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# The impact of campaign donation sources on election outcomes: donations from within the candidate's district

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BOSTON UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Thesis

**THE IMPACT OF CAMPAIGN DONATION  
SOURCES ON ELECTION OUTCOMES:  
DONATIONS FROM WITHIN THE CANDIDATE'S DISTRICT**

by

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B.A., Boston University, 2019

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**THE IMPACT OF CAMPAIGN DONATION SOURCES ON ELECTION  
OUTCOMES: DONATIONS FROM WITHIN THE  
CANDIDATE'S DISTRICT  
ADELAINE REYNOLDS**

**ABSTRACT**

This study seeks to examine the relationship between the percentage of campaign donations coming from within a candidate's constituency and his likelihood of winning the election, as well as look at the reasons for the existence of that relationship. This is accomplished by performing a logistic regression analysis of likelihood of winning against total percentage donations coming from sources within the candidate's district for 172 House candidates, followed by a series of case studies intended to allow for deeper examination into why this is the case. Findings indicate that there is no significant relationship between the percentage of donations from the constituency and the candidate's success and proposes that this is likely due to lack of voter awareness of how a candidate's campaign is funded due to the media neglecting to address the subject adequately or accurately.

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## INTRODUCTION

Campaign finance has become an increasingly popular topic for news coverage. Whether it is PAC money or “big money donors,” people are starting to concern themselves with who is financing the campaigns of candidates they may end up voting for. Some of the press is likely generated by the many contenders for the 2020 Presidential election making promises to not accept money from certain groups,<sup>1,2</sup> but they would not bring attention to it if they did not know that it is starting to be something that voters look to in order to gain information on candidates and who’s interests they might be representing. When you see a headline like “Only 13 Mainers gave \$200 or more to Susan Collins in the latest quarter,”<sup>3</sup> and realize that out of the \$1.1 million in donations Collins has received for the 2020 Senate election, less than 1% came from her home state of Maine, it can be concerning; assuming that money represents support, it is hard to see why only 1% of that support should be coming from the very people an elected official represents. Yet, most people would not know what a “normal” amount of

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Overby, “Democratic Presidential Candidates Say ‘No’ To Corporate PAC Money,” NPR, Feb 1, 2019

<sup>2</sup> MJ Lee, “Elizabeth Warren’s new promise: No fundraisers, phone calls with wealthy donors,” CNN, February 25, 2019.

<sup>3</sup> Simone Pathé, “Only 13 Mainers gave \$200 or more to Susan Collins in the latest quarter,” *Roll Call*, Apr 8, 2019.

donations from within a candidate's district might be, or how to interpret that information. How would you feel if you found out that most of the monetary support received by your Congressman came from outside of your own district? Whose interests are really at play here?

This study examines this aspect of the role of donation source by observing whether the percentage of funding from sources within a candidate's constituency plays a role in election outcome for that candidate. In effect, it seeks to determine if a higher percentage of donations from within the constituency has a positive, negative, or no impact on whether or not the candidate wins. Assuming local donors have interests due to policy impact on their community, while non-local donors have external interests (such as maintaining a red or blue seat or a particular policy stance that would benefit them), if campaigns that are funded by primarily sources outside of their constituency see more success than those that are locally funded, it indicates that there is an aspect beyond the vote of a constituent that is influencing elections. In order to assess this role, I first identify the relationship between percentage of campaign donations coming from within the candidate's constituency and if they won their election. This is followed by a set of case studies that allows for deeper exploration as to why this relationship may exist, and to briefly address the voter psychology that could be playing a role

in this relationship in the context of specific races. Ultimately, this study seeks to identify the impact of campaign donations from inside a candidate's district on his chances of winning the election, and produce potential reasons for why this effect can be seen.

### **CAMPAIGN FUNDING**

The majority of the literature currently available seeks to look at campaign donation source on a larger scale. Examination of raw data available from the FEC requires no study to comprehend; candidates who have more money do better in their elections than their less-funded opponents. On this note, money has been shown to play an essential role in the ability of a candidate to put up a fight against an opponent, and having more of it is shown to be beneficial.<sup>4</sup> Higher levels of spending allows for increased public appearances, more materials such as signs, commercials, and other means of increasing the candidate's visibility, which generally contributes positively to a candidate's likelihood of winning.<sup>5,6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Gary C. Jacobson, "Money and votes reconsidered: congressional elections, 1972–1982," *Public Choice* (1985) 47: 7. doi: 10.1007/BF00119352

<sup>5</sup> Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 72, no. 2 (1978): 469–91. doi:10.2307/1954105.

<sup>6</sup> Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments," *American Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 2 (1990): 334–62.

The policy regulating donations is the most commonly studied factor regarding the role of campaign finance on election outcomes, some of which briefly touches on source in some manner. Limits on donations have been found to play a significant role in election outcomes,<sup>7</sup> which pertains to source in that they are regulated based on what the source is. More attention is paid to sources in general groups broken down by their legislative designations used to set the limits: party, PAC, individual.<sup>8</sup> Statistically significant, positive correlations have been identified for PACs and individual donations, with PAC contributions show a slightly higher effect,<sup>9</sup> demonstrating that there is more at play than merely the total sum of all of the donations made to a candidate in whether or not he or she succeeds in winning the election.

Attention has also been given to the size of donations, claiming that both parties rely upon “big money” donors (donations of a larger value) more than

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<sup>7</sup> John R. Lott, Jr., "Campaign Finance Reform and Electoral Competition," *Public Choice* 129, no. 3-4 (2006): 263-300. DOI:10.1007/s11127-006-9028-x

<sup>8</sup> More recently, Super PAC has been added as a designation resulting from the *Citizens United v. FEC* and the *SpeechNOW.org v. FEC* rulings of 2010, but because Super PACS are not allowed to contribute or coordinate directly with candidates and their campaigns, they will not be addressed in this study, it looks only at campaign contributions

<sup>9</sup> Craig A. Depken, "The Effects of Campaign Contribution Sources on the Congressional Elections of 1996," *Economics Letters* 58, no. 2 (1998): 211-15. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765\(97\)00266-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00266-8)

smaller grassroots donations,<sup>10</sup> and that donations from these “big money” donors tend to be more due to ideological agreement between themselves and the candidate rather than for specific political benefits.<sup>11</sup> Local donors are generally *not* “big money” donors,<sup>12</sup> and likely have a vested interest in the district rather than being in ideological agreement with a candidate. Voters living within a district are more likely to be attuned to their specific needs rather than ideologies, so outside donors providing funding in order to promote their ideologies rather than specific needs could potentially be work against a candidate trying to gain popular support from his constituents by merely demonstrating alignment with community interests and desire to promote policy advantageous to his constituency.

## **VOTER PSYCHOLOGY AND CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE**

There is a gap in literature pertaining to voters’ views on donation source, and pieces that do examine it tend to look at it from a voter psychology perspective

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<sup>10</sup> Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, "Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, (2013) 27 (3): 103-24.DOI: 10.1257/jep.27.3.103

<sup>11</sup> Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De Figueredo, and James M. Snyder. 2003. “Why is There So Little Money in US Politics?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(1): 105-30.

<sup>12</sup> “FEC Reports on Financial Activity U.S. Senate and House Campaigns : Final Report.” *Washington, D.C. :Federal Election Commission, n.d.*

rather than an impact-based, outcome-oriented assessment. Moreover, the majority of the few pieces that look at donation source tend to approach it from the angle of impact of campaign finance disclosure (or nondisclosure), which does provide insight into the candidate side of campaign finance source, but does little to provide information on the voters.

