in the Security Council, deadlocked much of the UN's early agenda and determined the election of the uninspiring Trygve Lie as its first Secretary General.[49] Yet the United Nations survived and continued to shape international politics.

Although Cold War tensions dominated the headlines, contemporaries also remarked that a world community was coming into being. Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr believed that the "trend of history" pointed towards a "world community" embodied in the United Nations. Political scientist John Herz believed that "the ultimate spread of an attitude of 'universalism' through which a rational approach to world problems would at last become possible."[50] Technological innovations had also accelerated the mobility of people, ideas, and

[48] For the early Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford, 1997); Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 11-84. On the Cold War in Europe, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). On the Korean War and its effects on international politics, see Hajimu Masuda, *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2014).

[49] Paul Gordon Lauren, "The Diplomats and Diplomacy of the United Nations," *The Diplomats, 1939-1979* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 473.

[50] Reinhold Niebuhr and John Herz as cited in Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 139. See also Reinhold Niebuhr, "Peace Through Cultural Cooperation," *Christianity and Crisis* 17 (17 October 1949); Reinhold Niebuhr, "Theory and Practice of UNESCO."

capital - the postwar generation therefore continued to see the world as an interconnected global community. The specialized agencies - the World Health Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Food and Agriculture Organization above all - developed cooperative ties between all regions of the world.[51]

The great powers also maintained their commitment to international organizations. Washington may have had a nuclear monopoly until 1949, de facto nuclear superiority for another twenty years, and a powerful economy, but it was not content to rest its international legitimacy on power alone. American grand strategy supported and worked through liberal institutions like the UN, International Monetary Fund, and International Court of Justice. This system helped to normalize American ideas and goals internationally. Washington was able to gain UN support to resist the North Korean invasion of its southern neighbor. Many historians claimed that it was a mere fig leaf to provide legitimacy for American intervention. The UN, however, played an important role in the course of the war.[52] The Soviet Union also came to incorporate the United Nations into its grand strategy. Although Stalin distrusted the organization, Nikita Khrushchev used it to generate international support for Soviet foreign policy

[51] Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food And Agriculture Organization, And World Health Organization Have Changed the World 1945-1965* (Kent State University Press, 2006), 6.
[52] Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot*; John G. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2005), 5, 150; William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

goals, gain new allies in the decolonizing world, and improve the Soviet Union's domestic image. Soviet diplomats like Victor Israelyan believed that the "U.N. was the main stage for playing out the political and ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States."[53] International organizations were therefore central to the great powers' grand strategies.

The decolonizing world also employed international organizations to enhance its collective voice. The 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 1945 UN Charter raised the prospects of self-determination and suggested that the age of empire was coming to an end. Observers in the colonial world were enthusiastic about the possibility of an international organization that, unlike the League, would guarantee self-determination by giving each nation an equal vote in a General Assembly.[54] African and Asian dissatisfaction with the United Nations in the immediate postwar years led to efforts to reform the organization. Indian National Congress leader Jawaharlal Nehru proposed the idea of Asian Internationalism as an alternative to the United Nations and sponsored a series of regional conferences in 1949. In the following years, these conferences expanded to include African and Middle-Eastern states. This Afro-Asian movement, however, did not turn its back on the UN - it supported the organization, urged it to promote

[53] William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 472-477, 600-601; Aleksander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006); Michelle Denise Reeves, "Extracting the Eagle's Talons: The Soviet Union in Cold War Latin America" (PhD. Diss, The University of Texas at Austin, 2014), 255-257; Victor Israelyan, *On the Battlefields of the Cold War: A Soviet Ambassador's Confession* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003) as cited in Michelle Denise Reeves, "Extracting the Eagle's Talons," 255.
[54] Paul Gordon Lauren, "The Diplomats and Diplomacy of the United Nations," 461.

decolonization, and declared itself the greatest champion of the UN system.[55] Nehru first used the General Assembly to spotlight South Africa's persecution of Indian minorities.[56] The United Nations quickly became an international meeting ground for new states to discuss their common interests in the international system. More importantly, they used UN declarations, treaties, and resolutions to reshape global norms.[57] General Assembly resolutions against colonialism played an important role in mobilizing world opinion against French control of Algeria and helped to legitimize India's annexation of Portuguese Goa.[58] International organizations may have never fulfilled the optimistic hopes of the postwar generation, but they did play a central role in the postwar world.

UNESCO, more than any other international organization, embodied the most idealistic hopes of the postwar era. Its founding fathers agreed with French diplomat Henri Bonnet that it would be "both the conscience and the spearhead of the United Nations."[59] European and American diplomats designed it as an intellectual means to encourage cooperation between nations, teach world public

[55] Lorenz M. Lüthi, "Non-Alignment, 1946-65: Its Formation and Emancipation from Afro-Asianism," *Humanity* (forthcoming). For African perspectives, see Marika Sherwood, "'There is No New Deal for the Blackman in San Francisco': African Attempts to Influence the Founding Conference of the United Nations, April-July, 1945," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 29, no. 1 (1996), 71-94; G. H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London: Farrar and Faber, 1966), 41.
[56] Mark Mazower, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the Emergence of the Global United Nations," *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 149-190; Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* (Boulder: Westview, 1988), 183.
[57] Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, 251; Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot*, 143; Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, xvi, 23, 28, 49, 96, 102-103.
[58] Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution;* Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," 376.
[59] Henri Bonnet, "UNESCO: Spearhead of the UN," *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* (Winter 1946), 614.

opinion about internationalism, and delegitimize the pseudo-scientific pretensions of racial prejudice. American diplomats in particular believed that it should use mass communications in order to facilitate the free flow of information across national borders. Political issues - the rise of the Cold War, the decline of Europe's empires, and the persistence of nationalism - complicated the organization's mission but did not block it efforts. Most importantly, Asian states believed that the organization could help deconstruct the old standard of civilization and build a postcolonial and multicultural world in its place. Indian diplomats in particular believed that global intellectual cooperation could help create a world in which the "East" and the "West" were equal partners. These distinct agendas complimented each other. They were all predicated on the belief that information and ideas could reshape international politics.

The Idea Factory

The Second World War destroyed the League of Nations and revealed its shortcomings and idealistic pitfalls. Anglo-American leaders, however, committed themselves to a new system of international security and global governance that could help to win the war against Nazi Germany and imperial Japan. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt first committed their governments to an international system that would foster both international security and social welfare in the 1941

Atlantic Charter. They reaffirmed these war aims six months later with the "Declaration by the United Nations." Inter-Allied discussions built upon the Atlantic Charter and created a series of agencies to assist the war effort. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was formed in 1943 to care for and resettle refugees. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was created the same year to overcome food shortages. By 1944, inter-allied discussions turned towards postwar planning. The Bretton Woods Conference in July established the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to stabilize the global economy. Less than a year later, the San Francisco Conference drafted the UN Charter and established the organization as a permanent postwar organization.[60]

Meanwhile, a new center for international intellectual cooperation emerged in London. When Britain decided to continue the fight against Germany in 1940, politicians and intellectuals from across the continent fled Nazi occupation and established exile governments in the city. British Education Minister R. A. Butler tried to organize these exile governments and invited education officials to hold regular meetings to discuss postwar planning. The British Council helped to organize these meetings into the Conference of Allied

[60] Dan Plesch, "How the United Nations Beat Hitler and Prepared the Peace," *Global Society* 22, no. 1 (January 2008), 139-154; M. Patrick Cottrell, "Lost in Translation? The League of Nations and the United Nations," *Charter of the United Nations*, Ian Shapiro and Joseph Lambert, eds. (Yale University Press, 2014), 93-103; Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World*; Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development*.

Ministers of Education (CAME).[61] The ideological nature of the war informed their discussions. They believed that the perversion of education had strengthened fascism's mass appeal across Europe. Fascism had "morally transformed" a generation of school children, one Belgian minister worried. "Our children have become our enemies."[62] Many remembered the Nazi book-burning ceremonies.[63] They therefore agreed that intellectual and educational cooperation would be a vital part of the war effort. Reconstruction planning dominated their early discussions. "London had the aspect of a beleaguered city," one British participant recalled. The "reality of war" focused CAME on the "practical worries and material needs" that would confront them when peace returned to Europe. Butler established a Books and Periodicals Commission to pool books from Britain and the United States to restock European libraries. A sub-commission was established to discuss the restitution and preservation of cultural treasures. Social scientists discussed how to revise children's textbooks and fight theories of racial supremacy - both issues that they believed had contributed to Nazi ideological supremacy.[64] By early June 1943, they recognized that their meeting

[61] Jan Opocensky unpublished 1950 manuscript, "The Beginnings of UNESCO, 1942-1945," UNESDOC, 1-9.
[62] Canadian High Commissioner (London) to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 17 April 1944, 5582-40, Volume 3233, LAC. See also E. Vermeil, "The University Spirit in Germany and in the Western Democracies," n.d., 5582-40, Volume 3233, LAC.
[63] Archibald MacLeish, "Toward an Intellectual Offensive," July 1942, *Champion of a Cause: Essays and Addresses on Librarianship*, edited by Eva M. Goldschmidt (Chicago: American Library Association, 1971), 83. See also "Participation of the United States in Emergency Educational and Cultural Rebuilding of the War-Torn United Nations," *DOSB* 250 (8 April 1944), 299; Richard A. Johnson, "The Origins of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization," *International Conciliation* 424 (October 1946), 442.
[64] F. R. Cowell, "Planning the Organization of UNESCO, 1942-1946: A Personal Record," *Journal of World History* 10 (1966), 212; Jan Opocensky, "The Beginnings of UNESCO, 1942-

could potentially form the basis of a permanent postwar educational and cultural organization.[65] They drafted and circulated a memorandum in October proposing that CAME should become an official organization of the United Nations. Two months later, the British Foreign Office sent a circular to over a dozen states to attend the conference as "full member" states. In other words, they wanted to expand CAME'S activities beyond Europe.[66]

American diplomats supported CAME's efforts to become a permanent postwar organization with a "broader and bigger" agenda than European reconstruction.[67] The State Department had since 1938 begun to foster exchange programs and established a Division of Cultural Relations to manage the country's cultural diplomacy. Wartime planning inspired this new branch of the State Department to develop ambitious plans for postwar cultural reconstruction.[68] Assistant Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish helped to organize the country's "intellectual offensive" against Nazi Germany and argued that policymakers had

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1945," 0-11; James P. Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 34-54. For attitudes in London, see also Canadian High Commissioner (London) to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 17 April 1944, 5582-40, Volume 3233, LAC.

[65] Fernando Valderrama, *A History of UNESCO* (Paris: UNESCO, 1995), 20; "The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State," 30 July 1943, *FRUS 1943*: Volume 1, 1152.

[66] Foreign Office Communication, enclosed in "The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State," 9 December 1943, *FRUS 1943: Volume 1*, 1158-1159.

[67] "Draft Report of the 2nd Open Meeting, Held on Friday, April 14th, 1944, at the Board of Education," 5582-40, Volume 3233, LAC. See also H. H. de Capello, "The Creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization," *International Organization* (December 1970); Jan Opocensky, "The Beginnings of UNESCO," 0-12-13; F. R. Cowell, "Planning the Organization of UNESCO, 1942-1946: A Personal Record," 221; Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson, *UNESCO*, 24-25.

[68] Frank Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); "Participation of the United States in Emergency Educational and Cultural Rebuilding of the War-Torn United Nations," *DOSB* 250 (8 April 1944), 300.

to repair "the entire fabric of intellectual intercourse" in liberated territories.[69] State Department advisor Grayson Kefauver believed that postwar security required permanent exchange programs, since "Cooperation among nations requires an understanding of the culture of other peoples."[70] Americans therefore believed that any cultural organization should expand its focus beyond Europe and beyond the immediate need for reconstruction. The State Department sent a diplomatic mission to London in April 1944 to convey these American opinions. Czechoslovakian delegate Jan Opocensky recalled that "victorious American armies" strengthened the delegation's proposals at the conference. CAME discussions concluded that any permanent postwar organization should become associated with the United Nations system. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, world leaders assembled at the San Francisco Conference in May 1945 to finalize the UN Charter. Some diplomats complained that it skipped over discussions of intellectual cooperation. In response, American diplomats asked the British government to lead discussions about a postwar cultural organization. A month later the British Education Minister announced that London would host an international conference to determine CAME's future.[71]

[69] Archibald MacLeish, "Toward an Intellectual Offensive," July 1942; Archibald MacLeish, "The Intellectual Needs of Liberated Peoples," 3 May 1944, both in *Champion of a Cause.*
[70] Grayson N. Kefauver, "Peace Aims Call for International Action in Education," *New Europe* (May 1943), 15.
[71] Jan Opocensky, "The Beginnings of UNESCO, 1942-1945," I-30; "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)," 12 June 1945, *FRUS 1945*: Volume 1, 1512; "The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State," 13 July 1945, *FRUS 1945*: Volume 1, 1513-1515.

Diplomats and delegates at the London Conference in November 1945 shared the belief that ideas could shape the postwar world. Hundreds of delegations from Allied countries assembled in the Institute of Civil Engineers in central London. The conference was dedicated to their common belief that the diffusion of information and the exchange of ideas would accelerate the integration of the world and thereby create a more stable global community. World leaders like British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and former French Prime Minister Léon Blum delivered rousing speeches and raised hopes about the future. Attlee argued that an organization dedicated to the exchange of information and ideas would create the scaffolding for a "world of democracies, where the mind of the common man will be all important." The Prime Minister set the tone for the conference when he declared that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that peace must be preserved." The address sparked such an enthusiastic response that it quickly became the organization's official motto.[72] Delegates followed Attlee's lead and pledged their support for an organization to enhance "mutual comprehension" and a democratic institution reflecting "the common people and their needs." They shared the conviction that international cultural cooperation would strengthen democratic institutions. The Nazi perversion of education and culture had entrenched their political power in Germany. An international organization would keep world

[72] C. R. Attlee, "Welcoming Address by the British Prime Minister," 1 November 1945, Second plenary Meeting, *Conference for the Establishment*, 22.

public opinion around the world informed about politics at home and abroad and help foster consensus about international political issues.[73]

Behind the scenes, negotiations in London focused on how they should promote the exchange of information and ideas. French diplomats sparked controversy when they proposed to scrap plans for a UN Educational and Cultural Agency and instead resurrect the old Committee on Intellectual Cooperation. This proposal would have limited the organization to the field of high culture and philosophy. Americans wanted to "move the organization away from 'les belles lettres' character of the old commission on intellectual cooperation, and make it a useful instrument for the modern world."[74] French diplomats failed to gain support for their alternative plan. American delegate William Benton managed to quietly broker an agreement with French delegate Léon Blum. France agreed to abandon plans to revive the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation in favor of the UN plan devised by CAME. The United States in turn agreed to house the new organization in Paris as compensation.[75] Negotiations otherwise proceeded smoothly and UNESCO was born.

[73] Jan Opocensky, "The Beginnings of UNESCO, 1942-1945," II-3. For memories of fascism, see Ellen Wilkinson, "Opening Address by the President of the Conference," 1 November 1945, Second Plenary Meeting, *Conference for the Establishment*, 20; Provisional Record of the First Plenary Meeting, 1 November 1945, Box 2234, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA. For UNESCO and world opinion, see Archibald MacLeish, "UNESCO's Task," *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* (Winter 1946), 607-608; Henri Bonnet, "UNESCO: Spearhead of the UN."

[74] Winant to DOS, 2 February 1946, Box 2235, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

[75] "The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State," 15 November 1945, *FRUS 1945*: Volume 1, 1521-1522. For Benton's recollections of his discussions with Blum, see William Benton, "UNESCO Revisited," enclosed in Robert H. B. Wade to Harlan Cleveland, 18 November 1963, Box 3237, CFP 1963, RG 59, NARA; William Benton to James P. Sewell, 16 November 1971, Folder 2, Box 395, WBP, UCL.

Julian Huxley, the organization's first Director General, turned the new Secretariat into an intellectual hothouse. The British scientist and public intellectual had played an influential role in popularizing science in Britain over the past three decades. He was familiar with the countries' intellectual and scientific elites and had a thirst for knowledge. "I seem to have been possessed by a demon, driving me into every sort of activity," he recalled. He became a member of the Colonial Office Committee on Education and travelled throughout Africa to visit schools and talk with teachers, administrators, and missionaries.[76] On his own initiative, he wrote a manifesto - "UNESCO: Its Purpose and Philosophy" - that he hoped the General Conference would adopt as its mission statement. Huxley believed that the world was quickly integrating and growing more closely together. The organization's primary task should be to develop a "world philosophy, a unified and unifying background of thought for the modern world." Although he defended "world unity comprising regional and local diversities," his frequent calls for a "single world culture" and the unification of "traditions in a single common pool of experience" alarmed official and unofficial observers.[77] Political pressure from a series of countries challenged his ambitions. Vladislav Ribnikar, Yugoslavia's official observer, objected that Huxley's world philosophy would delegitimize the beliefs and values of millions of people around the world - including the communist governments that had gained power in

[76] Julian Huxley, *Memories I* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 179, 195.
[77] Julian Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Philosophy* (London: Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 1946), 46.

Eastern Europe. His ideas seemed to promote a form of intellectual world government that, many believed, threatened the world's cultural and intellectual diversity.[78] The Director General repudiated his ambitious attempts to create a world philosophy and declared his manifesto a personal statement rather than an official UNESCO document.

Huxley instead encouraged international cooperation between professionals that could help to build goodwill between different countries and better understanding between cultures.[79] He saw the organization, a colleague recalled, as "a sort of international university" and promoted international educational and scientific projects.[80] Huxley helped to make the Secretariat a stimulating environment for intellectuals and academics who travelled to Paris to meet with foreign colleagues and cooperate on global projects. Huxley was exuberant about this "galaxy of talent" and Secretariat members recalled the "colorful" people who assembled in the hallways and conference rooms of UNESCO House in the late 1940s. The Mexican writer and diplomat Jaime Torres Bodet replaced Huxley two years later in 1948. He came from an educational background - he had helped spearhead the country's literacy programs - and gained diplomatic experience through his tenure as Mexico's foreign

[78] Richard Peter McKeon, "A Philosophy for UNESCO," n.d., Folder: "Reports, Comments and Correspondence 1946-1956 (1)," Box 181, Richard Peter McKeon Papers, UCL; George N. Shuster to James F. Byrnes, 27 December 1946, Box 2239, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA. For an insightful contemporary discussion, see House of Commons Debate, 22 November 1946, volume 430, cc 1194-230.
[79] Julian Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Philosophy*, 69; Samuel Deese, "Ecology and the Gospel of Progress: Julian and Aldous Huxley in the American Century," 191-2; Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson, *UNESCO: Purpose, Progress, Prospects*, 295.
[80] "Interview Rex Keating," 10 March 1999, Box 2, Oral History Collection, AG 14, UA.

secretary. He placed greater emphasis on expanding the organization's influence at the grass roots levels - "the slums and in the villages" and the "man in the street." Torres Bodet, like Huxley, made the Secretariat a stimulating intellectual community.[81] The organization's first home, located in the Hotel Majestic along Paris' Avenue Kleber in the 16th arrondissement, fostered a feeling of community and camaraderie. The hotel was adapted for office space and conditions were therefore cramped: directors took over suites, department heads received double rooms, program specialists received single rooms, and other staff members received old bathrooms. The smell of cat urine was sometimes in the air since dozens of cats lived in the basement and wandered through the offices at night. It was dusty and dilapidated but its intimate environment attracted intellectuals and romantic bohemians. Juliette Huxley was a constant presence in the hotel's social life. The Director General's wife founded the Monday Club, which brought staff members' wives into contact with each other.[82] These were "years of creative euphoria."[83]

These staff members embraced the organization as the intellectual center of the international community. Political constraints reinforced this intellectual orientation. The organization's founders, and its constitution, rejected world

[81] Jaime Torres Bodet, "UNESCO: A Personal Faith," *Unesco Courier* (April 1949); "National Commissions' Vital Role," *UNESCO Courier* (November 1949).
[82] Gerard Bolla, "L'UNESCO a toujours été Notre Maison," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens* (Paris: UNESCO, 2006), 107; Juliette Huxley, *Leaves of the Tulip Tree: Autobiography* (London: J. Murray, 1986); Ernest O. Hauser, "Doctor Huxley's Wonderful Zoo," *Saturday Evening Post* (2 October 1948).
[83] Julian Huxley, *Memories* II (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), 27; Interview with Gerard Bolla, 15 December 1998; Interview with René Ochs, 16 December 1998, both in Oral History Collection, Box 2, AG 14, UA; Michel Prévost, "Relever les Ruines de la Guerre," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 73.

government and prohibited it from intervening in the domestic affairs of member states. The system relied upon the representation of national delegations. Only national governments could propose new projects and policies to the organization at the General Conference. Similarly, only official national delegates could invite the organization to launch projects in their territory. Although staff members and supporters spoke freely about the erosion of the nation-state, their constitution respected national sovereignty.[84] "Our real trouble is that we, as an organization, lack authority," one Secretariat staff member complained in 1948. "What is the use of thinking up big ideas for world peace if we can't go and enforce them?"[85] The Executive Board addressed the problem of sovereignty in the late 1940s. Board members concluded that they could promote the exchange of information, open regional cooperation centers and offices, deploy expert missions, organize pilot projects, assemble seminars, conferences, and expert committees, publish books and reports. The General Conference would draft declarations, recommendations, and international conventions that would impose "moral obligations" on states. Director General Torres Bodet felt uncomfortable being "restricted and supervised" by member states and agreed with his colleagues that "UNESCO propaganda campaigns" should be "aimed at informing the masses."[86]

[84] UNESCO Constitution, Article I, Paragraph 3; Glenda Sluga, "UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley," *Journal of World History* 21, no. 3 (2010), 393-418.
[85] Unidentified staff member as cited in Ernest O. Hauser, "Doctor Huxley's Wonderful Zoo," *Saturday Evening Post* (2 October 1948).
[86] "List of UNECO's Methods," 17 January 1950, 19 EX/5, UNESDOC; Jaime Torres Bodet comments in Summary Report of the Executive Board, Third Meeting, Nineteenth Session, 14 February 1950, 19/EX/SR3, UNESDOC, 3.

The organization decided to use its intellectual authority and international influence to advocate political change in the world.

The organization's paltry budget also constrained its ambitions. Secretariat officials and their allies assumed the budget would be pegged at around a billion American dollars. The first gross budget ended up being just under seven million dollars.[87] Torres Bodet repeatedly threatened to resign in protest over the General Conference's failure to raise funding.[88] "[A]lthough its potentialities are world-embracing," at least one senior State Department official agreed, "its annual budget would hardly run an aircraft carrier for a year."[89] The predicament reinforced the Secretariat's commitment to the power of information and ideas in the world. At the Executive Board, Chairman Paulo Carneiro complained that they had to operate on a "pauper's budget." He consoled his colleagues by emphasizing that they were a "federation of spiritual forces" - they must influence thinkers and religious authorities who could reshape opinion around the world.[90] One senior Secretariat member recalled that intellectual power outweighed financial constraints. "We deal mainly with ideas and can at best act as a catalyst

[87] "Unesco's Regular Budget and Assessment of Member States 1947-1987," *A Chronology of UNESCO, 1945-1987*, LAD.85/WS/4, UNESDOC, 86.
[88] See for example, Summary Report of the Executive Board, Sixteenth Meeting, Nineteenth Session, 21 February 1950, 19/ EX/SR3; Summary Report of the Executive Board, Seventeenth Meeting, Nineteenth Session, 21 February 1950, 19/ EX/SR3; Summary Report of the Executive Board, Seventeenth Session, First Meeting, 15 September 1949, 17 EX/SR.1; Summary Report of the Executive Board, Seventeenth Session, Third Meeting, 16 September 1949, 17 EX/SR.1; Summary Report of the Executive Board, Seventeenth Session, Fifth Meeting, 17 September 1949, 17 EX/SR.1 all in UNESDOC. See also James P. Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics*, 144, 148, 153-154.
[89] William Benton to George C. Marshall, 3 September 1947, Folder: "Benton, William 1947 Apr-Dec," Box 32, Chester Bowles Papers, YUL.
[90] Summary Report of the Executive Board, First Meeting, 29th Session, 13 March 1952, 29EX/SR.1-29, UNESDOC, 3.

in bringing about changes and innovation. I believe that ideas are more valuable than money."[91] The handful of different sectors in the Secretariat came to similar conclusions about the power of ideas.

The officials who congregated in the Education Department believed literacy and schooling were an important foundation for international peace, stability, and economic prosperity. Their flagship program was "Fundamental Education." The basic idea was to use education to teach people in Africa and Asia the basic skills necessary to develop their local economies. As the program's director argued, their campaigns should focus on "the principles of a balanced rural economy" - animal husbandry, forestry, natural resource management, industry, soil and water conservation, pest control, health, and hygiene. "It is fundamental in the sense that it gives the minimum knowledge and skills which are an essential condition for attaining an adequate standard of living.[92] They launched an ambitious technical assistance program in Haiti's Marbial Valley to introduce and develop these programs. Around the same time, they announced plans to create a "worldwide network of regional centers for Fundamental Education" to train teachers around the world. These programs failed dramatically. Secretariat officials lacked the necessary financial resources

[91] Rahul Singh, "Interview [with Prem Kirpal]," *Times of India* (5 January 1969), A1.
[92] John Bowers, "What is Fundamental Education?," 25 July 1947, EDUC/43; "A Definition of Fundamental Education," 14 February 1951, ED/94, both in UNESDOC. See also I. A. Richards, "On the Content of Fundamental Education," 11 August 1947, EDUC/45, UNESDOC.

required and did not anticipate the problems that would develop during its implementation.[93]

The failure of the Fundamental Education campaigns reinforced the department's intellectual foundations. C. E. Beeby, who headed the Education Department, agonized over the conflict between their ambitions to change the world and the constraints that hampered their influence. He recognized that the organization could never become an "interventionist organization on the ground." As he was lying in bed early one morning, he came to an inspiring revelation - they could shape international politics through "the diffusion of ideas and proven practices." The Education Department refocused its strategy around "the power of ideas" to spark educational change around the world.[94] The Fundamental Education program died officially in 1958 but the idea that education was a prerequisite for economic development lived on. The Secretariat published books and pamphlets, sponsored seminars and meetings, and consulted national governments about coordinating economic investment with educational planning. These activities helped inspire World Bank President George Woods to finance educational programs in the early 1960s (see chapter 3).[95]

[93] Charles Dorn and Kristen Ghodsee, "The Cold War Politicization of Literacy: Communism, UNESCO, and the World Bank," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 2 (2012), 377-379; Joseph Watras, "UNESCO's Programme of Fundamental Education, 1946–1959," *History of Education* 39, no. 2 (2010), 219-237; C. H. Dobinson, "Fundamental Education," *British Journal of Education Studies* 1, no. 2 (1953), 121-130.
[94] Clarence E. Beeby, "Aux Sources des Programmes d'Éducation," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 72.
[95] Charles Dorn and Kristen Ghodsee, "The Cold War Politicization of Literacy," 375, 379-380; Lionel Elvin, "Education," *In the Minds of Men: UNESCO 1946-1971* (UNESCO: Paris, 1972), 53-69; Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 109.

The Social Sciences Department wanted to teach the world how to be more peaceful. American social scientists, many of whom had participated in the State Department's psychological warfare activities, dominated the early years of the department. Their flagship program, the International Tensions Project, brought sociologists and psychologists together to explore the psychological factors that led to war and peace. They assumed that aggressive ideas were the result of mental illness. Their solution was to launch educational campaigns, propaganda, and cross-cultural exchange programs.[96] "UNESCO is not a scientific institute, but rather a kind of World Ministry of Education," a member of the Social Science Department argued.[97] They were most effective in the department's educational campaigns against racial prejudice.

The organization's charter enshrined the principle of racial equality and its founders had strong personal convictions about the idea of race.[98] The UN Economic and Social Council asked the organization to develop a program to disseminate "scientific facts designed to remove what is commonly known as racial prejudice."[99] The organization assembled a team of leading scientists and

[96] Teresa Tomas Rangil, "Citizen, Academic, Expert, or International Worker? Juggling with Identities at UNESCO's Social Sciences Department, 1946-1955," *Science in Context* 28, no. 1 (2013), 69-77; Fernando Valderrama, *A History of UNESCO,* 48; UNESCO Social Sciences Section, "Preliminary Outline of Project on Tensions Affecting International Understanding," 12 May 1947, Soc.Sci./2/1947, UNESDOC.
[97] J. R. Xirau memorandum to R. C. Angell, 21 December 1949, "Race Questions and Protection of Minorities," 323.1, Box 145, AG 8, UA. See also, "Social Scientists Issue Joint Statement on World Tensions," *Unesco Courier* (July 1948), 3.
[98] Julian Huxley had railed against scientific racism during the interwar era. See Julian Huxley, *We Europeans: A Survey of 'Racial' Problems* (New York: Harper, 1936); Glenda Sluga, "UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley," 396.
[99] "[Illegible] of Economic and Social Council on 'the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities': Activities of Unesco," n.d., "Race Questions & Protection of

anthropologists in 1949 to draft an authoritative statement to dispel popular myths about scientific racism. All of them had opposed racial thinking for years and saw it as an opportunity to expand their campaigns against racial prejudice. The team deliberated and drafted a comprehensive "Statement on Race" in 1950. It challenged the pseudo-scientific arguments for racism and instead argued that "race mixture appears to result in desirable biological effects" for the "human family."[100] The team made the statement "suitable" for the "informed layman" in order to ensure it would get as much publicity as possible. The Secretariat publicized it as the "most far-reaching pronouncement of its kind ever made" and invoked UNESCO's name and the international character of the meeting to strengthen its authority.[101] The Secretariat launched its "educational offensive" in June and distributed the statement around the world through radio, pamphlets, textbooks, and popular writers.[102]

The Statement on Race had an immediate impact on opinion worldwide. The pamphlets were so successful that they quickly went out of print.[103] It reached a "grass roots" audience in the United States among ethnic and religious

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Minorities," Box 145, 323.1, AG 8, UA; Louis Wirth, "Comments on the Resolution of the Economic and Social Council," *International Social Science Bulletin* 1 (1949).

[100] Ashley Montagu, *Statement on Race: An Extended Discussion in Plain Language of the UNESCO Statement by Experts on Race Problems* (New York: Schuman, 1951), 115, 118.

[101] Ashley Montagu to Robert C. Angell, 8 April 1950; Robert C. Angell to Ashley Montagu, 26 April 1950, both in 323.12 A 102, AG 8, UA; UNESCO Background Paper 104, "UNESCO Launches Major World Campaign Against Racial Discrimination," 19 July 1950, 323.12 A 102, AG 8, UA.

[102] Alfred Métraux, "Projet de Programme pour les Activites de L'Unesco Dans le Domaine des Questions de Race," enclosed in Alfred Métraux to Robert C. Angell, 2 June 1950, "Race Questions and Protection of Minorities"; Arvid Brodersen and Otto Klineberg to ODG, "The Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities," 25 March 1949, "Race Questions and Protection of Minorities," both in 323.1, Box 145, AG 8, UA.

[103] Alfred Métraux to Judith G. Wilson, 13 August 1951, 323.12 A 102, AG 8, UA.

minorities. A synagogue in Long Island preached about the statement, civil rights activist Pauli Murray included it in a symposium and book on race and law, and television stations planned to broadcast interviews with its rapporteur.[104] It inspired the legal scholars who testified before the American court that passed the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* decision that desegregated schools.[105] The country's leading African-American newspaper brought attention to the statement's "authoritative" claims about racial equality. A civil rights group brought UNESCO pamphlets to the attention of Secretary of State Dean Acheson.[106] When the UN General Assembly met in late 1950, there was controversy in the Trusteeship Council. The Filipino delegation invoked the "authoritative" statement to criticize racial discrimination in the British Empire. The Colonial Office in London followed the educational campaign and complained that it "impinge[d] upon conditions in the Colonies in particular."[107] The white settler colonies of East and South Africa were alarmed about the statement's threat to their domestic stability. In Kenya, where a movement known as the Mau Mau was rapidly beginning to spread and alarm the government, a settler newspaper complained about the "subversive" statement's challenge to

[104] D. H. Schneider to Alva Myrdal, "UNESCO 'Race Statement,'" 16 October 1950, 323.12 A 102, AG 8, UA.
[105] Harald E. L. Prins, "Toward a World without Evil: Alfred Métraux as UNESCO Anthropologist (1946-1962)," available online: <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=30431&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>.
[106] "UNESCO Raps All Race Myths," *Chicago Defender* (29 July 1950), 3; "Brothers Under the Racial Skin," *Chicago Defender* (29 July 1950), 6; Elmer W. Henderson to Dean Acheson, 4 June 1952, Box 1614, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[107] [illegible] to R. J. Harvey, Mr. Foggon, and Mrs. Chilver, 9 October 1950; "Racial Discrimination in Non-Self-Governing Territories: Note for United Kingdom Delegation," attached to Colonial Office to J. Fletcher-Cooke, 9 November 1950, both in CO 859/175/6, UKNA.

"British racial heritage."[108] In South Africa, the Statement on Race coincided with the government's first efforts to legally classify and separate the population by race. Five years later, External Affairs Minister E. H. Louw announced that South Africa would withdraw from UNESCO. He complained about the organization's "interference in South Africa's racial problems by means of UNESCO publications."[109] In each of these instances, international and domestic critics of empire and segregation invoked the organization's intellectual "authority" to provoke social and political reform.

UNESCO emerged during these early years as a bustling center of international cooperation. Prominent intellectuals like anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, sociologist Alva Myrdal, and biologist Joseph Needham all made the Hotel Majestic their second home. The Secretariat shared a common belief that the organization could use its authority to diffuse new ideas, legitimize social and economic policies, and inspire states to adopt certain international agreements. At the same time, another vision of international cultural cooperation was also shaping the way it approached world problems.

[108] "Postal Medley," *Kenya Weekly News* (2 March 1951), AG 8, 323.12 A 102, UA. For background on the Mau Mau, see David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (New York, Norton, 2005), 9-54.
[109] Cape Town to DOS, "South Africa to Withdraw from UNESCO," 13 April 1955, Box 1553, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA. On apartheid, see Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 116-141.

America's Global Republic of Letters

The proliferation of new communications technology in the early decades of the twentieth century transformed American politics and society between the World Wars. Film, radio, mass circulation periodicals, and the advertising industries that capitalized on them transformed American politics and society. The Hollywood studio system became big business, helped to nationalize American popular culture and popularize a common set of American ideals. Radio stimulated a new national political environment in which individuals felt connected to Washington politics. Contemporary observers and critics believed that the revolution in mass communications had created a more integrated and homogenous nation.[110] The mass media also reshaped America's role in the world. Radio broadcasts helped Americans to think of themselves as part of a wider world. They often treated foreign events as an immediate threat to the country and thereby helped to create and popularize the idea of national security. President Woodrow Wilson believed that "radio diplomacy" could circumvent national leaders and communicate American values and ideas directly to people around the world. A freer flow of information across international borders would create a more stable and secure world by creating an enlightened world

[110] David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945* (New York: Oxford, 1999), 229; Roland Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream* (Berkley: University on California Press, 1985); Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Wendy L. Wall, *Inventing the 'American Way': The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

community. It was this Wilsonian vision that convinced American postwar planners to make the "free flow of information" an American war aim.[111]

The interwar fascination with communications informed postwar American planning. Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms in 1941 championed "freedom of speech and expression — everywhere in the world."[112] The Potsdam Declaration stipulated that "Freedom of Speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established" in postwar Europe.[113] The American press petitioned Washington to promote freedom of speech and information in the postwar international system. Associated Press President Kent Cooper was a particularly active spokesman. The 1919 Peace Conference, Cooper argued in his 1941 book *Barriers Down*, was flawed because it did not develop a "world-wide free press... There can be no permanent peace unless men of all lands can have truthful, unbiased news of each other" and "all the barriers are down."[114] The American Society of Newspaper Editors shared Cooper's convictions and released a public statement on 28 November 1944 that asserted "complete friendship with any other power is dependent, among other considerations, on the freedom, the abundance and the exchange of information

[111] Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982), 93; Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s* (New Haven: Yale, 1995), 40.
[112] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union," 6 January 1941, PPP.
[113] "Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, China and the United Kingdom," 26 July 1945, *FRUS, Potsdam*, II: 1474.
[114] Kent Cooper, *Barriers Down* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942), 318, 9.

between peoples."[115] Media tycoons like Henry Luce, David Sarnoff, and Hugh Baillie publicized these views and pushed the State Department to eliminate barriers to the flow of information across national borders. America's "press leaders are urging us to formulate an international agreement regarding freedom of information," the State Department's Division of Information Chief complained in early 1945: this might be a "revolutionary" development.[116] Some of the country's leading thinkers assembled at the University of Chicago to discuss these ideas in late 1944. The Commission on Freedom of the Press believed that America's new global responsibilities required more informed public opinion about the outside world: the American people were facing an "emergency in the field of mass communication of political intelligence," the commission believed. Luminaries like Reinhold Niebuhr and Arthur M. Schlesinger argued that "instruments of communications" were necessary to promote the "cause of international comity" and "world peace."[117] The commission published its final report in early 1946 and urged Washington to promote international communications agreements to facilitate the spread of news

[115] American Society of Newspaper Editors (28 November 1944) statement, cited in Arthur W. Macmahon, "Memorandum on the Postwar International Information Program of the United States" (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945). See also American Society of Newspaper Editors, "Full Report of ASNE Committee on Freedom of Information," *Editor & Publisher* (18 June 1945).
[116] "Conference on International Information," in Commission on Freedom of the Press, "Minutes and Summary of Discussion, Meetings of January 22, 23, 1945, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel," Document #31, Folder 16, Box 1, The Commission on Freedom of the Press Papers, UCL.
[117] Commission on Freedom of the Press, "Part I of the First Draft of the Report," n.d. [1944], Folder 8, Box 1, The Commission on Freedom of the Press Papers, UCL; Reinhold Niebuhr, Statement on the Importance of the Commission's Work, Document #16, n.d. [April 1944]; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Statement on the Importance of the Commission's Work, Document #16, n.d. [April 1944], both in Folder 4, Box 1, The Commission on Freedom of the Press Papers, UCL.

and information around the world. It recommended that UNESCO would be the ideal international organization through which to coordinate these agreements.[118]

The State Department's new Office of Public Affairs attracted many officials from the country's literary and media world. Assistant-Secretary Archibald Macleish was poet laureate, Librarian of Congress, and a passionate believer that communications could recast international relations. "It is now, for the first time," he argued, "possible to conceive of culture in planetary terms because it is now, for the first time, possible to communicate upon a planetary scale."[119] MacLeish believed that UNESCO could use its status as the world's leading cultural organization to coordinate international agreements to lower barriers that impeded communications between nations. "History may be about to teach us that the Parliament of Mankind can only be attained through the Republic of Letters," he said in one typical statement. "For it is precisely the function of UNESCO to realize the ancient dream of the Republic of Letters."[120] William Benton, who succeeded MacLeish as Assistant-Secretary of State in September 1945, shared his colleague's convictions. He had started his career at Benton & Bowles, one of the most successful advertising agencies on New York's Madison

[118] Llewellyn White and Robert D. Leigh, *Peoples Speaking to Peoples: A Report on International Mass Communication from the Commission on Freedom of the Press* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).
[119] Archibald MacLeish, "Report of the Chairman of the Program Coordinating Committee to the UNESCO General Conference," n.d. [9 December 1946], *International Conciliation* 431 (May 1947).
[120] Archibald Macleish, "If We Want Peace, This is the First Job," *New York Times* (17 November 1946). See also "UNESCO Convenes," *New York Times* (20 November 1946).

Avenue, where he helped pioneer the cultural and commercial use of radio.[121] He brought these ideas to the State Department, where he tried to improve relations between diplomats and the press.[122] Benton, by his own account, had "a reputation for a one-track mind."[123] Between 1945 and 1948, he gave countless speeches and interviews promoting "the cause of peace through world freedom of information." He also came to believe that "UNESCO can perhaps make the greatest contribution of all to the implementation of freedom of communication."[124]

Benton and MacLeish - and their colleagues in the State Department and allies in the American media - believed that the free flow of information would lay the foundations of a new world order. "The various world publics exhibit a deepening anxiety," Benton claimed in 1947. "If they must decide the issues that make for peace or lead to war, on what basis shall they decide?" The free flow of information would foster "cultural democracy" and allow the people everywhere to "participate intelligently in the affairs of the world community."[125] The State

[121] Sidney Hyman, *The Lives of William Benton* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 336-7; William Benton comments in The University of Chicago Round Table Transcript, "Communications and Power," n.d. [January 1968], Folder 4, Box 570, WBP, UCL.
[122] M. J. McDermott to William Benton, 28 September 1945, Folder 1; M. J. McDermott to Secretary of State, "Mechanics of and Possible Improvement in the Department's Relations with the Press," 25 September 1945, Folder 1; William Benton to the Secretary of State, 23 October 1945, Folder 9, all in Box 375, WBP, UCL.
[123] William Benton, "Comments of William Benton at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Luncheon for U.S. National Commission for UNESCO," 12 September, Folder 7, Box 541, WBP, UCL.
[124] William Benton, "American News Abroad," 18 April 1946, Box 434, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA; NBC Radio Transcript, "Freedom of the Press - World-Wide," 26 January 1946, Folder 3, Box 477, WBP, UCL.
[125] William Benton, "Public Opinion and World Affairs," 2 September 1947, Folder 10, Box 491, WBP, UCL; William Benton, Address at the first general conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, November 1946, Box 435, CFP 1945-1949,

Department believed that the free flow of information would furnish people around the world with the "factual materials they need in order to make intelligent decisions on international affairs." Diplomats would speak to diplomats through conferences and summits, while peoples would speak to peoples through international radio broadcasts and affordable newspapers. Totalitarian states, in contrast, had ruled by erecting barriers and tightly regimenting their economies, societies, and all available information within their borders.[126] NBC president David Sarnoff argued that freedom of information would enhance international transparency and thereby build trust and facilitate the verification of arms control agreements.[127] The free flow of information, most Americans agreed, was the prerequisite for a peaceful and democratic world order. For these reasons, Benton declared, the "purpose of UNESCO is to bring Woodrow Wilson's vision of an informed world opinion nearer to realization."[128]

Washington quickly made the free flow of information a diplomatic priority.[129] The American National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO, which brought together dozens of leading figures in American cultural and

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RG 59, NARA; "Notes for Oral Statement of M. Benton at Press Conference of October 31," November 1947, Box 2244, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

[126] William Benton, "American News Abroad," Address Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 18 April 1946; William Benton, "International Understanding - A Mission for All of Us," Address Before the Associated Church Press, 24 April 1946, both in Folder 10, Box 480, WBP, UCL.

[127] David Sarnoff, "Freedom to Listen," Address at a Meeting in Honor of the United States National Commission for UNESCO," in *The University of Chicago Roundtable*, special issue: "Freedom of Information" 612 (11 December 1949), Folder 4, Box 480, WBP, UCL.

[128] William Benton, Statement Commemorating Woodrow Wilson's Birthday, 28 December 1946, Box 2241, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

[129] See Macleish's comments in Commission on Freedom of the Press, "Summary of Discussion and Action, Meetings, January 27-29, 1946," Folder 9, Box 4, The Commission on Freedom of the Press Papers, UCL.

intellectual life, advised the State Department to "advance and support proposals for the removal of obstacles to the free flow of information" at UNESCO conferences.[130] Celebrities like the Hollywood star Myrna Loy publicly supported the organization's communications policies. *New York Times* Pulitzer prize-winning foreign correspondent Anne O'Hare McCormack joined Benton's delegation to the General Conference and echoed his belief that freedom of information "is not only the condition of all other freedoms but of any genuine international life."[131] A major State Department study of American communications policies, conducted by the journalist Edward Barrett and a committee of consultants, agreed with the growing consensus. It concluded that "UNESCO must boldly attack the barriers which have so long blocked the free flow of ideas across national boundaries."[132] The State Department and the U.S. National Commission endorsed the report and instructed the American delegation in Paris to push its recommendations at the General Conferences.[133]

American delegations responded and raised the issue of mass communications and the free flow of information repeatedly. Archibald MacLeish made it a "prime concern" and "a problem of the utmost urgency" at the London

[130] U. S. National Commission, "Report of the United States National Commission for Unesco," *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* (Winter 1946), 619.
[131] Richard L. Coe, "Myrna Loy Talks of UNESCO Role," *Washington Post* (23 December 1949), B7; Anne O'Hare McCormack to James F. Byrnes, 13 December 1946, Box 2239, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.
[132] "The Mass Media and UNESCO: Report of the Committee of Consultants to the Department of State," 20 September 1946, enclosed in William Benton to Mr. Clayton, 4 October 1946, Box 2237, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.
[133] William Benton to Mr. Clayton, 4 October 1946; Spruille Braden, "Comments on the So-Called Barrett Report," 11 November 1946, attached to Braden to Ellis O. Briggs, both in Box 2237, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

Conference in 1945. The delegation introduced proposals to expand the organization's communications fields and lobbied foreign counterparts to support their commitment to the mass media.[134] The London Conference accepted American proposals and made the free flow of information a permanent part of its agenda.[135] Benton addressed the General Conference one year later and pressed his counterparts to expand the organization's communications program. He again declared his conviction that the free flow of information supported international peace. MacLeish repeated his idea of a global "republic of letters" and urged the conference to embrace the "revolutionary importance" of new media.[136] The program commission approved American proposals to expand the organization's attention to communications issues.[137] The most ambitious proposal was for a massive worldwide United Nations radio network. The U.S. National Commission proposed allocating 250 million dollars for the project. This was developed as a more "positive" measure in contrast to the "negative" campaign to sweep away older barriers and restrictions. It would broadcast programs to serve its charter -

[134] Minutes of the US National Commission Meeting at 2:30 p.m., Friday, October 26, 1945, *United States Delegation Meetings,* 10-13; Archibald MacLeish address, *Conference for the Establishment*, 68; Summary Minutes of the Meeting of the Delegation of the Proposed Educational and Cultural Organization of the United Nations, 26 October 1945, and Summary Minutes of the Meeting of the Delegation of the Proposed Educational and Cultural Organization of the United Nations, 1 November 1945, both in Box 2234, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.
[135] William Benton, "Understanding is also a Force," 29 March 1946, Box 434, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.
[136] William Benton, Address at the first general conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, November 1946, Box 435, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA; "UNESCO Convenes," *New York Times* (20 November 1946). Later UNESCO officials credited MacLeish with bringing the mass media to the attention of the organization. See for example, "Diffusion de la Pensée," n.d. [circa early 1948], "Organization - Department of Mass Communications," Box 3045, x07.55 MC, AG 8, UA.
[137] Anne O'Hare McCormack to James F. Byrnes, 13 December 1946, Box 2239, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

building peace in the minds of men through cultural and educational broadcasting.[138]

The American campaign to promote the free flow of information confronted resistance from both diplomatic allies and enemies. West European countries worried that American popular culture posed an economic and cultural threat to national cultures and domestic film industries. French policymakers in particular wanted to defend "the old world that wants to maintain certain values and... oppose a barrage of Hollywood films, UP and AP information, and *Reader's Digest* publications."[139] Communist bloc countries argued that American efforts to encourage the free-flow of information would facilitate the spread of fascist propaganda and "warmongering."[140] The Secretariat in Paris was also hesitant about the American diplomatic campaign. Julian Huxley had collaborated on documentary films before the war and believed that the media could be an effective educational tool. The Director General, however, worried that mass entertainment might debase traditional cultures and remained skeptical about American enthusiasm for a "laissez-faire anarchy in the services of

[138] "Ram or Windbag," *Time* (11 November 1946), 46; Archibald Macleish, "If We Want Peace, This is the First Job," *New York Times* (17 November 1946); UNESCO Press Conference Transcript, 24 September 1946, Folder 7, Box 541, WBP, UCL.
[139] "Note de la Direction des Affaires Culturelles: La Deuxième Session du Conseil Exécutif et la Rôle de la France à l'UNESCO," 3 August 1947, *DDF* 1946, 767.
[140] See for example M. Bogomolov, "Real Freedom of Speech," 30 March 1948, reprinted in *The University of Chicago Roundtable*, special issue: "Freedom of Information" 612 (11 December 1949), Folder 4, Box 480, WBP, UCL. For Soviet communications policies in Eastern Europe, see Anne Applebaum, *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956* (New York: Doubleday, 2012). For the role of anti-fascism in communist politics, see François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999 [1995]).

information."[141] Americans were largely alone in their effort to internationalize the free flow of information through UNESCO.

Complaints about the expansion of "American cultural imperialism" took center stage at the 1947 General Conference in Mexico City. Delegates from across the world complained about the "Extremism of [the] American press" and the expansion of American popular culture. The Indian delegate complained that removing barriers to international communication would unleash "a flood of U.S. crossword puzzles, detective stories and comic books." J. B. Priestly, the broadcaster and member of the British delegation, challenged optimistic American beliefs in lowering barriers to communication.[142] Czechoslovakia's delegate, following Soviet bloc propaganda strategies, warned about the dangerous "freedom of misinformation" that could inflame international tensions.[143] The Polish delegation introduced resolutions to restrict "warmongering" by establishing international legal controls over freedom of speech and the press. The resolution directly challenged American commitments to uphold the free flow of information.[144] The Polish challenge, however,

[141] Julian Huxley, "Huxley Defines Press Freedom at Geneva Conference," *Unesco Courier* (April 1948), 2. See also "Extracts from Confidential Reports of Chairmen of Previous U.S. Delegation to the General Conferences of UNESCO," 14 October 1948, Folder: "State Department (2)," Box 181, Richard Peter McKeon Papers, UCL.
[142] Thurston to DOS, 17 November 1947, Box 2244, CFP1945-1949, RG 59, NARA. See also NBC Radio Transcript for Broadcast on the Series Your United Nations, "UNESCO and Freedom of Information," 12 December 1947, Box 2245, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA; "One Man's Popeye," *Time* (24 November 1947); William P. Carney, "Priestley Assails our Aim in UNESCO," *New York Times* (14 November 1947).
[143] "One Man's Popeye," *Time* (24 November 1947).
[144] William Benton, Memorandum of Record on the UNESCO Conference in Mexico City, 22 December 1947, Box 2244, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA; Draft Report of the United States

alienated moderate European critics. French delegate Jacques Maritain helped to defeat the Polish proposal and the British supported many American communications proposals.[145] American delegates also publicly emphasized the importance of "a free two-way flow of information and ideas between all the peoples" in order to allay fears about American cultural domination.[146] American concessions and communist miscalculations led the General Conference to approve most of the American proposals. The Program Commission approved a plan to gradually reduce international barriers and develop support for journalists, broadcasters, and filmmakers. The conference also supported American proposals for a worldwide radio network.[147] Benton was pleased that it "unanimously agreed to intensify UNESCO's efforts to remove obstacles to communication, and to promote through a dynamic program the use of the press, radio and films to fulfill UNESCO's purposes."[148] Two months later, the campaign for the free flow of information shifted to Geneva.

Delegation, "Second Session of the General Conference of the United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization," CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

[145] Draft Report of the United States Delegation, "Second Session of the General Conference of the United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization," Box 2247, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

[146] "Guide to Conversations with Other Delegations: Subject: Freedom of Information," November 1947, Box 2244, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA; Charles A. Thomson address to the US National Commission, "UNESCO: What Next?," 10 December 1947, Folder 8, Box 389, WBP, UCL.

[147] William P. Carney, "Priestley Assails our Aim in UNESCO," *New York Times* (14 November 1947); Howland Sargeant Memorandum to Lovett, "Progress at Mexico City UNESCO Conference," 20 November 1947, Box 2244, CFP1945-1949, RG 59, NARA; Thurston to DOS, 21 November 1947, Box 2244, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA; Draft Report of the United States Delegation, "Second Session of the General Conference of the United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization," Box 2247, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

[148] William Benton Letter of Transmittal to the Secretary of State, 13 February 1948, Box 2247, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

The Cold War overshadowed the Freedom of Information Conference that was held in Geneva in the spring of 1948. The UN conference invited member states and international organizations like UNESCO to discuss major international communications issues. Discussions between the Americans, the Soviets, and the "middle nations" - West European states that sought a third way - largely followed the same course as the General Conference in November. American policymakers and legal advisors had by now begun to develop a more conservative vision of international communications - one focused on removing barriers to the flow of information and attacking the Soviet Union rather than opening up new opportunities for dialogue through communications.[149] The conference was the last attempt for decades to develop a comprehensive global approach to world communications policies. Cold War confrontation disappointed many participants who still hoped that the United Nations and communications technology could heal the world's ideological and political divisions.[150] Washington and the Secretariat in Paris, however, both considered the Geneva Conference a success. It confirmed UNESCO's role as a leader of international communications issues and thereby boosted its prestige and international

[149] William Benton Memorandum to Lovett, 19 January 1948, Folder 2, Box 250, WBP, UCA; Esther Caukin Brunauer to William Benton, 9 March 1948, Folder 2, Box 387, WBP, UCL. For a Soviet perspective, see M. Bogomolov, "Real Freedom of Speech," 30 March 1948, reprinted in The University of Chicago Roundtable, special issue: "Freedom of Information" 612 (11 December 1949), Folder 4, Box 480, WBP, UCL. See also Glenn Mitoma, *Human Rights and the Negotiation of American Power* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 92-95.

[150] See for example, United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information Geneva, Switzerland March 23-April 21, 1948: Report of the United States Delegates with Related Documents, Folder 2, Box 250, WBP, UCL.

authority on communications issues.[151] Washington was also pleased since it helped to put freedom of information on the UN's permanent agenda. Human rights officials rescued one of the draft articles on the freedom of information and included it in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights later that year.[152]

American commitment to spread the free flow of information between 1945 and the Mexico City conference two years later helped to make the organization a major center for international communications research and policymaking. Although American proposals for a world radio network were never implemented, the organization developed its own media capabilities and channels. The Mass Communications Department's Production Unit established divisions that helped to spread information about UNESCO, the United Nations, and current world problems. The international radio program *World Review* distributed its programs and transcripts to 4200 local stations across the world, in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic. It was often used verbatim in some countries' news hours or - in the case of the BBC - inspired independent news stories.[153] A Press Unit put out dozens of press releases each week.[154] The department turned the *UNESCO Courier*, an institutional journal, into a glossy

[151] Fernando Valderrama, *A History of UNESCO*, 46.
[152] "United Nations," *Censorship: A World Encyclopedia*, edited by Derek Jones (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 2499.
[153] "Facts and Figures on World Review Distribution and Usage," June 1955, annex 2 of Herbert Steinhouse to W. Frye, 2 August 1955 and Herbert Steinhouse to J. Garcia y de Garate, "Report on Unesco World Review," 13 October 1954, both in Volume 5, Herbert Steinhouse Fonds, LAC.
[154] Unsigned and Untitled Memorandum on the UNESCO Production Unit, n.d. [1948], Folder: "Organization - Department of Mass Communications," Box 3045, x07.55 MC, AG 8, UA.

magazine that appealed to a mass, international audience. The Press and Information Office subscribed to American arguments that UNESCO should suppress censorship around the world, ensure the "free circulation of journalists," and remove barriers to "the coming and going of journals, newspapers, and books into each country."[155] The Mass Communications Department considered American diplomats like Archibald MacLeish their founding fathers.[156]

The organization's mass communications services publicized information about the United Nations' technical assistance missions and development projects. The Natural Sciences Department deployed Ritchie Calder, Science Editor of the *London News Chronicle*, to report on desert reclamation projects in North Africa and the Middle East in 1950. It charged him with the "unique educational and reportorial task of explaining to the men and women of many countries so that they will agree to support and help to carry out the necessary measures."[157] Two years later, the Secretariat deployed Calder and *World Review* editor Herbert Steinhouse to travel throughout South East Asia and file reports. Steinhouse recorded sixty tapes of recordings for his radio program while Calder filled six notebooks for his articles and pamphlets. Together they crossed thirty-five borders in one hundred days, spoke with local leaders, teachers, nurses, and

[155] "Plan de Travail pour la Section Presse et Agences D'Information," n.d. [circa 1947], "Organization - Department of Mass Communications," Box 3045, x07.55 MC, AG 8, UA.
[156] "Diffusion de la Pensée," n.d. [circa early 1948], "Organization - Department of Mass Communications," AG 8, x07.55 MC, Box 3045, UA; Hamdy Kandil Address to the Inter American Press Association, 1981, Folder 138, Box 42, CAB 7, AG 8, UA. See also Joseph A. Mehan, "UNESCO and the U.S.: Action and Reaction," *Journal of Communication* 31 (Autumn 1981).
[157] Editorial Note in Ritchie Calder, "Men Against the Desert," *UNESCO Courier* (1 April 1950), 8.

officials from international agencies like the WHO, FAO, and the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund.[158] UNESCO's "front-line coverage" of the UN's development campaigns pleased officials in the Secretariat and in Washington.[159]

The organization achieved some success in fulfilling American desires to reduce international barriers. It dedicated itself to "overcoming or working round" political constraints to the flow of information by conducting research, assembling expert meetings, and collecting data on barriers around the world.[160] Most states resisted efforts to remove barriers that would allow other states to broadcast unhindered within their borders. The Secretariat was able to gain the assistance of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by limiting discussions to the free flow of educational, cultural, and scientific materials.[161] The organization sent a team led by Julian Behrstock to the Annecy round of the GATT in 1949 to convince member states to support the free exchange of cultural and scientific media.[162] The meeting removed few barriers to the flow of information - although the United States did facilitate the export of cheap radio

[158] Herbert Steinhouse, "South Asia Diary," n.d., Volume 5, Herbert Steinhouse Fonds, LAC.
[159] Howard Vickery memo, "UNESCO Mass Communications Services and their Relationship to U.S. Objectives," enclosed in Max McCullough to Perry Laukhuff, 6 November 1950, Box 1606, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA; Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson, *UNESCO*, 119.
[160] "A Meeting of Experts on The Improvement of the Free Flow of Ideas By Word and Image (Press and Films)," 21 August 1947; Press Release 343, "Spreading Cultural News: Information Centres and Fellowships," 15 October 1947, both in "Freedom of Information - Expert Meeting - Paris 1947," Box 53, 001 A 82/064 (44) "47", AG 8, UA.
[161] Julian Behrstock, "Mission to Geneva: Discussions with ICITO Secretariat," 28 February 1949, Folder: "Free Flow of Information - Relation with Gen. Agreement on Tarifs & Trade," Box 53, 001 A 82/81 GATT, AG 8, UA.
[162] "Memorandum on Trade Barriers Affecting the Import and Export of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials," n.d., enclosed in Jaime Torres Bodet to Dana Wilgress, 1 March 1949 and "Message from the Director-General to the UNESCO Working party of the Tariff Negotiations Committee (Annecy, France)," n.d., enclosed in Douglas Schneider memorandum to ODG, 18 May 1949, both in "Free Flow of Information - Relation with Gen. Agreement on Tariffs & Trade," Box 53, 001 A 82/81 GATT, AG 8, UA.

receivers - but did introduce the organization to the world of international trade negotiations: thirty-four governments stated that they would "in future tariff negotiations attempt to assist in furthering the objectives sought by UNESCO." One delegate informed Behrstock that "We now have such large dossiers about UNESCO's economic activity that we know we are going to have to do something about it." The organization's activities in lowering barriers to the flow of information achieved few immediate results but established itself as a central organization in the international information system.[163]

Empires of Ideas

Postwar leaders were confident that an organization devoted to the dissemination of ideas and information could create a more stable and interconnected global community but they were not naive about the problems it might provoke. By the end of 1946, American diplomats who returned from the General Conference in Paris recognized that it would become "an instrument for developing leadership" beyond politics and economics. "As older empires dissolve," they argued, "the struggle opens for the empire of ideas." Benton added that the organization would become a "hot bed of politics" since "ideas are

[163] Julian Behrstock to ODG, "Final Report of the Annecy Conference," 1 August 1949, "Free Flow of Information - Relation with Gen. Agreement on Tarifs & Trade," Box 53, 001 A 82/81 GATT, AG 8, UA.

weapons."[164] All "states have recognized that, in their foreign policy, culture, in the broad sense of creative and intellectual activity, have their proper place with commerce, industry, agriculture, and communications... How can one under these circumstances refuse to recognize that UNESCO is a political organization," Assistant Director General Jean Thomas agreed.[165] States tried to exploit the organization for their own national interests - but it was the Cold War which challenged the organization's independence.

France was the organization's most enthusiastic champion in the postwar years. The war, German occupation, and traumatic memories of political collaboration had destroyed its military, pillaged its economy, and left its international prestige in tatters. Paris responded to its marginal status by embracing international institutions to rebuild and recast its international influence. French diplomats embraced the European Coal and Steel Community and supported European integration to strengthen its influence over regional politics.[166] Paris put its weight behind UNESCO in order to regain its international intellectual influence. Charles de Gaulle's provisional government believed that planting an international cultural organization in Paris would augment its prestige by expanding the influence of French intellectuals and the French language. Paris lobbied Allied powers about the location of the new

[164] William Benton to James F. Byrnes, 23 December 1946; Anne O'Hare McCormack to James F. Byrnes, 13 December 1946, both in Box 2239, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA. See also Arthur H. Compton to James F. Byrnes, 28 December 1946, Box 2239, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.
[165] Jean Thomas, "Quelle étrange Illusion!," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 6.
[166] William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1998).

cultural organization. French diplomat Paul Voucher informed R. A. Butler that his government was "naturally preoccupied" with restoring Paris as the intellectual capital of the world. Ambassador Henri Bonnet informed his foreign counterparts that his government wanted "France's role in the intellectual field... made very apparent. For instance, by making the seat of the organization in Paris."[167] Paris recruited the country's leading artistic and intellectual figures for its delegation to the London Conference in order to establish that the organization "was very clearly a French idea."[168] The conference's decision to house the Secretariat in the heart of Paris pleased the French government. The Quai d'Orsay provided consistent support for the organization for decades. France used the organization to boost its image as an Asian cultural power when its influence in Indochina began to crumble.[169] At the same time, France also tried to limit the organization's prerogatives in areas that might undermine its interests. Colonial officials, like their counterparts in the British Colonial Office, mistrusted

[167] William Prendergast, "UNESCO and French Cultural Relations," *International Organization* (June 1976), 454-5. For French diplomatic efforts, see Memorandum, 27 July 1945; Grayson N. Kefauver memorandum to Eugene N. Anderson and Bryn Hovde, 24 July 1945; Paul Voucher to R.A. Butler; Bryn Hovde to Charles Page, 4 June 1945, all reprinted in Digest of Telegrams on the Proposals for an Educational and Cultural Organization of the United Nations since January 1945, 5 November 1945, Box 2234, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA; Minutes of the US National Commission Meeting of Sunday, October 28, 1945, 10:10 a.m., *The United States & UNESCO: A Summary of the United States Delegation Meetings to the Constituent Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in Washington and London, October-November, 1945*, Luther Evans, ed. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana, 1971), 38.

[168] "Note de la Direction des Affaires Culturelles: La Deuxième Session du Conseil Exécutif et la Rôle de la France à l'UNESCO," 3 August 1947, *DDF* 1946: 252.

[169] Statement of the Chief of the Laotian Delegation, 22 June 1951; Statement of the Chief of the Vietnamese Delegation, 23 June 1951, both enclosed in David Bruce to DOS, "Statements by Chiefs of Vietnamese and Laotian Delegations to UNESCO," 28 June 1951, Box 1610, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.

UNESCO's educational activities and refused to allow them to send technical missions in their African colonies.[170]

Soviet leaders and diplomats served their national interests by ignoring the organization. Communist Party ideologists rejected the idea that "wars start in the minds of men" or that cultural and educational exchanges could stabilize the postwar world. War was rooted in economic competition and class conflict - only hard power could ensure international security. Moscow still relied heavily on cultural diplomacy and propaganda to spread its international influence but considered UNESCO American turf. It looked instead to West European communist parties and front organizations to fight its war of ideas.[171] Soviet failure to join the organization initially discouraged some people in Washington. The State Department initially believed that the Soviet snub undermined the organization's pretensions to become a genuinely "universal" institution. The first General Conferences held an open seat for the Soviet delegation that never arrived. Some critics suggested that, without its participation, "UNESCO was a half-cooked goose."[172] Benton believed "Soviet participation is essential if UNESCO is to hope to achieve the goal set for it in the constitution."[173] The

[170] Chloé Maurel, "L'UNESCO Face aux Enjeux de Politique Internationale (1945-1974)," 197; William R. Pendergast, "UNESCO and French Cultural Relations," *International Organization* (June 1976), 464.
[171] Ilya V. Gaiduk, "L'Union Soviétique et l'UNESCO Pendant la Guerre Froide," *60 Ans*, 282; Chloé Maurel, "L'UNESCO Face aux Enjeux de Politique Internationale (1945-1974)," *60 Ans*, 296.
[172] "World Brains-Truster," *Time* (16 December 1946).
[173] UNESCO Press Conference Transcript, 24 September 1946, Folder 7, Box 541, WBP, UCL.

presence of East European delegations, especially the vocal Yugoslavian delegation, helped to compensate for the Soviet absence in the postwar years.[174]

The organization was popular across the United States in the early postwar years. Milton Eisenhower, brother of former General Dwight Eisenhower and president of Kansas State University, headed the U.S. National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO and made the American public the most "UNESCO-conscious in the world." The Denver and San Francisco regional meetings of the American National Commission were covered widely in the national and regional press and brought the United Nations to the heartland. According to Lord Halifax, Britain's former Foreign Secretary and ambassador to Washington, "nowhere has greater enthusiasm and energy been displayed for this cause than in the United States of America."[175] Across the Atlantic, American professionals flooded the Hotel Majestic and made it, French officials complained, "an Anglo-Saxon citadel in the heart of Paris."[176] Walter C. Laves of the University of Chicago became Deputy Director General, the organization's second most influential position. The United States also provided twenty-five percent of UNESCO's budget – a benefit which gave American delegates considerable influence and leverage over its policies.

[174] "Draft Report of the United States Delegation to the First Session of the General Conference of UNESCO," Folder 5, Box 389, WBP, UCL.
[175] Ernest O. Hauser, "Doctor Huxley's Wonderful Zoo," 76; House of Lords Debate, 26 January 1949, volume 160, column 299.
[176] "Note de la Direction des Affaires Culturelles: La Deuxième Session du Conseil Exécutif et la Rôle de la France à l'UNESCO," 3 August 1947, *DDF* 1946, 767.

Cold War tensions led Washington to reassess their commitment to the organization. Washington decided to devote more attention and resources to its bilateral information and cultural exchange programs. The 1948 Smith-Mundt Act expanded the country's resources devoted to public diplomacy and de-emphasized the internationalist programs that dominated the State Department's wartime approach to cultural cooperation.[177] The State Department deemphasized but did not forget UNESCO. Some intellectuals like Archibald MacLeish believed that "UNESCO may well break the paralysis of the 'cold war'" by reminding both sides of the Iron Curtain of their common humanity.[178] Policymakers in Washington, however, began to identify the United Nations' intellectual arm as a useful resource in the country's cultural offensive against international communism. Milton Eisenhower argued that "UNESCO cannot avoid taking an active part in the 'cold war' which is a war in the minds of men and therefore squarely in UNESCO's field."[179] One Central Intelligence Agency memorandum included the State Department's UNESCO Relations Staff in its "inventory of Cold War weapons" and suggested that it could help educate the world about American values.[180] The organization's role in the international information system made it a potentially powerful Cold War ally. On the one hand, the

[177] Frank Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, 113-168; Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, 217.
[178] Archibald MacLeish, "How Can UNESCO Contribute to Peace?," *American Association of University Professors* (September 1948).
[179] "Report on Public Meeting Symphony Hall, 8:00 P.M., September 27, 1948," Appendix C to Summary Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, Folder 5, Box 387, WBP, UCL.
[180] Paul C. Davis memorandum, "Inventory of Cold War Weapons," 17 October 1951, CIA FOIA, Doc No/ESDN: CIA-RDP80R01731R003500170002-8.

organization could project American ideas through multilateral channels. "UNESCO today," according to one State Department official, "is providing information to many parts of the world which can be regarded as propaganda for the ideals, ways of life, and objectives of the U.S. and other 'free nations.'"[181] On the other hand, the organization's media services could potentially circumvent Soviet radio-jamming and "disseminate the truth" directly to the Soviet people.[182]

The North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea in June 1950 provided an opportunity to test these strategies. The UN Security Council voted to intervene and support South Korean forces to repel communist advances. Some Secretariat officials welcomed the opportunity to participate in the conflict. A few reconstruction specialists argued that the Korean conflict could rehabilitate the organization's faltering prestige in international politics. Director General Torres Bodet agreed that they could play a role in the conflict but wanted to avoid the "shooting war" and restrict their work to areas unaffected by military operations. He favored allocating resources to educational relief and the postwar reconstruction of Korea.[183] Washington wanted the organization to use its

[181] Howard Vickery memorandum, "UNESCO Mass Communications Services and their Relationship to U.S. Objectives," enclosed in Max McCullough to Perry Laukhuff, 6 November 1950, Box 1606, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. See also George D. Stoddard, Statement Concerning Senate Resolution 243 Before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 July 1950, Folder 2, Box 388, WBP, UCL.
[182] "Report on Public Meeting Symphony Hall, 8:00 P.M., September 27, 1948," Appendix C to Summary Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, Folder 5, Box 387, WBP, UCL.
[183] Ethel B. Gilbert memorandum to Evert Barger, "Some Personal Opinions on UNESCO and Korea," 22 August 1950, Box 209, 361.9, AG 8, UA; Arthur A. Compton to DOS, "Report of Activities at UNESCO House for the Two-Week Period Ending July 14, 1950," 20 July 1950, Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA; Bruce to DOS, 7 July 1950, Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA; Robert C. Angell memorandum to Madame Myrdal, "Unesco's Role in the Korean Crisis," 18 August 1950, Box 209, 361.9, AG 8, UA.

resources to "educate" member states about UN efforts to repel the communist advance. "UNESCO's efforts to improve and maintain understanding would tend to develop a sense of moral solidarity among nations engaged in a common undertaking," the American National Commission advised.[184] American representatives in Paris agreed its media outlets should publicize UN articles and information.[185] Roscoe Drummond, European Cooperation Administration Chief of Information, pledged "50 percent of the time of his staff" to promoting a UNESCO information program to support the crisis. Marshall Plan officials could "urge" governments to volunteer their mass communications facilities to the program.[186]

American policymakers brought these proposals to the Executive Board in August. Board member Luther Evans sent a message to the chairman outlining American proposals and requesting an Executive Board session to discuss the crisis. He emphasized that they should launch "an all-out defense of the United Nations in this present crisis."[187] Evans' letter alarmed the Secretariat and sparked renewed criticisms about "American domination of UNESCO." Torres Bodet expressed his "great reserve" about American plans and responded that he did not want UNESCO to "interpret the news" or deal with "political" issues. The Mass

[184] U. S. National Commission for UNESCO, "Discussion Paper: Agenda Item VI: Unesco's Responsibility in the World Crisis," 20 July 1950, Box 209, 361.9, AG 8, UA. See also Charles A. Thomson to William McKenna, 29 August 1950, Folder 2, Box 388, WBP, UCL.
[185] Arthur A. Compton to DOS, "Report of Activities in UNESCO House for the Week Ending July 4, 1950," 9 August 1950, Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[186] Arthur A. Compton to DOS, "Report of Activities at UNESCO House for the Week Ending August 25, 1950," 29 August 1950, 27 August 1950, Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[187] Luther Evans to Count Jacini, 16 August 1950, enclosed in Charles A. Thomson to Members of the U.S. National Commission, 25 August 1950, Folder 1, Box 390, WBP, UCL.

Media Department was particularly concerned about being roped into a political propaganda campaign.[188] West European capitals issued similar complaints. The French Foreign Office complained that Evans' demands would turn the agency "into an organ of psychological warfare" and British representative Ronald Adam agreed. European newspapers like London's *News Chronicle* urged the organization to avoid becoming "a kind of psychological warfare bureau for the Western Powers" and focus instead on reconstruction and emergency relief after the fighting had ended.[189] American diplomats was more successful when the Executive Board met at the end of August. Evans encouraged the board to adopt an information program and denied accusations that it was a "propaganda" campaign.[190] Evans gained additional support when UN Secretary General Trygve Lie requested UNESCO's involvement in the crisis. Lie sent a representative to Paris to defend plans for an information campaign and reassured Torres Bodet that any information campaign would have "a positive character, with no tinge of propaganda."[191] After three days of debate, the board approved both a

[188] Arthur A. Compton to DOS, "Report of Activities in UNESCO House for the Week Ending July 4, 1950," 9 August 1950, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA; Arthur A. Compton to DOS, "Report of Activities at UNESCO House for the Two-Week Period ending August 18, 1950," 21 August 1950, Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.

[189] Arthur A. Compton to DOS, "Report of Activities at UNESCO House for the Week Ending July 29, 1950," 4 August 1950; Arthur A. Compton to DOS, "Report of Activities in UNESCO House for the Week Ending July 4, 1950," 9 August 1950, both located in Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA; Geoffrey Hoare, "U.S. Demands Threaten to Split UNESCO," *News Chronicle* (London), 14 August 1950, enclosed in Alice T. Curran to William Benton, 25 August 1950, Folder 2, Box 388, WBP, UCA; Arthur A. Compton to DOS, "Report of Activities at UNESCO House for the Week Ending July 29, 1950," 4 August 1950, Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.

[190] Bruce to DOS, 27 August 1950; Bruce to DOS, 28 August 1950, both in Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.

[191] Summary Report of the Executive Board, First Meeting, Twenty-Third Session, 26 August 1950, 23 EX/SR.1-8, UNESDOC, 6; Walter Laves and Charles Thomson, *UNESCO,* 276.

reconstruction program and an information campaign to publicize UN actions in Korea.[192]

The organization's contributions to the Korean conflict were mixed. The Secretariat raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for reconstruction needs and provided teachers and school supplies for refugee children. Beyond the Korean peninsula, it promoted "collective security" as a major theme in its 1951 worldwide educational programs. The campaign was designed to "bring home to the Man-in-the-street the significance of collective security" and UN intervention in the conflict through teaching aids and brochures for schools and universities.[193] Washington, however, was disappointed that the campaign was not aggressive enough and avoided anti-communist themes. The State Department's senior UNESCO official complained that information material was "timid and colorless, with its avoidance of any reference to [communist] 'aggression' so patent."[194] Although the organization provided valuable educational assistance for Korean schools and research institutions, the information campaign's failure undermined American hopes that it could play a central role in the country's Cold War strategy.

Washington also began to suspect communist subversion in the Secretariat. Anti-communists suspected that two Secretariat officials, John

[192] Arthur A. Compton to DOS, "Report of Activities at UNESCO House for the Week Ending August 25, 1950," 29 August 1950, 27 August 1950, Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[193] "The Meaning of Collective Security" and W. E. Williams, "UNESCO Wall Charts to Aid in Struggle for Collective Security," both in *UNESCO Courier* (February 1951), 4, 5.
[194] Charles A. Thomson, "Report of Activities at UNESCO House for the Period ending March 23, 1951," 30 March 1951, Box 1608, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.

Grierson and Joseph Needham, harbored communist sympathies after spy-rings were discovered in Ottawa and Cambridge.[195] Julian Huxley made the mistake of attending the Moscow-supported World Peace Council in 1947. Although he quickly denounced the pro-communist and anti-American proceedings, the Director General nevertheless reinforced suspicions in Washington that he was a fellow-traveller.[196] Central Intelligence Director Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter believed UNESCO was "more completely shot through with Communists and Communist sympathizers than any other international alphabetical organization."[197] The organization's popularity in the United States also eroded in the years after the Korea War. A heated conflict spread through the Los Angeles school board over its internationalist influence in American educational circles and ideological threat to school children. Anti-communist patriotic organizations also conflated "international understanding" with "world government" and urged Washington to sever its ties with the organization.[198]

The Soviet Union's unexpected application to join the organization as a full member state in 1954 revived American anxieties about the organization's

[195] Howland H. Sargeant to Richard Peter McKeon, 28 February 1947, Folder: "State Department (1) 1946-50," Box 181, Richard Peter McKeon Papers, UCL.
[196] "Dr. Huxley Issues A Personal Statement on the World Congress of Intellectuals," 2 September 1948, "Congres Mondial des Intellectuels p.l. Paix - Wroclaw 1948," Box 151, 327.4 A 06 (438) "48", AG 8, UA. For American suspicions surrounding Huxley's attendance, see Caffery to DOS, 5 February 1948, Box 2247; Caffery to DOS, 27 August 1948, Box 2251; Kenneth Holland to Charles A. Thomson, "Report of Activities at UNESCO for the Week Ending Monday September 6, 1948," 8 September 1948, Box 2251, all in CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.
[197] R. N. Hillenkoetter to Errett P. Sorivner, 3 August 1948, CIA FOIA, Doc No/ESDN: CIA-RDP80R01731R001600030010-5.
[198] For the Los Angeles school board controversy, see "UNESCO Stirs Row in Los Angeles," *New York Times* (9 May 1954), E12. For the American Legion, see Allen Drury, "Legion Ranks are Split over the UNESCO Issue," *New York Times* (18 September 1955), E7; Lawrence O'Kane, "Truman Rebukes Legion on UNESCO," *New York Times* (24 October 1955), 2

role in international politics. Stalin's death in early 1953 and the settlement of the Korean War a few months later eased international tensions. The new leadership wanted to escape its international isolation, shift more of its resources from the arms race to the domestic economy, and win new allies in Asia and the Middle East. Domestically, the government eased restrictions on Soviet intellectual and cultural life.[199] Russian scientists and intellectuals took advantage of their new role in the organization to rebuild their networks with foreign academics.[200] Internationally, it used UNESCO to build bridges with foreign adversaries and contact prospective allies in the Third World. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov sent the Director General a note on 17 January 1956 proposing that the organization become an institutional foundation for cultural relations between the Western and Soviet blocs.[201] Both the British and the Americans, believing the plan provided too many opportunities for communist propaganda, rejected the Soviet proposal.[202] Soviet diplomats, however, continued to challenge American positions in the organization. Moscow demanded that the General Conference extend membership to communist allies – the PRC and East Germany – denied seats in important international organizations.[203] Moscow financed a series of

[199] For the Soviet Thaw, see Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 163-192.
[200] Edward G. Trueblood to DOS, "Official Trip of Director-General Evans of UNESCO to Soviet Union," 13 October 1955, Box 1554, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.
[201] Edward G. Trueblood to DOS, "Summary of Report Submitted by N. Bammata on Mission of Unesco Officials to USSR," 13 January 1956, both in Box 1555, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.
[202] Charles Bohlen to Moscow, 24 January 1956, Box 1555, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA; Paper Prepared by the Foreign Office, "The Role of UNESCO in East-West Contacts," 10 May 1956, CAB 130/115, UKNA.
[203] Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State, 17 December 1955, *FRUS 1955-1957*: Volume XXVI, Document 40.

technical assistance projects for countries in Asia in order to overcome local reluctance to accept bilateral aid. Soviet delegates to the Executive Board and General Conference tried to gain international recognition for the Soviet theory of "peaceful coexistence." They introduced resolutions intended to outlaw "propaganda" and "warmongering" – which threatened American commitments to preserve the "free-flow of information" and threatened to legitimize censorship and state control over the mass media.[204] The Soviet Union and the East European states emerged as a major voting bloc in the General Conference. Moscow's new enthusiasm reinforced Washington's conservative attitudes towards UNESCO.

American influence over the organization expanded when Luther Evans became Director General. Jaime Torres Bodet had consistently tried to raise the organization's budget in order to fulfill its mandate and carry out the programs adopted by the General Conference. The great powers – the United States and United Kingdom most significantly – had blocked any increase in the budget. Torres Bodet resigned in protest over these financial constraints in 1953 and Luther Evans was elected to succeed him. Evans, born in central Texas at the turn of the century, was a polyglot intellectual whose Texas drawl and gruff demeanor belied his internationalist convictions.[205] He was convinced that ideas and information were a crucial part of world politics. Evans succeeded Archibald

[204] Paris to DOS, "Key UNESCO Official Gives Frank Report on UNESCO-USSR Developments," 27 June 1956, Box 1557, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA; Max McCullough to Luther Evans, 8 February 1957, Box 1560, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59 NARA; Ilya V. Gaiduk, "L'Union Soviétique et l'UNESCO Pendant la Guerre Froide," *60 Ans*, 283; "United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization," *International Organization* (1955, May).
[205] Interview with Gerard Bolla, 15 December 1998; Interview with René Ochs, 16 December 1998, both in Oral History Collection, Box 2, AG 14, UA.

MacLeish as Librarian of Congress and assisted the war effort by providing strategic information to the State Department culled from the Library. He also gained diplomatic experience by serving on the Executive Board in Paris. Although he was an international civil servant responsible to the General Conference and its constitution, Washington was pleased that Evans went "out of his way to cooperate with the United States."[206] He made the organization more pragmatic and more attuned to international politics.[207]

Evans supported American efforts to make the organization more responsive to member states. In the Executive Board, American diplomats led efforts to transform the meeting from a group of informal advisors into an official assembly of diplomats. A charter amendment in 1954 made the board a political meeting of appointed officials representing their governments. Foreign colleagues welcomed this American proposal since UNESCO would now reflect the true nature of world politics.[208] In the General Conference, Evans echoed Washington's belief that the organization should follow "sound program planning and sound administrative practices." Throughout his tenure as Director General he consistently opposed increases in the budget. This issue became acute in 1954, when the Brazilian delegation to the General Conference introduced proposals to raise the budget and attracted support from many smaller countries that benefitted

[206] Edward G. Trueblood Memorandum to DOS, "Unusual Recent Record of Cooperation with United States of Director General Evans," 1 March 1956, Box 1555, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA; James P. Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics*, 162.
[207] T. V. Sathyamurthy, "Twenty Years of UNESCO: An Interpretation," 624.
[208] James P. Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics*, 169; Vincenzo Pavone, *From the Labyrinth of the World to the Paradise of the Heart*, 99.

from the organization's programs.[209] Evans also wanted to shift the organization away from cultural programs and towards "more earthy, practical, technical aid sort of program[s]."[210] Evans therefore revived a proposal, first proposed by an American delegation in 1950, to make the organization's programs more practical. These reforms clarified UNESCO's program and focused its energies on more important activities. The organization planned to focus its energies over the rest of the decade on three "Major Projects" that would receive priority attention and resources. The first two projects were research on arid zones and the expansion of fundamental education in Latin America, both of which conformed to the Director General's vision for more practical and pragmatic programming.[211]

In the Secretariat, Evans reluctantly agreed to enforce Washington's demands that American civil servants who lived in Paris sign loyalty oaths. The international civil service was a recent development in international politics. The League of Nations had created an independent civil service and the UN Charter had revived the need for international civil servants who would be loyal to their organizations rather than home governments.[212] The staff members forged a

[209] For American diplomacy and the UNESCO budget, see Andrew H. Berding and Francis O. Wilcox Memorandum to Robert H. Bowie, "Recommendations for S/P Study of United States Relations with UNESCO," 18 June 1957; S. C. Allyn, "Report on Ninth General Conference of UNESCO," 15 January 1957, Box 1561, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.
[210] Luther Evans to Chester Merrow, 7 January 1954, Folder IA, Box 2691, X07.21(73), AG 8, UA.
[211] "Remodeling of the Future Programme of UNESCO: Report Presented by the Executive Board," 30 August 1954, 8C/PRG/13, UNESDOC; Laura Elizabeth Wong, "Cultural Agency: UNESCO's Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, 1957-1966" (PhD. Diss: Harvard, 2006), 59-60.
[212] Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture Delivered to Congregation at Oxford University, "The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact," 30 May 1961, United Nations Online, available online: http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/docs/internationalcivilservant.pdf.

common identity. They began to call themselves "Unescans" and created a Staff Association to defend their common interests as international civil servants.[213] Meanwhile, American public opinion grew more concerned about communist subversion in the United States and international organizations. The United States Senate's Judiciary Committee began to investigate Americans employed in international organizations in 1952. Evans was a dedicated internationalist but chose to cooperate with Washington. He instructed his American staff members to complete U.S. Civil Service forms and stand before Loyalty Boards. He suspended seven employees in December 1954 who declined to comply.[214] The conflict created a "sinister" working environment and led to revolt in the Secretariat. The Staff Association interpreted the American loyalty pledges as a threat to its independence and international organizations more generally. Staff members rallied around the seven persecuted Americans and personally pledged financial support hours after Evans announced his decision. The personnel association vice-president devoted years of his personal and professional life to protect staff members. "I devoted my heart, my energy and my convictions," he recalled.[215] Evans' support for Washington's demands, one journalist noted, was "a warning and a challenge to defend free international agencies."[216]

[213] James P. Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics*, 158.
[214] "Human Rights Day in UNESCO House," 13 December 1954, Herbert Steinhouse Fonds, Volume 5, LAC. See also James P. Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics*, 158.
[215] Herbert Steinhouse, "UNESCO vs. H. Steinhouse: Chronology," n.d., and "Human Rights Day in UNESCO House," 13 December 1954, both in Herbert Steinhouse Fonds, Volume 5, LAC; Interview with Gerard Bolla, 15 December 1998, Oral History Collection, Box 2, AG 14, UA; Alain Gille, "Unis Face à la Chasse aux Sorcières," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 182; Pierre Henquet, "Les Retombées du Maccarthysme: l'Affaire des Septs Américans," *L' Unesco*

American efforts to reform the organization left a lasting legacy. Washington's diplomats would complain about the organization's tendency to veer away from its technical agenda and take up controversial political issues. Staff members, drawing on their own personal and institutional memories, responded that it was American diplomats who first tried to mobilize the organization's resources, purge political opponents, isolate countries like the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic, and make the Executive Board more attuned to international politics.[217] But other countries, with their own agendas, also engaged the organization.

India's Afro-Asian Cultural Diplomacy

India was among the greatest postwar champions of international cultural cooperation. The anticolonial fight for independence and bitter memories of colonial humiliation shaped Indians' postwar attitudes towards the United Nations and the prospects for intellectual exchange. Bengal, the Northeastern region of India that had been the heart of India's intellectual and political renaissance, became a ferment of nationalist politics and internationalist thought. Aurobindo

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Racontée par ses Anciens, 57; "U.S. Citizens in UNESCO," *The Times Educational Supplement* (19 March 1954), enclosed in Herbert Steinhouse Fonds, Volume 5, LAC

[216] "Storm Signals at Unesco," *The New Statesman and Nation* (20 June 1953), Herbert Steinhouse Fonds, Volume 5, LAC.

[217] See for example, Jean Guitton, "N'en Dé Plaise a Quelques Tenants de L'espit Pur...," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 29; Michel Prévost, "Quelle Délégation Représente la Chine?," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 38; Paris to DOS, "Visit of Ambassador Young to UNESCO," 25 July 1977, Paris 21475, AAD.

Ghose, Swami Vivekanda, Bhudev Mukhopadhyay, and Rabindranath Tagore challenged Western materialism, embraced Asian spirituality, collaborated with intellectuals beyond the British Empire, and tried to renegotiate India's place in the world. They tried to tear down Europe's standard of civilization and hierarchical visions of world order.[218] Beginning around the same time, the Indian National Congress began to fight for national independence on the Subcontinent and champion anticolonial movements around the world.[219]

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in particular promoted multilateral diplomacy to secure India's national interest and the cause of decolonization throughout the region. The Prime Minister assigned his sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit as head of the unofficial Indian delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Two years later, New Delhi urged the General Assembly in 1947 to pass a resolution condemning South Africa's treatment of Indians working in the country.[220] Nehru declared India the "torch-bearer in the liberation movement of Asiatic countries" and cast around for sympathetic allies.[221] New Delhi hosted the 1947 Asian-Relations Conference in order to reestablish regional ties that had been interrupted and disrupted in recent centuries by the colonial powers.

[218] Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire*, 216-242; Kris Manjapra, *Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals Across Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2014), 43-45; Michael Adas, "Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology," *Journal of World History* 15, no 1 (2004), 50-55.
[219] Mahendra Kumar, *India and Unesco* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974), 16-18.
[220] Mark Mazower, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the Emergence of the Global United Nations," *No Enchanted Palace*, 149-190; Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, 183.
[221] Jawharlal Nehru's Address at South Asia Day Meeting, Lucknow, "India's Lead in Asian Liberation," 28 October 1945, *SWJN* 1: 14, 459. See also Jawharlal Nehru, "Statement Given to Paul Feng, Correspondent of the Central News Agency of China, Delhi," 20 January 1946, *SWJN* 1: 14, 470; "Interview to B. Shiva Rao," 21 January 1946, *SWJN* 1: 14, 473; "Interview to the Correspondent of Reynold's News, Allahbad," 10 Februay 1946, *SWJN* 1: 14, 477.

Delegates from across the continent proposed plans for science institutes, scholarships, language training, academic and educational exchanges, and an Asian broadcasting station. Cultural discussions were the most controversial. Although they shared fundamental economic and political problems and common memories of colonial oppression, profound cultural, linguistic, and religious differences still divided them. Cultural and educational exchanges therefore became a valuable means to strengthen Asian political unity.[222] India followed up the meeting in New Delhi with a series of Afro-Asian conferences to discuss issues like Indonesian independence, Dutch imperialism, and the possibility of establishing a permanent regional anticolonial organization. Nehru and his allies, however, maintained their commitment to the United Nations. These Afro-Asian states reassembled as an informal voting bloc at the General Assembly in December 1950 in an attempt to resolve the conflict in Korea.[223]

Indian efforts to mobilize Afro-Asian states in the United Nations influenced UNESCO. Jawaharlal Neheu was preoccupied with the economic and political challenges of independence and the diplomatic and military problems of the world and therefore focused primarily on the General Assembly and the Security Council. Nehru's government, however, assigned the country's leading intellectual and academics elites to align the organization with the ideals of the

[222] *Asian Relations*, 207; G. H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, 65; Vijay Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 33; Jawaharlal Nehru Speech Delivered at the Plenary Session of the Asian Relations Conference, 23 March 1947, *SWJN* 2: 2, 501-506.
[223] "'Cease-Fire' in Korea Goes Before U.N. Group Today," *Boston Globe* (12 December 1950), 1.

