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# Some modern conceptions of the absolute

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# SOME MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE

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# SOME MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE

Introduction:

1. Preliminary definition of the term Absolute.
   a. The ultimately real.

2. Rough classification of thinkers according to their conception of the absolute.
   a. Agnostic conception;
      Spencer.
   b. Materialistic conceptions,
      Hobbes, Feuerbach, Buchner, and Haeckel.
   c. Idealistic conceptions,
      I. Absolute Idealism
         Voluntarism - Schopemhauer
         Hegelianism - Hegel, Royce and Calkins.
      II. Personal Idealism
         Lotze, Bowne, Orr, and Leighton.

3. The necessary and rather arbitrary limitations of this discussion.
   a. The range of the discussion.

I. Anti-Idealistic Conceptions of the Absolute.
   1. Agnostic Conceptions.
      a. Positivists - no metaphysics (as such)
         Comte, John Stuart Mills.
      b. Spencer's Unknowable.
         The much known Unknowable.
         Spencer's affirmations concerning his Unknowable. Power, Will, Infinity, Eternity, Omnipresence.
      c. Hume's phenomenalism,
         Would disprove substance.
         Reduces selves to fleeting and unconnected ideas.
         Forced to deny the existence of deity, logically.

2. Materialistic Conceptions.
   a. Its principles stated by early Grecian Atomists, 500 B.C.
      Leucippus, Democritus.
      Its principles are:
         I. Qualitative varities and changes are reducable to quantitative terms and statements.
         II. The whole content and activity of mind are reducable to motions of mass particles.
         III. Secondary qualities of objects are merely phenomena in the human organism.
         IV. Every event which occurs is the result alone of blind mechanical motion.

   b. Modern materialism has added only elaboration of these.

      I. Identification of brain and mind.
      II. Cabinism, "Brain secrets thought as the liver secrets bile."
      III. The concurrance of Buchener, etc.
      IV. The variations of Tyndall and Huxley.

   c. Materialism is absolute.

      I. "The-all-that-their-is".
      II. And this is matter and its products.
      III. Mass particles in motion

   d. The failure of materialism.

      I. Fails to account for consciousness.
      II. Contrary to the sense of freedom.

II. Idealistic Conceptions of the Absolute.
   1. Absolute Idealism
      a. Voluntarism - Schopenhauer.
         I. Will and Idea.
         II. The Primal Will is:-
            Groundless; Blind-stress; Unconscious Impulse,
            An endless longing at the center of the universe.

b. Hegelianism - Royce and Calkins as representatives.
I. Hegelian method
(a) Hegelian dialectic.
(b) The Absolute:-
( I) Numerically, One and not many.
(II) Qualitatively, Spirit or Person.

II. Representatives - Royce and Calkins.
(a) Miss Calkins, (Monistic idealism).
( I) Speaks of the Absolute as Self or Person.
(II) By Person she means, "A relatively persistent, yet changing, unique, complex, related being.
(III) Characteristics; "Perisitence, change, uniqueness, and complexity."
(IV) Relation of the finite self to the Absolute Self.
(1) Included and yet not absorbed.
(2) Distinguished though not separated.
(3) Quantitative difference.
(V) Finite selves related through the Absolute.
(1) The world a community of selves.
(2) Finite selves enjoy a limited freedom.
(VI) Further characteristics of Absolute Self.
(1) A superatemporal self.
(2) A knowing self.
(3) Absolute freedom
(4) Sense experience.
(V) Problem of evil.
(1) Evil purely relative.
(2) A partial view of the self.
(VI) Finite selves and immortality.
(b) Josiah Royce.
(i) "There is but one absolute and final and integrated self,- that of the Absolute.
(ii) Difference in conception of the Absolute in doctrines of Royce and Calkins is largely one of terminology and therefore does not merit separate discussion in this connection.

iii. Objections to Hegelianism or Absolute Idealism.
(a) Violates the sense of uniqueness and privacy of the self.
(b) Finite freedom,- apparent only, not actual.
(c) Fails to solve the problem of evil.

2. Personal idealism, - Idealistic pluralism.
a. Present day idealism is predominantly personalistic.
b. Personalistic idealism traced from Leibnitz to Leighton.
c. Some things held in common with personalistic absolutism.
i. Supreme significance of personality.
ii. Universe a society of selves.
iii. Basis theory of existence in a manifestation of personal will.
d. Statement of main differences from personalistic idealism.
1. Conceptions of the Absolute and its relation to finite individuals.
(a) Personalistic pluralists deny the singularistic contention that finite persons only as constituent parts of the Absolute Self.
(b) Finite selves are free to err in sin.
11. Personalistic pluralism naturally ends in theism.

III. A More Adequate Discussion of that Branch of Idealism Known as Personalism.

1. The above discussion of personalism gives but some of the general statements of the tenets of personalism.
2. Personalism defined.
a. Reality is a society of persons.
b. The only real thing in the universe is person.
c. One Supreme Person in the Society of persons, God.
i. The universe depends upon His will for existence and continuance.
ii. Physical universe but a mode of His activity.
d. Depends upon the coherence theory of truth.

3. Arguments for the existence of God, Supreme Person.
   a. The traditional arguments.
      i. Ontological - being.
      ii. Cosmological - Universe.
      iii. Teleological - ends.
   b. Arguments of Lotze and Bowne, based upon inter-action.
   c. Other arguments (but stated.)
   d. Moral argument
      i. As stated by Prof. Sorley.
         We assume reality when we experience value.
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         Kant's Categorical Imperative of duty points to a source and ground of moral truth which we find implied in Christianity.

4. The Christian view of God.
   a. Christianity is a theistic system.
      i. The first postulate of Christianity - the personal, ethical, self-revealing God.
      ii. Self-revealing, - defined.
      iii. Theism cold without revelation.
   b. The revelation of God to finite persons.
      i. Intercommunication between persons.
         (a) Must postulate both finite and infinite persons.
         (b) Intercommunication between finite persons
         (c) Intercommunication between Supreme and finite persons.
            (i) The idea of a "silent God" is self-contradictory.
            (ii) Difficulties with Hegelian view of intercommunication.
      ii. The philosophical basis of intercommunication.
         (a) The doctrine of divine immanence.
         (b) The idealistic conception of God - which removes crass matter and thus assures the free operation of the Infinite Spirit upon the world.
      iii. Two suggested approaches to God.
         (a) Immediate experience
         (b) Philosophical approach - A sincere and logical attempt to know the meaning of life as a whole.
         (c) These approaches supplemental rather than contrasted.

iv. The solving of the relation of God to the finite person is always and necessarily colored by one's philosophical and religious outlook on life.

c. God and the problem of evil.
   i. Physical events are not good or bad except in their relation to personality.

d. God and value.
   i. Theism seeks a guiding principle for the discrimination of values.
   ii. Such principle found alone in intrinsic values.
   iii. The moral order expresses the divine nature.
   iv. God is the final home of values,- the supreme worth.
   v. Belief in the objectivity of value leads to faith in the conservation of value.
   vi. God is the guarantee of the conservation and increase of value.