Findings indicate that data on campaign finance that is available to voters offers too much information that is of little value and relevancy to those attempting to figure out the source of donations and what interest groups could potentially be offering their financial support, potentially in order to benefit their own interests.<sup>13,14</sup> The same study also found that when voters were given information with obvious cues that demonstrated support by interest groups, particularly those working against causes that the voter supported, there was a decidedly negative impact on voter support. When voters are made explicitly aware of donation source, it has been shown to have significant effect on candidate support, but it has also been determined that voters rarely dig for this data, and primarily rely on the media and watchdog groups to provide them with

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<sup>13</sup> Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel A. Smith, "Rules, Politics, and Policy," *Election Law Journal* 4.4 (Nov 2005): 234. doi:1089/elj.2005.4.295

<sup>14</sup> After spending over twenty hours sifting through FEC data on campaign contributions to candidates in order to pull specific information on the entities donating, I have come to the same conclusion as these authors

information on the candidates that may sway their vote.<sup>15</sup> Due to little and even inaccurate media focus on this topic,<sup>16</sup> this effectively means that in practice, voters are unaware of (and thus not influenced by) where funding comes from. This has serious implications for the significance of this information in voter decision-making as well as eventual legislative composition—knowledge of campaign funding source changes voter opinions, and thus election outcomes, but voters are unaware of who is influencing them due to lack of attention from the media, and even if they attempt search for this data themselves, will encounter difficulty finding the information necessary to determine who is behind the donations. Garrett and Smith’s explanation of the significance of disclosure statutes does a superb job of capturing why it is important for voters to be aware of where funding is coming from, indicating that in addition to offering more information on campaign activity and allowing voters to better evaluate candidates, it helps to prevent instances of *quid pro quo* occurrences or accusations.<sup>17</sup> While this is specifically referring to disclosure statements, it follows the same line of thought

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<sup>15</sup> Conor M. Dowling and Amber Wichowsky, “Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure,” *American Politics Research* 41 (2013): 965-996. DOI: 10.1177/1532673X13480828

<sup>16</sup> Stephen Ansolabehere, Erik C. Snowberg, James M. Snyder, “Unrepresentative Information: The Case of Newspaper Reporting on Campaign Finance,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69, Issue 2 (2005):213–231. doi:10.1093/poq/nfi022

<sup>17</sup> Garrett and Smith, pp. 299-300

regarding voter awareness of funding source. It brings up the important factor of potential *quid pro quo* arrangements, which adds another element to concerns about adherence to democratic values. While *quid pro quo* arrangements are illegal,<sup>18</sup> they can be fairly easily masked, particularly if donation sources cannot be easily identified by those who are likely to be most concerned — the people who are being represented by the official on the receiving end.

## **HYPOTHESIS**

Combining the insights about campaign funding with voter psychology leads me to the hypothesis that a higher percentage of outside money would mean lower levels of support for a candidate within his district due to a general sensitivity to the influence of outsiders and voters' desire to feel that they have elected the candidate that best understands the needs of their district, providing the following model:

H<sub>0</sub>= A higher percentage of funds coming from donors inside the district has no significant impact on election outcomes

H<sub>1</sub>= A higher percentage of funds coming from donors inside the district has a significant positive impact on election outcomes

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<sup>18</sup> As determined by 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (also known as the Hobbes Act) and 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006)

This conjecture follows the reasoning that more monetary support from inside the district would suggest to voters that the community itself harbors support for the candidate, which is indicative of an alignment in policy preferences, leading voters to favor said candidate. That said, I am hesitant to claim that the quantitative model will provide evidence supporting my hypothesis due to voter reliance on the media to provide them with information on candidates up for election, including information on their campaign funding sources—which reportedly is not very common. Without voter awareness, it is unlikely that there will be an impact, and if there is, I will need to examine the role of factors outside the media as sources of voter information. I anticipate stronger evidence in support of  $H_1$  in the case study portion where I am able to specifically examine media influence and voter response.

## **METHODS**

### **Part 1: Quantitative**

In order to assess whether or not percentage of campaign donations coming from within a candidate's district could be related to the candidate's election outcome, I run a regression analysis to see if there is a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable, higher percentages of constituent-

sourced campaign donations, and the dependent variable, the candidate winning their election. In order to assess this relationship, I use a logistic regression analysis, chosen due to the desire to observe the impact of an interval variable (percentage of campaign funds from sources within the district) on a binary nominal variable (win or lose). This is also taken a step further with a second round of regressions, also using a logistic regression, but with the data set broken down by party in order to see if there is a stronger relationship between the independent and dependent variables in one party than the other.

*Data Selection:*

Data from U.S. House of Representatives general elections was chosen because it is a set of elections deciding representation at the federal level that is tied to distinct, particular districts. There is a specific geographic area that is tied to each House seat election, making it simple to determine what counts as a candidate's constituency and what does not. The election years 2004, 2006, and 2008 were chosen in order to ensure that the entire election period fell within the laws set forth by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, but before the *Citizen's United* ruling that allowed for the creation of Super PACs, which offered

a way to get around individual donation limits by not donating directly to a candidate's campaign.

Data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) is used due to the mandatory reporting required by candidates, which guarantees that all individual donations to a candidate are accounted for. These donation records are tagged with the full address of the donor, including zip code. By cross checking the donor zip code against the zip codes within the candidate's constituency using the official districting data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I am able to determine whether the donation is sourced from within or outside the district and tag it as such.

A number of studies have shown that there is significant advantage for an incumbent candidate,<sup>19,20,21</sup> so in order to prevent this from influencing results by any means, only open seat races were considered. With the three years of elections (2004, 2006, and 2008) considered and the availability of FEC data, 172 House election candidates are assessed. Note also that only candidates from the two major parties, Democrat and Republican, are considered in this analysis since in

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<sup>19</sup>Robert S. Erikson, "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections," *Polity* 3, no. 3 (1971): 395-405. doi: 10.2307/3234117

<sup>20</sup>Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz, "Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?" *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 2 (1996): 478.

<sup>21</sup>Albert D. Cover, "One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 21, no. 3 (1977): 523-41. doi:10.2307/2110580

the selected races, no independent candidates garnered a significant (over 10%) of the vote.<sup>22</sup>

*Controls:*

In order to ensure that other factors do not influence the results, several potential confounding variables are controlled for. Since party has been shown to be the leading indicator for how people vote, it will be controlled for in the initial regression examining all of the candidates.<sup>23</sup> In the second round of regressions broken down by party, this will no longer require control since all of the candidates being evaluated will be members of the same party. This will be the only control that is dropped for the second round or regression analysis. Another variable relating to party will control for the party of the previous Representative elected in the district to ensure that if the district is a stronghold of one party and would therefore create a partisan influence on the election outcome beyond merely the effect of the parties of the current candidates, it will not have an impact upon

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<sup>22</sup> "FEC Reports on Financial Activity U.S. Senate and House Campaigns : Final Report." Washington, D.C. :Federal Election Commission, n.d.

<sup>23</sup> Larry M. Bartels, "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 35-50. doi:10.2307/2669291

the analysis results.<sup>24</sup> Year will be controlled for since 2004 and 2008 are Presidential elections as well, which could potentially have an impact on campaign donation patterns in comparison to the 2006 midterm election. This will be included in the form of dummy variables for the years 2004 and 2006 since it is a categorical variable that Stata would otherwise interpret as an interval due to its numerical value; 2008 is discarded since including all three dummy variables would be redundant. Gender of a candidate has also been shown to impact voter evaluation of a candidate, therefore it will be controlled for in both rounds of regressions.<sup>25,26,27</sup> The final control will be the overall dollar value of individual contributions received, since research has demonstrated that candidates with larger war chests tend to be more likely to win than their opponents with more limited financial resources.<sup>28,29,30</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Andrew Gelman, *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State Why Americans Vote the Way They Do*, Expanded ed. (Princeton, N.J. ; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2010).

<sup>25</sup> Richard L. Fox and Zoe M. Oxley, "Gender Stereotyping in State Executive Elections: Candidate Selection and Success," *The Journal of Politics* 65, no. 3 (2003): 833-50. doi: 10.1111/1468-2508.00214

<sup>26</sup> Koch, Jeffrey W. "Candidate Gender and Assessments of Senate Candidates." *Social Science Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (1999): 84-96

<sup>27</sup> Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates," *American Journal of Political Science* 37, no. 1 (1993): 119-47. doi:10.2307/2111526

<sup>28</sup> Jacobson, 1978.

<sup>29</sup> Jacobson, 1985.

<sup>30</sup> Jacobson, 1990.

The final dataset will contain all 172 candidates tagged for the independent variable of percentage of campaign donations from sources within the candidate's constituency (% value between 0 and 100) and the dependent variable, election outcome (win or loss), as well as the control variables: party (Democrat or Republican), party stronghold (party sitting congressman is the same or different as candidate's party), year (2004, 2006, or 2008), total amount of donations (dollar value), and gender (male or female). This will ultimately produce this logistic regression model:

$$\text{Logged Odds (win)} = a + b_1 (\% \text{ of donations from sources within district}) + b_2 (\text{party}) + b_3 (\text{party stronghold}) + b_4 (\text{year 2004}) + b_5 (\text{year 2006}) + b_6 (\text{gender}) + b_7 (\text{total donations})$$

The second round of regressions will produce a similar model:

$$\text{Logged Odds (win)} = a + b_1 (\% \text{ of donations from sources within district}) + b_2 (\text{party stronghold}) + b_3 (\text{year 2004}) + b_4 (\text{year 2006}) + b_5 (\text{gender}) + b_6 (\text{total donations})$$

*Data Collection:*

Data for this portion is acquired by pulling all records of individual donations to a candidate from the FEC database. Individual donation reports require the donor's address, including their zip code. The zip code of each donor is then cross-referenced with a list of every zip code in the district of the candidate

running for office. If the donor's zip code is on that list, the amount they donated is listed as being "in-district." Once each donation is marked "in-district" or not, I add together all of the donation amounts of the donors marked as "in-district" to get the total sum of a candidate's donations coming from within his district. I then add together all of the candidate's donations, both those marked "in-district" and not in order to get the total amount of all of the candidate's reported individual contributions. In order to calculate the percentage of donations coming from sources within the candidate's district, I divide the amount of "in-district" donations by the total of all donations. This action is completed for each of the 172 candidates.