Afro-Asian Movement.[224] Nehru personally asked the philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan to lead India's delegation in Paris and then to serve on the Executive Board.[225] The philosopher had first moved to Oxford in 1936 to become Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford University, where he promoted "mutual understanding and appreciation" between East and West. In India, he tried to make the universities leading centers of the independence movement and training grounds of Indian national consciousness. As independence loomed, he confessed that he wanted India and Britain to maintain contact but urged Europeans to prepare for "the rise of Asia and Africa."[226] Radhakrishnan saw UNESCO as the best forum in which to institutionalize and enhance his ideas about the postcolonial world. He avoided reading the detailed proposals and counterproposals that often dominated the Executive Board and commented "only on general questions or on what is said by other members of the Board."[227] He used his position to keep discussions focused on cultural issues and to promote Afro-Asian perspectives. He complained that UNESCO was "an Anglo-American concern" and urged the General Conference to devote more

[224] P.N. Kirpal, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the Unesco," *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, B. R. Nanda, ed. (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), 215.
[225] M.O. Mathai, *Reminiscences of the Nehru Age* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), 72.
[226] Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, "India and the West," *Asia and the Americas* (April 1946), 150; Robert Neil Minor, *Radhakrishnan: A Religious Biography* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 62; Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, "Presidential Address to the UNESCO General Conference," October 1954, *Occasional Speeches and Writings, October 1952-February 1959* (Publications Division: New Delhi, 1960).
[227] Charles A. Thomson to DOS, "Report of Activities in UNESCO House for the Period Ending January 27, 1951," 27 January 1951, Box 1606, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.

attention to Asian interests and demands. With Nehru's encouragement, he urged UNESCO to admit the People's Republic of China as a member state.[228]

Prominent Indians also gained senior positions in the Secretariat.[229] Prem Kirpal was assigned to head the Department of Cultural Activities in 1952. Kirpal studied at Lahore and Oxford and was in London for UNESCO's birth in December 1945. After Independence, he worked for New Delhi's Ministry of Education and Culture and directed Indian cultural diplomacy. His primary ambition in the Secretariat was to ensure that cultural projects played an important role in UNESCO's South Asia programs.[230] The Indian economist Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, one of the architects of India's Five Year plan, accepted Julian Huxley's invitation to work in the Secretariat in July 1948. He believed that it should focus on deconstructing the imperial world order. Adiseshiah recalled his own childhood experiences reciting British parliamentary speeches about the inferiority of Bengali thought and culture. The imperial world order "was based on the doctrine that there was a hierarchy of cultures in the very nature of things,

[228] Radhakrishnan's comments to the second session of the Executive board are typical. See Summary Report of the Executive Board, Second Session, 10 April 1947 and Summary Report of the Executive Board, Sixth Meeting, Second Session, 12 April 1947, both in CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC; William P. Carney, "UNESCO Work seen as Hope of World," *New York Times* (9 November 1947). See also William Benton, Memorandum of Record on the UNESCO Conference in Mexico City, 22 December 1947, Box 2244, CFP 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA; Jawaharlal Nehru to Radhakrishnan, 6 June 1950, *SWJN* 2: 14-II, 441-442.

[229] Maulana Azad, "Speech at the Inauguration of the National Commission of Unesco," 9 April 1949, *Speeches of Maulana Azad* (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1989), 92.

[230] Prem Kirpal Address Given at the Arts & Reality Conference Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada in August 1982, "Arts and Internationalism," *Culture and Development* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Press, 1992), 143-177; Robert S. Smith, "Report on Activities at UNESCO House for the Period Ending August 15, 1952," 21 August 1952, Box 1614, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.

that there were higher and lower cultures."[231] He helped to pioneer the United Nations' Technical assistance programs and focused on Asian development needs.[232] Kirpal and Adiseshiah promoted Asian interests in the organization's everyday work.

Indian pressure led to one of the most important international conferences in UNESCO's early history. Radhakrishnan, with New Delhi's support, developed a proposal for an international conference on cultural and intellectual relations between Asia and the West.[233] Radhakrishnan suggested that the meeting focus on the theme of education and chose the personnel who would help develop the program.[234] Participants who arrived in New Delhi in December 1951 for the conference discussed the role of ideas in the modern world – the history of intellectual exchanges across Asia and Europe, the decline of European imperialism, the idea of civilization, and global integration.[235] The Indian government treated the conference as an opportunity to inform Western intellectuals about their country's postcolonial achievements: European and North

[231] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Address Given at the Academy of Sciences of Serbia, "The Art of the Impossible: Unesco's Fight for Cultural Understanding," 7 November 1967, Folder 66, Box 19, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[232] Biographical Note on Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, April 1965, Folder 12, Box 4, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[233] Proceedings of the First Plenary Meeting of the Second Session of the Indian National Commission, 24 March 1951, "Report on the First Conference of the Indian National Commission for Co-Operation with UNESCO," Box 1612, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[234] E. J. Carter to Swami Siddheswarananda, 4 December 1950, "Philosophical Round Table - India 1951"; Prem Kirpal to Jacques Havet, 23 February 1951, both in File: "Philosophical Round Table - India 1951," 14 A 064 (540) "51", Box 99, AG 8, UA.
[235] See for example, T.M.P. Mahadevan, , "The Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in East & West: Comments and Observations," n.d.; Radhakrishnan's comments in "Proceedings of the Preliminary Meeting of the Delegates to the Symposium of the 'Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in the East and the West,'" 13 December 1951, both in "Philosophical Round Table - India 1951," Box 100, 14 A 064 (540) "51", AG 8, UA.

American intellectuals and officials were treated to special events, entertainment, and meetings with senior government officials. New Delhi's press and radio showed great interest in the conference.[236] It also shaped UNESCO's attitudes towards the region. As one Western participant noted in New Delhi, "this conference has confirmed my conviction that the men in the East know a great deal more of the West than we of the West know of the ideals of the East."[237] The conference began to refocus the Secretariat's attention towards exchanges between Asia and the Western world.

New Delhi appointed Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as the head of the National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO. The Muslim journalist and freedom fighter, like Adiseshiah, came of age during the Bengali Renaissance of the early twentieth century and gravitated towards revolutionary politics. Pan-Islamic scholars like Jamaludin al-Afghani and Bengali intellectuals like Aurobindo Ghose informed his attacks on Europe's claims to civilizational superiority and inspired him to advocate jihad against European imperialism.[238] After independence and partition, Azad remained in India and became its first

[236] Jacques Havet, "Compte-Rendu de la Mission Effecture dans l'Inde du 7 Decembre au 30 Decembre 1951," 24 January 1952; Jaime Torres Bodet to Servepelli Radhakrishnan, 8 January 1952, both in "Philosophical Round Table - India 1951," Box 100, 14 A 064 (540) "51", AG 8, UA.

[237] Clarence Faust remarks in "Proceedings of the Fourth Session of the Delegates to the Symposium of the 'Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in the East and the West,'" 17 December 1951, "Philosophical Round Table - India 1951," Box 100, 14 A 064 (540) "51", AG 8, UA.

[238] Khwaja Ahmad Faruqi, "Maulana Azad as a Man of Letters," *Indian Literature* 1, no. 2 (April-September 1958), 6-13; Asghar Ali Engineer, "Maulana Azad and the Freedom Struggle," *Economic and Political Weekly* 23, no. 50 (10 December 1988), 2633-2635; Ayesha Jalal, *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 178-202, 214, 225.

Education Minister – a position which gave him responsibility for Indian policy towards UNESCO. Azad believed the organization should focus on redressing European justifications for empire and global inequality. "UNESCO," he argued, "should give a lead to the world in understanding the great change which has come over Asia in the course of half a century or more. After age-long slumber, Asia is again awake and her awakening is symbolic of the awakening of all the East."[239] Azad used the Indian National Commission to promote the ideals of the Afro-Asian movement. Nehru addressed the first meeting of the National Commission in April 1949 and argued that UNESCO should prepare the world for Asia's rebirth. "What I want is not merely goodwill and desire. I want an appreciation of the fact of Asia's importance."[240] Commission members agreed that "the problems of Asian countries should be given high priority in the programme of Unesco" in the future.[241] These calls to shift the organization's focus from Europe to the postcolonial world became a common feature at the National Commission's annual meetings throughout the decade.

The Indian National Commission aligned UNESCO with the Afro-Asian Movement in the early 1950s. The organization became popular in other countries in Asia and the Middle East. In Central Asia, Afghan intellectuals began to

[239] Maulana Azad, "Speech delivered at the Unesco Conference," June 1951, *Speeches of Maulana Azad* (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1989), 156.
[240] Jawaharlal Nehru Inaugural Address, "Report on the First Conference of the Indian National Commission for Co-Operation with UNESCO," Box 1612, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. See also "Nehru Says Asia has New Key World Role," *New York Times* (10 April 1949).
[241] Proceedings of the First Plenary Meeting of the Second Session of the Indian National Commission, 24 March 1951, in "Report on the First Conference of the Indian National Commission for Co-Operation with UNESCO," Box 1612, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.

correspond with regional critics of imperialism. Kabul Radio and the burgeoning Afghan press began to cover UNESCO activities extensively.[242] In East Asia, Japan was particularly enthusiastic about the organization. Japanese intellectuals and academics mobilized to spontaneously form UNESCO clubs throughout the country, beginning in Sendai and spreading to Kyoto, Nara, Osaka, Kobe, and other cities in 1947. The country's admission to UNESCO in 1951 became a milestone in its return to the international community and became a household name among the Japanese people.[243] New Delhi tried to mobilize this regional support for the organization and sent invitations to "sister nations of Asia and Africa" to attend the 1954 meeting of the Indian National Commission.[244] Egyptian and Iraqi officials delivered speeches denouncing colonialism while Japanese officials reveled in their return to Pan-Asian politics. Maulana Azad repeated his conviction that UNESCO's intellectual resources could mobilize support for New Delhi's vision of world order. "We have to recognize that the days when Europe was equated with the world are gone forever," he declared. Nehru agreed that the organization's influence in international

[242] Kabul to DOS, "Ninth General Conference of UNESCO," 6 June 1956, Box 1557, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA. For anticolonial and Pan-Asian intellectuals in Afghanistan, see Robert D. Crews, *Afghan Modern: The History of a Global Nation* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2015), 186-188.
[243] Noboru Noguchi, "Le Mouvement Non Gouvernemental pour l'UNESCO au Japon - La Naissance des Toutes Premières Associations UNESCO," *60 Ans*, 263; "An Appraisal of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)," 9 September 1953, Box 1619, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA; "United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization," *International Organization* (May 1949), 356; Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson, *UNESCO*, 340; Charles A. Thomson, "Notes from UNESCO House," 26 February 1954, Box 1620, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. For Japan's postwar role in the world, see John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999).
[244] Maulana Azad, "Presidential Address at the Indian National Commission for Co-Operation with Unesco," 9 January 1954, *Speeches*, 276.

educational and cultural cooperation could help them to "capture the public mind" and appeal directly to world public opinion. It could be a more powerful force in the world than the General Assembly or the Security Council.[245] The Indian National Commission made it clear that UNESCO's goals resonated with the Afro-Asian world. Later in the year, at the General Conference, delegates from Indonesia, Pakistan, and Egypt delivered speeches that mirrored the discussions at the New Delhi meeting.[246]

The Afro-Asian Movement caught the attention of the Secretariat. Luther Evans left for a month-long trip through Asia in early 1954 to develop new policies for the organization. Evans' delegation, according to an American diplomat in Paris, noted that "all Asians with whom they talked regard the UNESCO program as too Europe-centered." Another member of the Secretariat's delegation noted that "Asia regards the Programme as still too much of a Western affair."[247] They demanded more technical assistance and educational support in order to improve their economic development programs. Yet they also noted that "Asians want UNESCO to help make their own traditional cultures better known

[245] Charles A. Thomson, "Notes from UNESCO House," 22 January 1954, Box 1620, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA; Robert Trumbull, "UNESCO Favoring West, Indians Say," *New York Times* (10 January 1954); Maulana Azad, "Presidential Address at the Indian National Commission for Co-Operation with Unesco," 9 January 1954, *Speeches*, 279-80; Jawaharlal Nehru, "Unesco as a Liberating Force," 9 January 1954, *SWJN* 2: 24-II, 95.
[246] Husain Qureshi address to the General Conference; M. Sudjono address to the General Conference; Awad address to the General Conference, all in Records of the General Conference, Eighth Session, Sixth Plenary Meeting, 15 November 1954, 8 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC.
[247] Ronald Adam, "Report of a Tour in South-East Asia and the Far East by General Sir Ronald Adam," Jan/Feb 1954, FO 371/112596, UKNA.

to the West."[248] Evans agreed with much of the criticism and began to devote more attention towards Asian demands. Indian diplomat Humayin Kabir invited the organization to hold the 1956 General Conference in New Delhi and the proposal was quickly accepted.[249] The conference would be the biggest United Nations conference in Asia. New Delhi invested heavily in a new conference building that would make the city uniquely equipped to handle large international conferences.[250] Nehru was reportedly concerned about the financial costs but supported the honor.[251]

India developed several new proposals in preparation for the conference in late 1956. Indian National Commission leader Dr. N. Junankar made it clear that he wanted UNESCO to double its budget in the next year.[252] Indian policymakers also wanted the organization to expand its cultural programs in Asia. The 1947 Asian-Relations Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference revealed that the postcolonial world remained divided by different cultural, intellectual, and religious traditions. Third World nationalists supported mutual efforts to translate

[248] Charles A. Thomson, "Notes from UNESCO House," 26 February 1954, Box 1620, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[249] Humayin Kabir address to the General Conference, Records of the General Conference, Eighth Session, Seventh Plenary Meeting, 16 November 1954, 8 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC, 106; Verbatim Records, Plenary Meetings, Fifteenth Plenary Session, Records of the General Conference, Eighth Session, 7 December 1954, 8 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC, 189-194; Summary Records, Administrative Commission, Fifth Meeting, Records of the General Conference, Eighth Session, 16 November 1954, 8 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC, 535-537.
[250] "New Delhi Builds to House UNESCO," *New York Times* (7 October 1956); "India Constructs Special Conference Building" Radio Broadcast Transcript, *UNESCO World Review*, 17 September 1955, Herbert Steinhouse Fonds, Volume 5, LAC.
[251] "Note of a Meeting of the Committee held in the Small Ministerial Conference Room, House of Commons, S.W.1., on Friday, 20th July, 1956 at 3:00 p.m.," CAB 130/115, UKNA.
[252] High Commissioner for Canada (New Delhi) to Ottawa, "The Next UNESCO Conference: A Further Battle in the Soviet Campaign for Asia," 17 February 1956, 5582-AK-10-40, Volume 6998, LAC.

books and establish cultural exchange programs in order to strengthen regional ties. "The services of UNESCO should... be utilized for popularizing the culture of the East in the countries of the East," an editorial in the semi-official *Times of India* noted in 1956. "Asia as a political entity has gained a new meaning in the last ten years. It is time a beginning were made to make Asia a cultural entity as well."[253] Malcolm Adiseshiah confirmed that Indian policymakers prioritized cultural programs and Kirpal reported that ninety percent of the Indian National Commission's proposals related to cultural matters.[254] Indian and Asian demands therefore challenged Director General Luther Evans' strategy to lower the budget and focus on pragmatic technical issues.

Asian demands led the Secretariat to consider dramatic new program proposals in 1956. At the regional Conference of National Commissions for UNESCO in Asia, meeting in Tokyo, the Indian delegation proposed that the organization should develop a project for the "Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values." The proposal reflected the Indian National Commission's desire to spread "Eastern culture to the West as the West has exported its culture to us."[255] The Secretariat approved the recommendation and began to develop them as one of the "Major Projects" that would receive priority

[253] "East is East," *Times of India* (17 July 1956).
[254] Malcolm Adiseshiah memorandum to Directors of the Departments & Heads of Services and Bureaux, "Mission to Delhi," 21 February 1956, Folder 2, Box 1, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Malcolm Adiseshiah memorandum to Directors of the Departments & Heads of Services and Bureax, "India," 5 September 1955, Folder 1, Box 1, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Robert S. Smith, "Report on Activities at UNESCO House for the Period Ending August 15, 1952," 21 August 1952, Box 1614, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[255] Closing Session Records, Indian National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO, *Proceedings of the First Conference, January 9 to 14, 1954* (New Delhi: Ministry of Education, 1954), 55-56.

attention and resources. The project encompassed a broad spectrum of cultural activities, including student exchanges, multinational research projects, and traveling art exhibits.[256] These activities were intended to foster mutual respect and understanding between Asia and the West, but put greater emphasis on expanding Asian art and culture in the Western world. Prem Kirpal, who developed these projects in the Secretariat, argued that they could augment Asian countries' prestige in the modern world and reduce their sense of inferiority. "To Eastern countries it was psychologically of great importance in maintaining the principle of reciprocity in relationships," Kirpal argued: Europe exported science and technology, Asia exported art and philosophy.[257]

India's growing prestige in regional affairs and the approach of the General Conference in October 1956 caught the attention of Western diplomats and policymakers. Canadian diplomats first addressed the issue in January when High Commissioner Escott Meredith Reid noted New Delhi's interest in UNESCO. "India's feelings towards the West would be warmer if the West showed more interest in and respect for Indian culture," Reid cabled Ottawa. "The holding of the next UNESCO conference in New Delhi this year provides the West with an admirable opportunity to show this interest and respect."[258] Over the course of the spring and early summer, Reid encouraged Canadian and NATO

[256] Laura Elizabeth Wong, "Cultural Agency: UNESCO's Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, 1957-1966" (PhD. Diss: Harvard, 2006), 63.
[257] Prem Kirpal, "Arts and Internationalism," 161-162.
[258] High Commissioner for Canada in India (New Delhi) to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "A Western Counter-Offensive in India," 11 January 1956, Folder 205.1, Escott Meredith Reid fonds, Volume 8, LAC.

counterparts to strengthen the organization and increase the budget.[259] He also urged Ottawa to challenge American strategy and support the admission of the PRC as a member of UNESCO.[260] The Canadian Ministry of External Affairs was generally supportive of Reid's analysis.[261] Canadian High Commissioners in Indonesia and Ceylon agreed with Reid's analysis.[262] Although Canadian policymakers had dismissed UNESCO in recent years, India's regional leadership and Reid's reports from New Delhi convinced them to reassess and revise their policies towards the organization. Ottawa opposed efforts to increase the budget but agreed to support an expanded cultural program.[263]

London also reassessed British policy towards UNESCO. Over the previous ten years, the Foreign Office had little patience with the organization. It believed that British financial contributions had been a waste of money and occasionally considered withdrawing. London was concerned about Asian demands to increase UNESCO's budget.[264] India's "bid for intellectual and cultural leadership" in the region, however, forced it to develop a conciliatory

[259] High Commissioner for Canada (New Delhi) to Ottawa, "The Next UNESCO Conference: A Further Battle in the Soviet Campaign for Asia," 17 February 1956, 5582-AK-10-40, Volume 6998, LAC. See also Escott Reid to Jules Léger, 11 January 1956, 5582-AK-10-40, Volume 6998, LAC.
[260] For more on this plan, see: Escott Reid to Jules Léger, "Admission of Peking to UNESCO," 12 March 1956, and Escott Reid to Jules Léger, "China and the UNESCO Conference in New Delhi," 23 April 1956, both in File 205.1: "Mr. Escott Reid - Foreign Affairs: India: Selection of Correspondence with Ottawa 1952-1957," Department of External Affairs, Volume 8, LAC.
[261] S.D. Pierce to Escott Reid, 9 April 1956, 5582-AK-10-40, Volume 6998, LAC.
[262] Canadian Ambassador (Indonesia) to Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "The Forthcoming UNESCO Conference in New Delhi," 3 April 1956, and High Commissioner for Canada (Ceylon) to Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "Forthcoming UNESCO Conference in New Delhi," 16 May 1956, both in 5582-AK-10-40, Volume 6998, LAC.
[263] R.A.D. Ford to Information Division, "UNESCO General Conference, New Delhi," 3 May 1956, 5582-AK-10-40, Volume 6998, LAC.
[264] Dillon to DOS, 11 July 1956, Box 1557, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA; P.F. Grey, Brief for Mr. Dodds-Parker, 19 July 1956, FO 924/1153, UKNA.

response. One British policymaker noted that Britain might try to encourage Afro-Asian cultural and scientific unity through UNESCO as a way to distract them from more controversial political, military, and economic issues. London was also concerned about Commonwealth relations.[265] The Ministry of Education, which was responsible for developing policy towards UNESCO, assembled a roundtable meeting of Commonwealth powers in July to coordinate policies. They also invited Washington to send a representative. Education Minister David Eccles dominated the discussions. Representatives reconfirmed that the budget should be restricted but also agreed with the Canadians that they should support more cultural programs. The roundtable agreed to promote Asian proposals for the East-West Major Project. Eccles believed it would be the "Belle of the Ball" and urged the British to promote it actively in New Delhi as a means to strengthen ties with Asian members of the Commonwealth.[266] Indian, Pakistani, and Ceylonese representatives agreed with Eccles' assessment.[267] The British Cabinet, meeting a

[265] H. F. Bartlett Minute, 6 February 1954, FO 371/112596, UKNA; F.R. Cowell to H. F. Bartlett, 13 February 1954, FO 371/112596, UKNA; Note of a Meeting held in the Small Ministerial Conference Room, House of Common, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, 16th May, 1956 at 5:00 p.m.," CAB 130/115, UKNA.

[266] Dillon to DOS, 11 July 1956, Box 1557; Edward G. Trueblood, "Discussions Between Members US Delegation to 44th Meeting Executive Board UNESCO and Officials of United Kingdom," 17 July 1956, Box 1557; James F. Ralph, Jr. to DOS, "London Meeting on Proposed UNESCO East-West Project," 7 August 1956, Box 1558, all in CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.

[267] Meeting Notes, 10 July 1956, FO 924/1153, UKNA; Office of the High Commissioner for Canada (London) to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), 2 August 1956, 5582-AK-10-40, Volume 6998, LAC; "Note of a Meeting of the Committee held in the Small Ministerial Conference Room, House of Commons, S.W.1., on Friday, 20th July, 1956 at 3:00 p.m.," CAB 130/115, UKNA; Dillon to DOS, 11 July 1956, Box 1557, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.

month later, agreed that "UNESCO in the past had been largely a waste of money" but recognized that Asian activism had changed the situation.[268]

Washington developed similar policies in preparations for the General Conference. Indian activism surprised Charles A. Thomson, one of the State Department's senior public diplomacy officials. "UNESCO now faces a great opportunity or a great danger. If it can assume prompt, energetic and imaginative leadership to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of Asia and the Middle East, this development may be the beginning of a movement of great promise."[269] The New Delhi conference, State Department officials suggested, would be "the first international conference of this size to be held in India and is a fitting recognition of the significant role that country plays in the United Nations system." Washington should therefore "vigorously" support new cultural programs and especially the East-West Major Project.[270] American delegation members planned to entertain Indian officials, deliver lectures at Indian universities, and install cultural exhibits for visiting delegations.[271]

Anticolonial rhetoric dominated the New Delhi Conference as soon as it opened in November. Maulana Azad addressed the conference hall and

[268] "Conclusions of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Thursday, 2nd August, 1956, at 10 a.m.," CAB 128/30/281, UKNA.
[269] Charles A. Thomson, "Notes from UNESCO House," 22 January 1954, Box 1620, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[270] Frances O. Wilcox Address made before the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO in NY, "UNESCO and American Foreign Policy," 18 September 1956, *DSB* 584 (1 October 1956), 520. See also Athelstan Spilhaus to Carl W. McCardle, 5 January 1956, Box 1555, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.
[271] Report on Ninth General Conference, UNESCO, 15 January 1957, enclosed in Andrew H. Berding and Francis O. Wilcox memorandum, "Recommendation for S/P Study of United States Relations with UNESCO," 18 June 1957, Box 1561, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.

underlined its symbolic importance. By choosing New Delhi for the General Conference, UNESCO had recognized "the birth of a new and resurgent Asia," Azad declared. "[R]epresentatives of Europe and America are meeting Asians and Africans on terms of absolute equality to discuss the common problems of the world."[272] The Indian press, especially the influential *Times of India*, followed the proceedings and editorialized that the "conference in New Delhi will be significant only if it leads to an Asian-African orientation in its work."[273] Two of the most pivotal crises of the Cold War also undermined Western unity and strengthened New Delhi's hand. Moscow's decision to invade Hungary, following a month-long political crisis in Eastern Europe, distracted attention among foreign ministries and delegates. The British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt, however, dominated the conference's attention.[274] The military conflict rerouted air traffic and made it difficult for commercial air travel flying east towards New Delhi. Many European delegates had to abandon the General Conference altogether.[275] The Canadian High Commissioner complained that the Suez Crisis "served to widen the gap between the new Asian democracies and the democracies of the West" at the conference. The plenary debates "turned into a sort of West versus orient battle," one Secretariat member recalled.[276] Afro-Asian

[272] Maulana Azad, "Address at the Formal Opening of the 9th Session of the General Conference of Unesco," 5 November 1956, *Speeches*, 373.
[273] "UNESCO," *Times of India* (6 November 1956), 6.
[274] See for example Verbatim Records of the Seventeenth Plenary Meeting, Records of the General Conference, Ninth Session, 21 November 1956, 9 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC.
[275] "Interview Rex Keating," 10 March 1999, Oral History Collection, Box 2, AG 14, UA.
[276] New Delhi to Ottawa, "UNESCO: Azad Speech: Should Canada Rebut?," 7 November 1956, File 205.1: "Mr. Escott Reid - Foreign Affairs: India: Selection of Correspondence with

states blocked both Britain and France from gaining important commission chairmanships and both countries, the American delegate noted, went into "a position of eclipse" at the conference.[277]

This Third World unity led the General Conference to adopt an ambitious program. It approved the East-West project and emphasized "the special urgency of increasing among the peoples and nations of the Orient and the Occident a mutual appreciation of their respective cultural values" and recognition of the "radical changes which have recently taken place in the life of both Eastern and Western nations."[278] It passed a resolution to raise the budget over the objections of the Director General and assigned most of these additional funds to the three Major Projects, each of which benefitted postcolonial countries.[279]

The New Delhi General Conference was a major Afro-Asian victory. Regional journals and radio broadcasts, like Afghanistan's *Bakhtar News Bulletin*, hailed the new budget as a victory that would strengthen regional development programs.[280] The East-West cultural project "caught the imagination" of the

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Ottawa 1952-1957," Department of External Affairs, Volume 8, LAC; "Interview Rex Keating," 10 March 1999, Oral History Collection, Box 2, AG 14, UA.

[277] S. C. Allyn Memorandum, "Report on Ninth General Conference of UNESCO," 15 January 1957, Box 1561, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.

[278] Records of the General Conference, Resolutions, Ninth Session, 1956, 9 C/RESOLUTIONS, UNESDOC.

[279] Resolution 12.2, Records of the General Conference, Resolutions, Ninth Session, 1956, 9 C/RESOLUTIONS; "Proposed Programme and Budget for 1957-1958: Corrigendum 3," 21 November 1956, 9C/5, both in UNESDOC. For the Three Major Projects, see addresses by the Japanese and Pakistani delegations, both in Verbatim Records of the Fourteenth Plenary Meeting, Records of the General Conference, Ninth Session, 13 November 1956, 9 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC.

[280] *Bakhtar News Bulletin* II, no. 157 (15 December 1956), enclosed in Kabul to DOS, 12 January 1957, Box 1560, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.

conference and promised to be of "paramount importance to the whole world."[281] London and Washington were unsatisfied with the General Conference's "adolescent" and "very irresponsible decision to increase the size of the budget."[282] American policymakers, however, began to focus more attention on the organization in order to improve their relations with Third World countries. "I think it is time we turned east toward Asia to listen and to learn," Under-Secretary of State Christian Herter remarked. The American delegation leader agreed that the organization was a "unique instrument for making friends" in the postcolonial world.[283] The New Delhi General Conference therefore reoriented the organization towards Third World priorities. C. E. Beeby, New Zealand's delegate to the conference and the Secretariat's former Education Department Director, argued that Afro-Asian unity at the General Conference had shifted the "balance of power" within the organization.[284]

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[281] Report of the Programme Commission, Records of the General Conference, Resolutions, Ninth Session, 1956, 9 C/RESOLUTIONS, UNESDOC, 89.
[282] Ben Bowen Thomas address, Verbatim Records of the Fourteenth Plenary Meeting, Records of the General Conference, Ninth Session, 13 November 1956, 9 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC, 189; Memorandum by the Minister of Education, "Ministerial Responsibility for UNESCO Affairs," 11 September 1957, CAB 129/88/48, UKNA.
[283] Stanley C. Allyn, "Ninth Session of UNESCO General Conference," *DOSB* 916 (14 January 1957); Christian Herter, "New Dimensions in Diplomacy," *DOSB* 961 (25 November 1957), 833; S. C. Allyn, "Report on Ninth General Conference of UNESCO," 15 January 1957, Box 1561, CFP1955-1959, RG 59, NARA.
[284] C. E. Beeby, "Policy on UNESCO," 4 April 1957, Folder: "Conferences - General 1957-1959," MG 28, I 97, Volume 4, LAC.

The south end of the Champ de Mars, opposite the Eiffel Tower, was hectic on 3 November 1958. UNESCO headquarters moved from its temporary home at the Hotel Majestic to its new location along Place de Fontenoy in Paris. The new, seven-story building's modernist architecture – developed by architects from Italy, France, and the United States and decorated by famous artists from nine countries – was heralded as "a landmark of modern international art and architecture in the heart of Paris."[285] Luther Evans opened the ceremony. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, now Indian Vice-President, officially "received the building" from the Director General in the name of the General Conference and delivered a speech – citing European philosophers and sanskrit verse – dedicated to the unity of the world.[286] Inside, new generations of international civil servants made the building their home. The sprawling concrete building lacked the Hotel Majestic's intimacy but created new opportunities for international cooperation. Staff members had breakfast in Japanese gardens, shopped at a co-op in the basement, relaxed and read in big arm chairs in the rest area, and ate lunch in the seventh floor cafeteria, where diplomats and intellectuals from around the world

[285] "Inaugural Ceremony of New UNESCO Headquarters," 3 November 1958, Folder 2, Box 2986, X07.354 A 066, AG 8, UA; Christopher E. M. Pearson, "Des Oeuvres Ambiguës et Subversives," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*; Gerard Bolla, "L'UNESCO a toujours été Notre Maison," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 108.
[286] "Inauguration Ceremony, 3 November 1958," attached to Mr. Farr Memorandum to Mr. Thomas, "Inauguration Ceremony Speeches," 17 July 1958, Folder 2, Box 2986, X07.354 A 066, AG 8, UA.

mingled and discussed current world problems, while looking down on the Champ de Mars and the Eiffel Tower.[287]

The organization's formative early years at the Hotel Majestic established the trajectory it would follow over the next three decades. The principle of national sovereignty and the organization's meager budget constrained its ambitions but focused attention on the role of ideas in world politics. The Secretariat would in future years exchange technical information, inspire states to adopt certain policies, and become an authority on controversial issues of interest to the international community. The United States meanwhile helped to make it one of the centers of the international communications system and a champion of the free flow of information principle. The decline of Europe's colonial empires and the birth of new states transformed the organization into one of the centers of dialogue between North America and Europe on the one hand, and Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America on the other.

Cultural projects dominated the organization's first generation at the Hotel Majestic. The East-West Major Project symbolized the desire to deconstruct the imperial world order and its standard of civilization. The project, Secretariat officials later argued, "provided excellent opportunities for East-West rapprochement." For Malcolm Adiseshiah, it was the organization's attempt to "consolidate a new world order" in which Asia, Africa, and the Middle East

[287] Krystyna Chlebowska, "Une Demeure Accueillante, Aimable et Lumineuse," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens,* 160.

would stand alongside the Western world as equals.[288] Yet the Secretariat's efforts to organize a cultural rapprochement between the decolonizing world and the West proved difficult. Thousands of scholars, artists, and intellectuals from around the world corresponded and cooperated but struggled to reach a mass audience.[289] The strains of cultural cooperation on a global level was most pronounced in one cultural project – the campaign to write a world history of mankind.

[288] "Appraisal of the Major Project on Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, 1957-1966," 1968, SHC.68/D.40/A, UNESDOC, 22; Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Address Given at the Academy of Sciences of Serbia, "The Art of the Impossible: Unesco's Fight for Cultural Understanding," 7 November 1967, Folder 66, Box 19, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[289] "Appraisal of the Major Project on Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, 1957-1966," 82.

Chapter 2: The International Politics of World History

> [A] set of ideas about the past... lives in our minds;
> colors our minds; moves our minds; and helps to determine
> the way in which we think and act on the current issues of the present.
> The past still lives, and not only lives but acts. It has hands and feet.
> It grasps us with its hands and hurries us along in the path of its feet.
>
> Ernest Barker, 1945[290]

The first decade of the postwar era was a time of both geopolitical conflict and cultural competition. The great powers mobilized intellectuals and academics to project their values and political beliefs into the rest of the world. Washington bankrolled the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an organization which supported intellectual freedom and liberal institutions. Moscow meanwhile secretly backed the World Peace Council to portray communist governments as peace-loving champions of both economic equality and international justice. Intellectuals and artists around the world flocked to these organizations and established connections with like-minded individuals in other countries. Both organizations, however, advanced binary interpretations of the world, pushed thinkers to declare their political loyalties, and stifled intellectual independence.[291]

[290] Ernest Barker, "The Historian, Too, Must Stand Trial," *New York Times Magazine* (9 December 1945), 9.
[291] For the Congress on Cultural Freedom, see Arthur Koestler, "Manifesto of the Congress for Cultural Freedom," 1950, Jussi M. Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 416-418; Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed*

The Cultural Cold War infected not just artists and intellectuals but also academic institutions. The Central Intelligence Agency financed area studies programs in American universities to prepare policymakers and popular opinion for the challenges of new security commitments. The State Department also encouraged student exchange programs with Europe and Asia in order to win allies among educated elites abroad.[292] These efforts culminated in the establishment of the East-West Center in 1960. The University of Hawaii, which had already held international academic gatherings such as an East-West Philosophers' Conference and an Afro-Asian Student Leaders' Conference, set up the center with congressional support as a meeting ground for scholars and students from the United States and Asia. The organization trained students to navigate a more multicultural world in which postcolonial states would play a more active role. One of the center's intellectual architects argued that it would be good training for American diplomats: "We'll be furnishing ambassadors to all the East one day. We breed a kind of kid who is multiracial and multilingual."[293] The ideal Asian candidates were those who looked like they might lead their

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American Culture Since World War II (New York: Basic Books, 1997), chapter 3. For the World Peace Council, see Lawrence S. Wittner, *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

[292] Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2007), 116; Paul Kramer, "Is the World Our Campus? International Students and U.S. Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 5 (2009), 775-806.

[293] John Stalker as cited in Horace Sutton, "Where the Twain *Will* Meet," *Saturday Review* (12 November 1960).

countries in the future. The center therefore helped to train anti-communist leaders in Asia.[294]

The Soviet Union meanwhile appealed to anticolonial sentiments throughout the Third World. Intellectuals from national liberation movements in South-East Asia, for example, attended World Peace Council congresses, pressed for national independence, and demanded respect for their cultural traditions. WPC President Frederic Joliot-Curie declared his support for "mutual knowledge of each other's civilizations and cultures."[295] Moscow expanded the Academy of Sciences to create an Institute of Africa, Institute of Latin America, and Institute of World Economy and International Relations.[296] The Soviets also began to champion Third World interests in international academic conferences. Senior Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan, for example, addressed an International Congress of Orientalists in 1960 and upheld the Soviet Union as the champion of Third World scholarship. "Russian scholars... could now purge this orientalism of its Western-colonialist corruption," a Canadian scholar who attended this Conference noted. "And, having purified it, they would now hand it over to the peoples of the Orient itself.... the point was being constantly made that 'we

[294] Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 244.
[295] World Peace Council, *Congress of the Peoples for Peace, Vienna, December 12th-19th, 1952* (Vienna: Congress Secretariat, 1952), 25.
[296] Jeremy Friedman, "Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s," *Cold War History* 10, no. 2 (2009), 247-272; Timothy Nunan, *Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 19-45.

Russian scholars' are transforming orientalism to deliver it purged into the hands of the resurgent East."[297]

Cultural and intellectual projects also dominated the intellectual branch of the United Nations. Indian delegates insured that these projects would focus on the challenges of a multicultural world order and Asia's resurgence after centuries of European colonial rule and intellectual domination. The Major Project on Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values was officially devoted to promoting understanding between Western and Asian peoples. At meetings, however, it was agreed that "emphasis should be placed on promoting the flow from the Orient to the Occident."[298] The Secretariat promoted research programs, student exchange programs, scholarly seminars, and the publication of books for the general public. The project brought together scholars and intellectuals from around the world to discuss ideas and share research. It was better, however, at facilitating cooperation between professionals than with educating the general public. Third World states had won the diplomatic struggle to shape UNESCO's agenda but failed to reshape men's minds.[299]

This chapter focuses on the organization's most ambitious cultural program – the series of campaigns to write and revise history textbooks. Between the end of the Second World War and the early 1960s, UNESCO sponsored a

[297] Wilfred Cantwell Smith Report to the Canada Council, "Twenty-Fifth International Congress of Orientalists," n. d., File: "XXVth Int'l Congress of Orientalists, 1960," R2781-0-7-E, Volume 17, LAC.
[298] Annex I, "Summary Report of the Discussion at the Session on Monday," 1 April 1957," 2 April 1957, MAPA/1 AC/SR.1, UNESDOC.
[299] *Appraisal of the Major Project on Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, 1957-1966* (Paris: UNESCO, 1968).

series of international projects to address the role of history in international peace and understanding. This chapter begins by exploring how activists initially focused on revising biased school textbooks that perpetuated international tensions across generations. They believed that scholars could help to resolve age-old conflicts that had destabilized diplomatic attempts to strengthen the foundations of peace. The next three sections focus on the evolution of the History of Mankind project between 1950 and 1963. The project, a landmark attempt to write a multivolume and comprehensive overview of human history, was not an abstract academic enterprise. Contemporary international developments, the Cold War and the decolonization of Europe's empires above all, profoundly shaped its development. The organization proposed that world history could foster respect between different cultures and improve international peace and understanding. Collective security, the Secretariat believed, was dependent on developing collective memory. However, some academics, especially from the Indian subcontinent, believed that historical scholarship was an important battlefield in the struggle for the postcolonial world.

The Historian, Too, Must Stand Trial

International organizations and political movements brushed up on their history in the interwar years. In Europe, peace movements criticized nineteenth-century depictions of the past. The emergence of the modern historical profession had coincided with the rise of modern nation-states. Historians searched for the

roots of the national community in ancient kingdoms, legal codes, and folk traditions. They helped national governments to gain popular loyalty, teach citizens about their rights and duties, and create a sense of common heritage. German Chancellor Otto van Bismarck even credited historians as the true founding fathers of the unified nation.[300] The First World War, however, inspired pacifists to cast blame on teachers and schools for fomenting war and conflict. "Burn the books which teach hatred, burn them all," French intellectual Anatole France declared at the Congress of French Elementary School Teachers at Tours in 1919. Hundreds of new international organizations emerged after the war and most of the major new pacifist organizations established programs to review textbooks. The League of Nations established a series of history conferences in order to foster the "interdependence of nations." French and German teachers promised to provide balanced information about the causes of the war and denied German war guilt. The Committee on Intellectual Cooperation also established procedures to process and investigate complaints about textbooks in foreign countries.[301]

[300] C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914* (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 208-211; Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (London: Pimlico, 1996), 815; William R. Keylor, *Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 92.

[301] *A Handbook for the Improvement of Textbooks* (Paris: UNESCO, 1949), 19; Anatole France as cited in *A Handbook for the Improvement of Textbooks*, 11; "'War Guilt' in France and Germany: Resolutions Adopted by a Committee of French and German Historians for the Improvement of Textbooks in Both Countries," *American Historical Association* (1938), 321. For the proliferation of international organization after the First World War, see Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 9-37.

American educators also believed that history could reshape international politics. They focused in particular on the history textbook's potential to improve regional politics and diplomacy. Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Latin America – the Good Neighbor policy – led to the withdrawal of American military forces from the region and the introduction of new cultural programs to foster closer relations. The wartime Office for Inter-American Affairs financed projects to review and revise American textbooks' treatment of Latin America. American private organizations also contributed to the stabilization of Europe. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the country's leading internationalist foundation, sponsored its own series of textbook conferences in Europe.[302] The American historical community also began to take an active interest in international politics. University of Chicago historian Louis Gottschalk, for example, was particularly vocal about the role that history should play in contemporary strategy and politics. He joined a secret committee of historians who worked for the Air Force during the Second World War. His job was to study Central European history in order to predict future German reactions to strategic bombing.[303] Yet Gottschalk also believed that history could stabilize a new international order. Peacemakers must learn the "lessons" of the past and use

[302] *A Handbook for the Improvement of Textbooks and Teaching Materials as Aids to International Understanding*, 25, 39-41. For the Good Neighbor Policy, see George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 497.
[303] War Department Bureau of Public Relations Press Release, "Commendations Awarded AAF Historians' Committee," 7 June 1946, Folder 4, Box 14, Louis Gottschalk Papers, UCL.

"historical analogies" to plan for peace in the future. Schools must avoid teaching their students "historical legends" that inflame hatred towards other peoples.[304]

The colonial world raised its voice about the deficiencies of nineteenth-century historians. Europeans had extended their influence over local schools in their colonies. These schools taught European cultural traditions and history and reinforced cultural and civilizational hierarchies. They taught little about the pre-colonial accomplishments and traditions of colonized peoples. Middle-Eastern and Asian societies were stuck in an earlier stage of historical development. Africans were "people without history."[305] Anticolonial movements across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East began to reclaim their history in the early twentieth century. Muslim scholars responded to European orientalists with their own accounts of Islam's progressive influence over the past millennium.[306] Indian nationalists rediscovered their pre-colonial histories and achievements. The Greater India school of historians traced Hindu cultural expansion throughout the region and the common ties that bound Asia together. Jawaharlal Nehru spent much of the Second World War in a British colonial jail, writing about Indian and

[304] Louis Gottschalk, "Lessons of Modern History for World Peace," *Approaches to World Peace*, fourth symposium, Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, Robert M. Maciver, eds. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944); Louis Gottschalk, "The Evaluation of Historical Writing," 1940, Folder 9, Box 22, Louis Gottschalk Papers, UCL. For an example of how Gottschalk used history to illuminate policy debates, see his comments in Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems, "Minutes of Meeting of July 7, 1943," Folder 4, Box 12, Louis Gottschalk Papers, UCL.
[305] David B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance*, 299, 332-339; Vanessa Ogle, *The Global Transformation of Time*, 5-7.
[306] Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*.

world history.[307] Africans, too, wanted to recover and reassert their history. A group of Nigerian students that petitioned the San Francisco Conference in 1945 demanded that the UN Charter promote the revision of American textbooks and their depiction of African history.[308]

UNESCO revived efforts to reform school history textbooks after the war but initially focused on Germany and the legacies of fascism. The Conference of Allied Ministers of Education established a History Committee to discuss the postwar revision of history textbooks. British political scientist Ernest Barker headed an editorial board assigned to research and write an international textbook on European history.[309] In December 1945, when the Allied Powers put war criminals on trial in Nuremberg, Barker argued that "the historian, too, must stand trial." Postwar peace and stability among states had to rest on a peaceful mentality forged in the world's classrooms: "The voter of the future is largely made in the schools of the present, and he is very particularly made by the teaching of history in the schools." Around the same time, educational authorities reported to CAME that the revision of German history textbooks could kill the "germs of Nazi political and racial theories" that had settled over the continent "like a cloud of

[307] Kris Manjapra, *Age of Entanglement*, 195-199; Brij Tankha, "The Greater India Society: Indian Culture and Asian Federation," *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, 1920-Present*, Sven Saaler and Chrispher W. A. Szpilman, eds. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 94-94; Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New Delhi, Oxford, 1982 [1946]).
[308] Marika Sherwood, "'There is No New Deal for the Blackman in San Francisco,'" 89.
[309] Ernest Barker, George Clark, and P. Vaucher, eds., *The European Inheritance*, Volume 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), v-vii. See also James P. Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics*, 38.

poison gas..."[310] Secretariat staff members and Executive Board members discussed the importance of history, conducted research in Germany, and consulted occupation authorities.[311] The Secretariat, however, quickly broadened its focus and proposed to revise textbooks throughout Europe. "Nazi textbooks probably represent the extreme limit of a process that goes on to a greater or lesser degree in the textbooks of most countries," the head of Educational Division argued. Torres Bodet agreed that the revision of history textbooks in Germany should be "an example to the whole world."[312]

The Secretariat therefore revived the interwar textbook conferences. It planned two of the most important textbook revision conferences in Brussels in 1950 and in Sèvres a year later. They established a common agenda, developed common ideals, and shaped debates about international textbook revision. Participants recognized that school textbooks were pillars of international peace and security. They were "seed-plots of international understanding which will help man to adapt to the swiftly changing circumstances of life in the world today," Torres Bodet declared. Yet participants also recognized the importance of patriotism and pride in national cultures and historical achievements. Members of the Brussels conference agreed that nationalism was compatible with

[310] Ernest Barker, "The Historian, Too, Must Stand Trial," 45; CAME, "Commission of Enquiry on Special Educational Problems in the Liberated Countries," January 1946, 5582-40, Volume 3234, LAC.
[311] See for example, Summary Report of the Executive Board, Third Meeting, Seventh Session, 3 April 1948, 7 EX/SR.1-4, UNESDOC; C. E. Beeby to Deputy Director-General, "Textbooks: Visit to Germany," 3 June 1948, Box 290, 371.671, AG 8, UA; Summary Report of the Executive Board, Second Meeting, Seventh Session, 2 April 1948, 7 EX/SR.1-4, UNESDOC.
[312] C. E. Beeby to Deputy Director-General, "Textbooks: Visit to Germany," 3 June 1948, Box 290, 371.671, AG 8, UA; Jaime Torres Bodet statement in Summary Report of the Executive Board, Second Meeting, Seventh Session, 2 April 1948, 7 EX/SR.1-4, UNESDOC.

internationalist sympathies – many argued that nationalism and internationalism were mutually reinforcing. "[T]he history of any nation," one British educator argued, "makes sense only if we understand the contributions made to it by men and ideas from outside its frontiers."[313] The conferences also urged school teachers to deemphasize military history, which typically used international conflict to enhance the prestige of the nation-state. History textbooks should instead focus on culture and science, which transcend "national divisions and [are] a universe where human beings meet and commune."[314] The Secretariat produced and distributed information to help textbook writers around the world develop better sources for their students. One widely distributed handbook in 1950 distinguished between nineteenth- and early twentieth-century history textbooks – which were used for "training future citizens to assume their roles as conscripts or empire builders" – and future history textbooks, which should teach children to "view the past from an international standpoint."[315]

The Secretariat also commissioned important academics. Lucien Febvre, one of the giants of French academia, had spent decades trying to internationalize the study of history. He had in 1929 helped to found the Annales school, which emphasized long-term historical change and downplayed political and military themes in favor of social and economic issues. The traditional focus on "political

[313] "Report of the United States Delegates to the Brussels Seminar on the Improvement of Textbooks Especially History Textbooks," n.d. [11 September 1950], Box 1605, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.; C. P. Hill, *Suggestions on the Teaching of History* (Paris: UNESCO, 1953), 54.
[314] J. A. Lauweys, *History Textbooks and International Understanding* (Paris: UNESCO, 1953), 35.
[315] Marie Thérèse Maurette, *Some Suggestions on the Teaching of History* (UNESCO: Paris, 1950).

conflicts resolved by wars," long-scorned by the Annales school, had "mutilated history" and undermined international stability. Febvre developed an alternative model, "addressed to French schoolchildren," which stressed France's "hybrid" identity and connections with the wider world. French nationalism and pride in the national *patrie* were compatible with acceptance and appreciation for the global forces and transnational currents that shaped its historical development. They adapted the Annales school methodology for the cause of international cooperation. Agricultural production and the natural world, commerce and international trade, cultural diffusion and migration all shaped France's evolution. Febvre believed that other countries should write their own national history textbooks by following his effort "to explain in concrete terms to the pupils of primary and secondary schools how much their country owes to the rest of the world." The Secretariat was pleased with Febvre's essay and distributed it to member states in 1951.[316]

International events also facilitated the organization's efforts to encourage textbook diplomacy. By 1949, Cold War tensions had led the Western allies to reintegrate West Germany into anti-Soviet institutions. Under American guidance, France and Germany began to integrate their economies and military resources through the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community.[317] Politicians and intellectuals promoted plans to deepen Franco-

[316] Lucien Febvre and Francois Crouzet, "International Origins of a National Culture: Experimental Materials for a History of France," 28 December 1951, ED/TB/10, UNESDOC. On the Annales School, see Norman Davies, *Europe*, 955-956.
[317] Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*.

German cooperation. "We are persuaded that Germany and France have a past and a civilization which are inseparable and both possess the elements necessary for a fruitful working together," a French occupation zone official in West Germany argued.[318] West German Federal President Theodore Heuss also recognized that the "way history is presented is closely bound up with politics." He encouraged UNESCO to help recover common Franco-German historical traditions in a way comparable to the way diplomats were pooling their economies and militaries.[319] The organization nominated the American educator Richard Perdew to facilitate contacts between French and German historians. He consulted frequently with German historian Georg Eckert and French academic Edward Bruley to discuss textbook revisions and Franco-German cooperation. Discussions focused on the history of Franco-German peace treaties over the previous thousand years. Both depicted Franco-German history as European history and encouraged research on peace movements and international organizations. The organization therefore stimulated Franco-German historical rapprochement.[320]

The organization's textbook programs confronted a series of challenges in the 1950s. Critics charged that rewriting textbooks to reflect internationalist ideals

[318] Irene Giron, Report at the Second National Conference, n.d. [probably March 1950], Box 5250, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[319] Theodore Heuss, "Unesco Can Help to Check Militarism, Says German Federal President," *Unesco Courier* (March 1952), 6. For Heuss' role in contemporary debates about history and memory, see Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
[320] Romain Faure, "Connections in the History of Textbook Revision, 1947-1952," *Education Inquiry* 2 (March 2011).

merely substituted one form of propaganda with another. American critics were particularly worried that the United Nations would impose standardized textbooks on classrooms and promote world government.[321] "We are not trying to establish, still less to impose, uniform textbooks for all the world," Torres Bodet responded as early as 1949. "We acknowledge and respect the diversity of national conditions and traditions."[322] Luther Evans, more concerned with technical aid projects, ended the textbook revision program after he was elected Director General. The conferences, however, left an enduring legacy. One participant who returned from a textbook seminar remarked that their discussions became "a temporary international community in which the members live in close contact with the problems of different languages, national attitudes and cultural habits. Personal friendships which are formed become lasting." A "multilateral network is being built up," one report remarked.[323] The Brussels conference developed plans to regularly exchange national textbooks so that colleagues in neighboring countries could comment on their interpretations. Georg Eckert and Edward Bruley later went on to direct the cultural activities of the Council of Europe. The

[321] "Isolation sensed in War on UNESCO," *New York Times* (4 October 1952); Malcolm Adiseshiah to René Maheu, 5 March 1956, Folder 40, Box 12, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[322] Jaime Torres-Bodet, "The Mission of UNESCO," *Unesco Courier* (March 1949), 10.
[323] *Better History Textbooks* (Paris: UNESCO, 1951), 5; "Report on the Present State of Bilateral Consultations for the Improvement of History Textbooks," 21 December 1952, WS/112.100, UNESDOC.

organization's role in the textbook business faded but left a lasting legacy on textbook reformers in Europe.[324]

World History Must be De-Europeanized

Meanwhile, other Secretariat officials set their sights on a more global perspective. During the war, American policy planners like Grayson Kefauver proposed that world history classes could provide the long-term foundations for peace.[325] Julian Huxley's unofficial 1946 manifesto proposed that world history could foster "the emergence of a single world culture." The Director General discussed ideas with his friend and colleague Joseph Needham. Both believed that a history of human cultural cooperation could bind people together. They talked about the idea in London and Paris and a global history project began to take shape in 1947.[326] The second General Conference instructed Huxley to prepare a large history project that would provide the general and specialist reader with "a wider understanding of the scientific and cultural aspects of the history of mankind." A team of experts produced a preliminary report in 1949 that endorsed plans to make world history "an instrument of greatly widened, universal, and

[324] "Recommendations made by the Brussels Seminar on the Improvement of Textbooks, Particularly History Textbooks,"enclosed in Jaime Torres Bodet Circular Letter, n.d. [1950], Box 290, 371.671, AG 8, UA; Romain Faure, "Connections in the History of Textbook Revision," 30.
[325] Grayson N. Kefauver, "Education an Important Factor in Achieving an Enduring Peace," *Approaches to World Peace*, fourth symposium, edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, Robert M. Maciver (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), 346.
[326] Julian Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Philosophy*, 72; Poul Duedhal, "The Mental Decolonization: UNESCO, Globalization and Pedagogy, 1945-65," Aalborg University Forskningsportal, available online: http://vbn.aau.dk/files/61248571/The_Mental_Decolonization_Paper_Poul_Duedahl.pdf.

sympathetic knowledge of the world as a whole."[327] Three years later the fifth General Conference authorized Director General Torres Bodet to create an International Commission for a Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind.

Third World intellectuals also supported Huxley's proposals. In the Executive Board, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan "pleaded" for the organization to dedicate itself to a "universal" history that demonstrated Indian, Chinese, and Islamic contributions to the modern world.[328] Maulana Azad approved the project and endorsed attempts to "recast the teaching of history to bring out the unity of man."[329] Indian intellectuals brought up the issue of history and textbooks in relations between Asia and the West at the 1951 New Delhi Education Conference. Secretariat officials responded that the History of Mankind project would address their concerns.[330] Asian academics attended the postwar textbook conferences and shared their interest in the historical foundations of international peace but complained that discussions neglected the world beyond Europe. Muslim educators and academics surprised their colleagues when they

[327] "Report of Prof. Lucien Febvre to the International Council for Philosophy and Social Sciences," May 1949, *Journal of World History* 1 (1954), 956-957.
[328] Summary Report of the Executive Board, Sixth Meeting, Second Session, 12 April 1947, CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC.
[329] Maulana Azad, "Speech at the Inauguration of the National Commission of Unesco," 9 April 1949, *Speeches*, 91; Maulana Azad, "Speech of Welcome at the Second Session of the Indian National Commission for Co-operation with Unesco, New Delhi," 24 March 1951, *Speeches*, 152. See also "Atom Bomb Symbol of Our Age, Says Mr. Nehru," *Times of India* (25 March 1951), Box 1609, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA; Maulana Azad, "Speech Delivered at the Unesco Conference in Paris, June 1951, *Speeches*, 157.
[330] Jacques Havet to Charles A. Thompson, 4 March 1952, "Philosophical Round Table - India 1951," Box 100, 14 A 064 (540) "51", AG 8, UA; Humayun Kabir remarks in "Proceedings of the Fourth Session of the Delegates to the Symposium of the 'Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in the East and the West,'" 17 December 1951; "Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the Delegates to the Symposium of the 'Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in the East and the West,'" 18 December 1951, both in "Philosophical Round Table - India 1951," Box 100, 14 A 064 (540) "51", AG 8, UA.

complained that North American and European textbooks "were not sympathetic to Islam" and laid dozens of examples before their Christian counterparts. Their textbooks treated the Muslim world as warlike, intolerant, and backwards. They ignored the "ideals of which Muslims are justly proud" – religious toleration, science and technology, social welfare – and slighted Islamic contributions to Western civilization. The meeting concluded that "World history needs to be de-europeanized."[331]

The commission began to chart an intellectual course for the history project in 1950. A small committee of experts met on 14 October to choose names for the Permanent Commission and voted unanimously to appoint Yale University historian Ralph E. Turner as its Editorial Chairman. Turner became the project's "moving spirit," the "king-pin" who saw the project as a whole.[332] His longtime personal and professional interest in cultural relations between Asia and the Western world made him the ideal candidate to direct it. The Iowa historian's first book was a kaleidoscopic biography of the early nineteenth-century British journalist James Silk Buckingham. Turner cast his subject as "a student of [foreign] cultures" and traced his journeys throughout Asia, encounters with Indian intellectuals, and attacks on the East Indian Company. The book's focus on Buckingham's "world outlook" and commitment to "colonial self-government"

[331] Meeting of Experts on the Teaching of History, "Summary statement of comments made on the first version of the pamphlet 'Some Suggestions on the Teaching of History,'" 27 October 1950, ED/IU/History/2, UNESDOC, 6; J. A. Lauweys, *History Textbooks and International Understanding*, 31-33; *Better History Textbooks*, 5.
[332] Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL; Charles A. Thomson, "Report of Activities at UNESCO House for the Period ending March 23, 1951," 30 March 1951, Box 1608, CFP 1949-1954, RG 59, NARA.

and "world peace" anticipated his later interest in the United Nations.[333] Turner's study of history shaped his belief in progress – the accumulation of knowledge and the development of science had over centuries shaped man's social and political order.[334] Turner also argued that historians do not reside in ivory towers. "History is the natural propaganda of a social order," he believed. "It may be fairly argued that the capture of the past in a view of history is a primary means of seizing power in the present."[335]

Turner's ideas about history and the colonial world influenced his diplomatic career. The State Department hired him in 1942 to work in the new Cultural Division. He served in the American delegation to London that helped to transform the Council of Allied Ministers of Education into UNESCO.[336] Turner headed the new research division and explored the history of cultural exchange and its potential role in international relations. Turner concluded that an American cultural exchange program would strengthen the country's diplomatic agenda.[337] He became convinced that the global circulation of people and ideas was the

[333] Ralph E. Turner, *James Silk Buckingham, 1786-1855: A Social Biography* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934), 11.
[334] Richard Strauss, "Turner and World Cultural History," *Yale Daily News* (3 May 1956); Ralph E. Turner to Armando Cortesao, 25 September 1950, Folder 2.627 (1), Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Ralph E. Turner, "European Civilization and the Study and Teaching of American Civilization," May 1952, Folder 5, Box 17, Louis Gottschalk Papers, UCL.
[335] Ralph E. Turner, *The Great Cultural Traditions*, volume 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941), vii; Ralph E. Turner, "Mankind from a New Summit: Writing History with a Global Slant," *Saturday Review* (5 April 1952), 9.
[336] Jan Opocensky, "The Beginnings of UNESCO, 1942-1945" (unpublished manuscript), 1950, UNESDOC. See also Ralph E. Turner and Hope Sewell French, "Conference of Allied Ministers of Education," *DOSB* 11 (19 November 1944): 602.
[337] Frank Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, 52-53, 66-72; Ralph E. Turner address to the American Russian Institute, "American Russian Cultural Relations," 19 October 1944, *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union* (November 1944), 114.

primary cause of historical change in the modern world. Intercultural exchanges fostered democracy by expanding people's ability to communicate and compare their lives with others. European empires created global networks of people that created opportunities for colonial peoples to travel between local communities and European capitals. This "world-wide social and cultural interaction" would ultimately "carry all peoples, imperial and colonial alike, to a democratic world order," he believed.[338]

Turner sought to create dialogue between the historical profession and international politics. He began to teach cultural history at Yale university in the fall of 1944 and quickly became the department's star historian.[339] Turner consistently criticized the country's Cold War foreign policy and urged Washington to focus on multilateral institutions like the UN and support transnational exchange programs. He emphasized that decolonization and the rise of Asia and the Middle East, not Soviet-American rivalry, was the defining challenge of the postwar world.[340] With financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation, he spent a year in 1949 traveling through Asia to explore "emergent forms of common world life" in the region. He met with local intellectuals and political leaders and developed his own "world outlook." The trip exposed Turner

[338] Ralph E. Turner, "The Modern Imperial Process: The Present Phase and its Significance," *Journal of Negro Education*, special issue: "The Problem of Education in Dependent Territories" 15 (Summer 1946), 284. See also Turner's comments in Summary Report of the Meeting of the Editorial Board, Eleventh Session, 14 February 1952, ICSCH/Doc. no. 11, UNESDOC.
[339] "Ralph E. Turner Appointed Yale History Professor," *Yale News Digest* 2 (7 July 1944). On Turner's popularity at Yale, see Jeffrey F. Thomas, "Ralph Turner: Agriculture and World Culture," *Yale Daily News* (21 November 1958); William F. Buckley, Jr., *God and Man at Yale* (Chicago: Regnery, 1951).
[340] "Professors Speak at UWF Meeting," *Yale Daily News* 95 (10 February 1949); "Northrop and Turner Take 'Issue' on Foreign Policy," *Yale Daily News* 30 (October 1946).

to the anticolonial movements that were tearing the European Empires apart. He recognized that these movements were committed to more than political independence and economic development – they were also determined "to retain their historic cultures. Cultural nationalism is rampant among them."[341] He developed a network of Asian and Middle-Eastern intellectuals with whom he collaborated and corresponded.[342] Turner's trip also brought him to the attention of the Secretariat in Paris. When Huxley was looking to staff the History of Mankind project, the Rockefeller Foundation recommended Turner and cited his extensive travel experiences and intellectual interests. Turner's ideas excited Huxley, who nominated him to head the project and ensured his election in October 1950.[343]

Turner's first task was to develop a general plan to serve as the project's roadmap. He developed an interpretation of human history that encompassed every continent and spanned thousands of years. Like Huxley, Turner thought "the purpose of a history of mankind is to give to everyone a new view of their future by making them understand their past." World history should predict a "hope-filled future" and "provide a faith to live by, not to die by."[344] Turner,

[341] "Turner to Study Foreign Culture," *Yale Daily News* (23 March 1949); Ralph E. Turner, "The Nature of the Crisis," *Saturday Review* (4 August 1951), 17. See also, "Turner Declares Disease Causes Asian Problems," *Yale Daily News* (19 October 1950).
[342] Ralph E. Turner to Luther Evans, 29 December 1950, Folder 2.627 (1), Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Ralph E. Turner to N. S. Sidhanta; Ralph E. Turner to Zakir Hussein; Ralph E. Turner to Humayun Kabir, all dated 11 January 1951, and all in in File 2.627 (1), Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[343] Charles Morazé, *Un Historien Engagé: Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 181.
[344] Ralph E. Turner's comments in Summary Record of the Second Meeting, Third Session, 19 March 1951, ICSCH/Doc. no. 2, UNESDOC; Ralph E. Turner, "Flavor of Wisdom," *Saturday Review* (14 June 1952), 51.

however, expanded the project's anticolonial orientation. He politely criticized Huxley's Eurocentric biases and placed more emphasis on Asian and Middle Eastern perspectives.[345] He instructed his team to avoid making comparisons between different societies and cultures – comparisons risked reproducing hierarchal rankings of civilizations.[346] Turner also developed the idea of "community" as an organizing theme for the six volumes. Human history, from the dawn of civilization to the present atomic age, was a "stream" that flowed towards an integrated "global community."[347] Most accepted Turner's interpretation since it was flexible enough to encompass different parts of the world.

The commission struggled to strengthen the project's international legitimacy. Ralph Turner's leadership sparked its first major international crisis. His lectures at Yale had gained him a reputation in the United States as an atheist. A former student at Yale, the young conservative intellectual William F. Buckley, Jr., criticized his former history professor. His book *God and Man at Yale* identified Turner as an exemplar of atheism in modern American academic and intellectual life – his world history lectures could convince a generation of future

[345] See for example, Summary Record of the Second Meeting, Second Session, 18 March 1951, ICSCH/Doc. no. 2, UNESDOC.
[346] Gilbert Allardyce, "Toward World History: American Historians and the Coming of the World History Course," *Journal of World History* 1 (1990), 35.
[347] Ralph E. Turner to Jaime Torres Bodet, "The Central Theme of a Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind," n. d. [December 1950], Folder 2.627 (1), AG 8, SCHM, Box 18, UA; Ralph E. Turner to N. S. Sidhanta, 11 January 1951, File 2.627 (1), Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA. For Turner's belief in history as a "stream," see Richard Strauss, "Turner and World Cultural History," *Yale Daily News* (3 May 1956). For an extensive debate on the validity of the idea of "community," see Summary Record of the Second Meeting, Third Session, 19 March 1951, ICSCH/Doc. no. 2, UNESDOC; Summary Record of the Second Meeting, Ninth Session, March 1951, ICSCH/Doc. no. 2, UNESDOC.

students to abandon Christianity.[348] Buckley's book inspired the National Catholic Welfare Council's news service to publicly criticize Turner's participation in UNESCO.[349] Catholic journals and organizations in the United States, France and Italy mobilized to protest Turner's involvement with the organization.[350] Turner feared that Catholic agitation in the USA – where American Bishops protested the Vatican and Catholic groups protested the State Department – would ultimately "scuttle the project."[351] The commission launched a public relations campaign to resolve the Catholic controversy. Armando Cortesao, one of Huxley's colleagues, travelled widely to consult with prominent Catholic intellectuals and publicize the contributions that Catholic historians had made to the project. The commission focused on enlisting the Vatican to strengthen international Catholic support. The Vatican's delegation to UNESCO visited the commission in early January 1952 and "seemed very pleased" with its commitment to address Catholic thought and religious ideas.[352] Carneiro travelled to Rome a week later to confer with the Papal Secretariat and speak with Pope Pius XII.[353] Six months later, the Roman Catholic Church assembled "the cream of Catholic historians" in Europe at a

[348] William F. Buckley, Jr., *God and Man at Yale*, 12-13. See also U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, "Facts on 'The History of Mankind' Project," 28 January 1952, File 2.51(6), Box 13, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[349] "Hit Turner as Unfit for Unesco Job," *Yale Daily News* (31 January 1952).
[350] ICSCH Information Paper 3, "Sections from Unesco's Weekly Press Reviews referring to the Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind," 28 March 1952, File 0.30, Box 2, SCHM, AG 8, UA. See also Paulo E. de Berredo Carneiro to Ralph Turner, 22 January 1952, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[351] Ralph E. Turner to Armando Cortesao, 21 January 1952, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Armando Cortesao to Ralph E. Turner, 14 January 1952, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[352] Armando Cortesao to Ralph Turner, 14 January 1952, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[353] Paulo E. de Berredo Carneiro to Ralph Turner, 22 January 1952, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Ralph E. Turner to Robert Hale, 3 April 1952, reprinted in "Extension of Remarks of Hon. Robert Hale of Maine in the House of Representatives," 8 April 1952, Congressional Record, A2307-8.

conference in Paris to discuss the project. Monsignor Roncalli, later elected Pope John XXIII, attended as a Papal Nuncio. Carneiro represented the commission and, with "suavity and diplomacy," tried to gain support for Turner and the project. The commission's presentation was successful and provided the project with "added prestige" among European Catholics.[354] The Vatican officially endorsed the project and prominent Catholic journals pledged support.[355]

The incident reinforced the organization's conviction that it needed a system to root out bias. Turner's team worried that a single state might gain control over the project and impose its own interpretation of world history. They developed a series of "safeguards" to ensure that it remained a truly international endeavor.[356] Turner developed "the idea of having Collaborators chosen from various countries" in order to "widen the international cooperation for the preparation of the History."[357] The commission agreed and selected members to represent different world cultures, religions, and political systems.[358] It also asked Lucien Febvre to edit a *Journal of World History* in order to solicit submissions

[354] Guy Métraux to Ralph E. Turner, 26 June 1952, File 2.627 (2), Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[355] Paulo E. de Berredo Carneiro, "Discours Prononce a la 83e Session du Conseil Exécutif de l'Unesco, le 24 Septembre 1969," *Journal of World History* (1969). For the Vatican's impact on Italian policies towards UNESCO, see Guy Métraux to Ralph Turner, 6 November 1952, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA. For intellectual support from prominent Catholic intellectuals, see A.C. F. Beales, "UNESCO's World History: A Project Taking More Satisfactory Shape," *Tablet* (9th April 1955).
[356] ICSCH Information Paper 3, "Sections from Unesco's Weekly Press Reviews referring to the Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind," 28 March 1952, File 0.30, Box 2, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[357] Ralph E. Turner memorandum to Guy S. Métraux, "Concerning Articles for the Journal and Collaborators," n.d. [probably spring 1953], Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA. See also Ralph Turner to Members of the International Commission for a Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind, "Author Editors for volume II and III and Associates for Author-Editors of Volumes II, III, IV, V and VI," 23 September 1952, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[358] Summary Records of the Third Meeting of the International Commission, Sixth Session, 20 February 1952, Document Code: ICSCH/Doc. no. 14, UNESDOC.

from historians around the world. Turner claimed it would "be open to the scholars of the world" and would "set up a world-wide process of thinking on the problems of history."[359] Febvre agreed since it would ensure that "the History would truly cover the whole World."[360] The team used the *Journal* to solicit suggestions from specialists from around the world. It publicized the project's progress and thereby encouraged transparency.[361] The commission also developed an editorial plan that encompassed, rather than obscured, dissenting opinions among different states, cultures, and religions. A small part of each volume would be devoted to footnotes with dissenting comments. The footnotes helped to make the series "both a coherent discussion of the human career and a record of differences of points of view toward and interpretations of either parts or all of it."[362] These editorial procedures strengthened the project's transparency and protected it from national biases.

The commission also confronted Cold War constraints on the project. Turner rejected Marxist interpretations of history but nonetheless believed that communist bloc representatives would be necessary to ensure the project's

[359] Ralph E. Turner, "The History of Mankind," 28 April 1951, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Working Paper no. 4, "Guidance for the Editor of Cahiers de L'Historie Mondiale (Journal of World History)," n.d., Folder 2.627 (1), Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[360] Summary Report of the Third Meeting of the Editorial Board, 12 February 1952, File 2.824, Box 28, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[361] ICSCH Information Paper 11, "Texte adopté par le Bureau de la Commission Internationale au Cours de sa 6e réunion, tenue à Paris, à l'Unesco, du 12 au 14 Février 1953," 3 March 1953, Folder 2.31(4), Box 8, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Paulo B. du Carneiro to Members of the International Commission, "Reponse du President de la Commission Internationale au Memorandum du Professeur R. E. Turner," 13 January 1954, File 0.25, 0.26, Box 1, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[362] Ralph E. Turner, "Mankind from a New Summit: Writing History with a Global Slant," 35.

commitment to internationalism.[363] The Soviets asked A. Zvorikine to be Moscow's representative to the commission. Zvorikine, an established authority on the history of science, was a veteran of the cultural Cold War. The Academy of Sciences hired him to serve as Assistant Editor-in-Chief of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, a reference work intended to publicize "the world-historical victories of socialism in our country" and provide "correct" interpretations of history.[364] Zvorikine promoted historical interpretations that conformed to Moscow's official policies. Although the arrival of communist members complicated the work of the commission, however, the project initially continued with minimal disturbances. Authors initially provided positive assessments of the Soviet role in the process. By 1958, one author claimed that Soviet academics "furnished a striking example of international co-operation" while another claimed that it "had been a pleasure to work with them from beginning to end."[365]

Turner dedicated himself to expanding support for the project in the Third World. The commission enlisted two of the most influential historians in India. The Bengali historian R. C. Majumdar had contributed to the interwar Greater India Society and criticized the "prejudiced outlook of European writers" who had dominated research on Indian history. He was interested in working at UNESCO

[363] For Turner's thoughts on Marxist history and Russian historians, see Ralph E. Turner to Armando Cortesao, 25 September 1950, Folder 2.627 (1), Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Ralph Turner to Members of the International Commission for a Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind, "Author Editors for volume II and III and Associates for Author-Editors of Volumes II, III, IV, V and VI," 23 September 1952, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Ralph E. Turner to Guy Métraux, 19 October 1954, File 1.36, Box 2, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[364] Soviet Council of Ministers Report Decree of 1949, as cited in William Benton, "The Strange Encyclopedia," *This Is The Challenge* (New York: Associated College Presses, 1958), 237.
[365] Summary Records of the Third Joint Meeting of the Bureau and of the Author-Editors, August 1958, Folder 4, Box 20, Louis Gottschalk Papers, UCL.

in the immediate postwar years. Instead, New Delhi appointed him chief editor of *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, a multivolume series intended to serve as a comprehensive survey of Indian history culminating in its independence.[366] Turner invited Majumdar to join the commission seven years later and he accepted the opportunity to ensure that the volumes make clear "the cultural attainments of India."[367] The Greater India Society's interest in the historical roots of Indian power and Pan-Asian orientation also shaped south Indian historian K.M. Panikkar's political and intellectual career. "For us in India today to study European history from the point of view of Britain or even of Europe is to subject ourselves to... intellectual dominance based on a distorted version of European history," he informed the Indian History Conference. His 1953 book *Asia and Western Dominance* rewrote modern history from the perspective of the great Asian civilizations in an effort to strengthen postwar Pan-Asian political movements. The book made such an impression on Nehru that he recommended it to his External Affairs Ministry.[368] His historical interests also shaped his second career as one of India's leading diplomats. He strove to

[366] R. C. Majumdar, "Nationalist Historians," *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, C. H. Philips, ed. (London: Oxford, 1961), 421; Brij Tankha, "The Greater India Society: Indian Culture and Asian Federation," *Pan-Asianism*, 93-94. For Majumdar's early interest in UNESCO, see Jawaharlal Nehru to R. C. Majumdar, 12 May 1946, *SWJN* 1: 15, 619.
[367] R. C. Majumdar to Ralph E. Turner, 13 February 1954, Folder 2.629.2, Box 21, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[368] K. M. Panikkar, Presidential Address to the Indian History Conference, 1955, *The State and the Citizen* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1956). For Pannikar's interpretation of historical analysis, see also K. M. Panikkar, Convocation Address to the Agra University, 1955, *The State and the Citizen*, 75-81; K. M. Panikkar, *Autobiography*, translated by K. Krishnamurthy (Madras: Oxford, 1977 [1964]); K. M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); Jawaharlal Nehru to Chief Ministers, 6 November 1953, *Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964* 3 (New Dehli: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1989), 429.

strengthen Sino-Indian friendship during his four years as ambassador to the People's Republic of China. Western diplomatic circles in New Delhi considered him an "evil genius" who pressed "Prime Minister [Nehru] into extremist policies on colonial issues."[369] His appointment as India's ambassador to France brought him to the attention of the Secretariat. Turner's commission believed Panikkar could "inspire greater confidence in the peoples of the Orient in our work" and invited him to join the team.[370] Majumdar and Panikkar were among the most important influences on the project.

Pakistani historians shared India's commitment to decolonize history but focused more on national priorities. Muslim politicians and intellectuals secured an independent state to preserve the rights of Islamic peoples in the otherwise Hindu-majority region. Partition bequeathed the state with a new series of challenges. The country remained geographically divided between a dominant western wing and a Bengali-dominated Eastern wing and internally divided between ethnic and religious groups. Pakistani leaders promoted their country as an Islamic homeland in order to strengthen national cohesion and obscure ethnic and linguistic divisions. The government also promoted Pan-Islamic movement to strengthen the state's regional influence.[371] Pakistani historians also grappled with the challenges of independence. In 1951 alone the government appointed a

[369] High Commissioner for Canada in India (New Delhi) to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Canada), "Prime Minister's Advisers on Foreign Policy," 14 January 1954, Folder 205.1, Volume 8, Escott Meredith Reid fonds, LAC.
[370] Guy Métraux as cited in Caroline Ware to Ralph Turner, 13 November 1954, Folder: "Ralph Turner - general editor - Correspondence," Box 22, CWP, YUL.
[371] Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2014).

Historical Board to "recast" school history syllabi, commissioned an official national history textbook, and supported the creation of the Pakistan Historical Society.[372] The Historical Society's inaugural conference in Karachi made it clear that history was "the very foundation upon which nations are built."[373] The nation's historians had to correct European biases, write biographies of the country's founding fathers and develop new historical narratives to inspire patriotism.[374] Historians in the South Asian state expressed enthusiasm for Turner's plan. Scholars from across Pakistan flooded the Ministry of Education with enquiries about the project.[375] S. M. Sharif, Pakistan's delegate to the Executive Board, pledged his country's support for the project.[376] Sharif was a prominent Islamic scholar and advisor to Pakistan's Education Ministry and was particularly interested in the organization's world history project. He shared his government's pan-Islamic foreign policy. "Pakistan was also anxious to be

[372] Mahmud Husain, "Preface," 13 November 1951, Pakistan History Board, *A Short History of Hind-Pakistan* (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1955), vii-viii.
[373] "Presidential Address by Hon'ble Dr. I. H. Qureshi," *Proceedings of the All Pakistan History Conference* (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1951). See also Fazlur Rahman, "Foreword," Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society 1 (1 January 1953), 1; "Presidential Address by Hon'ble Mr. Fazlur Rahman," *Proceedings of the All Pakistan History Conference* (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1951), 10-21; Fazlur Rahman, "Forward," *Pakistan History Board, A Short History of Hind-Pakistan*, v-vi; "His Excellency the Governor-General's Speech on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the All Pakistan History Conference, Karachi, on the 30th. March, 1951," *Proceedings of the All Pakistan History Conference* (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1951), 8; S. Moinul Haq, "Editorial," *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society* 1 (1 January 1953), 3.
[374] "His Excellency the Governor-General's Speech on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the All Pakistan History Conference, Karachi, on the 30th. March, 1951," *Proceedings of the All Pakistan History Conference*, 6-9; "Presidential Address by Hon'ble Mr. Fazlur Rahman," *Proceedings of the All Pakistan History Conference*, 10-21; "Presidential Address by Hon'ble Dr. I. H. Qureshi," *Proceedings of the All Pakistan History Conference*, 168-178.
[375] M. Sharif's comments in ICSCH Information Paper 4, "Twenty-Ninth Session of Unesco's Executive Board," 8 April 1952, Box 2, File 0.30, SCHM, AG 8, UA; "Individual Comments on the Plan Prepared by the Committee of Experts," 25 May 1950, PHS/W/8, UNESDOC.
[376] Memorandum of Conversation: Ben Bowen Thomas, F.R. Cowell, and Luther Evans, 18 April 1956, FO 924/1153, UKNA.

actively associated with the work of the International Commission in its quality as an Islamic State," he explained to the Executive Board, and "hoped that the revival of learning in his country would place it in the vanguard of the new renaissance of the Eastern Countries."[377] Sharif informed Turner that Pakistan's delegation "would take active leadership in revising the Commission's Budget upward" to support Pakistani membership in the commission.[378]

Turner recognized that Middle-Eastern and Asian states were the project's most enthusiastic supporters. Although he had reached out to Asian academics, Turner recognized that European and North American historians still dominated the project.[379] He therefore embarked on an eight month trip through Asia in1957 to gain support for the project and expand his network of scholars. He travelled from Lebanon to Japan, visited history faculties, attended seminars, and addressed the Pakistan Historical Conference. He assured every scholar he encountered that UNESCO would dispel "European centrism." "Perhaps the new nationalism makes them uncertain about European scholarship," he added.[380] By the mid-fifties, Turner had secured widespread diplomatic support among Asian member

[377] M. Sharif's comments in ICSCH Information Paper 4, "Twenty-Ninth Session of Unesco's Executive Board," 8 April 1952, Box 2, File 0.30, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[378] Ralph E. Turner Memorandum to Paulo B. de Borredo Carneiro, "Members of the Commission and Corresponding Members," 3 July 1952, File 2.627 (2), Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA. For Pakistan's diplomatic support, see for example ICSCH Information Paper 10, "The Seventh Session of the General Conference of Unesco," 18 December 1952, File 0.30, Box 2, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[379] Ralph E. Turner to Guy Métraux, 3 April 1957, File 2.627 (6), Box 19, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[380] Ralph E. Turner to Guy Métraux, 24 March 1957; Ralph E. Turner to Guy Métraux, 22 March 1957; Ralph E. Turner to Guy Métraux, 3 April 1957, all in File 2.627 (6), Box 19, SCHM, AG 8, UA.

states for the project. His "Asian friends," a colleague remarked, were crucial to the project's financial and diplomatic stability.[381]

The project used UNESCO's intellectual resources and international prestige to strengthen the work's authority. Turner's efforts to broaden the project's international foundations and reconcile different historical traditions were intended to create an authoritative vision of mankind's historical evolution. They were writing "primarily for the benefit of mankind as a whole," Turner informed his colleagues, and their work "was likely to be the most influential ever written." Huxley agreed and thought that it would provide a "guiding frame of reference."[382] They respected national sovereignty but, like the Secretariat's idealistic staff members, believed that ideas and the flow of information could change the world. Turner believed the series would be distributed widely through the world's bookshops and schoolrooms and would prepare schoolchildren for the postcolonial world.[383] Other commission members agreed that the series should form the basis for textbooks around the world and started plans to create abridged versions for secondary schools.[384]

[381] Caroline Ware to Ralph E. Turner, 6 August 1956, Folder: "Ralph Turner - general editor - Correspondence," Box 22, CWP, YUL.
[382] Ralph E. Turner's comments in Summary Report of the First Meeting of the Editorial Board, 11 February 1952, File 2.824, Box 28, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Julian Huxley, "First Draft: Notes on the History of Mankind: Cultural and Scientific Development," File 0.25, 0.26, Box 1, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[383] Ralph E. Turner to Robert Hale, 3 April 1952, reprinted in "Extension of Remarks of Hon. Robert Hale of Maine in the House of Representatives," 8 April 1952, Congressional Record, A2307-8.
[384] Armando Cortesao to Ralph Turner, 14 January 1952, AG 8, SCHM, Box 18, UA; Ralph Turner to Paulo B. de Carnneiro, "The Preparation of the Two-Volume Abridged Edition of the History," 4 May 1956, File 0.25, 0.26, Box 1, SCHM, AG 8, UA.

The Politics of Modern History

The commission turned its attention towards drafting the series in 1954. The project brought together thousands of scholars from around the world. These scholars – including a dozen co-authors and hundreds of consultants – corresponded and developed a massive intellectual network. Turner's general plan shaped the framework within which each historian worked, but each author was expected to develop their own general themes and interpretations for their work. Each author would work from their universities and research institutions and attend regular meetings in Paris. The commission also assigned each principle writer two co-authors who would assist them with the huge task of researching and writing their volume. The complete series comprised six volumes and six teams of writers. The first of three volumes began with the dawn of the human species and spanned until the European age of discovery in the fifteenth century. The last three volumes began with European expansion into Asia and the Americas and concluded with the birth of new nations in the mid-twentieth century. The two most important events in the last five hundred years were the American Revolution and the rise of Tokugawa Japan – the two great revolts against the European imperial world order.[385]

[385] Ralph E. Turner Address to the American Historical Association, "The History of Mankind," 28 April 1951, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Ralph E. Turner to Paulo B. de Borredo Carneiro, "Proposed Plan of Treatment in Volume V (1775-1905) by Professor Charles Morazé, Author-Editor," 11 July 1955, Folder 2.627 (5), Box 19, SCHM, AG 8, UA.

The Editorial Board enlisted academics engaged in the politics of the contemporary world. It hired Louis Gottschalk to write the fourth volume on early modern history. The University of Chicago historian was an engaged scholar and active political pundit. He delivered historical lectures to the Council on Foreign Relations, the NATO Defense College, and regularly contributed to public policy debates. History, Gottschalk believed, "should seek not only documented meaning but also meaningfulness, not only the correct understanding of the past for its own sake but also the correct understanding of the life of the dead for the sake of the living."[386] His understanding of history therefore appealed to Turner and the commission. They assigned the fifth volume, dedicated to the nineteenth century, to the French historian Charles Morazé. His research focused primarily on the social, economic, and scientific development of modern France. Like Gottschalk and Turner, Morazé had experience in contemporary politics. He maintained senior contacts in the French government, worked with Pierre Mendès-France, and encouraged the government to grant independence to Tunisia and Morocco. French diplomat and academic Roger Seydoux brought Morazé to the team.[387]

Both historians faced considerable challenges in writing their respective volumes. Gottschalk initially titled his book "the European Age" and focused on

[386] For Louis Gottschalk's lectures delivered to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the NATO Defense College, see respectively his "France and the International Scene," 28 May 1947, Folder 2, Box 22; Louis Gottschalk, "North American History," 8 September 1954, Folder 3, Box 22; Louis Gottschalk, "The Historian and the Lessons of History," Annex 1 of Minutes: Social Science Research Council Meeting of the Board of Directors, 10-13 September 1956, Folder 2, Box 17, all in Louis Gottschalk Papers, UCL.

[387] Centre Charles Morazé, "La Vie de Charles Morazé: Son Oeuvre Institutionnelle, Son Enseignement," 2005, Available online: http://www.centre-charles-moraze.msh-paris.fr/.

the expansion of West European empires into Asia. Gottschalk shared Turner's belief that intercultural relations were crucial to understanding the development of the modern world. He argued that "progressive European culture since 1300 is to a considerable extent due to international cultural diffusions."[388] Gottschalk, however, emphasized "the primacy of the West's scientific and technological developments, in music and painting" throughout the world. He admitted that his focus would be on Europe. Gottschalk was steeped in the nineteenth-century conceptions of world history that placed Europe in center stage and had to "lean over backwards" to overcome his Eurocentric worldview.[389] Morazé also struggled to de-Europeanize history. He was skeptical about Turner's efforts to balance Western and non-Western achievements. "The nineteenth century," he informed Turner, "witnessed the creative mind incomparably more productive in the white peoples and particularly in Europe, than anywhere else. Practically, the evolution of non-European cultures is the history of the impact of European developments on those cultures." He broke away from Turner's general plan and, like Gottschalk, subordinated the colonial world's cultural and political accomplishments to the achievements of Western Europe.[390]

[388] Louis Gottschalk to Pieter Geyl, 9 July 1959, Folder 3, Box 18, Louis Gottschalk Papers, UCL.
[389] Louis Gottschalk, "Plan of Volume IV," July 1954, Folder 2.83(13), Box 32, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Summary Report of the Meeting of the Editorial Board, Eleventh Session, 14 February 1952, ICSCH/Doc. no. 11, UNESDOC; Louis Gottschalk as cited in Gilbert Allardyce, "Toward World History," 102.
[390] Charles Morazé to Ralph E. Turner, 1 August 1955, Folder 2.627 (5), Box 19, SCHM, AG 8, UA.

The sixth volume, on the twentieth century, was the most difficult and controversial. European historians and diplomats did not want the commission to produce a volume on the recent past – presumably because 1914 spelt the end of the European world order. Third World delegations pushed for a complete volume dedicated to the twentieth century.[391] The commission recognized that it would be the "crucial" volume and therefore wanted an academic who had experienced "thoroughly the life of our days, must have personally shared in the struggle and anguish of our times to be in a position to draw a good outline of this century."[392] Turner recommended his former colleague Caroline F. Ware to the commission. Ware, a professor at Howard University in Washington, specialized in American social history and had edited a 1940 book, *The Cultural Approach to History*, that helped influence the American academic community to incorporate previously neglected historical actors like women and the poor into their work.[393] During the Second World War, she worked in the Roosevelt administration and participated in important American voluntary agencies. She had international experience through work in the Organization of American States, teaching in Puerto Rico,

[391] Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL; Caroline F. Ware, "The History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind: Some Problems of Interpretation," *Journal of World History* 5 (1959).
[392] Ralph E. Turner to Guy S. Métraux, 1 April 1953, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Paulo de Berredo Carneiro to Ralph E. Turner, 21 December 1953, File 2.627 (3), Box 19,SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[393] Caroline F. Ware, ed. *The Cultural Approach to History* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1940). For Ware's influence on the American historical community, see Ian Tyrrell, *Historians in Public: The Practice of American History* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2005), 33.

and community development programs throughout Latin America.[394] The commission was initially unimpressed with Ware, since she was primarily known as a sociologist but, on Turner's recommendation, approved her nomination.[395] The commission also assigned her two co-authors, K. M. Panikkar and the Dutch historian Jan Romein, to assist in the preparation of the book. All three corresponded, in English, and forged an intimate and friendly team.

Panikkar had the most powerful influence on Ware's interpretation of modern history. He repeated his conviction that postcolonial states had to recover their history in order to ensure their future independence. "The national sentiment in these areas is to a large extent built up on the recovery of their histories," Panikkar informed his colleagues. Ware in turn thought him, "in a very real sense, the embodiment of the period we were studying, of the meeting of East and West in the 20th century."[396] He drew upon his own personal and diplomatic experiences with Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai to enrich Ware's understanding of modern Asian politics. His *Asia and Western Dominance* was one of Ware's central sources when researching the development of Asian politics.[397] Panikkar tried to recover the roots of Liberal thought – political representation, free press, property rights, women's education – in Indian

[394] Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.
[395] Guy S. Métraux to Ralph E. Turner, 11 June 1954, Folder 2.627 (4), Box 19, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[396] Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL; K. M. Panikkar to Caroline F. Ware, 12 January 1955, reprinted in "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.
[397] K. M. Panikkar to Caroline Ware, 11 February 1959, Folder: "Panikkar," Box 23, CWP, YUL.

history in order to refute European imperial ideology. Panikkar, for example, provided detailed information about women's social and political positions in Asian societies and dispelled many Western myths about pre-colonial Asian law and political theory.[398] His guidance ensured that Ware's interpretation of the modern world conformed to the values and ideas of the Afro-Asian Movement.

Ware travelled widely to enrich her understanding of Asia, the Middle East, and the modern world. Ware initially approached cultural attachés in Washington embassies in an effort to strengthen her knowledge of foreign cultures. Foreign service officers, however, merely provided official pamphlets.[399] She realized that "much of the necessary material has not been written and the documentation can not be found but in the spirit of living men – necessitating personal contacts."[400] Ware decided to follow in Turner's footsteps and travel across Asia and the Middle East to acquaint herself with both regions. She jet-hopped from Tokyo to Istanbul over several months in 1956, carrying a bound copy of her provisional outline, and "wrestling with the problem of domesticating the endless and varied material of the 20th century."[401] She spoke with dozens of

[398] Caroline Ware, "Calcutta," 22 and 23 December [1955], Box 7, CWP, YUL; K. M. Panikkar to Caroline F. Ware, 9 January 1957, reprinted in Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL; K. M. Panikkar to Caroline F. Ware, 24 January 1957, reprinted in Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL. For the history of Liberalism in India, see C. A. Bayly, *Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-26, 354-355.
[399] Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.
[400] Minutes of Mixed Meeting of Author-Editors, Third Session, 8 May 1956, File 2.824, Box 28, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[401] Caroline Ware to Ralph Turner, 6 August 1956, Folder: "Ralph Turner - general editor - Correspondence," Box 22, CWP, YUL.

intellectuals and political leaders about history and the modern world. Most were unfamiliar with the project but quickly recognized its intellectual and political value. They were primarily concerned with national prerogatives and regional politics but shared common Third World preoccupations. As Jawaharlal Nehru informed Ware over a lunchtime meeting, postcolonial states were "reaching back into the past" in order to assert their identities.[402] The institutions and intellectuals who opened their doors to Ware tried to dispel the European misconceptions about their societies. They emphasized that key issues identified with modernity – democracy, women's rights, property rights – actually had local intellectual roots. This became clear when she visited India, Pakistan, and the Middle East.

Ware arrived in New Delhi in December 1955. Panikkar provided Ware with local contacts to the most important intellectual and political figures in India and encouraged her to explore the roots of Indian Liberalism. Intellectuals at the University of New Delhi urged her to make the rise of postcolonial nationalism a central theme in her volume. These political movements animated not just calls for national independence but also cultural revival and self-respect. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, now India's Vice-President, opened his door to Ware a few weeks later. He repeated his arguments that the course of history led towards global integration rather than international conflict. The world was becoming less hierarchical and more multicultural.[403]

[402] Caroline F. Ware, "Interview with Pandit Nehru at his Home at Lunch in Delhi," 12 January 1956, Box 7, CWP, YUL.
[403] "Calcutta," 22 and 23 December [1955]; "Record of Seminar Meeting with the Faculty of the School of Economics, University Delhi," 9 January 1956; "Record of Roundtable Discussion with

Ware encountered a more pessimistic response when she arrived in Pakistan in January. Riots and protests in East Pakistan and the military's growing involvement in national politics had strained the country's democratic system. The government decided to prepare a new constitution to strengthen the state's Islamic identity in an attempt to reconcile the country's growing divisions. Historical scholarship would play an important role in this Islamic state – which also made UNESCO's world history project both an asset and a liability.[404] Pakistan's government made Ware a "state guest" and "brought in their principal thinkers from all over the country to discuss the historic background and the contemporary issues of the new Islamic state."[405] These leading historians were anxious "that a history published by UNESCO would have a stamp of authority," Ware noticed, and "were very much afraid that the Pakistan position would not be properly presented." These scholars urged Ware to write about the importance of Islamic unity across Asia and Africa and emphasized Pakistan's centrality as a center of the Islamic world. UNESCO, in other words, could legitimize the country's new constitution.[406] The Pakistan Historical Association provided her with many

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the Staff of the School of International Studies, Indian Council of World Affairs, Delhi," 10 January 1956; Caroline Ware, "Interview with Dr. Radhakrishnan V-P of India," 30 January 1956, all available in Box 7, CWP, YUL.