5. The effect of one's belief on one's life.
   a. "Such as men are themselves, - such will God appear to them to be."
      i. The God of the moralist, - A great Judge and School Master.
      ii. The God of the priest, - Head of the celestrial and terrestrial hierarchies.
      iii. The God of Science,- Impersonal and inflexible vital Law.
      iv. The God of the savage, - His ideal chief.
   b. "The kind of religion one has depends upon the kind of God one believes in."
      i. The kind of world we think this is will determine for us the kind of life we think is worth living.
      ii. Our views of the universe colors every department of life.

IV. A Brief Summation and Conclusion.
   1. The inadequacies of, -
      a. Materialism
      b. Absolutism
   2. The satisfactoriness of, -
      a. Personalism.

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## SUMMARY

The conception one holds of the Absolute will largely determine one's entire conception of life. In the main there may be held three outstanding positions: - first, the position of the monist, who says the universe is one, and the Absolute is the sum total of this one of the universe; second, the position of the pluralist, who declares the universe is not one but many individuals; and the Absolute is identical with the whole; third, a position which embraces and in a sense reconciles the best of the preceding positions, in which God is the creating, sustaining cause of the all-that-there-is. The search then, for the Absolute is the search for the ultimately real. In our search we will traverse the fields of thought represented by a few outstanding thinkers of the modern period.

Among the anti-idealistic thinkers no man has more influenced his time than Herbert Spencer, who maintains an agnostic conception of the universe, namely, that the limitations of finite intelligence and the nature of the universe are incompatible so that the best that can be said of ultimate being is that, whatever its nature it must always pass our grasp. Upon investigation we find however that Mr. Spencer's so called agnosticism bears the mark of a non-material pantheism.

Since the time of the early Greek Atomists there has been propounded to the world the doctrine of materialism, which states, in the large, that the Absolute is the all-that-there-is, and, all

all that there is, is matter and its products. Thus the Absolute for materialism must be defined in terms of mass particles in motion. Such a position fails to account for the phenonema of consciousness in harmony with the scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy.

We turn in our consideration from the non-idealistic to the idealistic conceptions of the Absolute and discover first of all Schopenhauer's voluntarism. This position finds the Absolute in my own deeper inner life which is essentially my will. The world is Will- a will which exists solely because it desires to exist. Here is the true thing in itself. This position leads to hopeless pessimism for there is no escape for Schopemhauer from the endless longing and striving at the center of the universe. The Absolute is but blind-stress or unconscious-impulse.

The doctrine of Absolutism as formulated by Hegel and his disciples is still maintained by some few defenders of the faith. The Hegelian view-point differs in its monistic emphasis of the nature of the universe from the non-idealistic thinkers in that the kind or quality of the One is Self and not mere materiality. There is but one Absolute and final integrated self of which all finite or partial selves are parts and in the light of which self they alone can have meaning, - this is the Absolute Self. The objections to Hegelianism or Absolute Idealism are, (1) the doctrine violates the sense of the uniqueness and privacy of the self, (2) finite freedom is not accounted for- such freedom being apparent only, (3) this doctrine fails to solve the problems of evil.

We have rejected, on the whole, the conceptions of the Absolute propounded by both monistic and pluralistic thinkers whatever their

position may be qualitatively. We would now present the doctrine of personal idealism or personalism, which is, in the main, a synthetic conception combining the best in both monism and pluralism. Personalism states that the ultimately real is person or self, that the universe is a society of selves in which the Supreme Person or Self is God upon whom the entire universe is depending for creation and continuance. These finite selves while dependent, yet are unique and free. Personalistic pluralism naturally ends in theism.

The Christian view of the universe is a theistic system in which God is postulated as personal, ethical and self-revealing. In such a system the finite selves are called to cooperate with God in the creation and conservation of value. God is the guarantee of this conservation and increase of value.

Belief in the God and universe of personalism seems to be the "one unifying principle that can make out of our chaotic life a harmonious whole of thought and feeling and action." (Introduction to Philosophy, Brightman, Page 330.)

## SOME MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE.

The world in which we live is a constant source of question asking and solving to any thoughtful mind. Questions relative to the cause, meaning and continuance of that which we call matter and life. With each new generation there arise those who lay claim to "the-cure-all balm" for all of earth's maladies, - but still problems new and multiplied persist in showing themselves to haunt the thinker. Like the many headed dragon of Grecian mythology, - when one head is successfully severed many more appear to take its place. There is one question which seems more comprehensive or inclusive than its fellows,- this fundamental question is that one which has to do with the nature and meaning of the world-ground. This world-ground may be designated, and is for this brief treatise, the Absolute. Our conception of the Absolute or world-ground will largely determine our entire conception of life and its meaning.

What then, is our conception of the Absolute? We would give here but a preliminary and consequently not wholly satisfactory definition of our conception. For the monist or singularist, reality comes to be regarded as one all-comprehensive being, and this he declares as the Absolute. "The Absolute is all that there is. Nothing can exist outside or apart from it. All being is determined by and included in it" (Introduction to Philosophy, Brightman, Page 217.) Another class of thinkers, known as the pluralists, who look at things very differently from the monist, hold that reality consists of many and not one.

This class of thinkers would undoubtedly admit that there is some kind of unity in the universe which holds the individuals together, but they are yet individuals, each having its own unique being.

Both the monists and the pluralists have questions presented to them which are very hard to answer. It may be the truth lies in a mediatory position somewhere between or even within the two apparently very different points of view. For the monist, if he admits of God at all, must identify Him with the Absolute or all-that-there-is. The pluralist, - if he affirms that there be God, must place Him as one of the individuals in the universe. His relation to and importance in that universe may be stated in as many and as diversified terms as there are thinkers who attempt to state His relation to the universe. God may be but a "fellow-striver" with the innumerable host of individuals that make up this complex universe, or He may be the creating, unifying, sustaining, governing and supreme individual of the universe. For the solution of these questions we present a few of the conceptions presented in the very restricted field represented by our rather arbitrarily chosen, and thus necessarily limited, company of modern thinkers.