## **Part 2: Qualitative**

In order to explore the phenomenon of campaign donation sources from a more voter-oriented perspective, a qualitative analysis will be performed in addition to the previously explained work. While the quantitative section seeks to identify the relationship between campaign donation source and winning an election, the case study section of this project will aim for a deeper exploration into the possibilities of campaign-funding source affecting election outcome in specific situations rather than generalized analysis. I have three criteria that I am looking

at specifically: 1) amount and type of media coverage with regard to campaign funding sources of the candidate; 2) public discussion about the topic of campaign funding; and 3) the candidate's attention to his funding sources. By assessing each case in terms of these criteria, I hope to gain a deeper, and perhaps more causal understanding of why sources of campaign funding impact election outcomes the way they do. Moreover, this will provide insight into the experience of a citizen participating in the election in that it will be observable not only how much information is provided, but the amount of attention given that would be likely to cause a voter to consider the topic of campaign funding sources at all. Case selection is based upon availability of sources, percentages of donations from within the district, and media coverage. Elections with no media coverage will not be considered since there is no way to assess the impact or attribute the role of campaign donation sources in the election outcome.

## **DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS**

### **Part 1: Quantitative**

Before examining the results of the regressions, it is valuable to observe the statistical summary of the independent variable, particularly for the two parties in order to see whether there are any baseline differences that would be important to

note. The mean and standard deviations of the percentage of donations from sources within the candidate’s district, as well as the median and 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles are shown in Table 1 below:

**Table 1: Summary Statistics for % In-District Donations**

	All	Democrats	Republicans
Mean	44.13%	42.02%	46.34%
Std. Dev.	20.95%	21.71%	20.01%
25%	25.21%	24.95%	30.05%
50% (median)	43.51%	39.86%	46.25%
75%	59.13%	55.32%	61.44%
Observations	172	88	84

While one might assume there would be a difference in the percentage of donations from in-district sources between parties, the mean and standard deviations are relatively even across the samples, which provides a solid baseline for statistical comparison. The Republicans see a slight increase in their percentile spread in comparison to the other samples, with values about 6% higher than Democrats for the median, 25<sup>th</sup>, and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles. One might assume that these percentages might be higher for Republicans, since they are generally more likely to emphasize their local connections since conservatives generally support government power shifting away from larger bodies (i.e. federal and state) in favor

of local governance, which would mean they are likely more interested in a politician’s ability to demonstrate faith in his constituents, which could be demonstrated by their monetary support. Alternatively, one might assume Republicans would have higher levels of in-district donations because those with higher incomes are more likely to identify themselves as Republican,<sup>31</sup> thus Republican-dominated districts are more likely to have higher numbers of people with more disposable income that could be directed towards their candidate’s campaign. Despite this fact, the summary statistics indicate that there is only minimal difference between the two parties, a factor to keep in mind when assessing the party differences in the results of the logistic regressions.

To rule out the notion that number of wins might influence the results, I also want to note the number of wins broken down by party, as shown in Table 2:

**Table 2: Number of Races Won**

	All	Democrats	Republicans
Wins	87	44	43
Losses	85	44	41
Win %	50.58%	50.00%	51.12%
Observations	172	88	84

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<sup>31</sup> “Independents Take Center Stage in Obama Era: Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 1987-2009.” Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (May 21, 2009).

Even across three elections, one of which saw a change in party control of the House from Republican to Democrat, both parties see a win approximately half the time. This could potentially rule out concerns about differing odds due solely to a higher likelihood of one party winning more often within the dataset.

In order to best assess whether or not percentage of campaign donations coming from within a candidate's district could be related to the candidate's election outcome, I ran a logistic regression with the independent variable "% Donations In-District" and the dependent variable "win." To gauge if party played any role in these trends, in addition to the full sample including all of the candidates in each party, I also ran separate regressions for only the Democrats and only the Republicans. All three regressions were run with the variables party stronghold, year 2004, year 2006, gender, and total donations controlled for, and the first regression, including all 172 of the candidates, was additionally controlled for party.<sup>32</sup> The results of these regressions can be seen below in Table 3:

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<sup>32</sup> Explanation of these controls can be found in the "Controls" portion of the Methods section

**Table 3: Logistic regression of a candidate's odds of winning against the % donations from inside the candidate's district (controls included)**

	All	Democrats	Republicans
<b>% Donations In-District</b>	<b>.201</b>	<b>-2.651</b>	<b>2.320</b>
	<b>(.990)</b>	<b>(1.792)</b>	<b>(1.434)</b>
<i>p-value</i>	.839	.139	.106
Party (0=R)	1.300** (.491)	n/a	n/a
Party Stronghold (0=Same) <sup>33</sup>	-2.542** (.483)	-4.424** (1.055)	-2.675** (.796)
Year 2004	.266 (.467)	-2.094* (.981)	1.976* (.812)
Year 2006	.035 (.453)	-.105 (.725)	.174 (.645)
Gender (0=Male)	-.664 (.437)	-1.655* (.724)	-.627 (.762)
Total Donations <sup>34</sup>	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Constant	-.443 (.768)	4.087 (1.587)	-1.848 (1.040)
Observations	172	88	84

<sup>33</sup> While not the subject of this study, it is extremely interesting and counter to popular understanding that a "party stronghold" (here referring to the most recent former-Representative's party matching that of the candidate) would have a *negative* impact upon the odds of a candidate winning the race. As previously addressed in the review of the literature, this pattern often follows the pattern of incumbency in that those with the same party as the previous legislator generally have a better chance at winning. Perhaps it is the year or the circumstance that creates this situation in this data set, but it would be worth exploring since it falls outside of what is understood to be the norm.

<sup>34</sup> "Total donations" was able to be controlled for using this model, but as an interval variable with extremely high values (well over a million in many circumstances), its overall impact of its variation resulted in a very small odds coefficient despite its significance. The 0.000 coefficient resulting from this model should *NOT* be interpreted as evidence that total donation amount has no impact upon a candidate's odds of winning.

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*Standard error is reported in parentheses.<sup>35</sup>*

*Significance: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01*

In Table 3, I have bolded the “% Donations In-District” variable in order to differentiate it from the controls below it. The first regression statistics listed, “All,” used data from all 172 candidates in office. It produced the following model:

$$\text{Logged Odds (win)} = -.443 + .201(\% \text{ of donations from sources within district}) + 1.300(\text{party}) - 2.542(\text{party stronghold}) + .266(\text{year 2004}) + .035(\text{year 2006}) - .664(\text{gender}) + 0.000(\text{total donations})$$

The model produced sets the logged odds coefficient for the independent variable at .201, indicating that within the data used, percentage of donations coming from inside the candidate’s district plays little role in the candidate’s odds of winning. More importantly, the independent variable is statistically insignificant, with an extremely high p-value of .839. This means that I am unable to reject the null hypothesis, as there is no evidence that the percentage of a candidate’s donations from sources within his district has a significant impact upon whether the candidate will win the election.

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<sup>35</sup> It is important to note that in all three of these regression models, there are relatively high standard errors, but it does not necessarily invalidate the model since this is likely due both to considerable variation across the sample as well as the somewhat small sample size, especially once broken down by party. A smaller n-value was preferable for this study, and explanation of the choice in sample can be seen in the “Data Selection” portion of the Methods section.