[404] Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 61-97; Manzooruddin Ahmed and S. M. Sharif, "Islamic Aspects of the New Constitution of Pakistan," *Islamic Studies* 2, no. 2 (June 1963), 249-250, 267.

[405] Caroline Ware, "Perils and Pleasures: Process of International Collaboration," n.d. [probably 1967 or 1968], Box 1, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.

[406] "Interview with Dr. S. N. Ikram and Dr. Nazir Ahmad Karachi," 20 January 1956, and "Joint Interview in the Office of Dean Mahmud Hussain with Professors of History from the Various Universities of Pakistan," 21 January 1956, both in Folder: "Pakistan - Interviews," Box 7, CWP, YUL.

publications to take home, including the official textbook it had commissioned in 1951.[407]

Ware arrived in the Middle East when Pan-Arabism dominated regional politics and intellectual life. The Egyptian Revolution galvanized the region and made Arab unity the most dominant ideology in the region. Nasser invoked Arab history to mobilize political support.[408] In Cairo, Arab League Secretary General Abdul Khalek Hassouna told Ware that Arab identity was rooted in ancient history: "Arabs were Arabs before the time of Mohammed." Although Arab League officials emphasized the secular dimensions of Pan-Arabism, they also challenged misconceptions about Islamic traditions. The religion was liberal and tolerant. Intellectuals in Iraq made similar arguments. Former Prime Minister Fadhel Jamali told Ware that Arabs had their own democratic traditions.[409]

Ware's travel throughout Asia provided "extraordinarily fruitful" insights into the transformation of Asia throughout the twentieth century.[410] Ware returned to Washington in early 1956 and, after assembling the research materials she had collected from libraries and her Asian trip, began to write in 1957. "All this collecting of material and organizing of ideas has been wonderful," Ware told Panikkar and Romein over coffee in an Amsterdam café. "But the next two years

[407] Caroline Ware, "Perils and Pleasures: Process of International Collaboration," n.d. [probably 1967 or 1968], Box 1, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.
[408] Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 1-16, 149-150.
[409] "Interview with Dr. Fadhel Jamali, Former Prime Minister and Former Minister of Education, Baghdad," 29 January 1956; "Interview with Mr. Hussouna Exec, Dr. of the Arab League and Dr. Bellarma, Deputy Dr. Cairo," 7 February 1956; "Interview with Dr. Ashmawi, Director of Division of Social Affairs, Arab League, Cairo, 13 February 1956," all in Box 7, CWP, YUL.
[410] Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.

are going to be just hell."[411] Ware wrote most of the manuscript while Romein and Panikkar commented on her drafts. Her interpretation of modern history provided a conciliatory vision of international politics. She built upon Turner's general plan and incorporated her own interests in historically marginalized actors and social groups. Turner believed that the bloodshed of the twentieth century - two world wars, decolonization, and the ideological and geopolitical division of the world - were actually minor developments.[412] The true beginning of the twentieth century was not the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, nor the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, but rather the Japanese naval victory over the Russian fleet in the North Pacific Sea in 1905. Turner, building on the arguments of Asian intellectuals and anticolonial nationalists, believed that this event "changed fundamentally the relations of the world's peoples to Europe."[413] Ware shared Turner's conviction that the "emergence of the colonial and dependent peoples" was the central development of the century. The "awakening" of Asia

[411] Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.
[412] Ralph E. Turner to Jaime Torres Bodet, "The Central Theme of a Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind," n. d. [December 1950], Folder 2.627 (1), Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[413] Ralph E. Turner, "The History of Mankind," 28 April 1951, Box 18, SCHM, AG 8, UA; Ralph E. Turner to Paulo B. de Borredo Carneiro, "Proposed Plan of Treatment in Volume V (1775-1905) by Professor Charles Morazé, Author-Editor," 11 July 1955, Folder 2.627 (5), Box 19, SCHM, AG 8, UA. In the words of the historian Cemil Aydin, the "Russo-Japanese War of 1905 empowered the claims of non-western intellectuals in the debates about race, the Orient, and progress. It became the strongest evidence against the discourse of the white race's permanent and eternal superiority over the colored races." Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, 9.

and the rise of African nationalist leaders like Gold Coast (Ghana) Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah buried the old paternalist visions of the nineteenth century.[414]

Ware also developed Turner's ideas by developing a unique narrative for modern history. She surprised her colleagues by downplaying the cataclysmic conflicts of the modern age – the emergence of total war, the Great Depression, the spread of fascism and political violence – and focusing instead on the growing respect for "human dignity" around the world. It was only in the twentieth century that "women, children, workers, Negroes, colonial peoples, untouchables and all the other once-forgotten people" of the world had gained power and respect. In North America and Western Europe, the spread of the welfare state and the development of human rights in international law created greater social equality. Decolonization and the spread of independent nation-states created international equality. Intellectually, science began to refute theories about the superiority of peoples and cultures and created the ability to improve social welfare. Hierarchy, in other words, was breaking down around the world. The central chapter was dedicated to the "self-image and aspirations of the peoples of the world." Labor movements, women's associations, and civil rights groups were the prime movers of modern history. She put particular emphasis on the Third World movements - anticolonial movements and peasant rebels - that demanded respect for their social and political rights.[415] Ware's interpretation of modern history mirrored the

[414] Caroline F. Ware to Jan M. Romein, 11 November 1954, reprinted in Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.
[415] Caroline Ware, "Perils and Pleasures: Process of International Collaboration," n.d. [probably 1967 or 1968], Box 1, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL. See also Caroline Ware, "Volume VI -

Afro-Asian interpretation of the postwar world and its demands for justice and equality. "I shall put the book in Nehru's hands, for I know he will want to read it," Panikkar said when they finished.[416]

The Battle for Publication

Turner was committed to developing international consensus for the project. Individual authors, working closely with a small circle of colleagues, wrote the six volumes of the History of Mankind series. Hundreds of academics had already contributed to the project through submissions to the *Journal of World History* and enriched their understanding of world history. The commission distributed the six draft volumes around the world and solicited comments. The first three volumes of the series, spanning the emergence of modern homo sapiens until the start of the European Age of Discovery, released a flood of academic criticism. Muslim academics criticized interpretations of the crusades. The Catholic Church complained that the project disparaged it as a divisive faith rather than as a spiritual community. Latin American and African scholars complained that the series marginalized their countries and cultures. The commission made

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The Twentieth Century: Preliminary Outline of Plan, "10 December 1954, Folder: "Outlines of Plan for Volume," Box 9, CWP, YUL; Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.

[416] Caroline F. Ware, "Can World History be Viewed and Written Internationally?," n. d. [1987], Folder: "World History Assoc 1986-1987," Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.

concessions and addressed these complaints about the first three volumes.[417] Modern history, however, became a diplomatic issue. The stacks of ensuing criticism, as Ware recalled, forced them to run "a very formidable gauntlet."[418] The battle for publication ultimately undermined the project's survival.

R. C. Majumdar sparked the first great confrontation. He began to lodge complaints that some the authors did not understand Indian history and the world beyond Europe.[419] His attitudes hardened by the time that Louis Gottschalk and Charles Morazé submitted their drafts to the commission in 1958. Majumdar complained that they had written "trash" and urged the commission to abandon both historians and completely rewrite their volumes.[420] Their work excused the expansion of European empires, misrepresented Asian history and historical accomplishments, and was marred by errors and ignorance about the region's past. In other words, they had had failed to decolonize world history. Gottschalk's volume in particular, he complained, "reminds one more of the propaganda leaflets written by the Christian missionaries in India about a century ago." The book was "highly offensive and sure to wound the susceptibilities of all Indians. I am sure it will create alarm or indignation all over India."[421] Majumdar threatened

[417] Poul Duedahl, "Selling Mankind: UNESCO and the Invention of Global History, 1945-76," Aalborg University Forskningsportal, available online: http://vbn.aau.dk/files/61248679/selling_Mankind_Paper_Poul_Duedahl.pdf, 16.
[418] Caroline F. Ware, "Three Across the World" (unpublished manuscript), Box 2, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.
[419] R. C. Majumdar to Ralph E. Turner, 13 February 1954, Folder 2.629.2, Box 21, SCHM, AG 8 UA.
[420] R. C. Majumdar to Ralph E. Turner, 30 June 1958, File 2.627 (5), Box 19, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[421] R. C. Majumdar, "Comments on Volume IV, The Beginnings of European Expansion," n.d., File 2.629.2, Box 21, SCHM, AG 8, UA; R. C. Majumdar to Carneiro, 17 August 1958, File 2.629.2, Box 21, SCHM, AG 8, UA.

to resign in protest if Turner did not throw out the two volumes and have them rewritten.[422] Commission members agreed that the work did not adequately incorporate Asian culture and politic into its narrative of human history. Panikkar was more diplomatic but agreed with Majumdar's criticisms and recommended that a "formula would have to be found, so that the Asian point of view could be more adequately expressed."[423] Both authors agreed to rewrite their volumes in order to address these new criticisms.

Ware completed her manuscript in 1959 and submitted the finished work to the commission. Her colleagues anticipated the controversy that she would confront. "What Caroline Ware is to receive makes me shudder," Métraux confessed as early as 1956.[424] Third World states were more receptive of Ware's volume. Critics charged that their own countries did not receive enough treatment. Korean academics, for example, wanted to distinguish their country from larger imperial neighbors. They were "sick of China/India/Japan-centred oriental histories" and complained about Ware's "complete negligence of this nation" in the manuscript.[425] Pakistan's National Commission lobbied Ware to emphasize elements of South Asian history that strengthened the ideological foundations of Pakistani statehood. They wanted her to highlight Islamic accomplishments in

[422] R. C. Maumdar to Ralph E. Turner, 30 June 1958, Folder 2, Louis Gottschalk Papers, Box 18, UCA.
[423] Eric E. Hirschler, "Editorial Report," 22 April 1959, File 2.627.2, Box 20, SCHM, UA; K. M. Panikkar's comments in Summary Records of the Third Joint Meeting of the Bureau and of the Author-Editors, August 1958, Folder 4, Box 20, Louis Gottschalk Papers, UCL.
[424] Guy S. Métraux to Jacquetta Hawkes, 1 February 1956, Folder: "Hawkes, Jacquetta (Hopkins) 1956 Feb-1968 Dec 15," Box 4, Guy S. Métraux Papers (Addition 1980), YUL.
[425] Korean National Commission, "Comments on Volume VI, The Twentieth Century (Caroline F. Ware, K.M. Panikkar, J.M. Romein)," n. d. [1959?], Box 1, CWP, YUL.

early twentieth-century South Asia and asked her to substitute the term "Hind-Pakistan" for undivided, pre-independence India – presumably to enhance the country's historical foundations.[426] R. C. Majumdar complained again that the book did not devote enough attention to Asian independence movements.[427] Despite these nationalist criticisms, however, Third World countries approved Ware's interpretation of modern history.

The Soviet Union's intellectual intervention, however, rocked the project's foundations. Soviet scholars flooded the Secretariat with hundreds of pages of notes and corrections on the commission's interpretations of human history. Moscow's interpretation of history played an important role in its post-Stalinist foreign policy. The Soviet Union, after all, was a Marxist-Leninist state that had mastered the scientific understanding of historical development. "The [communist] party was legitimized not by popular suffrage but by its leaders' knowledge of the laws of history," as one historian noted.[428] Moscow also incorporated history lessons into its economic development models and technical assistance missions. Soviet leaders and economic advisors invoked their own historical development, from backwards monarchy to champion of the space age,

[426] National Commission for Pakistan, "Comments on Volume VI, The Twentieth Century (Caroline F. Ware, K.M. Panikkar, J.M. Romein)," n. d. [1959?], Box 1, CWP, YUL. For Pakistan's anxiety about India's name and "international personality, see Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 48.

[427] R. C. Majumdar to Guy Métraux, 23 November 1959, File 2.629.2, Box 21, SCHM, AG 8, UA.

[428] François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999 [1995]), 96. For the Soviet Union's "deification of history," see François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, 2, 67, 417, 492-493, 502. For the role of history in Marxist thought, see Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders, The Golden Age, The Breakdown* (New York: Norton, 2005).

in order to appeal to the Third World. "Our nation's history shows...," Nikita Khrushchev sometimes started speeches at the United Nations or in South Asia. Soviet diplomats and technical advisers promised that their history of economic development since the 1917 October Revolution could be exported to newly independent nations.[429] UNESCO's support for the history project provided an alternative source of intellectual authority. Zvorikine and the Soviet Academy of Science objected that Ware's volume did not support a Marxist interpretation of history and social development. "Socialist countries" had brought "rapid development of science and culture" to "1,000 million people" around the world. They also criticized Ware's argument that the emergence of European and North American welfare states had strengthened human dignity. The Academy of Sciences argued that these welfare systems actually obscured and perpetuated the persistence of hierarchical class systems and racial segregation. It was the "undeniable emergence and intensive development of a new, socialist camp in the 20th century" which had created a more egalitarian world, Soviet scholars concluded.[430]

[429] For the role of history and ideology in Soviet foreign policy, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge, 2007), 72; Timothy Nunan, *Humanitarian Invasion*, 20-22. For Khrushchev's invocation of Soviet history, see Nikita Khrushchev, "Speech at a Meeting in Bhilal," 15 February 1960, *The National Liberation Movement: Selected Passages, 1956-63* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963), 55-57. For Khrushchev's invocation of the October Revolution, see Nikita Khrushchev, "On the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," n. d.; Nikita Khrushchev, "Speech at a Mass Meeting in Sofia," 19 May 1962; Nikita Khrushchev, "Speech Made During the General Debates at the Fifteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly," 23 September 1960," all in *The National Liberation Movement*, 61-63, 65-67, 71-89.

[430] Eugene N. Anderson to Paulo E. de Berredo Carneiro, "Report on Volume VI and Suggested Editorial Notes," 15 February 1961, Folder: "Vol VI," Box 1, CWP, YUL.; K.V. Ostrovityanov to

The Academy of Sciences was explicit about its concerns about Third World politics. Soviet critics shared Turner and Ware's belief that the anticolonial struggle was the dominant narrative of the twentieth century but disagreed with their analysis of its intellectual origins. Zvorikine challenged their argument that the 1905 Japanese naval victory over Russian imperial forces was the beginning of the postcolonial age. They emphasized instead the "international significance of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia" and its role in sparking the anticolonial revolts that spread throughout the century. "It was the Russian Revolution that provided the great stimulus to the rising national-emancipatory movements in Asia," two historians at the Academy of Sciences argued. The international communist movement and the interwar comintern had directed the expansion of anticolonial politics throughout Asia. The Academy of Sciences also cast the "liberal democracies" as "colonial powers." Hungarian and Czech critics complained that the volumes "conceal[ed] the capitalist countries' oppression of colonial and semi-colonial countries" and "the USA's neo-colonialism."[431]

Ware made efforts to meet some of the Soviets' criticism. She made minor stylistic changes, watered down Cold War themes, and tried to preserve the project's internationalist ideals. Her interpretation of the early Cold War avoided

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Paulo B. de Borredo Carneiro, 26 September 1959, translated and reprinted as ICSCH Information Paper 25, 14 October 1959, File 0.30, Box 2, SCHM, AG 8, UA.

[431] A. Zvorikine to Members of the International Commission, "Comments on the Plan of Volume VI," 4 May 1956, File 2.629.91(1), Box 21, SCHM, AG 8, UA; K.V. Ostrovityanov to Paulo B. de Borredo Carneiro, 26 September 1959, translated and reprinted as ICSCH Information Paper 25, 14 October 1959, File 0.30, Box 2, SCHM, AG 8, UA; L. I. Zubok, V. M. Dalis, Hungarian National Commission for UNESCO, and Vavre Hajdu as cited in Eugene N. Anderson to Paulo E. de Berredo Carneiro, "Report on Volume VI and Suggested Editorial Notes," 15 February 1961, Folder: "Vol VI," Box 1, CWP, YUL; Caroline Ware to K. M. Panikkar, 17 January 1962, File: Correspondence with People Abroad, K. M. Panikkar Papers, NAI.

casting blame on either the Soviet Union or the United States and instead analyzed comparable misperceptions in their policies. Yet she refused to adopt most of the Soviet interpretations of modern history or acknowledge their complaints in the text. The project's international legitimacy was at the heart of the conflict. Zvorikine's demands that Ware include Soviet rebuttals in her text "amount[ed] to an insistence that it is not possible to write an international history of the 20th century."[432] She wanted to avoid "turn[ing] the Volume into a debate" which would "solidify the Russian opposition" and make it more difficult to preserve her draft. She responded by quietly circumventing Soviet her critics. In the Secretariat, she tried to convince the Director General to pursue legal actions to block Soviet actions. Ware also wrote to Panikkar in India and convinced him to intercede with Indira Gandhi, a rising politician and New Delhi's new representative in Paris, to resist Soviet efforts. Panikkar also reached out to Majumdar, who remained influential on the Editorial Board.[433] Ware's attempt to find allies in the struggle to rebuff the recent Soviet interventions was ineffective. She had to engage Soviet criticisms.

Soviet opposition to Ware's volume slowed down progress on the project for years. They had, Guy Métraux complained, an "unusual ability to draw profit from every small loophole. As far as I can see on the administrative level they

[432] Caroline F. Ware to Paulo B. du Carneiro, 6 July 1961, Folder 2.83 (22), Box 35, SCHM, AG 8, UA.
[433] Caroline Ware to K. M. Panikkar, 24 April 1961; K. M. Panikkar to R. C. Majumdar, 11 May 1961, both in File: Correspondence with People Abroad, K. M. Panikkar Papers, NAI. I am grateful to Brant Moscovitch for acquiring this and other documents in this chapter from the National Archives of India.

know our documents better than I or the President do."[434] Administrative problems also complicated the completion of the series. Ralph Turner, the project's "moving spirit" and most effective diplomatic champion, suffered a stroke and his declining health delayed progress. His death in 1963 deprived the commission of its most enthusiastic and effective champion. The commission replaced Turner with a joint Soviet-American editorial team to supervise the completion of Ware's manuscript. The commission pressured Ware to make concessions and address Soviet concerns in order to end the deadlock. Ware consequently claimed that Métraux "double-crossed" her and was "deliberately sabotaging the volume."[435]

Ware submitted a revised draft of the manuscript in April 1960 incorporating some Soviet criticisms. The Soviets continued to reject the revised manuscript and obstructed the publication of all six volumes until the commission agreed to further revise Ware's volume. Zvorikine demanded that Soviet "alternative texts" be placed at the end of each chapter as a rejoinder to Ware's analysis. The commission initially accepted this proposal in order to break the Soviet veto over the publication of the other volumes. This proposal, however,

[434] Guy S. Métraux to Jacquetta Hawkes, 1 February 1956, Folder: "Hawkes, Jacquetta (Hopkins) 1956 Feb-1968 Dec 15," Box 4, Guy S. Métraux Papers (Addition 1980), YUL.
[435] Caroline Ware to K. M. Panikkar, 13 November 1963, File: Correspondence with People Abroad, K. M. Panikkar Papers, NAI; Caroline Ware to Eugene Anderson, 24 August 1963, Folder: "Correspondence re Anderson," Box 20, CWP, YUL. See also Caroline F. Ware to K. M. Panikkar, 28 June 1961, File: Correspondence with People Abroad, K. M. Panikkar Papers, NAI; Caroline F. Ware to K. M. Panikkar, 23 February 1963, File: Correspondence with People Abroad, K. M. Panikkar Papers, NAI; Eugene Anderson to Caroline Ware, 1 September 1963, Folder: "Correspondence re Anderson," Box 20, CWP, YUL; Caroline Ware to Eugene Anderson, 5 September 1963, Folder: "Correspondence re Anderson," Box 20, CWP, YUL; K. M. Panikkar to Caroline F. Ware, 4 September 1963, File: Correspondence with People Abroad, K. M. Panikkar Papers, NAI.

compromised Ware's text. "The proposal converts our work from an effort to write history as nearly as possible in international terms... into a debate in which we are cast in the role of protagonists of the 'western' point of view, with the Soviet Editorial-Consultant invited to present the 'other' point of view," she complained.[436] This solution avoided efforts to resolve conflicting interpretations of history. Gottschalk agreed and asked, "are we not committing ourselves to a philosophy of history to the effect that a dispassionate, judicious writing of history is not even to be attempted, that history is best written by partisans presenting their several biased accounts?"[437] Ware and her colleagues vigorously protested this proposal. Zvorikine proposed a new plan a year later in order to resolve the new conflict. Ware's volume would be split into two separate books: Ware's complete manuscript and a separate companion volume that included the Soviet drafts. The commission believed that this solution would "avoid simple polemics and favor international understanding by the objective confrontation of different ideological interpretations."[438] This new plan partitioned the twentieth century into two distinct interpretations of history. The commission, at its sixteenth meeting on 11 January 1962, decided to approve the plan in order to resolve the deadlock. Ware was "delighted because it leaves our volume intact

[436] Caroline Ware to President Carneiro and Members of the Bureau, 24 April 1961, Folder: "Paulo E. de B., President (et al)," Box 22, CWP, YUL; Caroline F. Ware to K. M. Panikkar, 28 June 1961, File: Correspondence with People Abroad, K. M. Panikkar Papers, NAI.
[437] Louis Gottschalk to Paulo E. de Berredo Carneiro, 18 November 1961, Folder 5, Box 18, Louis Gottschalk Papers, UCL.
[438] Cited in Julian Huxley, "UNESCO History, Vol. VI, Part 2," 10 February 1965, Folder: "Vol. VI Tome 2 1962-1965," Box 1, CWP (Accession 91-M-36), YUL.

and gets it to press at long last."[439] This resolution resembled Cold War diplomacy: the commission decided to create two parallel texts rather than compromise and resolve common tensions and disagreements. Soviet acceptance of the revised editorial plan broke the deadlock and led to the publication of the entire History of Mankind series throughout the second half of the sixties.

The six thick volumes in the History of Mankind series trickled into bookstores and libraries beginning in 1963. The team breathed a sigh of relief and senior members of the Secretariat praised the series as one of the organization's crowning cultural achievements.[440] Their optimism, however, was short-lived – the project had a relatively limited impact on popular consciousness of world history. The lengthy footnotes and dissenting texts in each volume, necessary to gain international support for the series, made the books difficult to read. Teachers and the general public failed to adopt the series as textbooks. Academic like University of Chicago historian William H. McNeil dismissed the series as propaganda – "a political product" – for the United Nations. He rejected UNESCO's broad and inclusive interpretation of history and focused instead on the global *Rise of the West*. McNeill's 1963 book upstaged the organization and

[439] Caroline Ware to Annis Sandvos, 1 March 1962 [incorrectly labelled 1952], Folder: "Meeting of Bureau Attended by Author-Editors Paris January 1962," Box 9, CWP, YUL.
[440] See for example Malcolm S. Adiseshiah to Tor Gjesdal, 7 July 1965, Folder 13, Box 4, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to Director-General, "Mission Report/ UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC INSPECTION (25 February to 4 March 1968)," 5 March 1968, Folder 21, Box 6, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.

sparked popular and academic interest in the field of world history.[441] UNESCO's most ambitious attempt to de-Europeanize modern world history meanwhile languished in obscurity.

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UNESCO's first generation of leaders - men like Julian Huxley, Joseph Needham, and Lucien Febvre - believed that globalizing history could encourage people to embrace both their national community and the broader international community. This ambition achieved modest but concrete accomplishments in postwar Europe. The Secretariat's textbook conferences and symposiums brought together French and German academics and laid the foundation for the European Economic Community's efforts to develop the continent's historical memory. The History of Mankind project became a forum in the effort to create a postcolonial world. Hundreds of scholars and diplomats believed that world history could reorient the Eurocentric interpretations of history that had slighted Afro-Asian contributions to the contemporary world. India's leading historians, men like R. C. Majumdar and K. M. Panikkar, pressured the organization to promote and preserve these Third World perspectives. The project evolved from an instrument to achieve world peace into a weapon to demolish the old standards of civilization that had underpinned the European colonial world order.

[441] William H. McNeill, "*The Twentieth Century* by Caroline F. Ware," *The American Historical Review* 73, no. 5 (June 1968), 1479-1480. For McNeill's role in the emergence of world history, see Gilbert Allardyce, "Toward World History," 62-76.

UNESCO continued to organize international history projects. The Secretariat focused less on world history and launched instead a series of four regional history projects – on Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, as well as a thematic series on Islamic cultures – that would reflect the perspectives of peoples from those regions and would "heighten awareness of cultural identity through a modern and balanced historical approach."[442] International politics continued to shape their development. Soviet and Chinese diplomats, for example, accused one another of "pervert[ing] history" in order to advance their "territorial aspirations" in central Asia. Soviet diplomats urged regional allies to oppose Chinese historians working on the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* project and threatened to put a "complete stop to this work."[443] Africa's rapid decolonization in the early 1960s led a new generation of nationalist leaders and academics to reclaim sovereignty over both territory and national memory. The Organization of African Unity's founding 1963 meeting asked UNESCO to write a general history of Africa to replace the old European visions of the continent. "Although a scholarly work," this new team of historians decided, "it will also be, in large measure, evidence of consideration by African

[442] "Address by Mr. Koichiro Matsuura on the Occasion of the Completion of the UNESCO Project History of Civilizations of Central Asia: Results and Perspectives," 5 December 2005, DG/2005/194, UNESDOC.
[443] "Memorandum of Conversation between Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa, V.F. Mal'tsev, and D. Yondon," 8 June 1982; "Conversation between Soviet Foreign Ministry Official Mikhail S. Kapitsa and Deputy Foreign Minister of Mongolia D. Yondon," 9 June 1982, both translated by Sergey Radchenko, both in CWIHP.

authors of their own civilization."[444] Political and diplomatic pressures also shaped UNESCO's *African History* project. The team boycotted scholars from South Africa in order to conform with the UN and OAU's "international diplomatic strategies." Historians from Ethiopia and Somalia clashed when conflict engulfed the horn of Africa. The project to reclaim the continent's history therefore became "a microcosm of contemporary African realities," according to Ali Mazrui, who wrote the last volume of the series. Yet the project also galvanized the historical profession in Africa and the study of African history around the word.[445]

The History of Mankind project revealed the limits of international cultural cooperation. Some Secretariat officials grew frustrated with the International Commission's struggle to reconcile divisive academic issues. Many permanent staff members turned away from ambitious cultural projects and looked instead for more promising programs in which to invest the organization's money and intellectual resources. Third World intellectuals and academics also began to lose interest in philosophical discussions about history and civilization that had inspired Jawaharlal Nehru and the intellectual leaders who flocked to the Asian National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO. The persistence of

[444] First Plenary Session of the International Scientific Committee for the Drafting of a General History of Africa, "Final Report," 17 May 1971, SHC/MD/16, UNESDOC.
[445] Ali A. Mazrui, "Subjectivism and the Study of Current History: Political, Psychological and Methodological Problems," *The Methodology of Contemporary African History: Report and Papers Organized by Unesco at Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, from 17 to 22 May 1979* (Paris: UNESCO, 1984), 45. See also Ali A. Mazrui, "Dilemmas of African Historiography and the Philosophy of the Unesco General History of Africa," *Methodology of Contemporary African History*, 15-25. For UNESCO's impact on African historiography, see Jan Vansina, "Unesco and African Historiography," *History on Africa* 20 (1993), 346.

poverty and the struggle to create stable and cohesive nation-states began to overshadow most other concerns in the Third World. The Secretariat was alert to changing attitudes and devoted more of its attention to the worldwide crusade for economic development. UNESCO, with its intellectual resources and networks of information, was about to achieve its greatest successes.

Chapter 3: The Global War on Ignorance: Education and Development

No man is an island.
The literate man is even less of an island.
He is thrown into a situation where he must deal, must transact.

H.S.Bhola, 1973[446]

International economic development became the new global faith of the early 1960s. The Soviet Union and the United States funneled billions of dollars, thousands of technical missions, and new ideas about "modernization" into new nations in order to win allies, promote their own brands of economic development, and promote their ideological commitments. Most developed states – from Canada to Scandinavia – all contributed to this new global mission. The United Nations – working through the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization – emerged as another center in this global crusade.[447] The world's first Development Decade transformed UNESCO's role in the world. The Secretariat deployed more and more technical missions and the number of staff members working in the field increased tenfold. These years were "heroic times" – a "time of airplanes and 4x4 [trucks]." Field workers found inspiration in the "lost villages deep in the bush, perched on the sides of mountains, hidden in the heart of the desert as well as those who struggle to

[446] H. S. Bhola, "The Nature and Function of Literacy: Sociology, Cybernetics, Politics," 1973, ERIC.
[447] David C. Engerman and Corinna R. Unger, "Towards a Global History of Development," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (2009), 375-385.

survive in the slums of Third World capitals."[448] These changes shifted the organization's attention away from cultural projects like the History of Mankind series and the East-West Major Project and towards social and economic programs.

Geopolitical changes hastened this new global crusade. Dozens of new states throughout Africa gained independence in 1960 and flooded the United Nations system. These new states embraced the liberal international system to advance their own postcolonial domestic and foreign policies. Membership in the General Assembly in New York and the General Conference in Paris legitimized their fight for self-determination and national sovereignty. Africans, once at the margins of the international community, now had a voice in the conduct of international affairs.[449] These states quickly forged diplomatic ties with the intellectual branch of the United Nations. The first meeting of the Organization for African Unity's (OAU) Educational and Cultural Commission in Leopoldville discussed UNESCO in January 1964 and urged African countries to establish National Commissions for Cooperation with the organization. In October, an OAU delegate to the General Conference welcomed UNESCO's "overt presence" in the continent.[450] Africans also reinvigorated the Secretariat's staff members. "It

[448] "Évolution des Effectifs du Personnel," 127; "Raymond Johnson, "Une Année, Cela Suffit!,"223; Gérard Bolla, "Des Avions et des 4x4 d'époque," 216; Krystyna Chlebowska, "Le Terrain, Source d'Inspiration," 211, all printed in Association des Anciens Fonctionnaires de l'Unesco, *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*.
[449] Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot.*
[450] US Delegation Background Paper no. 8, "Role of OAU (Commission on Educational and Cultural Programs) Vis-A-Vis The Ministers Conference and UNESCO," n.d. [March 1964], Folder: "UNESCO I," Box 3338, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA; Records of the General

was a breath of fresh air for the Secretariat and especially for me to see the arrival of a great number of new member states that we did not know," one senior member of the Secretariat recalled. "African countries joined UNESCO in an atmosphere of euphoria," another staff member recalled. "They were absolutely giddy with joy when they became independent."[451] These new states quickly began to shape the organization's priorities and role in the international system.

New leadership also strengthened the Secretariat's international influence and prestige. The French philosopher René Maheu became Director General in 1962. He had worked in the organization since the late forties and within a few years had emerged as an influential figure. Maheu quickly gained a reputation as an efficient but ruthless administrator who was capable of bringing colleagues to tears.[452] He expanded the role of the Director General and became more assertive than his predecessors. Maheu's "personality hovered over the place like an outstretched great bird, even when he was absent," a colleague remarked. "His style was that of a little Napoleon."[453] He was also an effective diplomat who enhanced the organization's position in the world. He had tried as Assistant Director General to strengthen the organization's international influence but had

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Conference, Fourteenth Session, Fifth Plenary Meeting, 27 October 1966, 14 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 139.

[451] "Interview with Gerard Bolla," 13 January 1999, Box 2, Oral History Collection, AG 14, UA; "Interview with René Ochs," 16 December 1998, Box 2, Oral History Collection, AG 14, UA.

[452] "Interview Rex Keating," 10 March 1999, Box 2, Oral History Collection, AG 14, UA; Interview with René Ochs, 16 December 1998, Box 2, Oral History Collection, AG 14, UA.

[453] Richard Hoggart, *An Idea and its Servants: UNESCO from Within* (New York: Oxford, 1978), 148. See also Blake to DOS, "Malaise at UNESCO: Young Staff Leading Revolt Against Director-General's Leadership," 25 April 1970, Box 3225, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA; Charles Frankel, "Classified Report of the United States Delegation to the Fourteenth General Conference of UNESCO," 30 January 1967, Box 3211, CFP1967-1969, RG 59, NARA.

met resistance from Luther Evans, who wanted the organization to limit its field of vision.[454] An ethical vision infused this new assertive diplomacy. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, informed his commitment to fight for peace.[455] His growing awareness of the extent of Third World poverty shaped his vision of UNESCO's role in the world. He believed that decolonization made "expansionist" policies inevitable and that the organization should build on the "exuberance" of newly independent countries.[456] He sought to organize conferences for the "reorganization of relations between rich and poor countries, like those conferences that are held following great world conflicts to reorganize relations between [great] powers..."[457] He was articulate and emotional about the organization's commitment to help developing nations escape poverty. "I seem to hear their cry, like the ocean's roar, in which protest and anger mingle," he once confessed.[458] Maheu's leadership brought the organization to the height of its influence.

Assistant Director General Malcolm S. Adiseshiah shared Maheu's commitment to expand the organization's role in the world. "He truly had what the Americans call 'a vision,'" a colleague recalled.[459] He believed that the

[454] Edward G. Trueblood to DOS, "Assistant Director-General Maheu...," 21 June 1955, Box 1553, CFP 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA; "Interview Rex Keating," 10 March 1999, Box 2, Oral History Collection, AG 14, UA.
[455] Lyon to DOS, 16 August 1963, Box 3237, CFP 1963, RG 59, NARA.
[456] Memorandum of Conversation, "Visit of M. René Maheu, Acting Director General of UNESCO," 16 October 1962, Box 827, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[457] René Maheu, "'The Integral Development of any Man is Correlative to the Joint Development of all Men," 20 April 1967, Box 3214, CFP 1967-1969, RG 59, NARA.
[458] René Maheu as cited in Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, *Let My Country Awake: The Human Role in Development: Thoughts on the Next Ten Years* (UNESCO: Paris, 1970), 342.
[459] Interview with René Ochs, 16 December 1998, Box 2, Oral History Collection, AG 14, UA.

Secretariat should reject "conservative," overly "cautious" programs that committed the organization to "more of the same." Adiseshiah pushed his colleagues to develop "creative" new programs that could make a difference in the world.[460] He travelled so widely, giving lectures and consulting with world leaders, that colleagues began to refer to the organization as "Adiseshiah's empire."[461] Like Maheu, he fused diplomatic skill and technical expertise with an intensely ethical commitment to alleviate suffering on a mass scale. He was particularly committed to eradicating not just poverty but also inequality. International development programs had to lead not just to economic growth but also social equality and justice.[462]

The great powers also strengthened their ties with the organization. Washington began to reevaluate its relationship with UNESCO when President Eisenhower's term in office ended. John F. Kennedy arrived in the White House in 1961 with pledges to support the United Nations and the developing world. The new administration made efforts to encourage more qualified Americans to join UNESCO and contacted William Benton to again become the country's primary representative to the organization, this time with the rank of ambassador.[463] President Lyndon B. Johnson also supported the Secretariat's commitment to

[460] Malcolm Adiseshiah Memorandum to Director General, "1961-62 Planning," 2 April 1959, Folder 4, Box 2, DDG 1, UA.
[461] Records of the General Conference, Sixteenth Session, Thirty-Ninth Plenary Meeting, 14 November 1970, 16 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 1310.
[462] Eric Prabhakar, "Malcolm Adiseshiah (1910-94)."
[463] U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, "UNESCO in the UN Setting: American Service with UNESCO," 31 March 1964, Box 63, Harlan Cleveland Papers, JFKL; Henry Kellerman, "The United States and UNESCO," n.d., Box 35, Harlan Cleveland Papers, JFKL.

international educational programs through bilateral aid and support from the United States Agency for International Development.[464] Moscow strengthened its support for the organization in order to promote Soviet development models internationally. Soviet delegations to the General Conferences emphasized the "unprecedented leap from backwardness to advanced development [that] is clearly demonstrable in any Soviet State." Moscow sent distinguished experts to conferences, deployed technical experts to assist Paris with field missions, and shared constructive ideas that shaped many projects. Soviet delegates offered African delegation members university scholarships.[465] "The Soviets have apparently decided that their best is none too good for UNESCO," American observers grudgingly acknowledged.[466] The Secretariat welcomed Soviet support. Adiseshiah publicly spoke about friends from the Soviet Union and "all of the Socialist countries of Europe, who taught me many lessons in social and scientific development."[467] Maheu visited Moscow to solicit financial aid. Moscow saw the

[464] Lyndon B. Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress Proposing International Education and Health Programs," 1 February 1966, PPP; Malcolm Adiseshiah to William Benton, 17 October 1966, Folder 30, Box 9, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Chloé Maurel, "L'UNESCO Face aux Enjeux de Politique Internationale (1945-1974)," *60 Ans*, 301.

[465] Kulazhenkov Address, Records of the General Conference, Eleventh Session, Twenty-Third Meeting, 7 December 1960, 11 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC; Ilya V. Gaiduk, "L'Union Soviétique et l'UNESCO Pendant la Guerre Froide," *60 Ans*, 283; Houghton to DOS, 25 November 1960, Box 822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.

[466] Robert Wade to DOS, "Soviet Influence in UNESCO," 29 May 1965, Box 382, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA; William Benton, "Report to Assistant Secretaries Harlan Cleveland and Lucius Battle of Conversation with Director-General René Maheu," appendix to William Benton, Report Supplementing Official Report on 66th Session of the Executive Board, December 1963, Box 383, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA; William Benton to Walter Kotschnig, 21 December 1964, Box 63, Harlan Cleveland Papers, JFKL.

[467] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, "Education and Economic Growth in Asia," n. d. [1963], Folder 8, Box 3, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, "Human Resources Development in India: Some Aspects of the Economics of Education in India," 18 November 1963, Folder 9, Box 3, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, "Illiteracy - A Shame and an Opportunity," enclosed

organization as "a convenient channel for contact with underdeveloped areas" and "an ideal platform for ideological debate," Maheu acknowledged. He remained, however, eager to gain financial support.[468]

National leaders throughout Asia and Africa looked to the Secretariat's Education Department to address pressing social and political problems of postcolonial state-building. The urban intellectuals and nationalist elites who won independence sought to create robust nations. UNESCO officials and technical assistance missions helped education ministries to build schools, reform curricula, and invest in planning. The majority of their populations, however, were spread across large territories and few felt any sense of shared national identity. The anthropologist Lawrence Krader recognized this problem in a paper he prepared for the Secretariat's Social Science Department. He argued that peasants throughout Asia lived an "island-like existence" where "Ideas and information emanating from without barely and rarely reached the village." New nationalist leaders had to struggle in the monumental task of "converting a peasant into a citizen, a co-equal member of the state." Krader's analysis also reflected current thinking about other peoples scattered beyond the reach of the modern state in the Third World. The nomadic peoples of Asia and Africa presented a particular problem for nation-builders. "Politically, nomadism preserves the tribal

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in Malcolm S. Adiseshiah to Abdur Rashid, 12 May 1964, Folder 10, Box 3, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Records of the General Conference, Sixteenth Session, Thirty-Ninth Plenary Meeting, 14 November 1970, 16 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 1310.

[468] Henry J. Kellerman to DOS, "Report on Deputy Director Maheu's Visit to USSR," 23 May 1961, Box 822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; Lyon to DOS, 16 August 1963, Box 3237, CFP 1963, RG 59, NARA.

conscience and thereby also the autonomy of the tribe," one of the organization's technical assistance mission reported from Northeast Africa. "As such it conflicts with the creation of a national entity supported by people who first of all consider themselves citizens of the state and therefore tends to undermine the authority of the latter."[469] Village and nomadic life preserved fatalistic, passive, superstitious mentalities that were incompatible with economic planning. "Change comes hard" in Indian villages and African tribes, one expert argued. Local leaders make "conservative decisions" and are constrained by "a tight caste system" and "rather rigid customs" – people are "caught in the village system."[470]

National elites and economic planners envisioned their new countries as classrooms to be educated. They searched for tools and methods to teach isolated villagers to become "modern" and to think of themselves as part of a larger national community. New national leaders looked to UNESCO's Education Department as a potential resource to extend their political power over loosely integrated territory and build new nations. The organization used its intellectual resources to develop, popularize, and implement new ideas about economic and political development in the Third World. It now focused its attention on integrating the "isolated" peoples of the world into new nation-states. The organization developed two new educational strategies to achieve this goal: the expansion of mass communications and an international campaign to push back

[469] Lawrence Krader, "The Peasant of South Asia in Transition," 20 December 1957, EWMP/Conf./5, UNESDOC, 13, 61; "Report of the Educational Planning Group on their First Mission to Somalia," August 1962, WS/0862.300, UNESDOC, 27.
[470] Wilbur Schramm, *Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries* (Paris: UNESCO, 1964), 7.

against rising rates of illiteracy. These development projects in turn integrated Third World peoples into larger flows of information – both within and between nations.

The Circulation of Knowledge

The postcolonial leaders who won independence for their nations faced new strategic challenges. Governments throughout Asia, the Middle East and, especially, Africa confronted the need to strengthen their economies, provide social services for the people, and forge national unity out of great diversity. Most planners were mesmerized by the promise of industrialization and land reform. Many leaders also believed that educational reform would strengthen their states. The anticolonial struggle had shaped their attitudes towards the role that schools and teachers would play in nation-building. Thirty-four chief executives from across Africa and Asia earned degrees in Western universities. In many of their autobiographies, studying at schools and universities in London and Paris was the decisive experience that transformed budding intellectuals into anticolonial agitators. The experience of schooling helped to create shared experiences among colonial educated elite that allowed them to transcend religious, linguistic, ethnic, and tribal difference. Learning the colonizer's language helped them to communicate despite the many different mother tongues that proliferated throughout their countries. Colonial peoples with a secondary or post-secondary

education were also the backbone of political support for the anticolonial movements – schoolteachers dominated local village politics and later the legislative and executive branches of new governments. "The political revolution in Africa could be called a revolution by schoolmasters," some observers suggested.[471]

Leaders across the developing world introduced plans to spread this educational revolution by expanding primary and secondary school enrollment. They faced a bewildering array of challenges and competing demands for national resources and therefore solicited aid and advice from foreign powers. Washington deployed Peace Corps volunteers, usually young university graduates, to start schools in local communities. At the same time, Moscow's Friendship University provided advanced training and post-secondary schooling for developing nations and East Berlin granted generous stipends for Arab and African students. Even Cuba granted scholarships at the University of Havana to Africa's liberation movements and deployed school teachers throughout Latin America.[472] These countries could wield great financial resources and offered direct aid to impoverished nations. It was UNESCO, however, that became the most influential authority in international educational planning.

[471] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War*, chapter 3; David B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance*, 334-340; "Introduction," L. Gray Cowan, James O'Connell, and David G. Scanlon, eds., *Education and Nation-Building in Africa* (London: Praeger, 1965), 16-42.
[472] For the Peace Corps, see Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the Sixties* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). For Germany, see William Glenn Gray, *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 89. For Cuba, see Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

The organization's ideas about the connection between education and economic development caught on internationally. Moscow's 1957 announcement that it had placed an artificial satellite in earth's orbit pushed Washington to expand funding for education and inspired economists to study the role of schools in national security and economics.[473] Some economists argued that the classical factors of production (capital, natural resources, and manpower) could not account for economic growth and suggested that investment in education could encourage economic productivity.[474] The University of Chicago economist Theodore W. Schultz was perplexed by the economic expansion of the postwar era. He was particularly interested in the rapid advancements that Germany and Japan had made since the end of the war. He theorized that their investment in education had created a dynamic and productive workforce that contributed to national recovery. Schultz's writings focused on investment. He argued that increasing funding for schools and teachers would lead to a greater rate of return through enhanced productivity and, ultimately, national economic growth. Schultz's ideas, one economist remarked, had a "shock effect" on the field that forced other professionals to grapple with his ideas. Along with colleagues like Jacob Mincer and Gary Becker, his ideas helped to create a new branch of economics - "human capital theory" - that shaped the international development

[473] Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), chapter 3; Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
[474] M. Debeauvais, "The Concept of Human Capital," *International Social Science Journal* XIV, no. 4 (1962), 670.

policies of the era.[475] Soviet bloc economics arrived at similar conclusions. Moscow State University economist Stanislav Strumilin emerged as one of the country's most influential economic thinkers. He developed statistical models that shaped the Soviet Union's planned economy and five year plans. Labor productivity in particular grabbed his attention. Strumilin demonstrated, using statistics provided by Moscow's state planning committee GOSPLAN, "specialized workers provide the solution to all problems" by preparing labor for technological advancement. When UNESCO published one of his articles, "The Economics of Education in the USSR," he gained a new international audience and expanded the influence of Soviet economic ideas.[476] The growing influence of these economic ideas opened new opportunities for the global expansion of educational opportunity.

UNESCO had already gained worldwide prestige during its first fifteen years as the preeminent authority in international educational planning. The idea of Fundamental Education shaped the international community's educational activities (See Chapter 1). Meager financial resources limited the Education Department's ambitions. International funding institutions like the World Bank were reluctant to get involved in a risky investment like education, which offered

[475] Mary Jean Bowman, "On Theodore W. Schultz's Contributions to Economics," *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 82, no. 1 (1980), 80-107; Theodore W. Schultz, "Investment in Human Capital," *The American Economic Review* 51, no. 1 (March 1961), 1-17; Gary S. Becker, "Underinvestment in College Education?," *The American Economic Review* 50, no. 2 (May 1960), 346-354; Jacob Mincer, "Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution," *Journal of Political Economy* 66, no 4 (1958), 281-302.
[476] Stanislav Strumilin, "The Economics of Education in the U.S.S.R.," *International Social Science Journal* XIV, no. 4 (1962), 633-647.

little rate of return. Africa's political transformation led the international community to reassess aid and investment policies. The General Assembly in New York authorized the creation of a Special Fund in 1960 to finance and accelerate economic development. The fund provided the Secretariat with fifty million dollars, which doubled the organization's regular budget resources and allowed it to expand its technical assistance programs.[477] Renewed interest in the Fundamental Education program and the establishment of human capital theory redirected attention towards investment in education. The Economic and Social Council acknowledged in June 1960 that education was an essential factor in economic development and asked the Secretariat in Paris to develop and implement educational programs in developing countries.[478] A meeting between senior members of ECOSOC a year later demonstrated the consensus that had begun to form around the Secretariat's official positions. Mekhi Abbas, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "agreed with UNESCO that education planning should be part of overall development planning in every country" and Paul Hoffman, the Special Fund's Managing Director, sounded "a note of warning" about the "urgency of the situation in Africa" and exhorted the specialized agencies "to get on with the job."[479] The World Bank also conceded the importance of education in economic growth and made its first

[477] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, "United Nations Special Fund," 20 June 1960, Folder 5, Box 2, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[478] Gian Franco Pompei, "History of the Organization," *In the Minds of Men: UNESCO 1946-1971*, 37.
[479] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to the Director General, "ACC Sub-Committee on Education and Training," 12 July 1961, Folder 6, Box 2, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.

investment in education - to Tunisia - in 1962. The decision opened a flood of new investments in international educational programs, mostly through UNESCO. International developments - the spread of independent nations throughout Africa and the expansion of the United Nations' financial resources - provided the Secretariat with new opportunities to assume leadership over international educational planning.

Malcolm Adiseshiah became the Secretariat's most passionate educational missionary. He believed the organization had moral and intellectual authority in the world. It could, he told Maheu, rouse the "the conscience of governments" and make them "ashamed of ignorance, illiteracy and poverty."[480] He negotiated with diplomats, advised education ministers, lectured think-tanks and university economics departments, and spoke with national leaders throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He tried to convince his audiences that investing in education enhanced the state's productive capacity. Adiseshiah sought to overcome traditional convictions that investment in heavy industry was the key to economic growth. Tight national budgets required hard choices between investment in education on the one hand and more promising investments in agricultural modernization, transportation infrastructure, and mass industrialization. "Education is also an industry," Adiseshiah replied to skeptics. "A college is a factory." Schools, universities, and training centers strengthened each country's

[480] Malcolm Adiseshiah to René Maheu, 5 March 1956, Folder 40, Box 12, DDG 1, AG 8, UA. See also Malcolm S. Adiseshiah to Tor Gjesdal, 7 July 1965, Folder 13, Box 4, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, "UNESCO: Some Recent Achievements," enclosed in Malcolm S. Adiseshiah to A. S. Raman, 27 September 1965, Folder 14, Box 4, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.

"socio-cultural infra-structure" and increased the "circulation of knowledge." The spread of information made it easier for labor to develop new technical skills that could ultimately be used to expand economic output.[481] Education could also develop new mentalities and attitudes required for economic mobilization. Science classes could make the young more adaptable to change and more willing to learn new skills.[482] An "urgent and rapid expansion of secondary schools and secondary school graduates" was necessary for "the conservation of the political independence on the newly independent countries," he concluded.[483]

The Secretariat established new international institutions to spread these ideas - the most important of which was the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP). The World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also developed educational programs and sought to institutionalize education as an international activity. The OECD organized a conference in Washington in October 1961 to discuss and coordinate ideas. It focused on the "break-through" in ideas about educational investment and concluded that an international institute should be established to share new

[481] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Address to the Consultation on the Role of Christian Higher Education in Indian National Development Today, "Education as a Factor in National Development," 1967, Folder 66, Box 19, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, *Let My Country Awake*, 85; Malcolm S. Adiseshiah paper, "Human Resources Development in India: Some Aspects of the Economics of Education in India," 18 November 1963, Folder 9, Box 3, DDG 1, AG 8, UA. For a good discussion of his ideas, see Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, "Education and Economic Growth in Asia," n. d. [1963], Folder 8, Box 3, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[482] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah paper, "Human Resources Development in India: Some Aspects of the Economics of Education in India," 18 November 1963, Folder 9, Box 3, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[483] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Statement to the General Assembly of the World Veterans Federation, "Education in the Service of Peace," 18 April 1961, Folder 6, Box 2, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.

theories and train government officials.[484] René Maheu contacted Philip H. Coombs, who served as President Kennedy's first Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Culture, to help develop a plan for such an institute. Coombs urged the Secretariat to establish a semi-autonomous institution - "just like a university," he recalled - that would conduct research, develop new ideas, and train government officials. Since international educational planning was a "new area of knowledge, new even to us in [Secretariat] headquarters," Adiseshiah approved the plan. Discussions began to take place among experts and advisors from all these international organizations and all of them were preoccupied by the idea of "autonomy" - experts had to conduct research without outside interference. Adiseshiah objected and argued that only UNESCO should be responsible for coordinating aid and sending missions, since UNESCO was the "conscience of the world of education." He successfully made the IIEP a semi-independent institution tied to the Secretariat.[485] The IIEP subsequently helped national education ministers to develop new strategies. "If you go to any Member State," Adiseshiah boasted twenty years later, "you will find in the Ministry of Education, a planning cell, a planning body, a planning machine, and at the head of it a man or a woman who has been trained by the IIEP."[486]

[484] Remarks by Secretary Rusk, 16 October 1961, *DOSB* 781 (1961), 820; H. L. Elvin, "Education and Economic Growth: O.E.C.D. Conference: Washington, October 1961," *International Review of Education* 7, no. 4 (1961), 484-486.
[485] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to René Maheu, "Unesco's Educational Programme in Laos," 25 October 1962, Folder 7, Box 2, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Guy Benveniste, "Creation of the International Institute for Educational Planning," *Educational Planning* 16, no. 3 (2007).
[486] Adiseshiah Speech to the International Institute of Educational Planning, twenty-fifth anniversary celebration, 1988, as cited in Eric Prabhakar, "Malcolm Adiseshiah (1910-94)," 535-

The Secretariat also established regional training centers in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Consultants and experts deployed to these institutes - usually small offices provided by host governments - tried to overcome logistical difficulties and foster the exchange of ideas across continents. The consultant who headed the Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration in New Delhi confronted bewildering cultural and linguistic challenges. There were benefits to learning about other peoples' "ways and problems." But there were also major problems with large multi-cultural meetings. "I think that the 'international' character of the audience makes it more difficult to stimulate active participation in discussions," he complained, and concluded that "the international and heterogenous nature of our course[s] adds to the difficulties." Their goals remained "to improvise, alter, test, experiment, adapt."[487] The African Regional Center for Education in Accra faced similar challenges. The trilingual working environment - English, French, and the native African language - tested most staff members and guests. The center's head travelled widely throughout the continent, attended regional conferences, contacted education ministries, and established regional networks. He concluded from these discussions with officials across the continent that the UNESCO

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51. For Coombs' role in the IIEP, see Philip H. Coombs, "The International Institute for Educational Planning," *International Review of Education* 12, no. 3 (1966), 333-345; Philip H. Coombs, "Recalling the Origins of Unesco's International Institute for Educational Planning," 1992, available online: http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/IIEPOrigins.pdf.

[487] J.A.Y. Miller, "Brief Report of Period April-December, 1965 and Draft Final Report," UNESDOC.

regional center "could serve an extremely useful purpose" by facilitating the exchange of information and ideas between education ministries in the region.[488]

The Secretariat also used its influence to establish international standards in the field of education planning. A series of regional conferences assembled dozens of nations and convinced them to expand compulsory primary education. Seventeen states from across Asia assembled in Karachi in December 1959 to establish regional targets for their education programs. The meeting discussions recommended that states should provide free and compulsory primary education by 1980. These recommendations, which became known as the Karachi Plan, aimed to increase student enrollment from 66 to 277 million, train 5.5 million new teachers, and construct 5.5 million new class rooms.[489] Contemporary evidence demonstrated that the Karachi Plan helped to improve educational standards throughout the early sixties. A. F. M. K. Rahman, who headed UNESCO's regional office in Bangkok, praised the "heroic efforts" and financial sacrifices that local governments had made to expand primary education.[490] According to Adiseshiah, who was well-connected in New Delhi, the Karachi Plan had

[488] "Report on UNESCO Mission by Mr. J. R. Davidson, Chief, Programme Division, UNESCO Regional Centre for Education in Africa, Accra to Madagascar 30th June to 14th July, 1962"; "Report on UNESCO Mission by Mr. J. R. Davidson, Chief, Programme Division, UNESCO Regional Centre for Education in Africa, Accra to Nyasaland 17th-18th July, 1962"; J. R. Davidson to Director, Education Department, UNESCO, 4 September 1962, all available in ED/4113/1, UNESDOC.

[489] Benjamin C. Duke, "The Karachi Plan: Master Design for Compulsory Education in Asia," *International Review of Education* 12, no. 1 (1966), 73-79; Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, "Primary Education in Asia," 29 February 1960, Folder 5, AG 8, DDG 1, Box 2, UA.

[490] A. F. M. K. Rahman, "Educational Developments in Asia," *International Review of Education* 8, no. 3/4 (1962), 257-275.

influenced a high-level planning group assembled to draft the educational sections of India's fourth five-year plan.[491]

Strengthening regional international cooperation played a larger role in Africa. Adiseshiah proposed convening a conference in Ethiopia that would "mobilize" African leaders. He discussed educational issues with new leaders while traveling through West Africa and established the groundwork for the upcoming Addis Ababa Conference.[492] At a nighttime meeting with three colleagues, the Assistant Director General made it clear that he wanted to push African leaders to expand their commitment to educational investment: "They all say they love Africa. I want them to put a price tag on their love."[493] The Addis Ababa Conference, like the Karachi Conference, developed a regional plan and established common targets for the expansion of educational programs. The conference also chose 1980 as the date by which proposals should be achieved. African planners solicited advice about what share of their national budgets should be devoted to educational planning and how to coordinate their national efforts with multilateral and bilateral development agencies. The difference between needs and available resources helped to stimulate international aid for the

[491] Malcolm Adiseshiah Memorandum to Deputy Director General, "Educational Planning in India," 24 June 1964, Folder 10, Box 3, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[492] "Third Meeting of Permanent Delegates and Representatives of African Member States for Informal Consultation on the African Programme," 10 May 1961, Folder 6, Box 2, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[493] René Ochs, "La Conférence des Etats Africains sur le Développement de l'éducation en Afrique, Addis-Abeba, 21-25 Mai 1961," *60 Ans*, 478.

region.[494] The conference created a platform for African officials to talk to each other and develop regional links.[495] René Ochs, who helped Adiseshiah plan the conference, recalled that it "illuminated the African continent's fundamental unity beyond its extreme diversity." African education ministers in turn believed that the Addis Ababa Plan would "contribute[d] to the concept of unification of the African continent."[496] UNESCO's efforts to facilitate international cooperation also spread educational ideas and policies between continents. Asian education ministers, for example, followed the Addis Ababa Conference closely. Their "brother Ministers in Africa," they said, influenced their own thinking and influenced their decision to raise their budgets.[497]

The organization had a profound influence on Africa's educational infrastructure. Although European colonial administrators had established standardized schools and educational systems, their curricula were modeled on the cultural and political demands of Britain and France. Furthermore, they were often designed to serve the administrative interests of the colonial bureaucracy. The Secretariat responded to complaints that African reformers needed to

[494] "Third Meeting of Permanent Delegates and Representatives of African Member States for Informal Consultation on the African Programme," 10 May 1961, Folder 6, Box 2, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; William A. Eteki-Mboumoua, "Africa," 159-161; René Ochs, "La Conférence des Etats Africains," 478.

[495] For contemporary assessments, see "Introduction," *Education and Nation-Building in Africa*, 14; Casely M. O. Maté, "Addis Ababa in Retrospect: An Evaluation of Experience Since the 1961 Conference," Richard Jolly, ed., Published for the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom, *Education in Africa: Research and Action* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969).

[496] René Ochs, "La Conférence des Etats Africains," 478; "Evidence Emerging from the Implementation of the Addis Ababa Plan," 14 February 1964, AFMIN/6, UNESDOC, 22.

[497] "Statement," Annex I to "Report on Meeting of Ministers of Education of Asian Member States," 12 April 1962, Folder 7, Box 2, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.

decolonize their educational curricula, which were "patterned on European models" and geared towards the demands of colonial administration. This led, Maheu agreed, to the "disassociation of secondary schooling from indigenous culture and frequently from local environmental interests and needs."[498] Educational infrastructure was often inadequate for independent states. Most African students who wanted to pursue advanced degrees had to travel to London and Paris for postsecondary training. Government officials made it clear that new curricula "should promote the unification of Africa, encourage appreciation of African culture and develop the human resources for meeting manpower needs."[499] The Secretariat deployed hundreds of specialists to African countries to help develop new curricula and train new primary and secondary school teachers.

The most pressing demand was the need for educated manpower. African countries lacked indigenous specialists who could direct national institutions and industries. Advanced technical training was required for key sectors - the military, police, public works, agriculture, transportation and communications, as well as private-sector industries - that were crucial for the preservation of national independence. As Somalia's Minister of Education worried, "Unless steps are taken from now on to start more technical institutions to produce the required manpower, the shortage will be acute, hampering the execution of development

[498] René Maheu Statement, "Importance of General Secondary Education in Developing Economies," n.d., enclosed in Adiseshiah to C.V. Narasimhan, 20 May 1960, Folder 40, Box 12, DDG 1, AG 8, UA. See also Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, "Education and Development," n. d. [September 1961], Folder 6, Box 2, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.

[499] "The Contribution of African National Commissions to the Implementation of the Addis Ababa Plan for Educational Development and the Recommendations of the Tananarive Conference on Higher Education," 6 June 1963, AFNAC/4, UNESDOC.

plans and governmental activities."[500] These manpower shortages posed serious threats to young countries. Nigeria was "virtually in the position of a country at war" and looked towards schools to strengthen national unity, one educational mission reported.[501] Advisers deemphasized the "classical" educational curriculums imposed by Europeans - mission reports complained about classes on such subjects as ancient Greek history, British politics, and "obscure or dull writers of past centuries" - and joined a "revolt against the bookishness of earlier learning." They introduced technical training based on the "Scientific Approach" intended to help new nations strengthen their economies.[502]

Somalia's effort to reform its educational system illustrates the challenges that UNESCO faced in postcolonial Africa. The country had been divided into two territories: Britain administered the northern region while Italy controlled the south. Independent Somalia inherited their educational systems, which meant that students from the north had "entirely different intellectual backgrounds" from students in the south. The shortage of trained professionals handicapped the government's ability to deal with these new challenges. The Secretariat's Chief of Mission Abdul Hamid Kadhim arrived in Mogadishu in 1961 and quickly established contacts with the government's educational authorities. "There are

[500] Somali Minister of Education statement to UNESCO consultant, as cited in F. A. Varley Mission Report, "Somalia: Survey of Technical Education," February 1969, FR/RP/CONSULTANT, UNESDOC, 19.
[501] A. H. Thom, "Nigeria: Primary and Secondary Education," February 1966, WS/0266.167.EDS, UNESDOC, 125.
[502] P. Arreteau Mission Report, "Uganda: Rural Eduction in Primary Schools," March 1969, 1140/BMS.RD/APS, UNESDOC, 21; A. H. Thom, "Nigeria: Primary and Secondary Education," 125; F. A. Varley Mission Report, "Somalia: Survey of Technical Education," February 1969, 1254/BMS.RD/SCT, UNESDOC, 5; A. Hunt Cooke Mission Report, "Malawi: Primary Education," October 1968, 876/BMS.RD/EDM, UNESDOC.

few competent people at the present who could undertake [their] responsibilities." The Education Minister and Director General of Education "are able, sincere and devoted, but they are seriously handicapped by the system which they have inherited and the lack of well trained personnel," he reported to the Secretariat.[503]

Mogadishu relied on the Secretariat to help unify its educational system and overcome its own scarce resources and lack of expertise. The Secretariat deployed an Educational Planning Group (EPG) to Somalia in March 1962 to draft a report on educational problems in the country. The EPG placed educational development within a broad economic framework. They connected educational reform with such economic priorities as the settling of nomadic tribes, shifting agriculture from subsistence to the market system, and spreading knowledge of soil conservation. "General education at school" would foster important "human qualities, like industry, discipline, punctuality, reliability, [and a] sense of national responsibility" that can contribute to the "capacity of creating wealth" in the country. Their recommendations also stressed that educational reform would strengthen and extend the authority of the state. Compulsory education schemes would remove the country's youth from parents, "bound to their traditional pattern of life," and train them in their government's "national ideal."[504] The EPG also proposed a series of educational reforms to assist Somalia in "the task of establishing cohesion between different parts of the country" and

[503] "First Report Submitted by Abdul Hamid Kadhim, Chief of the UNESCO Mission in the Somali Republic," 12 November 1961, UNESDOC, 5.
[504] "Report of the Educational Planning Group on their First Mission to Somalia," 8, 26-27, 43.

strengthening the state's capacity to govern.[505] They recommended that the nation's schools should teach English as the official second language in order to foster "greater unity" within the new nation. "Besides it is evident that in the world of today English as a language opens up to one who has sufficient command of it vast areas," they concluded.[506] The Planning Committee of the Ministry of Education adopted the EPG report and incorporated it with minor revisions into Somalia's First Five Year Plan (1963-1967).[507]

The Secretariat deployed educational specialists to help Mogadishu implement the plans. The Secretariat's Chief of Mission "continuously" responded to questions and queries from the Minister and Director General of Education.[508] A UNESCO expert was assigned in 1964 to develop an integrated curriculum for primary and elementary school systems.[509] Teams helped to choose and commission textbooks about Somalia, "preferably by Somali authors," to enculturate schoolchildren in national and African politics and culture.[510] A language expert prepared syllabi for English classes and concluded in 1967 that

[505] "Report of the Educational Planning Group on their First Mission to Somalia," 125.
[506] "Report of the Educational Planning Group on their First Mission to Somalia," 26.
[507] R. Ruiter, "Somalia: Educational Planning," November 1964, WS/1064.34.BMS, UNESDOC, 2.
[508] Abdul Hamid Kadhim, "Annual Report Covering Activities from 21 June 1961 to 20 June 1962," 20 June 1962, UNESDOC, 24.
[509] W.A.B. Goodwin Mission Reports, "Somalia: Curriculum Development," December 1970, FR/TA/SOMALED 20, UNESCDOC, 3.
[510] W.A.B. Goodwin Mission Reports, "Somalia: Curriculum Development," 13; W. Perry, H. Schmutter, and J. B. Pride, "Report of the UNESCO Advisory Mission on Higher Education to the Somali Republic," December 1964, WS/0565.35.EDS, UNESDOC, 36; M. El-Shibiny, "Somalia: Teacher Training," March 1970, 1826/BMS.RD/EDM, UNESDOC, 8.

"English teaching has taken firm roots" in the country.[511] These missions trained teachers and establish training institutions. Because there were no qualified Somali mathematics teachers, one advisor even assumed teaching responsibilities in secondary schools in the northwestern city of Sheikh.[512]

These educational missions appealed to many developing countries for political reasons. According to Cameroon's Education Minister, new states wanted "aid from a special source, with a reassuring name, which could supplement and blend with bilateral aid and dilute certain of its anachronisms."[513] The Secretariat typically deployed multinational teams to advise governments on behalf of the organization. They theoretically represented not their own national governments but rather the international community. An educational mission in Northeast Africa reported that the British Council, Peace Corps, and USAID supported their development projects but also tried to "centralize all activities into their hands."[514] Local governments accepted financial and technical aid from national governments, which commanded more extensive resources, but looked to international organizations as an alternative. Ethiopian officials, for example, were "very anxious" to gain UNESCO's multilateral assistance to balance the

[511] Abdalla A. Metwally, "Somalia: English Teacher Training," September 1967, 260/RD/EDS, UNESDOC.
[512] Helge Foss, "Final Report," May 1966, SOMALED 13, UNESDOC, 4.
[513] William Eteki Mboumoua, as cited in Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, *Let My Country Awake*, 340.
[514] Abdalla A. Metwally, "Somalia: English Teacher Training," September 1967, 260/RD/EDS, UNESDOC, 20.

"enormous" bilateral aid it was receiving from the United States.[515] The Secretariat also attracted experts who wanted to avoid the diplomatic strings that hampered bilateral aid programs. Philip Coombs, for example, was anxious to escape the diplomatic constraints on Washington's bilateral aid programs, which tried to "sell" their domestic values, and embraced new opportunities in Paris.[516]

UNESCO had an enormous impact on the global expansion of educational opportunity. International conferences, meetings, and seminars extended networks of educators, developed links between teachers and economists, and spread a common discourse about education and development throughout the world. These ideas influenced international funding agencies to open new sources of funding for developing countries. The Secretariat's technical assistance missions directly prepared official policies for at least forty-two countries by 1965.[517] According to one Indian official, the Secretariat helped to establish "a kind of international charter or code of public education, a body of educational doctrine of very wide scope and importance."[518]

[515] "Report on UNESCO Mission by Mr. J. R. Davidson, Chief, Programme Division, UNESCO Regional Centre for Education in Africa, Accra to Ethiopia 4th August to 9th August 1962," ED/4113/1, UNESDOC, 15.
[516] Philip H. Coombs, "Recalling the Origins of Unesco's International Institute for Educational Planning."
[517] Julia Resnik, "International Organizations, the 'Education-Economic Growth' Black Box, and the Development of World Education Culture," *Comparative Education Review* 50, no. 2 (May 2006), 173-195; Connie McNeely, "Prescribing National Education Policies: The Role of International Organizations," *Comparative Education Review* 39, no. 4 (November 1995), 483-507.
[518] J. C. Aggarwal, *UNESCO's Contribution Towards World Education* (New Delhi: Arya Book Depot, 1971).

Rural Awakenings

The rapid development of communications technology captivated the imagination of statesmen and diplomats in the first half of the twentieth century and fueled Washington's efforts to expand the free flow of information after the war. But Americans were not the only proponents of mass communications. Anticolonial nationalists believed that harnessing the power of broadcasting could enhance their resistance to imperial subjugation and extend the reach of the nation-state. Intellectuals like Frantz Fanon argued that liberation movements' use of broadcasting spread revolution to the masses - "Having a radio seriously meant going to war." "Radio has changed everything," Gamal Abdel Nasser recognized, by bringing "the most remote villages" under the influence of the postcolonial state. In Latin America, Fidel Castro spread revolutionary fervor and Cuban influence throughout the region through fiery radio broadcasts - a force which led Chilean President Eduardo Frei to remark that "the transistor is a much more revolutionary factor than Karl Marx."[519] Many development experts believed that the global reach of new communications technology could "awaken" remote villagers and inspire them to modernize their lifestyles.[520] Third World states were

[519] Gamal Abdel Nasser cited in Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 17; Frantz Fanon, "This is the Voice of Algeria," *A Dying Colonialism*, translated by Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1967 [1959]), 93; Eduardo Frei as cited in Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, chapter 2.
[520] Nicole Sackley, "The Village as Cold War Site: Experts, Development, and the History of Rural Reconstruction," *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 3 (2011): 491.

interested in acquiring technical assistance and means to enhance their broadcasting abilities.

The Secretariat's Mass Communications Department emerged as a center for new ideas about the role of information and communication in developing nations. The organization's early founders thought about communications technology as a means to extend educational opportunity and to teach the world.[521] Tor Gjesdal, who headed the Mass Communications Department, argued that communications technology - especially radio - was "an attribute of national independence." Since "radio can be an essential link between government and people," communications technology should become a nation-building tool. This conviction that media was "an invaluable aid in administration and civic education" shaped the organization's approach to communications development. The Mass Communications Department and the Education Department worked together to "multiply the teacher and extend the school" across great distances.[522] Expanding communications infrastructure would broaden the state's influence beyond schools, universities, and training institutes.

American social scientists had a big impact on the Secretariat's communications policies. Daniel Lerner helped to launch American academic interest in communications, especially after he published the influential 1958

[521] See for example, John Grierson, "Production Unit Planned: Mass Media to be Used for Peace," *Unesco Courier* 1 (1948).
[522] Tor Gjesdal, "The Mass Media of Communication - A Factor in Economic and Social Development," 23 October 1962; "Statement by Tor Gjesdal, Director of the Department of Mass Communication, UNESCO, to the 18th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 15 March-14 April 1962," both in Folder 11, Box 393, WBP, UCA.

book *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, one of the major works in the emerging canon on modernization theory in American social science. He argued that literacy and communications development were the key factors that led to the modernization of "traditional" societies. Radios and newspapers exposed uneducated peoples to new ideas and thereby made them more receptive to social change.[523] Wilbur Schramm also developed these ideas and popularized them internationally. The Ohio native started his career as a writer, although his interests expanded and began to encompass the social and political challenges of the interwar era. Schramm developed a life-long interest in communications when Washington's Office of War Information hired him in 1941 to analyze the role of propaganda in the war effort. He pioneered the field of communications studies in American academia in the years after the war. Schramm quickly became a celebrity among the growing circle of American development experts. He headed the Institute for Communication Research at Stanford University, cooperated with Daniel Lerner at MIT's Center for International Studies, and briefed the White House on the role of communications technology in American development programs. He also travelled widely through newly independent nations, working with cabinet ministers in Africa and village leaders in India, to propagate his faith in communications technology. William

[523] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958). For Lerner's political and intellectual influence, see Matthew F. Jacobs, *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 173.

Benton, who had spent decades championing the expansion of international communications, recognized Schramm as a "world leader."[524]

Schramm spread a simple message: communications technology "can build nations." He argued that new leaders required communications infrastructure to bind new nations together. The "euphoria of revolution" and the "charisma of the leader" could create a temporary sense of national unity when anticolonial liberation movements opposed foreign oppression, but mass communications were necessary to foster an enduring sense of national cohesion.[525] Nations, Schramm emphasized, required new social bonds between their citizens. People had to conceive of themselves as part of a larger community.[526] He argued that the radio receiver - cheap and easily transportable - was the glue that would bind new nations. For villagers, "the noisy little receiver became a magic carpet to carry them beyond the horizons they had known." People were amazed when central governments addressed them and invited them to participate in national life. Schramm, like Lerner, also emphasized that communications and mass media could modernize mentalities. Communications "can help people in a developing country to understand how other people live, and

[524] William Benton to Wilbur Schramm, 11 November 1964, Box 396, WBP, UCA. See also Records of the General Conference, Thirteenth Session, Nineteenth Plenary Meeting, 30 October 1964, 13 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 570. For Schramm's international activities, see Chunfeng Lin and John Nerone, "The 'Great Uncle of Dissemination': Wilbur Schramm and Communication Study in China," *The International History of Communication Study*, chapter 18.
[525] Wilbur Schramm Address, "The Role of Communication," Tenth National Conference of the United States Commission for UNESCO, Fourth Plenary Session, 18 November 1965, Box 26, Luther Evans Papers, Columbia University Library, New York City.
[526] Wilbur Schramm and Gerald F. Winfield, "New Uses of Mass Communication for the Promotion of Economic and Social Development," 15 December 1963, WS/1163.109/MC, UNESDOC, 2.

consequently to look at their own lives with new insight." Schramm, invoking Daniel Lerner's ideas, believed that media can make villagers more "empathetic" and understanding of foreign cultures and ideas: "Thus the media, by bringing what is distant near and making what is strange understandable, can help to bridge the transition between traditional and modern society."[527] Schramm found a spiritual home in UNESCO. He was often seen stepping out of elevators and engaging in corridor conversations in the Secretariat headquarters in Paris. He impressed Maheu, worked with the Mass Communications Department, and helped to plan some of the organization's major conferences.[528] The Secretariat in turn helped to establish Schramm's reputation by publishing his book *Mass Media and National Development* in 1964. The Mass Communications Department promoted it as a "handbook" for developing nations. Critics referred to it as the "UNESCO bible on the topic."[529] Schramm's ideas shaped the organization's approach to communications development over the course of the decade.

The Secretariat promoted communications development throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America through regional conferences, technical assistance missions, and publicity campaigns. The Secretariat's first priority was to enhance the flow of information in developing nations. Officials warned about "information famines" that threatened to starve the developing world if

[527] Wilbur Schramm, *Mass Media and National Development*, 20, 127, 129.
[528] Memorandum of Conversation, "UNESCO Problems of Current and Continuing Interest," 21 January 1965, enclosed in Robert Wade to DOS, 28 January 1965, Box 383, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.
[529] Tor Gjesdal Circular Letter, "Mass Media and National Development," n.d. [December 1964], 55-8-UNESCO-1, Volume 10563, LAC; Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media are American: Anglo-America Media in the World* (London: Constable, 1977), 209.

communications systems did not meet the challenge.[530] Secretariat specialists promoted the idea that radios, televisions sets, and newspapers were as important for new nations as roads, airports, and hospitals. A flurry of international conferences established targets for the number of newspapers and radio receivers in developing countries. One report found that communications problems were "hindering development" and "noted that the countries suffering most acutely from poverty and illiteracy were also the poorest in communication facilities."[531]

The Secretariat tried to enhance national broadcasting capabilities throughout Asia by fostering regional cooperation among broadcasting groups and communications specialists. A 1960 meeting in Thailand brought together press experts from fourteen Asian countries with the intention of encouraging the expansion of Asian news agencies, to establish news agencies in countries where they did not yet exist, and facilitate the news exchanges between countries and regions. The Bangkok Conference concluded by establishing the Organization of Asian News Agencies, which facilitated regular meetings among Asian news agency officials.[532] Schramm noticed the "excitement of these Asian mass media

[530] Makaminam Makagiansar, "UNESCO and World Problems of Communication," *Unesco Courier* (April 1977), 6.
[531] Wilbur Schramm, "Report of the United States Delegation to the UNESCO Meeting on the Development of Information Media in Southeast Asia," 15 February 1960, Box 819, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; Philip L. Soljak, "Press Groups to Receive Plan for Development of Media in Asia," n.d. [1960], enclosed in P. Soljak to N. Lund, 307 (5) A 06 (573) "60" TA/19, AG 8, UA.
[532] "Co-Operation of National Commissions in the Development of the Communication Media and their Use for Beneficial Purposes in Asia," n.d. [1963?], enclosed in Tor Gjesdal to J. Chevalier, 307 (5) A 06 (573) "60" TA/19, AG 8, UA; Julian Behrstock, "News, Politics and Unesco's Wrong Turn," *International Herald Tribune* (7 November 1978), FCO 58/1229, UKNA.

people at coming together - most of them for the first time."[533] The meeting established common priorities and reference points for national governments. The meeting's recommendation that there be a "daily newspaper in every city of 50, 000 or over" became a standard target in the region. Broadcasting could lead to a "rural awakening" and help farmers to "get out of a mood of rural isolation and recognize that they are participants in the larger adventure of the whole development of the nation and of Asia."[534]

African officials were similarly interested in the possibility that communications systems could strengthen new nation-states. The Organization for African Unity believed that the organization could reform the vestiges of the colonial telecommunications networks that still made new African states dependent on Western powers for their information needs. The OAU Secretary-General informed the Secretariat's leading communications official that the organization could contribute to the "furtherance of African unity."[535] African officials were also eager to use communications technology domestically to mobilize their countries. African delegates at one conference, an American observer noted, "were preoccupied with the need not only to communicate more effectively with present audiences but to develop contacts in depth with untouched masses... Delegates seemed obsessed with the massive problem of

[533] Wilbur Schramm, "Report of the United States Delegation to the UNESCO Meeting on the Development of Information Media in Southeast Asia," 15 February 1960, Box 819, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[534] Meeting on Broadcasting in the Service of Education and Development in Asia, "Final Report and Recommendations," 22 May 1966, Box 3339, CFP1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.
[535] Tor Gjesdal memorandum to René Maheu, "Consultations in Addis Ababa on mass communications programme," 24 January 1964, File "MC," Box 3, CAB 5, AG 8, UA.

coping with rural masses untouched by modern media who constituted a large majority of their populations in most cases." Isolated rural masses posed "a fundamental challenge to political and social cohesion" in these countries and new communications systems appeared to be the solution.[536]

The Secretariat organized technical assistance missions to plan and organize new communications projects and had a great impact on India. New Delhi was committed to expanding its influence throughout the country's thousands of scattered and isolated villages. The idea of a primordial and premodern village community, escaping the centralizing and progressive pull of the modern nation-state, emerged in nineteenth-century Anglo-Indian political thought and persisted among many of New Delhi's political and intellectual leaders. Jawaharlal Nehru believed that the cities represented modernity - the rationalism and cosmopolitanism necessary for a modern sovereign state - and tried to spread their influence across the country. Nehru's India was also committed to democratic governance. He therefore launched a "community development" program in 1952, which Nehru believed could serve both economic and political needs: increasing food production and strengthening national cohesion by teaching about citizenship. New Delhi looked to the international community to help develop India's village communities and mobilize the

[536] Robert E. Hartland, "Report of the United States Delegation to the UNESCO Meeting of Experts on the Development of Information Media in Africa," 26 March 1962, Box 825, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.

people.[537] The Secretariat's ideas about the power of communications technology to "build nations" impressed New Delhi. All India Radio was responsible for developing village broadcasting projects. The Indian government in September 1954 introduced a scheme that would expand the number of communal radio receivers. Poor programming, however, undermined these early attempts to use radio to reach the villages. AIR achieved success, however, after the Secretariat approached New Delhi in May 1955 with a proposal to introduce a new broadcasting scheme that it had discovered in Canada.[538]

Twenty years earlier, the Canadian government sought ways to respond to the challenges of the Great Depression and the political threat of totalitarianism across the Atlantic. The concern was that Canadian farmers, the backbone of the country's economy and a breadbasket for the British Empire, were scattered across large spaces. In response to this challenge, agricultural and adult education officials in Ottawa developed a "radio farm forum" program. Radio programs delivered information about agricultural techniques and business developments for farmers spread across the prairies. Local farmers gathered in a community center or a local farmer's living room every monday night and listened to the weekly broadcasts. Ottawa urged farmers to respond to broadcasts with their own opinions and report information about local conditions. The farm forums helped

[537] Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1997), 107-150; Clive Dewey, "Images of the Village Community: A Study in Anglo-Indian Ideology, *Modern Asian Studies* 6, no. 3 (1972), 291-328; Nicole Sackley, "The Village as Cold War Site: Experts, Development, and the History of Rural Reconstruction," 481-504; B. R. Ambedkar as cited in Khilnani, 128.
[538] J. C. Mathur, "The Project and its Implementation," in J. C. Mathur and Paul Neurath, *An Indian Experiment in Farm Radio Forums*, 16, 22.

to mobilize agricultural labor to combat the economic depression, foster two-way communication between government and the grass roots during a period when democracy seemed vulnerable, and allowed government to assess national resources. Policymakers embraced the program as a cheap means to increase popular "consciousness of the need for national unity" and, after the outbreak of war in 1939, to develop a "total war effort."[539] British and American broadcasters also used the forums to address Canadian farmers who were providing agricultural support for the war effort.[540] The farm forums had by the postwar years, as one official remarked, expanded the development of a "national and international outlook" among millions of Canadian farmers.[541]

The Secretariat's communications officials were impressed with Canada's innovation and tried to popularize it internationally. They arranged to have Canadian experts draft a book-length report for the organization. UNESCO published the report in 1954 and distributed it as a handbook for other countries to emulate.[542] The organization's radio program promoted the farm forums' emphasis on "two-way education" and ability to foster communication between

[539] Farm Forum Facts, "U.S. Secretary of Agriculture is Guest of Farm Forum," n.d. [October 1942], Folder: "History & General Information (1941-43)," MG 28 I 68, Volume 1, LAC; Neil Morrison Memorandum, "Observations on the State of Public Opinion," 27 July 1940, Folder: "History & General Information (1937-41)," MG 28 I 68, Volume 1, LAC; Neil Morrison Memorandum, "Farm Forum Programme - 1942-43," 23 August 1942, Folder: "History & General Information (1941-43)," MG 28 I 68, Volume 1, LAC.
[540] Farm Forum Facts, "The First International Farm Forum Broadcast," n.d. [1942]; Farm Forum Facts, "An American Farmer Comes to National Farm Radio Forum," n.d. [October 1942], both in Folder: "History & General Information (1941-43)," MG 28 I 68, Volume 1, LAC.
[541] "Minutes of National Farm Forum Board Meeting," 20 May 1953, Folder: "Nat'l Board Meetings Minutes," MG 28 I 68, Volume 1, LAC.
[542] National Farm Radio Forum Broadcast Transcript, "UNESCO Studies National Radio Forum," 25 February 1952, Folder F3, Volume 41, MG 28 I 68, LAC; John Nicol and R. Alex Sim, *Canada's Farm Radio Forum* (Paris: UNESCO, 1954).

central government and outlying rural areas. It also noted that Canadian innovations could be applied to Third World countries. "What the Farm Forums have done has been to encourage neighbourliness in a rural community, and at the same time to bring farmers to grips with the outside world."[543] The formula was ideal for India's community development projects.

The Secretariat approached New Delhi in May 1955 and offered to help import the farm forum model into India. Paris was interested in seeing how well certain models could be adapted to foreign cultures - the Director General wanted to "test the validity" of the farm forums by adapting them in foreign countries.[544] Ottawa's ability to produce engaging radio programs, encourage popular participation in government programs, and foster a sense of national cohesion made it an appealing model for New Delhi's All-India Radio. AIR, working with Paris, introduced farm forums in one hundred and fifty villages throughout five districts in Bombay State.[545] The Secretariat's mass media experts worked with New Delhi to develop radio transcripts that would appeal to Indian villagers. Government health and development experts directly addressed village audiences and news stories reported national events. Topics included democracy and the responsibilities of citizenship, agricultural improvements, animal husbandry, health and family planning, economics, and marketing. The radio programs were

[543] "Canada's Farm Radio Forum" Radio Broadcast Transcript, *UNESCO World Review*, 8 January 1955, Volume 5, Herbert Steinhouse Fonds, LAC.
[544] J. C. Mathur, "The Project and its Implementation," in J. C. Mathur and Paul Neurath, *An Indian Experiment in Farm Radio Forums*, 20.
[545] Paul Neurath, "Evaluation and Results," in J. C. Mathur and Paul Neurath, *An Indian Experiment in Farm Radio Forums*, 87-88.

delivered in the form of radio plays and included traditional folk music and stories. In one radio play, villagers plagued by rats go to see the god Ganpati. The god advises the villagers to "go back to earth. Acquire knowledge by your own efforts. Find out experts who can guide you in these matters." Interviews with development experts followed the broadcast and urged villagers to work with planners from the central government.[546] In another radio play, a man seeks to arrange a marriage between his son and the daughter of a family from a neighboring village. When the daughter's family rejects the man's offers and complains about his village's backwardness, the spurned father helps to make his town a more appealing and "modern" community for his daughter-to-be. The man looks at how other villages "are being transformed from wretchedness to prosperity" through improved sanitation, new agricultural techniques, better infrastructure, and educational reform. The man, "with government help," persuades his fellow "village folk" to "clean the town" and thereby win the approval of his son's prospective bride. "Modern" ways of living, farm forum audiences learned, will help to create domestic happiness.[547]

The farm forums' success exceeded expectations in both Paris and New Delhi. A sociologist in Bombay analyzed the results and found that the farm forum model "had proved itself successful beyond the fondest hopes of anybody." Farmers enjoyed the broadcasts and began taking advice about such issues as

[546] Madhukar Kulkarni, "Uncle Rat," translated by Shanta Bhandarkar, in *An Indian Experiment in Farm Radio Forums*, 48.
[547] V. D. Madgulkar, "The Engagement That Was Broken and Mended," translated by Shanta Bhandarkar, in *An Indian Experiment in Farm Radio Forums*, 54.

agricultural improvement and animal vaccinations. Government planners applauded the forums when, following advice in recent broadcasts, the amount of poultry increased and villagers began to tackle guinea worm more effectively.[548] The forums also effectively influenced social and political attitudes of villagers. The forum discussions made small but tangible contributions to enhancing the role of women and untouchables in communal decision making.[549] The radio farm forums became a success story in India's economic and educational planning efforts. Four years after they were introduced in Bombay State, J. C. Mathur, Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, set a target to establish twenty-five thousand radio farm forums throughout India by 1966.[550] Both provincial and national officials praised the results. A West Bengali report acknowledged that "100 per cent of the members have said that the radio farm forum organization and the broadcasts are the best means of communicating and enhancing knowledge among the villagers on agricultural matters."[551] New Delhi's Ministry of Education and Social Welfare declared that the forums were a "spectacular success" at "transmitting knowledge."[552]

The successful adaptation of the farm forum model from Canada to India demonstrated that it could be applied to other foreign societies and cultures.

[548] "Farm Forums," *Times of India* (1 September 1957), 6. See also Paul Neurath, "Evaluation and Results," 105.
[549] Paul Neurath, "Evaluation and Results," 106.
[550] John Friesen, "Indian Farm Forum Report," n.d. [1961/1962], Folder: "Radios for India Project," MG 28 I 68, Volume 113, LAC.
[551] B. P. Bhatt and P.V. Krishnamoorthy, "Radio Rural Forums Spread Throughout India," in *Radio Broadcasting Serves Rural Development*, 1965, UNESDOC, 28.
[552] *A Challenge and an Opportunity: Adult Education in India* (New Delhi: Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, 8 September 1973), 27.

Wilbur Schramm endorsed it as an ideal way to implement his theories.[553] Over the course of the 1960s the Secretariat helped to introduce forums in other countries that wanted to integrate and educate populations distributed across large territorial units. The Secretariat's ability to translate the farm forum model from North America to South Asia convinced Ghana to import the model. "It has worked in Canada *and* India," two broadcasting officials in Ghana recalled. "We had no doubt that it would work in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa too." The government set up forums in forty villages in Ghana's Eastern Region, which covered over a thousand square kilometers and included two hundred thousand people. Broadcasts educated Ghana's remote peoples about a number of government programs: the role of farmers in the country's seven-year development plan, accessibility of state loans and subsidies, foreign trade, family budgeting, new agricultural techniques, and national health schemes. The forums were again a success among the country's political leaders.[554] Zambia also established a farm forum patterned on the Canadian-Indian model three years later. The country established four hundred and thirty-seven forums across the country by 1968.[555]

The Secretariat also embraced new technological resources that could "multiply" the effects of education and reach over greater distances. Henry

[553] Wilbur Schramm, *Mass Media and National Development*, 246; Mary Burnet, *ABC of Literacy* (Paris: UNESCO, 1965).
[554] Emphasis added. W. F. Coleman and A. A. Opoku, "Rural Radio Forum Project in Ghana," in *An African Experiment in Radio Forums for Rural Development*, 1968, UNESDOC, 11, 13.
[555] A. M. Natesh, "Organisation of Radio Farm Forums in Zambia - (mission) June 1966 to November 1968: Final Report," 1968, UNESDOC.

Cassirer, who headed of the Radio and Television Section of the Mass Communications Department, believed that television was becoming "part and parcel" of modern nation-states. "[T]he slogan 'we must have television!' can be heard from the Chilean Andes to the deserts of Iraq, and from the mountains of Yugoslavia to the plains of India." For Cassirer, television's "vividness" made it a particularly powerful medium to transmit information both within and between nations.[556] He led a series of missions throughout the decade to countries interested in using television to enhance educational opportunities. Educational television, for example, became particularly important in El Salvador. Wilbur Schramm and Cassirer - with financial support from USAID - helped make educational television the "star" project of the country's 1968 education reform.[557]

The organization also embraced the promise that satellite communications systems could help to bring isolated peasants into the modern world. In "regions such as Asia and Africa where distances are great," Maheu suggested, "space communication would bring their first completely dependable contact with the rest of the world."[558] Tor Gjesdal in the Mass Communications Department argued that satellites were the best means for "overcoming 'social isolation' - of

[556] Henry Cassirer, "1955: Big Year of Decision for TV," *UNESCO Courier* 6 (1955), 27; Henry Cassirer, "The Use of Television in Fundamental Education," 6 July 1953, WS/063.124; Henry Cassirer, "Preliminary final report," Study Course for Producers and Directors of Educational and Cultural Television Programmes, 5 August 1954, WS/084.28, both available in UNESDOC.
[557] Héctor Lindo-Fuentes, "La Télévision Éducative au Salvador: L'UNESCO et la Théorie de la Modernisation en Action," *60 Ans*, 449-460.
[558] "Report by the Director-General of Unesco on the Occasion of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference on Space Communications, 12 July 1963, WS/0763.88, UNESDOC, 46.

regions, countries, villages and even individuals."[559] Wilbur Schramm agreed that they could make a "striking" contribution to the postcolonial efforts at "binding together... the people of a nation."[560] Some argued that satellites could even help "industrialized" countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia that were spread across large territories and where native populations suffered from an "isolation problem."[561]

Reading the World

Literacy - the ability to read and write recorded symbols - has played an important role in human history.[562] At a global level, historians have identified the ability to transmit information across time and space as a leading pillar of Western imperial expansion.[563] Within societies, literacy and the ability to control the accessibility of knowledge had been restricted to political and religious elites.

[559] "Meeting of Experts on the Use of Space Communication for Broadcasting: Report of the Meeting," 26 January 1968, enclosed in Tor Gjesdal to René Maheu, 1 February 1968, Box 8, CAB 5, AG 8, UA.
[560] Wilbur Schramm, "New Uses of Mass Communication for the Promotion of Economic and Social Development," quoted in "Report by the Director-General of Unesco on the Occasion of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference on Space Communications, 12 July 1963, WS/0763.88, UNESDOC, 13. See also Wilbur Schramm, "Some Possible Social Effects of Space Communication," *Communication in the Space Age: The Use of Satellites by the Mass Media* (UNESCO: Paris, 1968), 25; Wilbur Schramm, "Communication Satellites for Education, Science and Culture," 1968, COM/MC.67/XVII.53/A, UNESDOC.
[561] H. R. Cassirer and H. Wigren, "Alaska: Implications of Satellite Communication for Education," 1970, 2198/BMS.RD/MC, UNESDOC, 22; Wilbur Schramm, Philip H. Coombs, Friedrich Kahnert, and Jack Lyle, *The New Media: Memo to Educational Planners* (Paris: UNESCO, 1967).
[562] Robert Pattison, *On Literacy: The Politics of the Word from Homer to the Age of Rock* (New York: Oxford, 1982); Carlo M. Cipolla, *Literacy and Development in the West* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969).
[563] The role of literacy in Western imperial expansion is argued most forcefully in Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel* (New York: Norton, 1997), 215-239.