No single school of present day philosophy can lay claim to the right to define the term Absolute. The variations in the conceptions of this term are as widely divergent as the systems of those who submit the definitions. Indeed it may fairly be maintained that for a metaphysical system the conception of that which is ultimately real -- the Absolute, is the central idea. All other conceptions adjust themselves by orientation to this.

Their positions, always slightly different in any two thinkers of intellectual independence, may nevertheless be roughly classified. Agnostic conceptions being represented chiefly by Spence's synthetic philosophy;materialistic conceptions represented by Hobbes,Feurbach, and Buchner. As against these anti-idealistis conceptions several graduations in the position of idealists may be discriminated. Schopenhauer's voluntarism; Hegelianism, represented in our present discussion by Royce and Calkins; and finally the position of personalism or personal idealism as represented by Lotze, Bowne and with a few modifications which may be stated, Leighton. A treatment of these positions,although somewhat arbitrarily selected, together with brief references to kindred thinkers will constitute the bulk of discussion of this treatment of "Some Modern Conceptions of the Absolute."

It is evident that these theories of the Absolute range in their conception from those on the one hand, that would make the Absolute to consist of a lumpish-sum-total of the constituents of the universe conceived of as being mass particles in motion in space through the qualitatively dualistic and numerically singularistic position which would make the Absolute to consist of both matter and thought or consciousness united in a more or less incoherent manner in an undefined common substratum, which ultimately makes them one. Such a position would give mind, or matter the greater significance in accordance with the chief interest of the individual. And finally on the other hand the qualitative monistic position, which conceives of the Absolute either (1) as the President of the Cosmic republic of persons, (2) as

creator and sustainer of all finite persons and the objective world as well, or of the position which is both qualitatively and quantitatively monistic; conceiving of the Absolute as a universal consciousness of which all particular selves or things are individual manifestations.

Dogmatic Atheism, meaning by this the denial of the existence of an Absolute as an individual in the universe has not many philosophic advocates, while agnosticism, which suspends judgment or indicates that there is lack of evidence to postulate either the existence of, or the nature of, an Absolute, is not without adherents. Among those who are prefessedly indifferent must be classed all positivists, the opponents of any metaphysics as such. Here should be included Comte and John Stuart Mill. While the systems of many influential thinkers might be presented in this connection there is no man who led the thought of his day so effectively as did Herbert Spencer. "Spencer was accepted as the philosophic exponent of the spirit of the age." His First Principles made him "almost at once the most famous philosopher of his day" (The Story of Philosophy, Durant, Page 431.) Spencer's agnosticism was perhaps no more pronounced than that of others but he was given to a more dogmatic and combative discussion of the subject than were his contemporaries. It is his dogmatic affirmation based on an examination of the nature and limits of h man intelligence that the power which manifests itself in consciousness and in the outward world is unknowable. If by this agnosticism it could be shown that Mr. Spencer meant to indicate that the full comprehension of the ultimate Being must always pass our grasp, -- that in the present state of existence it is only

very dimly and distantly that we can approximate a proper conception of the Deity. Such an agnosticism is shared by all thinkers and is, therefore, not the point at issue. The real item in dispute is whether we may apprehend through our intellectual investigations something of this Absolute Being though it be granted we cannot know all. Despite his negations Spencer affirms many items of knowledge which in themselves are fatal to his agnosticism. First of all, it is admitted that the unknowable exists as a power revealed in consciousness (First Principles pages 88, 89). He tells us in every variety of phase that we cannot know the Absolute, but almost in the same breath he tells us that we have an idea of the Absolute which our minds are compelled to form, that it is a positive and not merely negative conception, and, moreover that we have not only a conception but a direct and immediate consciousness of this Absolute blending itself with all our thoughts and feelings and recognizable by us as such. (First Principles page 88 - 97). Again if we ask what is meant by the Absolute it is defined by Spencer as that which exists out of all relations and for this reason the possibility of the knowledge of it is denied. (First Principles pages 78 - 81.) And yet the very grounds which we have for affirming the existence of such an Absolute are the grounds for affirming that it stands in relation both to nature and to consciousness and is a constituent element in every idea we can form. Thus it is discovered that this Inscrutable Power is not absolutely unknowable. It is soon apparent that there are quite a number of affirmations which we are able to make concerning the Absolute. This Ultimate Reality is a Power; It is a Force, the nearest analogue to which is our will (First Principles, Spencer, Page 189); it is infinite

it is eternal, it is omnipresent (First Principles, Page 199); it is infinite and eternal Energy from which all things proceed. "But one truth", he says, "must grow ever clearer -- the truth that there is an Inscrutable Existence every where manifested, to which we can neither find nor conceive either beginning or end. Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty that he is ever in the presence of one Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed." And further as seen in the quotation just given, it is the Cause of the Universe, which idea he asserts in the Nineteenth Century, July 1884 page 24, "I held at the outset, and continue to hold, that this Inscrutable Existence which science in the last resort, is compelled to recognize as unreached by its deepest analysis of matter, motion, thought, and feeling, stands towards our general conception of things in substantially the same relation as does the Creative Power asserted by Theology." The Power manifested throughout the Universe distinguished as material, is the same Power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness;"while the "necessity we are under to think of the external energy in terms of the internal energy gives rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect to the Universe." (First Principles, Spencer, Page 199ff).

We are forced, therefore, in conclusion, to assert that Mr. Spencer's so-called agnosticism is not an agnostic system at all, but his conception of the Absolute bears the mark of a non-material or semi-spiritual pantheism.

In approaching the second group of thinkers and their conception of the Absolute, we are at once confronted with the bold declarations of David Hume. While it is true that Hume everywhere assumes the existence of a Supreme Being or Deity, it is evident that on his principles we have no right to believe that there is a God. Indeed Hume never argues definitely against the existence of God, yet his efforts to disprove the existence of substance, material or spiritual, logically applies as well to God as to finite realities. There is no place in his philosophy for an Absolute. The same sweeping phenomenalism which reduced all selves to mere bundles of fleeting and unconnected ideas, forces Hume, if he follows a rigidly logical course, to deny the existence of Deity.