Despite lack of statistical significance, observing the party-isolated models still provides interesting insight regarding the independent variable's possible relationship with the candidate's likelihood of winning, producing the following models:

*Democrats:*

$$\text{Logged Odds (win}_{\text{Dem}}) = 4.087 - 2.651(\% \text{ of donations from sources within district}) + - 4.434(\text{party stronghold}) - 2.094(\text{year 2004}) - .105(\text{year 2006}) - 1.655(\text{gender}) + 0.000(\text{total donations})$$

*Republicans:*

$$\text{Logged Odds (win}_{\text{Rep}}) = -1.848 + 2.320(\% \text{ of donations from sources within district}) - 2.675(\text{party stronghold}) + 1.976(\text{year 2004}) + .174(\text{year 2006}) - .627(\text{gender}) + 0.000(\text{total donations})$$

While the logged odds coefficient for the full dataset offers a relatively small positive value, there is an obvious change when the data is broken down by party:

**Table 4: Odds from the logistic regression of a candidate's odds of winning against the % donations from inside the candidate's district (controls not displayed)**

	All	Democrats	Republicans
Logged Odds	.201 (.990)	-2.651 (1.792)	2.320 (1.434)
Odds Ratio	1.223 (1.211)	0.071 (.126)	10.141 (14.532)
<i>p-value</i>	.839	.139	.106
Observations	172	88	84

*Standard error is reported in parentheses.*

Not only does the logged odds coefficient of percentage of donations coming from inside the candidate's district increase by tenfold for each party, there is a divergence in the direction; in this set of data, Democrats see a negative coefficient from a higher percentage of donations coming from inside the candidate's district, while the Republicans see a positive coefficient. The earlier summary statistics showed that Republicans had similar rates as Democrats for the percentage of in-district donations, which makes the fact that there is such a discrepancy between the coefficients of each party even more interesting. The p-values of the results broken down by party also provide insight. While still not qualifying as statistically significant at .139 and .106, there is still a drastic difference from the p-value from the results of the full dataset, even with half the sample size. This

indicates that either there is a stronger relationship with percentage of donations coming from inside the candidate's district and a candidate's chances of winning by party, or that there are other factors at play.

## **Part 2: Qualitative**

The purpose of the qualitative section of this study is to allow me to dig deeper into the mechanisms behind the impact of the independent variable, percentage of a candidate's campaign donations coming from sources inside their district, on the dependent variable, election outcomes. While the quantitative section looked at general trends by using pooled data, here I will explore three specific elections and evaluate the role of in-district donations on the outcomes from the voter side. As previously mentioned, I will be specifically exploring the amount and type of media coverage relating to campaign funding sources of the candidate, public interest surrounding the topic of campaign funding, and the candidate's attention to the funding sources of both he and his opponent. Cases were selected by characteristics and amount of available data, specifically media coverage of campaign donations.

Before addressing the specific cases, it is important that I establish general trends of attention to election funding in order to be able to address deviations.<sup>36</sup> In the case that donation sources become a topic of interest, it is usually generated by the media in relation to a particular large donor. While this is sometimes done to show the popularity of the candidate, it is more often than not a form of sensationalist media focused on scandals, i.e. a candidate has received a donation from a controversial figure or group, or at times a famous person (often from outside their district, and often from in the entertainment industry). Occasionally, candidates themselves will bring up the topic of campaign funding, though much like the media, this is usually to point out a potentially controversial donation that will make their opponent look bad. One could assume that this tactic would be avoided by candidates who perhaps also have questionable donation sources, which is likely why we see attention to donation source coming from the media more often than from another candidate. With regard to public opinion of this, I fall back on the research addressed in the previous review of the literature,

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<sup>36</sup> These trends were not identified from specific analyses, but rather from experiencing all of the elections in my lifetime, as well as gleaned from the hundreds of news reports I have read about this topic. While this may not be a particularly scientific way of approaching trends, which is why I feel it is important to note it as such, I feel that it does little to impact its legitimacy since the majority of trends identified here are general knowledge that most members of the field of political science or the general public that considers themselves “politically oriented” could also identify with no issue or research prior to giving an answer

meaning that if people are aware, it likely alters their opinion of a candidate, but as I found when investigating which cases to select, there is very little media coverage on this topic overall.

*Case 1:*

Illinois District 6, 2006: Tammy Duckworth(D)- 5.78% versus **Peter Roskam(R)**- 46.84%

Candidate	Duckworth	Roskam (winner)
Total individual contributions	\$2,544,860.62	\$2,135,088.04
Funds from in-district donors	\$147,075.00	\$1,000,038.04
% of funds from district	5.78%	46.84%

Local News Sources: Chicago Daily Herald, Chicago Tribune, Associated Press State & Local Wire, Chicago Sun-Times

National News Sources: National Journal's House Race Hotline, The Frontrunner, Human Events Online, National Public Radio

This race poses a particularly unusual situation in that Candidate Tammy Duckworth only received 5.78% of her total individual donations from sources within her district.<sup>37</sup> This falls within the bottom 10% of all candidates observed in

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<sup>37</sup> FEC

the quantitative portion for proportion of donations from in-district sources. This race was given national attention and was ultimately fairly close, with Peter Roskam winning with 52% of the vote. The candidates were fairly evenly matched in their overall individual donation amounts, which makes it even more important to note the discrepancies in percentage coming from within the district.

Before moving forward, it is also important to emphasize that this race has a particular characteristic that offers an interesting lens through which I can observe the role of donations: Roskam ran a campaign around his long-time membership in the community and understanding of it, a sort of “home-grown” spirit, pointing out that Duckworth is taking advantage of the Illinois law that requires only that Representatives live in the state, but do not have to reside in the district they represent.<sup>38</sup> This creates a particular dynamic that lends itself to an emphasis in reporting funding from outside the district in order to promote the image that Roskam has created of himself.

There was a fair amount of media attention regarding sources of donations, particularly because Duckworth’s national attention seemed to be bringing in a lot of outside donors. Unlike general trends, some media reports addressed donations

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<sup>38</sup> Marni Pyke. "The next battle Duckworth ready to take on Roskam". *Chicago Daily Herald*. March 23, 2006 Thursday.

from outside her district from “normal,” everyday-people with no amount of fame, and pointed out that even they were contributing to her campaign.<sup>39</sup> In an interview, a donor from another state noted that she donated because “What happens in the 6th District of Illinois impacts the 4th District of Pennsylvania.”<sup>40</sup> This same article followed national trends, reporting that “the most competitive open seat races in Illinois, Colorado, Iowa and Arizona, Democrats raised more out-of-state money than Republicans by greater than a 4-to-1 margin.”<sup>41</sup> This is interesting with regard to data found in the quantitative section, which reported that both parties had average outside-district donations of very close to 55%. That said, when the regression was run for only the Democrats, I found that a higher percentage of funds from within district had more of a positive impact and a higher significance than when it was run for only the Republicans.

Duckworth also had some noteworthy donors such as Barbara Streisand, Bradley Whitford, and Rosie O’Donnell.<sup>42</sup> It was interesting to see reporting on this without some commentary on how this is good or bad for the candidate, as is usually found with celebrity donors. With regard to bad press on donations, the

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<sup>39</sup> Jim Kuhnhen. "Demos in open seat races in Colo elsewhere get outside help," *The Associated Press State & Local Wire*, August 26, 2006 Saturday.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Ibid

<sup>42</sup> Ibid

*Chicago Daily Herald* took Duckworth's lead as she pointed out that despite Roskam's claims of being "pro-green," he had accepted donations from a source in the middle of a water contamination suit.<sup>43</sup> Roskam admitted to taking the donation but dismissed it as not important since he had received positive environmental ratings in the past. This exchange follows the general trend of candidates attempting to make their opponent look bad by pointing out potentially problematic donation sources. This falls into the category of a donation from someone with views that potentially conflict with the candidate's expressed views, which opponents use to emphasize that their opponent may not be fully representing the interests that back them, and generally attempt to make voters wary of *quid pro quo* risks. Pointing out controversial donors was not limited to Duckworth; Roskam was slammed for a large contribution from an attorney linked to a federal corruption indictment,<sup>44</sup> displaying the more common instance of pointing out a donor: attempting to make their opponent look bad but unrelated to policy.

With regard to views of the district's constituents, many seem to follow the line of thought drawn by Roskam, and consider Duckworth an outsider, a

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<sup>43</sup> Eric Krol. "Roskam challenged on environment Duckworth says challenger is pro-'green'". *Chicago Daily Herald*. April 30, 2006 Sunday.

<sup>44</sup> "Slamming Back-And-Forth". *National Journal's House Race Hotline*. October 13, 2006, Friday.