Literacy was used to secure social power among elites: business leaders employ accounting records and legal contracts; military leaders gain victory through strategic communications; religious elites maintain influence through access to sacred texts; lawyers interpret and master written legal codes.[564] It was only the social changes that grew in tandem with industrialization beginning in the eighteenth centuries that led to higher rates of literacy in Western countries. Communist governments that claimed power in the early twentieth century promoted universal literacy campaigns as part of their ideological commitment to liberate the working classes and ethnic minorities that had traditionally been cut off from educational privilege. The Soviet Union cast the mold in 1919 when Vladimir Lenin decreed mass literacy one of the Russian Revolution's primary social goals. The Chinese and Cuban governments followed this model after successive revolutions in the postwar decades.[565]

[564] Robert Pattison, *On Literacy*, 61.
[565] H.S. Bhola, "Some Mass Literacy Campaigns of the 20th Century: A Tentative Analysis of First Returns on a UNESCO Study," March 1980, Folder: "Bhola Papers," Volume 106, R 14041, LAC.



Source: "World Illiteracy at Mid-Century," *UNESCO Courier* (March 1958), 18-19.

Literacy education was one of the organization's most idealistic causes. Some underscored that literacy was a human right, pointing towards article twenty-six of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guaranteed access to education. Others argued that literacy promoted the cause of peace and international understanding. Julian Huxley believed that literacy was "necessary for mutual understanding between peoples in the modern world."[566] The rising attention devoted to literacy coincided with new recognition of the widespread extent of illiteracy. The Secretariat's Statistical Division concluded in 1957 that

[566] Summary Report of the Executive Board, Second Session, 11 April 1947, CONS.EXEC./2e SESS./SR.1-12 REV, UNESDOC, 7.

two-fifth's of the world's adult population could not read or write.[567] This discovery encouraged international civil servants to promote campaigns to completely eradicate illiteracy. "There can be no two worlds, one learned and the other ignorant," one observer at a meeting noted in a typical comment.[568] These humanitarian imperatives culminated in plans for a "World Campaign for Universal Literacy" in 1963. In response to directions from the General Assembly, the Education Department developed plans to make three hundred and thirty million people literate.[569]

Financial and administrative concerns led some Secretariat officials to criticize these plans for a world campaign to eradicate illiteracy. Economic forecasters predicted that it would require two billion dollars to raise world literacy rates by fifty percent.[570] Member states also raised objections. Although Washington had expanded its foreign aid and development assistance programs dramatically since 1960, policymakers worried about limited funds and wanted UNESCO to turn away from expensive campaigns for "universal" literacy.[571] American delegates to the General Conference in Paris and the General Assembly in New York tried to inject a tone of "astringent realism" into discussions about

[567] *World Illiteracy at Mid-Century: A Statistical Study* (Paris: UNESCO, 1957), 190.
[568] Lionel V. J. Roy to Ottawa, "Meeting of Experts on Literacy," 9 July 1962, 5582-AV-11-40, Volume 5171, LAC.
[569] Kenneth Levine, "Functional Literacy: Fond Illusions and False Economies," *Harvard Educational Review* 52, no 3 (August 1982), 252.
[570] Press Release GA/EF/831, "Debate on Economic and Operational Programmes Continues in Second Committee," n.d. [October/November 1963], 5582-AV-11-40, Volume 5171, LAC.
[571] Crane Haussamen Report, "A Walk Around the Field: How Are We Doing In Aid To World Education?,"n.d., Box 383, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.

literacy.[572] In meetings of the Executive Board, Benton urged UNESCO to devote more attention to the distinction between means and ends.[573] Malcolm Adiseshiah warned Maheu in 1963 that the "financial preoccupation of the great powers" made an ambitious world campaign to eradicate illiteracy impractical. The organization's promotion of a multi-billion dollar literacy campaign was "acting as a brake on the project" and he therefore promoted a more modest literacy program.[574] The Secretariat's Economic Analysis Office suggested that a more affordable "selective approach" - prioritizing the education of key social groups - would achieve quick and more effective results.[575]

New discussions also began to reassess what literacy was supposed to achieve. Field experience led many literacy campaigners to turn away from traditional teaching methods. Adult students were too often treated like children in traditional schools - hierarchy dominated relationships between students and teachers, there was little student participation, and curriculums did not always conform to the realities of adult lives.[576] Teachers and trainers became frustrated that rural farmers and workers disregarded the importance of learning to read and write. "The problem of motivation was considered an all important one," literacy

[572] Paris to Ottawa, "UNESCO Illiteracy Campaign," 15 October 1963; New York to Ottawa, "18th UNGA: 2nd Ctte-Item39-Eradication of Illiteracy," 23 October 1963, both available in 5582-AV-11-40, Volume 5171, LAC
[573] "Opening Statement to the 67th Executive Board as Actually Delivered by Ambassador Benton," 5 May 1964, enclosed in Ralph W. Ruffner to DOS, 15 May 1964, Folder: "UNESCO 3," Box 3338, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.
[574] Malcolm Adiseshiah Memorandum to René Maheu, 29 January 1963, Folder 8, Box 3, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[575] Marshall D. Wattles, "The Economics of Planned Literacy," 28 June 1965, SS/AO/193, UNESDOC.
[576] *Literacy, A UNESCO Perspective* (Paris: UNESCO, 2003).

trainers began to note.[577] Literacy training had to seem relevant for adult students. These trainers began to develop a new approach to literacy that made reading and writing more appealing for learners. According to one UNESCO literacy trainer, "The concept has taken decades to emerge from the frustrations and failures of literacy workers the world over who found that too often the adults for whom they dreamed those beautiful dreams of enriched learning and enlightened lives did not want any part of the dream: they did not, voluntarily, want to read and write; did not want to avail of the human right to literacy." The solution was to introduce vocational training into literacy classes. This new approach - "functional literacy" - resolved the problem of "learner motivation" by making classes applicable to the "economic, social and political aspirations of developing nations."[578]

Economic development planners pushed the organization to adopt this new approach. British academic Adam Curle, who founded the Harvard Center for Studies in Education and Development in 1962, agreed that literacy was a human right but emphasized that it should address larger economic issues. For Curle, "education which enables the government to reach the majority of its citizens through the written word, and which aims to give them a view beyond the limitations of tribal or village society, is a necessary prerequisite to political stability..." The ability to read and write would also liberate the millions of villagers "shackled by traditional attitudes and practices." UNESCO, however,

[577] "General," in Final Report of the Regional Conference on the Planning and Organization of Literacy Programmes in Africa, 16 March 1964, AFMIN/7, UNESDOC, 4.
[578] H. S. Bhola, "Functional Literacy - The Concept and the Program," 1970, ERIC.

should also turn away from "universal literacy" and focus on more limited and targeted segments of the population. "Instead of an attempt to spread the jam of literacy indiscriminately thinly, the first efforts should be to discover the best channels for reaching the labor force." They should work through existing organizations, labor unions, public and private employers, and co-operatives that already engage in education.[579] Curle urged development experts to moderate their expectations but argued that literacy training could make a positive impact on developing countries. His more limited and more pragmatic approach to literacy campaigning, which the Harvard Center published in early 1964, appealed to the State Department. American diplomats like William Benton "subscribe[d] without reservation" to Curle's arguments and endorsed them at UNESCO meetings and conferences as an alternative to earlier mass campaigns.[580] Curle's ideas influenced the Secretariat's Education Department, which considered hiring him to work for the Secretariat and planned to distribute his study at upcoming literacy meetings in Paris.[581]

This new "functional" approach to literacy campaigning appealed to the new generation of politicians who were introducing development plans for their countries. African education ministers and experts assembled in 1963 all agreed that "Adult illiteracy constitutes the challenge of our times" and that literacy "was

[579] Adam Curle, "World Campaign for Universal Literacy: Comment and Proposal," Occasional Papers in Education and Development, no. 1 (Cambridge: Center for Studies in Education and Development, Harvard University, 1964), 20, 31.
[580] "Opening Statement to the 67th Executive Board as Actually Delivered by Ambassador Benton," 5 May 1964, enclosed in Ralph W. Ruffner to DOS, 15 May 1964, Box 3338, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.
[581] Abidjan to DOS, 23 March 1964, Box 383, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.

part of the scaffolding for the social and economic reconstruction of Africa."[582] Government Ministers like Ivory Coast's H. E. Mr. M'Bahia Blé argued that literacy training was related "to the economic liberation of our countries."[583] The African Ministers of Education promoted at its March 1964 meeting the idea that literacy work should be established within the wider framework of social and economic development.[584] Dozens of diplomats at the General Conference six months later supported the connection between literacy and economic development.[585] Political concerns eclipsed the humanitarian foundations of literacy education and led plans for a world campaign to collapse in 1964.

Iran, emerging as the world's leading supporter of functional literacy, had the greatest impact on the organization's program. Literacy was an ancient tradition in Persia for both poetry and theology, although a class system had traditionally determined who could and couldn't be trained to read and write. Twentieth-century reformers, eager to strengthen the nation's economic strength and political sovereignty, began to identify literacy as a key component of the modern nation. Reza Shah first made literacy training for the masses a nationalist

[582] Hassan Ahmed Yussif, "Report of Commission II," n.d. [September 1963], AFNAC/Report/Chapter II, UNESDOC. See also "General," in Final Report of the Regional Conference on the Planning and Organization of Literacy Programmes in Africa, 16 March 1964, AFMIN/7, UNESDOC.
[583] "Opening Address by H. E. Mr. M'Bahia Blé, Minister of the Armed Forces, Youth and Civic Services of Ivory Coast," Annex 1 in Final Report of the Regional Conference on the Planning and Organization of Literacy Programmes in Africa, 16 March 1964, AFMIN/7, UNESDOC, 26.
[584] Abidjan to DOS, 23 March 1964, Box 383, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.
[585] See especially Cummings address, Records of the General Conference, Thirteenth Session, Sixteenth Plenary Meeting, 29 October 1964; Carneiro address, Records of the General Conference, Thirteenth Session, Twenty-first Plenary Meeting, 2 November 1964; Prem Kirpal address, Records of the General Conference, Thirteenth Session, Thirty-Fourth Plenary Meeting, 19 November 1964, all available in 13 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC.

strategy and a monopoly of the state, although these campaigns were limited to urban schools and classrooms. Tehran launched a "Holy War" against illiteracy after the Second World War. It was Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Reza Shah's son and successor, who threw his weight behind nation-wide reform programs. The centerpiece of the new Shah's domestic program was the White Revolution, which sought to reform landholding and secure the loyalty of the peasantry. He created an Iranian "Literacy Corps," or "Army of Knowledge," that was deployed to remote villages in order to improve literacy rates throughout the country.[586] The Shah's commitment to expanding literacy throughout the country quickly attracted the attention of the Secretariat. Paris deployed a mission to Iran in 1963 to inspect the country's progress. The mission noted the White Revolution's "remarkable" progress in advancing literacy levels in rural Iran and credited its "guiding angel," the Shah, with making it a state priority.[587]

The Shah's foreign policy followed what some resident ambassadors called the diplomacy of "positive nationalism," whereby the country improved relations with neighbors and fulfilled international commitments. The Shah also began to invoke the ideals of international cooperation. He personally brokered peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan, improved relations with neighboring

[586] Pierre Furter, "Possibilities and Limitations of Functional Literacy: The Iranian Experiment" (UNESCO: Paris, 1973), UNESDOC, 10; Bangnee A. Liu, "Is World Illiteracy on the Increase?," *Unesco Courier* (March 1958), 4; Rex Keating, "Iran's Will to Learn," *Times of India* (19 June 1966), 6. For the White Revolution, see James A. Bill, "Modernization and Reform from Above: The Case of Iran," *The Journal of Politics* 32, no. 1 (1970), 19-40.
[587] S.V.S. Rao, "Six Weeks Report - Submitted by S.V.S. Rao Consultant in Literacy and Adult Education - UNESCO Mission in Iran," n.d. [1963]; S.V.S. Rao, "Report of My Visits to Adult Education Centres and the Army of Knowledge Schools to Study Their Work," n. d. [1963], both available in UNESDOC.

Iraq, and made sweeping intellectual proposals for world peace.[588] The Shah decided to internationalize the literacy campaign, his most successful domestic reform program, and looked to UNESCO. The Shah invited Ministers of Education from around the world to meet in Tehran to discuss and coordinate plans to fight illiteracy at the international level.

The Secretariat quickly accepted the Iranian proposal at the 1964 General Conference. Secretariat members like Adiseshiah believed such a world conference would revitalize the organization's new commitment to expand the functional literacy strategy.[589] The Education Department prepared a working paper for the conference which synthesized new ideas about functional literacy. The paper, titled "Literacy as a Factor in Development," made familiar arguments about the connection between investment in education and economic productivity. Yet the paper also connected the ability to read and write with larger political issues. The battle against illiteracy was necessary before new leaders could construct unified and harmonious nation-states. After all, "illiteracy makes a line of demarcation within the nation - in fact precludes the possibility of having a true community." Illiteracy was also a major international economic issue that affected relations between both the developed and the developing world. The inability to read and write "retards the development of a world

[588] Iran: Annual Report for the Year 1342, enclosed in T. Paul Malone to Ottawa, 20 March 1964; Paul T. Malone to Ottawa, "Political Philosophy of the Shah," 31 January 1967, both in 35-2-2-IRAN, Volume 14099, LAC.
[589] Lionel V. J. Roy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Analphabétisme - Conférence de Téhéran," 23 February 1965, 55-1-UNESCO-AE-1, Volume 15175, LAC.

market" and thereby debarred global economic integration.[590] The paper forcefully endorsed the idea that only the international adoption of functional literacy could help to strengthen Third World nation-states and the international community. Although the Education Department conceived of the conference as an international referendum on the relative merits of traditional and functional literacy methods, the working paper, as Adiseshiah noted, "definitely tilt[ed] the scale in favour of the selective and intensive approach."[591]

The Tehran Conference was the largest international meeting dedicated to the issue of illiteracy yet assembled. The Shah wanted to boost his own reputation as a reformer at home and peacemaker internationally. The conference therefore convened in September 1965, the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Shah's accession. As foreign delegations arrived in Tehran, twelve thousand members of the Literacy Corps marched through the city's streets.[592] The Shah dominated conference proceedings and attracted the attention of foreign ministries and the press. His participation helped to give the conference the kind of prestige and high-profile attention rarely granted to meetings about educational planning. Discussions among delegates, mostly development planners and education ministers, approved the functional literacy approach. All delegates agreed that illiteracy was a "world phenomenon" that required concerted international

[590] "Literacy as a Factor in Development," 30 July 1965, MINESLIT/3, UNESDOC, 32, 37, 38.
[591] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Memorandum to Asher Deleon, "Your Draft," 9 July 1965, Folder 13, Box 4, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[592] Paul Malone to Ottawa, "World Congress of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy," 25 September 1965, 55-1-UNESCO-AE-1, Volume 15175, LAC.

cooperation.[593] Maheu urged world education ministers to adopt functional literacy methods.[594] Addresses approved the working paper's argument that functional literacy could enhance economic productivity. Speakers were captivated by the idea that literacy would build new channels of communication that would integrate the isolated peoples of the Third World into centralizing nations states. According to Executive Board Chairman Mohammed El Fasi, "illiteracy prevents immense numbers of people in the developing countries from gradually adapting themselves to a rapidly changing world and joining in a national culture..." This logic, he added, also worked at the international level. Literacy can help "to make mankind less differentiated, more homogenous and more united."[595] The Shah repeated arguments that eradicating illiteracy could revitalize the development process and strengthen national cohesion. "Money spent on literacy is fully justified because it transforms illiterates into full citizens and proportionately increases their productivity."[596] Functional literacy would enable illiterates "to become socially and economically integrated in a new world where scientific and technological progress calls for ever more knowledge and specialization." The conference also discussed how literacy training could educate and thereby mobilize another significant part of the world's population: women.

[593] World Conference of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy, "Final Report," 1965, ED/217, UNESDOC, 33.
[594] "Speech by Mr. René Maheu," 8 September 1965, Inaugural Speeches Messages Closing Speeches, 1966, ED.65/D.31/A, UNESDOC, 38.
[595] "Speech by Dr. Mohammed El Fasi," 8 September 1965, Inaugural Speeches Messages Closing Speeches, 1966, ED.65/D.31/A, UNESDOC, 20.
[596] "Inaugural Address by his Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah," 8 September 1965, Inaugural Speeches Messages Closing Speeches, 1966, ED.65/D.31/A, UNESDOC, 13.

Although the industrial workers and agricultural laborers who were the focus of functional literacy strategies were usually men, planners also focused on how to educate women. By educating mothers, central governments could expand their influence into the family and shape the nation's health, hygiene, and family planning. Discussions concluded that women "are the key factor in the progress or backwardness of the family and, consequently, of the whole nation."[597]

The Tehran Conference established an international consensus among education ministers and development planners about the proper approach to deal with the problem of illiteracy. The conference's high-profile generated "world-wide publicity" that helped to gain broad support among international supporters of international development aid.[598] In Washington, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow became convinced that the organization was "now tackling illiteracy in the right way" by backing away from universal literacy and instead focusing on the education of social "groups who can contribute most immediately to their countries' development."[599] The World Bank supported the new approach, while the UN Under Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs endorsed the organization's claims that the fight against illiteracy could help to boost

[597] World Conference of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy, "Final Report," 1965, ED/217, UNESDOC, 29.
[598] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to Assistant Director-General for Education, "Development Decade Targets," 20 April 1966, Folder 15, Box 5, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[599] Walt W. Rostow Memorandum for the President, 26 May 1966, DDRS. See also Harvie Branscomb, "Unclassified Report of the United States Delegation: World Congress of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy," 11 October 1965, Box 382, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.

productivity and strengthen more egalitarian "national communities."[600] One of the most influential journalists in India, which had some of the world's highest rates of illiteracy, anticipated that UNESCO would "act as the spearhead of a great international revolution."[601]

Development planners and educators began to develop the idea of functional literacy in the years after Tehran. Practitioners repeated that functional literacy was not an end in itself but rather a means to an end: economic development and national unity. These skills were important as countries around the world were focusing more on technological development and bureaucratic governance. People who can read and write can calculate basic arithmetic, maintain records, or read instructions on bags of seeds and fertilizers. Literate men can be trained quicker and more effectively, thus raising productivity levels. "Functional literacy," one supporter wrote, "is really the key that unlocks the door to the future."[602] Proponents of the new method argued that functional literacy instilled not just new skills but new mentalities. Oral cultures, some development planners believed, were "mentally handicapped" and incapable of comprehending abstract and symbolic modes of thought.[603] Since developing countries had to radically transform their economies from rural and agricultural foundations to new industrial and urban economies, societies had to be prepared for the social

[600] Philippe de Seynes address, Records of the General Conference, Fourteenth Session, Fifth Plenary Meeting, 27 October 1966, 14 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 118.
[601] M. V. Kamath, "Global War On Illiteracy," *Times of India* (12 September 1965), 6.
[602] Mary Burnet, *ABC of Literacy*, 14.
[603] C. Bellahsène, "Practical Guide to Functional Literacy: A Method of Training for Development" (Unesco: Paris, 1973), UNESDOC, 37.

dislocations and cultural traumas that these changes entailed. Functional literacy was the key way to prepare "pre-modern" peoples for "a new way of life that is complex and rapidly changing," development planners and literacy teachers agreed.[604] Literacy trained people to think in more abstract terms and become more critical and rational.[605] They believed that literacy was a prerequisite for life in urban societies that were the social backbone of developed countries. "The introduction of writing coincides with the formation of large cities," one report suggested. Large population clusters and bureaucratic governance in an impersonal environment required written communications. "In origin, the act of reading is an urban act."[606] Others believed that literacy was an important component of an emerging "information society." What all these theories had in common was the belief that teaching peoples how to read and write was a way to create new societies: "Functional literacy work is social engineering," one UNESCO consultant concluded.[607]

[604] "The Position as Regards Functional Literacy Pilot Projects," 12 September 1968, 15 C/52, UNESDOC, 10. See also Margo Viscusi, "Discussion Guide for Photo-Poster Set: Your Share in Development," n.d. [1971?], UNESDOC, 5.
[605] For influential contemporary arguments, see Jack Goody, "Introduction," and Jack Goody and Ian Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy," in Jack Goody, ed., *Literacy in Traditional Societies* (Cambridge, 1968); Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962); Mark Blaug, "Literacy and Economic Development," *School Review* 74, no 4 (Winter 1966), 393-418.
[606] "Literacy and Development: Introduction to Functional Literacy," Appendix to *Study Visit and Seminar: Work-Oriented Adult Literacy Pilot Project in Iran: Final Report* (Bangkok: UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Asia, 1970). On the connection between literacy and urbanization, see also "An Illiterate in Paris," *UNESCO Courier* (March 1958), 13.
[607] H. S. Bhola, "Functional Literacy - The Concept and the Program." 1970, ERIC, 8.

The functional literacy strategy also focused on key groups that could best advance social and economic development in developing countries.[608] One field expert described the strategy in military terms: "Our new attack on illiteracy will be based on tactics of lightning warfare. Instead of trying to batter down an enemy all along a broad front, we plan this time to make a series of incisive, spearhead attacks, directed at the weakest point in his defenses. Against this we send small, well-trained divisions, armed with the most up-to-date equipment."[609] The organization decided to withdraw from the idea of achieving universal literacy in the short-term and focus instead on selected groups of people in each nation who could make valuable and immediate contributions to their nation's economic productivity. These groups varied in each country, depending on the economic needs and opportunities. Targeted groups were usually industrial laborers or rural agricultural laborers.

The new approach also re-conceptualized literacy campaigning as a means to reach the villagers and peasants who remained isolated from both the modern world and the reach of the nation-state. One 1959 mission to Southern Cameroon anticipated the organization's ideas about literacy education. "[W]hile we are in the midst of one of the most interesting and creative epochs in human history, destiny cannot be put into the hands of the illiterate and ignorant." He instead argued that literacy opened a window to the wider world: "Under these

[608] "Report of the Programme Commission," Records of the General Conference, Resolutions, Thirteenth Session, 1964, 13 C/RESOLUTIONS, UNESDOC, 186; Resolution 1.271, Records of the General Conference, Resolutions, Thirteenth Session, 1964, 13 C/RESOLUTIONS, UNESDOC, 16.
[609] As cited in Mary Burnet, *ABC of Literacy*, 60.

circumstances, if a person learns to read and write, he is given the backbone with which to stand erect, to look around and see the new world which is opening up." He suggested that literacy training could help to change the mentalities of the illiterate peasant and make them educated members of modern nation-states. This consultant advocated a literacy program that would "shake villages out of their lethargy and disinterest" in national programs and international events.[610] The new consensus maintained that literacy could help new nation-states to mobilize hundreds of millions of isolated peoples and integrate them into larger national communities. Western development planners and modernizing political elites tended to see literacy as a functional tool that could be used to communicate and move information.[611] H. S. Bhola, a prominent UNESCO literacy trainer, employed the language of cybernetics to explain this strategy. He argued that learning to read and write was a means to "affiliate" the masses into larger systems and groups. "Literacy structures and programs a human mind. It networks an individual into an outside network of a system of ideas while at the same time structuring the circuity within and providing antennas for better reception from various channels... It makes people more amenable to systems - of administration, army, economic organization." This integrative logic shaped the ideas and ambitions of the functional literacy planners of the time.[612] Teaching people to read and write plugged them into larger circuits of information exchange. These

[610] N. Bhadriah, "UNESCO Mission on Adult Literacy in the Southern Cameroons," 1959, UNESDOC, 13-15.
[611] Pattison, *On Literacy*, 127.
[612] H. S. Bhola, "The Nature and Function of Literacy: Sociology, Cybernetics, Politics," 1973, ERIC, 7.

new skills helped states to mobilize their populations for economic and political projects. At the international level, people could adapt new ideas and skills from other countries. This was particularly important for the adoption of new development projects imported from other states and international organizations.

The Secretariat publicized and spread the idea of functional literacy. The Secretariat's proclamation of International Literacy Day, marking the opening of the Tehran Conference on 8 September, provided developing nations with an annual opportunity to stress the importance of literacy and publicize recent achievements. There were parades, radio and film broadcasts, and speeches.[613] Business and financial networks began to become interested in functional literacy and, at a February 1969 Round Table discussion in Rome between the UNESCO Director General and bankers and businessmen, recognized the importance of the new approach.[614] The World Federal Trade Union - a predominantly communist organization - held a World Conference on Functional Literacy in Nicosia three months later which adopted a Charter on Functional Literacy.[615]

The Shah also continued to boost UNESCO's commitment to functional literacy. Tehran began to pursue a more independent foreign policy, challenging the great powers, improving relations with middle powers like Canada and West

[613] R. S. Blackburn to Ottawa, "Director-General's Information Meeting for Permanent Delegates - September 28 p.m.," 29 September 1967, 55-1-UNESCO-AE-1, Volume 15175, LAC; *Literacy 1967-1969: Progress Achieved in Literacy Throughout the World* (Paris: UNESCO, 1970), 28-29.
[614] Roundtable of Bankers, Economists and Financiers on Literacy, "Final Report," 17 March 1969, 55-1-UNESCO-AE-1, Volume 15175, LAC.
[615] "Experimental World Literacy Programme: Report of the Director-General," 17 September 1969, 83 EX/32, UNESDOC. See also H.M. Phillips, *Literacy and Development* (Paris: UNESCO, 1970), 41.

Germany, and expanding its influence with developing countries. The Shah's performance at the Tehran Conference positioned him as a champion of Third World development.[616] Iran's influential *Kayhan International* newspaper praised the Shah's domestic literacy campaign and boasted that he was, through UNESCO, "prepared to extend the same principle on the international level."[617] He also shocked many countries by donating a day's share of the country's military budget to UNESCO's literacy campaign and defying rich countries to do the same. The widely-publicized move, which evoked criticisms that the superpowers pursued war rather than peace, angered Western capitals but gained support among developing countries. According to one newspaper, "It was a masterful piece of diplomatic one-upmanship."[618] The Shah subsequently endowed UNESCO's annual Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Prize for literacy training, which rewarded literacy trainers throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[619]

The positive response to the functional literacy strategy convinced the Secretariat to develop an international campaign to implement and test it in

[616] Meyer to Department of State, 7 September 1965, DDRS; "Inaugural Address by his Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah," 8 September 1965, Inaugural Speeches Messages Closing Speeches, 1966, ED.65/D.31/A, UNESDOC, 13.
[617] "Shah Appeals to World Heads Again," *Kayhan International* (3 May 1966), enclosed in Box 382, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.
[618] "Swords into Pencils," *Toronto Globe & Mail* (4 May 1966), 55-1-UNESCO-AE-1, Volume 15175, LAC; William A. Helseth to Department of State, "Iranian Press Reacts Strongly to Nasser's Threats to Saudi Arabia," 9 May 1966, Box 3341, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.
[619] Tehran Embassy to Department of State, "Shah Donates $700,000 to UNESCO for World Literacy Effort," 4 May 1966, Box 382, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA; Pierre Furter, "Possibilities and Limitations of Functional Literacy"; Hadi Hedayati address, Records of the General Conference, Fourteenth Session, Ninth Plenary Meeting, 29 October 1966, 14 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC. See also Philippe de Seynes (United Nations Under Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs) address Records of the General Conference, Fourteenth Session, Fifth Plenary Meeting, 27 October 1966, 14 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 116.

practice. Maheu proposed an Experimental World Literacy Project (EWLP) in 1964. Dozens of countries flooded the Secretariat with requests to launch international functional literacy programs in their countries. They accepted requests from eleven countries - Algeria, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Iran, Madagascar, Mali, Sudan, Syria, and Tanzania - and assembled teams of development experts to begin implementing the ideas that had been percolating in recent years. The program mobilized thousands of people from around the world and trained them on how to implement these projects. Many of these volunteers contributed their own skills to the cause of literacy.[620] The advisors and officials deployed to work in these countries often saw them as "laboratories" to test new theories that could be expanded to new countries in the future.[621] "We are plowing virgin ground here," Adiseshiah remarked to Maheu.[622] The results of the EWLP would subsequently help to shape long-term plans to eradicate illiteracy both nationally and internationally.

Although Secretariat officials began to spread ideas about combatting illiteracy, national governments were the driving force behind these campaigns across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Some of these countries - like Algeria - approached UNESCO after earlier national plans had failed or encountered

[620] *The Experimental World Literacy Programme: A Critical Assessment* (Paris: UNESCO, 1976), 133.
[621] "The Position as Regards Functional Literacy Pilot Projects," 12 September 1968, 15 C/52, UNESDOC.
[622] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Memorandum to René Maheu, "Status of the Five Experimental Functional Literacy Pilot Projects," 12 December 1967, Folder 13, Box 4, DDG 1, AG 8, UA. See also Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Opening Address to the Panel of Experts on Evaluation of Literacy Projects in Iran, 8 September 1970, DDG/70/13, UNESDOC.

difficulties. Others requested assistance to complement their own national programs.[623] The organization provided valuable technical resources for national education campaigns. Developing nations that requested assistance from the Secretariat therefore adapted the EWLP to their own national interests and development strategies. Algeria, for example, was committed to the idea that literacy could strengthen the state - by promoting "mass political consciousness" and "integrat[ing] individual efforts into national development" - and therefore never abandoned the idea of mass literacy. Algiers instead requested international experts to educate workers, while the government focused on other parts of the population.[624] Other nations shared the organization's belief that literacy training could help to mobilize large populations dispersed across large territories. These programs are best observed in Iran, India, and Tanzania.

Tehran adapted the new literacy campaign to its own domestic development strategies. The organization deployed specialists to two regions in the country. Tehran first selected the rural region of Dezful. The government completed work on a hydroelectric dam in Dez, which made the region an economically important part of the country. Local laborers, however, remained uneducated and development planners hoped that a literacy project would prepare

[623] *The Experimental World Literacy Programme*, 17.
[624] "Alphabétisation Fonctionnelle en Algérie: Plans et Perspectives D'Action Gouvernementale," 1974, ED.74/CONF.660/COL/3, UNESDOC, 9; *The Experimental World Literacy Programme*, 17; "Projet Pilot D'Alphabetisation Fonctionelle des Adultes: Rapport sur les Resultats du Projet: Conclusions et Recommandations," January 1972, INT/UNESCO/UNDP(SF), UNESDOC.

them for industrial and agricultural work.[625] Five weekly evening classes developed basic literacy skills (reading and writing, arithmetic, scientific concepts, technical knowledge graphics) and provided basic technical training. Teachers tried to shift their students' skills from oral to written communication.[626] Tehran and the Secretariat initiated a second project in the Esfahan region, where the government hoped to enhance industrial development, and transferred the province's literacy activities to the EWLP.[627] Plans were developed to build a steel mill to augment the region's importance as a manufacturer for textiles. Again, illiteracy and the predominance of oral communications debased the region's "human capital" and constrained its development plans.[628] The city's growing economic demands sucked in labor from surrounding villages and farms. The functional literacy project was partly conceived as a means to facilitate the laborers' transition from farm to city, an environment that planners believed required literacy. Government officials were pleased when the classes increased worker productivity at the Taj textile mill.[629]

Tehran's planners also thought of the literacy campaign as a means to strengthen national cohesion and contact between central government and outlying villages. Development experts posted to Iran interpreted their job as

[625] John Smyth and K. Izadi, "A Costs-Effectiveness Report on the Work-Oriented Adult Literacy Pilot Project, Iran," ED-77/WS/10, UNESDOC, 13-17.
[626] Smyth and Izadi, "A Costs-Effectiveness Report," 12.
[627] *The Experimental World Literacy Programme*, 58.
[628] Smyth and Izadi, "A Costs-Effectiveness Report," 18.
[629] Pierre Furter, "Possibilities and Limitations of Functional Literacy," 21; Study Visit and Seminar: Work-Oriented Adult Literacy Pilot Project in Iran, "Final Report," 1970, ERIC, 14.

"integrating" individuals with the economy and national community.[630] Educational planners set up classes in both Isfahan and Dezful to teach women, a traditionally neglected social group, basic vocational skills. Classes tied literacy to house-keeping and issues like health, hygiene, and family planning. These classes thereby made women a partner in the government's efforts to shape family life in rural Iran.[631] Literacy instructors also introduced civics discussions into their literacy lessons. Beyond the classroom, literacy would enable remote villagers to read the country's newspapers and national literature. "We want people to read, so they will feel more Iranian," government officials told one economist.[632] The Secretariat's commitment to literacy education therefore supported the Shah's White Revolution.

Tanzania also used literacy campaigns for political purposes. President Julius Nyerere used the World Literacy Program to augment his domestic policies. The East African country became independent on 9 December 1962 after a seven-year struggle for independence. It was primarily a diplomatic struggle fought by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and its leader Julius Nyerere against Britain. When Dar-es-Salaam focused on the challenges of postcolonial state building, the party placed adult education at the center of its national strategy. The Arusha Declaration, passed at TANU's February 1967 National Committee, committed the government to socialist development.

[630] Smyth and Izadi, "A Costs-Effectiveness Report," 11.
[631] Study Visit and Seminar, "Final Report," 14, 23.
[632] John Ardagh, "UNESCO Pinpoints War on Illiteracy," *Washington Post* (3 June 1965), A39.

Nyerere defined education in political terms: "the primary purpose of education is the liberation of man."[633] Nyerere, known throughout the country as Mwalimu (or "teacher"), cultivated his public image as a "teacher revolutionary" and published policy proposals that explicitly linked postcolonial independence with educational development.[634] Nyerere's 1971 New Year's Eve address highlighted the role that literacy would play in this national education campaign: "The illiterate ones will never be able to play their full part in the development of our country or of themselves."[635] Dar-es-Salaam requested UNESCO's assistance in teaching the people to read, write, and solve basic arithmetic problems. They also wanted people to "apply new knowledge and skills to solve their basic economic, social and cultural problems" and to "prepare them for a more efficient participation in the development of their country."[636] Nyerere's commitment to education as both national ideology and engine of national development pleased educational planners in Paris. "Tanzania is developing into a fine laboratory in adult education

[633] V. H. Hundsdörfer, "Historical Outline," in H. Hinzen and V. H. Hundsdörfer, *Education for Liberation and Development: The Tanzanian Experience* (Hamburg : Unesco Institute for Education, 1982), 4, 5; Budd L. Hall, "The Ideology of Tanzanian Adult Education," n.d., Folder: "Adult Education and Development in Tanzania," Box 98, R14041, LAC.
[634] High Commissioner for Canada (Dar es Salaam) to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Authoritarianism and Stability in Tanzania," 30 April 1968, 38-7-1-TANZ, Volume 11982, LAC.
[635] J. K. Nyerere, "Education Never Ends" [The 1969 and 1970 New Years Eve Speeches to the Nation], reprinted in H. Hinzen and V. H. Hundsdörfer, *Education for Liberation and Development*, 33-37.
[636] Ministry of Community Development and National Culture, Tanzania Literacy and Adult Education Project [application for assistance from the UN Special Fund], n.d., cited in Ezekial E. Kaungamno, "The Role of Libraries in Post Adult Education," n.d., copy in Folder: "Adult Education and Development in Tanzania," Box 98, R14041, LAC.

and social change," the Secretariat's Project Manager for its Tanzanian operations commented to a colleague as early as 1967.[637]

The literacy project focused its attention on Mwanza, the area on the southern coast of Lake Victoria. Four UNESCO advisors moved into an old colonial building on the banks of Lake Victoria with nineteen Tanzanian officials. The region was the most economically important in the country. Its staple crop, cotton, was a major source of foreign exchange. Government planners believed that illiteracy was one of the major bottlenecks in efforts to introduce new agricultural innovations. They therefore looked to the Secretariat in Paris for ideas on how to improve agricultural productivity. The project's teachers focused on developing literacy primers.[638] They taught farmers not just how to read but also how to understand the TANU party's economic and political priorities. A literacy primer with texts about cotton led to class discussions about economic planning: "What is wealth? What is money? What can you do with money? How can you get the most money for your cotton?"[639] The project expanded and established a new goal of making one hundred thousand Tanzanians literate. The project leaders developed new primers for fishermen in the Lake Region. Adult students progressed from learning how to read the phrase "fish is better food" to "it is not easy to get rid of the middleman in the fish business. The only way to get rid of

[637] P. H. Bertelsen to J. R. Kidd, 5 April 1967, Folder: "ICAE - Tanzania," Box 98, R14041, LAC.
[638] S. Malya, "Literacy - A Work-Oriented Adult Literacy Pilot Project and a National Campaign," reprinted in H. Hinzen and V. H. Hundsdörfer, *Education for Liberation and Development*, 143.
[639] Margo Viscusi, "Literacy For Working: Functional Literacy in Rural Tanzania," 1971, ED.71/.XXIV.5/A UNESDOC, 26.

him is to form a co-operative. Co-operatives are death to the middleman."[640] New primers were developed for banana growers and other agricultural laborers near Bukoba.[641]

Tanzanian officials believed that literacy training was a key part of "consciousness-raising." This theory proposed that the ability to read and write would transform passive workers into active political participants. Tanzania's government embraced this educational philosophy and looked to schooling - especially literacy - as a means to mobilize Tanzanian citizenship. Literacy classes developed a political program - called "Politics of your country" - which provided basic information about political structures and the citizen's role. The UNESCO official deployed to the country paraphrased the theory: "to feel a full member of a modern progressive society, able to inform oneself and make one's own choices freely, one must be literate."[642]

The Indian government also embraced these new literacy techniques as a tool for national integration and consolidation. Indira Gandhi recognized that "Literacy, of course, is the base on which a country can be built." The Prime Minister endorsed the new functional literacy method which, she argued, "will expand and help us to bring new life which we want in our society and give a new trend to the thinking of our rural people." Indian President Shri V. V. Giri agreed

[640] Peter C. Muncie, "Torches in the Night: Educational Experiences in Tanzania and the Ivory Coast" (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1973), ERIC, 35.
[641] Paul J. Mhaiki and Budd L. Hall, "The Integration of Adult Education in Tanzania," 12 July 1972, UNESDOC, 32.
[642] Margo Viscusi, "Literacy For Working: Functional Literacy in Rural Tanzania," 1971, ED.71/.XXIV.5/A UNESDOC, 14.

that literacy can help to strengthen the Indian nation: "It will not be possible for us to release the unbounded energies of our people for national reconstruction unless we educate and motivate them on right lines. It is precisely with this view that the concept of Functional Literacy has been evolved."[643] Other senior politicians and officials followed the functional literacy line. "Literacy does not mean only reading and writing," Education Minister M. C. Chagla informed the Indian Parliament, "It also means better production."[644] Indian planners adapted the literacy campaign to the requirements of agricultural reform. After ten years of independence, Indian officials believed that the country was still prone to massive famines that threatened both social and political stability. New Delhi cooperated with the Ford Foundation to modernize farming techniques, import new agricultural technology, and develop new crops. For the rest of the decade, India became the center of the Green Revolution in Asia.[645] The development of new high-yielding crops - the centerpiece of the Green Revolution - required farm laborers who could handle more technologically-advanced agricultural methods.

New Delhi and the Secretariat linked the EWLP with a Farmers' Training and Functional Literacy Project (Kisan Saksharta Yojana). UNESCO again provided expert advice and deployed permanent staff members like Asher Deleon, who helped prepare the Tehran Conference in 1965, to work in the Indian Ministry of Education. Despite initial problems getting the program off the

[643] *A Challenge and an Opportunity: Adult Education in India*, 3-4.
[644] M. C. Chagla Statement, 13 May 1966, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, session 56, columns 1311-1315, available online: <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/523380>.
[645] For the Green Revolution, see Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

ground, planners initiated functional literacy courses and programs in one hundred selected districts. The Indian Functional Literacy Project's National Director later explained that it would adapt Indian mentalities to the demands of the central government. The ability to read and write would "eliminate prejudices and resistance by the farmer to the processes of change in agricultural practices... to change his attitudes towards socio-economic situations... to bring him in the orbit of communication so that he can have access to continuing education."[646] 1.2 million farmers passed the functional literacy courses by March 1973. Indian reports noted that the functional literacy programs had disseminated knowledge about new agricultural practices.[647]

The world literacy project confronted considerable problems managing the global campaign. Persistent conflicts between national education planners and international specialists complicated planning. Countries - like Algeria and Guinea - that were already committed to mass campaigns for universal illiteracy welcomed UNESCO's technical assistance but criticized the organization's selective approach. In Algeria, negotiations were required to harmonize the functional literacy approach with national development plans. In Guinea, the organization failed to "impose" the "UNESCO dogma" developed over the previous ten years. These kinds of problems led Madagascar to end the program

[646] S. N. Saraf, "Functional Literacy Project of India 1968-1978 - A Decade of Evaluation - Procedures, Problems and Prospects," April 1980, IIEP/TM/67/80, UNESDOC. See also *Handbook on Farmers Functional Literacy Project* (New Delhi: Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, April 1971).
[647] *A Challenge and an Opportunity*, 12.

prematurely.[648] Local interests also resisted efforts by central governments to expand their influence through educational interventions. As early as 1963, for example, an education mission to rural Iran noticed that local villagers "appear to have grown, of late, a little wary of experts coming from different Agencies."[649] Some villagers interpreted the campaign as a threat to traditional social life. Villagers in rural Tanzania, for example, kept their wives and daughters from attending literacy classes.[650] Local political powers also resisted the central government's efforts to expand literacy programs against their interests. The Indian State Governments resisted New Delhi's plans to expand literacy programs in the countryside. The Khuzistan Water and Power Authority, the dominant development body in western Iran, ignored the Shah's literacy programs in their region.[651] The centralizing ideology implicit in UNESCO's functional literacy strategies could not overcome these entrenched local social and political interests. These problems and pitfalls led many critics to dismiss the entire campaign as a flop.[652]

Despite failures and complications, the global literacy experiment did shape the long-term trajectory of literacy campaigning in Third World countries. The EWLP became, one participant recalled a decade later, "a training ground for

[648] *The Experimental World Literacy Programme: A Critical Assessment*, 18, 47, 69, 190.
[649] S.V.S. Rao, "Six Weeks Report - Submitted by S.V.S. Rao Consultant in Literacy and Adult Education - UNESCO Mission in Iran," n.d. [1963], UNESDOC.
[650] Peter C. Muncie, "Torches in the Night: Educational Experiences in Tanzania and the Ivory Coast," 34.
[651] M. C. Chagla Statement, 13 May 1966, *Rajya Sabha Debates*; John Smyth and K. Izadi, "A Costs-Effectiveness Report on the Work-Oriented Adult Literacy Pilot Project, Iran," 17.
[652] For a discussion of these criticisms, see Arthur Gillette, "The Experimental World Literacy Program," 198-199.

a large number of cadres of national and international literacy workers" who subsequently shaped literacy development projects around the world. Another participant described it as a "breeding ground for educational innovation."[653] States adapted functional literacy to their national mass literacy campaigns. New Delhi modeled its own literacy programs after the UNESCO campaign. The National Director of the Indian Functional Literacy Project argued that the EWLP was the "pathfinder and forerunner" of the 1978 National Adult Education Programme (NAEP), which expanded the campaign to make one hundred million Indians literate over the course of seven years.[654] The TANU Party's September 1971 biannual conference passed a resolution proclaiming a new campaign to eradicate illiteracy by 1975. The Mwanza Literacy Project provided experience that inspired the Party to "go nationwide" with UNESCO's Functional Literacy strategies. The organization's functional literacy project trained the cadre of specialists that provided "technical leadership" for the mass campaign that Dar-es-Salaam directed between 1971 and 1981.[655] The EWLP also galvanized

[653] H. S. Bholla, *Campaigning for Literacy* (Paris: UNESCO, 1984), 12; Arthur Gillette, "The Experimental World Literacy Program: A Unique International Effort Revisited," Robert F Arnove and Harvey J. Graff, eds., *National Literacy Campaigns: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (New York: Plenum Press, 1987).

[654] S. N. Saraf, "Functional Literacy Project of India 1968-1978"; H. S. Bhola Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the Comparative and International Education Society, "A Policy Analysis of Adult Education in India: Across the Two National Policy Reviews of 1968 and 1986," March 1988, ERIC.

[655] S. Malya, "Literacy - A Work-Oriented Adult Literacy Pilot Project and a National Campaign," reprinted in H. Hinzen and V. H. Hundsdörfer, *Education for Liberation and Development*, 141-152; Z.J. Mpogolo Presentation to the International Seminar on Campaigning for Literacy at Udaipur, in H. S. Bhola, ed., *The Promise of Literacy: Campaigns, Programs and Projects*, ERIC, 61-62; Daniel Mbunda, "Adult Education in Tanzania: Life-Long Process for National Development," 22 September 1972, ED-72/CONF.1/8, UNESDOC; Peter C. Muncie, "Torches in the Night: Educational Experiences in Tanzania and the Ivory Coast," 34; H. S. Bholla, *Campaigning for Literacy*, 138-156; Jeff Unsicker, "Tanzania's Literacy Campaign in

international attention to the problems of combatting illiteracy. UNESCO's activism even had an impact on Western donor countries like Britain, where the organization's world campaign led to a parliamentary bill and a nationwide literacy campaign.[656]

The EWLP also led officials to revise their ideas about the best approaches to combatting illiteracy. The Secretariat had promised that literacy would empower individuals to practice their basic human right to education but also promoted it as a tool for social engineering and nation-building. Some suggested that these two issues might be in "direct confrontation." "Is such a reform being carried out for the sake of social justice," Adiseshiah asked Maheu as early as 1967, "or as a means of arriving at greater productivity?"[657] The Assistant Director General believed that the functional literacy programs favored central planning at the expense of empowering individuals. By 1976, ten years after the start of the EWLP, Secretariat critics began to agree that the program had empowered central governments at the expense of individual illiterates. A similar intellectual argument began to emerge in the 1970s. The Secretariat's report complained that arguments about illiterates made ten years earlier "reduce[d] the illiterate to a caricature. He or she becomes a maimed human being for whom

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Historical-Structural Perspective," *National Literacy Campaigns: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, 239.

[656] Ann Hagell and Jonthan Tudge, "Illiterate Adults in Literate Societies: Interactions with a Social World," in Marta Kohl de Oliveira and Jaan Valsiner, eds., *Literacy in Human Development* (Stamford: Ablex, 1998), 168.

[657] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Memorandum to René Maheu, "Status of the Five Experimental Functional Literacy Pilot Projects," 12 December 1967, Folder 20, Box 6, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.

marginality even takes the shape of infantilization."[658] Literacy campaigns degraded the self-worth, ingenuity, and practical knowledge that illiterates possessed.

In response to these criticisms, the organization began to revise its approach to combatting illiteracy. Although literacy planners maintained that reading and writing were key pillars of economic development, they also began to broaden their agenda. "'Functional' must be seen as social and cultural and not narrowly economic," Assistant Director General John Fobes wrote two years after the end of the EWLP.[659] They suggested that literacy campaigns in the future should "aim above all to arouse in the *individual* a critical awareness of social reality, and to enable him or her to understand, master and transform his or her destiny."[660] H. S. Bhola, who had worked on the EWLP in Tanzania, believed that literacy was a double-edged sword. The ability to read and write made people intellectually vulnerable to state-builders who sought to "annex men" to larger political and economic projects. Yet literacy also provided individuals with the rational skills to resist oppression and assert their rights: "Literacy particularly is a mode which liberates as it annexes."[661] UNESCO began to adopt the theories of the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, a move which symbolized the organization's

[658] *The Experimental World Literacy Programme: A Critical Assessment*, 118.
[659] John E. Fobes, "A Turning Point for Literacy: The Changing Response of the World Community," *Prospects* VI, no. 1 (1976), 125; "The Changing Response of the World Community to the Need for Literacy," n. d., Folder 10, Box 3, DDG 2, AG 8, UA.
[660] Emphasis added. *The Experimental World Literacy Programme: A Critical Assessment*, 189.
[661] H. S. Bhola, "Functional Literacy - The Concept and the Program," 11.

shift from "functional literacy" to "literacy for liberation."[662] The Secretariat therefore came full-circle and retreated away from the connection between literacy and labor and back towards the humanist ideals of literacy.[663]

One issue remained central to UNESCO's ideological approach to literacy training, however, despite the shift from economic development to political liberation. The organization maintained that literacy should end the social isolation of peasants and villagers in the contemporary world. "To read the word is to read the world" became a common phrase at international meetings and conferences in the years following the end of the EWLP.[664]

The Experimental World Literacy Project, the first international campaign to fight illiteracy, gained traction when it appealed to centralizing political elites and Western development experts. Although it encountered administrative obstacles and confronted criticism, it had a longterm impact on international development. UNESCO was not the only source of literacy training in the postwar world. National governments played the most important role and the World Council of Churches also supported international efforts to coordinate literacy

[662] Freire believed that newly literate peasants should not be thought of as receptacles of new knowledge imparted by the government but as active participants in their societies. He often employed UNESCO's language about the functional approach to literacy but emphasized politics rather than economics. See Andrew J. Kirkendall, "Paulo Freire, Eduardo Frei, Literacy Training and the Politics of Consciousness Raising in Chile, 1964 to 1970," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 36 (November 2004), 698; Andrew J. Kirkendall, "Paulo Freire, l'UNESCO et la Lutte Contre L'Analphabétisme des Adultes dans le Monde de la Guerre Froide," *60 Ans*, 461.
[663] Kenneth Levine, "Functional Literacy: Fond Illusions and False Economies."
[664] See especially Majid Rahnema, "Literacy: To Read the Word or the World?," *Prospects* VI, no. 1 (1976), 72; Rahnema Address, Records of the General Conference, Nineteenth Session, Eleventh Plenary Meeting, 1 November 1976, 19 C/Proceedings, 503; H. S. Bhola, "The Politics of Adult Literacy Promotion: An International Perspective," *Journal of Reading* 31, no. 7 (April 1988), 668, 671.

campaigns. Yet the organization remained the world's foremost authority on the issue and determined the international agenda over the course of the following decades.

* * * * *

"Throughout the world a major war is being waged – the war against ignorance," a UNESCO pamphlet proclaimed in 1953.[665] Ten years later, military language permeated discussions about the expansion of education in developing nations. Throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America, national leaders developed plans to consolidate their lands and peoples. Central governments declared "holy wars" against illiteracy and deployed "armies of knowledge" into distant villages. Leaders as ideologically and culturally different as Shah Reza Pahlavi and Julius Nyerere cultivated their images as national teachers. Liberation movements launched joint struggles against "neocolonialism" through diplomacy abroad and against "spiritual colonialism" through schoolhouses at home. Many countries in Africa were "virtually in the position of... countr[ies] at war" in their efforts to train and educate future generations.

UNESCO increasingly became the central command for this global war on ignorance. "There is a ferment inside our education sector," one senior Secretariat official noted, "and it is becoming a significant switching centre of information on

[665] *Men Against Ignorance* (Paris: UNESCO, 1953).

developments around the world."[666] The Paris secretariat became an invaluable meeting ground for educators from around the world to share ideas and develop common strategies to expand the flow of information in their countries through the development of schools, communications technology, and literacy. The Secretariat's communications theorists - Wilbur Schramm and Henry Cassirer - argued that mass communications could conquer vast distances and forge nations. Communication systems were envisioned as the new sinews of the national community. UNESCO's promotion of functional literacy – "based on tactics of lightning warfare" – appealed to political leaders who wanted to "annex" isolated villagers and nomadic tribes to their expanding states. "Combating" illiteracy among *selected* social groups contributed not just to nebulous ideas of human rights but also to more pressing concerns with economic growth and political cohesion. Literacy, as one journalist commented, was a "useful weapon of political integration."[667]

Yet this global "war on ignorance" was also a new stage in the history of the organization's efforts to integrate Third World peoples into the global community. Earlier projects - like the History of Mankind series - were intended to foster a sense of unity out of the world's cultural diversity. The educational programs adopted during the first development decade expanded the channels of communication within nations states. UNESCO's educational programs were

[666] John E. Fobes to C. G. Bowen, 16 March 1972, Folder 14, Box 3, DDG 2, AG 8, UA.
[667] Citations are drawn respectively from Mary Burnet, *ABC of Literacy*, 60; H. S. Bhola, "The Nature and Function of Literacy: Sociology, Cybernetics, Politics," 1973, ERIC, 11; John Ardagh, "UNESCO Pinpoints War on Illiteracy," *Washington Post* (3 June 1965), A39.

therefore both more limited and more ambitious than earlier projects. It was more limited in that it focused not on promoting cooperation between different world cultures but rather on assisting governments to achieve their national goals. Governments relied on international financial and technical advice to shore up their national power and social stability. However, it was also wider in scope since experts targeted isolated peoples far beyond the control of urban elites. Education - whether in the form of schools, the mass media, or the acquisition of literacy - was intended to transmit information and knowledge. The decade's most ambitious international projects focused primarily not on the exchange of information between states or civilizations. It was focused on "awakening" the marginalized peoples of the Third World.

Chapter 4: Monumental Diplomacy: The Nubian Campaign

> UNESCO's work on behalf of the preservation
> of the cultural heritage of mankind is not aimed at...
> saving lifeless remains, however precious they may be;
> it is essentially designed, on the contrary, to foster
> the emergence of a new attitude of mind towards
> the building of the future by promoting,
> around the notion of a common heritage,
> a practical awareness of the intellectual and moral
> solidarity of mankind at all times and in all places.
>
> René Maheu, 1973[668]

The demands of postcolonial economic development and nation-building dominated the international agenda in the sixties. For some critics, cultural projects like the History of Mankind series seemed quaint when billions of people were struggling to survive and national leaders were fighting to stabilize weak and divided nations. More unforgiving critics argued that they were a shameless waste of resources that could be devoted to relieving misery and suffering. Despite this skepticism, many leaders rediscovered the importance of culture in the late 1960s. Political and economic leaders began to recognize that they had neglected the importance of cultural traditions and artistic expression in recent years. Earlier development experts had assumed economic "take off" could only be achieved by modernizing underdeveloped peoples. Social scientists assumed that Western economic models could be transplanted to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They typically associated "modern" mentalities with "Western" thought and value. The

[668] René Maheu, "Culture in the Contemporary World: Problems and Prospects," November 1973, UNESDOC.

realization that developing nations were not achieving dramatic economic growth led some thinkers to reassess their convictions about the cultural foundations of development. "Westernization," according to Adiseshiah, is merely "an unhappy form of mimicry."[669] Critics pointed not just to the environmental and social consequences of rapid industrialization but also the cultural alienation experienced by peoples torn from traditional ways of life and thought. "No, development is not a matter for technocrats," René Maheu informed ECOSOC in 1973. "It calls for an indissoluble union of technique... and of culture, which is the intuitive or reflective awareness of the values by which ends are defined."[670] Development experts by the end of 1960s began to incorporate cultural ideas into their theories and policy proposals.

Cultural concerns also began to shape international politics. Some countries – especially communist bloc countries – had created cultural ministries in order to expand and strengthen their ruling political ideology.[671] In the developing world, culture ministers sought to promote new national identities and recover local modes of expression. For many African countries, forged from diverse tribal and linguistic groups, crafting a common cultural identity helped to

[669] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Inaugural Address to the National Conference of Churches on Action for World Development, "The World Situation: The Seventies - Decade of Development," 12 February 1970, Folder 67, Box 19, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[670] René Maheu Statement to the Economic and Social Council (Fifty-Fifth Session), 6 July 1973, DG/73/10, UNESDOC. See also "Cultural Development in Asia," 1974, SHC.74/WS/36, UNESDOC. See also René Maheu Address at the Opening of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Institutional, Administrative and Financial Aspects of Cultural Policies, 24 August 1970, DG/70/11, UNESDOC.
[671] Anne Applebaum, *Iron Curtain*, 331-361.

ensure national survival.[672] Richard Hoggart, who served for several years as UNESCO's Assistant Director General of Culture, noticed the large number of governments that were beginning to establish ministries of culture in the early 1970s. The state's new commitment to preserve national cultures "express[ed] a search for some kind of cohesion or harmony in societies, in a period when religious cohesion is regarded as no longer possible or not desirable," he recalled. After all, "'culture' is at bottom a very serious and probably directly political matter."[673] According to Maheu, postcolonial nations were recovering their "cultural authenticity as the essential basis for the re-emergence and affirmation of their national identity."[674] The role of culture in the history of international development can best be seen in the efforts to preserve ancient sites and monuments.

While the international community focused on economic and social planning for the future, other specialists looked to the ancient past. UNESCO's founders hoped the organization would use its influence to preserve mankind's cultural and historical treasures but confronted political resistance. Geopolitical developments created new opportunities for the organization. Egypt's massive economic development program promised to improve the country's economic and

[672] "Cultural Policies in African Member States: Present Situation and Trends," 26 September 1975, SHC/AFRICACULT/4, UNESDOC.
[673] Richard Hoggart, "Culture and its Ministers," *An English Temper: Essays on Education, Culture and Communications* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1982), 192.
[674] René Maheu, "Culture in the Contemporary World: Problems and Prospects," November 1973, UNESDOC. See also Meeting of Experts on Cultural Rights as Human Rights, "Final Report," 30 September 1968, SHC/MD/1, UNESDOC.

social future but directly threatened to destroy the country's cultural and artistic history.[675]

Secretariat officials scrambled to coordinate an international campaign to protect and preserve the temples and monuments on the riverbanks of the upper Nile. Washington and Cairo took advantage of the cultural crisis to strengthen their own diplomatic and economic strategies. The Nubian Campaign elicited excitement worldwide and strengthened the organization's international authority. Secretariat officials used this new authority to "invent" and propagate the idea of World Heritage. It was an idea that reshaped international politics into the twenty-first century.

Archaeologists Versus Economists

People have imbued relics and treasures with political and spiritual meaning since the nineteenth century. Romantic poets and artists brought popular attention to gothic cathedrals and ruined castles. Social critics like John Ruskin urged contemporaries to preserve these architectural treasures for both their universal cultural value and as a symbol of Europe's preindustrial past.[676] Britain saw the political value of ancient sites and monuments. The diplomatic and

[675] Egypt formally joined with Syria in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. Syria then seceded in 1961, although Cairo maintained the name until 1971. I refer to "Egypt" for the sake of simplicity and consistency with earlier chapters.
[676] John Ruskin, *Unto This Last and Other Writings* (New York: Penguin, 1985). See also T. J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

political elites who became members of the National Trust exchanged ideas about preservation with their American counterparts in order to strengthen a common Anglo-Saxon identity. London likewise exchanged ideas with the white settler colonies in order to solidify imperial unity. Travelers could visit historic sites across the Atlantic and feel a sense of transnational community.[677] British imperialists also turned towards monuments to validate and legitimize their right to govern foreign lands. The protection of domestic sites, as one historian has noted, "was an index of civilization." British efforts to discover, excavate, and protect ancient temples in the colonial world would, Indian Viceroy Lord Canning believed, strengthen British claims to be "an enlightened ruling power."[678] Nineteenth-century preservationists were able to enlist sympathetic political and religious powers in their efforts to preserve historic and cultural sites at home and abroad but were unable to establish international agreements.

Twentieth-century military conflict made the preservation of cultural heritage sites a new diplomatic issue. The widespread destruction of the First World War caught the world's attention. The devastation of northwest Europe - where the sight of devastated churches and medieval towns reduced to rubble came to shape the popular image of modern war - led to the formation of a

[677] Melanie Hall, "The Politics of Collecting: The Early Aspirations of the National Trust, 1883-1913," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 13 (2003), 345-257. For Anglo-American transnational relations, see Kathleen Burke, *Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the Beginning* (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2008).

[678] Lord Canning as cited in Astrid Swenson, "The Law's Delay? Preservation Legislation in France, Germany and England, 1870-1914," *Towards World Heritage*, 148. For preservation in the British and French empires, see Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East* (New York: Knopf, 2005).

postwar "Commission on Responsibility for War and Guarantees" to investigate illegal attacks on cultural treasures. The commission and the League of Nations failed to establish a system with sanctions and these early efforts yielded few results. Interwar advancements in military technology, especially in long-range artillery and aerial bombing, made undefended territory more vulnerable and inspired proposals for a new international legal framework to keep pace with technological advancements. The territorial expansion of Nazi Germany following the invasion of Poland in 1939 and Western Europe in 1940 led to the looting of artwork. It was the liberation of Europe, following the Allied landings in France in 1944, that renewed attention on the problems of preserving cultural and historic sites. The postwar Nuremberg Tribunal discussed the "seizure and looting" of art and initiated a process of restitution.[679] The Secretariat assumed responsibility for leading international preservation efforts in the postwar years. Julian Huxley and Torres Bodet both committed themselves publicly to preserving historical sites and monuments and tried to make it a "matter of urgency" among "countries which are the guardians of those monuments."[680]

The Cold War constrained international efforts to guarantee the protection of monuments. This became clear when the Secretariat brought together diplomats in The Hague in 1954 to develop a legal framework for the protection of cultural property during wartime. The discussions revealed that the

[679] "Historical Note Concerning the Draft Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict," 1954, CBC/7, UNESDOC.
[680] Message from Mr. J. Torres Bodet Director-General of Unesco, *Museum* 3 (1950), 7.

preservation of monuments and historical sites could not compete with geopolitical demands. The issue of "military necessity" became "a trickle of skepticism" flowing through the conference discussions, one participant noted.[681] The American delegation brought a colonel to testify his "alarm" about the constraints that the convention would put on military preparedness. British participants praised his remarks and agreed with his concerns.[682] The Soviet delegation used the meeting as an opportunity to highlight American militarism. They focused on introducing resolutions condemning the use of nuclear weapons.[683] Smaller powers shared superpower reservations about military requirements. A Lebanese delegate observed that "in the heat of battle," when soldiers had to make hard choices, choosing between "the life of a man or the destruction of a cathedral" would be a difficult decision.[684] The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, despite these reservations, was signed in May 1954 and came into force two years later. It identified cultural sites that belligerent and occupying powers pledged to protect in times of war. Although the convention's influence was

[681] Tomeh comments, Record of the Fifth Plenary Meeting, 23 April 1954, CBC/SR/1-6, UNESDOC, 37.
[682] Colonel Perham Address, Record of the Third Meeting of the Main Commission, 27 April 1954, CBC/SR/8-12, UNESDOC, 20; Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Main Commission, 27 April 1954, CBC/SR/8-12, UNESDOC, 33; Record of the Eighth Meeting of the Main Commission, 3 May 1954, CBC/SR/8-12, UNESDOC, 72.
[683] Record of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, 12 May 1954, CBC/SR/1-6, UNESDOC, 107; Record of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Main Commission, 10 May 1954, CBC/SR/8-12, UNESDOC, 219. For the Soviet "peace offensive," see Alessandro Brogi, *Confronting America: The Cold War Between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 122-157.
[684] Record of the Fifth Plenary Meeting, 23 April 1954, CBC/SR/1-6, UNESDOC, 36.

limited, since it regulated the treatment of monuments only during times of war and occupation, it established their fate as an international concern.[685]

Decolonization and the demands of economic development also constrained international preservation programs. Asian and Middle Eastern states that threw off colonial subjugation announced plans to build giant hydroelectric dams, sprawling factories, and modern highways. These states borrowed and stretched their economies to fulfill economic promises to their peoples and had little interest in unproductive historical sites. Furthermore, those grandiose "temples of the future" - the hundreds of new concrete dams and factories - often came at the expense of the temples of the past.[686] This dilemma was most pronounced in Nasser's Egypt. The Free Officers who took power in 1952 made the Aswan High Dam the centerpiece of their revolution. It promised to control the Nile's annual flooding and thereby improve irrigation, boost agricultural productivity, spread electrification, and feed a hungry and rapidly growing population. The High Dam also became a symbol of Egyptian sovereignty and national prestige.[687] Cairo's announcement led to concern among archaeologists in Cairo and around the world. It would create an artificial body of water - "Lake Nasser" - that would flood hundreds of ancient Egyptian temples, tombs, and artifacts. The crisis dramatically demonstrated the dilemmas that faced those who

[685] Rodney Harrison, *Heritage: Critical Approaches* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 51.
[686] Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, 61. For Third World industrialization, see Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Norton, 2006), 301-321.
[687] Nancy Y. Reynolds, "Building the Past: Rockscapes and the Aswan High Dam in Egypt," *Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa*, Alan Mikhail, ed. (New York: Oxford, 2012), 181-207.

wanted to preserve historical treasures in the developing world. "Over the last half century," one prominent French archaeologist claimed while visiting Cairo in early 1956, "archaeologists have suffered in an unequal fight with economists."[688]

The world's artistic and archaeological communities believed that the Aswan High Dam was a catastrophe and assumed the Nile's historical treasures were doomed to disappear. Mustafa Amer of the Egyptian Antiquity Service felt it was his "duty" to convince his government to act and organized an expedition of specialists to survey the area.[689] Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, a French archaeologist, assisted Amer with the effort to survey threatened sites along the Nile and helped to bring international archaeological support to Egypt. Her professional experience - she curated the Louvre's Egyptian antiquities collection and spoke fluent Arabic - made her an influential figure in Cairo. She also had diplomatic skills and contacts in both France and Egypt. She spoke with leading Egyptian officials, including President Nasser, and appealed to their patriotism to gain their political support to preserve threatened monuments and archaeological sites. She also proposed that Cairo contact UNESCO.[690]

Desroches-Noblecourt's reports to the Secretariat's Museum Division led the Secretariat to establish a Documentation and Research Center in Cairo.

[688] Louis-A. Christophe address in Alexandria on 13 May and Cairo on 21 March 1956, "Promenade Archéologique dans la Nubie Menacée," Folder: "Toshka and Arminna Excavation," Box 6, William Kelly Simpson Papers, YPM.
[689] Louis-A. Christophe address in Alexandria on 13 May and Cairo on 21 March 1956, "Promenade Archéologique dans la Nubie Menacée," Folder: "Toshka and Arminna Excavation," Box 6, William Kelly Simpson Papers, YPM.
[690] Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, *La Grande Nubiade: Le Parcours d'une Égyptologue* (Paris: Stock/Pernoud, 1992), 182. For Desroches-Noblecourt's discussion with President de Gaulle, see *La Grande Nubiade*, 183. For her discussions with President Nasser, see Stéphane Foucart, "Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt," *Le Monde* (25 June 2011).

Mustafa Amer was assigned its director while Desroches-Noblecourt became his advisor and Cairo's unofficial cultural diplomat to both the Secretariat and the Quai D'Orsey in Paris. The Documentation Center helped the Egyptian government to catalogue the cultural and historical treasures of the Nile. Cairo supported the project and financed a floating "laboratory-barge" for archaeologists to use for research expeditions up the Nile.[691] Within a year the Documentation Center became a huge success. Assistant Director General Malcolm Adiseshiah visited and noted the "wonderful" circumstances that made it a success: "a moment in Egypt's history, a far-sighted Government and officials and a dynamic personality in Mrs. Noblecourt." The center, he concluded, was "undoubtedly" the organization's project with "the greatest sex appeal."[692]

Cold War tensions again complicated the Secretariat's efforts. Nasser's efforts to acquire arms from Czechoslovakia in 1955 led Washington to pull its financial support from the Aswan High Dam project. The World Bank followed the American lead and pulled its funding for the project. Nasser, unwilling to abandon his plans for Egyptian development, nationalized the Suez Canal in order to produce funds through shipping fees and strengthen Nasser's anticolonial image. The Soviet Union took advantage of the crisis and pledged to provide financial and technical support for the High Dam.[693] The British, French, and Israeli invasion of the Sinai peninsula a year later disrupted Egypt's place in the

[691] Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, *La Grande Nubiade*, 129-137.
[692] Malcolm Adiseshiah memorandum to Directors, Departments, Heads, Services and Bureaux, "Mission to Egypt," 15 February 1956, Folder 2, Box 1, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[693] Diane Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

international cultural and academic community. The disruption of Franco-Egyptian cultural relations in particular was "one of the greatest disasters in the world of cultural relations," Egyptian diplomat Awad Mohammed claimed.[694] The Suez Crisis solidified hostile attitudes towards foreign archaeologists that had been developing in the region over the previous thirty years. Egyptologists, usually fluent in Arabic and familiar with local customs and politics, had gained a reputation as covert colonial spies. Cairo began to limit the number of foreign specialists permitted to visit and conduct research expeditions out of concern for its national security.[695] The conflict reverberated through international politics and the international scholarly communities, which now faced greater obstacles to conducting field research in the region.

The conflict did draw UNESCO further into international efforts to preserve Egypt's ancient treasures. In New Delhi, where the Suez Crisis coincided with the General Conference, hostilities brought renewed attention to Egypt's cultural heritage. Egypt's delegation asked the organization to intervene in the conflict and invoked The Hague Convention that came into force three months earlier.[696] In Cairo, Nasser's government defended the organization's involvement

[694] Awad Mohammed comments, Verbatim Records of the Twentieth Plenary Meeting, Records of the General Conference, Ninth Session, 30 November 1956, 9 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC, 228.

[695] For contemporary accounts, see Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson, *UNESCO*, 132; John A. Wilson, *Thousands of Years: An Archaeologist's Search for Ancient Egypt* (New York: Scribners, 1972).

[696] Verbatim Records of the Nineteenth Plenary Meeting, Records of the General Conference, Ninth Session, 30 November 1956, 9 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC. Soviet delegates made similar arguments that radicals in Budapest were targeting Hungary's historic buildings and sites and claimed that Soviets were protecting the country's cultural heritage. See 9 C/PROCEEDINGS, UNESDOC, 222.

in Egypt. The UN evacuated all of its officials from Cairo and the "United Nations caravan" streamed out of the city and boarded the American Sixth Fleet. The Egyptian government informed the Secretariat, however, that it wanted to maintain the Cairo Documentation Center. It sent a telegram to the organization declaring that it would no longer welcome experts from countries that had severed relations with Egypt - such as France and Britain - "with the exception of Ms. Desroches Noblecourt, if she would like to [remain]."[697]

Mid-level officials in Paris and Cairo began to bring the fate of the Nubian monuments to world attention. Desroches-Noblecourt remained the most important international activist. She convinced the Secretariat to invest in a larger salvage project south of the Aswan Dam and personally escorted Director General Luther Evans through the Nubian Temples to demonstrate the urgency of the task. "These works cannot be lost and must be protected," Evans responded. She also gained the support of Assistant Director General René Maheu who, after lengthy discussions, proclaimed "I'm your man" and committed himself to help.[698]

Sarwat Okasha, Nasser's Minister of Culture, dominated deliberations in Cairo. Yet he was also among the earliest participants in the July Revolution that established the new government and was passionately committed to strengthening Egyptian nationalism and cultural influence. He helped to establish Egypt's great

[697] As cited in Christiane Desroches Noblecourt, *La Grande Nubiade*, 164.
[698] Christiane Desroches Noblecourt, *La Grande Nubiade*, 141, 220.

cultural institutions and helped to make Arab Nationalism a cultural force.[699] Okasha became Egypt's most important advocate for the preservation of the temples and monuments along the Nile. He saw the new Ministry of Culture as "a symbol of the vitality of our Government." The destruction of the Nubian monuments "would be a disgrace to the Ministry and indeed to the Revolution."[700] Okasha achieved a real victory in January 1959 when he met Maheu at Cairo airport and convinced the Assistant Director General to establish an international campaign to preserve the Nubian monuments.[701] Three months later on 4 April, after Okasha spoke with Nasser and gained his approval, Cairo officially sent the Secretariat a request for "large-scale financial, scientific and technical assistance" for the preservation of Nubian monuments.[702]

The minister of culture also helped to reshape Egypt's cultural place in the world. In 1958, the American ambassador and the Director of New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art approached Okasha with an offer to purchase temples that would be submerged by Lake Nasser. The American's "casual" offer

[699] "Tharwat Okasha, a Founder of Egypt's Culture Institutions Dies," *Ahram Online* (28 February 2012), available online: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/18/0/35564/Books/Tharwat-Okasha,-a-founder-of-Egypt's-culture-insti.aspx.

[700] Tharwat 'Ukāshah [Sarwat Okasha], *Ramses Re-Couronne: Hommage Vivant au Pharaon Mort* ([Cairo]: Dar al-Maaref, 1974), as cited in Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, ed., *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia: The International Rescue Campaign at Abu Simbel, Philae and Other Sites* (Thames and Hudson: UNESCO, 1987), 67.

[701] Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, ed., *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia*, 67. For Maheu's recollections of the meeting, see Address of René Maheu to the Conference of States Taking Part in the Salvage of the Philae Temples, 19 December 1970, Annex VIII to SHC/MD/15, UNESDOC. For Okasha's recollections, see Sarwat Okasha, "Rameses Recrowned: The International Campaign to Preserve the Monuments of Nubia, 1959-68," *Offerings to the Discerning Eye: An Egyptological Medley in Honor of Jack A. Josephson* (Boston: Brill, 2010) 227.

[702] "Report of the International Campaign to Safeguard the Monuments of Nubia," 30 September 1959, 11 C/PRG/9, UNESDOC; Sarwat Okasha, "Rameses Recrowned," 227.

"to purchase our ancestral heritage," Okasha recalled, insulted his patriotism. The American was no better than the European colonialists who pilfered their history. The encounter inspired him to look more closely at the value of the monuments and the role they could play in advancing Egyptian interests internationally. Okasha drafted a "Declaration by the Government of the United Arab Republic" with UNESCO officials that offered any country that contributed to the organization's salvage project in Egypt a reward: either a portion of archaeological treasures unearthed during excavations or designated temples in return for financial contributions. It established a 50-50 sharing scheme for unearthed treasures and artifacts.[703] The temples were Egyptian "ambassadors," Okasha believed. They would earn financial support for the Secretariat's efforts to preserve the Nubian treasures and improve Egypt's international image in Western countries. He therefore renegotiated, with the help of the Secretariat, the terms of the region's archaeological politics and established an enduring tradition in Egyptian cultural diplomacy.[704]

Secretariat officials began preliminary planning for an international campaign in 1959. A "floating commission" traveled up the Nile and surveyed the land and state of the monuments. The Executive Board agreed to launch an international campaign to preserve the monuments of Nubia in November. The Secretariat declared that its "role [would] be to promote a great movement of

[703] Sarwat Okasha, "Rameses Recrowned," 226.
[704] Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, ed., *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia*, 137; "Les Trésors Archéologiques égyptiens: Une Arme de Diplomatie Internationale," *Al Ahram* (17 July 2006).

international collaboration and to act as intermediary between those taking part in the work and the two governments."[705] It assembled an International Action Committee in 1960, composed of experts and advisors, to organize the Nubian Campaign. The Secretariat strengthened this body of experts in 1962 by replacing it with an Executive Committee to organize diplomatic, financial, and technical problems. This change, which transformed the committee from a body of experts into a body of diplomats, boosted international confidence in and support for the Nubian Campaign.[706] The Secretariat also managed the international financial dimensions of campaign by establishing a trust fund to hold resources and solicit donations.[707] The Director General asked French Culture Minister André Malraux to publicly deliver the organization's "world appeal." They evoked the organization's founding ideals. The effort to preserve ancient Egyptian temples, Malraux proclaimed for assembled journalists and TV cameras, "publicly proclaims the world's art as its indivisible heritage."[708]

Secretariat officials were primarily concerned about the financial resources required to excavate and preserve sites along the Nile. "This is an undertaking without precedent," a meeting of experts assembled in Cairo

[705] Christiane Desroches Noblecourt, *La Grande Nubiade*, 208; Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, ed., *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia*; *A Common Trust: The Preservation of the Ancient Monuments of Nubia* (Paris: UNESCO, 1960), 5.
[706] International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Terms of Reference and Competence of the Various Advisory Bodies," n.d. [1962], Annex III of NUBIA/2/CE/6, UNESDOC; Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, "International Salvage Archeology: Some Organizational and Technical Aspects of the Nubian Campaign," *Annales Academiae Regiae Scientiarum Upsaliensis* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1971–1972), 122.
[707] International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Meeting of the International Action Committee," 5 May 1960, SN/IAC/2, UNESDOC.
[708] André Malraux address delivered in UNESCO's Headquarters, 8 March 1960, *UNESCO Courier* (1960), 9.

declared, "the aid to be bestowed should be equally unparalleled."[709] Planners quickly realized that the organization could not fund the project with its own financial resources.[710] Cairo and the Secretariat focused on how to publicize and gain international support for the Nubian Campaign. They developed a "vast publicity campaign" to create "a psychological climate favourable to" diplomatic and financial support for the campaign. The organization printed and distributed hundreds of thousands of glossy color brochures and magazines publicizing the international campaign.[711] Cairo's Ministry of Education authorized a traveling exhibit, "5000 Years of Egyptian Arts," to tour European cities and keep "the public abroad up to date" about the progress of the campaign.[712] The Secretariat also invited prestigious personalities to hold honorary positions and support the project. King Gustaf VI Adolf of Sweden became president of an International Committee of Patrons.[713] This publicity campaign had a major impact on West European public opinion, which became fascinated by images and artifacts of

[709] "Meeting of International Experts on the Safeguarding of the Sites and Monuments of Ancient Nubia," 11 October 1959, SN/R.EXP/REPORT, UNESDOC, 10.
[710] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to Director-General, "Budgetary Position for 1959-60," 29 October 1959, Folder 5, AG 8, DDG 1, Box 2, UA; Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to Director General, "Financing of Nubia, etc.," 23 November 1959, Folder 5, Box 2, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[711] This included 430,000 copies of a special edition of the UNESCO Courier and 200,000 copies of the special brochure "A Duty of International Solidarity." René Maheu, Statement on the Progress Made in the International Campaign for Safeguarding the Monuments of Nubia, enclosed in John H. Esterline to DOS, 9 June 1960, Box 2822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; International Action Committee for the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Report of the Committee," 3 August 1961, IAC/2/7, UNESDOC.
[712] United Arab Republic Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, "Report on the Project for Safeguarding the Nubian Monuments," n.d. [1962], NUBIA/2/CE/4, UNESDOC.
[713] "Report of the International Campaign to Safeguard the Monuments of Nubia," 30 September 1959, 11 C/PRG/9, UNESDOC.

ancient Egypt. Within three months the campaign agreed that the "appeal has undoubtedly evoked a world-wide response."[714]

The West European diplomatic response, however, was mixed. London recognized that their support for the campaign could enhance British prestige in Africa and the Middle East.[715] Political considerations constrained London's diplomatic options. The main problem was persistent tension between London and Cairo over the Suez Crisis. British citizens lost a considerable amount of wealth from the Egyptian Revolution and the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Parliamentary pressure made it impossible for London to contribute more than a "token" contribution to the international campaign.[716] French relations with Egypt also remained tense and made significant financial contributions for the campaign impossible.[717] Canadian policymakers believed that contributions "would constitute a friendly and non-political gesture" towards Egypt "and would serve to enhance relations between Canada and that country." Like London, however, Ottawa believed that the campaign posed a heavy financial burden.[718] The

[714] Information About the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Progress of the Campaign from 8 March to 8 June," May 1960, CUA/103, UNESDOC.
[715] B. Bevan, meeting minutes, 17 July 1961, FO 924/1373, UKNA; Minutes of a Meeting held at 3:300 p.m. on Thursday, 13th July, 1961, in room 435, Ministry of Education, Curzon Street, London, W.1. to discuss the salvage of Abu Smibel, 19 July 1961, FO 924/1373, UKNA.
[716] Memorandum of Conversation, "UNESCO Program to Save the Nubian Monuments," 21 January 1960, Box 819, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; F. B. G. Bevan, "The Nubian Monuments," 5 February 1962, 924/1437, UKNA; A.A.F. Haigh, "UNESCO and the Preservation of Nubian Monuments," 23 December 1959, FO 924/1323, UKNA; George Rendel Minute, 1 August 1961, FO 924/1373, UKNA; George Rendel, "Abu Simbel Fund," 2 October 1961, 924/1374, UKNA.
[717] Christiane Desroches Noblecourt, *La Grande Nubiade*, 216.
[718] Memorandum for the Minister, "Unesco Project to Preserve the Monuments of Nubia," 9 November 1962, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC; N.A.R. Memorandum for the Minister, "International Appeal to Save the Monuments of Nubia," 5 March 1962, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC

publicity campaign gained considerable popular enthusiasm but little diplomatic support.

Critics also charged that the Nubian Campaign wasted precious resources that could be used to finance development programs and alleviate poverty in postcolonial states. The British education minister, for example, opposed spending money to "sav[e] the temples of the dead when he would like to spend public money on training teachers of the living."[719] Diplomats from across Asia and Africa shared these economic and humanitarian priorities. Northern Nigeria's education minister hoped that money would not be "wasted" on preservation projects.[720] Indian delegation leader Rajkumari Amrit Kaur voted contrary to instructions from New Delhi to support the Nubian Campaign. She voted as a matter of personal "conscience" in the belief that the Nubian Campaign would drive funds away from more deserving programs to help the poor.[721] The Secretariat was also divided about whether to finance schemes to preserve stones or to teach and educate human beings. Maheu responded to claims that "bread comes before stones" by explaining that food and culture were both important for

[719] A.A.F. Haigh, "Nubian Monuments," 13 January 1961, FO 924/1373, UKNA; Ronald Morrison to B. Bevan, 24 July 1961, 924/1374, UKNA; David Eccles to Hamilton Kerr, August 1961, 924/1437, UKNA; F. B. G. Bevan, "The Nubian Monuments," 5 February 1962, 924/1437, UKNA; David Eccles to Hamilton Kerr, August 1961, 924/1437, UKNA; David Eccles comments in House of Common Debate, 13 July 1961, volume 644, columns 558-9.
[720] Ronald Morrison to B. Bevan, 24 July 1961, FO 924/1374, UKNA.
[721] "Sunday Soliloquies," *Times of India* (12 May 1963), 6.

man's body and spirit.[722] The world appeal, however, could not overcome these financial and ethical problems.

European states began to commit themselves to archaeological missions on the Nile but did not meet expectations. Their financial commitment did nothing to help the most important monument in the region - the massive temples at Abu Simbel. As early as 1959 the international campaign had prioritized Abu Simbel and emphasized that its preservation was "of the first importance."[723] Yet most European countries were reluctant to commit themselves to such an expensive undertaking. Cairo and the Secretariat now turned towards Washington.

Washington's Cultural Diplomacy

The Nubian Campaign emerged at a promising time in the evolution of American foreign policy. President John F. Kennedy arrived in office with a renewed commitment to engage neutral and nationalist Third World countries. In the Middle East he was committed to improving relations with Nasser and Egypt.[724] The centerpiece of Egyptian-American relations was the surplus wheat that Washington bought from its heartland farmers. The United States directed a stream of wheat to Egypt under the Agricultural Trade Development and

[722] Lionel V. J. Roy Memorandum to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "Nubian Monuments," 18 December 1961, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC; Christiane Desroches Noblecourt, *La Grande Nubiade*, 236.
[723] "Meeting of International Experts on the Safeguarding of the Sites and Monuments of Ancient Nubia," 11 October 1959, SN/R.EXP/REPORT, UNESDOC.
[724] Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Assistance Act of 1954 and acquired nonconvertible Egyptian pounds in return - the so-called "PL480 funds." This American aid helped to feed Egyptians and free up Cairo's dwindling supply of foreign currency for investment in new development schemes. Kennedy hoped that this aid would provide leverage over Nasser's foreign policy and bring him closer into the American orbit.[725] There were domestic problems with this strategy. The State Department complained that Nasser's bellicose language and anticolonial posturing created an "unfortunate image" in American public opinion and complicated efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Egypt.[726]

The Secretariat began to make American support central to its diplomatic strategy. Washington's diplomatic and financial power seemed like the key to unlocking the barriers that stood in the way of efforts to salvage the monuments in Nubia. American support would convince other countries to contribute funds. The Director General, a consultant noted, "felt the success of the campaign depended in large measure on U.S. contributions, since many other nations are holding back their participation until the United States takes action."[727] American archaeologists agreed that "other nations are waiting to see how much the United States will give."[728] The Kennedy administration's decision to increase its foreign

[725] Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), chapter 3.
[726] "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic," 18 March 1961, *FRUS* 1961-1962: Volume XVII, Document 23.
[727] Memorandum of Conversation, "Discussion of Nubian Campaign," 19 September 1960, Box 821; Paris to DOS, 4 March 1960, Box 819, both in CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[728] John A. Wilson, "U.S. National Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments," 1960, Box 25, Luther Evans Papers, CUL.

aid commitments was a promising sign. One Executive Board member noted that "Americans are known for their fervor" and "generosity" for good causes.[729] The Nubian Campaign therefore focused not just on preserving the monuments of the Nile but also finding support in the halls of Washington.

Receptive groups of experts in the United States supported the Secretariat's world appeal and sought to enlist Washington. The American academic community, archaeologists, and Egyptologists were particularly enthusiastic about new professional opportunities. John A. Wilson of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago, Joe Brew at Harvard, and William Kelly Simpson of the Peabody Museum at Yale University, all leading figures in the profession, began to correspond with each other and with policymakers in Washington. They advised the American government about the technical aspects of antiquities, helped to negotiate with Egyptian authorities, provided expert testimony at congressional hearings, and helped to publicize the project through public lectures and television interviews. They had a special responsibility to help protect and promote the preservation of antiquities.[730] Yet they also viewed the Nubian Campaign as an opportunity to pry open the doors to Egyptian archaeological sites and enhance their professional opportunities in the region. Arab Nationalists often suspected that foreign archaeologists were spies or saboteurs. As early as 1957, during the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, the American

[729] Canadian Permanent Delegation to Unesco to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, "Meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia," 28 December 1962, File 3: "Nubian Monuments 1960-67," Volume 16, LAC.
[730] See for example, John A. Wilson, *Thousands of Years*, 149.

diplomats Charles Thomson and Walter Laves argued that UNESCO could help to build goodwill and alleviate Middle Eastern suspicions about foreign archaeologists.[731] Egyptologist John A. Wilson returned from a UNESCO meeting and noted that their cooperative discussions provided "hope for a real revival of Egyptology." The Nubian Campaign would overcome Egyptian hostility to their profession and foster a "friendly atmosphere" for American archaeologists in the region.[732] A meeting of the country's senior archaeologists and Egyptologists met in Washington on 24 March 1960 in response to UNESCO's appeal two weeks earlier. The group decided to form a National Committee for the Rescue of the Monuments of Nubia. They collectively endorsed the Nubian Campaign and encouraged the State Department to commit diplomatic and financial support.[733]

The State Department was also enthusiastic about the Nubian Campaign. Policymakers believed that UNESCO's salvage campaign could help to improve American relations with the Middle East. United States Information Agency head Edward R. Murrow argued that "U.S. interest in preserving these ancient Nubian

[731] Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson, *UNESCO*, 132.
[732] John A. Wilson, "Informal Report to Executive Committee on Cairo Meeting, Consultative Committee, May 23-June 1, 1960," Folder: "Official Correspondence UNESCO-Wilson-UAR," Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM; John A. Wilson Statement, reprinted in "Excerpts from Letters Received by the Smithsonian Institution from American Museums and Universities...," n.d. [probably 1966], Folder 5, Allen Dulles Papers, Box 3, PUL. See also Wilson's comments in "Meeting on Nubia," 24 March 1960, Box 25, Luther Evans Papers, Columbia University Library, New York City.
[733] Saxton Bradford to Raymond S. Hare, "Request for Information on the Nubian Project," 16 May 1960, Box 820, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA. See also John Wilson Statement, *Mutual Security Act of 1960: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, on S. 3058 to Amend Further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as Amended, and for Other Purposes: March 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31 and April 5, 1960* (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1960), 575.

Monuments will gain both official and popular appreciation" in Egypt and the Middle East.[734] Specialists on Egyptian politics agreed that differences over trade and Israeli security made any formal diplomatic rapprochement between Cairo and Washington impossible. They agreed with Murrow, however, that their support for the Nubian Campaign could become "another thread of goodwill" in American relations with Egypt.[735] John Wilson was particularly vocal that American participation would improve diplomatic relations between Washington and Cairo. Unlike other foreign assistance programs, he testified before congress, cultural aid was "noncontroversial" and could not "be called pressure politics" – which would permit Americans and Egyptians to work together on a common struggle to save their common heritage, rather than as a politically-motivated gift that implied Egyptian dependence on great power patronage.[736] Other experts suggested that archaeological aid would have a greater impact on public opinion in both countries. "We have not had a very grateful response to agricultural, economic, or other technical aid," the National Committee for the Rescue of the Monuments of Nubia noted. The arrival of American funds and American archaeologists will "arouse new friendliness in the local countries."[737]

[734] Edward R. Morrow memorandum to Dean Rusk, 21 February 1961, Box 2822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[735] Cairo to DOS, 20 November 1961, Folder: "United Arab Republic Subjects: Preservation of Egyptian Temples," National Security Files, Box 169, JFKL. For similar arguments, see also John Wilson to Max McCullough, 8 January 1963, Box 1, Richard N. Goodwin Papers, JFKL; George N. Shuster to Dean Rusk, 15 December 1961, Box 824, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[736] John Wilson Statement, 31 March 1960, *Mutual Security Act of 1960*, 576.
[737] National Committee for the Rescue of the Monuments of Nubia Statement, 31 March 1960, *Mutual Security Act of 1960*, 584.

The State Department also saw the Nubian Campaign as a means to defuse the spread of Arab Nationalism in the region. "The political policy of the Western powers tends to drive the Arab states away from the West. UNESCO, which is Western-centered, is the most important influence drawing the Arab States toward the West," State Department analysts argued as early as 1953, in the aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution.[738] A West German journalist noted that Egyptians still remembered how the British and the Americans had withdrawn their support for the Aswan Dam ten years earlier.[739] According to one Canadian archaeologist a few months later, "Egyptians have become emotional about this issue. The West had once let Egypt down... They feel now that the West would be guilty were they to let them down a second time."[740] René Maheu agreed that the British and American failure to fund the Aswan Dam aroused Egyptian hostility towards the international community. UNESCO's campaign to preserve Nubian monuments could help to restore Egyptian faith in the United Nations system.[741] American specialists like John Wilson echoed Maheu's argument and informed the State Department that the campaign could "open up Egypt" and cause a "significant reversal of nationalism" in the country.[742] Influential Washington journalists like

[738] "An Appraisal of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)," 9 September 1953, Box 1619, CFP 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.
[739] Eka Von Merveldt, "Aus Nubien wird ein Binnenmeer," *Die Zeit* (24 November 1961).
[740] Lionel V. J. Roy Memorandum to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "Nubian Monuments," 8 February 1962, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC.
[741] Lionel V. J. Roy Memorandum to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "UNESCO International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia," 17 May 1961, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC.
[742] John Wilson to Max McCullough, 8 January 1963, Box 1, Richard N. Goodwin Papers, JFKL; John A. Wilson, "U. S. Aid for the Nubian Monuments - Argument," 8 February 1961, Box 104, President's Office Files, JFKL.