Materialism while arriving at the same conclusion, relative to the Absolute, does so on a different basis. Under the dictates of this doctrine the whole category of being is filled out by matter. Its principles were stated by the early Grecian Atomists as early as Leucippus and Democritus nearly five hundred B.C. There are, roughly speaking four principal arguments (following Leighton's Field of Philosophy page 71); first, all qualitative varieties and changes are reducible to quantitative terms and statements; second, all perceptions, feelings, and thoughts,--the whole content and activity of the mind, are reducible to the motions of mass particles in space. Third, secondary qualities of objects are merely phenomena in the human organism. Fourth, every event which occurs, every happening in the process of things is the result alone of blind mechanical motion. To these inclusive principles modern materialism has added only elaboration. The thorough going variety literally identifies

brain and mind, -- and the movements of the brain, with the thoughts and feelings of which we are aware in consciousness. Brain action on this hypothesis is thought and feeling. "The brain", says Cabanis, "secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." In essential accord with this are Buchner, Moleschott and Vogt, more careful writers as Tyndall and Huxley are given to statements which either indicate an abandonment of the problem of the relationship between consciousness and matter, or conceive of them in common terms which consistently give matter untimate ascendancy. "I know nothing and never hope to know anything" says Prof. Huxley, "of the steps by which the passage from molecular movements to states of consciousness is effected." (Contemporary Review Nov. 1871 page 464.) And again he asserts speaking of our thoughts as, "The expression of molecular changes, in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." (Lay Sermons page 152.) He speaks of consciousness as "A function of nervous matter when that matter has attained a certain degree of organization." (Contemp. Review Nov. 1871 page 464. ).

This hyphenated materialistic-idealistic theory in outcome escapes crass materialism only in terminqlogy and appearance. It is not within the scope of our purpose to discuss or refute materialism as such,- its conception of the Absolute is our present interest. Like Absolute idealism it should define its Absolute as The-all-that-there-is, and all that there is, is matter and its by products. Therefore, the Absolute must be defined in terms of mass particles in motion and every valid argument against materialism finds full cogency. The refutation of such

conception of the Absolute. Such a position fails to account for the phenomena of consciousness in harmony with the scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy. Consciousness can not be properly called a by product of physical processes, it is rather the director and investigator of physical processes; and above all, such a theory is contrary to the sense of freedom in the moral individual.

We turn in our consideration, from the non-idealistic conception of the Absolute to those that may properly be classified as idealistic conceptions. Our first consideration will be Schopenhauer's voluntarism. While Schopenhauer's philosophy, as the philosophy of pessimism, is sometimes dismissed with a jesture of toleration, a truer evaluation will discover a system of much interest and no small value. Beginning with an inquiry into the nature of the world he arrives at the conclusion that it is for each and all of us just our idea. It is there because we see it and as long as we see it. We comprehend our world through two dividing principles, namely, space and time. This external world is perceived through a universal form of apprehension, that is, the principle of causation. The world of space and time with all that they contain exist for the knowing subject. There is no cause to be sought beyond my own true nature for my own experiences. But what is my nature? My deepest nature is so superior to space and time, that space and time are in fact in me, in so far as they are forms of seeing and knowing. My true nature neither causes nor is caused and this same deepest nature exists in all the particualrs of the universe, Only in space and time do there seem to be separate beings. They seem to

distinguish us all from one another. But ultimately abstract space and time with all their manifold and illusory distinctions of places and moments and the real world collapse into one immanent nature. Thus in my own deepest nature I am one with all that ever has been or ever will be either millions of ages ago or of millions of ages to come. No star is so remote but that the same essential nature of things which is manifested in that star is also manifested in my body.

In this position we find Schopenhauer's conception of the Absolute. I have only to find my own deepest nature of which I have an unquestionable awareness. My whole inner life is essentially my will, - I long, I desire, I move, I act, I feel, I strive, I lament, I assert myself -- the common name for all this is will. The world is Will. I am a Will -- a will which is notthere for the sake of something else but which exists solely because it desires to exist. Here is the true thing in itself. Since for Schopenhauer this soul of your soul is the capricious inner will, there is no reason to speak of it as God or Spirit. These words imply rationality and conscious intelligence, and will is vastly deeper than intelligence. Intelligence exists at all only as one of the caprices of this will. Thus the world is will and idea. This will give rise to Schopenhauer's pessimism since will is essentially a striving and since there is nothing in the world deeper than the longing, -- the unrest which is the very heart of willing. Therefore, there is no end of longing in the world. This is the problem that leads to Schopenhauer's pessimism. Since there is no ultimate goal to be realized by the striving there is no relief save in resignation -- the denial of the will

to live.

In this conception of the Absolute as will, this postulation of an endless longing at the center of the universe, Schopenhauer has contributed a deep and fundamental insight into life. In proceeding down the deep declivity into pessimism he has accepted one conclusion from his position, but fortunately not the only one possible. It is possible, on the other hand, to find in this unending struggle the inspiration for life which has been in the vision of all the great poets from Homer's wanderings of the much tossed and tried Odysseus down to the In Memoriam of Tennyson or the dramatic lyrics of Browning. Restlessness, longing, grief are fatal evils save to the spirit that is strong enough to endure them and to make of them stepping stones for the greater conquests of tomorrow. When one accepts this position he is prepared to unite with the idea -- will, that of intelligent moral purpose which united idea will give a rationally acceptable and practically livable conception of the Absolute. "Never has a system of thought so dominated an epoch as the philosophy of Immanuel Kant dominated the thought of the nineteenth century" (Story of Philosphy, Durant, Page 276.) "Kant's criticism of reason, and his exaltation of feeling, prepared for the voluntarism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the intuitionism of Bergson, and the pragmatism of James; his identification of the laws of thought with the laws of reality gave to Hegel a whole system of philosophy; and his unknowable "thing-in-itself" influenced Spencer more than Spencer knew" (Story of Philosophy, Durant, Page 317.) Of Schopenhauer and

and Spencer we have spoken. Hegel's influence upon the stream of thought has been even more significant and more abiding than even that of Schopenhauer and Spencer. His conception of the Absolute is of a type not touched by other thinkers taken into account. It is but fitting that we should seek to know his conception of the Absolute.

In endeavoring to discover the process by which Hegel sought to substantiate his conception of the Absolute it is necessary that a brief observation of his method is desirable. It is his position that a complete analysis of any wrong doctrine serves as a refutation, which is in reality a reinterpretation of it. Such an analysis begins by substituting for the conception with which one has started, the opposite of it, but ends by showing that the truth lies not in either conception as opposed to the other but in the third conception which unites on a higher plane the essential features of the initial conception and its opposite. This was Hegel's dialectic. Advancing by this method Hegel endeavors to show that the ultimate reality is not a single limited reality -- one among many,-- but is an Absolute One. He further maintains that the ultimate Reality is not a composite of all particular realities, that is, is neither an aggregate mor a system. Thus having answered, in a manner satisfactory to himself, the numerical question he gives his attention to the qualitative nature of the ultimate Reality, asserting that it is a spirit or person. In the process of his discussion he indicates that the Absolute is not adequately conceived of as mere life. This theory was advocatdd in Hegel's time by Schelling later by Spencer

and Haeckel. Neither may it be conceived of as a totality of particular selves. "The highest, extremest summit", he says, "is pure Personality, which alone -- through that absolute dialectic which in its nature encloses and holds all within itself" (Logic Werke V page 339).