“carpetbagger.”<sup>45</sup> One Democratic constituent states that “powerful friends and an influx of cash don't translate into people who'll put up your signs,”<sup>46</sup> This displays a powerful sentiment that easily comes up when outside donations are emphasized: money from outside the district does not mean support garnered from within. While total donations may have an overall positive impact upon the candidate’s performance,<sup>47</sup> knowledge of outside support can deter voters, or make them feel like the candidate is more focused on needs outside the district than within. Particularly in a case like Duckworth, who lives outside her district, this can be very detrimental. Meanwhile, Roskam was able to tout his donations from “over 1,000 district residents.”<sup>48</sup>

Case 2:

New York District 24, 2006: **Mike Arcuri(D)- 28.17%** versus Ray Meier (R)- 54.35%

Candidate	Arcuri (winner)	Meier
Total individual contributions	\$1,154,043.96	\$673,651.44
Funds from in-district donors	\$325,042.66	\$366,138.31
% of funds from district	28.17%	54.35%

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<sup>45</sup> Pyke, 2006

<sup>46</sup> Ibid

<sup>47</sup> Jacobson, 1990.

<sup>48</sup> "IL6: Funds Are Building For Roskam, Duckworth". *The Frontrunner*. July 14, 2006 Friday.

Local News Sources: Utica Observer Dispatch, News 10 Now, The Binghamton Press & Sun Bulletin

National News Sources: National Journal's House Race Hotline, The Frontrunner, Human Events Online

This race garnered interest due to particular media attention to the candidates' campaign funding sources. Unlike the previous race where the media reported on the amount of funds coming from outside the district without condemnation, and really only reported on specific sources when it was brought up by the candidates, the media really took the lead on identifying donors in this race. While there is a clear difference in percentages of funds coming from inside the district, both candidates fall into the middle 50% of all candidates considered in the quantitative section. Mike Arcuri ultimately won this race with 54% of the vote, so still fairly narrow margins for a House race.<sup>49</sup> He did hold the advantage in overall funds, with nearly twice as much received in total donations as Meier.

As previously mentioned, media coverage of funding was fairly extensive with regard to donations both inside and outside the district. Arcuri came under fire for donations from a pollster whom he employed, though the pollster himself emphasized that he donated because of his relationship with Arcuri's father, not

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<sup>49</sup> OpenSecrets, "New York District 24 2006 Race," *Center for Responsive Politics*, Aug 20, 2007.

because of his party or policy leanings, or because he was being employed by the candidate.<sup>50</sup> While this donation source was from within the NY24 district, the appearance of an exchange was still enough to incite media attention, displaying just how interested they were in this aspect of the race.

Arcuri also came under fire for donations from a businessman who came under investigation by the FBI on felony charges.<sup>51</sup> Not only this, but it appeared that this businessman had also perhaps used his employees as proxies in order to get around campaign finance laws that limited his donations.<sup>52</sup> While a number of people came to Arcuri's defense when he claimed no knowledge of the felony charges or questionable sources at the time of the donations, Arcuri ultimately returned the donations.<sup>53</sup> This act really demonstrates the importance of donations in perception—if Arcuri was not aware of and worried about a possible negative impact coming from the press surrounding this incident, he likely would not have returned the donations. This is a testament to both the underlying role of the media in playing watchdog and directing peoples' attention to this issue; attention to this

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<sup>50</sup> Robert B. Bluey. "Pollster John Zogby Is Also a Fundraiser". *Human Events Online*. August 28, 2006 Monday.

<sup>51</sup> "Fishy Contributions?". *National Journal's House Race Hotline*. July 31, 2006, Monday.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> "Don't Give Me Your Money, Please". *National Journal's House Race Hotline*. July 27, 2006, Thursday.

causes candidate reaction *because* of public perception, which in turn can be flipped to mean that lack of media attention plays a role in covering the potentially shady actions of candidates in accepting donations.

Another area this is seen in is the policy arena. The media again paid attention to Arcuri's donations, this time from people and groups supporting policy positions. The GOP critiqued Arcuri for donations from Barbara Streisand because "Streisand's [policy] positions are way out of the mainstream in Upstate New York,"<sup>54</sup> taking a more general tone and calling out outside influence that does not fall in line with what they would consider to be the opinions of the district. Arcuri also received thousands of dollars from both individuals and PACs known for their pro-choice stance on abortion.<sup>55</sup> The same article also notes Arcuri's extensive donations from areas outside the district, such as Los Angeles and San Francisco.<sup>56</sup> It is also worth noting that this article comes from a particularly conservative source. I note this not to say that a bias might lead to misrepresentation, but rather to demonstrate that not only is this an opposition source pointing specifically to donations from a standpoint of opposing the policy

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<sup>54</sup> "NY24: GOP Blasts Arcuri Over Contribution From Streisand". *The Frontrunner*. September 14, 2006 Thursday.

<sup>55</sup> Robert B. Bluey. "Liberal Interests at Work in Upstate N.Y.". *Human Events Online*. October 17, 2006 Tuesday.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid

views of donors, but also to compare it back to the quantitative findings—higher in-district donations had a positive relationship with Republicans winning within the dataset “Republicans”, and they are often the ones who hold greater issue with the idea of donations coming from outside the district. This goes alongside their conservative roots, which generally favor more local representation and less involvement from more progressive entities seen to donate to Democratic campaigns—i.e. Hollywood. This agrees with the quantitative findings and allows for deeper questions to be asked: since higher proportions of in-district donations generally do help Republicans, do they critique Democrats’ higher percentages of outside-the-district because they are actually opposed to it or because they know that it could otherwise potentially be helpful to Democrats?

*Case 3:*

Minnesota District 3, 2008: Ashwin Madia(D)- 24.16% versus **Erik Paulsen(R)- 69.07%**

Candidate	Madia	Paulsen (winner)
Total individual contributions	\$1,672,494.80	\$1,744,141.46
Funds from in-district donors	\$404,144.46	\$1,187,215.54
% of funds from district	24.16%	68.07%

Local News Sources: The Minnesota Independent, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Associated Press State & Local Wire, MNblue, Minnesota Public Radio, Twin Cities Pioneer Press, MinnPost, Minnesota Daily

National News Sources: Politico

While still not at the same level as the Duckworth versus Roskam race, The MN3 race of 2008 still sees a considerable difference in proportions of in-district funding, with Madia falling into the bottom quarter of all candidates considered and Paulsen falling into the top. This race has an interesting aspect that is worth immediately noting: Madia emphasized early on that he had not accepted PAC money, which some interpreted as a “promise” to not to accept PAC money at all.<sup>57</sup> He ultimately accepted only about \$100,000 less than Paulsen in PAC contributions, garnering critique from his opponent’s campaign despite his statements that it was never a promise.<sup>58</sup> While this study looks specifically at individual contributions, breaking a statement like that can cause more attention to be directed towards funding overall.

Perhaps the most interesting emphasis of funding in this race was a critique of Paulsen’s donation sources: he apparently accepted funding from a Republican

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<sup>57</sup> Targeted News Service. "Minnesota GOP: Ashwin Madia Running Away From Record". *Targeted News Service*. August 27, 2008 Wednesday

<sup>58</sup> Ibid

group who had raised money at a Las Vegas strip club.<sup>59</sup> This accusation actually came from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and *not* from Madia, who later criticized the lack of integrity of the ad.<sup>60</sup> Both candidates condemnation of the ad resulted in Paulsen not returning the donations, which shows that portrayal of donations is just as important as their actual sources; while the donations were from both outside the district and from a questionable source (particularly due to MN3's reputation for being more conservative), it ultimately did not appear to cause too much negative impact despite media attention. This could also be attributed to Paulsen's generally conservative viewpoints counteracting the harm done by money sourced from strip club attendees, but it is likely that since both candidates portrayed it as a non-issue, it did not see the same level of negative attention as seen in some of the cases of problematic funding sources from the previous cases. This is especially important since in contrast to this event, the election campaign as a whole was rampant with negative ads that promoted messages critiquing candidates rather than focusing on their policy or other aspects of the campaign. To drop the critique in the lens of donations is a very interesting deviation.