Walter Trohan also proposed that American aid for the Nubian Campaign could spark "the beginning of lasting peace" in the Middle East by making amends for the Western failure to fund the Aswan High Dam nine years earlier.[743]

Considerations of the broader Cold War conflict also shaped American responses to UNESCO's world appeal. NATO worried that the Soviet Union would provide funding for the Nubian Campaign and reinforce the prestige they had gained through its funding of the Aswan Dam. American allies like West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano informed Washington in May 1960 that they could demonstrate "the West's unselfish and helpful attitude toward the underdeveloped countries" by providing funding for UNESCO's Nubian Campaign. He emphasized that it would project NATO's concern for the "cultural interests of humanity."[744] The Nubian Campaign could also strengthen America's hand in the cultural Cold War. Over the previous fifteen years, both Eastern bloc diplomats and intellectuals in allied Western European countries had labelled the United States as a materialistic society devoted to mass culture at the expense of high art and local traditions.[745] Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Philip H. Coombs admitted that "we are frequently accused of being the materialistic nation" in comparison with the

[743] Walter Trohan, "Report from Egypt," *Chicago Tribune* (6 May 1964), D9.
[744] Foreign Office to Bonn, 20 January 1960, FO 924/1323, UKNA; Heinrich V. Brentano to Christian Herter, 6 May 1960, Box 2822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; Memorandum of Conversation, "UNESCO Program to Save the Nubian Monuments," 21 January 1960, Box 819, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[745] Volker Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepherd Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Alessandro Brogi, *Confronting America*.

Soviet Union. Asserting leadership over the preservation of the Nubian temples would dramatically demonstrate American efforts to "preserve the *spiritual* heritage of the West." American diplomats stationed in Cairo echoed these arguments while John Wilson lobbied officials and argued that the campaign would "enhance our standing in the world of arts and humanities."[746]

The Secretariat's new strategy to gain American financial support for the Nubian Campaign therefore encountered a receptive audience in Washington's foreign policy circles. Maheu traveled to the United States in February 1961 and "stressed that all UNESCO's member States considered it important that the United States of America should take a substantial, practical part in saving the monuments of Nubia."[747] Sadruddin Aga Khan, special advisor to the Director General, travelled to Washington in September and began, according to one observer, "lobbying all over the place." He visited foundations, interested individuals, and American officials.[748] He spoke with John F. Kennedy and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who enthusiastically supported the project.[749] State Department

[746] *Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1962: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session* (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1960), 647; Cairo to DOS, 20 November 1961, Folder: "United Arab Republic Subjects: Preservation of Egyptian Temples," Box 169, National Security Files, JFKL; John Wilson to Max McCullough, 8 January 1963, Box 1, Richard N. Goodwin Papers, JFKL.
[747] Report on the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Progress of the Campaign from 8 February to 1 May 1961," 5 June 1961, CUA/107, UNESDOC.
[748] Froelich Rainey to William Kelly Simpson, 4 March 1961, Folder: "1960-Jan. 61 Correspondence," William Kelly Simpson Archives, Box 5, YPM; Information About the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Progress of the Campaign from 8 June to 8 February 1961," 17 March 1961, CUA/106, UNESDOC.
[749] Memorandum of Conversation, "Discussion of Nubian Campaign," 19 September 1960, Box 821, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; Froelich Rainey to William Kelly Simpson, 4 March 1961, Folder: "1960-Jan. 61 Correspondence," Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM.

officials approved of the Nubian Campaign but were skeptical that congress would accept their financial requests. The large sums requested made the project politically difficult.[750] Aga Khan and the State Department agreed that a large publicity campaign, like the one launched in Western Europe, would be the best strategy to broaden popular support. Only a publicity campaign could arouse popular interest in the American people, "stimulating them to write to their Congressmen requesting U.S. participation."[751]

UNESCO's publicity campaign in the United States dwarfed earlier efforts in Western Europe. William Benton used his personal and professional contacts at *Reader's Digest*, America's most popular and widely read periodical, to write a vivid article introducing the Nubian Monuments and imploring readers to submit funds and write to their congressman. "Almost no event since Noah's Flood," the article informed readers, "has threatened destruction of so much historic treasure as does the building of Egypt's High Aswan Dam." *Life* Magazine printed an extensive photographic essay a year later, introducing Americans to the threatened monuments and temples.[752] Egyptologists volunteered to travel across the country and deliver speeches and lectures about Egyptian history. John Wilson alone delivered eighty talks to raise awareness for the campaign.[753]

[750] Thayer to Paris, 7 March 1960, Box 819, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[751] Memorandum of Conversation, "Discussion of Nubian Campaign," 19 September 1960, Box 821, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[752] Gordon Gaskill, "SOS From the Temples of Nubia," *Readers Digest Reprint* (1960), 2; "A Heritage in Need of Help: Nile Dam Will Immerse Fabled Monuments," *Life* (24 March 1961), 62-88.
[753] John A. Wilson, *An Archaeologist's Search for Ancient Egypt*, 152.

The publicity campaign provided initial success in Washington. President Kennedy appealed to congress in April 1961, citing American commitments to "man's great achievements of art and thought" and "deep friendship for the people who live in the valley of the Nile," and requested congress' support for the Nubian Campaign.[754] The State Department and the White House, in an attempt to overcome criticisms about the Nubian Campaign's financial burdens, proposed that Washington allocate Egyptian currency - the "PL480" funds - instead of American dollars. Congress approved the president's requests and contributed 2 million dollars in Egyptian pounds for the Nubian Campaign: 2.5 million for the removal of temples and 1.5 million to fund American archaeological missions.[755] The president's address provoked enthusiastic responses. The Secretariat's committee of advisors hoped it might "serve as an example to many other nations."[756] Egyptian newspapers published enthusiastic editorials about the American decision. President Nasser wrote to Kennedy to praise the Nubian Campaign as one bright spot in their diplomatic relationship.[757] The funds

[754] John F. Kennedy, "Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Concerning Preservation of Ancient Monuments in the Nile Valley," 7 April 1961, PPP. For Kennedy's interest in the project, see Oral History Interview with Lucius Battle, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
[755] These included the temples at Wadi es-Sebua Beit el Wali, and Aniba: Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, ed., *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia*, 78.
[756] International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia Executive Committee, "Report of the Committee," Annex IV of CUA/113, UNESDOC, 22.
[757] Lucius D. Battle Memorandum to Richard Goodwin, "Reaction to President Kennedy's Announcement about Nubian Project," 24 April 1961, Folder: "United Arab Republic Subjects: Preservation of Egyptian Temples," Box 169, National Security Files, JFKL. For UNESCO and the Nubian Campaign in Egyptian-American diplomacy, see Gamal Abdel Nasser to John F. Kennedy, 22 August 1961, Box 169, National Security Files, JFKL.

approved by congress, however, still fell short of the amount required to address the most pressing problems of the Nubian Campaign.

Abu Simbel remained the most important temple threatened by the Aswan Dam. Nasser and Okasha both informed Washington that "the Egyptians would consider any program which did not include provision for the preservation of Abu Simbel a failure."[758] Maheu and the Secretariat in Paris also informed Kennedy that Abu Simbel's survival "forms - it is scarcely necessary to say - the major objective and the main problem of the campaign" and urged the president to pledge additional funds.[759] Efforts resumed in Paris and Cairo to win an American commitment that would, in the words of an American diplomat, jumpstart "a pump-priming operation designed to stimulate further contributions from other nations."[760]

Cairo's commitment to save Abu Simbel was clear when the General Conference debated a new plan to raise funds from the organization's regular budget. This would have made funding for Abu Simbel a compulsory part of each member state's regular contribution to the budget. Cairo and the Secretariat hoped that it would break the deadlock and finally get the project moving. British,

[758] Memorandum of Conversation, "U.S. Contribution to the Nubian Program," 15 February 1961, Box 822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA. For Cairo's commitment to Abu Simbel, see "Statement of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of 20 June 1961 on the Preservation of Abu Simbel Temples," CUA/109, UNESDOC.

[759] René Maheu, Statement on the Progress Made in the International Campaign for Safeguarding the Monuments of Nubia, enclosed in John H. Esterline to DOS, 9 June 1960, Box 2822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; Carneiro and René Maheu to John F. Kennedy, 8 March 1963, reprinted in Paris to DOS, 11 march 1963, Folder: "United Arab Republic Subjects: Preservation of Egyptian Temples," Box 169, National Security Files, JFKL.

[760] Memorandum of Conversation, "Signature of Multi-year P.L. 480 Agreement," 8 October 1962, Box 2822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.

French, and American delegations met privately during the conference and agreed that compulsory financing would establish a dangerous precedent. Lucius Battle, the State Department's new Assistant Secretary for Education and Culture, met privately with Maheu and made clear American opposition to this strategy and warned that it would create tensions between the Secretariat and Washington. Western delegations also met with African counterparts and informed them that the compulsory scheme would come at the expense of educational assistance projects in their own countries.[761] News of the plan's defeat sparked protest in Cairo. Okasha, a moderate in Nasser's government, complained that the great powers' "brutal, unjust and unfair attack" had "condemned the great temple" of Abu Simbel. Egyptian artists and professionals, like *Al Ahram* art editor Kamal el-Mallakh, also viewed this setback as an international blow to the country's national prestige.[762] This response reinforced the State Department's commitment to find new sources of financial support to save the giant monuments.

Washington agreed to launch an American publicity campaign focused on a traveling exhibition of King Tutankhamen's treasures. The artifacts, first discovered in 1922, had never left Egypt and were regarded as the greatest treasure of the country's ancient past. American planners believed that a "really spectacular loan exhibit" would be "a sensational help to the American money

[761] Paris to Ottawa, "International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia," 22 November 1962, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC.
[762] Boswell to DOS, 8 December 1962; Boswell to DOS, 10 December 1962, both in Box 828, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.

raising effort" and that only Tutankhamen's treasures would be successful.[763] The American cultural attaché in Cairo thought that the exhibition would "create tremendous goodwill" in Egyptian-American relations.[764] Americans agreed to cover the expensive insurance coverage.[765] The Tutankhamen Exhibit opened at the National Gallery of Art in October 1961. Sarwat Okasha, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, the Egyptian ambassador, and senior State Department officials attended the opening of the exhibit and reminded visitors to support UNESCO and the Nubian Campaign.[766] Visitors browsed through the antiquities and read a museum pamphlet that included a message from Sarwat Okasha, who hoped that "thought will be given to those other antiquities that still rest in the Nubian part of the Nile Valley."[767]

The Exhibition generated immense publicity for the Nubian Campaign over the next two years. The Smithsonian Institution's Traveling Exhibition Service circulated the Tutankhamen exhibit to fourteen museums across the

[763] John A. Wilson, "U.S. National Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments," 1960, Box 25, Luther Evans Papers, Columbia University Library, New York City.
[764] John J. Slocum to William Kelly Simpson, 8 April 1961, Folder: "1960-Jan. 61 Correspondence," Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM; John J. Slocum to William Kelly Simpson, 21 June 1961, Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM. For more on the political background of the Exhibit, see Memorandum of Conversation, "Meeting with Under Secretary Bowles," 6 November 1961, Box 2822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; Memorandum of Conversation, "Preservation of Nubian Monuments," 1 September 1960, Box 2822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[765] Froelich Rainey to Saroite Okasha, 30 March 1961; John J. Slocum to William Kelly Simpson, 5 August 1961, both in Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM.
[766] National Gallery of Art Press Release, 22 October 1961, Folder: "Event Files: Egyptian Exhibit at the National Art Gallery," Box 11, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis Papers, JFKL; Sarwat Okasha, "Speech at the Opening of The Tutankhamen Exhibit," 3 November 1961, Folder: "Event Files: Egyptian Exhibit at the National Art Gallery," Box 11, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis Papers, JFKL.
[767] Sarwat Okasha, "Foreword," *Tutankhamun Treasures: A Loan Exhibition from the Department of Antiquities of the United Arab Republic* (Washington: Smithsonian, 1961).

country, thereby reaching hundreds of thousands of Americans. The fate of the Nubian antiquities reached millions more indirectly through exhibition publicity. When the exhibition reached Chicago in May 1962, for example, the city was flooded with forty thousand posters, subway billboards, and promotional material for office bulletin boards. Egyptian politicians and diplomats were interviewed on local radio programs.[768]

International events also helped to encourage an American commitment to Abu Simbel. There was no past engineering project of comparable size to guide the project's development. The temple, constructed by Pharaoh Ramses II in 1244 BCE and rediscovered by the Swiss explorer John Burkhardt in 1813 after centuries buried beneath the sand, was one of the most elegant in the region. The four statues of Ramses, carved directly from a cliff's rock face and rising twenty meters, flank an entrance into an inner sanctuary that stretches for another twenty meters into the cliff. Twice a year light floods through the main entrance and illuminates a statue of the Pharaoh at the far end of the sanctuary. The size and the intricate geographical orientation of the temples challenged the experts who developed proposals to salvage them. Secretariat officials solicited proposals from specialists around the world to develop plans to save the temple. French experts proposed a plan to construct an earth and rock-filled dam, sixty-five meters high and a kilometer and a half long, around the site. French experts promoted the plan with "patriotic zeal" as a way to keep the temple intact in its original location,

[768] Harry Price to Sol Tax, 24 May 1962, Box 69, Sol Tax Papers, UCL.

thereby preserving the temple's unique solar design. Italian specialists drew up an alternative plan to cut the temple from the ground and hoist it up to higher ground with large hydraulic jacks. A British architect designed a fanciful plan that would permit Lake Nasser to submerge the temples but permit visitors to visit and view them through submersibles.[769] Two international teams of experts analyzed the plans and unanimously supported the Italian plan to lift the Temples.[770] Nasser officially endorsed it in June 1961.[771] Cairo contracted the Swedish engineering firm AB Vattenbyggnadsbyrån (VBB) in October to develop and implement the Italian Plan.[772] The price of the Italian plan, however, continued to deter international financial contributions and therefore blocked progress. Two years later, with the rising waters of Lake Nasser approaching Abu Simbel, Cairo decided to develop a new plan that promised to reduce costs and attract greater financial support internationally. The new plan proposed to cut the temple into hundreds of large cubes, dismantle them, and then reassemble them piece by piece

[769] "Summary of the Preliminary Design Prepared by Coyne and Bellier, Consulting Engineers, for the Protection of the Abu Simbel Temples," October 1960, Annex I of 11 C/PRG/9, UNESDOC; K.C. Khanna, "Four Projects To Save Relics Of Ancient Nubia," *Times of India* (19 May 1963); "Rescue Project for the Monuments of Abu Simbel," 18 October 1960, Annex IV of 11 C/PRG/9, UNESDOC. For French concerns about the salvage plans see also International Action Committee for the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Report of the Committee," 3 August 1961, IAC/2/7, UNESDOC. For an analysis of the international "competition" to develop the preservation plans, see Lucia Allais, "Integrities: The Salvage of Abu Simbel," *Grey Room* 50 (Winter 2013), 14, 19.

[770] "Report of the Committee of Technical Experts for the Safeguarding of the Abu Simbel Temples," 16 January 1961, Annex I of CUA/109; "Report of the International Committee of Specialists Appointed by the United Arab Republic Government to Evaluate Certain Points Regarding the Project of Saving the Temples of Abu Simbel Submitted by Italconsult," 2 June 1961, Annex II of CUA/109, both available in UNESDOC.

[771] "Statement by President Gamal Abdel Nasser on the Preservation of the Abu Simbel Temples," 20 June 1961, Folder: "United Arab Republic Subjects: Preservation of Egyptian Temples," Box 169, National Security Files, JFKL.

[772] Board of Consultants for the Scheme of Lifting the Abu Simbel Temples, "Report," Annex III of CUA/113, UNESDOC.

in the temple's new location on higher ground.[773] The committee agreed it was the most practical plan.[774]



Cross section diagram of the Abu Simbel Temples relative to rising water levels. Source: Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, ed., *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia: The International Rescue Campaign at Abu Simbel, Philae and Other Sites* (Thames and Hudson: UNESCO, 1987), 105.

Events reached a climax in late 1963. With international support for the "cutting scheme" now secure, and with the rising waters of Laker Nasser approaching the temples, the Secretariat organized an international meeting in early November at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo. The Secretariat was optimistic that American support would make the campaign a success. "[I]f we

[773] "Declaration Made on 10 June 1963 by the Government of the United Arab Republic Concerning the Safeguarding of the Abu Simbel Temples," n.d. [1963], Annex I of NUBIA/4, UNESDOC; Board of Consultants for the Abu Simbel Project, "Report," n.d. [June 1963], Annex III of NUBIA/4, UNESDOC.

[774] International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia Executive Committee, "Report of the Committee," 28 June 1963, NUBIA/4, UNESDOC. For a good discussion of the relative merits of each plan, see John Wilson Letter to Members of the U.S. National Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments, n.d., Folder: "Correspondence 1961," Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM.

win Washington," the Director General commented, "there is no doubt for me that London and Paris will follow, in their time."[775] The State Department had convened a Commission of Experts on 13 May 1963 to assess the new plans. Washington deployed the head of the United States Army's Engineering Division to Egypt assess the feasibility of the preservation plans. He returned and agreed that the plans could succeed.[776] The commission recommended unanimously to adopt proposals to finance the salvage of Abu Simbel.[777] American diplomats therefore arrived at the Cairo conference with a pledge to finance one third of the costs to preserve Abu Simbel. Washington's pledge provided the greatest source of revenue for the preservation project and became the "decisive" moment that encouraged other countries to provide the funds necessary to salvage the temple.[778] Maheu and Egyptian Minister of Information and Culture Abdel Qadar Hatem signed the accord that officially financed the Au Simbel project. The Secretariat quickly helped to put together a "Joint Venture" that became responsible for the salvage of Abu Simbel.

[775] René Maheu to Sarwat Okacha, 7 January 1963, Folder: "NUBIE (II)," Box 19, CAB 1, AG 8, UA.
[776] Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, ed., *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia*, 103.
[777] A. Vrioni to René Maheu, 31 May 1963, Folder: "NUBIE (II), Box 19, CAB 1, AG 8, UA; M.H.J. Reinink, "Campagne Internationale Pour la Sauvegarde des Monuments de Nubie," n.d. [1963], annex to CL/1661, Folder: "NUBIE (II), Box 19, CAB 1, AG 8, UA.
[778] Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt and Georg Gerster, *The World Saves Abu Simbel* (Berlin: Koska, 1968), 93; Gérard Bolla, "Péripéties d'une Gestation Laborieuse," in Michel Batisse and Gérard Bolla, "L'Invention de 'Patrimoine Mondial'" (Paris: Association des Anciens Fonctionnaires de l'Unesco, 2003), 73; Lionel V. J. Roy Memorandum to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "66th Session of the Executive Board," 30 October 1963, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5175, LAC; Russell V. Keune, "An Interview with Hiroshi Daifuku," *CRM: The Journal of Heritage Stewardship* 8, no. 1 & 2 (2011).

American diplomats and policymakers still had to overcome one domestic constraint: congressional support. The State Department still needed to appropriate American dollars to purchase the Egyptian pounds already held by the Treasury Department. Lucius D. Battle testified in congress. He met a hostile reception from the House Appropriations Committee, where congressmen remained hostile towards Nasser and ambivalent towards State Department plans to improve diplomatic relations. One congressman found Battle's arguments "awfully hard to understand" and remarked, "Perhaps if they [Egypt] let go a few troops and jet airplanes they might be able to afford it." The House rejected requests to purchase the PL 480 funds.[779] The State Department appealed to the Senate. Dean Rusk testified to the project's importance and Battle repeated his arguments that Abu Simbel was important both to American foreign policy and to humanity. The Senate was more sympathetic but felt that an appropriation was not necessary. Senator Allen J. Ellender mentioned that bringing the appropriations request before congress was "not the only way." He suggested that "the President himself" grant the PL 480 funds to UNESCO so that the State Department could fulfill "its promises in Egypt." President Johnson therefore evaded congress and

[779] Appropriations Committee, House of Representatives, *Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related agencies appropriations for 1965. Department of Justice: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-Eighth Congress, Second Session* (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1964), 1246.

used his discretionary authority to grant the Egyptian pounds that diplomats had pledged the year before.[780]

The organization was committed to maintaining funding drives to finance the expansion of the budget. Supporters of the campaign in the United States, which remained the most promising source of financial support, organized the American Committee to Preserve Abu Simbel. Committee members agreed that the Nubian Campaign could expand American efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Cairo. "Abu Simbel is currently the great cultural project of Egypt," they noted. "By taking a leading role in it, the United States strengthens its position as an influence in Egyptian cultural life, opens doors of communication with the cultural and intellectual elite of the country, and improves the climate for cultural and industrial cooperation."[781] Washington's foreign policy elite continued to exploit the Nubian Campaign. Lucius D. Battle, the State Department official who did the most to secure American support for the Nubian Campaign, was named American Ambassador to Egypt in 1964.[782]

[780] Appropriations Committee, Senate, *Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 1965*, Eighty-Eighth Congress, Second Session, 1964; Oral History Interview with Lucius Battle, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC; Oral History Interview with Francois Dickman, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC; Lucian Allais, "The Design of the Nubian Desert," in *Governing by Design: Architecture, Economy, and Politics in the Twentieth* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 210.

[781] American Committee to Preserve Abu Simbel, "Situation Report," 13 August 1965; American Committee to Preserve Abu Simbel, Untitled Memorandum, n.d. [1966?], both in Folder 5, Box 3, Allen Dulles Papers, PUL.

[782] Interview with Lucius Battle, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, LOC.

Cairo's Experiment in International Cooperation

Cairo had its own economic and strategic interests in the Nubian Campaign. Nasser's central goal was the economic development of Egypt, which required generous supplies of foreign capital. It was competition over the terms of Egypt's economic development, after all, that led to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the construction of the Aswan Dam, and the 1956 crisis that shattered Western influence in the Middle East. Yet Nasser continued to rely on Western foreign aid, especially American wheat and PL480 funds, to finance his development schemes. Despite his anticolonial rhetoric and gradual alignment with the Soviet Union, he continued to press for better relations with Western states that could open up the country to more foreign capital. Cairo's dwindling supply of foreign exchange in the early 1960s made this need a new priority. Diplomatic and strategic goals also motivated Nasser's efforts to improve diplomatic relations with western states. Egypt's conflict with Saudi Arabia - the so-called the Arab Cold War - and disastrous intervention in Yemen pushed the country into international isolation.[783]

Egypt's growing isolation and need for foreign exchange coincided with the emergence of the Nubian Campaign. Although Nasser was initially ambivalent about the fate of the monuments – he decisively sided with economists

[783] For the regional Cold War, see Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009). For Nasser's strategic position in the sixties, see Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble*, 119.

against the archaeologists – Egyptian officials recognized that the campaign could improve their country's international position. The 1960 World Appeal and the 1963 American pledge to finance a third of the expenses for Abu Simbel, which subsequently expanded international support for the Nubian Campaign, opened Egypt to a flood of international activity. Abdel Moneim El Sawi, Under-Secretary of State in Ministry of Culture, recalled that the campaign had transformed the Nile River from a desert "denuded of life... into a unique international arena."[784] Archaeologists sailed up the river to explore threatened historic sites, engineers worked on threatened monuments, and tourists clambered for a last chance to see the remains of ancient Egypt. Cairo found that the campaign could serve its own strategic interests.

The Nubian Campaign led Cairo to strengthen its ties with one of the most important branches of the United Nations – the UNESCO Secretariat. René Maheu was enthusiastic about the Nubian Campaign and committed the organization's resources to its successful development. Maheu in particular claimed to commit "at least one hour per day to the study of the problems involved in the Nubian campaign" and worried some diplomats that he was investing too much of his personal attention in the campaign.[785] The Secretariat established a special "Nubian Unit" in Paris under the leadership of the Italian diplomat Ali Vrioni to promote the campaign in Secretariat discussions. The

[784] Abdel Moneim El Sawi, "Nubia: Victory of International Solidarity," *Unesco Courier* (August-September 1971), 61-62.
[785] Lionel V. J. Roy Memorandum to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "Nubian Monuments," 18 December 1961, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC.

Secretariat also deployed the French archaeologist Louis Christophe to Cairo, where he supervised the Nubian Campaign, reported its progress back to Paris, and became the organization's unofficial ambassador in Egypt.[786] Cairo's relations with the organization, a Secretariat mission to the country concluded, were "solid, far-reaching and unique."[787]

The media in Egypt also helped to spread exciting images of Nubian Campaign. Foreign correspondents travelled to the Nile, where they interviewed government officials in Cairo and Aswan. Journalists travelled up the Nile and filed colorful stories about its wildlife and treasures. Secretariat officials arranged and coordinated a group of writers and photographers in February 1960 to support the global publicity campaign.[788] The Secretariat deployed the British broadcaster Rex Keating to cover the campaign for its radio programs. His reports from the Egypt and Sudan, distributed to radio programs around the world and broadcast over film documentaries, provided vivid firsthand accounts of the international campaign.[789] The Cairo Documentation Center, in addition to sending regular survey missions up the Nile, also escorted European film crews to record the Nubian Campaign's salvage operations.[790] Cairo went to great lengths to assist

[786] William Y. Adams, "Organizational Problems in International Salvage Archaeology," *Anthropological Quarterly* 41 (1968), 115.
[787] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to Director-General, "Mission Report/ UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC INSPECTION (25 February to 4 March 1968)," 5 March 1968, Folder 21, Box 6, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[788] Information About the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Progress of the Campaign from 8 March to 8 June," May 1960, CUA/103, UNESDOC.
[789] "Interview Rex Keating," 10 March 1999, Oral History Collection, Box 2, AG 14, UA.
[790] Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt to René Maheu, "Egypte - (Mission) du 8 Mai au 9 Juin 1965," 6 August 1965, DN/A/264, UNESDOC, 41.

these efforts.[791] When the *Illustrated Daily News* commissioned the artist Alan Sorrell to travel to Nubia to paint watercolors of the archaeological excavations, Sarwat Okasha provided him with an eighty-four foot boat, a crew of ten, and an interpreter. The drawings were published between June and August 1962 and the complete collection was exhibited in London, with a reception hosted by the Egyptian ambassador.[792] These stories, published in North America and Europe, maintained the publicity campaign that the Secretariat had launched in 1960.

Despite Egypt's growing diplomatic isolation, the start of the campaign made the country a focus of great international cultural activity. Hundreds of thousands of visitors arrived in Cairo throughout the sixties to book seats on riverboats bound up the Nile. These boats were often crammed with passengers who wanted to visit monuments and temples. UNESCO's global publicity campaign mobilized an "invasion" of tourists eager to see the temples before they were threatened by the rising waters of Lake Nasser or displaced by the salvage campaigns.[793] The sounds of Arabic, French, English, German, Danish, Italian and Swedish were discernible in ship lounges and dining halls. The boats made regular stops on the riverbanks so that passengers could disembark and visit the

[791] See for example P.A.R. Blaker, Minute, 15 January 1962, FO 924/1374, UKNA.
[792] "Alan Sorrell In Nubia, February—March 1962," available online: http://www.alansorrell.ukartists.com/index_files/nubia1962.htm. For the drawing and watercolors, see Alan Sorrell and Margaret S. Drower, *Nubia: A Drowning Land* (New York: Atheneum, 1970).
[793] For contemporary reports of the tourist "invasion," see Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, ed., *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia*, 199; Walter Trohan, "Report from Egypt," *Chicago Tribune* (6 May 1964), D9; Jay Walz, "The Temples of Abu Simbel," *New York Times* (2 February 1964); "Egyptian Temples Face Adjustments," *Los Angeles Times* (12 May 1963), J10; Eka Von Merveldt, "Rettung mit der Säge," *Die Zeit* (21 June 1963).

temples and archaeological sites that lined the river.[794] The Egyptian Tourist Administration added new passenger ships to the Aswan fleet to address the demand. The Ministry of Culture signed a contract with a British company in 1963 to import hovercrafts that could quickly move tourists upriver.[795] A West German company provided Egypt with two "floating hotels" equipped with swimming pools, air conditioning, and a theater.[796] A British journalist noted how the Nubian Campaign had made the upper Nile a bustling waterway, with boats "hooting and honking [their] flashy way up the river where once nothing but feluccas glided and ancient paddle steamers plodded their patient way."[797] Travel agencies like the West German *Dr. Tigges* organized study groups for youth groups from Switzerland, Austria, France and the United States.[798] Half a million tourists visited Egypt in 1964.[799] The International Committee agreed that the large rise of tourist traffic traveling up the Nile "constituted an excellent form of propaganda for the Campaign" and urged Egypt to focus on the importance of "cultural touring in Nubia."[800] Cairo needed little encouragement.

[794] R.A.D. Ford Memorandum to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "Visit to Upper Egypt," 16 January 1962, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC.
[795] Jay Walz, "The Temples of Abu Simbel," *New York Times* (2 February 1964), XX1; "Hovercraft New Way to See Old," *Los Angeles Times* (30 October 1963), 23; K.C. Khanna, "Hovercrafts to be Used," *Times of India* (31 October 1963), 7.
[796] "Reise-Notizen," *Die Zeit* (25 October 1963).
[797] David Holden, "First and Last Look at Abu Simbel," *The Guardian* (2 January 1963), 924/1438, UKNA.
[798] "Abu Simbel: Respekt vor der Antike," *Die Zeit* (24 November 1961).
[799] Zein Nagati, "Egypt Expands Tourist Attractions," *New York Times* (28 February 1965), XX51.
[800] International Action Committee for the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Report of the Committee," 3 August 1961, IAC/2/7, UNESDOC.

The international effort to preserve the Nubian monuments began to shape Egyptian society and strengthen the economy. The "tourist invasion" of the Nile transformed the country's place in the world tourist industry. Minister for Information and Tourism Abdel Kadir Hatem introduced reforms as early as 1960 that helped to open the country to tourist development. Cairo signed a series of new agreements with foreign hoteliers, airlines, public relations firms, and travel agencies to promote tourist traffic. Advertising campaigns focused on the temples and monuments of the upper Nile. Archaeological expeditions employed local laborers and spent the majority of their budgets on paying wages in regions of the country that had few other industries. By 1962 the tourist invasion earned an estimated twenty million Egyptian pounds. Two years later, tourism became the country's third major source of foreign currency, after cotton and the Suez Canal. The Nubian Campaign in this way helped to address the country's growing foreign exchange crisis.[801]

The influx of archaeologists also shaped Egypt's place in the world. Floating laboratory-barges lined the sides of the Nile near where excavation sites had sprouted. "Camps were everywhere along the river," Rex Keating recalled, "some in houseboats, others in tents or village houses, their 'digs' betrayed by clouds of dust..."[802] Although the Egyptian antiquity service's budget rose from

[801] "More Amenities For Tourists," *Times of India* (26 March 1962), 3; Zein Nagati, "Egypt Expands Tourist Attractions," *New York Times* (28 February 1965), XX51.
[802] Rex Keating, *Nubian Rescue* (London: Robert Hale, 1975), 11-12.

one thousand to ten thousand pounds, the country required UNESCO's support.[803] Cairo therefore relaxed restrictions on foreign archaeologists and opened the country to dozens of field missions from countries across the world. Authorities in Cairo were particularly keen to reward archaeological concessions in exchange for currency.[804] A Canadian team worked at Kom-Ombo, a site north of the Aswan Dam threatened by the tens of thousands of Nubians who were being resettled by the government, where they discovered previously unknown prehistoric sites.[805] South of the Aswan Dam British, West German, Italian, French, and Spanish expeditions devoted several seasons to the area around Qustul, Gebel Adda, and Aniba. Moscow sent an expedition to Dakka and Wadi Allaqi. A joint team of American scholars from the University of Pennsylvania and Yale worked in the area south of Aniba while a nearby Indian team recovered twelve crate loads of antiquities. Egyptian laborers assisted all these teams with digs and in many cases provided expert advice about the region.[806] Louis

[803] "Meeting of International Experts on the Safeguarding of the Sites and Monuments of Ancient Nubia," 10 September 1959, SN/R.EXP/1-2, UNESDOC.
[804] John A. Wilson, "Informal Report to Executive Committee on Cairo Meeting, Consultative Committee, May 23-June 1, 1960," Folder: "Official Correspondence UNESCO-Wilson-UAR," Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM.
[805] Walter Dinsdale Memorandum for the Cabinet, "Canadian Participation with UNESCO in Preserving Nubian Antiquities," 2 May 1962, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC; Canadian Embassy (Cairo) to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "UNESCO Campaign for Nubian Antiquities - Canadian Archaeological Expedition," 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5175, LAC.
[806] William Kelly Simpson, "The Pennsylvania-Yale Excavations in Egyptian Nubia," n.d., Folder: "Correspondence 1961," William Kelly Simpson Archives, Box 5, YPM, pp. 1-2; Kevin P. Buckley, "Arabian Crossroads: Antediluvian Assault," *Yale Daily News* (11 January 1961), 1; Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, "Floating Laboratories on the Nile," *Unesco Courier* (October 1961), 26; K.C. Khanna, "Four Projects To Save Relics Of Ancient Nubia," *Times of India* (19 May 1963), 6. For a discussion of how the international archaeological attention along the Nile enriched historical understanding of ancient Nubia ("And so the history of Nubia can at last be

Christoph, the organization's liaison officer in Cairo, helped to "facilitate their organization" and "co-ordinated their results" on a daily basis.[807]

International rivalry did shape the archaeological missions in the region. Sarwat Okasha's 50-50 sharing scheme attracted foreign archaeologist but still sparked confrontation. Different countries competed for the most valuable historical zones along the Nile. The joint Yale-Pennsylvania mission sought to expand its influence in Cairo to ensure valuable digging sites near Abu Simbel and avoid being pushed to sites further south in Sudan. The team competed with a West German team over access to a nearby citadel.[808] Ottawa meanwhile considered excavation work on the Nile "a matter of national prestige" and subsequently prided itself on recovering more artifacts and treasures than their American colleagues.[809] These missions also argued with Cairo, which monitored digs and was authorized to nationalize selected finds, and sought to maximize their prizes. John Wilson "fought day after day" with Egyptian authorities. "We of the West," as Wilson paraphrased his discussions with the Egyptian Antiquities Department, "We're really putting out exceptional effort to dig in Nubia; we

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written"), see Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, "Nubia's Sands Reveal their Secrets," *Unesco Courier* (December 1964), 7-8.

[807] Report on the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Progress of the Campaign from 8 February to 1 May 1961," 5 June 1961, CUA/107, UNESDOC.

[808] John Wilson to William Kelly Simpson, 25 May 1960; William Kelly Simpson to P. Kirwan, 12 September 1960; Froelich Rainey to William Kelly Simpson, 4 March 1961; William Kelly Simpson to Leslie Cheek, 25 May 1961, all located in Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM.

[809] A. D. Tushingham to Marcel Cadieux, "Nubian Project," 3 November 1960; "Unesco Nubian Campaign: Interview with Dr. Russell of the National Museum, November 4th, 1960," both in 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 7007, LAC; Canadian Embassy (Cairo) to Ottawa, "UNESCO Campaign for Nubian Antiquities - Canadian Archaeological Expedition," 6 June 1963, Volume 946, 81-4-6, LAC.

expect you to reward us with a handsome division."[810] Although competition over antiquities complicated international cooperation, it never derailed negotiations in Cairo, Paris, or on the Nubian riverbanks. Countries that participated in the digs claimed, despite squabbles over apportioning artifacts, that the excavations had helped to improve their cultural relationship with Cairo.

The Nubian Campaign's accomplishments overshadowed the petty diplomatic conflicts and professional rivalries that sometimes marred its implementation. International teams decided that temples and monuments should be preserved *in situ*, relocated to safe ground but remaining in the same territory. The Antiquities Service, the most active Egyptian organization in the salvage operations, dismantled a number of small temples and stored them on Elephantine Island near Aswan. International teams also helped to preserve other temples in the region. The director of the German Archaeological Institute in Cairo recommended that Bonn finance the salvage of the Temple of Kalabsha. The German engineering firm Hochtief AG, students from the Technical University of Aachen, and 250 Egyptian workers reconstructed the temple on higher ground.[811] The Temple of Amada posed problems, since the intricate inscriptions and murals on the interior walls made it impossible to dismantle. A French team of engineers developed an innovative scheme that lifted the temple onto rails that transported it

[810] John A. Wilson to William Kelly Simpson, 25 June 1960, William Kelly Simpson Archives, Box 5, YPM; John A. Wilson, "Informal Report to Executive Committee on Cairo Meeting, Consultative Committee, May 23-June 1, 1960," Folder: "Official Correspondence UNESCO-Wilson-UAR," Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM.
[811] "Für acht Millionen zerlegt: Kalabsha – alter Tempel am neuen Platz," *Die Zeit* (12 March 1965).

to safe ground as a single unit.[812] These international teams saved a total of twenty-three temples.

The Nubian Temples also became a part of Cairo's public diplomacy. The 1960 declaration, which promised fifty percent of the treasures to foreign archaeologist, also promised that a small number of temples would be granted as gifs to the donor countries that contributed the most to the campaign. Cairo shipped the Temple of Debod to Madrid, the Temple of Taffeh to the Netherlands, and the Temple of Ellesyia to Turin. The most famous was the Temple of Dendur, which was shipped from Elephantine Island by a Norwegian freighter to New York City, where it was reassembled in the Metropolitan Museum of Art.[813] The arrival of these temples in Western capitals sparked another popular outburst of interest in Egyptian culture and history.

Abu Simbel, located 230 kilometers south of the Aswan Dam, dominated the international campaign to preserve the monuments of Nubia. Visitors who arrived at Abu Simbel vividly remembered their first impressions. Egyptian officials scheduled boats to arrive in front of the temples in the early morning so that visitors could see the rising sun illuminate the front of the temple.[814] The site inspired awe among both tourists and diplomats. "We reached Abu Simbel about five in the morning and went ashore immediately to take up position for the sunrise," Canadian ambassador R. A. D. Ford reported in his next diplomatic

[812] "Amada: A Whole Temple Moved on Rails," *UNESCO Courier* (December 1964), 9.
[813] Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, ed., *Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia*, 137.
[814] Jay Walz, "The Temples of Abu Simbel," *New York Times* (2 February 1964), XX1.

cable to Ottawa. "This is surely one of the most stunning sights in the world... [It is] one of the most stupendous things in the world."[815] Egyptian authorities routinely escorted diplomats to the site in order to impress the importance of the campaign. UNESCO held the 1959 Cairo meeting on a boat docked beneath the temples.[816] The waves of tourists who travelled up the Nile brought back vivid memories and stories of their encounters with the massive Pharaoh. "I have personally seen the temples of Abu Simbel along with thousands of others," one American tourist wrote in a letter to Appropriations Committee Chairman John McLellan. "They are one of the great sights and emotional and cultural experiences of my life." He urged the Senate to support Egypt and UNESCO.[817] Three millennia after his death, Ramses was still extending Egypt's influence.

Abu Simbel became an international hotspot for archaeologists and engineers who had traveled from around the world to assist in the preservation of the temples. The Nubian Campaign constructed a "colony" that included a mess for engineers, a police station, post office, and dozens of masonry houses for workmen.[818] The camp sites surrounding the monuments "had a decidedly international atmosphere," Desroches-Noblecourt noted. "Abu Simbel was an

[815] R.A.D. Ford Memorandum to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "Visit to Upper Egypt," 16 January 1962, 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 5174, LAC.
[816] For another example, see Mortimer Wheeler's comments in B. Bevan, meeting minutes, 17 July 1961, FO 924/1373, UKNA; "Meeting of International Experts on the Safeguarding of the Sites and Monuments of Ancient Nubia," 11 October 1959, SN/R.EXP/REPORT, UNESDOC.
[817] Joshua Logan to John McClellan, 8 June 1964, in Senate, Appropriations Committee, *Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 1965*, Eighty-Eighth Congress, Second Session, 1964, 848.
[818] International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia Executive Committee, "Salvage of the Abu Simbel Temples Report," 12 March 1965, Annex II of NUBIA/CE/IX2, UNESDOC.

experiment in international co-existence..."[819] The thousand specialists who lived there, along with their families, struggled to work together and overcome complicated linguistic and cultural diversity. Cooperation between international teams proceeded smoothly with minimal problems. Tensions and arguments developed not between different nationalities but between the engineers tasked with the technological challenges in moving the temples and the archaeologists who were committed to protecting its aesthetic integrity. Some Secretariat officials noted tensions between engineers and archaeologists at meetings and believed that it would be "essential" to have archaeologists present at Abu Simbel to ensure that the sanctity of the temples were preserved.[820] Visiting journalists noticed that disagreements and "bitter arguments" often erupted between engineers and archaeologists. There were some problems: blocks removed from the rock face split, one block was temporarily lost in the storage yard, and resin used to seal cracks in the blocks seeped over wall art.[821] There were "lively" conflicts between Egyptian antiquities experts and Italian artisans, but these debates were not over politics or culture but rather, as Project Manager Werner Volland argued, technical questions about "where the sawing should take place."[822] The demanding circumstances of the construction zone - laborers

[819] Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt and Georg Gerster, *The World Saves Abu Simbel*, 100.
[820] See for example L. Gomes Machado to Director General, "Première Session du Comité d'Archéologues et d'Architectes-Paysagistes pour l'études des Aspects Paysagists du Transfert des Temples d'Abou Simbel," 19 July 1963, Folder: "NUBIE (II)," Box 19, CAB 1, AG 8, UA.
[821] Alan McGregor, "20 Egyptian Temples Saved by UNESCO," *Washington Post* (27 February 1967), A6.
[822] Jay Walz, " Restored Abu Simbel Keeps Ancient Grandeur," *New York Times* (10 October 1967), 49.

worked day and night in three shifts - also helped to foster a sense of solidarity and common purpose among specialists from different countries.[823]

The campaign at Abu Simbel developed relatively smoothly. Progress began on Abu Simbel only weeks after the November 1963 pledging conference had secured the necessary funding. Engineers constructed a large cofferdam to keep the rising Nile waters away from the work zone. Engineers used precision drills to cut the temples into cubes that could be removed from the rock face. A portal crane was constructed to lift large chunks and lower them to the storage yard. Archaeologists then marked each stone and made repairs where the stones had crumbled or suffered damages. The last temple blocks were removed on 29 March 1966. It was ultimately cut into 1035 blocks, each weighing between twenty and thirty tons. Workers began reassembling the temples in January 1966 "without hurry," usually at a pace of one block per crane daily.[824] The major phase of the reconstruction effort was complete by 1967. The reconstruction of the temples stunned most observers. "[O]ne has to look for the cuts and the plastering work almost through a magnifying glass to see them," Malcolm Adiseshiah informed Maheu after visiting the temples.[825]

[823] For the labor conditions and scheduling, see International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, "Summary of the Progress of Work on Saving the Abu Simbel Temples, March, April and May 1965," 12 July 1965, NUBIA/CE/A.S./INF.1, UNESDOC.
[824] International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia Executive Committee, "Report on the Progress of Work on the Project for Safeguarding the Abu Simbel Temples up to the End of August 1966," 14 September 1966, Annex I of NUBIA/CE/XII/1, UNESDOC.
[825] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to Director-General, "Mission Report/ UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC INSPECTION (25 February to 4 March 1968)," 5 March 1968, Folder 21, Box 6, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.

Abu Simbel's arrival at its new site became a powerful symbol of the United Nations' ability to foster international cooperation. UNESCO argued that the "saving of Abu Simbel" was "one of the greatest international cultural endeavors of all time."[826] Secretariat members like Adiseshiah and Prem Kirpal regarded Abu Simbel as the organization's "most spectacular achievement."[827] Desroches-Noblecourt, who had provided crucial early diplomatic support for the project, later argued that "the name Abu Simbel" has become a "byword" for and "a landmark in international co-operation."[828] Even UN General Secretary U Thant recalled the campaign as one of the UN's great victories.[829] The organization publicized the "victory in Nubia" as the realization of its original goals to foster international cultural cooperation.[830] The Secretariat believed that world heritage sites were unique spaces that could foster a sense of community that transcended the nation. Indeed, planners decided that Abu Simbel should both preserve the historical integrity of the ancient Egyptian past and become a monument itself for the future of international cooperation. Experts assembled to

[826] Position Paper: Draft Program and Budget for 1969-1970 - Culture, 1 October 1968, Box 3213, CFP 1967-1969, RG 59, NARA. See also UNESCO, *What is UNESCO?* (UNESCO: Paris, 1970), 39.
[827] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to Director-General, "Mission Report/ UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC INSPECTION (25 February to 4 March 1968)," 5 March 1968, Folder 21, Box 6, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Rahul Singh, "Interview," *Times of India* (5 January 1969), A1.
[828] Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, "The Magic of Abu Simbel," *Unesco Courier* (February/March 1980), 53.
[829] U Thant, *View from the UN* (New York: Doubleday, 1978), 451.
[830] Ali Vrioni, "Victory in Nubia," *Unesco Courier* (May 1964); Desroches-Noblecourt, "Nubia's Sands Reveal their Secrets," *Unesco Courier* (December 1964); Desroches-Noblecourt, "The Magic of Abu Simbel," *Unesco Courier* (February/March 1980), 53.

plan the new site decided to make it a symbol both to Egypt's cultural heritage and the international community that preserved it.[831]

This flurry of activity along the Nile made significant contributions to Egypt's place in the world. The arrival of the four temples in New York and Western Europe inspired front-page coverage in the newspapers. Millions of the tourists who returned home, primarily from North American and West European countries, told stories about their trips and experiences in modern Egypt. Millions more who could not travel to Egypt read about the international campaign in newspapers and magazines, or attended the traveling museum exhibits. "Egypt and Nubia were on every tongue," Okasha recalled, "and the world was able to observe contemporary Egypt on the march from its towering ancient past to its present renaissance."[832]

The Nubian Campaign also made significant contributions to Egypt's diplomatic efforts. The Hallstein Doctrine guided Bonn's policy towards the region. West Germany was preoccupied by the need to isolate East Germany internationally by courting Third World governments and compelling them to choose sides in the German-German Cold War. The West German foreign office was particularly concerned to maintain good relations with Cairo, which stood at the crossroads of Asia and Africa and had emerged as a leading voice of the nascent Non-Aligned Movement. West German Foreign Minister Heinrich V.

[831] International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, Executive Committee, Nineteenth Session, 9 July 1971, NUBIA/CE/XIX/3, UNESDOC.
[832] Sarwat Okasha, "Rameses Recrowned," 234.

Brentano was concerned to coordinate Western support for the salvage program in order to outmaneuver Soviet bloc support.[833] Bonn's mission to save Kalabsha temple promoted public diplomacy and invested millions of marks into the Egyptian economy.[834] A series of political missteps sabotaged these diplomatic victories. East Germany's economy expanded in the sixties and made East Berlin's diplomatic overtures more appealing in Cairo. At the same time, Bonn angered Arab capitals by supplying Israel with tanks. Nasser retaliated in January 1965 by declaring that Walter Ulbricht would visit Egypt - the first time that the East German party boss had travelled outside of the Soviet bloc. It was a major debacle for West German foreign policy and a blow to the Hallstein Doctrine.[835] Bonn's ambassador in Cairo avoided economic and military issues and focused on cultural cooperation in an attempt to regain Cairo's favor. "We have saved the Temple of Kalabsha," he emphasized in conversations with Nasser. The President snapped and said that it wasn't enough to repair the breakdown of Egyptian-West German relations.[836] West German diplomats still invoked their participation in the UNESCO campaign as a sign of goodwill.[837]

Other Western countries had better luck following this strategy. American officials hoped to maintain the goodwill that their financial commitment had generated in 1963. The American embassy in Cairo had been an early supporter of

[833] Memorandum of Conversation, "UNESCO Program to Save the Nubian Monuments," 21 January 1960, Box 819, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.
[834] "Für acht Millionen zerlegt: Kalabsha – alter Tempel am neuen Platz," *Die Zeit*.
[835] William Glenn Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, 172-173.
[836] "Tränen im Waldorf-Astoria," *Der Spiegel* (24 February 1965).
[837] See for example, "Zwischen Tempel und Baracke," *Die Zeit* (4 October 1968).

the Nubian Campaign. The American cultural attaché even complained at one point that his office had became a "repository for archaeological equipment."[838] Lucius Battle, who had directed the State Department's relations with UNESCO and had testified in congress about the benefits of the Nubian Campaign, became Washington's ambassador to Cairo in September 1964. Battle continued to support these efforts in his new post and reached out to Egyptian artists and intellectuals from the embassy. "If my efforts do not succeed in opening the doors for understanding through politics, maybe they can succeed in opening this door through culture." Despite the decline in Egyptian-American relations, Battle's commitment earned goodwill among some Egyptian intellectuals.[839] The Canadian expedition to Egypt similarly cabled Ottawa that their work had strengthened "UAR-Canadian cultural relations" while senior officials in Ottawa were optimistic that their archaeologists had established "excellent relationships with the authorities of the United Arab Republic."[840] The Nubian Campaign probably had the most dramatic effect on Egypt's relations with France. When Cairo deployed Tutankhamen's treasures to Paris to solicit further funds for UNESCO in early 1967, Egyptomania swept France. Even President de Gaulle praised Egypt and held a lunch in honor of Sarwat Okasha. A flurry of new

[838] John J. Slocum to William Kelly Simpson, 17 November 1960, Folder: "Official Correspondence UNESCO-Wilson-UAR," Box 5, William Kelly Simpson Archives, YPM.
[839] Salah Gawdat, "A Message from the Poet Laureate to the U.S. President," *Al-Musawar* (27 September 1968), reprinted in "Mr. Lucius Battle's Visit to Cairo," Box 4, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Files, Folder: CUL-1, RG 59, NARA.
[840] Canadian Embassy (Cairo) to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, "UNESCO Campaign for Nubian Antiquities - Canadian Archaeological Expedition," 6 June 1963, File 2: "Nubian Monuments 1960-67," 5582-BU-3-40, Volume 16, LAC; E. A. Coté to Philip Smith, 19 July 1963, Volume 946, 81-4-6, LAC.

Franco-Egyptian cultural agreements were negotiated over the following months.[841] The campaign could not reverse Cairo's growing international isolation but did provide a crucial cultural lifeline.

Despite the Nubian Campaign's contribution to Egypt's public diplomacy and economic plans, Cairo continued to struggle with the pressing economic problems and international isolation. In order to distract attention away from the war in Yemen and continuing social and economic problems on the home front, Nasser started plans to invade Israel. His plans sparked a preemptive Israeli attack that led to the Six Day Way in June 1967. The war shattered Egyptian power and changed the international politics of the region. The economy reeled and began to stagnate. One contemporary estimate calculated that Egypt lost between fifty and sixty million pounds in convertible foreign exchange earnings from the loss of tourism.[842] The debacle humiliated Nasser and undermined the prestige of Arab Nationalism. Cairo severed diplomatic relations with Western states and accused them of conspiring to subvert Egypt's security. Yet Nasser also began to make hesitant steps towards improving ties with Western states.[843]

UNESCO's dedication ceremony convened at Abu Simbel in September 1968. One hundred and fifty visitors - mostly senior ministers - representing forty

[841] "Les Trésors Archéologiques égyptiens: Une Arme de Diplomatie Internationale," *Al Ahram* (17 July 2006).
[842] Richard Parker Memorandum to Mr. Davies, "The UAR Economy - Losses and Assets Relating to June Hostilities," 24 October 1967, Box 4, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Files, RG 59, NARA.
[843] Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

countries attended. Newsmen from around the world travelled south from Cairo on a chartered plane and then arrived at Abu Simbel by hydrofoil. At a time when the economy was stagnating, the government invested over fifteen million pounds into the event. For some Egyptian nationalists who attended the ceremonies, these celebrations seemed hollow. "They came from all parts of the world to participate with Egypt in celebrating one of her historical days," Egyptian poet laureate Salah Gawdat ruminated. "While I was scanning these faces I asked myself: Do they sympathize with us in our affliction as they now participate in paying homage to our heritage?"[844] Yet the event served the government's political interests. Behind closed doors, government officials spoke about resuming diplomatic ties while Tourism Minister Muhammad Hafiz Ghanim discussed plans to expand ties with the West German Minister of Economic Cooperation.[845]

Cairo returned to the Nubian temples to recover its international influence. Washington removed travel restrictions in November 1967 as a gesture to improve diplomatic relations and Cairo launched a new campaign to attract tourists back to the country. "We look on tourists as potential ambassadors for our country," Minister for Tourism Zaki Hashem declared a few years later.[846] The salvaged temples that lay south of Aswan - especially Abu Simbel - continued to

[844] Salah Gawdat, "A Message from the Poet Laureate to the U.S. President," *Al-Musawar* (27 September 1968), reprinted in "Mr. Lucius Battle's Visit to Cairo," Box 4, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Files, RG 59, NARA.
[845] "Mr. Lucius Battle's Visit to Cairo," n.d., Box 4, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Files, RG 59, NARA.
[846] Osgood Caruthers, "U.S. Will End Ban on Tourist Visits to Egypt," *Los Angeles Times* (20 November 1967), 5; E.M., "Ägypten: Touristen erwünscht," *Die Zeit* (6 December 1968); "Ägypten: Touristen erwünscht," *Die Zeit* (6 December 1968); Eunice Telfer Juckett, "For a Tourist in Egypt, War's Just a Nuisance," *Washington Post* (7 May 1972), L1.

play a large role in these efforts. Following the 1973 October War, tourism to the region began to take off and strengthen the Egyptian economy. Millions of dollars flowed into Egypt along with armies of tourists. UNESCO's cultural programs also played a role in one of the region's greatest strategic shifts. Two years after the dedication ceremonies at Abu Simbel, René Maheu and the new Egyptian President Anwar Sadat launched a campaign to save the Island of Philae. This new campaign emerged as Cairo was shifting away from Moscow and towards Washington. The American embassy cabled Washington that aid to the project would be a "very tangible way" of strengthening American support for a "project which is close to [the] heart of Egyptians."[847]

The Idea of World Heritage

In September 1964 René Maheu addressed a crowd and invoked the international campaign that had "appealed to the conscience of the world" to save the Nubian monuments. "Today, profiting from that experience and encouraged by its success, we seek to enlist that conscience, now aware of its duty and its power, in support of a campaign as universal as itself, on behalf of all the great monuments of the world, of every age and clime." Maheu's address inaugurated a new International Campaign for Monuments that was intended to build on the success of the Nubian Campaign and expand preservation projects to other

[847] Cairo to DOS, "Third U.S. Contribution to International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia (Philae) Through UNESCO," Cairo 3262, 31 March 1975, AAD.

threatened sites.[848] Eighteen states and professional organization met in Venice that same year to establish permanent agreements to preserve cultural sites. They agreed on common standards and created an International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) to provide professional advice to UNESCO and the international community.[849] UNESCO soon launched new appeals to save threatened monuments in Venice and the Borobudur temples in Indonesia. Maheu's colleagues agreed that the Nubian Campaign "dissipated much of the pessimism that formerly existed regarding the hope or possibility of collectively saving celebrated monuments that seemed doomed to disappear."[850] It generated publicity and propelled support for other salvage and preservation projects around the world.

The Nubian Campaign's impact on international tourism was particularly dramatic. Rapid improvements in transportation technology, particularly the jet airplane, and the rapid expansion of economic prosperity in North American and West European societies made tourism more accessible and more profitable in the early 1960s.[851] The United Nations organized a series of international conferences

[848] René Maheu Address Given at the Opening of the International Campaign for Monuments, "The Preservation of Monuments for Posterity Is One of the Duties of Mankind," 7 September 1964, WS/0864.64/CUA, UNESDOC.
[849] Alexandra Kowalski, "When Cultural Capitalization Became Global Practice: The 1972 World Heritage Convention," *The Cultural Wealth of Nations*, Nina Bandelj and Frederick F. Wherry, eds. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 77-83.
[850] "Desirability of Adopting an International Instrument for the Protection of Monuments and Sites of Universal Value," 31 July 1970, 16 C/19, UNESDOC, 8.
[851] For recent work that integrates tourism into the international history of the twentieth-century, see especially Petra Goedde, "Global Cultures," in Akira Iriye, ed., *Global Interdependence: The World after 1945* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2014); Christopher Endy, *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Jenifer Van Vleck, *Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American Ascendancy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

to address the phenomenon and discuss its potential for the international economic system. The General Assembly declared 1967 the "International Year of Tourism," while institutions like the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the Conference on International Travel and Tourism, and the World Bank began to propose that "tourist dollars" could become an effective way to shift capital from the economically advanced North to the impoverished but culturally rich South.[852] UNESCO specialists linked the preservation of historic sites with these effort to shape international patterns of tourism and development aid. René Maheu began to argue that "even those most anxious to see the national budget balanced might bear in mind that a country's economy everywhere benefits widely, and increasingly, from the tourist traffic brought into being or maintained by the attraction of monuments."[853] Historical monuments were capable of redirecting the flow of people from "tourist exporting countries" towards underdeveloped "tourist importing countries."[854] Numerous reports and

[852] The idea of cultural tourism emerged in several UN meetings: 1963 UN Conference on International Travel and Tourism in Rome noted "the very substantial value, from the point of view of tourism, of the natural, historical and cultural heritage of countries" and urged their preservation. May 1964 UNCTAD promoted tourism in developing countries and also urged the preservation of cultural sites and monuments. See "Tourism and Financing of the Conservation of Sites and Monuments," 22 August 1968, 15 C/59, UNESDOC; Marie-Francois Lanfant, "Introduction: Tourism in the Process of Internationalization," *International Social Science Journal* (1980); "1967: International Tourist Year," *Unesco Courier* (December 1966), 7.
[853] René Maheu Address Given at the Opening of the International Campaign for Monuments, "The Preservation of Monuments for Posterity Is One of the Duties of Mankind," 7 September 1964, WS/0864.64/CUA, UNESDOC; René Maheu Talk Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the "Vieilles Maisons Françaises" Association, "The Protection of the Cultural Heritage," 2 June 1970, DG/70/6, UNESDOC. For similar arguments among UNESCO specialists, see also Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, "International Salvage Archeology, 139.
[854] "Cultural Tourism: The Unexploited Treasure of Economic Development," *Unesco Courier* (December 1966), 12.

development plans began to evaluate these monuments as "economic assets."[855] Malcolm Adiseshiah argued that an historical monument "could be considered a 'commodity' which is produced, distributed and consumed."[856] These new development theories transformed historical monuments from economic burdens into prized resources that could help attract foreign currency and capital.

The idea of cultural tourism began to shape new economic development models. Early attempts to develop preservation schemes sought to isolate cultural property from development plans and military conflicts. Cultural tourism preserved monument and temples, Maheu suggested, "not by roping it off but, on the contrary, by integrating it into the very heart of a scheme which aims to meet the needs and aspirations of the local communities and to meet the conditions for development of one of the major social phenomena of our time - international tourism."[857] The preservation of monuments should play "a fully useful role" in both the cultural and economic life of developing nations.[858] These monuments, often located in isolated locations remote from urban centers, could help to revitalize formerly isolated and unproductive regions. Their presence could improve infrastructure through the development of airports and hotels. New

[855] "Desirability of Adopting an International Instrument for the Protection of Monuments and Sites of Universal Value," 31 July 1970, 16 C/19, UNESDOC; "Unesco's Contribution to the Administrator's Report to the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme," enclosed in René Maheu to Paul G. Hoffman, 11 August 1967, Folder 19, Box 6, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; "Cultural Tourism: The Unexploited Treasure of Economic Development," *Unesco Courier* (December 1966), 12.
[856] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, *Let My Country Awake*, 158.
[857] René Maheu Address, "Saving Carthage," 19 May 1972, DG/72/9, UNESDOC.
[858] "Tourism and Financing of the Conservation of Sites and Monuments," 22 August 1968, 15 C/59, UNESDOC.

tourist industries could also provide opportunities for employment in areas that lacked industry or productive agriculture.

The Nubian Campaign made Egypt a laboratory for many of these theories. The financial value of historical monuments and cultural tourism emerged in early Egyptian-American diplomatic discussions. Nasser's effort to strengthen Egypt's economic power reportedly influenced his support for UNESCO and the international campaign.[859] A State Department advisor informed Secretary of State Dean Rusk as early as 1961 that "Abu Simbel would add greatly to the development of the Nubian Valley as a center for tourists." John Wilson agreed the temples could expand the "flow of tourism and the income from the tourist dollar" from the United States to Egypt.[860] One specialist suggested that the economic development of Egypt through historic preservation and cultural tourism could be applied to other countries across the Third World: "this argument reaches far beyond Abu Simbel to the jungles of Cambodia and Guatemala, to the ancient urban sites of Mohenjo and Persia."[861] International preservation campaigns could advance American interests not just in Egypt and the Middle East but across the Third World.

The Egyptian Tourist Administration developed programs to improve facilities for visitors to southern Egypt. "Nearing completion is a colony of tourist

[859] Interview with Lucius Battle, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training; "Interview Rex Keating," 10 March 1999, Box 2, Oral History Collection, AG 14, UA.
[860] George N. Shuster to Dean Rusk, 1 October 1962, Box 827, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; George N. Shuster to Dean Rusk, 15 December 1961, Box 824, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; John Wilson to Max McCullough, 8 January 1963, Box 1, Richard N. Goodwin Papers, JFKL.
[861] Luther Gulick to Lucius Battle, 18 January 1963, Box 1, Richard N. Goodwin Papers, JFKL.

bungalows," reported a foreign correspondent in 1964 who noticed the transformation of the Nile River. "Skeletons of a half-dozen new hotels are rising to become part of the Aswan skyline." An Indian journalist noticed that "Vast colonies of air-conditioned flats have sprung up on undulating sand dunes" and argued that Aswan, strengthened by the High Dam and tourists visiting temples upriver, might soon "dwarf the splendours of Cairo and Alexandria."[862] 53000 annual tourists visited Abu Simbel, a quiet and secluded region of the country, within seven years of the temple's reconstruction. Planners predicted that number would reach 200000 by the end of the decade.[863] When the salvage work at Abu Simbel came to an end in 1968, the Nubian Campaign shifted its attention towards managing the tourist traffic. Economic planers began to center the economic development of the upper Nile around Abu Simbel.[864]

The Secretariat began to expand its commitment to the idea of of cultural tourism. The Executive Board, during the last two days of the May 1966 session, departed from Paris to attend a special meeting in Budapest to discuss the role that historical monuments could play in the organization's mission. Outside of the conference halls, the diplomats toured the city's monuments and architecture (American members noticed the bullet holes that still marred buildings from when the city rebelled against the Warsaw Pact and Soviet power ten years earlier).

[862] Jay Walz, "The Temples of Abu Simbel," *New York Times* (2 February 1964), 22; K.C. Khanna, "New Sense Of Confidence And Buoyancy In UAR Evident," *Times Of India* (10 January 1963), 6.
[863] Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, "International Salvage Archeology, 139; K.M. Savosnick, *Economic Evaluation of the Abu Simbel Restoration Project: Costs and Benefits* (UNESCO: Paris, 1978), 4.
[864] International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, Executive Committee, Nineteenth Session, 9 July 1971, NUBIA/CE/XIX/3, UNESDOC.

They turned their attention to the world's cultural treasures when they reassembled in the conference rooms. Everyone agreed that cultural tourism could foster a "new mentality" that would foster cultural understanding and "help to strengthen peace in the world."[865] Critics like William Benton and British delegate Dame Mary Smieton worried that cultural tourism and historical preservation reduced cultural treasures to mere economic resources but decided to support the organization's new faith in cultural tourism. The board agreed that UNESCO should promote cultural tourism among international funding agencies.[866]

The Nubian Campaign dominated the organization's efforts to popularize these new ideas. Newspapers around the world printed dramatic images of workmen lifting the massive statues of Ramses at Abu Simbel on their front pages. As the Swedish delegate to the Executive Board's Budapest meeting proposed, the "Nubian story was a very inspiring one and should be told to the whole world" in order to promote the cause of historical preservation and international development.[867] René Maheu used the success of Abu Simbel to draw attention to his plans for cultural tourism in program commission

[865] Hilding Eek comments and Pompei Comments, both located in Provisional Summary Record of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting, 14 June 1966, 72 EX/SR.35, Folder 8, Box 566, WBP, UCA.
[866] Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at its Seventy-Second Session, Paris and Budapest, 2-31 May 1966, Executive Board, 72 EX/Decisions, UNESDOC; "Unesco's Contribution to the Administrator's Report to the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme," enclosed in René Maheu to Paul G. Hoffman, 11 August 1967, Folder 19, Box 6, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[867] Hilding Eeek remarks in Provisional Summary Record of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting, 14 June 1966, 72 EX/SR.35, Folder 8, Box 566, WBP, UCA.

discussions at the General Conference in November.[868] The *Courier* devoted a stream of articles to the economic benefits of monuments.

Secretariat members who had worked on the Nubian Campaign returned to Paris and began to adapt the lessons they had learned in Egypt. Ali Vrioni, who began his career in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had directed the Monuments of Nubia Service in the Secretariat. He devoted his time to international fund-raising efforts, which brought him into personal contact with world leaders and power brokers. The Secretariat assigned him to head the organization's new cultural tourism department in 1969. He quickly began to build on his experience abroad by popularizing the idea of cultural tourism. He advised foreign leaders about their cultural treasures and tourism strategies and developed accords on behalf of the organization.[869] Vrioni's colleague, the American specialist Hiroshi Daifuku, had coordinated archaeological investigations in Sudan, south of Abu Simbel. His Secretariat bosses then assigned him to head the Monuments and Sites section and then the Department for the Development of the Cultural Heritage after his return to Paris. "One of the unlooked for results in the Nubian Campaign was the rise in tourism in Nubia," he remarked in 1968. World leaders should take note of the "considerable

[868] General Debate, Program Commissions, Resolutions, Records of the General Conference, Fourteenth Session, 14 C/Resolutions, UNESDOC, 164.
[869] René Maheu memorandum, "Division des Campagnes Internationales et de la Promotion du Tourisme Culturel," 7 March 1969, Folder 3, Box 1, CAB 9, AG 8, UA. For Vrioni's negotiations with developing countries, see for example René Maheu memorandum, "Mission en Iran (22-28 Avril)," 29 April 1968, Folder 2, Box 1, CAB 9, AG 8, UA.

improvement in the overall economy of the region."[870] In his new office, Daifuku started commissioning studies for manuals devoted to the restoration of monuments. He also represented the organization at international meetings and advised the World Bank on investment opportunities for cultural tourism in South-East Asia.[871]

Governments across Asia and the Middle East took advantage of the Secretariat's growing interest in cultural tourism. The Secretariat deployed dozens of consultants and technical assistance missions, usually after a preliminary discussion with Hiroshi Daifuku and other officials in Paris, to inspect monuments and ancient temples. These missions promised governments that the preservation of monuments could give them an attractive international image, strengthen their economies, and improve their balance of payments. They advised governments not just on how to salvage and preserve their monuments but also how to integrate them into global markets. One advisor traveled by land rover through Nepal, traveling down "roads never meant for wheels," headed for remote monuments and temples. He promised the government that the kingdom's "exotic temples and towns" were "magnet[s]" that would draw the outside world into the Kathmandu Valley. These advisors made suggestions on how to market their countries and accommodations to Western consumer demands. One advisor suggested that Pakistan's government should promote itself as the "heir and

[870] Hiroshi Daifuku, "Saving our Heritage: A World-Wide Challenge," *Unesco Courier* (June 1968), 4-11.
[871] Russell V. Keune, "An Interview with Hiroshi Daifuku," *CRM: The Journal of Heritage Stewardship*; "Cultural Tourism in Central Java and Bali," enclosed in Hiroshi Daifuku to David Davis, 4 April 1969, Records of President Robert S. McNamara, World Bank Archives.

guardian of Mogul civilization" and urged it to develop its "aesthetic identity" in the international community. Domestically, investment in the preservation of monuments would have a spillover effect on the country's "required infrastructure" – including "agriculture, husbandry, artisan crafts, etc. in new, underdeveloped areas." A specialist assigned to catalogue the temples and shrines of northwestern Iran suggested they would strengthen transportation infrastructure and roads leading to the remote city of Ardabil. Monuments would also have effects on the balance of trade, since cultural tourism would lead to the "redistribution of wealth through international tourism."[872]

The Nubian Campaign helped to popularize these ideas among Third World governments. "The Abu Simbel venture has aroused interest everywhere," William Benton remarked after returning from a meeting in Paris. "If Egypt can get such assistance for Abu Simbel, say the poorer countries to themselves, why can't we get it for our historical monuments?" A panel of experts concluded in 1968 that the Nubian Campaign had "stimulated interest in monuments and showed that their greater use did not compete with the demands of economic development but rather could contribute effectively to it."[873] Tunisian

[872] E.A. Connally, "Nepal: Cultural Tourism," January 1970, 1731/BMS.RD/CLT; R. M H. Magnee, "Pakistan: Architectural Presentation of Historic Cities, Sites and Monuments with a View to Cultural Tourism," September 1967, 176/RD/CLT; J. C. Pollacco, "Nepal: Development of Cultural Tourism," 11 August 1968, 807/BMS.RD/CLT; M.E. Weaver, "Iran: Preliminary Study on the Conservation Problems of Five Iranian Monuments," April 1970, all available in UNESDOC.

[873] William Benton, "Report of the United States Delegation to the 72nd Session of the UNESCO Executive Board," Box 3340, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA; Panel of International Experts on Enhancing the Cultural Heritage Through Economic Development, "Final Report," 13 May 1968, SHC/CS/8/1, UNESDOC. Paris to DOS, "UNESCO Director-General's Report on Recent Travels," 9 March 1967, Folder 2, Box 400, WBP, UCA. See also Charles Frankel, "Report of the

development expert Jellal El Kafi invoked the Nubian Campaign as a precedent that justified plans to salvage the ancient city of Carthage. These treasures and monuments "can be looked upon as consumer goods or as raw materials whose development justified capital investment."[874] When the Pakistani government created a "Save Mohenjodaro" organization to preserve ancient Indus monuments, it appealed to precedents established by the Nubian Campaign. "If UNESCO can help the Egyptian Government," Custodian Niaz Rasool claimed, "it can help the Government of Pakistan, too."[875] Colombia's delegation to the General Conference proposed that the organization develop "an operation similar to the one undertaken by UNESCO in the Upper Nile" for Latin American monuments.[876]

The flood of requests convinced the organization to develop a more permanent international agreement to preserve historical sites. The 1966 General Conference asked the Director General to develop "an appropriate system of international protection" to preserve "the monuments that form an integral part of the cultural heritage of mankind."[877] The Secretariat approached legal experts and

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United States Delegation to the Fourteenth General Conference of UNESCO," 15 May 1967, Box 3211, CFP 1967-1969, RG 59, NARA.

[874] Jellal El Kafi, "Carthage Must Not be Destroyed," *Unesco Courier* (December 1970), 5, 8.

[875] Joseph Lelyvelds, "Remains of Ancient Indus City Periled," *New York Times* (16 February 1969), 16; "Save Mohenjodaro," clipping from unidentified journal, 53-19-UNESCO-1, Volume 10901, LAC.

[876] Records of the General Conference, Thirteenth Session, Eighteenth Plenary Meeting, 30 October 1964, 13 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC. For Latin American interest in cultural preservation, see Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to Director-General, "A 'Synthèse' of My Inspection Mission to 8 Latin American Countries (March/April 1966)," 14 April 1966, Folder 15, Box 5, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.

[877] General Conference resolution as cited in Christina Cameron and Mechtild Rössler, *Many Voices, One Vision: The Early Years of the World Heritage Convention* (Burlington: Ashgate,

technical advisors, diplomats and international civil servants to draft a convention on world heritage sites. Many contemporary concerns shaped these discussions. Archaeologists and veteran Secretariat officials believed that a permanent convention would protect man's common cultural heritage and encourage people to travel and learn about the world.[878] American experts were particularly interested in refocusing the convention on the preservation of natural sites. Environmental advocacy groups and the National Parks Service had begun to influence American domestic and foreign aid policy in the late 1960s.[879] Third World officials opposed these American proposals. They worried that the preservation of natural sites would hamper their own industrial development schemes and violate their sovereignty. However, the preservation and development of cultural sites, which were abundant in many developing countries, would strengthen their national communities and jumpstart their tourist industries.

The Secretariat asked Gérard Bolla, René Maheu's former cabinet director, to negotiate a formal agreement. The Swiss lawyer and his Secretariat colleagues continued to focus on cultural sites. He wanted to "give an institutional framework to the international solidarity displayed at the time of the rescue of the temple of Abu Simbel." The Nubian Campaign "needed to be able to be repeated"

2013). See also Michel Batisse, "Nature and Culture: Recollections of a (Conventional) Marriage," translated by Robert Grauman, *The Invention of 'World Heritage'* (Paris: Association of Former Unesco Staff Members, 2005), 16.

[878] Alexandra Kowalski, "When Cultural Capitalization Became Global Practice," 85.

[879] Peter H. Stott, "The World Heritage Convention and the National Park Service, 1962–1972," *The George Wright Forum* 3 (2011), 279-290.

around the world, he recalled.[880] The tourist invasion of the Nile also impressed Bolla and his colleagues. A meeting of experts convened to lay the foundation for the convention agreed that "cultural heritage was an economic asset of prime importance, the basis and lifeblood of tourism, in an increasingly leisured society." The Abu Simbel operation "aroused enthusiasm and approval in all quarters" and established "spectacular precedents" for further measures. Secretariat officials therefore tried resist American efforts to turn the convention into an environmental protection agreement.[881] Bolla travelled to Washington and, in a series of meetings with the State Department's deputy legal adviser, resolved the deadlock. They agreed that both natural and cultural sites would have an equal place in the convention. Bolla was also able to convince Washington officials that UNESCO should direct the program.[882]

The dozens of experts meetings, diplomatic negotiations, and discarded drafts finally led to the development of the World Heritage Convention that was presented to the 1972 General Conference. The convention invoked the

[880] Gérard Bolla, "Péripéties d'une Gestation Laborieuse," in Michel Batisse and Gérard Bolla, *L'Invention de 'Patrimoine Mondial'* (Paris: Association des Anciens Fonctionnaires de l'Unesco, 2003), 97; Gerard Bolla, "Protection of Historic Towns and Quarters: National and Institutional Legal Standards," May 1987, as cited in J. Mark Schuster, *Regulating Place: Standards and the Shaping of Urban America*, 338.

[881] Meeting of Experts to Establish an International System for the Protection of Monuments, Groups of Buildings and Sites of Universal Interest, "Final Report," 10 November 1969, SHC/MD/4, UNESDOC. See also Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Opening Address to the Fifth Regional Conference of Asian National Commissions for Unesco, "UNESCO in Asia - Retrospect and Prospect," 5 September 1970, DDG/70/12, UNESDOC, 7. For Bolla's interest in cultural tourism, see Interview with Gerard Bolla, 11 February 1999, Oral History Collection, Box 2, AG 14, UA; Gérard Bolla, "Des Avions et des 4x4 d'époque," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 216.

[882] Gerard Bolla, "Episodes of a Painstaking Gestation," translated by Raymond Johnson, *The Invention of 'World Heritage'* (Paris: Association of Former Unesco Staff Members, 2005); Michel Batisse, "Nature and Culture: Recollections of a (Conventional) Marriage," translated by Robert Grauman, *The Invention of 'World Heritage'*; Carl F. Salans Interview, 30 December 1998, Frontline Diplomacy Oral History, LOC.

organization's high ideals. Monuments, temples, and other historic sites constituted "a world heritage for whose protection it is the duty of the international community as a whole to co-operate."[883] It established a World Heritage Committee of fifteen members to provide international oversight of heritage sites. It also received and researched requests for international aid. A World Heritage Fund distributed this aid and assistance to member states for the preservation and restoration of threatened sites and monuments. It would send aid and advisory missions and help to train local specialists. A World Heritage List publicized sites around the world and imbued them with cultural value. States competed to have their monuments inscribed on the list and used the label to promote their cultural treasures internationally.[884] The committee forged links with global tourist industries and integrated previously neglected historical sites into global markets.[885] UNESCO, empowered by the success of the Nubian Campaign, had created and popularized powerful new ideas about international economic development.

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[883] Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage adopted by the General Conference at its Seventeenth Session, 16 November 1972, WHC/72/WS/1, UNESDOC.
[884] For the World Heritage List, see Alexandra Kowalski, "When Cultural Capitalization Became Global Practice," 85; Noel B. Salazar and Yujie Zhu, "Heritage and Tourism," 247.
[885] For recent examples, see "Memories of the Future: A Partnership Between the Tourism Industry and UNESCO for World Cultural and Natural Heritage Towards a Responsible, Sustainable and Qualitative Tourism" (Paris: UNESCO, 2001); Arthur Pedersen, *Managing Tourism at World Heritage Sites: A Practical Manual for World Heritage Site Managers* (Paris: UNESCO, 2002).

The Nubian Campaign served powerful diplomatic strategies. Washington supported the project, especially through financial aid, in order to strengthen its interests in Egypt and the Middle East. Nasser also leveraged the international campaign to improve Egypt's relationship with the Western world. The transfer of temples to American and West European museums played a role in improving its diplomatic position. Heritage sites were never "lifeless remains." They became national ambassadors, objects of national prestige, symbols of international community, and economic resources that could be exploited and commodified to gain crucial foreign exchange. A belief in their universal cultural and historical value dominated contemporary debates, but consideration of power and prestige shaped their political development. Ironically, these consideration helped to ensure their survival. Earlier attempts to preserve cultural artifacts confronted more pressing economic and military demands. American cultural diplomacy and Egyptian efforts to improve its international position and foreign exchange holdings created crucial foundations for the campaign's success. Yet the campaign was truly monumental in the way that it contributed to the conduct of international politics.

Monuments emerged as powerful sites in the postcolonial international system. They exerted a magnetic pull on the international flow of people and capital around the world. Ten years earlier, many intellectuals had believed there was an international balance of trade and culture: the West exported technology and foreign aid, the East exported its art and culture. "Beginning the decade with

a grasp on the nebulous coat-tails of 'mutual understanding,'" a Secretariat official reported in 1970, UNESCO's "cultural programme ended the decade clasping the economically more promising coat-tails of tourism."[886] World Heritage Sites made this equation a reality. The monuments diverted the transnational flow of millions of tourists and, through them, the flow of capital and international investment. "What a colossal movement of men and money," former Secretariat official Prem Kirpal marveled in 1969.[887] Some states turned these heritage sites into central pillars of their economies. Jordan, for example, was surrounded by major energy-producing states but had negligible deposits of oil. Officials in Amman instead turned towards the ancient rock-hewn temple of Petra as the true "oil of Jordan." World Heritage Sites shaped the postcolonial trajectory of South-East Asia. After decades of war - rebellion against the French empire, armed revolt and insurgency against American ground forces and aerial bombardment, and a third Indochinese conflict with China - reunified Vietnam and Cambodia transformed themselves into tourist hotspots for the international community. The sprawling temples of Hué and Angkor Wat became the magnets that drew most visitors to the region. This new tourist traffic improved South-East Asia's image in the international community and stimulated international investment in local development.[888]

[886] Consultation on UNESCO and the Second Development Decade, "General Statement," 6 July 1970, SHC/MD/9, UNESDOC.
[887] Rahul Singh, "Interview [with Prem Kirpal]," *Times of India* (5 January 1969), A1.
[888] Luna Khirfan, *World Heritage, Urban Design and Tourism: Three Cities in the Middle East* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), chapter 1; Michael Giovine, *The Heritage-scape: UNESCO, World*

Chapter 5: Third World Spokesman: The North-South Dialogue

The winds of change are blowing
through the corridors of UNESCO in Paris.

Times of India editorial, 1974[889]

By the end of the 1960s, UNESCO had achieved a level of popularity and influence that it had not enjoyed since the immediate postwar years. The dramatic efforts to expand educational programs, preserve historical monuments, and contribute to economic development made the organization popular in developing countries. René Maheu boasted as early as 1962 that he had the "unquestioning support of the developing countries."[890] The Director General's prestige in developing countries annoyed some foreign officials. "Maheu is a world figure," William Benton complained to a colleague four years later, "and is received like traveling royalty" in developing countries.[891] These successes reestablished the organization as a key member of the international community.

Global developments presented new opportunities and challenges for the organization. The strains of the nuclear arms race compelled the United States and Soviet Union to relax tensions and pursue diplomatic negotiations. The rise of

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Heritage, and Tourism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 4-5. See also Noel B. Salazar and Yujie Zhu, "Heritage and Tourism," 240-258.

[889] "A New Start," *Times of India* (1 December 1974), 6.

[890] Memorandum of Conversation, "Visit of M. René Maheu, Acting Director General of UNESCO," 16 October 1962, Box 827, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA.

[891] William Benton to Frederick Praeger, 19 December 1966, Folder 9, Box 395, WBP, UCA; Benjamin H. Read Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, "Visit of René Maheu, Director-General of UNESCO," 22 October 1963, Box 66, President's Office Files, JFKL. See also William Benton to Aherne, 9 November 1964, Folder 3, Box 394, WBP, UCA.

détente led many international civil servants to believe that a new era was dawning for the organization. The Executive Board was the first UN body to recognize the People's Republic of China as "the only legitimate representative of China in UNESCO" in October 1971.[892] A year later, after months of diplomatic wrangling, the board unanimously welcomed East Germany as the organization's newest member state.[893] Their admission resolved a long-standing complaint that their inclusion was necessary to preserve the organization's "universality" (Beijing and East Berlin in turn believed that membership in the UN's intellectual branch would bolster their international legitimacy).[894] Delegates to the General Conference and the Executive Board assumed that the expected decline in global arms expenditures would be redirected towards international development programs.[895]

Global social upheaval reverberated through the Secretariat in 1968. Rebellious youth destabilized national politics in dozens of countries across the world and on every continent. Students and their supporters decried conservative governance, impersonal and alienating societies, and unfulfilling employment

[892] "UNESCO Board Votes Peking in, Taiwan Out," *Chicago Tribune* (30 October 1971), 1. The Executive Board's vote followed Secretary-General U Thant's message to UN agencies concerning the passage of Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which declared the PRC the "only legitimate representative" of China. See Editorial Note 442, *FRUS 1969-1976*: Volume V, 880.
[893] "U.N. Door Ajar for East Germany," *Los Angeles Times* (21 November 1972). For the diplomatic negotiations that preceded the vote, see the telegrams collected in Box 3224, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA. Negotiations between GDR and FRG senior officials over the normalization of German-German relations delayed the vote in the Executive Board.
[894] For an American assessment, see CIA Intelligence Note, "United Nations: East German Membership in UNESCO?", 11 September 1970, Box 3229, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA.
[895] René Maheu Address, Records of the General Conference, Eighteenth Session, Fourth Plenary Meeting, 18 October 1974, 18 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 150. The idea that the arms race had redirected financial support for the developing world was a persistent theme of General Conference debates throughout the 1960s.

opportunities.[896] Paris became the symbolic epicenter for this "global revolution" and the storm along the Seine inevitably blew through the Secretariat. "The spirit of May 1968 fanned the organization," one official recalled. "The staff discussed democracy, bureaucracy, dialogue, participation, working methods, human relations."[897] The organization had swelled in size over the past ten years - UNESCO "House" had evolved into the sprawling and impersonal UNESCO "Palace" - while the number of staff members had nearly doubled.[898] The twenty-seven year old American educator Michel Huberman "detonated" the crisis when he drafted and distributed a scathing critique of Maheu's leadership in April 1970. Huberman complained that bureaucratic expansion had encouraged elite "control" and "stability" at the expense of new ideas and democratic governance within the organization. Only "radical" reform could democratize the Secretariat and empower its idealistic commitment to international understanding.[899] Maheu publicly ordered the formation of a special group to study these accusations. Privately, his cabinet dismissed the challenge and swept the controversy under the

[896] Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest*, 88-131, 164-213.
[897] Krystyna Chlebowska, "Mai... 1970: Une Table Ronde à L'UNESCO," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 190; Paris to DOS, "Malaise at UNESCO: Young Staff Leading Revolt Against Director-General's Leadership," 25 April 1970, Box 3225, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA.
[898] For a good contemporary discussion about the Secretariat's "dreamlike atmosphere" and "Kafkaesque climate," see B. Girod de L'Ain, "Doute et Contestation a L'UNESCO," *Le Monde* (25 April 1970), 9. For staff numbers, see "Évolution des Effectifs du Personnel," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 127.
[899] "A Petition to the Director General for a Self Study of the Secretariat," enclosed in Paris to DOS, 25 April 1970, Box 3225, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA. For background, see also "Le Mal de Vivre de L'UNESCO," *L'Express* (20-26 July 1970), enclosed in Paris to DOS, 25 April 1970, Box 3225, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA; Pierre H. Coeytaux to Jean-Luc Mathieu, 19 September 1974, Folder 23, Box 6, CAB 8, AG 8, UA.

rug. Discontent among staff members remained subdued but periodically threatened to reemerge.

Third World discontent about decolonization and the international economic system lashed the Secretariat and reoriented its agenda over the next fifteen years. The Vietnam War in Asia, the persistence of white settler regimes in Africa, and the struggle for Palestinian statehood in the Middle East radicalized demands for self-determination. By the end of the 1960s, it was also clear that the world's first development decade was failing and the economic gap between the rich and the poor continuing to widen. The "crisis in development" cast a shadow over the international community, which turned its collective attention to developing new strategies to meet the challenge.[900] It had two major effects on Third World politics. Slow economic growth validated the dependency school of economics. The Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch first argued that the developing "periphery" depended on the wealthy and industrialized "center" for economic aid and export markets. This dependency fostered unequal commercial and trading relationships that exacerbated the gap between the developing and the industrial worlds and perpetuated a new form of neocolonialism. Third World states would only escape poverty and dependence by shaking off the international economic system imposed by Western countries.[901] The failure of development

[900] Malcolm Adiseshiah, "The Crisis in Development," *UNESCO Courier* (October 1970), 4-14; David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 226-257.
[901] Jeffry A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, 309-312; Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, 90-95; Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 233-235.

also reinforced fears about Western cultural domination. International development experts and their secular, technocratic political allies had pushed Third World peoples to abandon traditional values - which were interpreted as impediments to rapid social and economic progress - and embrace new cultural practices and technology. These development strategies exacerbated social tensions and inspired resistance movements - based around religious leaders and anticolonial intellectuals - opposed to the spread of foreign ideas.[902] In response, states around the world began to assume greater responsibility for cultural programs that could create greater social harmony and appease conservative social groups.[903] This series of Third World demands - ending European colonialism and blocking the spread of economic and cultural neocolonialism - became central to the interconnected series of international agreements and discussions that became known as the "North-South Dialogue."

Third World internationalism also developed more organized and institutional forms. The Afro-Asian Movement, based around geographical location and anti-imperial ideology, failed to become an established international power after the 1955 Bandung Conference. Growing frustration about the international system, however, led Third World states to form new international bodies to share ideas and enhance their collective voices. Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito adapted Jawaharlal Nehru's thinking and

[902] David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 227-246; Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World*, 200-201; Beverly Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945*, 51-70.
[903] Richard Hoggart, "Culture and its Ministers," 192.

proposed the formation of a Non-Aligned Movement during the 1960 UN General Assembly. The first NAM conference in Belgrade emphasized their commitment to a range of issues: dialogue on international issues, disarmament, and an end to the Cold War. This new international movement, based on a more flexible commitment to political ideals rather than geographical location, highlighted Third World concerns like colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, and economic development. It would exert a strong influence on international politics throughout the decade.[904] A second international movement began to emerge around the dependency theorists. Prebisch and his colleagues institutionalized their ideas through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that first met in Geneva in 1964. Seventy-seven of the states that attended its first conference mobilized to form the G-77, a major voting bloc that would defend UNCTAD positions in the United Nations and other international organizations. These states believed that their power derived from "their own unity" and agreed to concert their foreign policies in order to create a "new and just world economic order."[905] These bodies organized conferences and drafted dozens of resolutions and agreements based on the principle that market forces alone were not sufficient to alleviate poverty in the Third World - market forces

[904] Lorenz Lüthi, "The Non-Aligned: Apart From and Still Within the Cold War," in *Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung - Belgrade* (New York: Routledge), 97-113; G. H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*; Vijay Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 101, 104.
[905] "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development," 15 June 1964, The Group of 77 at the United Nations, available online: <http://ww.g77.org/doc/Joint%20Declaration.html>; John Toye, "Assessing the G77: 50 Years After UNCTAD and 40 Years after the NIEO," *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 10 (2014), 1759-1774.

actually kept developing nations in a state of poverty and facilitated the great powers' ability to maintain them in a state of neocolonial dependency.[906] Despite the collapse of Afro-Asian internationalism, the NAM and the G-77 built themselves on its rubble and posed as the champions of Third World unity in international politics in the 1960s and 1970s.

These tensions created turmoil in the Secretariat throughout the 1970s. The anticolonial struggle to fight the remnants of Europe's colonial empires, overturn a neocolonial international system, and expand the Third World's collective voice in international politics propelled UNESCO to the center of world politics. American threats to withdraw from the organization in 1974 revealed the confrontation between the global North and South. The Secretariat's diplomatic success in briefly restoring American commitment to and confidence in UNESCO provided hope that it could reconcile the United States and the increasingly assertive Third World. By the end of the decade, however, the Secretariat's strident intellectual campaign against neocolonialism soured North-South relations. A common question shaped North American and West European attitudes towards the organization during this period: Was it a radical vanguard of the Third World's challenge to their dominance of the international system or a moderate force to reconcile them?

[906] Paul M. Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations* (New York: Random House, 2006), 127; Vijay Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 70; "First Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77: Charter of Algiers," October 1967, The Group of 77, available online: <http://ww.g77.org/doc/algier%7E1.htm>.

Third World Vanguard

A spirit of Third World solidarity hovered over international politics in the late 1960s. In street protests across the world, demonstrators carried images of Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and North Vietnamese Communist Party Chairman Ho Chi Minh - radicals from different cultures and continents united in a common effort to confront superpower oppression.[907] In international organizations, diplomats cooperated more closely together in efforts to remake the international system. By the beginning of the decade, Arab and African officials began to concert their positions on a range of regional issues, such as the "liberation" of Palestine and South Africa. The Afro-Arab bloc in turn began to appeal to Latin American and Asian diplomats for additional support and votes. "Nonaligned states clearly sense [the] power they can wield," the American mission to the United Nations noted in 1973, "and now there is a disturbing tendency to use this power on [an] increasing number of issues."[908] This new unity did not resolve regional conflicts among participants - tensions between India and Pakistan, for example, deteriorated as Third World unity grew in influence. Yet diplomatic cooperation helped the developing world, despite their cultural and political differences, to confront the superpowers over common postcolonial grievances.

[907] Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (New York: Oxford, 2012), 30.
[908] New York to DOS, "Growing Cohesion of Nonaligned Block in UN," 21 November 1973, USUN 4973, AAD.