Hegen's philosophy of history is an endeavor to show that the "procession of events in the progressive apprehension of this absolute self under more and more adequate forms; goodness is the adequate relation of human beings to each other as all related to this larger self; beauty is the absolute self's expression in sense forms; religion is the personal relation to the absolute self; and philosophy, finally, is the reasoned apprehension of the Absolute " (Persistent Problems, Calkins page 389.)

Hegel's Absolute is a living process, purposive and rational. The Absolute is a spiritual system, a whole of interrelated, living, thinking, willing beings which exist as a whole in and for God -- the unitary spirit of the whole. The Absolute is a Spirit living in His own concrete differences, men and things.

Accepting this statement of Hegel's conception of the Absolute as being a Person all inclusive and progressively attaining consciousness in the onward march of events we will reserve criticisms of absolute idealism until after brief treatments of the conceptions of Royce and Calkins have been successively given. Roughly speaking the criticisms of the systems are identical with those of their common master, -- Hegel.

Miss Calkins and Royce speak of the Absolute as a self or a person.

Miss Calkins calls the system of Royce and herself a monistic personal idealism. She interprets Hegel as holding the same doctrine.

Since Miss Calkins defines the Absolute as the Absolute Self it is necessary to have a clear conception of the term self. Of this, she asserts, several definite principles (Persistent Problems page 427), which we condense. A self, or I, or person, is not the entelechist's soul, that is, the self cannot be conceived as having a decisive influence on phenomena. In the second place it is not to be confused with soul in Lock's sense of the term;that is to say, is no underlying substratum, no unknown substance. Positively, by self is meant a relatively persistent, yet changing, unique, complex, related being. These then are its outstanding characteristics; persistence, change, uniqueness and complexity. While it may be questioned whether she always frees herself of the soulish implications of the selfhood yet the above principles evidently are those which she has in mind when she endeavors to give the personalistic absolute conception of the Absolute self.

Referring to this same definition of self she affirms, "the absolutist holds that the essential characters of self as enumerated in the description already given of the human self may be attributed to Absolute Being. Obviously the Absolute is a persistent, a unique, and a complex being." ( Persistent Probelms page 445.) It is of course necessary to determine the relation of the individual finite self to this Absolute Self. It is at this point that Hegelian absolutism is forced to transverse its roughest road.

The individual finite self must be regarded, she contends,

as being included in a very real and definite manner in the absolute self, and while being thus included, is not absorbed and annulled by the central and total self of which it is a part. This conception, which the pluralistic personalist cannot brook, is supported by Miss Calkins by appeals to the individual periodic selfhoods of childhood, youth, and so-forth, which are combined within the individual; also, by appeal to the study of so-called multiple personalities and the phenomena of abnormal psychology. There is nothing she asserts, "in itself incompatible with the doctrine of the finite selves as included parts of the Absolute Self. A genuinely personal Absolute must include all aspects of human experience. He must then be an individualizing self distinguishing each from each, and each from himself, -- the innumerable objects of his emotion and his will. Each finite self is thus a distinct expression of the individualizing emotion of the Absolute Self; my consciousness of my uniqueness is no illusion, and the ultimate reason why I am I, and you are you is that each is definitely and distinctively willed by the Absolute. And yet, like all the lesser included selves I am distinguished though not separate from the absolute self and he from me. The difference is in part quantitative and is evident in the fact that I do not know all the objects which he knows. In part, however, it is the difference of the Absolute as an utterly unique person from any included self. From this difference it follows that the lesser self does not necessarily feel and will with the Absolute; whereas the absolute self besides possessing his own, the ultimate personality, must feel and will with every lesser self."
(Persistent Problems page 470 and 471.)

Our interest of course is primarily in the relation between the finite selves and the Absolute Self. Yet it is of interest to note that these finite selves are interrelated indirectly through the Absolute, though not directly each to each. Each is included in the Absolute Self and unites with the rest to express his complete will. The human world is, in other words, a community -- a totality of selves each with hiw own individual point of view. And further these finite selves are free.

Admittedly this position is not without difficulty to the absolutist. Of course this freedom is not absolute but relative. His freedom in which he may oppose the Absolute is an opposition in which he opposes His specific and not His inclusive purpose. "I, as choosing self am object of the will of the Absolute; and if He proposes precisely my freedom then it follows that specific acts and momentary choices may be in opposition to what would have been His purpose if He had willed a world without me in it." (Persistent Problems pafe 477.) And,again, "in so far as He has willed me to be free there must be or may be partial phases of reality which He experiences but does not will." (Persistent Problems page 478.) And yet again, "The Absolute wills the rebellious volition not as a lesser self wills it in isolation of relation to the whole, but as apart of a universe which included also such other purposes and fulfillments as balance or (in Royce's fine phrase) 'atone for" this rebellious violation and its outcome." (Persistent Problems page 478.)

These finite selves are immortal and the proof of it lies

not in the fact that they long for immortality, neither because the Absolute Self could conceivably express Himself only in immortal partial selves, but because there are human beings who know themselves as embodiments of unique duties and because a duty is inherently endless.

We have discussed the position of two of the outstanding representatives of absolutism namely, Royce and Calkins, and have reserved until now the criticisms which are common to both. In the first place it is exceedingly difficult to determine what kind of selfhood that is which is a composite of lesser selves, yet uniquely greater and independent of their sum total. If indeed such an Absolute can be properly termed a self it cannot be readily granted that the fractional finite beings are individually also selves. A definition may be indeed the beginning of all well meaning discussions, yet a definition cannot bear too much. To define a self as a "relatively persistent, yet changing, unique, complex, relative being" is certainly to give it great width of latitude, and yet, hardly enough in the judgment of the present writer, to include, such a wide diversity of individuals as is required by the absolutists. The adding of the adjectives, finite and absolute does not change the problem. To call one the total self and the others fractional or partial selves may point in the right direction but also proportionately reduces the significance of each fraction.