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<sup>59</sup> "Ramstad: Dems using 'gutter politics' in Minn.". *The Associated Press State & Local Wire*. October 8, 2008 Wednesday.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid

## DISCUSSION

In reviewing both the quantitative and qualitative portions of data collection, it appears there are a number of mechanisms at play when it comes to the role of in-district donations in overall election outcomes. While the results found in the data analysis do not have a level of significance in which I am able to reject the null, the coefficients still hold true for this dataset itself. Does this potentially mean that for this data set, Republicans were more aware of campaign donations? Or possibly, that Democrats favor the idea of outside support while Republicans do not? Or perhaps both are unaware, and the insignificance demonstrated by the high p-value indicates a fluke? Assume for a moment that these findings have an inkling of significance—one might imagine that as the Conservative party, the Republicans would likely be more inclined to prefer those candidates who support home-grown, local community values, explaining why higher percentages of in-district are potentially more advantageous to them. In looking at the case studies, the Republican Peter Roskam ran his campaign on the idea that he was from the district and thus more familiar with its values. On the same vein, Democrat Mike Arcuri was critiqued for his donations from outsiders since they were from someone with policy interests that diverged from what might

be considered the norm for the district. Interestingly, in all three cases studied, which were selected due to media attention to campaign donations, Democrats had lower percentages of donations coming from inside the district than did their Republican opponents. This could perhaps offer a more partisan explanation—if Republicans can gain support from potential swing voters by pointing out that their opponent is receiving money from people with interests outside the district, yet do not risk the same impact if their donors find out theirs is not, or more common, more of their donations are from within the district to begin with, as is seen in the three cases, there is little reason to not use this as a talking point. With regard to risking their own odds, if translated into rhetoric, “Invading conservatives—coming in with their money and trying to return this place to what it used to be!” sounds far more ridiculous than “Invading liberals—coming in with their money and trying to promote their progressive agenda!” This could offer an explanation for why the results from the regression analysis demonstrated that in this particular dataset, higher in-district campaign donations resulted in positive odds for Republicans—while more outside donations could be a motivating force for more conservative swing voters to choose a Republican with more in-district support, Democrats may not care to the same degree.

The data still contributes to the notion that voters are likely unaware of information regarding campaign finance, particularly that relating to whether the source is within or outside of their district, because there was no significance observed in the quantitative analysis. That said, the findings of diverging directions of the logged odds for each party could be due to an alternative factor. Since I only observed open races, which eliminated the incumbent advantage, it is possible that these districts saw an influx of investment from the supporters of the Parties where they saw a possibility of gaining a seat. The fact that the “party stronghold” control variable saw significance in each regression contributes to this argument; there was a negative impact on the likelihood of a candidate winning if the district’s former Congressman was of the same party as the candidate, and this negative effect was even more potent with Democrats. In the case of the Party fearing a loss of the seat, it is likely that more contributions to those campaigns would be made in an effort to maintain that seat, especially since 2006 was a midterm election, where there is generally a flip in which party controls the House.<sup>61</sup> That would be reason enough for more money to be directed towards any district where there is the possibility of a Democrat winning, even if that chance is

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<sup>61</sup> Samuel Kernell, "Presidential popularity and negative voting: An alternative explanation of the midterm congressional decline of the president's party," *American Political Science Review* 71, no. 1 (1977): 44-66.

slim. Since Republicans have less trouble mobilizing voters than Democrats, that, in theory, would promote more donations to Democratic campaigns in an attempt to possibly break this via an increase in visibility of the candidate, even if the election is up-in-the-air with regard to which way it will go. In looking at the case studies, in Case 1 and Case 3, both Democrats had considerably lower percentages of in-district donations, and both Republicans won. Previous studies demonstrated that more money means a higher likelihood of winning,<sup>62</sup> so for a race such as that in Case 1, the close margins of Duckworth's loss show a divide in the district. Had she not received such a high level of outside funding, would Roskam have won by a greater margin? Perhaps this offers a fuller explanation than what the quantitative analysis alone can tell us.

With regard to an overall assessment independent from party, I still once again start from the point of lacking statistical significance in the quantitative data. Pairing previous findings with evidence in the case studies, people do appear to care about where a candidate's donations are coming from, but they have to be made aware of it. The three cases that were studied were selected because they had the most media coverage regarding campaign finance of all of the races observed in the quantitative section, and compared to other issue areas, even this

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<sup>62</sup> See the "Campaign Finance" section for references and explanation of this effect

coverage was minimal. That indicates that the overall coverage of campaign finance for the data assessed was very small, which would explain a lack of significance in the quantitative findings. Without asking people, there is no way to know if campaign finance was something they even considered in their choice of who to vote for, even if media coverage is observed.

## **CONCLUSION**

While the lack of statistical significance in the quantitative analysis prevented the rejection of the null hypothesis, this analysis offered important information in terms of what should be targeted and observed moving forward. By the findings related to party difference, those seeking to further research the topic of the role of percentage of in-district donations on election outcomes know to pay attention to the effects of partisanship, both in addressing the proportions of donations coming from inside and outside the district, as well as how much the voters potentially care about the issue. Moreover, this study illustrates the importance of voter knowledge and psychology; media reliance can take a toll both on what voters know and how much they care about it. This could provide useful insight to candidates by offering a minimally-tapped issue area that could actually impact voters.

Extensions of this study could be examining the role of PAC donations in the same context—perhaps there is more media coverage or general awareness surrounding these interest groups than there are surrounding individual contribution. Moreover, with the advent of super PACs, which Americans fear due to their allowance of big money influence, there are even more factors than merely individual donations and interest groups that operate separately from a campaign but can still have considerable impact. Following the direction of the 2019 Presidential contenders, I imagine that campaign finance will become a much greater focus over time. Replicating this study for more recent elections could provide very different results, whether that is due to more media coverage or just more voters paying attention to where a candidate’s money is coming from. Regardless, as fear of campaign donations and influence of “big money” grows, interest this aspect of campaigning is sure to grow as well, including attention to whether or not donors are located, perhaps, within a candidate’s district.

## APPENDIX

### **Stata Do-Files:**

#### First Regression

```
1      #delimit ;
2
3      rename decidonationsfromwithindistrict per_don_dis ;
4      sum per_don_dis, detail ;
5      tab year, generate(years) ;
6      rename years1 y2004 ;
7      rename years2 y2006 ;
8      rename years3 y2008 ;
9      sum per_don_dis , detail ;
10     logit win_code per_don_dis ;
11     logistic win_code per_don_dis ;
12     logit win_code per_don_dis party_code party_match y2004
13     y2006 ;
14     gender_code totaldonations ;
15     logistic win_code per_don_dis party_code party_match
16     y2004 y2006 ;
17     gender_code totaldonations ;
```

#### Party Regressions

```
1      #delimit ;
2
3      rename decidonationsfromwithindistrict per_don_dis ;
4      tab year, generate(year) ;
5      rename year1 y2004 ;
6      rename year2 y2006 ;
7      rename year3 y2008 ;
8      sum per_don_dis , detail ;
9      logit win_code per_don_dis ;
10     logistic win_code per_don_dis ;
11     logit win_code per_don_dis party_match y2004 y2006
12     gender_code totaldonations ;
13     logistic win_code per_don_dis party_match y2004 y2006 ;
14     gender_code totaldonations ;
```

Full Dataset on House Candidates:

<b>Name</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Former Party of District</b>	<b>Result</b>	<b>Total Donations</b>	<b>Total In-District Donations</b>	<b>Deci donations from within district</b>	<b>% donations from within district</b>
Braley, Bruce	M	2006	IA	1	D	D	W	1457662	98517.41	0.0676	6.76%
Lipinski, Dan	M	2004	IL	3	D	D	W	98600	43175	0.4379	43.79%
Hare, Phil	M	2006	IL	17	D	D	W	253609.5	78393.53	0.3091	30.91%
Ellison, Keith	M	2006	MN	5	D	D	W	354050.5	149297.2	0.4217	42.17%
Carnahan, Russ	M	2004	MO	3	D	D	W	1086054	424755.9	0.3911	39.11%
Cleaver, Emanuel	M	2004	MO	5	D	D	W	981851.2	645573.7	0.6575	65.75%
Wilson, Charlie	M	2006	OH	6	D	D	W	542059.9	244639.9	0.4513	45.13%
Sutton, Betty	F	2006	OH	13	D	D	W	481605.2	119020.8	0.2471	24.71%
Fudge, Marcia	F	2008	OH	11	D	D	W	103955.8	51945.29	0.4997	49.97%
Moore, Gwen	F	2004	WI	4	D	D	W	233624.8	76230	0.3263	32.63%
Duckworth, Tammy	F	2006	IL	6	D	R	L	2544861	147075	0.0578	5.78%
Halvorson, Debbie	F	2008	IL	11	D	R	W	1075017	169515.1	0.1577	15.77%
Callahan, Colleen	F	2008	IL	18	D	R	L	230358.1	122859.1	0.5333	53.33%
Renier, Sharon Marie	F	2004	MI	7	D	R	L	2100	1100	0.5238	52.38%
Wetterling, Patty	F	2006	MN	6	D	R	L	354050.5	29875	0.0844	8.44%