Third World efforts to fight the last remnants of Europe's territorial empires had a profound impact on UNESCO's agenda. The Afro-Asian states first opened a campaign in 1963 to exclude Portugal from UNESCO conferences and meetings.[909] African diplomats claimed that Portugal's colonial policies automatically disqualified it from participation in UNESCO. Ivory Coast representative Bernard Dadie summed up these convictions with an impassioned speech in the October 1965 session of the Executive Board. "One of the great features of colonialism was to erase other country's cultures. UNESCO to the contrary is committed in its heart to bringing men and cultures together. How could it admit in its heart a state that has contempt for this special part of its mission?"[910] The Africans who attended the General Conference the next year assumed that René Maheu would try to moderate their demands in order to appease Western statesmen. The Director General, to their great surprise, encouraged them to push their anticolonial agenda further. The Secretariat subsequently began to provide educational assistance to national liberation movements fighting Portuguese colonialism in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola, and Mozambique.[911] The Movement for the Liberation of Angola

[909] Paris to DOS, "The Portuguese Problem at the UNESCO 13th General Conference," 21 August 1964, Box 383, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA; Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "Portugal and the Edinburgh Conference of National Commissions of UNESCO," June 1965, CAB 148/21, UKNA.
[910] Bernard Dadie address, Summary Records of the Executive Board, Seventh Meeting, 71st Session, 14 October 1965, 14 C/34, UNESDOC.
[911] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO Cooperation with OAU in Assisting African Liberation Movements," 3 August 1972, Box 3224, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA; Report of the United States Delegation to the 93rd Session of the UNESCO Executive Board, n. d. [circa October 1973], Box 3224, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA. On Maheu, see Henri Lopes, "Le Temps de la Décolonisation," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 97

(MPLA), in a memorandum it delivered to the Organization for African Unity in 1969, welcomed UNESCO's "heartening decision" to provide educational assistance and claimed that it "could be an important factor in the advancement of our peoples."[912] The Director General played an active part in sustaining this anticolonial effort. According to former Congo-Brazzaville Prime Minister Henri Lopès, who had worked at the Secretariat in the late 1960s, "René Maheu cared about the [African] continent's integration into the international community."[913]

The Secretariat also began to directly address the problem of South African apartheid. By 1966, the efforts of African nationalists to impose sanctions on South Africa through the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice had faltered. The anti-apartheid movement began to focus less on political action and more on spreading information about the effects of racial segregation.[914] UNESCO, which had already launched educational campaigns against racial prejudice, would obviously be an important player in this international strategy. Assistant Director General Malcolm Adiseshiah recognized that participating in such an intellectual offensive risked involving the organization in divisive political issues. Yet he quickly came to agree that there was a "philosophical contradiction between the UNESCO idea and Apartheid." He therefore supported efforts to publicize information about the dangers of racial

[912] Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola, African Support Committee, "Memorandum to the 15th Session of the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity," n.d. [late 1969], African Activist Archive, available online: http://africanactivist.msu.edu/document_metadata.php?objectid=32-130-185A.
[913] Henri Lopes, "Le Temps de la Décolonisation," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 97.
[914] Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot*, 139-146.

prejudice in South Africa.[915] Maheu also began to support "militant" intellectual campaigns against apartheid.[916] The organization consequently commissioned and published a series of books and articles on apartheid that played an influential role in the information campaigns against South Africa.[917]

Conflict in the Middle East soon dominated the Third World's anticolonial agenda. Israel's 1967 preemptive attack on its Arab neighbors changed the diplomatic dynamics of the region. Tel Aviv's military victory over Cairo, Damascus, and Amman led to the acquisition of new territory, including the old city of Jerusalem. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reemerged as a platform for Palestinian statehood in the years after the third Arab-Israeli conflict and cast itself as a Third World liberation movement. PLO public diplomacy successfully mobilized support among African and Asian public opinion by tapping into persistent anticolonial sentiments in the NAM and the United Nations. Chairman Yasser Arafat addressed revolutionaries "in Africa, Asia and Latin America who consider our struggle as part of the struggle against oppression everywhere."[918] Arafat's strategy was successful. Newly independent countries viewed the occupied territories as an extension of European imperialism. "Israel," as the anticolonial journalist Ania Francos noted a few

[915] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah memorandum to the Assistant Director-General for Social Sciences, Human Sciences and Culture, "Unesco Report on the Effects of Apartheid," 7 October 1966, Folder 17, Box 5, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[916] René Maheu, "Long-Term Outline Plan for 1971-1976 Presented by the Director-General," 31 August 1970, 16 C/4, UNESDOC, 10.
[917] See for example, *Apartheid: Its Effects on Education, Science, Culture, and Information* (Paris: UNESCO, 1967); *UNESCO Courier*, special issue: "Apartheid" (March 1967); Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot*, 139-146.
[918] Yasser Arafat as cited in Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive*, 18-28.

years later, "is finding itself more and more in the position of Portugal."[919] Even Washington's former ambassador to the United Nations urged Americans to view the conflict through the eyes of Third World peoples, who were sympathetic to Palestinian demands for self-determination.[920] Third World states gradually began to support resolutions and declarations in the General Assembly and the Specialized Agencies condemning Israeli actions. These developments led observers, like those at the World Jewish Congress, to complain about a campaign by "a coalition of Arab and most Afro-Asian and Communist states" to transform international organizations "into instruments of political warfare" aimed at Israel.[921] UNESCO's 1974 General Conference, like other international organizations that year, agreed to admit the PLO as an official observer and passed resolutions declaring Zionism a form of racism.[922] Yet the Secretariat also emerged as a unique international forum in the Arab-Israeli crisis.

The status of Jerusalem dominated the organization's role in the Middle East conflict. Israel captured the Old City, the eastern part of the city that had been under Jordanian control since 1948, and merged it with the western half. West Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek recruited contractors to demolish the Mughrabi Quarter and create a broad plaza in front of the Western Wall, one of

[919] Ania Francos, "Israel Aujourd'hui Comme le Portugal Hier...," *Jeune Afrique* 726 (7 December 1974), 117.
[920] Charles W. Yost, "Clash of the 'Two Majorities' - Whose United Nations?," *New Republic* (28 December 1974).
[921] Minutes of the First Session of the Governing Board, World Jewish Congress, July 1975, Folder: "W.J.C., Governing Board Sessions," Leo Kronitz Fonds, Volume 23, LAC. See also, "Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, undated," *FRUS 1969-1976*: Volume E-14, Part 1, Document 50.
[922] Chloe Maurel, "L'UNESCO de 1945 à 1974," 335.

Judaism's holiest sites. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol asked businessman Yehudah Tamir to build Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Settlement of Jerusalem, the theory went, would strengthen Israeli control over the Old City.[923] Archaeology emerged as a popular field of study in Israel, where, according to the Israeli historian Martin Van Creveld, "archaeologists followed the flag."[924] In the years following 1967, Tel Aviv deployed archaeological missions to survey ancient sites in and around Jerusalem. An Israeli team led by Professor Benjamin Mazar, a renowned archaeologist and former president of Hebrew University, was assigned the task of scraping away layers of dirt and debris that had covered the southern wall of the Temple Mount. The excavations, which began in March 1968, quickly discovered stones that had belonged to Herod's royal stoa and other artifacts from the ancient Davidian period. Mazar was particularly excited about exposing a double gate that had in ancient times served as the entrance to the Temple. This was a controversial decision. The gate lay beneath the Al Aksa Mosque, one of Islam's holiest sites. Mazar dismissed complaints about potential damage to the Mosque. "We can dig beneath it without any problem," he claimed.[925] Tel Aviv recognized concerns about Jerusalem's spiritual and cultural identity. The Knesset passed a law guaranteeing the preservation of the holy

[923] Gershom Gorenberg, *The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 42-45, 63; James Feron, "Israelis Begin Razing Arab Homes at Wailing Wall," *New York Times* (16 June 1969), 8; J.F., "On Jerusalem, Israel Sees Permanent Control," *New York Times* (6 July 1969), E4.
[924] Martin Van Creveld, *The Land of Blood and Honey: The Rise of Modern Israel* (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2010), 166.
[925] Terence Smith, "Israelis Press Excavation at Temple in Old City of Jerusalem, *New York Times* (15 August 1968), 14.

places and Mayor Teddy Kollek publicly promised that "Jerusalem is a center of Arab culture and we hope to preserve it that way."[926]

Israeli actions, however, could not resolve criticism over the cultural consequences of the Six Day War and subsequent annexation of the city. A Save Jerusalem Committee, which labeled Israel "the child of world imperialism," urged the international community "to stop the implementation of their plan to 'Judaise' the Arab City of Jerusalem."[927] Two months later the Fifth Arab Archaeological Conference resolved "to hold Israel fully responsible for the destruction and mutilation of archaeological and historical sites and for the plundering of museums" in Jerusalem.[928] Arab leaders brought the issue to UNESCO. Iraqi officials privately approached Adiseshiah and Maheu and urged them to preserve Arab cultural property in the occupied territories.[929] Lebanon and Qatar prodded the organization to condemn Israeli actions in Jerusalem.[930] Arab states invoked UNESCO's 1954 Hague Convention, which required occupation powers to preserve cultural property under their control, in a regular

[926] Protection of Holy Places Law 5727 (1967), www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/HolyPlaces.htm. J.F., "On Jerusalem, Israel Sees Permanent Control," *New York Times* (6 July 1969), E4. See also Walter Zander, *Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom* (New York: Praeger, 1971), chapter six.
[927] "Appeal by the 'Save Jerusalem Committee' to World Public Opinion," 21 February 1968, *International Documents on Palestine: 1968* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), 316.
[928] "Appeal and Recommendations of the Fifth Arab Archaeological Conference," 24 April 1969, *International Documents on Palestine: 1969* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), 667.
[929] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah to Director-General, "Mission Report / IRAQ INSPECTION (20 to 25 February 1968)," 27 February 1968, Folder 21, Box 6, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[930] Halim Abu-Izzedin address and Kamal Nagi address, Records of the General Conference, Sixteenth Session, Sixth Plenary Meeting, 19 October 1972, 17 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 175, 181.

series of resolutions instructing Tel Aviv to discontinue the excavations.[931] Critics of the Israeli occupation invoked an argument that became famous during the Nubian Campaign in Egypt ten years earlier: Jerusalem's monuments belonged to the world community and could not be annexed by an occupying power. This argument resonated with members of the Executive Board. The controversy over Jerusalem was "above politics," Jamaican delegate Hector Wynter informed the board. "UNESCO must give as enthusiastic support to the protection of the City of Jerusalem as it had given in the past to the safeguarding of Abu Simbel, Venice and other cultural sites and monuments."[932] This argument helped to internationalize the regional conflict over Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem. At least one member of the British Foreign Office agreed that millions of "Christian as well as Moslem" peoples believed "that Jerusalem is a Holy Place which belongs to countless millions of people outside the border of Israel and that they have a right to be consulted about what is taking place."[933] The Vatican also worried that Israeli actions were threatening the "pluralistic nature of Jerusalem"

[931] "Decisions Taken at 18th Session General Conference," Annex A of United Kingdom National Commission for UNESCO, "UNESCO Decisions Affecting Israel - Background Note," January 1975, FCO 61/1360, UKNA. See "UNESCO Executive Board Decision 83 EX/4.3.1 Expressing Deep Concern at Israel's Violations of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Properties in the Event of Armed Conflict," 1970, *International Documents on Palestine: 1970* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1973), 732; "UNESCO Executive Board Decision 89 EX 4.4.1 Deploring the Continuation of Israeli Archaeological Excavations in Jerusalem," 6 July 1972, *International Documents on Palestine: 1972* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1975), 93; "UNESCO Executive Board Decision 90 EX/ 4.3.1. Submitting the Problem of Israeli Excavations in Jerusalem to the General Conference," 12 October 1972, *International Documents on Palestine: 1972*, 94; "UNESCO General Conference Resolution 170 3.422 Calling on Israel to Desist from Altering the Features of Jerusalem and from Archaeological Excavations," *International Documents on Palestine: 1972*, 94.

[932] Hector Wynter address, Summary Records of the Executive Board, Thirteenth Meeting, 92nd Session, 10 May 1973, 92 EX/SR.1/16, UNESDOC, 139.

[933] I. W. Norwood Minute, "USA and UNESCO," 14 January 1975, FCO 61/1360, UKNA.

and the safety of the holy sites.[934] American and British diplomats acknowledged that criticism about Jerusalem's cultural and historical identity were "legitimate" and that the "burden is on Israel" to address international criticism.[935]

Maheu enlisted his own representative to inspect the Israeli archaeological missions. He chose Raymond Lemaire, a Belgian specialist and frequent consultant who helped to develop the World Heritage Program. After visiting Jerusalem, Lemaire dismissed Arab complaints as "groundless." The Israeli teams were "extremely attentive" and the digs were "Carried out with the utmost care and employing the most expert methods," he reported.[936] Lemaire's report, however, failed to alleviate the growing international controversy surrounding Israel's archaeological missions in Jerusalem. Foreign archaeologists in the region were critical of Lemaire's findings. The head of the American Albright Institute of Archaeological Research in East Jerusalem criticized the Israeli team's "primitive" methods and complained that it had bulldozed through Arab and Ottoman cultural remains.[937] Walter Zander, an international authority on Jerusalem's monuments who was close to Israeli officials but sympathetic to Islamic concerns, criticized Lemaire's failure to address the spiritual dimensions of the Israeli excavations. The Belgian specialist had objectively assessed the

[934] Rome to DOS, "Further Vatican Views on UNESCO," 11 July 1975, Rome 09988, AAD.
[935] Jerusalem to DOS, "Arab Resolution on Jerusalem Excavations," 16 December 1974, Jerusa 02135, AAD; I. W. Norwood Minute, "USA and UNESCO," 14 January 1975, FCO 61/1360, UKNA.
[936] "Facts Noted and Observations Made by the Director-General's representative for Jerusalem," n.d. [May 1974], Annex of 94 EX/14, UNESDOC.
[937] Jerusalem to DOS, "Arab Resolution on Jerusalem Excavations," 16 December 1974, Jerusa 02135, AAD.

physical safety of the mosques, Zander claimed, but failed to study whether the excavations were inadvertently desecrating them.[938] Most importantly, Third World diplomats maintained their pressure on Israel.

The diplomatic efforts to resist the Israeli actions in East Jerusalem climaxed at the 1974 General Conference. Arab states introduced a resolution to cut off the organization's assistance to Israel until archaeological missions were halted. The resolution gained wide support throughout the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry distributed a "very urgent" circular letter requesting support for the resolution in order to "ward off the Israeli occupation and aggression on the town" of Jerusalem.[939] King Faisal's "depth and sincerity of religious conviction," an American diplomat in Paris noted, "was in the last analysis decisive" in gaining broad diplomatic support for the resolution.[940] Saudi Arabia's financial power pressured more moderate Arab powers like Egypt and African countries like Zambia, worried about their oil supplies, to fall in line.[941] After an intense, day-long debate in the Social Sciences and Humanities Commission, the General Conference passed the Arab text which cut off program assistance to Israel.[942]

[938] D. J. Church Minute, "Visit of Dr. Walter Zander," 15 January 1974, FCO 61/1360, UKNA.
[939] Jidda to DOS, "UNESCO 18th General Conference," 1 November 1974, Jidda 068092, AAD.
[940] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO 18th General Conference: Final Wrap-Up on Arab/Moslem Resolution on Jerusalem," 22 November 1974, Paris 28029, AAD.
[941] DOS to Tel Aviv, "UNESCO 18th General Conference: Arab-Moslem Re Resolution Re Jerusalem," 15 November 1974, State 252437; Lusaka to DOS, "UNESCO Resolution on Jerusalem," 7 November 1974, Lusaka 02334; Cairo to DOS, "UNESCO," 24 January 1975, Cairo 00885, all available in AAD.
[942] 54 Arab, Islamic, and Soviet bloc states voted in favor, 25 countries abstained, and 21 countries voted against the resolution: Paris to DOS, "UNESCO 18th General Conference: Arab Text on Jerusalem Excavations Passed Unamended," 15 November 1974, Paris 26511, AAD.

Procedural issues also threatened to isolate Israel in the organization. In order to implement projects more effectively, the organization decided in 1964 to assign all member states to one of five regional groups (African, Arab, Asian, European, and Latin America-Caribbean). A handful of member states - Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States - were not assigned to any of these groups. Diplomatic problems kept them from joining one of the five regional grouping over the next ten years. Washington managed to put the issue on the 1974 General Conference's agenda and, alongside the three Commonwealth countries, was assigned to a region (the United States and Canada joined the European region, Australia and New Zealand joined the Asian region).[943] Israel's efforts to gain admittance to a regional group were more difficult. Arab states blocked Israel from joining the Middle Eastern regional group. According to Egyptian permanent delegate Ahmed Chams Eldine El-Wakil, "the Arab view of the question is that as long as the present situation in the Middle East continues we cannot agree to Israel being attached to our area."[944] The General Conference exacerbated the controversy when Israel also failed to

[943] For the American diplomatic campaign that preceded the General Conference, see DOS to All European Diplomatic Posts, "US Membership in UNESCO Regional Groups," 3 March 1973, State 056794; DOS to All NATO Capitals, "US Membership in European Regional Group of UNESCO," 13 April 1973, State 070260; DOS to London, "U.S. Membership in European Regional Group of UNESCO," 24 April 1973, State 077403, all available in AAD. For American diplomatic coordination with Ottawa, Wellington, and Canberra, see DOS to various posts, "Membership in UNESCO Regional Groups," 27 August 1973, State 170730; DOS to various posts, "U.S. Membership in UNESCO Regional Groups," 16 May 1973, State 093962, both in AAD.

[944] "Press Interview Statements by Permanent UNESCO Delegate Wakil of Egypt Explaining the Recent UNESCO Resolutions Regarding Israel," December 1974, *International Documents on Palestine: 1974*, 540.

join the European region alongside the Americans and Canadians.[945] The decision was relatively inconsequential but delivered a symbolic blow to Israel. The "anti-Israeli resolutions" at the 1974 General Conference - the suspension of assistance to Israel in response to the Jerusalem excavations and its failure to join the European regional group - created the impression that Israel had been expelled from a major United Nations agency.

Third World unity also focused on the great powers' neocolonial control over the international economy and international institutions. UNCTAD began to discuss the need to renegotiate the terms of the international economic system and especially relations between the developing and the developed world. Mexican President Luis Echeverría proposed a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties at UNCTAD's third session in May 1972. The Non-Aligned Movement also began to turn its attention away from Cold War diplomacy and towards economic and cultural neocolonialism. Delegations to the September 1973 NAM Summit in Algiers raised similar concerns about economic sovereignty and international trade.[946] While regional political conflicts fractured the NAM, the crusade to reform the international economic system united and reinvigorated its unity.[947] A

[945] "Decisions Taken at 18th Session General Conference," Annex A of United Kingdom National Commission for UNESCO, "UNESCO Decisions Affecting Israel - Background Note," January 1975, FCO 61/1360, UKNA.
[946] Groupe D'Analyse Politique, "Le Non-Alignement: La Conference D'Alger," 23 January 1974, Volume 9103, Political Affairs, RG-25, LAC.
[947] Malaysia, for example, walked out of a Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers meeting in Guyana in 1972 in protest over the decision to seat the Khmer Rouge. Malaysia complained that the NAM paid little attention to smaller states and had intervened in regional conflicts. Less than a year later, Kuala Lumpur urged the Algiers Summit to strengthen its unity in order to confront the neocolonial great powers over international economic issues. See Kuala Lumpur to Ottawa, "The Future of Non-Alignment," 1 February 1974, Volume 9103, Political Affairs, RG-25, LAC.

month later, the UN General Assembly in New York passed a Charter, which established a preliminary set of demands about the international economic system.[948] The following April, Algerian president Houari Boumediene addressed the General Assembly and proposed the establishment of a New International Economic Order. The NIEO - actually a set of proposals to renegotiate international trade, improve commodity prices, and raise foreign aid - became the most important sustained attempt to reform the international economic and political system. According to one historian, "Its fundamental objective was to transform the governance of the global economy to redirect more of the benefits of transnational integration toward 'the developing nations' - thus completing the geopolitical process of decolonization and creating a democratic global order of truly sovereign states."[949] Leaders across Latin America, Africa, and Asia lined up to support resolutions to implement new programs and agreements. These ideas and demands for greater international justice dominated the "North-South Dialogue" over the next ten years.

Since the General Conference in Paris, like the General Assembly in New York, governed the organization's biannual agenda, bloc politics shaped its program. Delegations began to address the "lack of international justice" in world politics and introduce resolutions in support of the NIEO.[950] The Secretariat's

[948] "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States," 6 October 1973, General Assembly Resolution 3082 (XXVIII).
[949] Nils Gilman, "The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction," *Humanity* 6, no 1 (2015), 1.
[950] Abdel Hassein Samii address, Records of the General Conference, Eighteenth Session, Fifth Plenary Meeting, 19 October 1974, 18 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 166.

senior leaders, however, had already embraced the new campaign and began to adopt its ideas. Malcolm Adiseshiah sympathized with UNCTAD's anticolonial agenda, approved its "very good general principles," and urged it to develop "a program of action." He agreed with the dependency theorists that the developed world should renegotiate terms of trade with the developing world by reducing tariffs and quotas, rescheduling sovereign debt, and increasing levels of economic aid.[951] Boumedienne's address immediately caught Maheu's attention in 1974. The Director General approved of the NIEO but thought it had "very little heart and soul." John Fobes, one of Maheu's closest advisors, responded that their organization was "eminently fitted to help the world give a moral, ethical or spiritual base to the new order" and should therefore play a central role in promoting and shaping the NIEO.[952] Maheu agreed and sought to broaden discussions abut the new order. He argued that the social aspects of the international system were "at least as crucial as the economic aspect" and tried to shift discussions from "relations between States" to the "actual condition of the people" in developing countries.[953] The Secretariat, after all, had been in "the vanguard of ideological movements within the United Nations" and "has in recent years taken up an increasingly militant attitude in promoting these ideas" about

[951] Malcolm S. Adiseshiah to Henry S. Bloch, 27 April 1965, Folder 12, Box 4, DDG 1, AG 8, UA; Malcolm Adiseshiah, "The Crisis in Development," *UNESCO Courier* (October 1970), 10. See also Malcolm S. Adiseshiah Address Given at the Academy of Sciences of Serbia, "The Art of the Impossible: Unesco's Fight for Cultural Understanding," 7 November 1967, Folder 66, Box 19, DDG 1, UA.
[952] John Fobes memorandum to Director-General, "Draft Document on the New International Economic Order," 25 July 1974, Folder 8, Box 3, DDG 2, AG 8, UA.
[953] René Maheu Address to the Fifty-Seventh Session of the Economic and Social Council, 5 July 1974, DG/74/8, UNESDOC.

international justice. The Secretariat therefore began to position itself as the intellectual home of the NIEO.[954]

Third World diplomats also addressed the conduct of global governance. Leaders from across the world had argued for decades that international organizations ignored or misinterpreted their collective interests. Asian, African, and Latin American states introduced draft resolutions at the General Assembly "to bring democracy to the United Nations" in 1957, 1959, and 1960. The NAM states and the G-77 used their numerical advantage and sparked efforts to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, curb veto powers, and shift the UN system towards the cause of international justice. Africans and Asians - the two underrepresented regions in the UN system - agitated for greater influence in international affairs through greater representation in ECOSOC and the Security Council in 1963.[955] Growing Third World power helped secure the election of the Burmese diplomat U Thant as the new UN Secretary General in 1962. He spoke about his "first-hand experience of colonialism at work" and promoted a series of anticolonial resolutions during his tenure in New York.[956] Despite initial optimism, the great powers used their influence on the Security Council to block many Third World initiatives. There was brief hope in a "Third

[954] "Ways and Means Whereby UNESCO could Contribute to the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," 1974, 18 C/103, UNESDOC, 2-3.
[955] Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 102-103; "Question of the Composition of the General Committee of the General Assembly Amendments to Rule 31 and 38 of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure," 17 December 1963, UN General Assembly Resolutions 1990 (XVIII); "Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council," UN General Assembly Resolutions 1991 (XVIII); "Enlargement of the Economic Committee, the Social Committee and the Co-ordination Committee of the Economic and Social Council," 17 December 1963, UN General Assembly Resolutions 1992 (XVIII).
[956] Paul Gordon Lauren, "The Diplomats and Diplomacy of the United Nations," 479.

World veto" in the Security Council when the PRC gained its seat ten years later, although Beijing's alignment with the United States quickly eroded that optimism.[957] Many new leaders, especially in Africa, also distrusted the powerful international organizations and specialized agencies, which they assumed served the interests of the United States and Western Europe. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which had both been run respectively by an American and a European since their creation during the war, were persistent targets of criticism. "Let us face it," the World Bank's Director of Information reported to President Robert S. McNamara in 1971, "none of us is [sic] trusted in to-day's Africa. We are thought to be interested in advancing our own trade or policies."[958] Enhancing the Third World's voice in international organizations remained central to the North-South Dialogue by the mid-1970s. After most countries had gained their independence, according to Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, "the only thing left now to decolonize is the [UN] Secretariat."[959]

UNESCO emerged as a promising international forum among Third World diplomats. René Maheu's term as Director General was due to expire in 1974 and Secretariat officials began casting around for his successor. He reportedly wanted to "wipe the slate clean" and hoped that his successor would be

[957] Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World.*
[958] William Clark Memorandum to Robert S. McNamara, "Our African Trips," 24 May 1971, Folder: "Anglo-American Conference on Africa, May 27-29, 1971," Series: Conference, Lectures and Addresses, Robert McNamara Records, WB.
[959] Abdelaziz Bouteflika as cited in Mazower, *Governing the World*, 271.

a "man of the Third World."[960] One name began to dominate discussions in the Secretariat: Assistant Director General for Education Amadou Mahtar M'Bow. The Senegalese educator, born and raised in the arid Sahel region of Northwestern Africa, had ridden the anticolonial wave of political upheaval that swept through the mid-twentieth century. He volunteered for the French Army in Morocco in 1942, studied geography and history at the Sorbonne, and became Secretary-General of the Federation of Black African Students in France. He married a Haitian diplomat's daughter, traced the African diaspora through the Caribbean and the American South, and travelled through the late-colonial Senegalese countryside. M'Bow gained political experience after Senegal gained independence, when he became Minister of Culture and Education, developed a friendship with President Léopold Sédar Senghor, supported the cause of African unity and the creation of the Organization for African Unity, and led the country's delegations to UNESCO General Conferences in the 1960s. He moved to Paris to chair the G-77's liaison office, led the African group, and accepted Maheu's invitation to lead the Education Department in 1970. His diplomatic missions for the organization expanded his personal networks. He forged working relationships with Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano, anticolonial leader Amilcar Cabral, and African National Congress leader Oliver Tambo. These experiences had made him, by 1974, Maheu's most eligible successor.[961]

[960] Paul Bernetel, "Un Africain à L'UNESCO," *Jeune Afrique* 684 (16 February 1974), 14-16.
[961] Thassinda Uba Thassinda, *Amadou Mahtar M'Bow: Un Sahélien à L'Unesco* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1989), 196-197, 206, 214; Pierre Kalfon, "Amadou Mahtar M'Bow," *Unesco Courier* (February 1975).

M'Bow launched a diplomatic campaign to gain support for his candidacy in 1973. He visited Brazil in July for a banquet in his honor and began to gain popularity in Latin America.[962] The Senegalese government strongly supported M'Bow's candidacy. He informed President Senghor of his intention to run for Director General and the president approached the OAU to gain support from African states. At the same time, Cheikh Tidjane Sy, a Senegalese colleague in the Secretariat, toured several Latin American countries on a routine educational mission and took advantage of the opportunity to push his friend's candidacy.[963] Maheu praised M'Bow but disapproved of the brash diplomatic campaign that the Senegalese government had launched on his behalf. He complained about Senegalese diplomats "intimidating major donors who do not commit themselves for M'Bow" and pressuring them with loaded questions like "What have you got against developing states?"[964] Third World diplomats embraced M'Bow's candidacy. The Non-Aligned Movement supported M'Bow in early 1974.[965] The popular Pan-African journal *Jeune Afrique* endorsed him a month later and published a flattering profile popularizing M'Bow as "the Third World's candidate."[966]

[962] Paris to DOS, "Further Conversations on DG Succession at UNESCO," 12 July 1973, Paris 19130, AAD.
[963] Paris to DOS, 28 June 1973, Box 3224, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA; DOS to Paris, "Director-General Succession Issue," 29 August 1973, State 172571, AAD.
[964] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO DG Maheu Speaks of Next Director General," 9 January 1974, Paris 00665, AAD.
[965] Paris to DOS, "Director-Generalship of UNESCO," 28 March 1974, Paris 07646, AAD.
[966] J.-P. N'D, "Candidat du Tiers Monde," *Jeune Afrique* 693 (20 April 1974), 26; Paul Bernetel, "Un Africain à L'UNESCO."

M'Bow saw himself as a citizen of the Third World. "I am the son of a farmer and I worked on the land until the age of fifteen in a traditional African society," he later told an interviewer. "I have not forgotten this experience."[967] The 1974 General Conference vindicated his hopes. The 14 November plenary session voted overwhelmingly by secret ballot to elect Amadou Mahtar M'Bow as Director General.[968] His speech the next day acknowledged the changing balance of power in international politics. M'Bow interpreted his election as "a gesture of consideration and esteem for regions and peoples - those of the Third World - which have for so long been confined to a peripheral role in reaching decisions and exerting influence at world wide level." He drew upon his own life experiences, growing up in West Africa and engaging in anticolonial causes, which informed his own vision of leadership. "When I speak of the people of Africa, it is not an abstract vision I evoke, but a reality experienced and fully entered into."[969]

The election earned enthusiastic responses from around the world. *Jeune Afrique* praised the organization's "rebirth" and claimed that "Africa has registered a remarkable diplomatic success. For the first time, one of its authentic sons has taken direction of an important international organization."[970] Senegal's

[967] Interview, "Amadou Mahtar M'Bow," *Third World Quarterly* 1 (April 1982), 216.
[968] Paris to DOS, "M'Bow Elected Director General of UNESCO," 14 November 1974, Paris 27144, AAD.
[969] Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Address on the Occasion of his Installation as Director-General of Unesco, 15 November 1974, 18 C/INF.17, UNESDOC.
[970] Siradiou Diallo, "Justice est Faite," *Jeune Afrique* (5 October 1974), 29; Jacques Vignes, "UNESCO Le Second Souffle," *Jeune Afrique* (23 November 1974), 18; "Amadou Mahtar M'Bow: Directeur Général de L'Unesco," *Jeune Afrique* (23 November 1974), 22.

Minister of Education interpreted M'Bow's election as "a symbol that our continent had acquired the experience and credibility that would allow it to play a larger role in international relations... We welcomed M'Bow's election as a great turning point in international relations." One Moroccan official recalled that M'Bow's election "proved that despite everything there was justice and justice that the Third World would not always be injured before the developed, civilized, and industrialized world."[971] Asian observers approved of the new Director General. "The Third World has at long last arrived," the *Times of India* editorialized. "The winds of change are blowing through the corridors of UNESCO in Paris."[972]

The Spirit of Nairobi

The dramatic series of events that led to the 1974 General Conference in Paris coincided with a period of crisis in the United States' attitudes towards the Third World and the United Nations. Washington had supported UNESCO's international development projects in the 1960s but also tried to restrain Maheu's efforts to turn its attention towards broader political issues like apartheid, peace, and disarmament.[973] The State Department tried to defend Portugal and South

[971] Ahmed Reda Guédira, as cited in Thassinda, *Amadou Mahtar M'Bow*, 221; Iba-Der-Thiam, as cited in Thassinda, *Amadou Mahtar M'Bow*, 222.
[972] "A New Start," *Times of India* (1 December 1974), 6.
[973] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Memorandum for the President, "René Maheu, Director-General of UNESCO," 22 October 1963, Box 66, President's Office Files, JFKL; William Benton, "Report to Assistant Secretaries Harlan Cleveland and Lucius Battle of Conversation with Director-

Africa from Third World pressure. American strategy was to attract Asian and Latin American delegations, thereby "isolating Africans" in UNESCO's General Conference.[974] As the rise of Third World unity began to pressure Washington over a range of sensitive issues and interests, the United States increasingly began to marginalize the United Nations by the end of the decade and write off the General Assembly as a mere talking shop.[975]

The new administration that took power in Washington in 1969 demoted the role of international organizations in American grand strategy. The State Department anticipated that UNESCO would play an important long-term role in the process of European détente. It therefore believed that the United States should "exercise greater influence in UNESCO policies and programs" in order to expand American international influence.[976] The White House, which exerted greater influence over American foreign relations in the new administration, nevertheless had little faith in the UN system. President Richard Nixon and

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General René Maheu," appendix to William Benton, Report Supplementing Official Report on 66th Session of the Executive Board, December 1963, Box 383, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA; William Benton to Aherne, 9 November 1964, Folder 3, Box 394, WBP, UCA. Washington was also annoyed by Maheu's failure to resist Soviet propaganda efforts. See for example, Henry J. Kellerman to DOS, "Report on Deputy Director Maheu's Visit to USSR," 23 May 1961, Box 822, CFP 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA; Lyon to DOS, 16 August 1963, Box 3237, CFP 1963, RG 59, NARA; Robert Wade to DOS, "Soviet Influence in UNESCO," 29 May 1965, Box 382, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.

[974] Paris to DOS, 11 September 1966, Box 3340, CFP 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.

[975] Mazower, *Governing the World*, 272; Irwin, *Gordian Knot*, chapter 6.

[976] "Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon," 7 December 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*: Volume V, 61. For State Department perspectives on the organization's role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, see for example Helsinki to DOS, "Summary Impressions of UNESCO Regional Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe," 29 June 1972, Box 3224, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA; Paris to DOS, "UNESCO-CSCE First Consultation of Secretariat with Helsinki Final Act Signatories on UNESCO Follow-Up Implementation," 24 September 1975, Paris 24876, AAD; Geneva to DOS, "CSCE: Possibilities for Follow-On Activity," 7 November 1973, Geneva 05906, AAD.

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger believed that dynamic individual leadership provided better solutions to the challenges of global governance than inefficient and bureaucratic international organizations. They focused on building bilateral relationships with regional powers and nurturing personal relationships with charismatic world leaders who were the real power brokers in the international community.[977] Neither did the president and his National Security Advisor have much interest in educational, scientific, and cultural issues. Nixon made his attitudes towards the Secretariat clear. "I want a deliberate policy of cutting up UNESCO at every opportunity when we can get away with it."[978] Beginning with the new administration, the State Department's UNESCO office lost clerical staff, its newsletter, and even its office library.[979]

The White House's actions did have inadvertent consequences for UNESCO's economic and political stability. Washington's decision to devalue the dollar in February 1973 was a blow to the Secretariat's economic health - officials had to confront a ten million dollar deficit.[980] Maheu imposed belt-tightening measures and restricted unnecessary travel expenses for Secretariat

[977] Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*, 169.
[978] Nixon handwritten response to "Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon," 7 December 1971, as cited in *FRUS 1969-1976*: Volume V, 61, n. 2.
[979] Jack Fobes Statement, 25 April 1984, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, Second Session, April 25, 26, and May 2, 1984* (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1984), 58-81.
[980] For background on the devaluation, see Daniel J. Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), chapter 4. For devaluation's impact on UNESCO, see Louise Gore, Report of the United States Delegation to the 92nd Session of the UNESCO Executive Board, 25 July 1973, Box 3224, CFP 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA.

staff members.[981] The financial crisis dominated Executive Board discussions in September. Maheu led a difficult debate about how to deal with the crisis. Most board members agreed that there would have to be increased efficiency and hiring freezes to deal with the deficit. Delegates from the United States and Western Europe urged the Secretariat to cut programs that had been adopted by the General Conference the year before. Most of these budget cuts affected programs in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Third World members of the board therefore interpreted the American devaluation as an attack on their collective interests. Sri Lankan delegate Frederick E. De Silva maintained that the debate addressed "issues far deeper than the mere covering of a deficit" and actually represented a concerted attempt by the developed world to "undermine" the organization and the programs "on which the developing countries pinned such faith."[982] Some West European delegates complained that Third World diplomats were "begging" international organizations for aid. These comments angered other delegates and "deeply disturbed" the board chairman.[983] The meeting revealed the tensions between American and Third World diplomats and the organization's economic vulnerability.

[981] "Consequences de la Devaluation du Dollar des Etats-Unis sur le Financement du Fonctionnement et des Activites de L'Organization," 4 April 1973, 92 EX/15, UNESDOC; "Texte de L'Intervention du Directeur General a la Deuxieme Seance Pleniere de la 92e Session du Conseil Executif," Annex to Summary Records of the Executive Board, Second Meeting, 92nd Session, 25 April 1973, 92 EX/SR.1/16, UNESDOC.
[982] Frederick E. De Silva comments, Summary Records of the Executive Board, Ninth Meeting, 93rd Session, 18 September 1973, 93 EX/SR.1-27, UNESDOC, 71.
[983] Chairman comments, Summary Records of the Executive Board, Ninth Meeting, 93rd Session, 18 September 1973, 93 EX/SR.1-27, UNESDOC, 70.

The anti-Israeli resolutions forced Washington to pay more attention to the organization. David Tourgman, a counselor at the Israeli embassy, visited the influential State Department official Harold Saunders on October 31. He argued that the General Conference's actions might establish a dangerous precedent that could spread to other international organizations. Tourgman called for American leadership to oppose the resolutions and compel Arab states to modify their strategy.[984] American observers followed reports on the conference in November. By December, as Assistant Director General John Fobes reported to Paris from Washington, "attitudes in the USA" were "gloomy... The present mood is not to listen to our arguments."[985]

Washington initially tried to derail the resolutions through bilateral diplomatic channels. The State Department instructed diplomatic posts throughout the Middle East and South Asia in early November to approach their host governments about opposing the anti-Israel resolutions.[986] Diplomatic conflict over the status of Jerusalem, however, revealed the spiritual and ideological contradictions that were beginning to separate the United States from its allies in the region. These allies had begun to sponsor Islamic internationalism, a new form of Third World unity that had grown in influence after the collapse of the

[984] Memorandum of Conversation: Harold Saunders and David Tourgman, 31 October 1974, Box 17, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs: Office of Israeli Affairs, RG 59, NARA.
[985] John Fobes memorandum to Director-General, "Attitudes in USA," 6 December 1974, Folder 8, Box 3, DDG 1, AG 8, UA.
[986] DOS to all Near Eastern and South Asian Diplomatic Posts, "Instructions on Arab Resolution Seeking Sanction of Israel for Jerusalem Excavation," 1 November 1974, State 240797, AAD.

Afro-Asian Movement.[987] Saudi Arabia, which had begun funneling millions of dollars into Islamic causes abroad, was the principal sponsor of the resolution and was unwilling step back from its commitment. Pakistan's sponsorship of Islamic internationalism trumped its enthusiasm for the United States. Senior Pakistani diplomats cosponsored the Saudi resolution and responded to American complaints by reminding them that the "sanctity of Muslim Holy places in Jerusalem" was a "real concern" for Islamabad.[988] Although Anwar Sadat had been cultivating better relations with Washington, he was torn by competing domestic demands. The Egyptian president had begun to promote Islamic causes in order to strengthen Cairo's domestic legitimacy after the debacle of the 1967 war and Nasser's death in 1970. He was therefore hesitant to alienate his conservative religious base of support. Besides, the State Department noted, "Sadat is himself a devout Moslem and is troubled by Israeli actions in Jerusalem."[989] Muslim states across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were unwilling to cross these regional powers, Washington concluded.[990]

M'Bow's election as Director General provided Washington with a new opportunity. M'Bow, when campaigning for the position, had approached

[987] Beverly Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945*; Lorenz Lüthi, "Non-Alignment, 1946-65: Formation and Emancipation from Afro-Asianism."
[988] Islamabad to DOS, "Instructions on Arab Resolution Seeking Sanction of GOI for Jerusalem Excavations," 4 November 1974, Islama 10437, AAD. For American-Pakistani relations, see also Robert J. McMahon, "The Danger of Geopolitical Fantasies: Nixon, Kissinger, and the South Asia Crisis of 1971," Frederick Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds., *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations* (New York: Oxford, 2008), 249-269.
[989] DOS to Tel Aviv, "UNESCO 18th General Conference: Arab-Moslem Re Resolution Re Jerusalem," 15 November 1974, State 252437, AAD. For Sadat's domestic policies, see also Beverly Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945*, 62-64.
[990] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO 18th General Conference: Final Wrap-Up on Arab/Moslem Resolution on Jerusalem," 22 November 1974, Paris 28029, AAD.

American diplomats in Paris. In his efforts to gain Washington's support for his nomination, he made it clear that he wanted to promote an American as Deputy Director General. The American permanent delegation in Paris in turn believed that American support for a moderate African could "induce Afro-Arabs [to] play a more responsible role." It urged Washington to support M'Bow's candidacy, encourage "highly qualified Americans" to participate in the organization's programs, and strengthen American relations with the Secretariat. The delegation, "looking down the long road," suggested that American support for the organization could help soften "otherwise hard political attitudes and provide [a] more favorable climate" that could improve America's image in the Third World.[991] Washington therefore endorsed M'Bow in early 1974 in the hopes that it could win a pro-American ally.[992] Embassy officials in Addis Ababa recommended that the State Department devote "maximum publicity" to the decision in order to expand American influence in the OAU.[993] The initial response was promising - UNESCO's African Group informed the American delegation that their support for M'Bow demonstrated "the willingness of the U.S. to contribute positively to the construction of a new world."[994] Washington was enthusiastic about M'Bow since he was both an influential Sub-Saharan African

[991] DOS to Paris, "Director-General Succession Issue," 29 August 1973, State 172571; Paris to DOS, "Political Climate UNESCO," 17 December 1973, Paris 32140, both available in AAD.
[992] Irvin S. Lippe to Buffum, "Endorsement of Amadou Mahtar M'Bow as Director-General of UNESCO," 12 March 1974, Box 21B, P-Reel Printouts 1974, RG59, NARA.
[993] Addis Ababa to DOS, "Endorsement of M'Bow for UNESCO Director General," 24 April 1974, Adis 04565, AAD.
[994] Paris to DOS, "Endorsement of M'Bow for Director General," 7 May 1974, Paris 10991, AAD.

official and a devout Muslim whose influence could extend across Africa, the Middle East, and possibly as far as South Asia.

Washington encouraged M'Bow to halt the anti-Israeli resolutions before they came up for a vote. At a meeting with American delegation members, he expressed his "complete understanding" of their concerns and proposed that his influence and prestige among African leaders could help him pressure Arab states. M'Bow quickly began to approach African delegates and, by the next day, had gained some support in the halls of the Secretariat.[995] Representatives from Dahomey, Senegal, Nigeria, and Kenya met quietly with Arab delegations and proposed to modify the resolutions. M'Bow approached Arab diplomats attending a cocktail party organized by the Saudi Arabian delegation at the Secretariat two weeks later.[996] Although M'Bow demonstrated his considerable influence among African statesmen and diplomats, Arab diplomats refused to budge and the resolutions passed without any revisions.

The Israeli resolutions gained headlines worldwide. The same evening that M'Bow was canvassing Arab diplomats at the Saudi delegation's cocktail party, heavily-armed police guarded Secretariat headquarters from hundreds of protesters. Jewish student leaders presented a petition to the Director General's

[995] Paris to DOS, "M'Bow to Work for Deletion of Sanction from Arab-Moslem Resolution on Jerusalem," 4 November 1974, Paris 259972; Paris to DOS, "UNESCO 18th General Conference Jerusalem Title," 4 November 1974, Paris 25973, both in AAD.
[996] Paris to DOS, "Arab-Moslem Resolution on Israeli Excavation in Jerusalem," 19 November 1974, Paris 27533, AAD.

representative.[997] The American Jewish Committee, a global advocacy organization, coordinated protests in Paris and consulted with political leaders on strategies to "nullify" the resolutions.[998] Israel's National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO decided to stop cooperating with the organization until the resolutions were rescinded and recommended that all individuals and organizations in Israel discontinue their work with it. Tel Aviv decided to withhold its payment to the budget in protest.[999] Intellectual and artistic groups first in France and then in Britain publicly condemned the resolutions and threatened to boycott the organization until they were repealed.[1000] Even former Director Generals Julian Huxley and René Maheu distanced themselves from the resolutions.

The response was most heated in the United States, where the anti-Israeli resolutions threatened key American strategic interests. Washington had embraced Israel as a regional ally and sought to shield it from international isolation.[1001] Kissinger was also personally immersed in Middle Eastern diplomacy and the resolutions, American officials informed allies, threatened to complicate his "arduous task in pursuit of progress in [a] Middle East

[997] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO 18th General Conference: Arab-Moslem Resolution on Israeli Excavation in Jerusalem," 19 November 1974, Paris 27533, AAD.
[998] Elmer L. Winter, "Report of the Year's Activities: May 1974 - May, 1975," 1 May 1975, American Jewish Committee Online Archives; "The Boycott Backlash," *Time* (30 December 1974); Terence Smith, "Jerusalem: UNESCO Curb Backfires," *New York Times* (12 May 1975).
[999] D. H. K. Amiren to the Chairman, National Committee for MAB, 14 January 1975, FCO 61/1360, UKNA; United Kingdom National Commission for UNESCO, "UNESCO Decisions Affecting Israel - Background Note," January 1975, FCO 61/1360, UKNA.
[1000] "Text and Signatures of Protest Letter Published in 'The Times' Letter Column December 5th," enclosed in Thomas Brimelow to S. E. Finer, 14 February 1975, FCO 61/1360, UKNA.
[1001] Salim Yaqub, "The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Nixon in the World*, 227.

settlement."[1002] Domestically, the resolutions confirmed growing suspicions in American politics that the United Nations was threatening American interests and values. A congressional subcommittee devoted to the radicalization of the UN focused heavily on UNESCO. Chairman Donald M. Fraser stated that UNESCO had "intensified" American criticism of the UN system.[1003] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Washington's ambassador to India, caught the national mood in his influential 1975 *Commentary* article, "The United States in Opposition." He had become increasingly critical of the "tyranny" of the "new majority" in international organizations.[1004] For Moynihan, Israel's isolation in these global forums demonstrated the dysfunction of global governance in the postcolonial world. When he met with Nixon and Kissinger at the White House to discuss American policy towards the UN, he invoked UNESCO as a prime example of the United Nations' adversarial role in international politics: "Israel was expelled," Moynihan (incorrectly) claimed. "I would like to be firm and say you can't expel Israel and expect us to participate."[1005]

[1002] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO General Conference Arab Resolution Proposing Sanctions Against Israel," 5 November 1974, Paris 26122, AAD.
[1003] Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Review of the 1974 General Assembly and the United States Position in the United Nations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, February 4 and 5, 1975* (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1975), 1.
[1004] Daniel P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," *Commentary* (March 1975), 31. For Moynihan's views on American strategy and international organizations, see also Memorandum of Conversation: President Ford, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Brent Scowcroft, 27 August 1975, National Security Adviser Files, Box 14, GRFPL.
[1005] Memorandum of Conversation: President Ford, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Henry A. Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, 12 April 1975, National Security Adviser Files, Box 10, GRFPL.

Washington responded to the passage of the anti-Israeli resolutions through financial pressure. The initiative came from congress. When seventy-one senators sent President Gerald Ford a letter in December 1974, they specifically cited UNESCO's decision to withhold funding for Israeli projects as an example of PLO efforts to turn the United Nations into a "political weapon."[1006] A week later, the House of Representatives added an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that prohibited the release of funds to UNESCO in response to the organization's recent "politicization." Congress would restore funding only after the president certified that it had repealed contentious political decisions.[1007] State Department officials reviewed the congressional prohibition for "loopholes" but concluded that the Secretariat would have to find a way to get Israel accepted into the European regional group in order to appease congress.[1008]

Amadou Mahtar M'Bow moved into his new office while a cloud of controversy swirled around the organization. Less than a week after being elected he confessed publicly that he felt "some anxiety" and feared for the future of the organization.[1009] His first challenge as Director General was to repair the organization's international position. M'Bow met with his senior Secretariat officials and advisors between January and February to hammer out possible

[1006] "Letter to US President Ford from US Senators Deploring Recent UN Decisions Regarding the PLO and Calling for Renewed Commitment to Israel's Security," 9 December 1974, *International Documents on Palestine: 1974*, 371.
[1007] House of Representatives, *Conference Report on Foreign Assistance Act of 1974: S. 3394 to Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for Other Purposes, December 17, 1974* (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1974), 35.
[1008] E. C. Glover Minute, "United States and UNESCO," 3 February 1975, FCO 61/1360, UKNA.
[1009] Address by Amadou Mahtar M'Bow at the Closure of the Eighteenth Session of the General Conference, 23 November 1974, DG/74/15, UNESDOC.

strategies. He believed that some countries were launching a "poisonous campaign" in retaliation for the General Conference's Israeli resolutions. "This campaign represented the trouble that certain places have admitting recent developments around the world" - in other words, Third World ascendence in international organizations and the strains of a postcolonial world order. The new Director General proposed that the organization launch a publicity campaign to correct misperceptions about Israel's role in the organization, "spread objective information on the General Conference's decisions and to reestablish a correct image of UNESCO in public opinion." He suggested "high-level" meetings with journalists, press conferences, and outreach efforts to permanent delegates and prominent intellectuals.[1010] M'Bow published an editorial in the *Courier* and the influential French newspaper *Le Monde* and released a press statement that absolved the Secretariat of wrongdoing. He distanced himself from the resolutions but reemphasized that Israel had not been expelled from the organization.[1011]

The American decision to withhold funding over the organization's "politicization" hit the Secretariat harder and required a diplomatic strategy. The Director General tried to find ways to address the loss of American financial contributions. He planned to ask member states for interest-free loans to cover the

[1010] Cabinet Director Memorandum, "Direction Générale: 3 Décembre 1974," 6 December 1974, File 23; Cabinet Director Memorandum, "Direction Générale: Réunion du 14 Janvier 1975," 15 January 1975, File 24; Cabinet Director Memorandum, "Direction Générale: Réunion du 4 Février 1975," 6 February 1975, File 24, all available in Box 6, CAB 8, AG 8, UA.
[1011] "Unesco and Israel," 1974, COM.75/WS/10, UNESDOC; "A Statement on Israel by Amadou Mahtar M'Bow," *UNESCO Courier* (January 1975), 34; *Le Monde* (7 December 1974).

financial shortfall.[1012] Arab states seemed most promising. M'Bow received a sympathetic reception when he visited King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia in December.[1013] Egypt's influential *El-Ahram* newspaper proposed in March 1975 that Arab states take "immediate action" and assist the Secretariat with its financial problems in order to "protect [the] honor of UNESCO."[1014] Three months later, M'Bow deployed a personal emissary on a two-month mission to comb Arab states for interest-free loans. The emissary met with officials "at [the] highest level[s]" of government in sixteen Arab states. Saudi Arabia and Libya both offered over four million dollars. The Arab League also assembled to discuss the Director General's request and pledged nineteen million dollars, pooled from member states, to help make up the loss of American funds.[1015] Although M'Bow was able to overcome these short-term financial problems, he decided to set his sights on a long-term settlement.

American financial pressure reinforced M'Bow's conviction that he had to address the anti-Israeli resolutions. The American permanent representative in Paris had a lengthy meeting with M'Bow in December 1974 to discuss the major issues. The Director General was calm and diplomatic, although he was clearly unsettled by American actions. "M'Bow considers he has been [a] good friend of

[1012] Geneva to DOS, "Buffum-M'Bow Meeting, UNESCO," 4 February 1975, Geneva 00677, AAD.
[1013] Cabinet Director Memorandum, "Direction Générale: Réunion du 7 Janvier 1975," 8 January 1975, File 24, Box 6, CAB 8, AG 8, UA.
[1014] "Save Honor of UNESCO," *El-Ahram* (March 1975), reprinted in Cairo to DOS, 5 March 1975, Cairo 02401, AAD.
[1015] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO Search for Interest-Free Loans," 25 August 1975, Paris 21771, AAD.

[the] US," the American delegate noted. The Director General also made clear his international influence by discussing his plans to meet with world leaders in Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, Jeddah, and Belgrade. The American was impressed by M'Bow's popular reception following the General Conference in November and noticed his influence with the "non-white" peoples of the world. M'Bow was also "by nature conservative and very pro-American." He concluded that "We have a lasting and fast friend who [is] now influential in [the] so-called Third World and who will become more influential as time goes by."[1016] The American delegation continued to see M'Bow as their spokesman in the Third World.

M'Bow and the Americans focused on influencing the Executive Board. American diplomats wanted the board to approve a resolution recommending that the General Conference admit Israel to the European regional group.[1017] The Director General complied and helped to introduce a resolution to the October 1975 Executive Board that would ease Israel's admission to the European group. He relied on his personal and professional networks to mobilize diplomatic support. He cooperated with Jamaican Board Chairman Hector Wynter and Dahomeyan board member Léon Bossier-Palun, a close friend, to gain support from the African board members. M'Bow also drew upon his political contacts in Senegal. He convinced President Leopold Senghor to speak with Algerian leader Houari Boumediene on behalf of the board resolution, which helped to gain the

[1016] Paris to DOS, "Permrep's Meeting with DG M'Bow," 19 December 1974, Paris 30574, AAD.
[1017] W. T. Birrell Minute, "USA - Israel," 8 August 1975, FCO 61/1362, UKNA.

support of Egyptian, Mauritanian, Tunisian, and Syrian delegates. There was opposition to his efforts. The Saudi Foreign Ministry instructed its permanent representative to oppose the resolution and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat lobbied Arab diplomats to oppose any actions that would modify the Israeli resolutions passed the previous year. Arab states caucused for two days while their home governments urged African governments to reject M'Bow's resolution. When the board members took their seats for a late afternoon session on October 8, African members voted against their Arab colleagues' wishes and approved the resolution that would pave the way for Israeli entry to the European regional group.[1018]

The board meeting was a "major breakthrough" in American attitudes towards the organization. The American Delegation in Paris cabled Washington a lengthy analysis of the board session. Delegates were impressed that M'Bow had managed to split the Afro-Arab bloc - "otherwise considered to act in monolithic unison in the UN system" - and defend American interests. The board meeting was "an implicit act of penitence by [the] member states of a UN agency made to try and meet part of the way US demands," the American delegation in Paris concluded. "This in itself is, to put it mildly, an uncommon occurrence."[1019] M'Bow followed up on his Executive Board victory by regaining Arab support for the next General Conference, where the board resolution would come up for a vote. M'Bow met with Anwar Sadat, where the Egyptian president acknowledged

[1018] Paris to DOS, "Saudi Arabian Opposition to UNESCO European Regional Group Resolution," 2 October 1975, Paris 25477, AAD; Paris to DOS, "Significance of Executive Board," 9 October 1975, Paris 26338, AAD.
[1019] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO-US: Significance of Executive Board," 9 October 1975, Paris 26338, AAD.

the Director General's efforts to resolve the diplomatic crisis and pledged "quiet Egyptian support." Syrian President Hafez al-Assad gave M'Bow similar assurances. After he complained to Boumedienne about Algeria's spoiling role in the board session, Foreign Minister Bouteflika assured him that his country would support M'Bow's efforts to resolve the diplomatic crisis.[1020]

The Secretariat meanwhile continued to plan the upcoming General Conference in late 1976. The Executive Board decided to hold the conference in Nairobi, the first time that it had been held outside Paris since the New Delhi Conference in 1956. Some delegates complained that organizing the conference outside its normal location in Paris was a wasteful extravagance. Supporters claimed it was a powerful gesture to Africa, which felt slighted in the international community. Filipino delegate Estefania Aldaba-Lim, speaking "as a citizen of the Third World in Asia," supported the decision to hold the next General Conference in Nairobi. "It was only by seeing Africa, its poverty, deprivation and the condition of its children, that the Organization would be able to make a true appreciation of its commitments and contribute to the establishment of a new economic order."[1021] The conference's location in Kenya enhanced M'Bow's influence, since African states had an interest in ensuring a major UN conference proceeded smoothly.

[1020] DOS to Paris, "Acting Secretary Ingersoll Meeting with Director General M'Bow," 27 October 1975, State 254949, AAD.
[1021] Estefania Aldaba-Lim, Summary Records of the Executive Board, Twenty-Fifth Meeting, 98th Session, 9 October 1976, 98 EX/SR.1-27, UNESDOC, 250-251.

Both Washington and the Secretariat were conscious of the stakes involved in the Nairobi Conference and prepared to reconcile. The Director General met with Henry Kissinger and senior State Department officials on 18 October 1976 in Washington, a week before the start of the conference, to discuss strategy and American attitudes towards the organization. The State Department focused again on gaining "M'Bow's vigorous personal help with the Arabs, Africans and East Europeans." Kissinger made it clear to M'Bow that Israeli acceptance in the European regional group would determine American attitudes. Failure to do so "would almost certainly lead to a further Congressional fund suspension, and probably force our withdrawal from UNESCO."[1022] M'Bow pledged his continuing support and in turn encouraged the State Department to contact "high-level" officials in Moscow in order to "encourage a more passive Soviet role" in Nairobi.[1023] Meanwhile, the White House wanted the American delegation to strike "an up-beat U.S. presence" at the conference. The Ford administration wanted to improve its position in Sub-Saharan Africa, where Cold War tensions were heating up, and believed that a "dramatic infusion of creative diplomacy" in the Nairobi Conference would be helpful, "since UNESCO means so much to the intellectual community in Africa."[1024]

[1022] Samuel W. Lewis to the Secretary, "Your Meeting with UNESCO Director General M'Bow (Senegal)," 15 October 1976, Box 167B, P-Reel Printouts 1976, NARA.
[1023] Samuel W. Lewis Memorandum to the Secretary, "The Soviets and the UNESCO General Conference," 14 October 1976, P-Reel Printouts 1976, Box 167D, NARA; Paris to DOS, "UNESCO General Conference, Conversation with M'Bow," 10 September 1976, Paris 26323, AAD.
[1024] Jim Connor Memorandum to Brent Scowcroft, "UNESCO General Conference," 2 October 1976, Folder: "Presidential Handwriting, 10/2/1976," Box C49, Presidential Handwriting File,

M'Bow also ensured that the conference would proceed smoothly and avoid controversy. He proposed the establishment of a Drafting and Negotiation Group (DNG) to defuse divisive issues at the conference. The DNG - consisting of about twenty-five members meeting only in private session - would discuss and try to arrive at a consensus on issues that were too controversial for the General Conference proceedings.[1025] African political tradition shaped his vision of diplomatic consensus - "the tradition of unanimity which remains so much alive in my native Africa: when a problem arises, it is customary, in the traditional societies in which I grew up, for it to be discussed in common by all concerned, each setting out his point of view and trying to convince the others, until gradually agreement is reached on a solution accepted by all."[1026] He hoped these African diplomatic traditions would help streamline the conference and fulfill American demands. M'Bow chose Léon Bossier-Palun - his close friend, personal confidante, and primary ally at the breakthrough October 1975 Executive Board session - to chair the group and strengthen the Secretariat's influence over the General Conference.

The conference opened at the Kenyatta Convention Center in Nairobi in November 1976 and fulfilled expectations in both Washington and Paris. M'Bow

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GRFPL. On American policy towards Africa, see also Piero Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 28-36.

[1025] "Organization of the Work of the Nineteenth Session of the General Conference," 3 September 1976, 100 EX/43, UNESDOC.

[1026] Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Address to the International Diplomatic Academy, "Consensus in International Organizations," 21 March 1978, DG/78/01, UNESDOC. See also Pierre Kalfon, "Amadou Mahtar M'Bow," 18.

dominated the conference. The Director General convinced many African delegations to oppose renewed criticism of Israeli policies. He referred controversial issues - draft declarations on such controversial subjects as race and racism, the responsibilities of the mass media, and the NIEO - to the Drafting and Negotiation Group. Bossier-Palun meanwhile demonstrated his firm command of the DNG and helped the conference to avoid confrontation, achieve consensus on divisive issues, and win the trust of American diplomats.[1027] M'Bow's actions, an American observer noted, helped the conference to "avoid particularly acrid, 'no-win' debates."[1028] The American delegation appreciated the efforts the Secretariat took to address its demands. The General Conference approved the 1975 Executive Board resolution and allowed Israel to join the European region, resolving the primary cause of the congressional boycott. The conference continued to criticize Israel in plenary sessions over the excavations in Jerusalem but did not impose any new sanctions. The conference - "in some ways the greatest conference yet held by UNESCO," according to former Director General

[1027] Nairobi to DOS, "Second Meeting, Drafting and Negotiating Group (DNG)," 3 November 1976, Nairob12112; Nairobi to DOS, "19th General Conference, Third Meeting, Drafting and Negotiating Group (DNG)," 5 November 1976, Nairob12252; Nairobi to DOS, "Drafting and Negotiating Group (DNG) - Assessment After First Meeting," 11 November 1976, Nairob12531; Paris to DOS, "ADG Najman's Remarks Concerning 14th, 18th, and 19th General Conferences," 6 December 1976, Paris 35991, all available in AAD.

[1028] "Telegram 307916 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts," 21 December 1976, *FRUS 1969-1976*: Volume E–14, Part 1, Document 102. For the African Group's perspective on the Nairobi Conference, see Siradiou Diallo, "Du Bon Usage de la Majorité," *Jeune Afrique* 833 (24 December 1976), 54.

Luther Evans - was a triumph. The "Spirit of Nairobi" promised a new era in the organization's history.[1029]

M'Bow's leadership was the key actor in American efforts to end Israel's isolation in the organization. Israel's formal admission to the European Group in 1977 buried the controversy that shook the Secretariat after the 1974 General Conference. The status of Jerusalem and the holy places remained unresolved and periodically strained the relationship between Israel and the Secretariat. Israeli diplomats were less enthusiastic than Washington about the Director General's leadership. "M'Bow is not a friend of the West," Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Shlomo Avineri maintained.[1030] Yet the Nairobi conference disarmed many critics of the organization. The Director General's "quiet diplomacy" and efforts to revise the anti-Israeli resolutions gave one observer from the World Jewish Congress hope that Israel could now escape the threat of international isolation. "As Third World countries attach much importance to UNESCO," he suggested, "UNESCO could become one of the meeting points between developing countries and Jewry."[1031] A similar belief gripped Washington.

[1029] Luther Evans to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 7 May 1977, Folder: "Luther Evans," Box 103, CAB 1, AG 8, UA.
[1030] Tel Aviv to DOS, "UNESCO: Israeli Views of the Presidential Certification," 20 January 1977, Tel Av 00439, AAD.
[1031] F. L. Brassloff, "Note on the 19th Session of the Unesco General Conference, Nairobi 18 October-30 November, 1976," enclosed in Gerhart M. Riegner to Members of the WJC Governing Board, 20 January 1977, Folder: "W.J.C.: Report on the Unesco General Conference, Nairobi by Dr. F.L. Brassloff on Behalf of the W.J.C. 1977," Leo Kronitz Fonds, Volume 23, LAC.

The Nairobi Conference elevated the organization's position in American discussions of the Third World and the UN system. As the American delegation in Paris noted, M'Bow was "a man with a future and a man of influence that should not be taken lightly. His weight will be felt, in one way or another, on the international scene for years to come." The State Department agreed it would have to support the organization in order to "preserve" this new "asset."[1032] Kissinger also encouraged President Ford to request congress to resume funding.[1033] Cyrus Vance, who replaced Kissinger as Secretary of State a month later, agreed American participation was a crucial part of its engagement with the developing world.[1034] At the White House, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft arrived at the same conclusion and urged the president that they should restore funding for the organization. He added that failure to do so would stoke "bitterness from Third World countries" that had faith in it.[1035]

Congressional leaders also began to reassess their opinions of the organization. Speakers at a Subcommittee Hearing in June testified that M'Bow, "a fellow member of the Third World," had helped to tone down the crisis in the

[1032] DOS to Nairobi, "U.S. Initiative Re De-Politicization," 19 November 1976, State 284172, AAD; DOS to Nairobi, "U.S. and Israeli Assessments of UNESCO 19th GC," 27 November 1976, State 290690, AAD; "Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington," n.d. [November 1976], *FRUS 1969-1976*: Volume E–14, Part 1, Document 50; Paris to DOS, "UNESCO General Conference - An Analysis," 8 December 1976, Paris 36304, AAD.
[1033] Henry Kissinger to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 17 January 1977, reprinted in DOS to Paris, 19 January 1977, State 012268, AAD.
[1034] "Secretary Vance's Letters to Chairmen of Senate and House Appropriations Committees," in DOS to Paris, 4 February 1977, State 025324, AAD.
[1035] "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington," n.d., *FRUS 1969-1976*: Volume E–14, Part 1, Document 103. See also Paris to DOS, "Handing UNESCO Over on a Platter to the Soviets - An Assessment," 19 February 1976, Paris 05051, AAD.

United Nations.[1036] The White House's endorsement sparked a new round of debate. Freedom House, an American human rights organization that frequently advised Washington on foreign policy issues, warned congressional leaders in February that American failure to resume its funding "would have the practical effect of bankrupting UNESCO by this Fall." Washington could instead better serve its interests in the Third World by improving its relationship with the organization.[1037] Congressional leaders agreed and restored American funding.

The War of Ideas

Amadou Mahtar M'Bow steered the organization out of turbulent international waters but was also determined to chart a new course for the organization. Although some of M'Bow's critics accused him of "being a stooge of the West," he also positioned himself as a spokesman of Third World demands in the ongoing North-South Dialogue.[1038] UNESCO was an "intellectual power-house" and should become "one of the centers of world thought." A week after his election, he announced plans to assemble a small group of "eminent thinkers"

[1036] Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, *UNESCO: Challenges and Opportunities for the United States: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session, June 14, 1976* (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1976), 63.
[1037] Memorandum, "UNESCO and U.S. Financial Support: An Advisory on the Issue," enclosed in Gerald L. Steibel to Board of Trustees, 24 January 1977; Leonard R. Sussman Memorandum to Board of Trustees, 18 April 1977, both in Folder 6, Box 6, FHR, PUL.
[1038] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO General Conference - An Analysis," 8 December 1976, Paris36304, AAD.

to advise him on how to turn the organization into a kind of world brain trust.[1039] M'Bow met with his senior Secretariat colleagues in February to finalize these plans. They agreed that a group of about twenty intellectuals should meet and discuss "the nature of the great problems confronting the international community, to secondly determine what problems are relevant to UNESCO's field of competence and how it can contribute to their solution." Like the Director General, they believed that "UNESCO was responsible, in the UN system, for provoking deeper reflection about contemporary problems."[1040] A dozen intellectual heavyweights met between April and June to discuss the economic, social, and military crises facing the modern world. This study group reinforced M'Bow's conviction that UNESCO was an intellectual organization. After all, the organization's extensive international network of research institutions, academics, and government officials could be devoted to resolving global problems. It should return to its roots as an intellectual organization: "The emphasis should be on the exchange of experience, rather than on the transfer of resources." These ideas reinforced M'Bow's conviction that the organization should become an intellectual "trail-blazer for the United Nations system and the entire international community."[1041]

[1039] Address by Amadou Mahtar M'Bow at the Closure of the Eighteenth Session of the General Conference, 23 November 1974, DG/74/15. UNESDOC.
[1040] Cabinet Director Memorandum, "Direction Générale: Réunion du 11 Février 1975," 13 February 1975, File 24, Box 6, CAB 8, AG 8, UA.
[1041] Panel of Counsellors on Major World Problems and Unesco's Contribution to Solving Them, "Report," 24 November 1975, BEP/76/WS.1, UNESDOC.

M'Bow himself played an important role in expanding the organization's international influence. The Secretariat's public relations officials encouraged him to take advantage of state visits and travel opportunities to speak with journalists and broadcasters.[1042] The Director General embraced oratory as his central strategic tool. He rarely missed the opportunity to lecture an audience on the state of the modern world or to explain the conditions prevailing in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. He travelled widely several months every year and used the opportunity to speak regularly at local universities, conferences, and seminars. His official position gave him a seat - and a podium - at the UN's Administrative Committee on Coordination, the Economic and Social Council, and regional organizations like the Organization for African Unity. He returned again and again to his experience as a child of the Third World to strengthen his authority and legitimacy as a world leader in a postcolonial world. He invoked anticolonial themes that made him popular among Third World intellectuals but radiated optimism about the prospects for international cooperation in order to forge consensus and gain the trust of Americans and West Europeans.[1043] According to the Director General's closest advisors, his speeches helped to popularize and explain the organization's "global vision with lucidity and optimism."[1044] The

[1042] "Rapport au Directeur General du Groupe de Travail sur les Problemes de L'Information," [May] 1975, Folder 562, Box 185, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1043] For American praise of M'Bow's "optimism," see Accra to DOS, "Conversation with UNESCO DG M'Bow," 4 November 1975, Accra 7284, AAD. For M'Bow's ideas about consensus, see Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Address to the International Diplomatic Academy, "Consensus in International Organizations," 21 March 1978, DG/78/01, UNESDOC.
[1044] Adel Rifaat & Bahgat Elnadi, "Réunions du Comité Nord-Sud Durant la Période du Jeudi 23 au Jeudi 30 Avril," 4 May 1981, Folder 142, Box 43, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

Secretariat's public relations staff agreed that he was a statesman, an intellectual, and a "prophet." He embodied the organization's "utopian" vision of a multicultural world.[1045]

M'Bow focused considerable attention on the issue of cultural identity. He had directed the "Africanization" of Senegal's universities and internationalized his efforts ten years later. He turned his attention as Director General to the cultural critique of the first development decade. "The idea of a universal pattern for society, to which all peoples should conform, is currently losing ground. It is giving way to a new pluralistic belief in a great variety of specific cultures that are bound to come into contact with each other," M'Bow declared in one typical speech.[1046] The Secretariat subsequently strengthened projects to preserve and strengthen local cultural traditions and modes of expression. The World Heritage Convention that was signed in 1972 came into effect in 1975 and became one of the organization's central contributions to both international development and preservation of cultural identity. The organization coordinated and advocated new international agreements to crack down on the illicit traffic of antiquities and restore artwork to their counties of origin. Third World countries reacquired new treasures for their profitable museums and strengthened their own national

[1045] Office de L'Information du Public, "Images de L'Unesco a Travers la Presse Mondiale: Analayse de Contenus de Presse," October 1981, Folder 410, Box 131, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1046] Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Address on the Occasion of the First General Assembly of the International Association "Islam and the West," 14 October 1981, DG/81/38, UNESDOC. See also Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow Statement, "Introduction to the General Policy Debate," 3 November 1976, 19 C/INF.12, UNESDOC, 43.

identity.[1047] There were renewed efforts to encourage the use of local languages in schools, government, and public life in Asia and especially in Africa. The Secretariat provided more financial and technical resources for local cinema and broadcasting facilities, which would enhance Third World peoples' ability to express themselves locally and internationally. As Tunisia's Information Minister argued at one meeting, the expansion of Third World communications infrastructure would help overcome the Western misconception that "Third World countries had oil, but not ideas."[1048] This flurry of activity led M'Bow to declare the 1970s the world's "first cultural development decade."[1049]

The 1975 conference on cultural policies in Africa illustrates the growing international interest in the Secretariat's ideas about cultural identity. René Maheu had initiated a regular series of world cultural conferences in 1970. Culture ministers from around the world met first in Europe and then in Asia to discuss how cultural-policymaking could strengthen national identity, stabilize social conflict, and ease the process of economic development.[1050] Dozens of diplomats

[1047] Kwame Antony Appiah, "Whose Culture Is It?," *Whose Culture?: The Promise of Museums and the Debate over Antiquities*, James Cuno, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 71-86; James Cuno, *Who Owns Antiquity?: Museums and the Battle over Our Ancient Heritage* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[1048] Mustapha Masmoudi as cited in "Chronological Report on an International Colloquium Held in Florence," n.d.[April 1977], Folder: "Florence Conference," Box 18, WPFCR, PUL. See also chapter 6.

[1049] Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Address at the Opening of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Africa, 27 October 1975, DG/75/23, UNESDOC.

[1050] These conferences included the Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional, Administrative and Financial Aspect of Cultural Policies, Venice in 1970; the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe, Helsinki in 1972; and the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Asia, Yogyakarta in 1973. For background see Richard Hoggart, "Culture and its Ministers." The role that Ministers of Culture could play in the process of economic development are discussed in René Maheu Address at the First Working Meeting of

arrived in Accra, Ghana for the third of these world conference to discuss cultural policies in Africa. M'Bow dominated the conference, where, according to American observers, his "unusually buoyant" and "exuberant" optimism "won the respect of members of all delegations." He took advantage of a weekend break to attend a procession of chiefs at nearby Kumasi in full Senegalese dress.[1051] OAU Secretary General William A. Eteki'a Mbumua, a former Executive Board colleague who had called for "cultural revolution" on the continent, also attended with the Director General.[1052] Speakers condemned the spread of Western culture in their countries and emphasized their efforts to strengthen more authentic cultural traditions. The conference concluded that "cultural expression probably offer[s] the African States the best opportunities of asserting themselves" while M'Bow agreed that "the assertion of cultural identity" was "an act of liberation" from neocolonial oppression.[1053] The conference reaffirmed the organization's efforts to support the development of communications infrastructure and facilities, educational reform, and traditional language training programs in Africa. Yet African calls for "cultural emancipation" alarmed some foreign observers, like a

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the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Asia, 11 December 1973, DG/73/21; "Cultural Development in Asia," 1974, SHC.74/WS/36, both available in UNESDOC.

[1051] Accra to DOS, "Conversation with UNESCO DG M'Bow," 4 November 1975, Accra 7284, AAD.

[1052] William A. Eteki'a Mbumua, *Un Certain Humanisme* (Yaoundé: Éditions Clé, 1970). See especially, "La Revolution Culturelle Pour Restituer a L'Homme Africain 'La Liberte D'Etre Ce Qu'il Doit Être,'" *Un Certain Humanisme*, 13-29, for his ideas on cultural cooperation in Africa.

[1053] Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Africa, "Problems and Prospects," n.d. [1975], SHC.75/AFRICACULT/3, 76; "Report of the Director-General on the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Africa," 30 September 1976, 19 C/107, UNESDOC, 1; "Cultural Policies in African Member States: Present Situation and Trends," 26 September 1975, SHC/AFRICACULT/4, UNESDOC, 2. See also "Africa Rediscovers its Cultural Roots," *UNESCO Courier* (May 1977), 4-11.

Vatican official who worried that the continent risked becoming a "leaf withered into itself." American observers were particularly worried that these new cultural policies would exclude American "culture and media products" from African markets.[1054]

M'Bow was also committed to contemporary UN campaigns against racial prejudice. Decolonization and the retrenchment of apartheid in South Africa kept the issue of race and racism on the international agenda. The General Assembly declared the 1970s to be the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and organized a series of conferences and resolutions throughout the decade.[1055] The Director General believed that the Secretariat's early educational campaigns against racial prejudice had placed it in the "front-ranking place" among international organizations.[1056] M'Bow himself had experienced and was sensitive about racial slights. He had travelled widely and had witnessed segregation when he visited the United States. His experience fighting in France's Senegalese army also exposed him to the ultimate consequences of racial prejudice: "I saw the concentration camps in Europe. I saw the crematoria."[1057] The Secretariat developed plans to draft a new Declaration on Racial Prejudice. A meeting of government experts assembled in March 1978 in Paris to discuss a draft

[1054] Accra to DOS, "UNESCO Conference: Substance of African Interventions," 4 November 1975, Accra 07270, AAD.
[1055] Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, 251-289.
[1056] "Reply by the Director-General at the Close of the Discussions," 26 June 1976, 99 EX/INF.8, UNESDOC, 7. See also Paris to DOS, "Visit of Ambassador Young to UNESCO," 25 July 1977, Paris 21475, AAD.
[1057] Thassinda Uba Thassinda, *Amadou Mahtar M'Bow*, 201-202; Leonard Sussman Memorandum, "Meeting with Director-General M'Bow," 7 July 1978, Folder: "M'Bow Statements & Correspondence," Box 19, WPFCR, PUL.

declaration that would later be submitted to the General Conference. They agreed it should be "scientifically sound and drafted in a style which would be persuasive to laymen and to young people." Yet it was also a more political document. Discussions focused not on competing scientific theories of race and human inheritance but rather on whether the declaration should be founded on "scientific findings or on moral and ethical principles."[1058] The meeting decided to focus on the political and legal dimensions of race and racial prejudice. The earlier series of statements on race between 1950 and 1967 (see chapter 1) incorporated the latest research from biologists and anthropologists to delegitimize theories of racial hierarchy. By 1978, the idea that "all human beings belong to a single species" was considered axiomatic. The meeting focused instead on pushing member states to take action to combat the lingering effects of racial prejudice. The declaration urged states to enact "anti-racialist legislation" to protect minorities and eliminate racist ideas. It targeted apartheid, "which is the extreme form of racism" and "gravely disturbs international peace and security." The draft declaration also connected racial equality with the preservation of cultural identity.[1059] The explicit inclusion of apartheid in the declaration fueled controversy. African diplomats successfully resisted American efforts to tone down the draft's condemnation of South Africa - M'Bow himself was particularly active and directly intervened in discussions to support the draft's strong

[1058] "Final Report of the Meeting of Governmental Representatives to Prepare a Draft Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice," 20 C/18, UNESDOC.
[1059] Draft Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, 25 September 1978, 20 C/18, UNESDOC.

language.[1060] The meeting ultimately approved a declaration that would be submitted for a vote at the next General Conference.

Although the meeting went well, international events between March and October threatened to derail support for the declaration before it could reach the General Conference. Jewish NGOs in the United States were worried that the new race statement would reignite and legitimize criticism of Israel.[1061] Less than a month after the March meeting, an Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference in Dakar reaffirmed the idea that Zionism was a form of racism.[1062] In August, over a dozen Western states walked out of a World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination after Arab states introduced a clause condemning the relationship between "the Zionist state of Israel and the racist regime of South Africa."[1063] Not only did Washington believe the "zionism as racism" equation "an abhorrent and tendentious political weapon with no substantive merit and with great destructive potential," it also believed that the issue threatened to complicate the ongoing peace process in the Middle East and the viability of the UN more generally.[1064]

Despite American resistance, M'Bow was committed to getting the declaration passed at the General Conference. He opposed the Zionism issue,

[1060] DOS to Dar Es Salaam, "UNESCO: Dynamics of the Intergovernmental Meeting to Draft a Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice," 25 March 1978, State 077845, AAD.
[1061] Philip E. Hoffman Memorandum to Morris Fine, 20 November 1975,
[1062] DOS to Nonaligned Movement Collective, "July 25-29 Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Meeting at Belgrade: Part II," 14 July 1978, State 178242, AAD.
[1063] Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, 268-274.
[1064] DOS to Nonaligned Movement Collective, "July 25-29 Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Meeting at Belgrade: Part II," 14 July 1978, State 178242, AAD.

which he believed was a distraction from the more important fight against South African apartheid. He spoke with Arab leaders - Anwar Sadat, Saddam Hussain, Hafez al-Assad, and Houari Boumediene - in an attempt to discourage Arab members from pressing the Zionism issue.[1065] M'Bow met with African heads of state at an OAU summit around the same time and urged them to avoid antagonizing Israel.[1066] When the draft declaration came up for a vote at the General Conference in November, most observers were surprised by the unusually conciliatory support for the declaration. The Iraqi delegate, speaking on behalf of the Arab states, indicated that they had not abandoned their belief that Zionism was a form of racism but, in order to support their African friends, would not raise the issue. Arab moderation even led the Israeli delegate to make conciliatory remarks about cooperation with the Arab world.[1067] M'Bow's skillful diplomacy averted another crisis and successfully saved the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice.

The Secretariat skirted greater controversy when it plunged into debates about international economic relations. Western political resistance and global economic recession made it unlikely that the New International Economic Order would reshape international relations. Yet the NIEO did transform academic and intellectual discussions among social scientists and economists around the

[1065] Paris to DOS, "Meeting with Director General M'Bow in Paris," 16 June 1978, Paris 19392, AAD.
[1066] Paris to DOS, "M'Bow at OAU Summit," 28 June 1978, Paris 23798, AAD.
[1067] Paris to DOS, " UNESCO 20th GC," 18 November 1978, Paris 38055 , AAD.

world.[1068] UNESCO helped to keep these discussions alive. Delegates from around the world used the General Conference's plenary sessions to laud the NIEO and keep it on the organization's agenda. The Executive Board also adopted the Third World's economic campaign. Former Mexican President Luis Echeverría, who had helped to launch the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties in 1972, was a particularly active and influential member of the Executive Board.[1069] The Secretariat had already, during Maheu's last year in power, committed itself to developing the social and cultural dimensions of the NIEO. M'Bow continued this commitment and took advantage of his position to deliver dozens of speeches in its support. He argued that the United Nations should fight for "greater justice" in the world when he attended the July 1975 session of the Economic and Social Council. He emphasized that it would "be necessary to adapt the structures of the United Nations system to the requirements of the new international order."[1070] The Director General impressed Washington's ambassador to the meeting. Most leaders in the UN system deferred to the opinions of major donor countries, especially the United States, and were cautious

[1068] See especially Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some Recent Literature," *International Organization* (Spring 1979).
[1069] For American views of Echeverría's "Powerful force" on this issue, see DOS to Tel Aviv, 30 March 1978, State 070809, AAD. See also "Address Delivered by Mr. Luis Echeverria, Constitutional President of the United Mexican States, on 10 April 1973, at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris," UNESDOC.
[1070] Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Address to the Fifty-Ninth Session of the Economic and Social Council, 7 July 1975, DG/75/11, UNESDOC.

when making proposals. M'Bow was the only specialized agency head to "speak critically" and advocate reforming the UN system to conform with the NIEO.[1071]

The organization became an intellectual home for supporters of the new order. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in December requesting UNESCO to make new efforts to improve international public understanding of the UN, "including the principles and aims related to the new international economic order."[1072] Delegates who attended the May session of the Executive Board six months later agreed that UNESCO should launch an intellectual offensive in parallel to the General Assembly's diplomatic offensive. "A change of attitude was needed in the developed countries to make them willing to share what they possessed with the others," Colombian delegate Gabriel Betancourt believed. "UNESCO could and should, therefore, help to alter people's outlooks in both groups of countries." The Syrian delegate argued that it should become the "pilot organization" in building "moral and spiritual" support for the NIEO.[1073] M'Bow himself later pledged to make the organization "the intellectual cutting edge of the NIEO."[1074] The struggle for the NIEO was both a diplomatic and an intellectual offensive against the injustices of the postwar international system.

[1071] W. T. Birrell Memorandum, "U.S.A.," 4 August 1975, FCO 61/1362, UKNA.
[1072] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 30/3535, 17 December 1975, 2444th Plenary Meeting, Thirtieth Session of the General Assembly.
[1073] Summary Records of the Executive Board, Twenty-Sixth Meeting, 99th Session, May 1976, 99 EX/SR.1-35, UNESDOC, 264; Summary Records of the Executive Board, Twelfth Meeting, 99th Session, 3 May 1976, 99 EX/SR.1-35, UNESDOC, 84.
[1074] Paris to DOS, "Meeting of Experts on the NIEO," 18 July 1978, Paris 22503, AAD.

UNESCO launched a publicity campaign to support the NIEO. The Secretariat hosted a series of conferences, seminars, and roundtable discussions on various dimensions of world order. They explored how a range of issues - education, youth, cultural cooperation, religion, ethics, philosophy, and, most controversially, communications (see chapter 6) - influenced the shape of world order.[1075] Philosophers were commissioned to discuss the ethical foundations for a new world order. M'Bow was particularly anxious to attract prominent thinkers like John Rawls, probably the era's most renowned moral philosopher. Rawls declined, but other thinkers responded to the Philosophy Department's call for reflection on how an "international ethic" could replace "economism" as the basis of international relations.[1076] The Youth Division launched a program to inform children and young adults about the basic ideas behind the NIEO.[1077] The Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice that M'Bow struggled to pass at the 1978 General Conference argued that "disequilibria in international economic relations contribute to the exacerbation of racism and racial prejudice; all States should consequently endeavour to contribute to the restructuring of the

[1075] These included a Round Table on Cultural and Intellectual Cooperation and the New International Economic Order and a Symposium on the NGO Contribution to the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in 1976; a Conference on The Challenge of the Year 2000 in 1977; a meeting on the Rights and Duties Deriving, for States and Groups, from the Establishment of a New International Economic and Cultural Order and a Meeting of Experts on Human Rights, Human Needs and the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in 1978; a Symposium on Islam and a New International Economic Order in 1980. International communications and information will be addressed in chapter 6.

[1076] Paris to DOS, "US Participation in UNESCO Conferences," 13 December 1977, Paris 36363, AAD; Working Paper, "Meeting of Experts on the Rights and Duties Deriving, for States and Groups, from the Establishment of a New International Economic and Cultural Order," 31 January 1978, SS.78/CONF.604/3, UNESDOC.

[1077] Michel Pagnier, "The New International Economic Order: A Selective Bibliography Drawn up for Youth Groups and Organizations," 1977, SS.77/WS/4, UNESDOC.

international economy on a more equitable basis."[1078] A Round Table on Cultural and Intellectual Cooperation attracted headlines in 1976. A small number of world leaders, like former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, attended but took a back seat to some of the world's leading artists and intellectuals. Pianists, architects, painters, actors, dramatists, and writers discussed how to reconcile the needs of multipolar world politics with multiculturalism. The British actor Peter Ustinov wrote the conference's concluding declaration.[1079] After returning from the meeting, the Ecuadorian artist Oswaldo Guayasamín praised the organization and called for worldwide solidarity among artists to support its "campaign for a new world economic order" in order to "preserve the vitality of cultures" around the world.[1080] The Secretariat believed that these conferences and meetings would "throw light on the changes in outlook which are seen to be an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a regenerated world order."[1081]

The organization also published a series of books and pamphlets on various issues related to the NIEO. The organization's publishing division translated important texts and distributed them among member states.[1082] The

[1078] Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, 27 November 1978, UNESDOC.
[1079] Guirec Le Douce, "Au Colloque International de L'UNESCO," *Le Figaro* (26 June 1976); Jean Schwoerer, "Des Savants, des Artistes et des Hommes de Lettres ont Discuté d'un Nouvel Ordre économique et Social," *Le Monde* (2 July 1976), both in Box 41, CAB 1, AG 8, UA. See also, "Suites Possible de la Table-Ronde sur la Cooperation Culturelle et le Nouvelle Ordre Economique Mondial," n.d. [1976], Box 41, CAB 1, AG 8, UA.
[1080] "Oswaldo Guayasamín's 'Weeping Woman,'" *UNESCO Courier* (October 1976), 10.
[1081] "UNESCO's Contribution to the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," 9 May 1978, 104 EX/51, UNESDOC.
[1082] For pertinent examples, see *Moving Towards Change: Some Thoughts on the New International Economic Order* (Paris: UNESCO, 1976); *Thinking Ahead: UNESCO and the Challenges of Today and Tomorrow* (Paris: UNESCO, 1977); Alfred Kastler, *Suicide or Survival? The Challenge of the Century* (Paris: UNESCO, 1976); *International Social Science Journal*,

UNESCO Courier, the organization's mass circulation periodical, published regular articles and news about the progress of the NIEO in fifteen languages.[1083] M'Bow sometimes used his diplomatic opportunities to spread these ideas. When he visited West Germany in 1979, for example, he scheduled time to meet with Willy Brandt, who had recently been tasked by the World Bank with studying global economic problems. He provided the former chancellor with UNESCO documents about the educational and cultural dimensions of the NIEO in the hopes that they would influence the World Bank report.[1084] Delegates to the General Conference approved these measures and believed that a "monumental, encyclopedic, scholarly study in depth" that would reveal the social, economic, and cultural foundations for a new world order could make an impact on international politics.[1085]

The work of Mohammed Bedjaoui best illustrates the organization's impact on the global debate and efforts to develop reflection on NIEO. The jurist served jointly as Algeria's ambassador to France and permanent representative to UNESCO in Paris. Bedjaoui praised M'Bow's "tireless personal struggle" to support the NIEO and approached the organization about the possibility of publishing the book he was writing on the international legal dimensions of the

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Special Issue: "Towards a New International Economic and Social Order," XXVIII, no. 4 (1976). For publishing activities, see Edward Wegman, "UNESCO: Publisher to the World," *UNESCO Courier* (October 1978), 31-33.

[1083] See especially, *UNESCO Courier* (October 1976); *UNESCO Courier* (April 1977). By 1977, the *Courier* was published in English, French, Spanish, Russian German, Arabic, Japanese, Italian, Hindi, Tamil, Hebrew, Persian, Dutch, Portuguese, Turkish, and Urdu.

[1084] "Oral Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization Since the 106th Session," 18 May 1979, 107 EX/INF.5, UNESDOC, 31.

[1085] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO: 20th General Conference," 23 November 1978, Paris38600, AAD.

new order, *Towards a New International Economic Order*. Although publishing delays frustrated him, he admitted in a private note to the Director General, he maintained that the organization could help him give a "voice" to the Third World and "start a dialogue that [will] terrify the rich [world]."[1086] His book argued that decolonization and the NIEO were a challenge to the "Euro-American hegemony" that fostered uneven economic development. A truly universal world community could only be built on a new international order that freed newly independent nations from colonial - and neocolonial - constraints. Bedjaoui regularly attended and participated in the Secretariat's conferences and roundtable meetings. Its publicity campaign and "very elevated point of view" influenced his belief that the NIEO extended beyond the realm of trade and economics and shaped culture and society.[1087] UNESCO published the book as the inaugural volume in a new series on international law and world order. It subsequently became the most influential and widely read textbook defense of the NIEO.[1088]

The Secretariat's commitment to support the NIEO led it to diverge from both Washington and the more powerful international organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Both Bretton Woods organizations had been adapting their international development strategies to the challenges of the North-South Dialogue. Financial instability in the seventies - the

[1086] Mohammed Bedjaoui to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 10 August 1979; Mohammed Bedjaoui handwritten personal letter to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 10 August 1979, both in Folder: "Livre Bedjaoui," Box 52, CAB 1, AG 8, UA.
[1087] See especially Mohammed Bedjaoui, *Towards a New International Economic Order* (Paris: UNESCO, 1979), 73-75, 119, 243.
[1088] Umut Özsu, "In the Interests of Mankind as a Whole': Mohammed Bedjaoui's New International Economic Order," *Humanity* 6, no 1 (Spring 2015), 131.

breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the rise of floating exchange rates - led the IMF to prescribe new cures for the health of the international economic system. It began to make new loans conditional on combatting inflation by limiting public debt and accepting greater levels of unemployment. The Bank responded to Third World demands by developing alternative strategies to alleviate poverty worldwide. Economists developed what became known as the "Basic Human Needs" strategy. Development experts believed that instead of ambitious attempts to rearrange the global economic system - which raised contentious issues ranging from tariffs and commodity prices to the regulation of transnational corporations - the new approach focused on the need to alleviate the suffering of the poor within developing nations. This new theory divided Third World leaders by displacing calls for international justice with humanitarian appeals for charity. Like the IMF, the World Bank also developed an assertive strategy to promote free market reform in the developing world. Through high-level economic advice to world leaders and lending programs conditioned on the liberalization of state-directed development, the Bank helped to extend market forces throughout the developing world. The IMF and the World Bank therefore built the framework and set the rules for a new era of financial deregulation that historian Mark Mazower has called the "Real New International Economic Order.[1089] Third World leaders and intellectuals opposed these new "structural

[1089] Patrick Sharma, "Between North and South: The World Bank and the New International Economic Order," *Humanity* 6, 1 (Spring 2015), 189-200; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World*, 343-378.

adjustment" strategies. A group of African political leaders, for example, sent a joint memorandum to World Bank President A. W. Clausen in 1981 warning that new lending policies "risked fueling social disorder" in their countries and renewed their demands that Africans be given greater say in international economic decision-making.[1090]

The Bretton Woods organizations' turn away from state-led economic development towards market forces anticipated broader political changes in the North Atlantic world. The revival of free market ideas on both sides of the Atlantic culminated in the election of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the United States the following year.[1091] Both leaders lost no time in deregulating their economies, privatizing public industries, and cutting taxes. Reagan and Thatcher began to internationalize these ideas in late 1981. The Third World's decade-long attempt to develop a New International Economic Order climaxed in the Cancun Development Summit held in October. President Reagan maintained his conviction that the way to end world poverty was to rein in economic aid and "flashy" rhetoric. He believed that North-South negotiations should instead be oriented around liberalizing trade and encouraging private investment. G-77 diplomats claimed that Washington was out of step with worldwide opinion. By the end of the summit, however, an American delegation member described the discussions as "a general consensus for open trade and free

[1090] "Memorandum des Gouverneurs pour les Pays Africains Assemblees Annuelles 1981," n.d. [1981], Folder 142, Box 43, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1091] For the intellectual revival of free market ideology, see Daniel T. Rodgers, *Age of Fracture* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2011); Angus Burgin, *The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets Since the Depression* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).

markets."[1092] Reagan dismissed the idea that "global negotiations" should be conducted through the United Nations or "some gigantic new international bureaucracy" but maintained his faith in the value of the World Bank and the IMF.[1093] It spelt the end of the New International Economic Order.