It does not appear to the present writer that Miss Calkins or any of the other absolutists succeeds in solving the significant problem

of freedom. To say that the finite self is free in that he opposes the specific but not the inclusive purpose of the Absolute strikes one as being more of a verbal gesture than of a solution. If the reply is that the violation is a part of the Absolute experience yet the Absolute Self though conscious of it opposes it, is to postulate either an incoherence in the Absolute, which is suicidal to the idea, or to guarantee to the finite self an independance which bars inclusion in the Absolute. Then finally, for the proponent of personalistic absolutism to say the solution lies in the fact that the Absolute, because of His very absolutness succeeds in striking a balance or "atoning for" any individual rebellious violation or collection of rebellious violations, is so far from solving the problem that when the violation is stressed it strengthens the belief in the individuals freedom but not his inclusion in the Absolute, or when the idea of balance is stressed it strengthend the impulse towards inclusion but eliminates the freedom.

In passing from the discussion of Absolute idealism with its numerical Monism to idealistic pluralism, personal idealism, or, as it is commonly known, personalism, it may be well to note that present day idealism is predominantly personalistic. This emphasis of personality may be traced with more or less definiteness from the early hours of the modern division of the history of philosophy through the monadology of Leibnitz, the person of Berkeley, the synthesizing mind of Kant, to the personalist of the late nineteenth

and early twentieth century. Among whom are found such names as Lotze, Ward, Sorley, Seth Pringle - Pattison, and Bowne. This position has many things in common with personalistic absolutism. They hold in common the supreme significance of personality; that within certain limits the structure of the universe is a society of selves; that the external world gains its significance only in the light of personality and bases its existence in a manifestation of personal will. But when it comes to the conception of the Absolute and its relation to the individual there is a fundamental and irreconcilable divergence. Personalistic pluralists deny the singularistic contention that finite persons exist only as constituent parts of the one Absolute Spirit. There is nothing, they contend, in our normal and sane experiences which entitles us to say that one person can be literally contained in another person, one self simply cannot be part of another self. But the personalistic pluralist insists on the other hand that it belongs to the very essence of personality to exist only in social relationships with other persons, therefore, for him ultimate reality consists of a society or community of selves, living incessantly in communion with one another. The Absolute or Perfect Self or Person who is the source or ground of its continuous movement is a personal Deity who is the Creator and Sustainer of all finite selves and things on whom they are dependant but in whom they are not included.

The implications of Personalism carry us still further. Finite selves are free to err in sin, for God has not willed a world of mere mechanism but a society of persons who can will to cooperate

or to oppose Him within certain limits. It is God's will to create free moral agents who can grow into wisdom and conscious cooperation with Him. The whole creation moves through its strifes and sufferings toward a community of ethical and rational selves, -- to this development of selves, evil in the world is incidental. "Value exists only in petsons, therefore, persons must be immortal." (Leightons Field of Philosophy page 418.) Persons are not transitory expressions or modifications of the Absolute, -- but He is immanent in human life and in nature. God is a super-personal reality, the Absolute Being who is the ground and goal of all things. Thus personalistic pluralism naturally ends in Theism.

Since it is our purpose to dwell a bit longer in the field of personalistic discussion, than in those fields of thought which have preceeded, it is necessary for us to say that the preceding paragraphs which have dealt with the personalistic conception of the Absolute have been but the general statements of the tenets of this doctrine and it is now our purpose to go into a more detailed view of the subject.

Personalism is a form of idealism, which interprets reality as a society of persons. In fact, it would go so far as to state that the only real thing in the universe is person; - all true being is Personal. Personalism in this sense might be called Theistic Idealism, which grants us the further right of adding to our definition that there is one Supreme person in the society of persons and that all the universe depends upon His will for its existence and continuance. Physical and finite persons are nothing apart from Him. The

physical universe as a whole is but a mode of God's activity. Finite persons, while true and unique selves, depend on His purpose for their being. The supreme person wills existence of what is truly other than himself, so that the universe is not a single self but is ultimately a society of selves, as Prof. Leighton puts it (Fields Phil. page 417). The Supreme Person, "Is the source of the whole system, the ground of its continuous movement towards fuller personal and communal life, and the eternally realized Ideal or Goal of the life of spirits." Personalisms excuse for existence is based upon the coherence theory of truth, the distinctness of the individual and upon epistemological dualism. While some objections have been and may be raised, yet no objection holds water when light is shed upon the meaning of the universe as a whole.

We will proceed to the arguments that Personalism has to offer for the existence of God. It is, howver, unnecessary to laborously rehearse the age-worn arguments in detail. The traditional arguments known as the ontological (theory of being), cosmological (theory of the universe), teleological (theory of ends) while attacked by many since the time of Kant, still retains in a large measure their old cogency. These traditional arguments have survived, especially the cosmological and the teleological. Lotze and Bowne undertake to argue that the cause of the world is one and notmany, and is intelligence. They base their argument upon inter-action as a necessary postulate of thought dealing with the world, as interacting systems. They contend that one cannpt conceive successful interaction without God to support it. A

unitary system of interacting members is possible only through a unitary being, which posits and maintains them. This is a world of interaction according to law, and reason demands as the only satisfactory explanation that there must be a single unitary cause or ground. This underlying ground must be intelligence. We necessarily assume our world to be a world of meaning and law, otherwise we have a world of "hit and miss." Science is dependent upon this. It is only a mind that can grasp a universal meaning and apart from minds universals have no meaning, only intelligence can grasp law. While this is not an entirely conclusive argument, yet it is the most satisfactory hypothesis.

While there are other arguments that might be stated with profit, such as the epistemological argument, the argument from finite intelligence and the argument based upon religious experience, we will give room to the discussion only of the moral argument for the being of God. Prof.Sorley derives his moral argument for God from the argument for the existence of values. (Moral Values and the Idea of God Sorley Ch.XIII Page 329 ee). We experience values, and just as we experience things of sense and infer their existence, so we accept the existence of values; -- we assume reality when we experience value. Dr. James Orr (Christian View of God and the World,page 108) states the moral argument a bit differently, he states with Kant that "the moral law that appears in conscience - 'the categorical imperative' of duty - that ideal of unrealized goodness which hovers constantly above us,awakening in us a noble dissatisfaction with all past attainments, -- these are

not facts which explain themselves. Moral law is not comprehensible except as the expression of a will entitled to impose its command upon us. The rules and ideals of conduct which conscience reveals to us and which bind the will with such unconditional authority point to a deeper source in an eternal moral reason. The ethical ideal, if its absolute character is to be secured, points back to an eternal ground in the Absolute Being. It takes us back to the same conception of God as the ethically perfect Being, source and ground of moral truth, fountain of moral law, which we find to be implied in Christianity."