Madia, Ashwin	M	2008	MN	3	D	R	L	1672495	404144.5	0.2416	24.16%
Baker, Judy	F	2008	MO	9	D	R	L	790986.2	391058.4	0.4944	49.44%
Connealy, Matt	M	2004	NE	1	D	R	L	334003.5	164769	0.4933	49.33%
Kleeb, Scott	M	2006	NE	3	D	R	L	552491.6	135337	0.2450	24.50%
Siferd, Richard	M	2006	OH	4	D	R	L	90819.31	69734.31	0.7678	76.78%
Space, Zack	M	2006	OH	18	D	R	W	787409.1	177531.3	0.2255	22.55%
Neuhardt, Sharen	F	2008	OH	7	D	R	L	505971.6	131595.7	0.2601	26.01%
Kilroy, Mary Joe	F	2008	OH	15	D	R	W	1360391	462676	0.3401	34.01%
Bocchieri, John	M	2008	OH	16	D	R	W	815328.1	164573.8	0.2018	20.18%
Kagen, Steve	M	2006	WI	8	D	R	W	217243.7	42280	0.1946	19.46%
Zinga, Andrea Lane	F	2006	IL	17	R	D	L	242152.6	167532.1	0.6918	69.18%
Fine, Alan	M	2006	MN	5	R	D	L	123346.7	29830.7	0.2418	24.18%
Federer, Bill	M	2004	MO	3	R	D	L	423266.1	81746	0.1931	19.31%
Patterson, Jeanne	F	2004	MO	5	R	D	L	321223.6	127973.6	0.3984	39.84%
Blasdel, Chuck	M	2006	OH	6	R	D	L	450747.9	108275	0.2402	24.02%
Foltin, Craig	M	2006	OH	13	R	D	L	335093	165687	0.4945	49.45%
Boyle, Gerald H.	M	2004	WI	4	R	D	L	40949.99	11150	0.2723	27.23%
Whalen, Mike	M	2006	IA	1	R	R	L	943799.8	380951.4	0.4036	40.36%
Roskam, Peter	M	2006	IL	6	R	R	W	2135083	1000038	0.4684	46.84%
Ozinga, Marty	M	2008	IL	11	R	R	L	1090521	197016.7	0.1807	18.07%
Schock, Aaron	M	2008	IL	18	R	R	W	1808738	1342345	0.7421	74.21%

Bachmann, Michele	F	2006	MN	6	R	R	W	1459802	292027.6	0.2000	20.00%
Paulsen, Erik	M	2008	MN	3	R	R	W	1744141	1187216	0.6807	68.07%
Luetkemeyer, Blaine	M	2008	MO	9	R	R	W	462506.9	253307.7	0.5477	54.77%
Fortenberry, Jeff	M	2004	NE	1	R	R	W	593347.1	349863.8	0.5896	58.96%
Smith, Adrian	M	2006	NE	3	R	R	W	593475.1	137647.7	0.2319	23.19%
Jordan, Jim	M	2006	OH	4	R	R	W	874600.7	564853.5	0.6458	64.58%
Padgett, Joy	F	2006	OH	18	R	R	L	214827.9	124702.9	0.5805	58.05%
Austria, Steve	M	2008	OH	7	R	R	W	585272	328152.7	0.5607	56.07%
Stivers, Steve	M	2008	OH	15	R	R	L	974928.4	481242.6	0.4936	49.36%
Schuring, Kirk	M	2008	OH	16	R	R	L	876649.6	730663.9	0.8335	83.35%
Gard, John	M	2006	WI	8	R	R	L	1525594	671436.7	0.4401	44.01%
Pingree, Chellie	F	2008	ME	1	D	D	W	1665461	419396	0.2518	25.18%
Sires, Albio	M	2006	NJ	13	D	D	W	1404879	428431.8	0.3050	30.50%
Clarke, Yvette	F	2006	NY	11	D	D	W	380231	129971	0.3418	34.18%
Tonko, Paul	M	2008	NY	21	D	D	W	332927.3	219958.3	0.6607	66.07%
Schwartz, Allyson	F	2004	PA	13	D	D	W	3196636	517078.4	0.1618	16.18%
Welch, Peter	M	2006	VT		D	I	W	1471426	901204.9	0.6125	61.25%
Adler, John	M	2008	NJ	3	D	R	W	1704421	435681	0.2556	25.56%
Stender, Linda	F	2008	NJ	7	D	R	L	1433450	581909.3	0.4060	40.60%
Higgins, Brian	M	2004	NY	27	D	R	W	669991	477433	0.7126	71.26%

Barend, Samara	F	2004	NY	29	D	R	L	345641	34025	0.0984	9.84%
Arcuri, Mike	M	2006	NY	24	D	R	W	1154044	325042.7	0.2817	28.17%
McMahon, Michael	M	2008	NY	13	D	R	W	711853	394975	0.5549	55.49%
Maffei, Dan	M	2008	NY	25	D	R	W	1139291	369571	0.3244	32.44%
Kryzan, Alice	F	2008	NY	26	D	R	L	550464.6	105740	0.1921	19.21%
Schrader, Virginia	F	2004	PA	8	D	R	L	199716.8	48112.01	0.2409	24.09%
Driscoll, Joe	M	2004	PA	15	D	R	L	1239832	34773.12	0.0280	2.80%
McCracken, Mark	M	2008	PA	5	D	R	L	28510.32	23192.2	0.8135	81.35%
Summers, Charlie	M	2008	ME	1	R	D	L	468978.1	306880.9	0.6544	65.44%
Buhrmaster, James	M	2008	NY	21	R	D	L	214788.5	162478.2	0.7565	75.65%
Brown, Melissa	F	2004	PA	13	R	D	L	920742	277930	0.3019	30.19%
Rainville, Martha	F	2006	VT		R	I	L	615242	340157.7	0.5529	55.29%
Myers, Chris	M	2008	NJ	3	R	R	L	866286.9	369872.2	0.4270	42.70%
Lance, Leonard	M	2008	NJ	7	R	R	W	948897.4	416891.5	0.4393	43.93%
Naples, Nancy	F	2004	NY	27	R	R	L	712043.9	420569	0.5907	59.07%
Kuhl, Randy	M	2004	NY	29	R	R	W	416596.4	243749.4	0.5851	58.51%
Meier, Ray	M	2006	NY	24	R	R	L	673651.4	366138.3	0.5435	54.35%
Straniere, Robert	M	2008	NY	13	R	R	L	137334	36414	0.2651	26.51%
Sweetland, Dale	M	2008	NY	25	R	R	L	270655.3	217656.3	0.8042	80.42%
Lee, Christopher	M	2008	NY	26	R	R	W	722419.9	293504	0.4063	40.63%

Fitzpatrick, Mike	M	2004	PA	8	R	R	W	601048	278020.9	0.4626	46.26%
Dent, Charlie	M	2004	PA	15	R	R	W	1177859	744183.1	0.6318	63.18%
Thompson, Glenn	M	2008	PA	5	R	R	W	174213.9	126911.8	0.7285	72.85%
Griffith, Parker	M	2008	AL	5	D	D	W	655953.2	372897.1	0.5685	56.85%
Schultz, Debbie Wasserman	F	2004	FL	20	D	D	L	921283.6	292152.3	0.3171	31.71%
Castor, Kathy	F	2006	FL	11	D	D	W	751338.6	334219.8	0.4448	44.48%
McKinney, Cynthia	F	2004	GA	4	D	D	W	317836.7	28450	0.0895	8.95%
Mount, Willie	F	2004	LA	7	D	D	L	1046663	630915.4	0.6028	60.28%
Sarbanes, John	M	2006	MD	3	D	D	W	1079096	374896.4	0.3474	34.74%
Cohen, Steve	M	2006	TN	9	D	D	W	465301.4	342199	0.7354	73.54%
Page, Gary	M	2004	TX	24	D	D	L	700	500	0.7143	71.43%
Bright, Bobby	M	2008	AL	2	D	R	W	631765.1	344332.7	0.5450	54.50%
Neeld, Robert	M	2004	FL	14	D	R	L	7540	5240	0.6950	69.50%
Busansky, Phyllis	F	2006	FL	9	D	R	L	896838.6	183920.3	0.2051	20.51%
Jennings, Christine	F	2006	FL	13	D	R	L	1829018	1008693	0.5515	55.15%
Mahoney, Tim	M	2006	FL	16	D	R	W	1320727	260710.4	0.1974	19.74%
Blythe, Stephen	M	2008	FL	15	D	R	L	49504.87	45072.32	0.9105	91.05%
Delamar, Silvia	F	2004	GA	8	D	R	L	6242	4842	0.7757	77.57%
Boswell, David	M	2008	KY	2	D	R	L	463082.4	252352.9	0.5449	54.49%
Melancon, Charlie	M	2004	LA	3	D	R	W	1020694	432047	0.4233	42.33%