M'Bow resisted this more conservative turn in discussions about international economic governance. He was particularly critical of the World Bank's Basic Needs approach. Although he did not dismiss the ideas out of hand, he argued at the 1977 session of the Executive Board that it focused too much attention on "immediate needs, admittedly legitimate and urgent," but lost sight of "more long-term" solutions embodied in the NIEO. He complained that the World Bank's strategy prioritized "charity or alms-giving" over the international "equity and solidarity" that Third World states demanded.[1094] The Director General's thoughts hardened by the time he addressed the Executive Board a year later. The World Bank's humanitarian approach suited the "protectionist attitudes" of developed countries that resisted the Third World's efforts to improve their international economic power. It was also pessimistic, "one might be tempted to describe it as a strategy without hope - or even as a strategy of despair," he

[1092] "Remarks to Reporters Upon Departure for the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development in Cancun, Mexico," 21 October 1981, PPP; Ronald Reagan, "Statement at the First Plenary Session of the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development in Cancun, Mexico," 22 October 1981, PPP; Arturo de la Guardia Memorandum to ADG/CPX, "International Meeting on Co-Operation and Development," 26 October 1981, Folder 142, Box 43, CAB 7, AG 8, UA. The importance of the Cancun Summit is stressed in Mark Mazower, *Governing the World*, 360; Vanessa Ogle, "State Rights Against Private Capital: The 'New International Economic Order (NIEO)' and the Struggle Over Aid, Trade, and Foreign Investment, 1962-1981," *Humanity* (2014), 211, 223-225.

[1093] "Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters During the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development in Cancun, Mexico," 23 October 1981, PPP.

[1094] "Reply by the Director-General," 7 October 1977, 103 EX/INF.7, UNESDOC, 4.

claimed. "In short, a strategy of basic needs has a profoundly humanitarian ring, when it comes to individuals, but is coupled with deep-seated pessimism concerning the overall development of societies." M'Bow again spoke "from personal experience" - he grew up in "a country where poverty prevails" - and reconfirmed that the world needed international justice.[1095] Delegates at the General Conference echoed M'Bow's sentiments and pushed the Secretariat to maintain its commitment to the NIEO.

By 1980, as one Secretariat official noted, UNESCO officials and their counterparts in the IMF and the World Bank were developing "especially different ideas about [economic] development and the ways to bring this about."[1096] In the summer of 1981, around the same time that Washington and London were preparing for the Cancun Summit, M'Bow asked his closest advisors to explore North-South problems and make recommendations about the organization's future. Members of the group had strong opinions about internationals relations. Assistant Director General for Culture, and former Congolese Prime Minister, Henri Lopès believed that "the World Bank's radical alignment with the Reagan Administration's philosophy" had betrayed Third World hopes.[1097] M'Bow's speech writers, the Egyptian intellectual partners Adel Rifaat and Bahgat Elnadi, similarly believed that Western leaders were imposing

[1095] "Reply by the Director-General," 27 October 1978, 105 EX/INF.5, UNESDOC. See also Interview, "Amadou Mahtar M'Bow," *Third World Quarterly* 1 (April 1982), 14.
[1096] G. Fulcheri Memorandum to DDG, "Visite de Mr. Waide et Mr. King," 22 May 1980, Folder 165, Box 51, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1097] Henri Lopès Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Analyse de Documents de L'Assemblée des Gounverneurs du Fonds Monétaire Internationale et du Système de la Banque Mondiale," 2 November 1981, Folder 142, Box 43, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

an "inappropriate" development model - "based on the implicit acceptance of the model of industrial society" - that benefitted developed countries at the expense of Third World aspirations. "There is no true solution outside of a radical change in North-South relations," they responded.[1098] The group decided to draw back from detailed policy analysis and instead discuss the philosophical and economic foundations of modern world order. While economists in Washington believed that their policies would liberate developing countries from inefficient economic planning, the Secretariat's study group believed that neocolonial exploitation and foreign economic domination remained the primary cause of international economic inequality. The expanding process of globalization rested on a "system of domination." The group also emphasized that any new system of international development could not merely be economic and materialistic. Development models should not just serve "each person's material conditions" but should also provide everyone with "a life rich with spiritual, ethical and aesthetic significance."[1099] This was a vision of international economic relations sharply at odds with the ideas that would dominate the Cancun Conference.

M'Bow's commitment to turn the organization into the intellectual home of the NIEO soured the goodwill he earned during his handling of the crisis over the Israeli resolutions. Washington initially worried about M'Bow's "hawkish" efforts to become the "intellectual guidepost of a NIEO" but decided to avoid

[1098] Adel Rifaat & Bahgat Elnadi, "Note de Synthèse," 26 October 1981, Folder 142, Box 43, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1099] Memorandum, "Direction Générale: Réunion du 7 Avril 1981," 9 April 1981; Adel Rifaat & Bahgat Elnadi, "Réunions du Comité Nord-Sud Durant la Période du Jeudi 23 au Jeudi 30 Avril," 4 May 1981, Folder 142, Box 43, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

undermining his "pet project" in order to maintain his support against a resumption of anti-Israeli resolutions.[1100] The Secretariat's efforts to foster discussion on new approaches to world order began to grab the attention of some American observers. The permanent delegation believed that "we should take these meetings seriously." These expert meetings and discussions would produce reports, documents, and declarations that would fuel international discussions. "We should make an effort to get the best possible texts," the delegation concluded in 1978.[1101] American delegates began to challenge the more "unacceptable resolutions" that came up at periodic general conferences.[1102]

The political watershed in British and American politics between 1979 and 1980 polarized this confrontation. The revival of market ideas shaped contemporary discussions about society, economics, and international relations.[1103] The organization's commitment to the NIEO and a host of state-driven development schemes clashed with Washington's new commitment to liberal economics. Chester E. Finn, Daniel Patrick Moynihan's former Legislative Director, believed that M'Bow was waging a "war of ideas" against "Western political, intellectual, and moral values."[1104] Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Greg Newell worried about the impact that these

[1100] DOS to All Diplomatic Posts, "UNESCO 19th General Conference," 10 September 1976, State 224244; Paris to DOS, "UNESCO General Conference - An Analysis," 8 December 1976, Paris 36304, both in AAD.
[1101] Paris to DOS, "Meeting of Experts on the NIEO," 18 July 1978, Paris 22503, AAD.
[1102] See for example, DOS to Paris, "DR-9 -- New International Economic Order," 4 November 1978, State 282003, AAD.
[1103] Daniel Rodgers, *Age of Fracture*, 41-77.
[1104] Chester E. Finn, Jr., "How to Lose the War of Ideas," *Commentary* (August 1983), 41.

dangerous ideas would have on the international community. He criticized M'Bow's "endemic hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society" and "promotion of statist theories of development."[1105] The new administration also embraced the reenergized cause of human rights. Yet this language emphasized the importance of individuals and downplayed the importance of broader social and cultural rights.[1106] Congressional officials complained that the Secretariat, in its efforts to fight racial prejudice and promote cultural identity, emphasized "collective rights" at the "expense of the human rights of individuals."[1107] The debate in London followed a similar pattern. Members of Parliament like Lord Vaizey complained that the organization had become "a major centre of anti-Western agitation and propaganda."[1108] During the heady days of the early 1980s, UNESCO seemed the intellectual antithesis of the transatlantic consensus on market ideas and individual human rights.

M'Bow's reputation and legitimacy as a world leader also suffered. The staff problems that began twenty years earlier and that exploded in 1970

[1105] Greg Newell Address at Stanford University, *DOSB* 2094 (January 1985), 55. See also "U.S./UNESCO Policy Review," reprinted in *U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO: Report of a Staff Study Mission, February 10-13 1984, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives* (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1984); "Letter Dated July 13, 1984, From Secretary Newell and Ambassador Gerard to Director General M'Bow," Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Recent Developments in UNESCO and their Implications for U.S. Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eight Congress, Second Session, July 26, September 13, December 6, 1984* (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1985), 171-177.

[1106] Barbara J. Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Samuel Moyn, "Human Rights and the Age of Inequality," *Open Democracy* (27 October 2015).

[1107] "U.S./UNESCO Policy Review," 91, 97, 103.

[1108] House of Lords Debate, 25 January 1984, volume 447, cc304-30. See also comments by Lord Gladwyn and Viscount Eccles, 25 January 1984, volume 447, cc304-30.

continued to plague day to day life in the Secretariat. Staff complaints about poor job security and career opportunities, lack of transparency, and poor communication between staff and management created a sense of fear and malaise.[1109] M'Bow unwittingly exacerbated these tensions. The Director General's reelection in 1980 strengthened his self-confidence and weakened his willingness to cooperate with colleagues. Close colleagues began to criticize his "disastrous management," favoritism, and reliance on "mediocrities and courtesans."[1110] These administrative problems fueled British and American criticism of the Director General. American diplomats increasingly came to see M'Bow as an African "warlord" who ruled a private "fiefdom."[1111] One official in the British Foreign Office argued that M'Bow's "megalomania" posed a threat to Western interests. He had a simple strategy to personalize power: "He has a quiet word with his trusties who are black Africans... They line up the African bloc, and through the latter most of the Group of 77." These African countries listened to "their" Director General and "follow him sedulously," he warned colleagues.[1112] As late as 1980, M'Bow still considered himself a mediator between the West and the Third World. When Iranian forces seized hostages at the American embassy in

[1109] Geraldo Nascimiento, "Vie Syndicale et Relations Avec L'Administration Selon la STA," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 200.
[1110] Peter Lengyel to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 30 May 1984, reprinted in *Recent Developments in UNESCO and their Implications for U.S. Policy*, 135-141; Dragoljub Najman, "A Fateful Decision for Unesco," *New York Times* (23 September 1987); Bruno Padraic and Dragoljub Najman, as cited in Thassinda, *Amadou Mahtar M'Bow*, 319, 335.
[1111] Lacy Wright Interview, 6 January 1998, Frontline Diplomacy Oral History, available online: http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001508; Lev Reuben Interview, 18 June 1999, Frontline Diplomacy Oral History, available online: http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001584/. See also Chester E. Finn, Jr., "How to Lose the War of Ideas," 41.
[1112] D. J. Kirkness Minute, "UNESCO General Conference, 1980: Some Points to Make," 5 December 1980, attached to D. L. Pearson to Buiet, 8 December 1980, FCO 58/2217, UKNA.

Tehran, M'Bow offered support to the American embassy in Paris. He offered, speaking as "the most senior Muslim in the UN" who had "great prestige in the Third World," to help Washington negotiate with the new regime in Tehran.[1113] Western officials, however, had lost faith in his ability to manage constructive dialogue between Washington and the Third World.

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UNESCO was at the heart of the decade-long storm that swept through international organizations and the United Nations throughout the 1970s. The G-77 and the Non-Aligned Movement's numerical superiority in the General Conference ensured that issues like the Palestinian fight for statehood, the campaign against apartheid, efforts to reform the international economic system, the struggle for postcolonial sovereignty, and efforts to enhance Asian, African, and Middle-Eastern participation in global governance would have a place on the organization's agenda. The General Conference's plenary sessions mirrored the heated rhetoric that regularly engulfed the General Assembly in New York each autumn over the course of the decade. Yet UNESCO was never the passive victim of Third World unity.

Senior Secretariat officials embraced the Third World agenda. The organization's constitutional commitment to expand international understanding and facilitate the exchange of ideas made it inevitable that it would be an important forum in debates about the international system. While Western foreign

[1113] Memorandum from The Situation Room to Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Evening Notes," 12 September 1980, DDRS.

ministries, especially in Washington and London, complained that Third World pressure was "politicizing" the organization, permanent staff members responded that it had always been "a political organization, not only because of its intergovernmental structure, but because of the nature of its activities."[1114] René Maheu encouraged the General Conference to promote "militant" policies in the late sixties. Assistant Director General John Fobes, who worked closely with both Maheu and M'Bow, defended the organization's struggle to win a more equitable position in the international community for the Third World. "The resentment of domination and of being treated indifferently or as marginal is very deep and strong," he explained to Assistant Secretary of State Charles Maynes. "The 'other world' does not like being handled in a patronizing manner nor having the 'rules' being made by the North and West.'"[1115] Amadou Mahtar M'Bow's 1974 election symbolized the organization's emergence as a vanguard of the Third World. "Third World nations," as one State Department consultant argued in 1981, "regard UNESCO as their spiritual home."[1116]

[1114] Jean Thomas, "Quelle Étrange Illusion!," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 6. See also Jean Guitton, "N'en Dé Plaise a Quelques Tenants de L'Esprit pur...," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 29; Chickh Bekri, "Politisation: Un Faux Procès," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens*, 31.
[1115] John E. Fobes Memorandum, attached to John E. Fobes to Charles William Maynes, Jr., 16 December 1976, Folder 18, Box 6, DDG 2, AG 8, UA.
[1116] William G. Harley, "The U.S. Stake in the IPDC," *Journal of Communication* 31 (Autumn 1981).

Chapter 6: The Balance of Power and the Balance of Information

[T]he flow of information is at heart a political issue.
There is no escape from this fact.

Dileep Padgaonkar, 1978[1117]

"Information: there's growing agreement that it's the name of the age we live in."[1118] IBM's first advertising campaign struck a chord among many people living in the 1970s. There was a new awareness that revolutionary changes were reshaping and shrinking the world. The roots of this "information revolution" were laid in 1957, when the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial satellite. Moscow and Washington competed to determine which political and economic system could dominate the dawning space age. Washington invested millions of dollars into space technology and encouraged business to take advantage of its research and development. The United States created the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) in 1962 and the International Communications Consortium (INTELSAT) two years later. Washington urged other nations to join these telecommunications networks and encouraged the creation of a "single global common carrier and public service communications satellite system" that would "provide expanded telecommunications services and which will contribute to world peace and understanding." By the end of the

[1117] Dileep Padgaonkar, "Credibility and Pluralism Essential," *Proceedings of the Seminar on Non-Aligned News Pool held in New Delhi on February 12, 1978* (New Delhi: All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference, 1978), 55.
[1118] IBM advertisement as cited in Armand Mattelart, *The Information Society: An Introduction* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2003), 115.

decade, these satellites had established a worldwide network of telephone, fax, radio, and television links.[1119]

These technological developments in turn fueled the political and economic changes that reconfigured the international system in the 1970s. Journalists energized the human rights revolution of the era by raising awareness about violence and oppression abroad. Human rights organizations and dissidents used television to broaden their public relations campaigns.[1120] New communications technology and newspapers also shaped the international economy. World Bank President Robert S. McNamara, as he informed journalists gathered at the *Financial Times* in London, became "increasingly aware that amongst all the myriad ties that bind the world's economies together, none is more important than information."[1121] American leaders noticed the change in the international communications system. Congressman George McGovern, for example, urged Washington to recognize that the "control of information can be a new economic weapon in the arsenals of both developing and developed nations."

[1119] "Policy Paper," 25 August 1965, *FRUS 1964-1968*: Volume XXXIV, Document 73. See also Irving Fang, *A History of Mass Communication: Six Information Revolutions* (Boston: Focal Press, 1997), 210; David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945* (New York: Norton, 2000), 500; Walter a McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 351-361.

[1120] Barbara J. Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge, 2014), 10, 101-102, 211; Martin Ennals, "Free Flow of Human Rights Information: The Need for a Systematic Communications Network," *International Social Science Journal* 4 (1981), 72-82; Kenneth Cmiel, "The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States," *The Journal of American History* 86, no. 3 (1999), 1231-1250; Patrick Chung, "The 'Pictures in Our Heads': Journalists, Human Rights, and U.S.–South Korean Relations, 1970–1976," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 5 (2014), 1136-1155.

[1121] Jeffry A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 2006), 394-396; Robert S. McNamara, "Speech at Financial Times Dinner in London," November 11, 1969, Folder: 1772438, Robert S. McNamara Papers, World Bank Archives, Washington, D.C.

As a Washington official and an influential journalist wrote in a joint editorial for the *New York Times*, the international system was entering a new "postindustrial age" in which "a nation's power must be measured not simply by millions of tons of steel produced or automobiles assembled, but also by the quality and quantity of the information it can summon up on short notice."[1122] It was an age in which the United States, with its advanced communications technology and electronics industry, was poised to dominate.

UNESCO was alert to this information revolution and its impact on international politics but was more attuned to the challenges of global inequality. Secretariat officials like Assistant Director General John Fobes argued that there was greater need for "a more scientific approach" to address the problem of information imbalances in the world. The "growing volume of information" and "the demand for greater equity in the availability of information" demanded new solutions and strategies. A new branch of science, known as "informatics," began to emerge around the study of computer systems, libraries, and electronic databanks. The Secretariat invested in the advancement of computing technology in order to help the developing world improve its access to information.[1123] Amadou Mahtar M'Bow shared his deputy's faith in the power of computers and data-processing. "Information Technology will certainly become one of the most

[1122] George McGovern, "The Information Age," *New York Times* (June 9, 1977); Philip H. Power and Elie Abel, "Third World Vs. The Media, *New York Times* (September 21, 1980), SM29. See also Rita Cruise O'Brien, "The Political Economy of Information in a Changing International Economic Order," *International Organization* 34, no. 4 (1980 Autumn), 445-470.
[1123] John E. Fobes Memorandum, "Problems of the Medium-Term Plan and the Objectives Derived Therefrom," 30 May 1975, Folder 9, Box 3, DDG 2, AG 8, UA.

important fields in the life of nations," he informed the Executive Board.[1124] Over the course of the decade, however, international attention focused not on computers and databases but rather on the mass media.

This chapter explores UNESCO's efforts to reform the international communications system. A growing number of communications specialists and political leaders around the world began to claim that the information revolution and the free flow of information principle benefitted the Western world at the expense of the Third World. Diplomats successfully placed issues like "cultural sovereignty" and the "free *and balanced* flow of information" on the organization's agenda by the mid-1970s. Director General M'Bow agreed that the "mass media have woven a web of relationships from which none can escape" but expressed concerns that they perpetuated a neocolonial system.[1125] M'Bow and his allies therefore sponsored a decade-long global debate about information's role in the international system. They believed they could generate new ideas and develop new strategies to remake the international information system. American media officials, who interpreted efforts to balance the flow of information as a threat to freedom of information, launched a countermovement. News editors and executives mobilized colleagues internationally, pressured the Secretariat, lobbied world capitals, and developed their own vision of how the international

[1124] "Rapport Oral du Directeur Général Sur L'Activité de L'Organization depuis la 104e Session," Summary Records of the Executive Board, Third Meeting, 105th Session, 28 September 1978, 105 EX/SR.1-29, UNESDOC, 31.
[1125] See for example, Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Address at the Talloires "Voices of Freedom" Conference, 16 May 1981, DG/81/13, UNESDOC.

information system should be structured. Disagreements about information issues set the Secretariat and the United States on a collision course.

The World Confronts the Information Revolution

Although American leaders had long championed new information and communications technology as a solution to many of the world's problems, a new generation of academics emerged to challenge the consensus. New Left founding father and sociologist C. Wright Mills first characterized the mass media in 1956 as a "malign force" that helped America's "power elite" to maintain its control over the government, economy, and military.[1126] Ten years later, the Vietnam War shattered America's Cold War consensus, which upheld the country's benevolent role in the world, and inspired a younger generation of sociologists and communications theorists to expand Mills' criticism to the realm of American foreign policy. Sociologist Alan Wells argued that American "Picture Tube Imperialism" was stunting Third World economic development. Jeremy Tunstall wrote that the American media shaped how news and information was distributed around the world. Journalism professor Al Hester argued that news agencies neglected Third World struggles for self-determination, sovereignty, and justice. Even Cold War academics like Sovietologist Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that it was American communications technology that had the "greatest impact on all

[1126] C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford, 2000 [1956]), 314-315.

other societies, prompting a far-reaching cumulative transformation in their outlook and mores."[1127]

Herbert Schiller was the most vocal proponent of this new critique of American power. The University of California communications theorist established the standard analysis of American communications power in a series of books and articles. He argued that a "marriage of economics and electronics" provided the foundations for the "American imperial structure" that had dominated international politics since the Second World War. American "communications diplomacy," like nineteenth-century "gunboat diplomacy," extended the "American business system and its values to all corners of the international community." The free flow of information was the "channel through which life styles and value systems can be imposed on poor and vulnerable societies." Anyone interested in international justice should fight instead for "Freedom from the Free Flow" of information.[1128] Schiller travelled widely, collaborated with academics abroad, and popularized criticism of the American media.[1129]

Similar ideas also shaped hemispheric responses to American communications. Latin American criticism was most pronounced in Chile. Ariel

[1127] Alan Wells, *Picture Tube Imperialism* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1972); Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media are American* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Al Hester, "North American and Western European Perspectives on Free and Balanced Flow of News and Information," 1-14; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Age* (New York: Viking Press, 1970), 4, 35.
[1128] Herbert I. Schiller, *Mass Communications and American Empire* (New York: A. M. Kelly, 1969), 5, 92, 100; Herbert I. Schiller, "Freedom from the 'Free Flow,'" *Journal of Communication* 24 (Winter 1974). See also Herbert I. Schiller, *The Mind Managers* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 6-7, 143.
[1129] Richard Maxwell, *Herbert Schiller* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 40.

Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, two intellectuals associated with Chilean President Salvador Allende's socialist government in Santiago, published a scathing critique of American power in 1971 by analyzing the "imperialist ideology" encoded in one of the region's most popular American imports: Donald Duck cartoons. *How to Read Donald Duck* sparked a cultural turn in Latin American criticism of American imperialism in the hemisphere.[1130] Revelations that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation had published right wing newspapers and helped to destabilize President Salvador Allende's government reinforced this new interest in the political power of international communications. The Chilean exile Juan Somavía, who led the Andean Group's attempts to foster regional economic cooperation at the expense of the United States, fled to Mexico City and founded the Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies. Somavía criticized the free flow of information, attacked American mass media biases, and argued that information and communications should serve social rather than corporate interests. Under his direction, the Institute became the most influential communications research center in the region.[1131]

[1130] Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic* (New York: International General, 1975 [1971]). See also Sophia A. McClennen, "Beyond 'Death and the Maiden': Ariel Dorfman's Media Criticism and Journalism," *Latin American Research Review* 45, no. 1 (2010), 173-188.

[1131] Juan Somavia, "The Transnational Power Structure and International Information: Elements of a Third World Policy for Transnational News Agencies," *Development Dialogue* (1976), 23-26. For a survey of communications research in the region, see Raul Fuentes-Navarro, "Institutionalization and Internationalization of the Field of Communication Studies in Mexico and Latin America," *The International History of Communication Study*, chapter 15. For the ITTC and Chile, see Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 159.

Criticism of American communications also took on an anticolonial tone north of the border. The resurgence of Canadian nationalism began to target the surging flood of television signals and magazines that were poring over the border. Parliamentary proposals to regulate and limit the "Americanization" of Canadian culture sparked resistance from American business, especially publishers and broadcasters, that strained Canadian-American relations for over a decade. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau worried in particular that American television programs and advertisements would influence patterns of consumer behavior and would therefore undermine Canadian sovereignty and Ottawa's ability to direct its own economy.[1132] Latin American and Canadian discussions about the information revolution revealed the anxiety about national sovereignty and information imbalances.

Nowhere else was concern about national sovereignty more pronounced than in Moscow. Soviet officials had consistently interpreted the free flow of information as a threat to international peace and domestic stability. The series of East European uprisings that shook the communist bloc - East Germany in 1953 and then Poland and Hungary in 1956 - reinforced official conviction that territorial sovereignty should include control over the flow of information and

[1132] "Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting," 8 March 1974, *FRUS 1969-1976: Volume E-15*, Part 2, document 109; "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford," 5 January 1976, *FRUS 1969-1976: Volume E-15*, Part 2, document 115. For Pierre Trudeau's perspective on Canadian economic sovereignty, see "Memorandum of Conversation," 23 March 1976, *FRUS 1969-1976*: Volume E-15, Part 2, document 117. See also "Report of Commonwealth Committee on Media and Communication Issues and the New World Information and Communication Order," n.d. [probably 1980], 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15972, LAC.

ideas. Soviet officials blamed Western radio broadcasts, both anti-communist networks like Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as well as radio programs that indirectly advertised Western Europe's high living standards, with inflaming armed opposition. Conflict in Czechoslovakia in 1968 reinforced these fears. Pent-up discontent with the government led dissident artists and intellectuals to call for more openness and freedom of speech. Slovak communist leader Alexander Dubček responded positively and promised to liberalize the country through democratic reform and contact with the outside world. The media - newspapers, radio, and television - expanded calls for reform and helped foment the Prague Spring.[1133] Czechoslovakia's neighbors grew concerned about the reform movement and secured Warsaw Pact agreement to jointly crush the Prague Spring and end its political experiments with reform. East European troops invaded, removed Dubček and his political allies, and installed new leaders loyal to Moscow and communist orthodoxy. These "fraternal" forces also had to confront the Czechoslovakian media that spread and maintained dissent. "In conversation the locals emphasize ever more frequently that the people have been deceived by the press and radio," Polish officials complained.[1134] The Prague Spring demonstrated that the free flow of information remained a central threat to Soviet security.

[1133] Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest*, 194-206; Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), chapter 1.
[1134] "Report from the Political Department of Polish Second Army on the emotional-political condition of the soldiers taking part in Operation 'Danube,'" 7 September 1968, CWIHP.

Moscow sought to strengthen control over the mass media and communications in its post-1968 efforts to normalize communist power and Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Soviet leaders believed that they were engaged in "an unabating ideological war" with the Western world's mass media.[1135] "These media are integrally linked to the question of power," Leonid Brezhnev informed Warsaw Pact colleagues some years later.[1136] The Soviet Union redoubled efforts to block the flow of Western radio and television signals crossing its borders. Soviet legal scholars began advocating a separate branch of international law pertaining to the flow of information, especially with regards to satellites, that would strengthen its control over its borders.[1137] At the same time, Moscow strengthened its own communications power by tightening censorship, imposing politically loyal officials to head the Soviet media, and investing more in news production. Soviet journalism schools had long taught political doctrine alongside technical training and had emphasized the importance of serving political goals. The Soviet career ladder dictated that professional security and prosperity were dependent on cooperation with political elites. Nikita Khrushchev praised Soviet journalists as "helpers of the party" and "the most reliable transmission belt of the party." Brezhnev's Politburo tightened constraints on journalists, enforced political orthodoxy, and limited professional

[1135] "Report of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee to the 24th Party Congress," reprinted in *CDSP* XXIII, no. 14 (1972), 8.
[1136] "Stenographic Minutes of the Meeting of Leading Representatives of the Warsaw Pact Countries in Moscow," 5 December 1980, CWIHP.
[1137] Yu. M. Kotosov, "The Law and Scientific and Technical Progress: Mass Information and International Law," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, November 1972, reprinted in *CDSP* XXV, no. 4 (1972), 12.

independence.[1138] Moscow sought to normalize communist orthodoxy and stability after the Prague Spring by strengthening what one historian has called an "informational cordon sanitaire" around Eastern Europe.[1139]

Moscow worried that international laws and agreements would undermine its attempts to secure the communist bloc's "informational sovereignty." A young generation of dissidents had begun to challenge the communist party's authority in the late 1960s. *The Chronicle of Current Events*, the most influential Samizdat journal, reprinted article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the start of each issue to legitimize its efforts to spread information about political repression in the Soviet Union.[1140] Soviet diplomatic miscalculations reinforced international constraints on its informational sovereignty. Moscow had succeeded in launching a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, which brought together every country in Europe, as well as the United States and Canada, in a comprehensive attempt to discuss and resolve regional problems, in the hope that it could gain international recognition of Eastern Europe's borders and thereby secure its sphere of influence. West European capitals saw the conference as an opportunity to pry human rights concessions from their communist counterparts. Soviet diplomats resisted and Henry Kissinger, eager to wrap up the conference, ridiculed the idea that the Soviet

[1138] Thomas F. Remington, "Politics and Professionalism in Soviet Journalism," *Slavic Review* 44, no. 3 (Autumn 1985), 490, 497, 500.
[1139] Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 54, 150; Kristin Roth-Ey, *Moscow Prime Time: How The Soviet Union Built the Media Empire that Lost the Cultural Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2011), 192.
[1140] Irena Maryniak, "Khronika Tekushchykh Sobytii," *Censorship*, 1331-1332.

system could "be changed if Western newspapers were put on sale in a few kiosks in Moscow."[1141] West European diplomats successfully convinced their Soviet counterparts to recognize human rights in Eastern Europe and, in the so-called Basket 3 agreements, to ease restrictions on the flow of information across the Iron Curtain. Moscow believed that the Helsinki Accords, signed in July 1975, would strengthen their national sovereignty. "We are masters in our own house," Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko cheered.[1142] Yet Soviet agreements to recognize human rights and permit a freer flow of information backfired. Helsinki Watch Groups formed spontaneously in the region and monitored human rights violations and compliance with the Accords. East European dissidents and human rights organizations now invoked the Helsinki Accords, alongside the Universal Declaration, to legitimize their efforts to spread information about Soviet oppression.[1143]

Soviet diplomats turned towards the international community in order to resist the accelerating flow of information within and across their borders. Communist bloc intelligence services met in 1976, less than six months after the passage of the Helsinki Accords, to coordinate strategy. They agreed to "isolate" the western media "in the international arena" by characterizing them "as subversive agencies, whose activities in the spirit of the Cold War stand in

[1141] Henry Kissinger as cited in Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 78.
[1142] Anantoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 346.
[1143] Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*; Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 229-238, 254.

contrast to détente, and the strengthening of cooperation among countries of a different social order."[1144] Soviet ideologists like Georgi Arbatov argued that the Helsinki Accords, and the commitment to liberalize the flow of information, should not open the door to subversive and anti-soviet propaganda.[1145] The "enemies of socialism, peace and cooperation," one journalist agued, "are trying turn the mass media into an effective instrument of psychological warfare and subversion against the socialist and developing countries."[1146] Officials characterized "dangerous" news reports in the foreign press - testimony by dissidents, reports of human rights violations, criticism of Soviet foreign policy - as threats to the principles of national sovereignty and detente. Diplomats repeated these arguments in international conferences, summits, and political speeches. This propaganda campaign shaped how Moscow responded to discussions about the information revolution. By the end of the decade, state-run journals began to warn about the "blast waves of the information explosion" - the accelerating flow of unmanageable information that threatened peace and undermined national sovereignty.[1147] When an explosion rattled Moscow's subway system in 1977, for example, officials blamed the "uncontrolled flow of

[1144] "Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services Take Joint Countermeasures against Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty," 13 February 1976, Translated by Christian Ostermann, CWIHP.
[1145] Georgi Arbatov, "Reciprocity after Helsinki," *New York Times* (8 October 1976).
[1146] Andrei Grachov, "The Media and the Political Climate," *New Times* (47: 1979), 22.
[1147] See for example, Sergei Golyakov, "Crooked Mirror of Information Imperialism," *New Times* (43: 78); "The Responsibility of the Mass Media," *New Times* (6: 77); Moscow to DOS, "Spate of Articles in Soviet Press Herald Opening of UNESCO Session," 30 October 1978, Moscow 26302, AAD; Nikolai Yermoshkin, "Blast Waves of the 'Information Explosion,'" *New Times* (35: 80), 18.

information" for inciting domestic terrorism.[1148] The international community, they argued, needed to develop safeguards to regulate the international flow of information.

Third World states also questioned the dangers of the new information age. Diplomats and officials from the developing world had complained for years about their treatment in the press. Their constant refrain was that the international media perpetuated stereotypes and undermined the image and credibility of new states. Filipino diplomat Carlos Romulo argued as early as 1949 that the Western media had the responsibly to balance the "achievements" of foreign peoples with "their bad habits or catastrophes."[1149] Some officials maintained in the early sixties, when African decolonization dominated headlines worldwide, that Hollywood films and sensationalistic newsreels provided antiquated and prejudiced images of the postcolonial world as hungry, dirty, overpopulated, and corrupt. These complaints about the cultural residue of European colonial ideology had implications not just for national prestige but for international politics. The image of "darkest Africa" distorted American relations with the continent and undermined support for important aid programs.[1150] Asian officials like Indian Education Minister V. K. R. V. Rao went further and argued in 1970 that the "brutal attacks from the publicity fiends of the mass media in

[1148] London to DOS, "Viktor Louis on Terrorist Incident in Moscow," 10 January 1977, London 00399, AAD.
[1149] Roundtable Radio Transcript, The University of Chicago Roundtable, special issue: "Freedom of Information" 612 (11 December 1949), Folder 4, Box 480, WBP, UCA.
[1150] See for example, Ian Forman, "UNESCO Speakers Rap Old Notions About Africa," *Boston Globe* (25 October 1961), 1.

industrialized nations" necessitated an "international code of conduct" to protect the Third World from "ridicule and derision."[1151]

Anticolonial critics focused their attention on the great international news agencies - the Associated Press (AP) and the Universal Press International (UPI) in the United States, Reuters in Britain, and Agence France-Presse (AFP) in France - which controlled the global flow of information. World news agencies had an immense worldwide network of subscribers and correspondents. Foreign correspondents sent regular news stories and reports to their headquarters, which in turn edited and distributed them to local newspapers and broadcasters at home and abroad.[1152] The non-aligned world saw them, however, as merely the latest vanguard of Western imperialism. Nineteenth-century British industrialization had fueled an imperialist quest to conquer new markets in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and even formally independent Latin American republics.[1153] The non-aligned feared that the news agencies, like the merchants who championed "Free Trade Imperialism," invoked the free flow of information to legitimize control over weak states.[1154] Third World countries, many concluded, had to break neocolonial control over the flow of information and establish alternative institutions to voice their grievances.

[1151] V. K. R. V. Rao address, Records of the General Conference, Sixteenth Session, Eleventh Plenary Meeting, 17 October 1970, 16 C/Proceedings, UNESDOC, 359.
[1152] For an engaging discussion, see Percy Winner, "A Newsflash Crosses the World," *Unesco Courier* (1954), 11.
[1153] For the classic articulation of free trade imperialism, see John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review* (August 1953), 1–15.
[1154] Al Hester, "North American and Western European Perspectives on Free and Balanced Flow of News and Information," 12; Philip Elliott and Peter Golding, "Mass Communication and Social Change: The Imagery of Development and the Development of Imagery," in E. de Kadt and G. Williams, *Sociology and Development* (London: Tavistock, 1974).

The Non-Aligned Movement began to make the media an international political issue at its 1973 summit in Algiers when it declared that it would pursue the "reorganization of existing communication channels which are the legacy of the colonial past."[1155] Two years later, the NAM launched a Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool. Twenty nations negotiated a series of bilateral agreements to share and jointly broadcast information about their countries. Yugoslavian news agency Tanjug coordinated the effort and broadcast daily news reports across the world.[1156] The News Pool's success encouraged NAM leaders to focus more attention on communications issues at their next summit in August 1976. Senior officials billed the meeting, assembled in Sri Lanka's capital city Colombo, as a "Bandung [Conference] for Information Policy."[1157] Delegates agreed that "persistent and serious imbalances" existed in the global flow of information, expressed interest in developing an international code of ethics governing the flow of information, and promised to concert their policies towards the United Nations and other international organizations on these issues. There was a general consensus that, in the words of Indian Information Minister Vidya Charan Shukla,

[1155] Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, "Action Programme for Economic Co-Operation," *The Third World without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries,* Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvant, eds. (Dobbs Ferry, 1978), 227.

[1156] These reports were broadcast in in English, French, and Spanish. Participating countries included Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Zambia, as well as the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the Palestine Liberation Organization. See The News Agency Tanjug, Information Booklet, 21 April 1975, enclosed in Canadian Embassy Belgrade to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 13 June 1975, 20-4-NON-ALIGNED, Volume 9104, RG25, LAC.

[1157] Tunis to DOS, "Multilateral Affairs: Tunisia and the Non-Aligned Conference on Information," 7 July 1976, Tunis 04779, AAD.

"the idea of [a] 'free' flow of information fits insidiously into the package of other kinds of 'freedom' still championed by the adherents of 19th century liberalism."[1158] The Colombo Conference concluded by declaring that a "New World Information and Communications Order" (NWICO) was as necessary as a New International Economic Order (NIEO).[1159] It was vague and poorly defined but became a convenient slogan that conveyed the Third World's desire to reform the global information order.

National interests motivated some political support for the News Pool and the NWICO. Yugoslavia used the News Pool to position itself as a major power in the Third World. Tanjug, the country's national news agency, unveiled a new transmission center that it claimed was powerful enough to broadcast to "the remotest parts of Asia, Latin America, [and] Africa." It could "transmit to the world the truth about Yugoslavia, its internal and foreign policy, about the development, successes and aspirations of all the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia."[1160] Some observers speculated that Belgrade was opening markets for Yugoslavia's electronics industry.[1161] Overlapping domestic and diplomatic issues also pushed India to assert leadership over information and communications issues. New Delhi's decision to intervene in Pakistan's civil war

[1158] New Delhi to DOS, "Non-Aligned News Pool Conference Opens," 9 July 1976, New De 10145, AAD.
[1159] New Delhi to DOS, "Non-Aligned Meeting on Press Agencies Pool: A Declaration on Information," 13 July 1976, New De 10272, AAD.
[1160] Tanjug News Agency, Information Booklet, 21 April 1975, enclosed in Canadian Embassy Belgrade to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 13 June 1975, 20-4-NON-ALIGNED, Volume 9104, RG25, LAC.
[1161] Belgrade to DOS, "First Conference of Broadcasting Organizations of the Non-Aligned Countries," 9 November 1977, Belgra 07804, AAD.

with Bangladesh in 1971 and breakup its regional rival led to censure in the UN General Assembly and the NAM.[1162] A series of escalating political protests four years later led Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to declare a national "emergency" - which included new censorship laws and rule by decree - to reassert government power throughout the country. The episode tarnished India's image as the world's most populous democracy.[1163] New Delhi believed that assuming leadership of the News Pool could restore India's international prestige.[1164] Gandhi vocally supported the News Pool and posed as elder statesman among the Non-Aligned while journalist D. R. Mankekar headed the News Pool and represented the Third World at international conferences.[1165] Yugoslavian and Indian officials competed for influence over Third World information and communications issues and became the NWICO's leading champions.

Third World diplomats and officials also began to coordinate their information policies in order to strengthen Third World unity. The News Pool, as

[1162] Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2013).
[1163] Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 222. For the press during the Emergency period, see also D.S. Mehta, *Mass Communication and Journalism in India* (Bombay: Allied, 1979), 54-55, 59, 258; D. R. Mankekar, "Indira and the Press," *Indira Era: A Symposium*, D. R. Mankekar, ed. (New Delhi: Navrang, 1986), 85-86.
[1164] Tunis to DOS, "Multilateral Affairs: Tunisia and the Non-Aligned Conference on Information," 7 July 1976, Tunis 04779, AAD; "Non-Aligned Conf on News Pool Agency," 20 July 1976, 20-4-NON ALIGNED, Volume 9104, LAC; Canadian High Commission (New Delhi) to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), "India and the Non-Aligned Conference," 20 September 1976, 20-4-NON ALIGNED, Volume 9105, LAC; D. R. Mankekar, "Answer to Points Raised," *Proceedings of the Seminar on Non-Aligned News Pool held in New Delhi*, 79.
[1165] New Delhi to DOS, "Gandhi Address to Non-Aligned News Pool Conference," 9 July 1976, New De 10144, AAD; Scheider to DOS, "PM Gandhi's Speech Before NAC Plenary," 23 August 1976, New De 12338, AAD; D. D. R. Mankekar, *Sheer Anecdotage: Leaves from a Reporter's Diary* (New Delhi: Allied, 1983), 419-422.

a senior Yugoslavian New Pool editor informed a Canadian diplomat, would "allow the non-aligned to better know each other and to project themselves and their views more effectively internationally."[1166] By exchanging more information, Third World countries would understand each better and improve conditions for trade and investment between developing nations.[1167] Delegates to NAM conferences and summits revealed how enhanced information and communications capabilities could augment their strategic goals. Some believed that the "international news media" had "underplayed or misrepresented" - and therefore sabotaged - the Third World's economic agenda, especially the NIEO. The media continued to fixate on Third World corruption - coups, political repression, civil wars, and the boorish behavior of Ugandan President Idi Amin at the UN General Assembly - that eroded Western goodwill and patience for Third World demands. Better communications power would empower them to reach over the heads of political leaders and appeal directly to Western public opinion.[1168] Diplomats from recently reunified Vietnam reminded one conference that the mass media had facilitated their own diplomatic and military campaign against the United States.[1169] Other NAM officials saw the News Pool as the last

[1166] Canadian Embassy Belgrade to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, "Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool," 13 June 1975, 20-4-NON-ALIGNED, Volume 9104, LAC. See also Pero Ivacic, "The Non-Aligned Countries Pool Their News," *Unesco Courier* (April 1977), 20; W. Lazarus, "A Role to Play," *Proceedings of the Seminar on Non-Aligned News Pool held in New Delhi on February 12, 1978*, 60.
[1167] D. R. Mankekar, "Answer to Points Raised," *Proceedings of the Seminar on Non-Aligned News Pool*, 75.
[1168] New Delhi to DOS, "Non-Aligned Meeting on Press Agencies Pool: A Declaration on Information," 13 July 1976, New De 10272, AAD.
[1169] Belgrade to DOS, "First Conference of Broadcasting Organizations of the Non-Aligned Countries," 9 November 1977, Belgra 07804, AAD.

stage of decolonization. Anticolonial diplomats and intellectuals condemned "information imperialism" and called for the "decolonization of the news."[1170] Some charged that the international news agencies had facilitated the covert American interventions that had brought down Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran and Salvador Allende in Chile.[1171] By 1975, information and communications issues had become a central plank of Third World unity.

UNESCO was also turning its attention towards the challenges of the information age. The organization had championed the free flow of information for decades as both a means to foster international understanding and a strategy to build nations. Dissenting voices, however, raised their concerns about the need to ensure a "balanced" and "two-way" flow of communications.[1172] These ideas moved to the center of the organization's agenda after a 1969 meeting of world communications officials assembled in Montreal. Discussions turned from the benefits of the free flow of information to its potential dangers and the need to enhance a "two-way" flow of information. Some emphasized the need to preserve "cultural privacy" and defend "cultural sovereignty" from the swelling waves of information that were beginning to crash over new nations. The conference

[1170] New Delhi to DOS, "Non-Aligned News Pool Conference Opens," 9 July 1976, New De 10145, AAD; D.R. Manekar, *One-Way Free Flow: Neo-Colonialism via News Media* (Delhi: Clarion Books, 1978).
[1171] D. R. Mankekar, "Why News Pool," *Proceedings of the Seminar on Non-Aligned News Pool*, 86. See also Jonathan F. Gunter, *The United States and the Debate on the World 'Information Order'* (New York: Academy for Educational Development, 1979), 56.
[1172] For pertinent examples, see "Social Scientists Issue Joint Statement on World Tensions," *Unesco Courier* (July 1948); "Key Words of UNESCO: The Free Flow of Ideas & Information," *Unesco Courier* (March 1956); Meeting of Experts on the Use of Space Communication by the Mass Media, "Draft Report of the Meeting," SPACECOM/Draft report, 9 December 1965, UNESDOC, 20.

encouraged the organization to revise its attitudes towards information.[1173] The Secretariat sponsored the Finnish academic Tapio Varis, the Finnish Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication, and their efforts to quantify global flows of information and news. The Finnish Institute organized a Symposium on the International Flow of Television Programs in May 1973 to present the results of their research. Varis and his colleagues, using statistical records of television broadcasting, concluded that the free-flow of information between nations amounted in practice "to the 'one-way street' principle: the streams of heavy traffic flow one way only."[1174] Finnish President Urho Kekkonen attended the symposium and endorsed many of its conclusions. "Could it be that the prophets who preach unhindered communication are not concerned with equality between nations, but are on the side of the stronger and wealthier," the president asked. He urged the international community "to achieve a 'balance of payments' in communication between states to the largest degree possible."[1175] Tapio Varis' study was published by UNESCO and became widely cited by critics of the free flow doctrine while Kekkonen's participation gave it greater publicity.

Global critics of the international information order began to turn towards UNESCO. Moscow's permanent delegate in Paris leveled familiar complaints that the media was "an extremely dangerous means for the preaching of violence,

[1173] Dick MacDonald, "Mass Media Research is Needed," *Montreal Star* (5 July 1969), 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 10563, LAC.
[1174] Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis, *Television Traffic - A One-Way Street?: A Survey and Analysis of the International Flow of Television Programme Material* (UNESCO: Paris, 1974), 52.
[1175] Urho Kekkonen, "The Free Flow of Information: Towards a Reconsideration of National and International Communication Policies," in *Television Traffic*, 44-45.

racial inequality, misanthropy and chauvinism." Dozens of Soviet experts argued at professional conferences that the free flow of information and TV broadcasts across national borders represented "intolerable intrusion in the internal affairs of States."[1176] Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko wrote to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in August 1972 to voice his concern about direct satellite broadcasts. A Soviet resolution led the General Assembly to call upon the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to elaborate a series of principles governing satellite communications and national sovereignty.[1177] The Soviet delegation supported the passage of a "Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information" at the UNESCO General Conference a few months later. The declaration repeated arguments that satellites could improve "understanding among peoples" but emphasized Soviet demands that "Satellite broadcasting shall respect the sovereignty and equality of all states."[1178] At the same time, the General Conference approved a similar Soviet request for a "draft declaration concerning the fundamental principles governing the use of the mass media with a view to strengthening peace and international understanding and combating war

[1176] Vadim Sobakin, *UNESCO: Problems and Perspectives* (Moscow: Novosti, 1972), 77; Meeting of Experts on Interpretations of Experience by and Through the Mass Media, "Final Report," 21 July 1976, SHC.76/CONF.621.3, UNESDOC. See also V. Korobeinikov, "What is Behind the 'Freedom of Information' Concept," *International Affairs* 2 (Moscow: February 1976).
[1177] Harry Bloom, "A Therapy for the Mass Media," SHC.76/CONF.621/7, UNESDOC, 3; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 27/2916, 9 November 1972, 2081st Plenary Meeting, Twenty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly.
[1178] "Declaration of Guiding Principles on the use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange," 1972, UNESDOC. See also Gunnar Naesselund, "International Problems of Television Via Satellite," *Unesco Courier* (February 1973), 21-23.

propaganda, racialism and apartheid." The Soviet proposal for a "Mass Media Declaration," although intended to strengthen Soviet security, took on a life of its own and dominated the organization's information and communications agenda for the next six years (see below).[1179]

The Non-Aligned Movement also looked towards UNESCO as its international champion. M'Bow publicly proclaimed that the organization would play no role in helping to launch the News Pool.[1180] Yet the organization lent both technical and moral support to the NAM over the following decade. Yugoslavia's National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO invited the Secretariat's Mass Communications department to deploy a mission to Belgrade to consult with Tanjug and the News Pool. Gunnar R. Naesselund, the Director of the Secretariat's Free Flow of Information Department, expressed interest in the News Pool and pledged closer cooperation between the UNESCO and the NAM.[1181] The Colombo Summit in 1976 resolved to formally request the organization's support. The General Conference formally expressed its support three months later and instructed M'Bow "to pay very special attention" to the Non-Aligned News Pool.[1182] The organization named News Pool director D. R. Mankekar "Consultant to UNESCO on communications." Mankekar later claimed that the organization's "blessings and sponsorship" had benefitted Third World

[1179] Historical Background of the Mass Media Declaration, 1982, UNESDOC, 2.
[1180] Nairobi to DOS, "DG's View of UNESCO's Role in NAM Press Pool," 17 November 1976, Nairob 12842, AAD.
[1181] Gunnar R. Naesselund to ADG/COM, "Mission to Yugoslavia," 16 June 1975, Folder: "Organization - Department of Mass Communications," Box 3046, x07.55 MC, AG 8, UA.
[1182] Resolution 4.142, Records of the General Conference, Resolutions, Nineteenth Session, 1976, 19 C/Resolutions + CORR, UNESDOC, 53.

news agencies and helped a "dream to come true."[1183] Non-Aligned conferences would draw inspiration from Secretariat studies and conferences in future years.[1184]

Amadou Mahtar M'Bow made his organization the center of international debate about communications issues. He had already committed himself in 1974 to making the organization the intellectual cutting edge of the NIEO and its efforts to create a more equitable global economic system (see chapter 5). The struggle to improve the international flow of news and information seemed tailor-made for UNESCO. NAM efforts to "decolonize the media" complemented his belief that nations had to reclaim their cultural identity. He also sympathized with non-aligned arguments that the international media did not understand Third World demands. "When Idi Amin Dada says something, the whole world press explodes and covers all that he says," he complained to Washington insiders during a visit to the prestigious Cosmos Club. "The developed world has an incomplete image of the developing world," he added, which required international efforts to "correct imbalance[s] in the news flow."[1185] M'Bow plunged himself into these global discussions. He gave speeches on communications and international politics and repeated NAM arguments that if

[1183] D. R. Mankekar, *Sheer Anecdotage*, 429; D. R. Mankekar, "Why News Pool," *Proceedings of the Seminar on Non-Aligned News Pool held in New Delhi*, 91.
[1184] Robinson to DOS, "Multilateral Affairs Non-Aligned Summit: Non-Aligned News Pool and Control of News Media," 11 August 1976, State 199514, AAD; D. R. Mankekar, "Three Kinds of Gaps," *Proceedings of the Seminar on Non-Aligned News Pool held in New Delhi*, 14, 16.
[1185] Leonard Sussman Memorandum, "Meeting with Director-General M'Bow," Folder: "M'Bow Statements & Correspondence," 7 July 1978, Box 19, WPFCR, PUL.

"the flow of information is to be free then it must also be balanced."[1186] The Director General made the struggle for a New World Information Order his own and became its most dedicated champion in the international community.

By the mid-1970s, growing criticism among communications theorists, Soviet efforts to normalize communist orthodoxy and shore up national sovereignty in Eastern Europe, and non-aligned efforts to improve their relative information power had transformed international discussions of the free flow of information. A commitment to ensure a "free *and balanced* flow" of information now dominated international discussions on the subject. "There was once the naive idea that the more communication there is between different countries the more we shall understand one another," one conference concluded. "This is no longer prevalent."[1187] UNESCO emerged as the most important international organization devoted to working through these discussions. The Secretariat's senior officials believed in 1974 that they had to develop long-term plans and strategies to fix the "balance and diversity of the flow of information" around the world.[1188] Over the next decade, they led a global debate to discuss how this could be done.

[1186] Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Address at the Opening Meeting of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 14 December 1977, DG/77/15, UNESDOC.
[1187] "The Problems of Imbalance in the Flow of Information," 5 April 1977, OPI.77/WS/2, UNESDOC.
[1188] "Analysis of Problems and Table of Objectives to be Used as a Basis for Medium-Term Planning (1977-1982)," 12 April 1974, 18 C/4, UNESDOC, 27.

The Global Information Debate

The communications revolution sparked a wide and unwieldy spectrum of critiques and proposals for change. The Secretariat confronted the challenge by trying to synthesize and reach some consensus on how to reform the international information system. This global information debate first began to swirl around the Mass Media Declaration proposed by the Soviet Union. The Swedish legal expert Hilding Eek wrote the first draft of the declaration in early 1974. The eleven articles emphasized "responsibility" and stressed limits. It argued that "the right to seek and transmit information should be assured in order to enable the public to ascertain facts and appraise events," arguments that were compatible with the free flow of information, but qualified this statement by guaranteeing "respect for the sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of States and of non-intervention in the internal affairs of foreign countries." Several articles focused on the media's "responsibility" to avoid "incitement to racial discrimination" and conflict between states. The draft went further in suggesting that states were "responsible" not just for governmental information services but also for "national legislation relating to the performance of mass media within its own territory."[1189] As Secretariat experts quickly realized, these articles were subject to "varying interpretations" that could lead to controversy.[1190]

[1189] Draft Declaration of Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of the Mass Media, 23 January, 1974, COM-74/CONF.616/3, UNESDOC.
[1190] Jacques Bourquin, "Comments on the Draft Declaration," 11 February 1974, COM-74/CONF.616/3, UNESDOC.

A March 1974 meeting of experts that assembled in Paris to discuss Eek's draft declaration revealed the fault lines that would shake the organization. The twelve experts clashed over the tensions between "freedom of information" and "a sense of responsibility to prevent abuses of this freedom." The Soviet expert, concerned with the principle of national sovereignty, sought to strengthen its emphasis on the media's international "responsibilities" and suggested that "States should be held internationally responsible for the conduct of private, as well as governmental, mass media within their territory."[1191] Third World countries were more interested in "promoting a more balanced flow of information and opinion, so that the cultural integrity of their countries would not be submerged or dominated by foreign sources."[1192] The Senegalese official interjected that African culture and youth needed to be protected from "ridicule." Argentina's delegate criticized the international news agencies' neocolonial international power. The Canadian representative tended to agree with many Third World interventions in the discussion. "Interestingly enough, almost all the concerns touched on by the other delegates about media domination were concerns that Canada has grappled with frequently in the context of U.S.-Canada relations," he cabled Ottawa.[1193] American representative Carl Salans was

[1191] Carl F. Salans, "Report on the Meeting of Experts on a Draft Declaration Concerning the Use of the Mass Media,"Attached to Carl F. Salans to William B. Jones, 22 March 1974, Folder: "Wingspread-1974," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1192] Meeting of Experts on a Draft Declaration Concerning the Role of the Mass Media, "Report of the Meeting," 25 April 1974, COM.74/CONF.616/5, UNESDOC, 2-3.
[1193] Peter S. Grant Memorandum to Pierre Juneau, "Report Concerning Draft UNESCO Declaration on the Role of the Mass Media," 15 August 1974, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 10563, LAC.

"essentially isolated" in his attempt to kill the declaration.[1194] He commented on most sentences and paragraphs, suggested changes in the text to preserve the free flow principle, and made "a general nuisance of himself." Salans objected to any implication states should manage "non-governmental, people-to-people communications." His counterparts decided to water down the draft in order to gain consensus.[1195] The State Department was impressed with Salans' "extraordinarily successful efforts" to revise the draft declaration but still believed it could be "construed to give UNESCO's blessing to a wide range of restrictive practices on the part of governments in relation to mass communications media." Salans therefore had to inform the meeting that Washington would not approve of the declaration.[1196]

International events pushed American allies to close ranks and forge common positions. An intergovernmental conference assembled in December 1975 to prepare the draft declaration for the next General Assembly revealed the growing polarization of opinion around the free flow principle. After signing the Helsinki Final Act in July, North American and West European diplomats worried that the Soviets would use the December meeting to undermine their commitments to liberalize the flow of information. Canadians, who were still

[1194] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO Meeting on Mass Media Principles Declaration," 13 March 1974, Paris 06308, AAD.
[1195] Carl F. Salans to William B. Jones, 22 March 1974, Folder: "Wingspread-1974," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL; Carl F. Salans, "Report on the Meeting of Experts on a Draft Declaration Concerning the Use of the Mass Media," Attached to Carl F. Salans to William B. Jones, 22 March 1974, Folder: "Wingspread-1974," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1196] DOS to Paris, "UNESCO Meeting on Mass Media Declaration," 14 March 1974, State 051683, AAD. See also DOS to Paris, "UNESCO Meeting on Mass Media Declaration," 18 March 1974, State 053631, AAD.

concerned about American threats to their "cultural sovereignty," now worried more about Soviet actions. Ottawa therefore sought to ensure that the declaration was "sidetracked, delayed, or otherwise stopped."[1197] West Europeans also worried that Moscow would use the declaration to "adulterate" Soviet commitments made at Helsinki and, according to British diplomats, planned "to pour [*sic*] sufficient cold water on [the] proposed declaration to drown it."[1198] These states arrived at the December meeting ready to defend their Helsinki victories. When Yugoslavian delegates proposed including "Zionism" in the Mass Media Declaration, however, Western delegates walked out in protest. Soviet bloc delegations took advantage of the situation to push through a new draft that included an article indicating "states are responsible for the activities in the international sphere of all mass media under their jurisdiction."[1199] On the one hand, the December meeting reversed Salans' victories from a year earlier. On the other hand, it helped to broaden Western diplomatic support for American policies towards the Mass Media Draft.

International developments continued to polarize the international debate on the free flow of information in 1976. The Non-Aligned Movement sponsored regional meetings to discuss media issues in Tunisia in March and in Mexico City

[1197] "Proposed Canadian Position on the UNESCO Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles on the Role of the Mass Media," enclosed in Peter S. Grant to Jacques Asselin, 3 December 1975, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 10563, LAC.
[1198] Brussels to DOS, "UNESCO Meeting on Proposed Declaration on Use of Mass Media," 16 December 1975, Brusse 11246, AAD; London to Ottawa, "UNESCO Declaration on Mass Media," 18 November 1975, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 10563, LAC.
[1199] Ronald F. Stowe to Josef Grohman, reprinted in Paris to DOS, 18 December 1975, Paris 33045; Paris to DOS, "UNESCO Meeting on Draft Declaration of Mass Media Principles," 23 December 1975, Paris 33519, both in AAD.

two months later.[1200] The Secretariat commissioned studies and began to coordinate meetings and conferences on the international flow of information. A UNESCO conference in San José, Costa Rica on communications policies gained headlines worldwide in July when experts called on greater government regulation of foreign and domestic media. Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez blasted the "uncontrolled invasion of news" that he claimed threatened "public and social order" throughout Latin America.[1201] The meeting's anticolonial rhetoric took many Western observers by surprise. American diplomats found it easier to gain diplomatic support before conferences later in the year.[1202]

The Secretariat struggled to defuse the controversy that was brewing around the Mass Media Declaration. M'Bow was in 1976 preoccupied with regaining American confidence in the organization and therefore wanted to avoid deadlock over communications issues. The Secretariat, however, was not trying to extricate itself from the global debate about the role of the mass media and the free flow of information. Dragoljub Najman, M'Bow's leading political advisor, believed that the global communications debate was "probably the most important

[1200] "The Concept of a New International Information Order Initiated Among the Non-Aligned Countries," June 1976, attached to Gunnar R. Naesselund to ADG, 25 June 1976, Folder 153, Box 48, DDG 2, AG 8, UA.
[1201] San Jose Declaration, July 1976, UNESDOC; Caracas to DOS, "Perez Stands Firm on Flow of Information," 14 July 1976, Caracas 8464, AAD; DOS to San Jose, "Guidance for Intergovernmental Conference on Communications Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean," 17 July 1976, State 177800, AAD; William G. Harley Background Paper, "International Showdown on Press Freedom," 17 September 1976, Folder 153, Box 48, DDG 2, AG 8, UA.
[1202] DOS to Various Posts, "Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of the Mass Media...," 30 July 1976, State 188615, AAD; Paris to Ottawa, "Mass Media Declaration - Info Group," 17 September 1976, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 10563, LAC; Paris to DOS, "UNESCO Mass Media Declaration," 21 September 1976, Paris 27569, AAD.

UNESCO involvement throughout the rest of the century."[1203] The Director General worked closely with American and West European delegations at the 1976 General Conference and ensured that the Mass Media Declaration was postponed until the next Conference in 1978. This solution kicked the can down the road and bought the Secretariat another two years to resolve the deadlock.[1204] The Secretariat also reached out to critics. M'Bow hired a consultant, the retired British journalist and leader in the Commonwealth Journalists Association Clement Jones, to discuss the draft declaration with North American and West European opponents of the draft. He discussed changes in the draft, solicited advice, and indicated he would pass suggestions on to M'Bow in Paris. Jones helped the Secretariat redraft the declaration and gain the support of Western diplomats.[1205] The Secretariat prepared a draft for the 1978 General Conference that, American observers in Paris commented, actually "tilted" towards Western positions.[1206]

[1203] Paris to DOS, "Conversation with UNESCO ADJ Najman," 21 December 1976, Paris 37613, AAD.
[1204] Paris to Ottawa, "Mass Media Declaration - Info Group," 17 September 1976, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 10563, LAC; Paris to Ottawa, "Mass Media Declaration - Info Group Mtg," 22 September 1976, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 10563, LAC; Nairobi to DOS, "UNESCO: Mass Media," 5 November 1976, Nairobi 12251, AAD; Nairobi to DOS, "Mass Media," 26 November 1976, Nairobi 13277, AAD; Paris to DOS, "UNESCO General Conference - An Analysis," 8 December 1976, Paris 36304, AAD; "Telegram 307916 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts," 21 December 1976, *FRUS 1969-1976*: Volume E–14, Part 1, Document 102.
[1205] Memorandum of Discussion between Leonard R. Sussman and J. Clement Jones, 31 October 1977, Folder III 17, Box 169, FHR, PUL; "Report on Visit of Clement Jones to George Beebe to Get World Press Freedom Committee Views on Revised UNESCO Media Declaration," 1977, Folder: "WPFC-1977," Box 17, WPFCR, PUL.
[1206] Paris to DOS, "Revised Text, Mass Media Draft Declaration," 13 January 1978, Paris 01205, AAD.

The conflict over the Mass Media Declaration reached its climax in November 1978. Washington continued to believe that it would threaten the free flow principle.[1207] American diplomats focused on a last ditch effort to "pull... the teeth from the tiger" - in other words, they focused on removing any phrase that could be interpreted as a threat to the free flow of information.[1208] The State Department appointed former diplomat and journalist William Attwood as the most senior American official to the conference. He quickly established contact with the Secretariat through M'Bow's advisor and confidante Léon Boissier-Palun, who often worked "sous la table" as a backchannel between M'Bow and the American delegation in Paris. They established a friendly working relationship and Najman suggested that they move their discussions to Boissier-Palun's apartment in order to maintain a low profile. The Director General's confidante made it clear to Attwood that M'Bow would not back away from the declaration - he had already postponed a vote at the last conference and was now personally committed to resolving the four-year old conflict. He promised, however, that M'Bow was determined to root out "Soviet-inspired" ideas. The Director General was more concerned with West European and American

[1207] Bill Harley Memorandum to Selected Media Specialists, "UNESCO Executive Board Resolution on the Draft Declaration on Use of the Media," 22 June 1978, Folder: "E-U.S. Position on UNESCO," WPFCR, Box 20, PUL; Henry Richardson Memorandum to David Aaron, "UNESCO Policy," 13 September 1978, DDRS.
[1208] Paris to DOS, "Ambassador Reinhardt Meeting with Information Group Chairman Ambassador Carducci Concerning Mass Media Declaration," 27 October 1978, Paris 35673, AAD.

"domination" of the international news industry - he had no interest in legitimizing censorship or restricting the flow of information.[1209]

The draft declaration that came up for a vote at the General Conference was different than the one that first emerged four years earlier. The eleven articles still maintained that the mass media was a major component of the international system. It still promoted "a new equilibrium and greater reciprocity in the flow of information" and it still maintained that the media played an important role in "educating people" about contemporary political and cultural issues. Yet the draft deemphasized national sovereignty and reaffirmed the free flow of information. One issue did remain problematic. The draft invoked the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (articles 19 and 20) which suggested that freedom of speech could sometimes be circumscribed for the sake of social and political stability. This statement, originally drafted by Soviet delegates, threatened to undermine freedom of information and bolster arguments for state control of the mass media. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Charles Maynes met with Bossier-Palun in a last minute meeting to revise that draft's language. He suggested that this reference be reworded and tied instead to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which unambiguously supported freedom of speech. Boissier-Palun and M'Bow agreed and "stopped the presses" in order to include this amendment in the printed text

[1209] Paris to DOS, "Discussion of Mass Media Issue by William Attwood and Boissier-Palun," 26 October 1978, Paris 35331; New York to DOS, "Bossier-Palun Discussion of UNESCO Media Declaration," 28 October 1978, USUN 04556; DOS to Paris, "UNESCO Mass Media Draft Declaration," 1 November 1978, State 277298, all available in AAD.

scheduled to be distributed the next morning. This secret agreement to sideline Soviet arguments was the turning point that led to American acceptance of the declaration.[1210] The General Conference passed the resolution the next day. A standing ovation and thunderous applause greeted the news throughout the conference hall.[1211]

Beyond Paris' conference halls, global responses to the declaration were positive. Most West European and North American observers approved that the conference had deleted all explicit references to government control over the media.[1212] The Soviets - whom most observers recognized as the primary losers in the competition over the Mass Media Declaration - nevertheless approved of the document since it achieved their "primary objective [to] place the media in the service of peace."[1213] Most supporters from the developing world tended to agree with one Algerian newspaper that the Mass Media Declaration was not the endpoint but rather the "first step in [a] difficult, long process."[1214] Indeed, the negotiations and diplomatic maneuvering that made the declaration possible also

[1210] DOS to Paris, "UNESCO 20th General Conference: Mass Media," 21 November 1978, Paris 294490, AAD.
[1211] *International Herald Tribune* (23 November 1978) and Ian Murray, "UNESCO Finds Common Ground on Media," *Times* (22 November 1978), both excerpted in Paris to DOS, "Press Coverage - Media Declaration," 24 November 1978, Paris 38698, AAD.
[1212] See for example, "UNESCO Endorses a Compromise That Calls for Free Press Coverage," *New York Times* (12 November 1978); Paris to DOS, "Press Coverage - Media Declaration," 24 November 1978, Paris 38698, AAD; DOS to Paris, "Media Declaration," 28 November 1978, State 301336, AAD; "Truce In Paris: UNESCO Delegates Drop a Threat to Curb the News," *Time* (4 December 1978); House of Commons Debate, 4 December 1978, volume 959, column 1028; DOS to All Diplomatic Posts, "International Journalistic Freedom," 5 January 1979, State 003302, AAD.
[1213] Igor Zemskov, as cited in *Le Monde* (23 November); *Le Soir* (23 November 1978), both reprinted in Paris to DOS, "Press Coverage - Media Declaration," 24 November 1978, Paris 38698, AAD; Andrei Grachov, "The Media and the Political Climate," *New Times* (47: 79), 22.
[1214] Lahouari Sayah, as cited in Algiers to DOS, "Algerian Press on UNESCO Information Declaration," 17 December 1978, Algier 03557, AAD.

made it weak and uninspiring. Many agreed that it was the "lowest common denominator between different points of view."[1215] The central issue - how to balance flow of international flow of information - remained unresolved.

A secretive group of world communications experts that met every few months in Paris began to guide the international debate after 1978. Secretariat officials had grown weary of the diplomatic constraints on the global debate and the negative publicity it generated. The series of intergovernmental meetings and public plenary discussions had fueled a stale debate and courted diplomatic disaster. The Secretariat decided to organize a commission of "Wise Men" to discuss world communications problems with minimal diplomatic scrutiny and pressure and release a comprehensive report.[1216] The Yugoslavian staff official Asher Déleon organized this new commission and served as its point man. Déleon wanted to insulate their meetings from outside interference. Commission members would therefore "sit in closed meetings in order to permit frank and open discussion and avoid distortion and tricks to which debate would necessarily be exposed when unfolding in front of the public or the 'galleries.'"[1217] Déleon also ensured that the commission would avoid getting bogged down in technical issues. Instead, he instructed participants to study the role of communications through "the lens of social and political power, of the individual and the

[1215] Ian Murray, "UNESCO Finds Common Ground on Media," *Times* (22 November 1978).
[1216] William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises: The MacBride Commission: A Firsthand Report and Reflection on the Workings of UNESCO's International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993), 27-28.
[1217] Acher Déleon Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Participation des Personalités Non Membres aux Sessions de la Commission Internationale D'étude des Problèmes de la Communication," 29 May 1979, Folder 125, Box 37, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

community, their progress, emancipation and liberation from various constraints."[1218] M'Bow expected that the commission's final report would be able to achieve some international consensus, develop a strategy to balance the international flow of information, and improve the organization's prestige.[1219] The new commission sparked a new sense of optimism among officials in Paris - many believed it was the organization's most important undertaking to date.[1220]

The first commission meeting in December 1977 established the format for their periodic meetings over the next two years. The fifteen "wise men" - and one wise woman - who first shook hands around a conference table in an austere basement meeting room at Secretariat headquarters represented the "principal regions of the world, belonging to different professions and representing different currents of thought."[1221] They included journalists, information ministers, academics, a lawyer, an economist, and a best-selling novelist. At the center of the commission was its chairman, Seán MacBride. The elderly Irish lawyer shared many of the concerns that animated the global debate. He had gained diplomatic experience as the Irish Republican Army's Chief of Staff and Irish Minister of

[1218] Acher Déleon, "Propositions en Vue de la Creation du Groupe de Reflection sur la Communication," n.d. [July 1977], Folder 140, Box 42, CAB 7, AG 8, UA; Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Memorandum, "Création d'une Commission Internationale d'étude des Problèmes de la Communication," 7 October 1977, both in Folder 140, Box 42, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1219] "Rapport Oral du Directeur Général Sur L'Activité de L'Organization depuis la 103e Session," Summary Records of the Executive Board, Second Meeting, 104th Session, 24 April 1978, 104 EX/SR.1-35, UNESDOC, 18. See also Memorandum of Discussion between Leonard R. Sussman and Dragoljub Najman, 10 February 1978, Folder III 17, Box 169, FHR, PUL.
[1220] Paris to DOS, "Mass Communications in UNESCO Context: Summary Observations," 9 November 1977, Paris 32726, AAD.
[1221] "Rapport du Directeur General Sur L'Activite de L'Organisation," Summary Records of the Executive Board, Fifth Meeting, 103rd Session, 21 September 1977, 103 EX/SR.1-27, UNESDOC, 36.

External Affairs (where he blocked Ireland's membership in NATO). His leadership of the human rights organization Amnesty International won him both the Nobel Prize and the Lenin Award. His Irish roots also inclined him to sympathize with those who fought against European colonialism.[1222] MacBride was primarily interested in the "credibility gap" that had developed between political powers and the people in societies around the world. He criticized the "existing complacency of institutional establishments" in governments and churches and he criticized the "vested interests" and "experts" who strengthened political power and preserved injustice. He believed that "the centre of gravity of power has been moving from the secretive power centers of governments to the public sector." Only the mass media could inform and empower these public sectors.[1223]

The commission members represented a spectrum of different cultural and philosophical attitudes towards communications issue, but all shared MacBride's belief that information and communications were central to the politics of the present world. "The entire history of mankind bears witness to the fact," French commission member Jean D'Arcy argued, "whoever controls communications

[1222] Altaf Gauhar and Sean MacBride, "Sean MacBride," *Third World Quarterly* 1 (July 1982), 385-398.
[1223] Seán MacBride, "Nobel Lecture: The Imperatives of Survival," Nobelprize.org; Seán MacBride statement to the 31st Congress of Federation Internationale des Editeurs de Journeaux et Publications, "Press Becomes Real Safeguard of Liberties," 26 May 1978, Folder 140, Box 42, CAB 7, AG 8, UA. See also "Le Tiers Monde n'a Pas Les Moyens," *Jeune Afrique* 958 (16 May 1979); Yves Magat, "Le Pouvoir de L'Opinion Publique," *Tribune de Genève* (10 June 1981), Folder 139, Box 42, CAB 7, AG 8, UA; "Sean MacBride Media Breakfast at Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C.," 8 March 1979, Folder: "Seán McBride [sic]," Box 18, WPFCR, PUL; Seán MacBride, "The Mass Media's Role in the Search for Disarmament,"1 April 1980, SS.80/CONF.401/13, UNESDOC.

controls society, whoever is master of the information flow ensures for himself - for a time - order and stability."[1224] Dutch politician Jan Pronk argued that it was necessary to reform the "underlying information order" before the international community could address new challenges like human rights, environmentalism, and the regulation of multinational corporations.[1225] All participants shared the conviction that the global flow of information was imbalanced and that Third World countries in particular needed to catch up. They all believed, according to American observer William G. Harley, that these were "matters of world-shattering importance" and defended their positions accordingly.[1226]

Some commission members took aim at the corporations and businesses that controlled the global flow of information. Yugoslavian member Bogdan Osolnik argued that news agencies commodified information about the Third World and turned it into spectacle and entertainment for Western consumers.[1227] Chilean member Juan Somavía backed up these ideas and complained that the international news agencies focused on sensationalistic news that sold papers and avoided important stories. Business practices therefore buried the problems of the Third World in the small print of the Western world's newspapers and therefore doomed the North-South dialogue. "Providing information is a social function,"

[1224] Jean D'Arcy, "The Right to Communicate," 1978, ICCP 36, UNESDOC, 3.
[1225] Jan Pronk, "Some Remarks on the Relation Between the New International Information Order and the New International Economic Order," 1978, ICCP 35, UNESDOC, 17.
[1226] William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 47.
[1227] Bogdan Osolnik, "Aims and Approaches to a New International Communication Order," July 1978, ICCP 32, UNESDOC, 3, 8.

he maintained, "it should not be a business transaction."[1228] Indonesian member Mochtar Lubis and Gamal El-Oteifi, Egypt's former Minister of Information and Culture, emphasized the neocolonial dimensions of the information order. Both argued that "the Western press controls the ideas and information of Third World intellectuals."[1229] These commission members emphasized the threats of multinational corporations, advertising, and business monopolies.

The commission also addressed NAM proposals for the New World Information and Communications Order. The NWICO slogan remained, in 1978, popular but vaguely-defined. Former Tunisian Information Minister Mustapha Masmoudi used the MacBride Commission to define the idea more concretely and legitimize it internationally. He assembled a small group of information experts from leading non-aligned countries in Tunis in early 1978. The meeting drew all the strands of the NAM position into a single authoritative text, titled "The New World Information Order," which Masmoudi delivered to the next commission meeting in July.[1230] He repeated the NAM's anticolonial interpretation of communications issues. "The present-day information system enshrines a form of political, economic and cultural colonialism," he argued. European and North American corporations controlled the world's communications infrastructure and

[1228] Informal Minutes of Meeting III, First Session, 10 July 1978, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 77; Stanley M. Swinton to George Beebe, 13 July 1978, Folder: "G-News Agencies," WPFCR, Box 21, PUL. See also Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies Seminar Memorandum, attached to Gunnar R. Naesselund to ADG, 25 June 1976, Folder 153, Box 48, AG 8, DDG 2, UA.
[1229] Gamal El-Oteifi, "Call for a New International Information Order: Preliminary Remarks," ICCP 33bis, UNESDOC, 7.
[1230] Paris to DOS, "Third Meeting of International Commission for Study of Communications Problems," 18 July 1978, Paris 22511, AAD.

used that power to ridicule developing nations and silence their demands for a New International Economic Order. "The mass media must endeavor to" assume its global responsibilities and "alert public opinion in the industrialized countries and encourage it to pay greater attention to Third World demands and to support the changes entailed by this new order."[1231] Masmoudi assigned states and international organizations an important role in managing this new international order. He emphasized that codes of ethics should govern the activities of journalists and news professionals around the world. An international right of correction should give countries the ability to respond to falsehoods made about them. "Supranational organizations" should enforce and govern these new codes and legal rights.[1232] These international efforts to "balance" the West's dominance in the international information order could construct an international order in which the flow of information truly reflected the reality of the postcolonial world. Masmoudi's commission paper became the de facto manifesto of the New World Information and Communications Order and was distributed widely within the commission and internationally.

The American member of the commission challenged these non-aligned ideas. The Secretariat had privately urged Washington to participate actively in the commission.[1233] State Department officials and advisors agreed that the MacBride Commission provided, especially compared to the expert meetings that

[1231] Mustapha Masmoudi, "The New World Information Order," July 1978, ICCP 31, UNESDOC, 2.
[1232] Mustapha Masmoudi, "The New World Information Order," 18.
[1233] Memorandum of Discussion between Leonard R. Sussman and Dragoljub Najman, 10 February 1978, Folder III 17, Box 169, FHR, PUL.

had drafted the Mass Media Declaration, an ideal forum in which to advance Western perspectives on information and communications issues.[1234] Journalist and Washington insider Elie Abel volunteered to defend American positions and became an active participant in commission meetings.[1235] He criticized Masmoudi's argument that the current information order was a continuation of the imperial world order and responded that it "is by focusing on the prospects the future holds, rather than the legacies of the colonial past, that this Commission can accomplish its assigned task." Communications systems in an "interdependent, pluralistic" and "multidirectional world system can become a primary agent of reform and reconstruction also affecting political and economic relationships among nations." He believed that the imbalance in the flow of information was not in the content but rather the quantity of news being broadcast internationally. The industrialized world should therefore help develop the Third World's ability to communicate. Better "information technology" - broadcasting facilities, printing presses, computers, and satellite broadcasting - would enhance the Third World's voice in the international community. Abel compared the debate over the international information order with the energy crisis. He believed that information, unlike "oil or coal or other non-renewable materials, can never be exhausted. As it becomes ever more productive, hence cheaper, it can be

[1234] DOS to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, "Media Treatment of Ambassador Young Interview," 7 October 1977, State 242436, AAD; Peter Galliner to George Beebe, 31 October 1977, Folder: "International Press Inst.," Box 22, WPFCR, PUL; Peter Galliner to George Beebe, 17 November 1977, Folder: "International Press Inst.," Box 22, WPFCR, PUL; Peter Galliner to George Beebe, 21 December 1977, Folder: "International Press Inst.," Box 22, WPFCR, PUL.
[1235] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO: First (Organizational) Meeting of International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems," 27 December 1977, Paris 37560, AAD.

universally available."[1236] In other words, the world should focus on expanding the developing world's ability to broadcast and communicate rather than restrict news agencies and regulate information flows. More information, not regulated information, was the best way to improve relations between different parts of the world.

The Soviet Union also opposed Masmoudi's "utopian" proposals. Moscow sent Leonid Zamiatin, probably the commission's most prestigious member, to represent its views on international communications. As a member of the Soviet Central Committee and former Director General of the TASS news agency, he was essentially the Soviet Union's communications czar. Although they supported Third World demands to throw off Western cultural imperialism, the Soviets had opposed the New World Information and Communications Order. The NWICO, especially its emphasis on international oversight and regulation of communications systems, threatened Soviet strategy to uphold the sanctity of national sovereignty. "We are living in a real world of sovereign states which have their own legal systems," Zamiatin responded when the subject came up at their first meeting. "You can't just announce that there is a new world order and then put it into effect."[1237] Zamiatin agreed with Abel that the concept of a NWICO was so vague and "wooly" that it was both useless and a potential threat to national sovereignty, since it proposed common international standards about

[1236] Elie Abel, "Communication for an Interdependent, Pluralistic World," ICCP 33, UNESDOC, 5-6, 15.
[1237] Informal Minutes of Meeting I, Third Session, 16 December 1977, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 52. See also Zamiatin's comments in Informal Minutes of Meeting III, First Session, 10 July 1978, *Creative Compromises*, 74.

the flow of information. The Soviet diplomat literally linked arms with Abel for private discussions following commission meetings. Abel, although slightly uncomfortable partnering with the former Director General of TASS, accepted this "unholy partnership."[1238] The Secretariat worried about a split between Soviet-American participants on one side and Third World participants on the other side.[1239] The Soviets eventually reversed their objection to the NWICO, probably to curry favor with the NAM, although they objected when TASS was lumped together with the Western news agencies.[1240] The Soviets continued to make the preservation of national sovereignty over communications the center of the commission's discussions.

The commission also focused on the role of journalists in international politics. The Soviets emphasized that journalists played a role in maintaining peace and stability. According to Leonid Zamiatin, "A newspaperman has a public and moral responsibility - to his paper, to his society, and to his country."[1241] Conversely, he added, journalists threatened to destabilize international politics. By giving a voice to political dissidents or fabricating

[1238] William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 67. See also C. R. Irani to Leonard R. Sussman, 2 May 1978, Folder III 15, Box 169, FHR, PUL.
[1239] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO: First (Organizational) Meeting of International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems," 27 December 1977, Paris 37560, AAD.
[1240] Paris to DOS, "Third Meeting of International Commission for Study of Communications Problems," 18 July 1978, Paris 22511, AAD; Informal Minutes of Meeting III, Second Session, 13 July 1978, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 80; Informal Minutes of Meeting III, Third Session, 14 July 1978, *Creative Compromises*, 83; Informal Minutes of Meeting VII, Fourth Session, 13 September 1979, *Creative Compromises*, 134; Informal Minutes of Meeting VII, Fourth Session, 13 September 1979, *Creative Compromises*, 135.
[1241] W. G. Harley Memorandum for the Record, "International Seminar: Infrastructures of News Collection and Dissemination in the World," 16 May 1978, enclosed in Gabriel Guerra-Mondragon to George Dalley, 18 May 1978, Folder III 15, Box 169, FHR, PUL.

"misinformation" about living conditions in foreign countries, for example, these journalists were creating international tensions and undermining the spirit of detente. "We kept the peace for thirty years," Zamiatin implored the commission, "let us not have a psychological war!"[1242] Commission members who supported the non-aligned position agreed that journalists contributed to the imbalance in the flow of information. Masmoudi criticized the investigative journalists who had shaken American politics in recent years. When Abel argued that the Watergate scandal had demonstrated how the media could make governments accountable, Masmoudi responded that journalists were playing by their own rules. Future generations will probably view the Watergate scandal as "a wrong challenge to central authority." Bogdan Osolnik agreed and added that "legally elected government must not be destabilized."[1243] Abel argued that foreign journalists should have unhindered freedom to travel, report internationally, and to contact opposition groups and dissidents within foreign countries.[1244]

The commission also discussed how to improve news reports about world events. Some commission members agreed that there should be an international code of ethics for journalists. Masmoudi repeated his arguments that codes of ethics, a right of reply, and international organizations should govern the

[1242] Zamiatin, as cited in William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 57.
[1243] Informal Minutes of Meeting III, First Session, 10 July 1978, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 75, 78; William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 141.
[1244] Record of Conversation with Elie Abel, 2 June 1978, Folder III 15, Box 169, FHR, PUL; W. G. Harley Memorandum for the Record, "International Seminar: Infrastructures of News Collection and Dissemination in the World," 16 May 1978, enclosed in Gabriel Guerra-Mondragon to George Dalley, 18 May 1978, Folder III 15, Box 169, FHR, PUL.

professional activities of journalists around the world.[1245] Juan Somavía praised Masmoudi's ideas. His belief that the international news agencies had commodified news and information led him to advocate that journalists "should be placed within some framework establishing certain norms of conduct."[1246] Bogdan Osolnik believed that journalists' right to freedom of information should be dependent on their recognition that they bore responsibility for the consequences of their reports on society and individuals.[1247] Nigerian representative Fred Isaac Akporuaro Omu proposed that a World Press Council could impose sanctions on irresponsible press services.[1248] Elie Abel emphasized his "extreme pessimism about an international code of ethics" and took it upon himself to oppose any plans to regulate the international media.[1249] Some commission members suggested alternative schemes, such as regional - rather than global - codes of ethics. Others argued that any code of ethics should be written and administered by professional organizations and groups. If any code

[1245] Mustapha Masmoudi, "The New World Information Order," 17; Informal Minutes of Meeting II, First Session, 28 April 1978, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 62; Informal Minutes of Meeting IV, Second Session, 9 January 1979, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 104-106; Acher Déleon Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Quatrieme Session se la Commission Internationale d'etude des Problemes de la Communication," 2 February 1979, Folder 124, Box 37, CAB 7, AG 8, UA; Memorandum to Selected Media Specialists, "Informal Minutes: International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems," 23 April 1979, Folder: "UNESCO - New Delhi," Box 20, WPFCR, PUL.
[1246] Informal Minutes of Meeting III, First Session, 10 July 1978, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 77; Stanley M. Swinton to George Beebe, 13 July 1978, Folder: "G-News Agencies," Box 21, WPFCR, PUL.
[1247] Informal Minutes of Meeting VI, Fourth Session, 7 June 1979, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 125.
[1248] Informal Minutes of Meeting I, First Session, 14 December 1977, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 50.
[1249] Memorandum to Selected Media Specialists, "Informal Minutes: International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems," 23 April 1979, Folder: "UNESCO - New Delhi," Box 20, WPFCR, PUL.

was to be established, professional organizations - not states - should be responsible for accrediting journalists and developing common codes of conduct.[1250] "Any attempt to decree a single planetary standard for resolving these issues must necessarily fail," Abel declared.[1251]

MacBride himself, inspired by commission discussions, proposed that UNESCO should develop a scheme to identify and protect foreign correspondents around the world.[1252] He wanted the commission to develop international conventions that could provide journalists with "as much protection and respect as diplomats and international officials."[1253] Abel, however, opposed any international schemes to identify and protect journalists. The idea of "protecting" journalists had dangerous connotations and seemed to imply "licensing" - which again brought up the issue of regulation. States could use any international scheme to identify and protect journalists as a pretext to license only politically-loyal members of the media.[1254]

The commission members struggled to synthesize their opinions for the final report. All sixteen members of the commission approved the final text, although the report provided space for dissenting opinions. The final text

[1250] Informal Minutes of Meeting VI, Fourth Session, 7 June 1979, William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 126. Informal Minutes of Meeting IV, Second Session, 9 January 1979, *Creative Compromises*, 104-105.
[1251] Elie Abel, "Communication for an Interdependent, Pluralistic World," 17.
[1252] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO MacBride Commission Meetings on Protection of Journalists," May 17, 1979, Paris 15956, AAD; Draft Declaration on the Protection of Journalists, Annex II of Sean MacBride, "The Protection of Journalists," 1979, International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems 90, UNESDOC.
[1253] Sean MacBride, "The Protection of Journalists," 1979, International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems 90, UNESDOC, 29-30.
[1254] William G. Harley, *Creative Compromises*, 111.

reaffirmed the commission's belief that the "global web of electronic networks can, potentially, perform a function analogous to that of the nervous system, linking millions of individual brains into an enormous collective intelligence." The final report toned-down the anticolonial rhetoric that alienated American critics but raised a series of new controversial issues. It endorsed the idea of a New World Information and Communications Order, urged journalists to support the cause of self-determination and economic development, and complained that "market and commercial considerations" undermined the role of the media in international politics.[1255]

MacBride personally handed M'Bow the final version of the commission's report in February 1980. The breadth of the report's scope impressed most early readers in the Secretariat. "From the discovery of the papyrus to the microprocessor, from oral communications to telematics, from the role of communications in education to its role in development and its contribution to the resolution of the great problems which humanity confronts, the report ignores practically nothing," Secretariat member René Lefort commented after reading the final draft.[1256] The Director General praised the commission's ability to achieve consensus. According to M'Bow, "the whole text demonstrated a remarkable willingness to cooperate and showed a pronounced spirit of

[1255] International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, *Many Voices, One World: Towards a New, More Just, and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order* (Lanham, 2004 [1980]), 254, 259, 260, 265, 268, 271-2, 340.
[1256] René Lefort Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Réflexions sur le Rapport Final (Version Provisoire) de la 'Commission Internationale d'étude des Problèmes de la Communication,'" n.d., Folder 129, AG 8, CAB 7, Box 38, UA.

conciliation, cooperation, and mutual understanding among member of the Commission."[1257] M'Bow's senior advisors also hoped the report would restore confidence in the organization after the controversy that had erupted over the Mass Media Declaration. Najman believed the report was "clear and courageous." It would help to stimulate and reform the international communications order and would address "the hasty opinions and premature judgements about UNESCO's place in the whole problem."[1258] To Lefort, the report demonstrated again that the organization "represents the most important international organization in the communications field."[1259] The Director General ensured that thousands of copies were delivered free of charge to communications institutions around the world.[1260] As far as the Secretariat was concerned, MacBride and his wise men had produced a road map to guide future international efforts to resolve the international imbalance in the flow of information.

Washington, however, did not share the Secretariat's conviction that the global debate was over. State Department officials were pleased that the report condemned censorship and promoted a free flow of information. However, the report did not go far enough in promoting an open world of free-flowing

[1257] "Rapport Oral du Directeur Général sur L'Activité de L'Organisation depuis la 108e Session," Summary Records of the Executive Board, Second Meeting, 109th Session, 30 April 1980, 109 EX/SR.1-33, UNESDOC, 30.
[1258] Dragoljub Najman Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Rapport Final de la Commission Internationale d'Etude des Problèmes de la Communication," 12 November 1979," Folder 161, Box 50, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1259] René Lefort Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Réflexions sur le Rapport Final (Version Provisoire) de la 'Commission Internationale d'étude des Problèmes de la Communication,'" n.d., Folder 129, Box 38, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1260] Antonio Pasquali Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Institutions et Centres du Recherche sur la Communication," 21 June 1982, Folder 136, Box 41, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

information. It still emphasized that states, international organizations, and international norms should play an enhanced role in the international flow of news and information. It still urged the media to support national liberation movements. It still condemned Western communications "monopoly" and "hegemony."[1261] According to State Department advisor William G. Harley, who advised Elie Abel and accompanied him in Paris, "the overall tone and weight of the report is certainly anti-Western business and industry and strongly pro-Third World."[1262] Secretary of State Alexander Haig was more blunt. "Our reading of the MacBride report gives us certain chills," he confessed.[1263] Across the Atlantic, the British Foreign Office came to the same conclusion. Analysts worried that the report's focus on "states" and "nations" - rather than the "rights of the individual" - provided "coded language" that could empower Third World dictators and communist leaders to clamp down on dissent.[1264] Washington and London, unlike the Secretariat, did not want to find common ground between different communications systems. They wanted to discredit "dangerous" ideas.

[1261] "The State Department's Analysis of the MacBride Commission Report," n.d., Folder: "E-U.S. Position on UNESCO," Box 20, WPFCR, PUL.
[1262] William G. Harley Memorandum to Selected Media Specialists, "Final Meeting of MacBrIde Commission," n.d. [December 1979], Folder: "Sean McBride [sic]," Box 18, WPFCR, PUL. See also Sarah Goddard Power memorandum, "Assessment of Information and Communications Issues," reprinted as "The U.S. View of Belgrade," *Journal of Communication* 31 (Autumn 1981).
[1263] "The World Press Freedom Committee Meeting with Secretary of State Alexander Haig," 24 April 1981, Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1264] Parsons to Belgrade, 16 October 1980, FCO 58/1823, UKNA. See also "Intervention by Mr T. A. Margerison, United Kingdom Delegation, in Commission IV, Item 25 on Monday 13 October 1980," FCO 58/1824, UKNA; "Background: New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)," 25 March 1981, FCO 58/2216, UKNA; House of Commons Debate, 8 December 1980, volume 995, columns 758-66.

Despite these sympathetic voices, London and Washington grew pessimistic about the debate. The Secretariat tried to convince critics that their reports and declarations were "only words" and did not directly affect national or international politics.[1265] Washington and London did not buy this defense. Both worried that the debate would strengthen "gag laws" around the world. Their primary concern, however, was that UNESCO would encourage states and international organizations to assert greater control over the international flow of information. Any attempt to regulate the international flow of information would reduce the amount of available information. Congressional staffers warned that this would create a hostile "climate for international business and investment" and "seriously alter the U.S. decision-making process."[1266] London in particular was concerned that the debate would infect other international organizations. The debate had already become a regular item on the UN General Assembly's annual agenda in New York. World leaders spoke up in favor of a New World Information and Communications Order and pledged support for UNESCO's leadership in the struggle.[1267] UNESCO's ideas, one Whitehall official worried, threatened to "spill over increasingly into other areas" and "proliferate" into other

[1265] See for example, Memorandum of Discussion between Leonard R. Sussman and Dragoljub Najman, 10 February 1978, Folder III 17; Stanley Swinton Confidential File Memorandum, "UNESCO," 17 February 1978, Folder III 16, both in FHP, Box 169, PUL; Leonard Sussman Memorandum, "Meeting with Director-General M'Bow," Folder: "M'Bow Statements & Correspondence," 7 July 1978, Box 19, WPFCR, PUL.