Christianity is a theistic system and postulates as its first premise, the personal, ethical, self revealing God. Such a God discovered to men answers the demands of the religious spirit. By self revealing God, we mean one who enters into the history of the world in a most living way. He is not only actually present in a material universe,-- ordering, guiding, controlling, -- but He enters also into a most direct way in the course of human history, working in its general and specific providence, and by a gradual and progressive revelation, which is at the same time, practical discipline and education, giving to man that knowledge of himself by which he is enabled to attain the highest ends of his own existence and to cooperate freely in carrying out of divine ends. Thus theism is cold without revelation to complete it. The Christian doctrine, while including all that the word theism ordinarily covers, is much more than a doctrine of simple theism.

The question next for our consideration is to discover, if possible, how this self revealing God can reveal Himself to His world and to His subjects, the infinite to the finite, the divine

to the human. "All genuine first hand religion whether of the learned or unlearned in the experience of a personal; relation to the highest." (Man and the Cosmos, Leighton, page 549.) Dr. Leighton insists this is true even where the highest is not conceived as a Person or Personality. It has been found that in Buddhism redemption or salvation is found in a mystical or immediate union of the individual with the Absolute. It is admitedly true that the trancendency (of which we will have more to say later) may may be so emphasized, as has been done of times in Judaism and Mohammedanism, and frequently in Christianity, as to render the object of worship unapproachable to the devotee. While this is true yet it is also true that the very heart of religion is union or communion or immediate experience of the devotee with the highest. Dr. Leighton puts this thought in terse form when he says: "If religious experience be valid, then the worshipers claim to know God immediately, by intuition or insight, must be allowed reasonable." (Man and the Cosmos, page 550.)

To attempt to establish the possibility of intercommunication between the Infinite Person and finite person, we have already referred to the traditional arguments for the Infinite Person, and while none of these arguments severally may amount to a demonstration yet their culminative effect is to show that the theistic postulate is not only not irrational but is the most satisfactory solution to the riddle of the universe, solving more problems and leaving fewer unsolved than any other theory. Dispensing with any renewal of these arguments we posit the existence of the Infinite Person.

Neither can we do more than to assume the existence of the finite persons without attempting here to contravert the materialistic psychological theories, such as, -- behaviorism, associationalism, analythical psychology. We can only make the final appeal to self consciousness and endeavor to show that only on the basis of finite personality can life have meaning or society have significance. We must postulate the existence of the finite personality. To deny the possibility of intercommunication beyween human persons would be to make the writing of this paper, or any social system, merely a subjective or solipistic exercise. With these three assumptions then we launch our argument for intercommunication between God and finite persons.

We not only contend that within the personalistic argument for the Absolute lies the possibility of intercommunication between persons, but that it is the only argument which is truly compatible with the idea of intercommunication or self revelation on the part of God. No deistic or agnostic position can be accepted. To postulate the personality of God in one moment and, in the next to prohibit any self revelation of the Deity is, we think, a rational contradiction. We believe that it can be shown that agnosticism and deism cannot logically stop short of atheism. This we think, James Orr in his Christian View of God and the World, (Lecture II page 49), has sufficiently demonstrated. "It is here" says Orr, "that pantheism has its advantage over deism, it is indeed more reasonable to believe in a living personal God , who created and who controls the universe,

than to believe in the one and all of pantheism, but it does not follow that it is more reasonable to believe in an abstract deity,- a mere figment of the intellect who stands in separation from the world and yields no satisfaction for the Religious Life." And, to quote Orr again, (Lecture II page 49) the real difficulty is in believing "Him to be a God who remains seld-enclosed, impassive, uncommunicative towards creatures whom He has dowered with a share of His own rational and moral excellencies, who has so shut Himself out by natural law from direct contact with the spirits that see Him that He can neither speak to them, answer their prayers, help them in trouble nor even reach them by inward succors --- a silent God, -- who can not more enter into personal relation with His creatures than if He were impersonal. Such a conception is self-contradictory and cannot maintain itself." The truly personalistic world-ground cannot be thought of deistically. Neither can the intercommunicative divine person be viewed from the Hegelian point of view. Admitting that Hegel conceived of God as a person, as Miss Calkins argues (Persistent Problems of Philosophy page 390) although his meaning is certainly not clear, yet insuperable problems remain. In the first place it is difficult to see how a consciousness which first becomes aware of itself in you and in me, and progressively in successive generations, can be fairly termed personal, and again, even if this can be satisfactorily answered it is quite impossible to conceive of communication in the true sense, between parts of the same personality, and since Hegel reduces the universe to a single individual, intercommunication is

thereby made impossible. There is then, but one clear conception of God as a person which is adequate. Such a view will insist on finding in Him intellect for which there is no opaqueness, and for which, certainly nothing which is knowable is unknown; sensibilities which will make the life of His creatures meaningful for Him; their sorrows and joys, triumphs and failures, find reciprocation in Him. In this will we find ground for such acts as are characteristic of personality, and in these are the grounds for hope of answer to prayer and for providential superintendence. This is the foundation for the Christian view of a personal Holy God as the Author of the universe, and its moral Legislator and Ruler. Such a view is the only one in which the reason and heart of man can permanently rest.

The philosophical basis of communion with God is certainly two-fold. In the first place the doctrine of divine immanence which placed God within the universe, and, for that matter, in some sense within human personality itself, would seem to give a nexus between God and man, the finite and the infinite. It is of course at this place that deism fails to have meaning for life. Perhaps not wholly aside from the doctrine of immanence, but yet at least giving a new approach, is the idealistic conception of the world which would remove any crass, brutish matter which might be held to oppose the free operation of the infinite spirit upon the world. For that matter of course, the God who is creator of the universe would not be likely to produce that which would oppose His communi-

cation with finite personality which He created in His own image.

The immanence of God, then -- the idealistic conception of the universe, as well as revelation, corroborate the mystical experience of the race relative to the possibility of communion with God. When the immanence of God properly emphasized, the impassable gulf between the natural and supernatural is seen to be eliminated. These terms become relative and from the new point of view all is supernatural in the sense that God is operative in all His creation. It is obvious, then, that from the metaphysical basis there could be no objection to some kind of communion between the finite and infinite. The same conclusion is reached if we accept the postulate of idealism, -- there is no materialistic bar to God's immediate operation on the finite spirit, and, if we go as far as the principle of Berkley would carry us, God is indeed "closer to us than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."

It may be suggested that there are two ways of approaching the idea of God. First, the way of immediate experience, which expresses itself in the feeling of the nearness of God. It gives to theindividual who thus approaches God, a first hand consciousness of His presence. This experience carries its own conviction with it, and while it may be classified as mystical, yet it has its value for religious life. Second, one may approach the idea of God by way of philosophy, which way is constituted by a sincere and logical attempt to know the meaning of life as a whole. It seeks to consider life and experience not alone by analysis and synthesis but from the synoptic view point, - as a whole. The way of philosophy to God

must discover the meaning of all embracing unity of life and its meaning, which all embracing unity is found to be in God.