Carmouche, Paul	M	2008	LA	4	D	R	L	906227.9	434907.5	0.4799	47.99%
Gill, Joel	M	2008	MS	3	D	R	L	25513.55	25513.55	1.0000	100.00%
Harrell, Jim, Jr.	M	2004	NC	5	D	R	L	221762	165602	0.7468	74.68%
Fischer, Anne	F	2004	NC	10	D	R	L	1675	450	0.2687	26.87%
Hunter, David	M	2006	OK	5	D	R	L	244376.9	155001.9	0.6343	63.43%
Brown, Brandon	M	2004	SC	4	D	R	L	4200	3250	0.7738	77.38%
Trent, Rick	M	2006	TN	1	D	R	L	14372.92	5522.92	0.3843	38.43%
Ashe, David	M	2004	VA	2	D	R	L	148481.4	95145	0.6408	64.08%
Connolly, Gerry	M	2008	VA	11	D	R	W	1183991	438993	0.3708	37.08%
Parker, Wayne	M	2008	AL	5	R	D	L	1053349	840431	0.7979	79.79%
Hostetter, Margaret	F	2004	FL	20	R	D	L	21530	4610	0.2141	21.41%
Adams, Eddie	M	2006	FL	11	R	D	L	5100	4100	0.8039	80.39%
Davis, Catherine	F	2004	GA	4	R	D	L	16000	5700	0.3563	35.63%
Boustany, Charles	M	2004	LA	7	R	D	W	1794302	820976.8	0.4575	45.75%
White, John	M	2006	MD	3	R	D	L	21685	8350	0.3851	38.51%
Smalley, Wayland	M	2004	OK	2	R	D	L	19399	9949	0.5129	51.29%
White, Mark	M	2006	TN	9	R	D	L	51961.26	39411.26	0.7585	75.85%
McCaul, Michael	M	2004	TX	10	R	D	W	731853.8	138387.3	0.1891	18.91%
Conaway, Mike	M	2004	TX	11	R	D	W	1059877	741090.2	0.6992	69.92%
Marchant, Kenny	M	2004	TX	24	R	D	W	231410.4	107015.8	0.4624	46.24%
Love, Jay	M	2008	AL	2	R	R	L	920359.6	510118.8	0.5543	55.43%

Bilirakis, Gus	M	2006	FL	9	R	R	W	1858103	559878.4	0.3013	30.13%
Buchanan, Vern	M	2006	FL	13	R	R	W	2184333	950574.3	0.4352	43.52%
Negron, Joe	M	2006	FL	16	R	R	L	465099.9	144591.4	0.3109	31.09%
Posey, Bill	M	2008	FL	15	R	R	W	513480.1	297757.1	0.5799	57.99%
Westmoreland, Lynn	F	2004	GA	8	R	R	W	1353154	794899.4	0.5874	58.74%
Guthrie, Brett	M	2008	KY	2	R	R	W	689395.5	451545.5	0.6550	65.50%
Jindal, Bobby	M	2004	LA	1	R	R	W	1673129	584733.7	0.3495	34.95%
Tauzin, Billy, III	M	2004	LA	3	R	R	L	93000	20500	0.2204	22.04%
Fleming, John	M	2008	LA	4	R	R	W	488086.9	291407	0.5970	59.70%
Harper, Gregg	M	2008	MS	3	R	R	W	894447.2	529404.2	0.5919	59.19%
Foxx, Virginia	F	2004	NC	5	R	R	W	537371.4	392522.9	0.7304	73.04%
McHenry, Patrick	M	2004	NC	10	R	R	W	194066.7	41684.75	0.2148	21.48%
Fallin, Mary	F	2006	OK	5	R	R	W	1311059	778377.5	0.5937	59.37%
Davis, David	M	2006	TN	1	R	R	W	187410	135460	0.7228	72.28%
Drake, Thelma	F	2004	VA	2	R	R	W	322383.3	204858.3	0.6354	63.54%
Fimian, Keith	M	2008	VA	11	R	R	L	1389425	303434.8	0.2184	21.84%
Costa, Jim	M	2004	CA	20	D	D	W	1104024	320970.3	0.2907	29.07%
Hirono, Mazie	F	2006	HI	2	D	D	W	783418.5	199818.1	0.2551	25.51%
Schrader, Kurt	M	2008	OR	5	D	D	W	443806.5	190476.5	0.4292	42.92%
Giffords, Gabrielle	F	2006	AZ	8	D	R	W	1533902	710069.1	0.4629	46.29%
Kirkpatrick, Ann	F	2008	AZ	1	D	R	W	1064813	236772.8	0.2224	22.24%
Castillo, Gabe	M	2004	CA	3	D	R	L	42343.7	23353.7	0.5515	55.15%

Beery, Sharon	F	2006	CA	22	D	R	L	12890	11390	0.8836	88.36%
Brown, Charles	M	2008	CA	4	D	R	L	1438623	426388.7	0.2964	29.64%
Lumpkin, Mike	M	2008	CA	52	D	R	L	148764.8	112829	0.7584	75.84%
Salazar, John	M	2004	CO	3	D	R	L	726686	133519.1	0.1837	18.37%
Fawcett, Jay	M	2006	CO	5	D	R	L	265204.9	65073.85	0.2454	24.54%
Perlmutter, Ed	M	2006	CO	7	D	R	W	1997698	367192.3	0.1838	18.38%
Eng, Hank	M	2008	CO	6	D	R	L	102844.9	57301.44	0.5572	55.72%
Grant, Larry	M	2006	ID	1	D	R	L	255754.1	83508.93	0.3265	32.65%
Heinrich, Martin	M	2008	NM	1	D	R	W	1546192	768996.2	0.4973	49.73%
Teague, Harry	M	2008	NM	2	D	R	W	1369114	674144.5	0.4924	49.24%
Derby, Jill	F	2006	NV	2	D	R	L	838060.2	266427.5	0.3179	31.79%
Barbieri, Don	M	2004	WA	5	D	R	L	614974.2	196012.1	0.3187	31.87%
Ross, Dave	M	2004	WA	8	D	R	L	673668.3	294835.1	0.4377	43.77%
Trauner, Gary	M	2008	WY		D	R	L	984577.7	420891.5	0.4275	42.75%
Ashburn, Roy	M	2004	CA	20	R	D	L	778842.2	338780	0.4350	43.50%
Hogue, Bob	M	2006	HI	2	R	D	L	159415	92150	0.5781	57.81%
Erickson, Mike	M	2008	OR	5	R	D	L	392582.9	169629	0.4321	43.21%
Graf, Randy	M	2006	AZ	8	R	R	L	493112.6	263323.1	0.5340	53.40%
Hay, Sydney	F	2008	AZ	1	R	R	L	402924	47288.3	0.1174	11.74%
Lungren, Dan	M	2004	CA	3	R	R	W	935962.8	280529.8	0.2997	29.97%
McCarthy, Kevin	M	2006	CA	22	R	R	W	709440.3	473315.3	0.6672	66.72%

McClintock, Tom	M	2008	CA	4	R	R	W	1961135	170840.7	0.0871	8.71%
Hunter, Duncan D.	M	2008	CA	52	R	R	W	1961135	34695	0.0177	1.77%
Walcher, Greg	M	2004	CO	3	R	R	L	1052276	148092.6	0.1407	14.07%
Lamborn, Doug	M	2006	CO	5	R	R	W	407423.5	107558	0.2640	26.40%
O'Donnell, Rick	M	2006	CO	7	R	R	L	1892249	227938.9	0.1205	12.05%
Coffman, Mike	M	2008	CO	6	R	R	W	1021499	335048.5	0.3280	32.80%
Sali, Bill	M	2006	ID	1	R	R	W	560676.8	107056.8	0.1909	19.09%
White, Darren	M	2008	NM	1	R	R	L	1112723	752400.1	0.6762	67.62%
Heller, Dean	M	2006	NV	2	R	R	W	1156314	485994.3	0.4203	42.03%
McMorris, Cathy	F	2004	WA	5	R	R	W	876241	346081	0.3950	39.50%
Reichert, Dave	M	2004	WA	8	R	R	W	1011685	376516.2	0.3722	37.22%
Lummis, Cynthia	F	2008	WY		R	R	W	708534.6	448114.9	0.6325	63.25%

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