[1266] George Kroloff and Scot Cohen, "The New World Information Order: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate." See also George M. Kroloff, "The View from Congress," *Journal of Communications* 29, no. 4 (Winter 1979).

[1267] See especially statements by Ugandan representative E. Kanyanya Wapenyi, Filipino representative Carlos P. Romulo, Mali's Nouhoum Samassekou, Sri Lankan representative Nihal Rodrigo, and Jamaican representative Donald Mills to the Thirty-Fourth General Assembly, Special Political Committee, all in FCO 58/1497, UKNA.

organizations.[1268] They were particularly worried about the technical organizations that governed the international communications system. Indeed, around the same time that the Secretariat was praising the MacBride Report, the Deputy Secretary-General of the International Telecommunications Union and the Deputy Director General of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union visited M'Bow and threatened to denounce UNESCO.[1269] The global debate therefore threatened to politicize the technical international organizations that structured - through the allocation of frequencies on the radio spectrum, the coordination of satellite systems, and tariffs on publications - the global information system.[1270]

Between the first meeting assembled to discuss the Mass Media Declaration in 1974 and the completion of the MacBride Report in 1980, UNESCO was at the center of a global debate about the structure of the international communications system. Few participants in this debate agreed on a common set of coherent proposals. Some proposed technological solutions - such as transferring telecommunications equipment and reapportioning the radio spectrum - in order to "decolonize information." Most tended to promote international codes of ethics for journalists, states' right to reply to foreign media

[1268] W. E. H. White to Mr. Leahy, "ITU, WARC, UNCPUOS, etc.," n.d. [1978], FCO 58/1230, UKNA; Carrington to Gerald Long, 27 June 1980, FCO 58/1822, UKNA. See also "Speech by Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Annual Conference of the Commonwealth Press Union," 9 June 1980, FCO 58/1822, UKNA.
[1269] Unsigned Letter from the Department of Industry to V. C. Waterman, August 1980, FCO 58/1823, UKNA.
[1270] These institutions included the International Telecommunication Union, United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and the Universal Postal Union, and the World Administrative Radio Conference, which regulated global radio signals, that was scheduled to meet in 1979.

reports, and enhancing the role of states and international organizations in the development of communications industries and infrastructure. The organization's prestige in the world of ideas, however, made them threatening to media leaders who had an interest in the international information system. A transnational counter-movement quickly mobilized to challenge this authority.

The Journalists' Offensive

"Throughout the world, the free flow of information is under fire" in an expanding "international information war," the *Washington Post* editorialized in 1978. *Time* warned that "a First Amendment war is shaping up on a global scale." British journalists, like Rosemary Righter of the *Sunday Times*, also worried that "Information has become one of the most controversial issues on the international agenda."[1271] Similar headlines were common in American newspapers in the late-1970s but also cropped up regularly in newspapers across Canada, France, West Germany and Norway.[1272]

For Western press officials, talk about efforts to "balance" the international flow of information, develop international codes of conduct, and

[1271] John M. Eger, "The Coming 'Information War,'" *Washington Post* (15 January 1978), B1; Curtis Prendergast, "The Global First Amendment War," *Time* (October 6, 1980), 62; Rosemary Righter, "The Political Challenge to the Western Press: Another 'New Order'?," *The World Today* 35 (April 1979), 167.
[1272] See for example, "Capone-Style Protection," *The Observer* (24 June 1979), 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15130, LAC; "Blödsinnige Anstrengung," *Der Spiegel* (6 November 1978), 164; "Say 'No' Instead," *Aftenposten* (9 October 1978), translated and reprinted in Oslo to Ottawa, 13October 1978, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15130, LAC.

dictate what subjects journalists had a "responsibility" to cover challenged one of their core values - the independence of the media.[1273] UNESCO's authority in the international community made these ideas particularly threatening. Associated Press (AP) Vice-President Stanley Swinton believed UNESCO had become an ideological "spawning ground" that was giving birth to "issues [that] now have a life of their own."[1274] Former United Press International (UPI) vice-president and editor-in-chief Roger Tatarian similarly believed that the organization had become a "suspect midwife" for concepts of government control over a free press.[1275] The National Association of Broadcasters - the American media's most influential trade association - worried privately that UNESCO documents like the MacBride Report would establish new global norms and undermine their professional values and business interests.[1276] These officials now mobilized to roll back discussion of any ideas that seemed to challenge the independence of the media.

The American non-governmental organization Freedom House, and its director Leonard Sussman, first confronted the organization directly and began to redefine the global debate. Freedom House was dedicated to "hard-line liberalism" - based on anti-communism, human rights, and American military

[1273] Michael Schudsen, *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers* (New York: Basic Books, 1978).
[1274] Stanley Swinton Confidential File Memorandum, "UNESCO," 17 February 1978, Folder III 16, Box 169, FHR, PUL.
[1275] Roger Tatarian, "The Multinational News Pool," March 1978, Folder: "Reports 1977-1978 (1/2)," Box 18, WPFCR, PUL.
[1276] Steve Nevas Memorandum to Mr. Wasilewski, Mr. Summers, Mr. Krasnow, and Mr. Madsen, "Final Report/International Commission (MacBride Commission) for the Study of Communications Problems," 25 April 1980, Folder: "NAB," Box 20, WPFCR, PUL.

power - and had close connections with the American government.[1277] This Cold War agenda framed the way that Sussman interpreted and responded to UNESCO's activities. He believed that rhetoric about "balance" and equality masked a totalitarian effort to stifle freedom of expression and political liberty in new states. "Whichever word is used - 'balanced' or 'equilibrated' - the intention is the same: to assure governmental control of the flow of news and its analysis."[1278] Since the organization was influential internationally and had great prestige in developing nations, its media studies and declarations could "become the basic texts around the world, for professionals as well as politicians and scholars."[1279] Freedom House therefore began "to protest UNESCO-Third World efforts to legitimize and expand governmental control of the mass media" in June 1976. Sussman attended conferences, sent reports to newspapers and broadcasters, and became a "quotable authority" in American debates about the organization.[1280]

The formation of the World Press Freedom Committee, an umbrella group representing news groups and journalists' associations, in May 1976 was the

[1277] Memorandum by Leonard Sussman, enclosed in Leonard Sussman to Executive Committee, 23 February 1981, Folder 13, Box 3, FHL, PUL. See also "What is Freedom House?," 13 August 1982, Folder 14, Box 3; "a 'new image' statement," August 1982; R. Bruce McColm to LRS, "Freedom House's Image," n.d. [1982], all in Folder 14, Box 3, FHR, PUL.
[1278] Leonard R. Sussman, "The 'March' Through the World's Mass Media," *Orbis* 20 (1977), 875.
[1279] Memorandum of Discussion between Leonard R. Sussman and Dragoljub Najman, 10 February 1978, Folder III 17, Box 169, FHR, PUL.
[1280] Leonard R. Sussman Memorandum to Board of Trustees, 25 January 1977, Folder 6; Leonard R. Sussman Memorandum to Board of Trustees, 26 August 1976, Folder 5, both in Box 6, FHR, PUL.

major turning point in efforts to challenge UNESCO's influence.[1281] *Miami Herald* editor George H. Beebe became its first director. A Cold War faith in freedom and American internationalism shaped his interpretation of the global debate. For decades he had believed that "a free press that keeps the people accurately informed" was the best means to roll back "Communist propaganda."[1282] He believed that communist bloc countries were using UNESCO, "in its Parisian Pentagon," to "subjugate the Western Information order" and contain the international flow of information.[1283] Beebe's group, based in Miami, quickly became the nucleus of the counter-movement against UNESCO worldwide. Beebe attracted leading communications officials in both government and professional circles and worked closely with Leonard Sussman and Freedom House. Former United States Information Agency (USIA) Director Leonard Marks, who supported the "free flow of news" and criticized "closed societies," became the group's treasurer and facilitated contacts with officials in Washington.[1284]

The WPFC rapidly expanded its influence beyond the United States and built institutional networks and connections with some of the world's free presses.

[1281] "The World Press Freedom Committee Story," n.d, Folder: "1981 IAPA and WPFC," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1282] "Talk by George Beebe before Chamber of Commerce of Puerto Rico in San Juan," 12 February 1960, Universidad InterAmericana de Puerto Rico Website, accessed 22 July 2016: available online: http://dspace.cai.sg.inter.edu/xmlui/handle/123456789/12662.
[1283] "Report by Executive Director George Beebe to Biannual Meeting of the World Press Freedom Committee in Honolulu," 20 April 1980, Folder: "Minutes and Reports," Box 23, WPFCR, PUL.
[1284] Leonard Marks address to the Over Seas Press Club, 1 June 1966, NYC Municipal Archives, accessed July 22, 2016, available online: http://www.wnyc.org/story/leonard-marks/; Nicholas Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 256-267.

Beebe contacted foreign press institutes and deployed colleagues to attend journalists' conventions around the world. The group's "main purpose is to unite the free world media for the attacks ahead," he informed a colleague.[1285] It began, one African journalist observed, issuing "endless offers to travel half way around the globe... to stand up and be counted among those opposed to UNESCO's policies on communications."[1286] Beebe found sympathetic allies across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Political upheaval shaped Latin America's responses to the global debate. Escalating conflict between left-wing and right-wing political movements reached a turning point in the mid-1970s, when Juntas took advantage of urban guerilla unrest and leftist dissent to gain power across the Southern Cone.[1287] Political extremists on the right and left curbed the free press. A 1976 UNESCO conference on regional communications policies in San José mobilized proponents of press freedom in the region.[1288] Dominican publisher German E. Ornes, one of the most prominent advocates of the free press in the region, argued that UNESCO threatened to empower and legitimize an "alliance of authoritarian governments of the Right and the Left." The same year, Ornes' newspaper *El Caribe* criticized American UN Ambassador Andrew Young of being too soft on

[1285] George Beebe to Peter Galliner, 27 December 1977, Folder: "International Press Inst.," Box 22, WPFCR, PUL; "Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting of the World Press Freedom Committee," 12 December 1977, Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1286] Hilary B. Ng'weno to Alan Pearce, 7 July 1981, Folder: "Hilary B. Ng'weno," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1287] Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2010), 96-129.
[1288] San Jose to DOS, 16 July 1976, San Jo 03481, AAD.

the organization.[1289] The Miami-based Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) also protested the San José conference, organized its own conferences, and issued press statements on UNESCO's activities in the region.[1290] Both Ornes and the IAPA worked closely with Beebe and his colleagues on the WPFC's Executive Committee.

In Asia, Indian journalists became particularly active in the global information debate. The restoration of democracy and press freedom in March 1977, after a two-year "Emergency" government, accelerated the development of a more populist form of Indian politics.[1291] The new political environment inspired journalists to defend their independence and resist government regulation of the media. Former Prime Minister Indira Ghandi and Information Minister V. C. Shukla had vocally supported UNESCO and the NAM's communications policies - which made both organizations suspect among many professional journalists.[1292] The *Calcutta Statesman* and its editor Cushrow Irani, a vocal critic of the Emergency government, joined the WPFC in 1977. Irani promised that

[1289] Special Report on UNESCO, n.d. [1976], Folder: "San Jose - UNESCO - 1976," Box 20, WPFCR, PUL; Bridgetown to Santo Domingo, "El Caribe Report and Editorial," 16 August 1977, Bridge 01933, AAD; Santo Domingo to DOS, "El Caribe Report and Editorial Re Ambassador Young's Views on Communications Media," 15 August 1977, Santo 05031, AAD.
[1290] James B. Canal Memorandum, 16 June 1976, Box 16, WPFCR, PUL; "A Confrontation in San Jose," *IAPA News* (1976), Box 16, WPFCR, PUL; Santo Domingo to DOS, "Conclusions of the 33rd Assembly of the Inter-American Press Association," 28 October 1977, Santo 06470, AAD.
[1291] Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, 48.
[1292] D. R. Mankekar, *Sheer Anecdotage*, 447-449; D. R. Mankekar, *Whose Freedom?*, vii; D.S. Mehta, *Mass Communication and Journalism in India*, 54-55, 59, 258; D. R. Mankekar, "Indira and the Press," *Indira Era*, 85-86; P. Roberts to Miss Vercoe, "Indian Semi-Official View on Press Freedom," 16 October 1978, FCO 58/1228, UKNA.

more Indian journals would join the group, helped to develop its strategy towards the Third World, and lobbied American congressmen to oppose UNESCO.[1293]

Beebe and his colleagues had more trouble finding African allies. The Executive Committee wanted "to get an African on the Board of Directors."[1294] The most vocal African defender of the free press was the Kenyan journalist and media mogul Hillary Ng'Weno. He edited the influential *Weekly Review* as well as a satirical youth magazine that put him at odds with Jomo Kenyatta's government. He chaffed against the European-owned newspapers and advertising communities in the region but was most critical of the warlords who had come to power since the mid-1960s and undermined the free press across the continent.[1295] Ng'Weno interpreted UNESCO's efforts to balance the global flow of information as a "heavy-handed attempt" to muzzle the press in Third World countries. When the General Conference assembled in Nairobi in 1976, not far from Ng'Weno's cluttered office on Moi Avenue, he published a scathing critique of the 1976 draft of the Mass Media Declaration. The true debate, he believed, should be "between the proponents of government control of the mass media and

[1293] "Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting of the World Press Freedom Committee," 30 April 1978, Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL; Cushrow Irani to Daniel P. Moynihan, December 1, 1981, Folder: "IPDC Facts and Figures," Box 21, WPFCR, PUL; Cushrow Irani to Dana Bullen, 20 July 1983, Folder: "Post-Talloires Meeting," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL. For Irani's criticism of Indira Gandhi, see Sangita P. Menon Malhan, "The Decline of The Statesman: A Shakespearean Tragedy," *The Leadership Review*, accessed 22 July 2016, available online: <http://theleadershipreview.org/features/the-decline-of-the-statesman-a-shakespearean-tragedy/>.

[1294] "Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting of World Press Freedom Committee at Chicago O'Hare Hilton," 12 July 1977, Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.

[1295] Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 218-249; Alhaji Babatunde Jose, "Press Freedom in Africa," *African Affairs* 74, no. 296 (July 1975), 255-262.

those of an independent press that is not controlled by the government."[1296] Ng'Weno's criticism pleased American critics like Leonard Sussman, who thought him "one of the most important men in all of Africa." The media mogul, however, remained focused on the constant struggle to keep his newspapers alive and resented WPFC efforts to co-opt him without offering concrete support for his business.[1297] The WPFC instead recruited *Nigerian Tribune* journalist Lateef K. Jakande to the Board of Directors - although he would play little role in private deliberations and strategic planning.[1298] Although the WPFC had trouble recruiting African and Middle-Eastern allies, it was able to cast itself as a global movement to defend the free press.

The press quickly began to pressure officials in Washington, London, and the Secretariat in Paris. The WPFC worked closely with American diplomats. It prepared position papers and rebuttal arguments for the State Department and accompanied American delegations to international conferences.[1299] Its transnational networks also provided valuable diplomatic tools. George Beebe, a State Department official said, "agreed to coordinate efforts to get international

[1296] David Lamb, *The Africans* (New York: Random House, 1982), 256-257; Hilary B. Ng'Weno, "The Nature of the Threat to Press Freedom in East Africa," *Africa Today* 16, no. 3 (1969), 1-4; Hilary B. Ng'weno to Alan Pearce, 7 July 1981, Folder: "Hilary B. Ng'weno," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL; Hilary Ng'weno, "All Freedom is at Stake," *The Weekly Review* (November 8, 1976), Folder: "Florence Conference," Box 18, WPFCR, PUL.
[1297] Leonard Sussman Memorandum to John Richardson, 27 April 1978; Hilary B. Ng'weno to George Beebe, 8 February 1979; Hilary B. Ng'weno to John Reinhardt, October 6, 1979, all available in Folder: "Hilary B. Ng'weno," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1298] "Minutes of the Biannual Meeting of the World Press Freedom Committee," 20 April 1980, Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1299] George Beebe, "Report of Meeting of United States Commission for UNESCO and News Media Representatives in New York," 8 December 1976, Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.

journalists and press agencies to urge their governments to back US position."[1300] The group became more confrontational over the next two years. As George Beebe later noted, "when the media gets mad and demands action, governments have responded."[1301] Beebe and Marks directly pressured Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to "maintain close touch with the U.S. media" during preparations for UNESCO conferences.[1302] The Carter administration by 1978 was growing concerned about its declining domestic popularity over international issues and was therefore sensitive to the media's attention.[1303] At the White House, the National Security Council began to worry about the "dire domestic political consequences" that might erupt if American delegations in Paris capitulated in the escalating information debate. They had to defend the free flow of information in order to protect "the administration's flanks against the domestic mass media," one NSC staffer noted.[1304] Around the same time, British and American news reports also pushed London to confront the media's "extreme demands." According to one senior Foreign Office official, media leaders were becoming very "indignant" about the government's response to UNESCO and were beginning to "regard themselves as a law unto themselves" in international

[1300] Sarah Goddard Power Memorandum to Clayton Kirkpatrick, "UNESCO General Conference," 16 September 1976, Folder: "New York Meeting," Box 17, WPFCR, PUL.
[1301] "Report by Executive Director George Beebe to Biannual Meeting of the World Press Freedom Committee in Honolulu," 20 April 1980, Folder: "Minutes and Reports," Box 23, WPFCR, PUL.
[1302] Stanley M. Swinton Confidential File Memorandum, "UNESCO - Secretary of State Vance," 9 June 1978, Folder III 16, Box 169, FHR, PUL.
[1303] Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 313.
[1304] Henry Richardson Memorandum to David Aaron, "U.S. Policy on UNESCO Conference," 6 September 1978; Henry Richardson Memorandum to David Aaron, "UNESCO Policy," 13 September 1978, both in DDRS.

politics.[1305] This growing criticism pressured officials to oppose any UNESCO declarations or documents that might undermine the principles of the free press.

WPFC members also pressured UNESCO directly. They gained admission to official gatherings and became active and aggressive critics. Washington sometimes used diplomatic pressure to assist their efforts to gain access to closed meetings. The American permanent delegation in Paris "forcefully insisted again and again" that WPFC officials be admitted to one prominent conference, M'Bow's colleagues complained.[1306] Beebe's rhetoric was aggressive and confrontational. He considered the WPFC a "guerrilla fighter" in international organizations.[1307] Beebe's combative tactics sometimes created tensions within the committee. A colleague privately complained that Beebe was stoking "unnecessary antagonism" and urged him to tone down his rhetoric.[1308] By the end of the decade, however, Beebe boasted that their efforts had "moderated" the global debate. Even State Department officials claimed their "pressure" had "been extremely useful."[1309]

[1305] Evan Luard to Mr. Allen, "Background Brief: World Information Problems," 26October 1978, FCO 58/1228, UKNA.
[1306] Antonio Pasquali Memorandum to M'Bow, 6 February 1981, Folder: "Protection de Journalistes," Box 53, CAB I, AG 8, UA.
[1307] George Beebe Memorandum for Files, "Meeting of Several Members of the World Press Freedom Committee Executive Board at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York on Sunday, 22 April 1979," Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1308] Peter Galliner to George Beebe, 6 July 1978, Folder: "International Press Inst.," Box 22, WPFCR, PUL.
[1309] George Beebe, "Report of Meeting of United States Commission for UNESCO and News Media Representatives in New York," 8 December 1976, Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, PUL; "AP-WPFC Discussion in New York," 16 January 1980, Folder: "WPFC History," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL; Sarah Goddard Power Statement, 17 September 1980, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Review of U.S. Preparation for the 1980 UNESCO General Conference: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on*

Beebe's activism was most clearly demonstrated at a January 1981 meeting to discuss Seán MacBride's proposal for an international scheme to protect journalists. The Secretariat's allies argued that journalists had "the right to the moral and practical protection of the international community since professional solidarity crosses borders." They asked UNESCO to coordinate this effort.[1310] The WPFC, along with three closely aligned journalists' associations, opposed the plan and any system to protect journalists. They argued that any scheme to protect journalists would lead to licensing and government regulation of the press. "These efforts must not create new problems for journalists."[1311] These arguments led to an animated debate.[1312] WPFC officials, senior Secretariat members complained, "firmly resolved to refuse any agreement on this question" of protection for journalists. Their "quasi-systematic opposition to all proposals" had "rendered vain all efforts to achieve compromise" on the issue. Consequently, one of M'Bow's advisors complained, "the establishment of a mechanism to facilitate the protection of journalists is considerably faraway."[1313]

Beebe's aggressive strategy put considerable pressure on the Secretariat. Some mid-level officials agreed with some of the criticism being leveled at them and expressed reservations about M'Bow's efforts to restructure the international

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Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, September 17, 1980 (Washington, D.C., 1980), 4.

[1310] "Recommandation Présentée par Huite Organisations Internationale et Régionales de Journalistes Professionales," 17February 1981, Folder 130, Box 38, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

[1311] "Recommandation Proposée par IIP, FIEJ, IAPA, WPFC," 17 February 1981, Folder 130, Box 38, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

[1312] See memoranda and reports collected in Folder 130, Box 38, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

[1313] René Lefort Memorandum, "Note à l'Attention de Monsieur le Directeur Général," 19 February 1981, Folder 130, Box 38, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

information order.[1314] Most senior officials, however, focused on rebutting press criticism. The director of the Free Flow of Information Department complained about Freedom House's "sleek and vicious" attacks. Deputy Director General John Fobes blamed Sussman's reports, which had been "picked up and repeated, mis-used and mis-interpreted" in newspapers and radio broadcasts, for spreading false impressions about their activities.[1315] The WPFC's attacks reinforced the idea that the media was stacked against Third World interests. M'Bow was convinced that there was an "international media conspiracy" and took the criticism personally. He scolded journalists who repeated sensationalistic news stories about the organization's activities, singled out Beebe's crusade to destroy his reputation, complained that news stories had distressed his family, and repeated his conviction that journalists needed "discipline and responsibility."[1316] Beebe's attacks therefore reinforced his personal belief that the international news agencies were trying to maintain their "monopoly" over the global flow of information.[1317]

[1314] See for example H. Cholmondeley memo to DIR/DCS, "Memo ADG/CC/523: 23 Nov/1977," 18 November 1977, "Organization - Department of Mass Communications," Box 3046, x07.55 MC, AG 8, UA.
[1315] Gunnar R. Naesselund Aide Memoire, 30 July 1976, Folder 153, Box 48, DDG 2, AG 8, UA; John E. Fobes memorandum, 3 August 1976, Folder 153, Box 48, DDG 2, AG 8, UA; John E. Fobes to Theodore Waller, 5 August 1976, Folder 18, Box 6, DDG 2, AG 8, UA.
[1316] Paris to DOS, "104th EXBD: First Day's Issues," 24 April 1978, Paris 13301, AAD; Paris to DOS, "Atmospherics of M'Bow's Discussion of the Mass Media," 3 May 1978, Paris 14337, AAD; DOS to Paris, "Meeting with Director General M'Bow," 31 May 1978, State 136977, AAD; Siradiou Diallo, "Le Meilleur, Malgré Eux," *Jeune Afrique* 1030 (October 1, 1980), 28-29; "Oral Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization Since the 103rd Session," 5 May 1978, Hundred-and-Fourth Session of the Executive Board, 104 EX/INF.3, UNESDOC, 12-14.
[1317] "Oral Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization Since the 103rd Session," 14; Paris to Ottawa, "Entretien MDG Avec DG M'Bow: Info et Communications," 16 February 1981, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15972, LAC.

The Secretariat struggled to respond to the growing press campaign. M'Bow was concerned about public opinion in the United States. He therefore flew to New York City and Washington on several occasions to talk with media officials and deployed his senior advisors on similar missions.[1318] M'Bow also tried to strengthen his own public relations campaign. He appointed Hervé Bourges, a French journalist who had made his name as a spokesman for the Algerian National Liberation Front, as his official spokesman. His appointment, at least one British journalist believed, "seemed to cock a snook at the Western press."[1319] M'Bow and Leon Davico, who headed the Secretariat's Information Department, responded directly to some of the media's criticism. Their organization spread "freedom" by integrating Third World countries into the "world of information." Western corporations and their "monopolization" of the international information system - not dictators, communist party leaders, or bloated international bureaucracies - threatened freedom of information.[1320] M'Bow also responded to charges that the organization supported state control of the media. He emphasized that Asian and African countries in particular did not have the private capital necessary to build up communications institutions and

[1318] Bill Harley Memorandum to Sarah Goddard Power, "M'Bow Meeting with U.S. Media Representatives," 10 November 1980, Folder: "E-U.S. Position on UNESCO," Box 20, WPFCR, PUL; Memorandum of Discussion between Leonard R. Sussman and Dragoljub Najman, 10 February 1978, Folder III 17, Box 169, FHR, PUL; Dragoljub Najman Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Mission à New York," 21 November 1980, Folder 168, Box 52, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

[1319] Walter Schwartz, "Illiteracy and the Politics of Communication," *Guardian World Review* (22 July 1981), Folder: "Protection de Journalistes," Box 53, CAB I, AG 8, UA.

[1320] "Interview de M. Davico par M. Sabilier," 18 October 1978, Folder 48, Box 12, DDG 3, AG 8, UA; Rapport Oral du Directeur Général Sur L'Activité de L'Organization depuis la 103e Session," Summary Records of the Executive Board, Second Meeting, 104th Session, 24 April 1978, 104 EX/SR.1-35, UNESDOC, 17.

infrastructure, which meant that states - not private business - had to direct regional communications development.[1321]

Sympathetic allies came to the organization's defense in an attempt to circumvent press criticism. The Inter Press Service tried to generate positive publicity for the Secretariat's efforts. The IPS' mission "to provide the Third World with an information system" and cover news that was typically neglected in the mainstream media, anticipated UNESCO and NAM activities.[1322] Its founder, Italian journalist and political activist Roberto Savio, approached Secretariat member Leon Davico and, after a long meeting in September 1979, agreed that the IPS would distribute information about UNESCO's communications efforts.[1323] It would "confront the polemics organized by the adversaries of the Director General and the Third World" and help to "counterbalance the polemical campaign launched against UNESCO and against the irreproachable conduct of Mr. M'Bow."[1324] Two years later, a Group of 77

[1321] "Rapport Oral du Directeur Général sur L'Activité de L'Organisation depuis la 108e Session," 40.
[1322] "Our History," Inter Press Service News Agency, accessed 22 July 2016, available online: http://www.ips.org/institutional/get-to-know-us-2/our-history/; "In Lieu of a North American IPS Pamphlet," 8 October 1979, Folder: "Inter Press Service," Box 41, CAB I, AG 8, UA; IPS Press Release, "Projet de Cooperation Entre la Direction Generale de L'UNESCO et L'Agence de Presse Internationale du Tiers Monde IPS," n.d. [1979], Folder: "Inter Press Service," Box 41, CAB I, AG 8, UA.
[1323] Leon Davico Memorandum to Federico Mayor, "Possibilités de Collaboration avec 'Inter Press Service," 24 July 1979; Leon Davico Memorandum to Federico Mayor, "Possibilités de Collaboration avec 'Inter Press Service," 8 October 1979, both in Folder: "Inter Press Service," Box 41, CAB I, AG 8, UA.
[1324] IPS Press Release, "Projet de Cooperation Entre la Direction Generale de L'UNESCO et L'Agence de Presse Internationale du Tiers Monde IPS," n.d. [1979], Folder: "Inter Press Service," Box 41, CAB I, AG 8, UA.

(G77) working group encouraged member states to actively support UNESCO and combat negative news reports.[1325]

The Secretariat also made efforts to cooperate with the press. In response to growing criticism, the Secretariat reached out and invited leading press leaders to a special meeting in Florence in April 1977 that would allow them to participate in the debate. Many journalists arrived, in the words of one American diplomat, with a sense of optimism that Florence could be a "first step in redirecting energies" towards "lively and fruitful dialogue" on major communications issues.[1326] At the heart of their disagreement remained the proper role of the journalist. The Secretariat's working papers argued that journalists had broad social, political, and economic responsibilities - especially the duty to report on the lingering persistence of neocolonialism in the international economic system. Western journalists denied that they had a "new and expanded role." While some defended the idea that journalists acted as a check on the power of governments, they denied that they had a responsibility to advocate or promote certain interpretations of international politics. The Florence gathering discouraged journalists and reinforced their opposition to UNESCO's communications activities.[1327]

[1325] Memorandum, "Reunions du Groupe des 77," enclosed in John B. Kaboré to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 21 April 1981, Folder 171, Box 53, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1326] Paris to DOS, "UNESCO Sponsored Florence Symposium on Information Flow," 7 March 1977, Paris 06631, AAD.
[1327] Canadian Report on the Florence Conference, n.d. [May 1977], 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15130, LAC.

The press campaign against UNESCO also developed a parallel and more conciliatory strategy. Senior officials in the WPFC argued it was "vital that we act swiftly and in unison to eliminate some of the Third World complaints that have contributed to its growing disaffection with the free world."[1328] News agency officials began to acknowledge that, despite the communications revolution, Western news coverage of foreign events had become disjointed, unfocused, and uneven.[1329] Senior AP and UPI officials pledged to make their "foreign coverage more meaningful" and improve their coverage of Third World developments in response to the global debate. The debate reinforced Reuters' and the Agence France-Presse's decision to "regionalize" their wire services outside Europe and North America.[1330] Another group of news officials with ties to the WPFC worried that Central Intelligence Agency propaganda programs were creating a "double standard" that undermined American arguments about the independent press. The CIA agents who bribed foreign journalists and planted propaganda stories in newspapers around the world were "undercutting... the United States in the battle that is now being actively waged" in UNESCO forums. They publicly

[1328] George Beebe Memorandum, 7 April 1977, Folder: "Third World Assistance," Box 17, WPFCR, PUL.
[1329] Ernest R. May, "The News Media and Diplomacy," 691.
[1330] Carla Marie Rupp, "AP Prepared to Upgrade Foreign News Coverage," *Editor & Publisher* (13 November 1976), 11-13. For UPI, see Roger Tatarian, "The Multinational News Pool," March 1978, Folder: "Reports 1977-1978 (1/2)," Box 18, WPFCR, PUL. For Reuters and the AFP, see Michael B. Palmer, "News Agencies," *Censorship: A World Encyclopedia*, Derek Jones, ed. (London and New York, 2001), 1714.

urged the CIA to phase out these propaganda activities in order to strengthen the American press' intellectual legitimacy.[1331]

This conciliatory strategy led the WPFC and the State Department to launch an ambitious development program. Leonard Marks, Beebe's close colleague and former USIA director, believed it was necessary to acknowledge present communications imbalances and problems in the world. He proposed that the American press and electronic media pledge support for a program to modernize Third World communication systems. Marks believed that this aid program could "knock the props out from under M'Bow and the Soviets by offering to correct - without government cooperation - the deficiencies that now exist in the poorer countries." Marks' proposal elicited minor resistance. "We in the AP don't give a damn about the Third World," Associated Press General Manager Wes Gallagher complained. "Let them spend millions on their new wire services." Most participants supported the plan, however, leading Beebe to sense that "enthusiasm was building up for his [Leonard Marks'] battle plan."[1332] Journalists and independent organizations assumed the central role in financing and directing this project. Seven months later, at the American Newspaper

[1331] Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *The CIA and the Media: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First and Second Sessions: December 27, 28, 29, 1977, January 4, 5, and April 20, 1978* (Washington, DC, 1978), 252-256, 260, 263.
[1332] George Beebe Memorandum to Lee Hills, 13 September 1976, Folder: "New York Meeting," Box 17, WPFCR, PUL.

Publisher's Association convention in April 1977, George Beebe announced a development program to assist the world's free press.[1333]

Washington and London also pledged to develop Third World communications infrastructure in order to undermine UNESCO's support for a New World Information Order. The Ford Administration had already developed a conciliatory approach to the North-South Dialogue in order to break up Third World unity and demands for a New International Economic Order and global redistribution of economic power.[1334] Secretary of State Henry Kissinger promised to help develop Third World communications capabilities in his 1976 address to UNCTAD in Nairobi.[1335] Washington expanded these pledges over the next two years. Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron believed that promises to develop Third World communications infrastructure would "create important leverage" that would empower diplomats to "protect the critical U.S. interest in free flow of information."[1336] Policy planners in the State Department recognized that they had to pledge financial support for developing communications infrastructure as a "quid pro quo" to bury ideological debates. "Don't be seduced into restricting information flows to meet your grievances," as State Department official Frederick Hartley summarized the basic idea, "let us

[1333] George Beebe Memorandum, 27 April 1977, Folder: "Third World Assistance," Box 17, WPFCR, PUL.
[1334] Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed*, 175-182; Christopher R. W. Dietrich, "Oil Power and Economic Theologies: The United States and the Third World in the Wake of the Energy Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 3 (2016), 500-530.
[1335] Henry Kissinger, "UNCTAD IV: Expanding Cooperation for Global Economic Development," *DOSB* (31 May 1976), 667.
[1336] David Aaron Memorandum, "U.S. Policy on UNESCO Conference," 1976, DDRS.

join with you in developing your own media and communications resources."[1337] American delegates delivered these promises at successive UNESCO General Conferences. American delegate John Reinhardt first acknowledged the need for "two-way communications" in late 1976 and promised that Washington would help to enhance the Third World's communications capacities.[1338] The Carter Administration, which had committed the USIA to work more closely with foreign media, maintained the communications development strategy.[1339] Reinhardt renewed the American commitment to develop the Third World's communications infrastructure at the 1978 UNESCO General Conference in order avert the emergence of a world divided between the "information rich" and the "information poor."[1340] The British Foreign Office approved these American development plans and agreed that their common objective should be to convince Third World states that they could get better technical support directly through the developed world than through UNESCO.[1341] Despite these pledges, Undersecretary of State Matthew Nimetz admitted to a gathering of the country's leading news editors in 1981 that communications issues were not a priority for

[1337] Frederick Hartley Memorandum, "Communications Media and the LDCs: Developing CU Programs to Meet U.S. Commitments," enclosed in Frederick Hartley to Philip Horton, 2 February 1977, Folder: "Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Correspondence," Box 18, WPFCR, PUL.
[1338] Records of the General Conference, Nineteenth Session, Eleventh Plenary Meeting, November 1, 1976, 19 C/Proceedings; DOS to Nairobi, "Information/Media Issue," 16 November 1976, State 281591, AAD; DOS to Nairobi, "UNESCO 19th General Conference: Meeting of DMG Group on Mass Media," 13 November 1976, State 279509, AAD.
[1339] Nicholas Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 373.
[1340] John Reinhardt, "General Policy Statement Before the 20th General Conference UNESCO," 3 November, 1978, *DOSB* 29, no. 2023 (February 1979), 50-53; Henry Richardson Memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron, September 7, 1978, DDRS.
[1341] Lord N. Gordon Lennox Minute, "UNESCO: Follow-Up on Communication/Information Issues," 7 November 1980, FCO 58/1824, UKNA.

the Carter Administration. Instead, he emphasized that the "private sector could try to use its influence to obtain the needed resources to back up U.S. promises."[1342]

The WPFC had already spearheaded this American commitment to expand the Third World's communications capacities. Beebe established a Development Committee to raise funds and approve programs in 1977. Within a year, he claimed, they had received "almost daily requests for assistance from such faraway places as Africa, Asia, and Latin American countries."[1343] The WPFC awarded dozens of grants - for professional development seminars and workshops, feasibility studies, educational exchanges, and training programs - and deployed teachers to train journalists around the world. Beebe's efforts to "scare the hell" out of his North American colleagues led hundreds of publishers to donate second-hand media equipment - typesetting machines, computers, printers, and broadcasting equipment - to foreign professionals throughout the Third World.[1344] The WPFC also called in favors from Congressional allies. Representative Dante Fascell of Florida helped to revise Pan American Development Foundation policies to permit it to pay shipping costs for media equipment headed for independent newspapers and broadcasters in Latin

[1342] Memorandum of Conversation, "Secretary Muskie's Meeting with U.S. Publishers," 10 June 1980, Folder: "E-U.S. Position on UNESCO," Box 20, WPFCR, PUL.
[1343] "Report of George Beebe, Chairman of the World Press Freedom Committee at the Biannual Conference in Miami," October 8, 1978, Folder: "Minutes and Reports," Box 23, WPFCR, PUL; "Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting of the World Press Freedom Committee," 30 April 1978, Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1344] "Suggested Letter for Fund-Raising Effort of World Press Freedom Committee," n.d., Folder: "Third World Assistance," Box 17; "World Press Freedom Committee Grants and Amounts Given and Still Due as of 1 March 1982," Folder: "1981 IAPA and WPFC," Box 16, both in WPFCR, PUL.

America.[1345] These training programs responded to legitimate complaints with concrete solutions. "This effort not only improves professionalism in the world of developing journalism, but also removes misconceptions about and makes friends for the United States - and the West generally," Beebe boasted.[1346] By building up the Third World's ability to communicate, these programs also tried to shift the global debate away from discussions about the content of information - biased and inaccurate information and the idea of journalistic responsibilities - and towards strategies to increase the quantity of information passing across international boundaries. Independent media professionals could prove that they, not states and international organizations, were best able to develop communications infrastructure and capabilities.[1347]

The WPFC development program also sought to roll back the spread of dangerous ideas. Leonard Marks, at a Conference of Editors and Publishers in 1976, urged press leaders to play a more active roll promoting press freedom around the world: "I think some of you are going to have to be missionaries if you're going to preserve the kind of press throughout the world that we believe is essential to the maintenance of peace."[1348] Beebe and his colleagues designed their development programs as a means to spread the good word about the free

[1345] "Minutes of the Biannual Meeting of the World Press Freedom Committee," 20 April 1980, Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.
[1346] "Remarks by George Beebe at the Biannual Meeting of the World Press Freedom Committee in San Francisco," 25 April 1982, Folder: "Minutes and Reports," Box 23, WPFCR, PUL.
[1347] Dana Bullen, "The List of Talloires," 2 October 1983, Folder: "VOF '83 - Speech Texts," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL.
[1348] Leonard Marks Speech to the 17th Annual UPI Conference of Editors and Publishers, enclosed in Paris to DOS, "UPI News Release Embargoed for October 24," 23 October 1976, Paris 31453, AAD.

press. They deployed North American journalists and media technicians in order to "help inform and educate Third World news officials about how free world newspapers, broadcast organizations, news services and magazines function as private organizations free of government control."[1349] Professionals and technical advisors, they believed, would carry a more inspiring message than any UN declaration or report.

WPFC leaders also sought to upstage the Secretariat and establish themselves as the world's leading authorities on international information and communications issues. They decided that their own world conference would help to "redefine the debate" and wrest the initiative away from UNESCO.[1350] WPFC leaders invited communications professionals, primarily those who had criticized the Mass Media Declaration and MacBride Commission, and commissioned papers to be read at this conference and then later published. "The purpose here is to provide a factual kit for use in rebutting Third World claims that are not supported by the evidence."[1351] Their strategy was to shift the global debate away from its focus on international justice and anticolonial internationalism to the idea

[1349] "Proposed Program for the Third World Media," n.d. [April 1977], Folder: "Third World Assistance," Box 17, WPFCR, PUL. See also Dana Bullen, "The List of Talloires," 2 October 1983, Folder: "VOF '83 - Speech Texts," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL.
[1350] Unsigned Memorandum, "Conflict vs. Resolution," n.d., Folder: "Talloires Conference - 1," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL.
[1351] Unsigned Memorandum, "Proposals for Commissioned Papers," n.d., Folder: "Talloires Conference - 1," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL.

of freedom. They aimed "to assemble the voices of freedom from all continents" in order to split Third World unity.[1352]

The conference assembled in the French town of Talloires in May 1981. WPFC officials adopted the title "Voices of Freedom" for the gathering that assembled in the Tufts University conference center on the shores of Lac d'Annecy. Journalists and media officials addressed the meeting and challenged the anticolonial ideas that underpinned discussions in UNESCO forums. Participants like Indian publisher Cushrow Irani argued that "irrespective of national boundaries and irrespective of areas of the wold, those of us who share certain common ideals stand together."[1353] M'Bow ignored his colleagues' advice and attended the conference. He maintained that his organization was defending the ability of Third World peoples to communicate and express their collective voices in the international community. "They, like the others, want their own voices, their own view of their countries and the world to be seen and heard," he informed his skeptical audience.[1354] His audience, however, asked difficult questions that made the Director General visibly uncomfortable.[1355] "He was, clearly, an angry man," Leonard Sussman noted. M'Bow "lashed out at the

[1352] "Notes from Telephone Conversation with Leonard Marks," 21 November 1980; "Notes from WPFC Luncheon in NYC on Dec. 15," 1980, both in Folder: "Talloires Conference - 1," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL.
[1353] "Transcript of Cushrow Irani's Speech," 15 May 1981, Folder: "Talloires Docs," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL. See also Paul Lewis, "West's News Organizations Vow to Fight Unesco on Press Curbs," *New York Times* (June 18, 1981).
[1354] Amadou Mahtar M'Bow Address at the Talloires "Voices of Freedom" Conference, 16 May 1981, DG/81/13, UNESDOC.
[1355] "Transcription: Question and Answer Period Following Mr. Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow's Speech at Talloires," 16 May 1981, Folder 476, Box 156, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

Western press generally."[1356] Even M'Bow's advisor warned him that he "had revived their fears. Right now, your intervention seems to me therefore to have crystallized rather than bridged different points of view."[1357]

The highlight of the conference was the announcement of the "Talloires Declaration." Signed by "members of the journalistic profession from many parts of the world... linked by our mutual dedication to a free press," the declaration affirmed the importance of a free press, condemned governmental interference, and denounced any "international code of ethics" for the media. At a global level, the declaration pledged "cooperation in all *genuine* efforts to expand the free flow of information worldwide" [my emphasis].[1358] While the MacBride Report advocated a series of recommendations to correct the "influence of the market" and urged journalists to recognize their responsibilities, the Talloires Declaration advocated a world information order based on independent newsmen unconstrained by international restrictions or standards.[1359] Beebe concluded that it would be "one of our strongest weapons for future confrontations."[1360]

The Talloires Declaration achieved everything that Beebe had hoped. "Certain place names instantly bring to mind great events or watersheds - Waterloo, Pearl Harbor, Yalta, Dunkirk," one WPFC associate argued at the

[1356] Leonard R. Sussman Report on the Voices of Freedom Conference in Talloires, n.d., Folder III 55, Box 170, FHR, PUL.
[1357] René Lefort Memorandum, "Compte-Rendu de la Conference de Talloires," 19 May 1981, enclosed in René Lefort to M'Bow, 5 June 1981, Folder: "Protection de Journalistes," Box 53, CAB I, AG 8, UA.
[1358] "Declaration of Talloires," May 1981, Folder 476, Box 156, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1359] *Many Voices, One World*, 260.
[1360] George Beebe to Dona Harvey, 28 September 1981, Folder: "WPFC - Miscellaneous," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.

Board's next meeting in June. "Talloires will be remembered as the place where the free press of the West united and, for one brief moment at least, started to fight back." He believed that the "Declaration probably is the strongest and finest statement of free world journalism." Leonard Marks considered it "the Magna Carta of the free press."[1361] The document helped to mobilize political and diplomatic circles on both sides of the Atlantic. In Washington, Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams officially endorsed the document and promised to defend it as a "basic statement of U.S. values" in American diplomacy.[1362] Congressional leaders like Bob Shamansky and Millicent Fenwick, who provided critical support for Washington's human rights diplomacy, also endorsed the declaration "as a guide for any further negotiations by the United States on this issue."[1363] In London, one Whitehall official commented that journalists "have stated their case with such force and clarity that it cannot be ignored."[1364]

The Secretariat followed the Talloires Conference and Washington's response closely. M'Bow's leading political advisors continued to dismiss their critics' emphasis on the themes of freedom and totalitarianism as antiquated and conservative. "The majority of the participants," one argued, "don't belong to our

[1361] Lee Hills Comments to the KRN Board Meeting, "Update on the World Press Freedom Fight," 24 June 1981, Folder: "WPFC-1981," Box 17, WPFCR, PUL; Leonard H. Marks Statement, 16 July 1981, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Review of U.S. Participation in UNESCO: Hearings and Markup Before the Subcommittees on International Operations and on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session on H. Res. 142, March 10, July 9, and 16, 1981* (Washington, DC, 1982), 160.
[1362] Elliot Abrams Statement, 9July 1981, *Review of U.S. Participation in UNESCO*, 68-107.
[1363] Bob Shamansky Statement, 9 July 1981, *Review of U.S. Participation in UNESCO*, 50; Millicent Fenwick Statement, *Review of U.S. Participation in UNESCO*, 42.
[1364] V. E. Beckett Minute, "UNESCO: Communications Matters," 27 July 1981, FCO 58/2227, UKNA.

world nor to our time. They were using a vocabulary typical of the 'Cold War' era. They did not seem to be aware of either the reasons for or the impact of Third World liberation." Western critics didn't understand the multipolar dynamics of the postcolonial world: "their vision of the world remains bipolar." The Secretariat did recognize, however, that the "journalists' offensive" - a "war machine driven against UNESCO" - had created a powerful ideological countermovement. The WPFC was conspiring to "unify Western countries" and "break the unity of the Third World with regards to communication issues."[1365] Despite the press campaign's threat to the organization's credibility, M'Bow maintained his commitment to communications issues. The Talloires Conference had bruised the Secretariat but reinforced its belief that the mass media was stacked against UNESCO and Third World demands.

The Diplomacy of the Information Age

The press campaign bruised the Secretariat but did not weaken its commitment to the global information debate. Senior officials were pleased that it was beginning to shape regional organizations. It assisted Middle Eastern states to

[1365] René Lefort Memorandum, "Compte-Rendu de la Conference de Talloires," 19 May 1981, enclosed in René Lefort to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 5 June 1981, Folder: "Protection de Journalistes," Box 53, CAB 1, AG 8, UA; René Lefort Memorandum, "Suite Probables de la Conférence de Talloires et Propositions de Réaction pour L'Unesco," n.d. [1981], enclosed in René Lefort to M'Bow, 5 June 1981, Folder: "Protection de Journalistes," Box 53, CAB I, AG 8, UA.

develop the Gulf News Agency, for example.[1366] In Africa, the organization provided technical and financial assistance to help create a Pan African News Agency, which adopted much of the rhetoric about the decolonization of information.[1367] The Secretariat had originally helped to create an Organization of Asian News Agencies (OANA) in December 1961, although it did little beyond bringing together regional professionals for periodic meetings.[1368] UNESCO played a central role in coordinating the meetings among Asian news agencies that paved the way for the Asia-Pacific News Network and the expansion of the OANA.[1369] These developments bolstered the Secretariat's confidence. Senior officials were confident that they were going to play a central role in the international system. One visitor reported a phrase he heard again and again in the hallways and elevators of the Secretariat: "Information is the oil of the 1980s."[1370] It was their organization, an internal Secretariat report reminded the Director General, that had pushed communications and information issues to the center of international politics. "To continue on this path is without a doubt the most logical

[1366] Paris to DOS, "Ministers of Information Conference in Baghdad - the Gulf States News Agency," 1 February 1978, Paris 03122, AAD.
[1367] Kevin Cavanagh, "Freeing the Pan-African News Agency," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 27, no. 2 (June 1989), 353-365.
[1368] Esmond Wickremesinghe, "The Quest for Third World News Agencies: Asian, African or Latin American: The Heart of the Problem," 15 November 1977, CC.77/CONF.606/8, UNESDOC.
[1369] British High Commission (Kuala Lumpur) to N. J. Bowen, "OANA: Fifth General Assembly," 25 November 1981, FCO 58/2226, UKNA.
[1370] Thomas L. McPhail, *Electronic Colonialism: The Future of International Broadcasting and Communication* (London: Sage, 1987); Thomas L. McPhail, "The International Politics of Telecommunications: Resolving the North-South Dilemma," *International Journal* 42 (Spring 1987), 289.

solution."[1371] Despite the press campaign's threat to the organization's credibility, M'Bow maintained the organization's commitment to communications issues.

British and American critics continued to believe that the global debate was undermining press freedom around the world. American ambassadors reported that Anastasio Somoza's government in Nicaragua and the military government in Honduras were praising M'Bow and invoking UNESCO in order "to lay the groundwork for an indefinite extension of censorship."[1372] Leonard Sussman, who analyzed and ranked political liberty around the world in an influential series of *Freedom in the World* reports, attributed the global decline of press freedom to UNESCO's influence.[1373] London came to similar conclusions. The Foreign Office estimated that seventeen members of the Commonwealth, especially in Asia, held "political" or "hard-line" attitudes towards the global debate.[1374] Around the same time, social unrest and the rise of Solidarity in Poland rocked the Soviet bloc and led to a new round of Politburo discussions about the media's threat to political stability. Moscow journals began to invoke international agreements like the 1978 Mass Media Declaration, which specified that international broadcasting should encourage peace, in order to legitimize their efforts to "Strengthen party control over the work of the central and local press"

[1371] "Problematique Generale de L'Information et de la Communication," 15 March 1982, Folder 220, Box 70, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1372] Tegucigalpa to DOS, "Committee Formed to Defend Press Freedom," 16 October 1978, Teguci 04977, AAD; Managua to DOS, "Journalists Meeting in Managua," 14 October 1976, Managu 04810, AAD.
[1373] Leonard R. Sussman Address at the 37th Congress of FIEJ, "The UNESCO Factor, the Press and the Third World," 21 May 1984, Folder: "Freedom House," Box 22, WPFCR, PUL.
[1374] Untitled Chart of Telegrams from Foreign Posts in Response to Circular Telegram of 16 July 1981, enclosed in I. W. Mackley, "NWICO: Consultations with the US," 22 October 1961, FCO 58/2226, UKNA.

in Poland.[1375] UNESCO documents, officials in the Foreign Office and the CIA believed, provided legitimacy for Soviet efforts to crush East European dissent.[1376]

Britain and the United States began to devote more attention to the organization. The journalists' offensive convinced senior policymakers and power brokers that UNESCO's communications agenda was a threat to the liberal world order that Reagan and Thatcher both championed. As an analyst from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research noted, the problem facing Anglo-American leaders was how to "mesh a laissez-faire domestic policy, driven by the deregulation urge and characterized by burgeoning commercial stakes, with foreign demands for more regulation of international communications and a larger share of economic benefits."[1377] Senior officials in both the State Department and the Foreign Office began to take an interest in communications issues. As Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office Lord Nicholas-Gordon Lennox argued, a "tight political grip was necessary both for effective coordination and as a reflection of the essentially political dimension of the problem." London began to approach members of the European Community and the Council of Europe in order to "concert a more robust and united Western

[1375] I. Rodionov, "Against Radio War," *New Times* (41: 82), 25; G. Arbatov, "Seeking a Crisis," *Pravda* (1 January 1982), in CDSP (3 February 1982). For the Politburo, see CPSU CC Politburo Report, "On Theses for the Discussion with Representatives of the Polish Leadership," 3 September 1980, CWIHP.
[1376] E. A. Irwin to D. G. Manning, "CSCE and the Media," 27 October 1980, FCO 58/1824, UKNA; CIA Memorandum, "Soviet Policy on Outer Space," 29 January 1980, CIA-FOIA.
[1377] Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "The New World Information Order at UNESCO'S Belgrade General Conference," 15 September 1980, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15973, LAC.

response" to the global information debate. "The Western interest is a shared one," as one senior Whitehall official declared.[1378] In the United States, Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams reorganized the International Organizations office to "improve the way it handles information issues arising in UNESCO" and centralized its resources into an enlarged Office of Communications and UNESCO Affairs.[1379]

The Secretariat and its Anglo-American critics made one sustained effort to avoid confrontation and reach an accommodation. The American delegation had proposed in 1978 that the General Conference focus its attention on technological solutions to the global imbalance in the flow of information. The General Conference agreed and empowered the Secretariat to establish a new institution to address information imbalances and develop concrete plans to address the problem.[1380] This proposal initiated plans to create an International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC) to coordinate the development of Third World communications infrastructure. Washington, London, and the Secretariat in Paris greeted the IPDC as a means to strengthen their credibility, divide their enemies, and avoid confrontation. Policymakers in Washington, in both government and the World Bank, saw it as the culmination of American efforts to substitute technical solutions for political rhetoric and

[1378] "UK/FRG Information Talks at the FCO on Friday 20 March 1981," 24 March 1981, FCO 58/2216, UKNA; I. W. Mackley to A. B. P. Smart, "The Commonwealth and the New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO)," 16 July 1981, FCO 58/2225, UKNA; House of Commons Debate, 8 December 1980, volume 995, columns 758-66 (quotation in column 766).
[1379] Assistant Secretary Elliot Abrams, "New World Information Order," *DOSB* 2055 (October 1981), 66.
[1380] John Reinhardt, "General Policy Statement Before the 20th General Conference UNESCO."

potential threats to the international information system. They urged the Secretariat to stay focused on technical issues.[1381] London similarly saw the new program as a means to derail "grandiose new initiatives" and demonstrate that Western countries could respond "positively" to world communications problems.[1382] In Paris, the Secretariat believed that the new institute could strengthen its own credibility - especially after being bruised by the WPFC and the journalists' offensive. It was a "vivid" way to counter criticisms that UNESCO was merely an ideological organization, one senior officials maintained. The IPDC would thereby push "UNESCO's adversaries against the wall."[1383] Washington, London, and the Secretariat in Paris therefore saw the IPDC as a means to avoid an impending diplomatic showdown.

Diplomats met in Washington in November 1979 to lay the foundation for the IPDC. The meeting focused on the institution's organizational structure. American officials proposed a modest institute that would focus on coordinating bilateral investment development programs.[1384] Secretariat officials and G77

[1381] Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "The New World Information Order at UNESCO'S Belgrade General Conference"; "Belgrade Scope Paper: Communication Issues," in House of Representatives, Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Review of U.S. Preparation for the 1980 UNESCO General Conference, 96th Congress, second session, 17 September 1980, 18; Pierre Navaux Memorandum to M. Makagiansar, "Raport sur ma Mission à Washington," Folder 124, Box 37, CAB 7, AG 8, UA; David Rowe Memorandum to Mr. Maynes, "UNESCO: Media, Congressional Briefing," 27 March 1980, Folder: "E-U.S. Position on UNESCO," Box 20, WPFCR, PUL.

[1382] Carrington to Gerald Long, 27 June 1980, FCO 58/1822, UKNA; "The New International Information Order," attached to W.R. McQuillan to Lord N. Gordon Lennox, 9 January 1980, FCO 58/1822, UKNA.

[1383] René Lefort Memorandum, "Suite Probables de la Conférence de Talloires et Propositions de Réaction pour L'Unesco," n.d., enclosed in René Lefort to M'Bow, 5 June 1981, Folder: "Protection de Journalistes," Box 53, CAB I, AG 8, UA.

[1384] Washington to Ottawa, "UNESCO Mtgs on Communications and Development," 24 March 1980, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15130, LAC.

delegates complained that their proposal "marginalized UNESCO" and "relegated [it] to a supporting role."[1385] Mustapha Masmoudi, who had emerged as the international champion of the New World Information and Communication Order in the MacBride Commission, proposed an alternative plan. The Tunisian ambassador, as one Secretariat official explained, repeated his conviction that international organizations should play the central role in assisting global communications development "and placed UNESCO in a central position."[1386] Secretariat officials wanted the organization to maintain their leadership over international communications development - although some worried that Masmoudi was giving them too much responsibility.[1387] Diplomats reassembled in Paris five months later to finalize agreements on the shape of the new organization. The United States maintained its commitment to an autonomous organization beyond UNESCO's influence. Canadian and West European allies, however, thought the American proposal "politically unrealistic" and agreed with Masmoudi that the IPDC should be established within UNESCO. The British worried that American actions "may well have hardened G77 suspicions about the

[1385] Dragoljub Najman Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Réunion d'Experts sur la Développement et la Planification de la Communication," 10 December 1979; Makaminan Makagiansar Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, both in Folder 127, Box 37, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1386] Makaminan Makagiansar Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, Folder 127, Box 37, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1387] "The New International Information Order," attached to W.R. McQuillan to Lord N. Gordon Lennox, 9 January 1980, FCO 58/1822, UKNA; Antonio Pasquali Memorandum to DDG, "Meeting of Experts on Communication Planning Development," 7 February 1980, Folder 47, Box 13, DDG 3, AG 8, UA.

underlying intentions of the West."[1388] The conference therefore rejected the American proposal and approved a program for the development of communications to be situated within UNESCO.[1389] The Americans also lost an effort several months later to gain a veto over the institute's deliberations.[1390]

The first session of the IPDC council that assembled in Paris in June 1981 was a success. Americans were worried about who would be chosen to direct the new program and informed the Secretariat that the choice "would be viewed as a signal about the future direction of the program" - as well as the organization as a whole - and urged it to appoint a moderate and apolitical civil servant.[1391] When news reached Washington that Mustapha Masmoudi wanted the position, Americans worried that he would turn the IPDC into a soapbox.[1392] The meeting settled on Gunnar Garbo, a Norwegian journalist and diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the first chairman. He was an uncontroversial choice who proved an ideal compromise. He saw it as his job to transcend aggressive debate

[1388] "Delegation Report," April 1980; Annex I of "Delegation Report," April 1980, both available in FCO 58/1822, UKNA; "Reunion Interministerielle Preparatoire a la Conference Intergouvernementale d'Avril 1980 Convoquee Par le Directeur General de l'UNESCO sur le Developpement des Communications," 14 February 1980, 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15130, LAC.

[1389] William G. Harley, "The U.S. Stake in the IPDC"; "Rapport Oral du Directeur Général sur L'Activité de L'Organisation depuis la 108e Session," 25.

[1390] Dana Bullen Speech, "UNESCO and the Media: A Report on Developments at Belgrade," 10 November 1980, Folder: "Talloires Docs," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL; Rosemary Righter, "Statist Vision of Press Risk's UNESCO's Future," *Sunday Times of London*, Folder 137, Box 41, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

[1391] "Memorandum of Conversation: Visit to Washington," Annex II enclosed in Gerard Bolla Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 1 March 1982, Folder 139, Box 42,CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

[1392] Paris to Ottawa, "PIDC," 29 April 1981; Paris to Ottawa, "Presidence du PIDC," 27 May 1981, both available in 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15972, LAC. On Masmoudi, see "Special Meeting of Key World Press Freedom Committee Officers in Chicago's O'Hare Hilton on 3 September 1980," Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL; Paris to Ottawa, "PIDC," 11 May 1981, Volume 15972, 55-9-4-UNESCO, LAC.

and focus on technical programs.[1393] The meeting reaffirmed "that priority should henceforth be given to practical, operational measures designed to strengthen the communication capabilities" of countries throughout the world.[1394] The Secretariat was pleased and issued press releases highlighting the council's dedication to "concrete and immediate needs" and the "spirit of dialogue and cooperation" that made it successful.[1395]

By the end of 1981, in the aftermath of the Talloires Conference, the IPDC seemed to be breaking the stalemate and building bridges between the Secretariat and its critics. M'Bow invoked it as proof of the organization's viability.[1396] Colleagues and advisors praised it as an "epic accomplishment." After visiting the United States in January 1982, Secretariat official Gerard Bolla confirmed that it had "encouraged" opinion in Washington.[1397] The Secretariat's assessment of the IPDC's potential to heal divisions with the Americans proved correct. The State Department's communications specialist argued that "we did not do badly... We can work with the new UNESCO-based communications development

[1393] Gunnar Garbo Address, Annex VI of CC/MD/47, UNESDOC.
[1394] Intergovernmental Council of the IPDC, First Session, "Final Report," 31 August 1981, CC/MD/47, UNESDOC.
[1395] Press Release N. 47, "Une Nouvelle Etape Franchie Par le Programme International Pour le Developpement de la Communication (PIDC)," June 1981, Folder 184, Box 51, DDG 3, AG 8, UA.
[1396] "Rapport Oral du Directeur Général sur L'Activité de L'Organisation depuis la 108e Session," Summary Records of the Executive Board, Second Meeting, 109th Session, 30 April 1980, 109 EX/SR.1-33, UNESDOC, 25; "Réponse du Directeur Général au Débat Relatif à Son Rapport Oral Sur L'Activité de L'Oragnisation Depuis la 111e Session," Summary Records of the Executive Board, Ninth Meeting, 112th Session, 21 May 1981, 112 EX/SR.1-14, UNESDOC, 125.
[1397] Hamdy Kandil Address to the Inter American Press Association, 1981, Folder 138; Gerard Bolla Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "PIDC et Missions à Washington et New York," 1 March 1982, Folder 139, both available in Box 42, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

mechanism."[1398] Elliot Abrams thought the IPDC could "be a fresh start for UNESCO, with emphasis on technology transfer and de-emphasis on ideology and politics."[1399] Senior WPFC members like George Beebe "wished it every success" and believed that it could benefit American interests.[1400]

A series of international crises and miscalculations, however, eroded the IPDC's viability. Although leading officials in Washington, London, the WPFC in Miami, and the Secretariat in Paris put their faith in it, dissenting voices continued to cast doubt about the prospects for compromise. Some states believed the IPDC was a distraction from underlying political disagreements and tried to push the organization back towards more confrontational strategies. For example, Indira Gandhi, back in power in New Delhi since January 1980, resumed her support for News Pool and denounced the Western media.[1401] The influential Indian diplomat T. N. Kaul criticized the IPDC in the Executive Board and called for a more confrontational approach to global information problems.[1402] Latin American critics - especially in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Cuba - complained that the Secretariat was giving in to American pressure to "abandon the cause it had defended and limit it to a conformist and depoliticized technical [program]." Cuba

[1398] David Roew Memorandum to Mr. McCall, "Minutes of the June 11 IO Meeting with Media Representatives and Congressional Staff Aides on UNESCO Issues," 18 June 1980, Folder: "E-U.S. Position on UNESCO," Box 20, WPFCR, PUL.
[1399] Elliot Abrams Prepared Statement, *Review of U.S. Participation in UNESCO*, 92
[1400] "Remarks by George Beebe of the World Press Freedom Committee at the Voices of Freedom Conference in Taillores," 16 May 1981, Folder: "Talloires Docs," WPFCR, Box 13, PUL; "Transcript of Discussion Following IPDC Panel at Talloires, 16 May 1981," Folder: "Talloires Docs," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL.
[1401] Indira Gandhi, "New Information System," February 1983, *Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi* 5 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1986), 289.
[1402] M. Troloki Nath Kaul statement, Summary Records of the Executive Board, Thirteenth Meeting, 113th Session, 25 September 1981, 113 EX/SR.1-21, UNESDOC, 169.

in particular started to promote confrontation. Fidel Castro became chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979 and used his charisma to condemn the free flow of information, promote the NWICO, and laud M'Bow's leadership. Antonio Pasquali, the Secretariat's senior communications official with close ties to Latin America's research institutions, believed the situation was "critical" and that M'Bow would have to address the "malaise" in the region.[1403] Dissenting voices within the WPFC also continued to spread doubt. Cushrow Irani, one of the most active participants at the Talloires Conference, believed that the IPDC was a "ruse and a device to lull the free world into a false sense of complacency" about UNESCO's intentions. In the fall of 1981, when optimism about the IPDC was greatest, Irani lobbied congressmen in Washington in an attempt to sow doubt about its potential.[1404]

Political issues also trickled into IPDC council discussions. Although the Secretariat and their critics tried to create a business-like atmosphere in council meetings, anticolonial rhetoric and ideology began to upset their tranquil tone. Many western critics had hoped it would bury discussions of the New World

[1403] "Rapport Final du Monitoring Group de Quito," cited in Antonio Pasqualli Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Détérioration de L'Image de L'Unesco en Amérique Latine," 22 December 1981, Folder 136, Box 41, CAB 7, AG 8, UA. For Cuba's interest in UNESCO and the NWICO, see "Final Report of the 6th Meeting of the Inter-Governmental Council for the Co-operation of Information Among Non-Aligned Countries Held in Valletta, Malta," FCO 58/2542, UKNA; Gérard Bolla Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Déclaration du Délégué de Cuba à la Commission Politique Spéciale de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unis," 5 November 1982, Folder 136, Box 41, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

[1404] "Transcript of Discussion Following IPDC Panel at Talloires, 16 May 1981," Folder: "Talloires Docs," Box 13; Cushrow Irani to Daniel P. Moynihan, 1 December 1981, Folder: "IPDC Facts and Figures," Box 21, both in WPFCR, PUL; Manjunath Pendakur, "NWICO: An International Powerplay Between the Core and the Periphery Countries," *Politics of News: Third World Perspectives*, edited by J. S. Yadava (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1984), 63, n. 53.

Information and Communications Order. Instead, as one British media official commented, a new round of "ideological debate" at the council's second session "led us right back to the NWICO debate."[1405] At a council meeting a year later, Sri Lanka blasted the Western news agencies that constituted an "international mafia," while Mozambique and Sandinista-led Nicaragua attacked American cultural imperialism.[1406] Ideological differences began to tarnish not just the tone of the discussions but the choice of development projects. Americans wanted to launch a project to develop cheap newsprint from the fibrous kenaf crop found throughout Africa and Asia. The council instead dedicated more resources to printing presses for the Organization of African Unity - which would presumably be used to distribute pamphlets in support of African liberation movements. The episode revealed, observers worried, that the organization remained committed to shaping the content of information - promoting anticolonial causes - rather than increasing the quantity of information.[1407]

Cold War tensions also paralyzed the IPDC's work. A series of international conflicts - the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 and his anti-communist rhetoric, the rise of Solidarity and upheaval in Poland the same year, and the collapse of negotiations over strategic arms limitations - brought Soviet-American relations to a nadir and the

[1405] "Record of the Minister of State's Meeting with Sir E. Pickering at 4:00 PM on 11 February 1982," 16 February 1982, FCO 58/2542, UKNA.
[1406] Intergovernmental Council of the IPDC, Fourth Session, "Final Report," COM/MD/4, UNESDOC; A. Grachyov, "Information, Development and Peace," *International Affairs* (December 1983), 124.
[1407] Ronald Koven Report on IPDC Meeting, attached to Dana Bullen to George Beebe, 30 December 1982, Folder: "Intergovernmental Council of IPDC," Box 21, WPFCR, PUL.

Cold War back to the center of international politics.[1408] As Cold War confrontation intensified, the Politburo turned east in 1982 and started to court rising powers in Asia.[1409] Soviet delegates managed to secure the Uzbek capital of Tashkent - the largest city in Central Asia and an ancient crossroads on the Silk Road that connected Europe and Asia - as the location for the 1983 session of the IPDC. Soviet delegates used the opportunity to laude their technical assistance programs in the region: Soviet experts were assisting Asian states to construct new radio stations, television centers, and relay lines. They announced the development of a new atmospheric communication line connecting India with the Soviet Union. First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Sharaf Rashidov addressed the council meeting and supported the NWICO - although he still reminded every state to promote the principle of national sovereignty.[1410] WPFC observers thought the Soviets were becoming "very aggressive" again on information issues and interpreted the IPDC meeting in Tashkent as the start of a new Soviet ideological offensive in Asia and the Middle East.[1411]

Financial problems crippled the IPDC's chance of success. Its "meagre" resources limited its ability to address underlying communications problems. The debates about the new organization's budget reflected Third World ambitions.

[1408] Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 1-142, 504-522, 546-553, 678-733; Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 299-337.
[1409] Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 10-50.
[1410] V. Kostokov to Deleep Pangaonkar and Alsino Da Costa, 5 September 1983, Folder 220, Box 70, CAB 7, AG 8, UA; A. Grachyov, "Information, Development and Peace," *International Affairs* (December 1983), 125.
[1411] "Informal Minutes of Meeting at Hotel zum Storchen, Zurich, Jan. 25, 1983," Folder: "WPFC Minutes," Box 16, WPFCR, PUL.

Esmond Wickremesinghe of Sri Lanka proposed a budget between one and two billion dollars, the Tunisian delegate suggested a budget between fifteen and twenty billion dollars, while Cuba suggested that it should be three hundred billion dollars.[1412] The Secretariat struggled to meet these expectations. The council called on the Director General to launch an international appeal for financial support in mid-1981.[1413] M'Bow tried to solicit financial support for the program by informing London that they could "take the political sting out" of the global debate by contributing "generously" to the IPDC's budget. Washington and London were willing to support the IPDC but made it clear to the Director General that they preferred bilateral aid rather than contributions to multilateral institutions.[1414] The IPDC consequently floundered and had a limited impact on Third World communications development. Gunnar Garbo returned from one trip to Africa, where he encountered enthusiastic responses to promises to improve communications infrastructure. "My enduring difficulty in Africa was to explain that the richer nations are contributing so little" to UNESCO's efforts to develop

[1412] "Address by Mr Gunnar Garbo at the Opening Meeting," Annex VI of COM/MD/1, UNESDOC. For budget proposals, see Roger Tatarian Memorandum, "Preliminary Notes on UNESCO Meeting in Paris," 19 April 1980, Folder Untitled, Box 17, WPFCR, PUL.
[1413] Makaminah Makagiansar Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, "Programme International pour le Déveleoppement de la Communication (PIDC)," 7 July 1981, Folder 183, Box 51, DDG 3, AG 8, UA.
[1414] "Speaking Notes: Meeting with the Pickering Group on 4 November," n.d.; "Record of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State's Meeting with Sir E. Pickering at 4:30 PM on Thursday, 4 November 1982," 15 November 1982, both in FCO 58/2542, UKNA; Beckett Sutherland to FCO, "Mr Rifkind's Visit to UNESCO on 11 October," 4 October 1982, FCO 58/2566, UKNA. Some officials in Washington and London did urge superiors to provide the IPDC with greater financial resources, but with little success. See for example, Meeting Record, "NWICO: Strategic Planning," 24 November 1981, FCO 58/2227, UKNA.

technical programs.[1415] Even critics in the United States and United Kingdom, like one member of the House of Lords, warned that "the Third World may feel a further rebuff" in response to paltry Western financial support.[1416] Financial problems alienated developing countries and made it difficult for the Secretariat to claim any dramatic successes.[1417]

The IPDC consequently began to lose support by 1982. Officials in London now believed that it had become merely an "ideological smokescreen" and "rhetorical make-believe" that clouded practical ideas.[1418] Martin Jacobs, who headed the Communications and UNESCO Affairs office in the State Department, argued that "NWICO militants" had "belittle[d]" the role of the "private sector in the IPDC" and focused on "centralized and statist" programs.[1419] George Beebe also complained that the "independent news media have been ignored."[1420] The IPDC continued to function as a communications development agency for decades. As a diplomatic tool to ease international tensions, it fell apart by 1983.

[1415] Gunnar Garbo, "Report on Visit to Africa by the Chairman of the International Council of the IPDC," 7 July 1982, enclosed in Gunnar Garbo to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 7 July 1982, Folder 136, Box 41, CAB 7, AG 8, UA. See also "Report by the Chairman," Annex IV of COM/MD/3, UNESDOC; Antonio Pasquali Memorandum to the Director General, "Rapport de Visite en Afrique de M. Gunnar Garbo," 20 August 1982, Folder 136, Box 41, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1416] House of Lords Debate, 03 July 1981, volume 422, columns 404-5 (Lord Brockway quotation in column 404).
[1417] Clifford H. Block, "Promising Step at Acapulco: A U.S. View," *Journal of Communications* 32, no. 3 (Summer 1982).
[1418] Malcolm Rifkind, "NWICO and IPDC: A Flawed Approach?," n.d., FCO 58/2566, UKNA. See also "Record of the Minister of State's Meeting with Sir E. Pickering at 4:00 PM on 11 February 1982," 16 February 1982, FCO 58/2542, UKNA.
[1419] Martin Jacobs Scope Paper on the Second Meeting of the IPDC, 11 January 1982, Folder: "IPDC-Mexico-1981," Box 21, WPFCR, PUL. See also comments by American diplomat Jean Girard, Summary Records of the Executive Board, Fifteenth Meeting, 116th Session, 7 June 1983, 116 EX/SR.1-29, UNESDOC, 173.
[1420] "Remarks by George Beebe at the Biannual Meeting of the World Press Freedom Committee in San Francisco," 25 April 1982, Folder: "Minutes and Reports," WPFCR, Box 23, PUL.

UNESCO slid further into diplomatic confrontation with Britain and, especially, with the United States. Press criticism resumed with a renewed series of critical reports in the press. A second Talloires Conference assembled in 1983 and renewed calls for the organization to withdraw from interfering in the international information system. "Let us welcome the era of great communications possibilities, and allow the communications revolution to proceed, without harassment," the conference declared.[1421] The brief hope that communications development programs could resolve the conflict over the global information debate deteriorated in the fall of 1983. The Secretariat struggled to respond to increasing tensions. The organization's local liaison office in New York City launched a public relations campaign to sway American opinion. A series of lectures and presentations defending their actions reached a broad audience but could not slow down the flood of criticism.[1422] As UN Under-Secretary-General for Information Thérèse Paquet-Sévigny conceded by the end of the decade, "the international debate on information and communication did not result in agreement on a common approach."[1423] Although information and communications issues continued to reemerge throughout the decade, the confrontation between UNESCO and the United States shattered any hope that a common global approach to communications problems could be developed.

[1421] "Report," n.d. [1983], enclosed in Hewson A. Ryan to Members of the Murrow Center Board of Advisers, 25 October 1983, Folder: "Talloires II," Box 13, WPFCR, PUL.
[1422] "Débat sur la Question de la Communication aux Etats Unis," 18 November 1983, Folder 220, Box 70, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1423] Thérèse Paquet-Sévigny as cited in Andrew Calabrese, "MacBride Report: It's Value to a New Generation," available online: <http://spot.colorado.edu/~calabres/Calabrese%20(Quaderns%20del%20CAC).htm>.

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The information revolution began to transform international politics in the 1970s. As one senior Secretariat official noted in 1982, "UNESCO can feel pleased to have been the great crossroad and the central forum where awareness of this new reality has been clearly manifested."[1424] All participants agreed that improving the flow of information would create a more harmonious world. The legacies of colonialism, however, created a world in which the ability to receive and spread information was unevenly distributed. The global debate that engulfed UNESCO for ten years centered on how to overcome these barriers. The Secretariat and its allies invoked ideas about international equality and "balance" to describe their proposals. They proposed that states and international organizations should coordinate global efforts to protect journalists from persecution, encourage marginalized peoples and nations to participate in global discussions, curb the power of multinational corporations, and establish basic codes of conduct. London, Washington, and the World Press Freedom Committee responded that "freedom of the press" was inseparable from the "free flow of information" and that any attempts by states or the international community to regulate one would undermine the other. Their proposals for communications development focused on the quantity rather than the content of information that

[1424] "Problematique Generale de L'Information et de la Communication," 15 March 1982, Folder 220, Box 70, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.

crossed international borders. Most importantly, the WPFC shifted the terms of the debate from balance and inequality to freedom and totalitarianism. Soviet efforts to legitimize their "information sovereignty" reinforced their fears about the organization's efforts and helped to bridge divisions between the United States and its Canadian and West European allies. The WPFC won this debate - and UNESCO lost much of its international prestige as a result.

The global information debate that raged in UNESCO and, to a lesser extent, in the Non-Aligned Movement collapsed in the mid-1980s but left an indelible mark on the international information system. The debate broadened attention to the role of communications problems. The MacBride Report, the organization's most important contribution to the global debate, became a foundational text in late-twentieth century communications research.[1425] Probably more important was the controversy's indirect effects. The controversy sensitized the international news agencies to Third World countries and reinforced their decision to devote more attention to regional issues in the 1980s and 1990s.[1426] The conflict also bruised the United Nations and discouraged international projects to manage the international flow of information. When the emergence of the Internet transformed global communications ten years later, memories of UNESCO discouraged discussions about grand schemes to manage the global

[1425] Mustapha Masmoudi, "Correlations Between NWICO and Information Society: Reflections of a NWICO Actor," Divina Frau-Meigs, Jeremie Nicey, Michael Palmer, Julia Pohle, and Patricio Tupper, eds., *From NWICO to WSIS: 30 Years of Communication Geopolitics: Actors and Flows, Structures and Divides* (Chicago: Intellect, 2012), 24.
[1426] Michael B. Palmer, "News Agencies," 1714.

flow of information.[1427] By the end of the decade, after fifteen years of stalemate and stale rhetoric, the World Press Freedom Committee's ideas conquered the Secretariat. The Secretariat declared that it was "leaving codes of journalistic ethics" to "press and media professionals themselves" in 1993 and, two years later, guided the Pan-African News Agency's efforts to privatize.[1428] The World Press Freedom Committee was surprised to find that it was now aligned with its former adversary on a range of global issues.[1429] The organization did help to reshape the international information system - albeit in ways very different than what M'Bow and his colleagues expected.

The global information debate was the climax of UNESCO's forty year struggle to construct a postcolonial international system. The Secretariat had for decades thought of itself as the intellectual workshop of the world. It helped to develop, legitimize, and popularize ideas like functional literacy and world heritage. It used its prestige in efforts to establish an international consensus on such controversial subjects as the scientific foundations of racial classification, the structure of world history, and the outline of a New International Economic Order. The Secretariat's efforts to remake the international information system stretched these international and intellectual ambitions to the breaking point. Like the History of Mankind project twenty years earlier, communications encroached

[1427] See for example, Kenneth Neil Cuckier, "Who Will Control the Internet?: Washington Battles the World," *Foreign Affairs* (November 2005).
[1428] Frederico Mayor as cited in Debra Gersh, "A Return to UNESCO?," *Editor & Publisher* (29 May 1993); Tony Case, "Striding Toward Independence," *Editor & Publisher* (14 October 1995).
[1429] DOS to USMISSION USVIENNA, "IO Evening Notes," March 1992, Document C05418576, FOIA-DOS; Allan Wolper, "World Press Day is Born," *Editor & Publisher* (1 May 1999).

on sensitive issues that defied consensus. The Secretariat's efforts polarized international politics and undermined the organization's credibility. M'Bow found the challenge difficult to escape.

Conclusion

The traveling of ideas recurred in human history
as naturally as the migration of birds.

Mohammad Khatami, 2000[1430]

Information and ideas have played a major role in modern international history. UNESCO's founders believed that they could create a more stable international system. Asian intellectuals used its authority as the world's intellectual body to deconstruct global hierarchies of race and civilization and strengthen international respect for their cultural traditions and historic achievements. These efforts were less an effort to create a more peaceful world than an attempt to attack the cultural underpinnings of the colonial world order. The organization mobilized intellectual resources in the 1960s to bridge the economic gulf that separated the Third World from North America and Western Europe. Educational advisors promised that their ideas would facilitate economic development and, through mass communications and literacy, expand the circuits of knowledge and information through their countries. Secretariat officials invented the idea of World Heritage and popularized the idea that monuments could stimulate trade and integrate new nations into global markets. In each case, the organization's ability to mobilize intellectual resources and popularize new

[1430] Mohammad Khatami, as cited in Press Release GA/9747, 5 September 2000, available online: http://www.dialoguefoundation.org/?Lang=en&Page=22&TypeId=5&NewsId=21&Action=NewsBodyView.

ideas internationally ensured their success. They were also victories in the struggle to create a postcolonial world.

Yet the organization's founders were also realistic and recognized that competition over ideas and the flow of information would lead to political conflict. States supported the organization because they were confident it could serve their national interests and ideological values. Countries competed to gain UNESCO's "seal of approval" for their ideas about international politics, history, and economic planning. It was this intellectual authority that made it so dangerous when the North-South Dialogue ignited a protracted war of ideas in the 1970s. Director General Amadou Mahtar M'Bow in particular believed the organization could speak for the parts of the world that lacked a voice in discussions about global governance. Secretariat headquarters in Paris became one of the central forums for debate about the international economic system, the persistence of neocolonialism, threats to cultural identity, and the international flow of information. Critics became weary of the organization because it was "a potent incubator and legitimizer of ideas," as one American critic warned.[1431] The organization's founding leaders and staff members thought of their organization as a "laboratory" or "factory" for new ideas. Forty years later, according to one newspaper, North American and West European critics thought of it as a "dimly-

[1431] Dana Bullen statement on US withdrawal from UNESCO, *Journal of Communication* 34 (Autumn 1984).

lit workshop" for repressive and anti-Western policies.[1432] British and American diplomats confronted these latent anxieties in 1984.

The United States challenged the organization's intellectual authority directly. President Ronald Reagan claimed that the United Nation's agenda was anti-American, statist in its approach to economic development and governance, and supported Third World dictators. The ballooning size of the United Nations' budget and its sprawling bureaucracy also convinced Washington it was dysfunctional and irrelevant in the modern world. M'Bow's leadership and involvement in controversial issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict alarmed many in Washington. "UNESCO is in many ways a test case for the entire U.N. system," the United Nations Association of the United States of America noted.[1433] Washington was most concerned with its intellectual threat to free speech and the free market – the foundations of "Western civilization." Greg Newell, who headed the State Department's International Organization department, urged his superiors to consider withdrawing from the organization. American action could "rob it of some of its moral authority," he explained.[1434] UN ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick briefed the president on 22 December 1983. We should "pick up our

[1432] "Capone-Style Protection," *The Observer* (24 June 1979), 55-9-4-UNESCO, Volume 15130, LAC.
[1433] Kim R. Holmes, "Ronald Reagan's Approach to the United Nations," *Reagan's Legacy in a World Transformed*, Jeffrey L. Chidester and Paul Kengor, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 202-215; United Nations Association of the United States of America Briefing Paper, "The United States and UNESCO: A Year of Decision," 20 February 1984, Folder 421, Box 135, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1434] *Recent Developments in UNESCO and their Implications for U.S. Policy*, 83; Paul Lewis, "U.S. Says it May not Quite if Unesco Changes," *New York Times* (16 February 1984).

marbles and go home," Reagan wrote in his diary that night.[1435] A week later, Secretary of State George P. Schultz, a strong supporter of the "free flow of information" and the "revolution in global communication," informed M'Bow that the United States would withdraw from the organization in one year.[1436] American critics of the organization championed the decision. "Like [the American invasion of] Grenada," one critic claimed, "the UNESCO withdrawal was a case of actions conforming to principle, of policy tracking conviction."[1437] Washington walked out of the organization in December 1984.

London shared Washington's concerns and adopted the same strategy. Parliamentary critics targeted the organization's "deeply sinister" ideas and attack on "Western values."[1438] Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was an early critic of the organization's commitment to the New World Information and Communications Order and repeated criticisms of its efforts to "prevent freedom

[1435] Ronald Reagan diary entry, 22 December 1983, *The Reagan Diaries*, Douglas Brinkley, ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 207.
[1436] George P. Shultz to Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, 28 December 1983, Annex I of 119 EX/14, UNESDOC. For Shultz's ideas about the role of communications and information technology in international relations, see George Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," *Foreign Affairs* (1985 Spring), 716; George Shultz interview, 2000, PBS, available online: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/int_georgeshultz.html.
[1437] Chester E. Finn, Jr., "The Rationale for the American Withdrawal," *Comparative Education Review* 30, no. 1 (February 1986), 140. See also Senator Solomon Statement, *Recent Developments in UNESCO and their Implications for U.S. Policy*, 49; Greg Newell Statement, *Recent Developments in UNESCO and their Implications for U.S. Policy*, 121.
[1438] Statements by Lord Vaizey, Viscount Eccles, Lord Bauer, and Lord Gladwyn Jebb, all in House of Lords Debate, 25 January 1984, volume 447, columns 304-308, 317-319, 322-324, 313-317.

of speech and freedom of the press in parts of the world."[1439] London announced in November 1984 that it would also leave UNESCO.[1440]

The Secretariat struggled to understand Anglo-American actions. Some of the Director General's advisors suggested that traditional American "isolationism" was regaining influence. Reagan, after all, came of age in postwar California, where local school boards and patriotic organizations had attacked the United Nations.[1441] M'Bow acknowledged many of the organization's administrative shortcomings. "Reforms now filled the air," a Burmese diplomat recalled.[1442] The Secretariat officials, however, stridently defended the organization's intellectual mission in the world. They acknowledged that the majority of the budget was spent at headquarters in Paris rather than in the field but denied that this amounted to financial mismanagement. UNESCO "renders services" and was not a humanitarian aid agency. "It's like telling a university it spends all its money on teachers or telling a research institute it spends all its money on researchers," one of M'Bow's aides complained.[1443] The Director General denied that the organization was a threat to Western civilization but emphasized the world was intellectually and politically diverse. The international

[1439] Margaret Thatcher Speech to Institute of Journalists, "Press Freedom," 28 November 1978, available online: http://margaretthatcher.org/document/103789; Margaret Thatcher statement in House of Commons Debate, 20 November 1984, volume 68, columns 143-147.
[1440] R. W. Apple, Jr., "Britain Threatens to Leave UNESCO Unless it Changes," *New York Times* (23 November 1984), A1; House of Commons Debate, 5 December 1985, volume 88, column 448.
[1441] "Les Auditions du Sous-Comité des Opérations Internationales, des Droits de L'Homme et des Organisations Internationales," Annex II of Dragoljub Najman Memorandum to Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, 1 September 1981, Folder 137, Box 41, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1442] U Thet Ten, "The Crisis at UNESCO," *Selected Writings of Retired Ambassador U Thet Tun* (Yangon: Myanmar Historical Commission, 2004).
[1443] As cited in Andrew Radolf, "Is UNESCO Misunderstood?," *Editor and Publisher* (21 April 1984).

system no longer revolved around Europe and was no longer defined by its standards and values. Countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America had "different viewpoints and outlooks on the world." UNESCO merely reflected the intellectual state of the international community.[1444]

Anglo-American withdrawal hit the Secretariat hard. It lost almost a thousand staff members – close to a third of the entire organization's workforce.[1445] M'Bow lost favor internationally and within the Secretariat. The General Conference elected Spanish scientist and education minister Federico Mayor to replace him in 1988. The new Director General distanced himself from M'Bow and controversial issues like the New International Economic Order and the New World Information and Communications Order. The organization fell back on its two most successful projects, literacy and World Heritage, to restore the organization's international prestige and moral authority.[1446]

The international community is still struggling to build a postcolonial world order. Contemporary critics have claimed that the United States is now the world's last empire. American policymakers, like their European imperial predecessors, invoke standards of international behavior to justify foreign

[1444] Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow to George P. Shultz, 18 January 1984, Annex II of 119 EX/14, UNESDOC. See also Prem Kirpal, "The UNESCO Crisis," *India News and Feature Alliance* III, no. 7 (9 January 1984), Folder 421, Box 135, CAB 7, AG 8, UA.
[1445] "Évolution des Effectifs du Personnel," *L' Unesco Racontée par ses Anciens* (Paris: UNESCO, 2006), 127.
[1446] René-Pierre Anouma, "Le Retrait des Etats-Unis d'Amerique de l'Unesco (1984): Conséquences et Plaidoyer pour le Retour à l'Universalité," *Civilisations* 43, no. 2 (1996), 147-148; Steven Greenhouse, "New Unesco Chief Wants the U.S. to Rejoin," *New York Times* (8 November 1987); Vincenzo Pavone, *From the Labyrinth of the World to the Paradise of the Heart*, 228.

intervention.[1447] The persistence of Third World poverty is also an enduring legacy of European colonialism. Some academics and critics have blamed the problem on the global economic rules – austerity, privatization, and a small public sector – proscribed by the World Bank and the IMF. The Indian historian Vijay Prashad has characterized the international economic system as a neocolonial threat to "the sovereignty of the national liberation states."[1448] Discussions about civilization, which underpinned nineteenth-century European imperialist discourse, have also returned to political and economic discussions about the international community. The American political scientist and Washington insider Samuel P. Huntington shaped the post-Cold War debate about the "clash of civilizations." He argued that the world could be divided into a handful of civilizations with a fixed set of cultural values. Conflict between them would shape international politics in the next century. Huntington was particularly influential in Washington and shaped how many beltway elites thought about the world after the end of the Cold War. These arguments, critics were quick to charge, echoed the old European world order and the standards of civilizations it promoted around the world.[1449]

UNESCO's ideas, however, have still resonated with some world leaders in recent years. President Mohammad Khatami's efforts to reform Iran's foreign

[1447] Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
[1448] Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 236.
[1449] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 22–49; Edward Said, "The Clash of Definitions," Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Shells, eds., *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy* (New York: Columbian University Press, 2003), 69-75.

and domestic policies provides the most important example. The Iranian leader, following his surprise 1997 election, quickly introduced an ambitious reform program to ease the government's control over civil society and to open intellectual and diplomatic contacts with the United Sates and Europe. He defended the Iranian Revolution's anticolonial ideals and condemned Western neocolonialism but advocated "dialogue between civilizations and cultures" to improve Iran's international image.[1450] Khatami resurrected a 1974 UNESCO project to foster "dialogue between different civilizations" – designed largely to inform the Western world about African and other postcolonial nations – and made it central to his diplomatic ambitions and efforts to overcome Iran's cultural and political isolation.[1451] World leaders assembled in New York City in September 2000 for the Dialogue Among Civilizations roundtable. Khatami's inaugural lecture repeated his arguments that the world's leaders had to promote intellectual and cultural exchange programs in order to foster international stability.

The gathering provided an opportunity for other world leaders to share their opinions about the role of ideas and information in the post-Cold War world. Leaders from across North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia directly challenged Samuel Huntington's argument that cultural traditions and values were incompatible and destined to clash. The Emir of Qatar and a member of

[1450] "Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami," 7 January 1998, CNN, available online: http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html.
[1451] Interview with Hans Köchler, 19 February 2014, International Progress Organization, available online: http://i-p-o.org/Koechler-Dialogue_of_Civilizations-interview-WPFDC-2014.htm.

Pakistan's National Security Council condemned Huntington's "dangerous idea" and urged their colleagues to "shake off the clash of civilizations syndrome." They defended Islamic thought as peaceful and blamed international conflict on misunderstanding between Islamic states and Western countries. Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in particular addressed the "irrational fear" of Islam that was growing in Western countries.[1452] Discussions also turned towards the internet and the flood of information that was spreading around the world. Russian "godfather of glasnost" Alexander Yakovlev, veteran American journalist and diplomatic correspondent Flora Lewis, and former Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar agreed that the latest communications revolution did not facilitate dialogue and international justice - many Third World peoples, after all, still did not have access to the Internet and modern communications.[1453] The Secretariat and the United Nations sponsored symposiums, roundtable conferences, and other projects to improve dialogue and respect between different civilizations and cultures. The next year, a series of terrorist attacks in the United States changed the geopolitical world map. The attacks did not, as these series of gatherings illustrated, stop efforts to challenge how people thought about the world.[1454]

[1452] *Dialogue Among Civilizations: The Round Table on the Eve of the United Nations Millennium Summit* (Paris: UNESCO, 2001), 34, 62, 95.
[1453] See comments and addresses by Alexander Yakovlev, Javad Faridzadeh, Ugne Karvelis, and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in *Dialogue Among Civilizations*, 119-121.
[1454] This argument is emphasized in Akira Iriye, "The Making of a Transnational World," Akira Iriye, ed., *Global Interdependence: The World After 1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 824.

Information and ideas have criss-crossed and flowed across geographical and cultural borders for millennia. They have travelled along trans-continental caravans, trans-oceanic trade routes, and the networks of sprawling empires. Itinerant teachers and intellectuals have carried ideas with them and international organizations and have exchanged them. In recent years, new communications technologies have unleashed a flood of information around the world and allowed new ideas to spread across borders and reach new masses of people. This dissertation has explored how states and individuals have tried to manage and mobilize these exchanges. Some have contributed to these efforts in the name of humanity and world peace. Many sought new sources of intellectual authority to legitimize their visions of international society. It is unlikely that UNESCO will have the same international and intellectual authority as it did during the age of European decolonization in the late twentieth-century.[1455] But people around the world will continue to seek new sources of intellectual authority to validate and expand their demands for justice, empowerment, and understanding.

[1455] Mark Mazower, *Governing the World*, 406-429.

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