It is not wholly correct to contrast these two ways of approach to God, for philosophy embraces in a certain sense the all of life, both approaches are needed without the inclusion of the approach by immediate experience, the philosophical approach might lead to a cold Absolute. It might well be said that the approach by immediate experience to God without the corrective element found in the philosophical,approach might be found of doubtful validity. Both approaches are intertwined and interwoven. All knowledge rests on basic intuition, but these are futile unless related to life as a whole.

The solving of the relation of God to the finite is ever colored by one's philosophical and religious outlook on life. The monistseeks to state the relation of God and man in terms of a category of whole and part. This category, however, fails of rational explanation when it attempts to describe personal relation. "The more illuminating category is that of purpose which, on our view, determines that whole and parts shall be in the universe. The monist rightly holds that the divine purpose is supreme but we can give a self consistent interpretation of the facts only on the view that it is the divine purpose, that there shall be separate finite persons, on whom God acts intimately and constantly without there being a part of Him. In himself man finds signs of God and of God's nearness and activity. Yet man is always himself and God is God. They are mutually transcendant in a sense in which God and nature are not."

(Introduction to Philosophy, Brightman, page 339.)

Theism conceived the world of nature as dependent on God conceived the world of nature as expressing the will and purpose of God. The energy that is at work in the system of physical nature may best be understood as the will of a supreme person, Stating this in the terms of religion, this is the theory of the immanence of God in nature. "The belief in the divine immanence has sweeping implications. If it be true, every motion of every'particle of matter' is nothing more nor less than God Himself willing that He and finite persons shall have experiences of a certain type. Every event in nature is God's own conscious deed. (Introduction to Philosophy, Brightman page 336.) But the fact that God is the metaphysical cause for events in nature does mot necessitate that God is bad, since many physical events are ordinarily judged to be bad. "Physical events are not good or bad in themselves, they are good or bad as they express and influence personality." (Introduction to Philosophy, Brightman page 337.) No event regarded apart from the mind that produces it, can have the quality of goodness or badness. Only personality can sin or be good, physical events deriving their significance entirely from personality.

Theism believes in a God that is purposive, one who is in some sense immanent in the metaphysical cause of everything in the world of nature. One will lies back of the order of nature and this order of value, one mind is expressing themselves in both, if this is not true Theism would contend that there could be no ultimate meaning for

the universe as a whole.

The Theistic view of God must be found somewhere between deism and pantheism. Theism seeks a guiding principle for a discrimination of values. (Moral Values and The Idea of God, Sorley page 453.) This primciple is not to be found in the realm of nature and its laws nor in that of finite selves and their wills, but is found in intrinsic values. The moral order expresses the divine nature; and things partake of this nature in so far as they conform to that order, or manifest goodness. This is the key to the theistic interpretation of the world. We find that the moral purpose of the world must be the purpose of the Supreme Mind, which regards finite minds as attaining mystical and moral but not eristential unity with this Supreme Mind by the perfecting of their character in cooperating with the divine purpose. Wherever there is intrinsic worth, in the world, as well as in moral goodness, we may see a manifestation of the divine. God must be then conceived of as the final home of values, the Supreme Worth. Whatever value there is, there is meaning to value beyond our experience of it. The true values of life which we experience are ideals of life which derive their existence and validity from their presence in the Supreme Person.

Belief in the obejctivity of value leads to faith in the conservation of value, and if we trust in the conservation of value in the universe we are not trusting in man alone. If realized values are to be conserved it must be due, to something in the order of the universe which is sympathetic and favorable to these values. In brief,

theism is the theory which holds that God is a person whose will is expressed in the physical universe, who in His goodness wills existence of finite persons; who is interested in the conservation and increase of value, and upon whom the universe is depending for its existence and maintenance.

"Such as men themselves are, such will God appear to them to be." These words of John Smith, the Cambridge Paltonist, expresses a findamental fact about the condition of a religious belief from which we can nomore escape than we can "leap off our own shadows." "The God of the moralist is before all things a Great Judge and School Master; the God the the priest is the Head of the celestial and terrestial hierarchies; the God of science is impersonal and inflexible vital Law; the God of the savage is the kind of chief he would be himself if he had the opportunity. So closely do gods resemble their worshipers that we might almost parody Pope's line and say than an honest God is the noblest work of man. This incurable anthropomorphism has been noticed and ridiculed from Xenophanes to Spinoza. (Personal Idealism and Mysticism, Inge, Page 1,2).

"Religion depends on faith in God and the kind of religion one has depends on the kind of God one believes in." (Intorduction to Philosophy, Brightman, Page 329). Belief in God which emminates from a sincere and thoughtful soul, has positive value for life. It gives him hope that in the face of apparent evil, good shall triumph. Such belief encourages one that loves labor is not lost for in God is found assuramce of the conservation of value. The kind of a world we think this is, will determine for us the kind of life we think is worth living. The view which we hold of the universe cannot ~~refrain~~ remain

a mere intellectual concept. It colors every emotion, it shapes one's attitude towards the world and his personal part in it. If one is materialistic he excludes religion and value and gives himself over to bare mechanism, If one surrenders to absolute idealism he opens himself to all the errors of monism. A monism which gives no adequate account of the natural order; one which does not make clear the manifestation of the Absolute One in the finite many; which involves contradiction in its solving of the relations of the Absolute One is the facts of ignorance and evil.

Absolutism does not answer the problem of free agency satisfactorily. Finite reasoning and willing and knowing cannot be the mere involuntary "Punch and Judy" of the world's show, through which the Vantriloquist can throw His voice. And lastly, the absolitistic conception pf the developing God is, I think, open to fatal objection. The school-boy of the universe has reached a very creditable standing, but what of the past? If he has been eternally evolving, he must have had at some time in the regress, less than any assignable degree of knowledge, etc., however small. This infinite regress of knowledge would eventually bring the Absolute perilously near the vanishing point. Looking toward the future we have no guarantee that the Absolute will be able to endure the the cosmic weather. Such problematic future does not satisfy the demands of the universe.

Belief in the God of personalism seems to be the "one unifying principle that can make out of our chaotic life a harmonious whole of thought and feeling and action." (Introduction to Philosophy, Brightman, Page 330.) The conclusion we reach from the various arguments

and considerations advanced in this treatment is, that the personalistic view, of the personal and holy God, as the Author of the universe, and its moral Legislator and Ruler, is the only one in which the reason and heart of man can permanently rest.

- Finis -