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# OF HARMS AND BENEFITS: TORTS, RESTITUTION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

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## I. INTRODUCTION

COPYRIGHT and patent take the *form* of ordinary property. As tangible property has physical edges, intellectual property statutes create boundaries by defining the subject matters within their zone of protection. As real property owners have rights to prevent strangers from entering their land, intellectual property statutes and case law grant owners rights to exclude strangers from using the protected work in specified ways. As tangible property can be bought and sold, bequeathed and inherited, so can copyrights and patents.<sup>1</sup>

But does this similarity of form mask an inconsistency of function? Justifications for tangible property typically refer to the internalization of both positive and negative effects, but justifications for intellectual property tend to be more one-sided. Legal protection for intellectual products is based on the benefits the producers generate: from a fairness point of view it is argued that persons who create works of value deserve to be

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<sup>1</sup> For a Hohfeldian comparison between the entitlement packages that comprise tangible and intangible property, see Wendy J. Gordon, *An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory*, 41 *Stan. L. Rev.* 1343, 1354–88 (1989).

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paid for the benefits generated,<sup>2</sup> and from an economic point of view it is argued that desirable incentives are provided by allowing creators to capture (internalize) some share of the benefits they create.<sup>3</sup> Because intellectual products can be infinitely replicated without necessarily depriving their creator of possession, their economic key is the provision of positive rather than negative incentives: copying is not in itself something to discourage, any more than additional use of a classic noncongested public good such as national defense should be discouraged. Uncompensated use of an inexhaustible good is worth discouraging only as a means to an end: obtaining adequate incentives for the good's initial production and maintenance.

Yet the traditional patterns of judge-made law much more easily provide negative incentives than positive incentives. Duties to guard against harm are far more common than duties to provide or pay for benefits. Tort law flourishes, while restitution law remains a virtual backwater<sup>4</sup>—an area where benefits rendered by mistake, or as the result of a failed contract, or in an emergency can sometimes be sued on.

I have briefly argued elsewhere that the core of intellectual property—a grant of rights over benefits—is consistent with the common law's pattern of entitlements.<sup>5</sup> But, given the dissimilarity with which judges have treated harms and benefits, negative and positive incentives, is that correct?

<sup>2</sup> The fairness argument works better for copyright than for patent. In copyright, only copying—the use of a beneficial work originating with another—is actionable, while, in patent, even an independent and coincidental replication of a patented invention is actionable by the patent holder.

<sup>3</sup> The incentives for the creation of new work provided by an intellectual-property system must be weighed against the deadweight loss and administrative costs of the system; the economic goal is to obtain the highest net sum. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, *An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law*, 18 *J. Legal Stud.* 325, 326 (1989). How to achieve that precise balance is outside the scope of this article.

<sup>4</sup> Note, however, that some instances of restitution may be invisible because of an overlap with tort or contract. See Douglas Laycock, *The Scope and Significance of Restitution*, 67 *Tex. L. Rev.* 1277, 1283 (1989). In addition, the provision of positive incentives in traditional law may be partially masked by a survey of case law; tangible property works to internalize both positive and negative effects, and the basic allocation of tangible property has not been primarily a judicial matter.

<sup>5</sup> See Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1446–59 (exploring competing baselines and concluding that a noncontractual entitlement to be paid for what one's labor produces is consistent with a basic pattern in restitution doctrine). See also Wendy J. Gordon, *On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutory Impulse*, 78 *Va. L. Rev.* 149 (1992) (examining corrective justice and restitution and concluding that both support an entitlement to be paid for one's labor, though the resulting entitlement is weak, conditional, and limited). Note that I will use "common law" to mean judge-made law; unless the context suggests otherwise, the usage will thus embrace cases decided both at common law and equity.

Some of the differential treatment of benefits might be explained as due to the judiciary's consciousness of its own institutional limitations<sup>6</sup>—an approach that could render many of the common-law denials of recovery irrelevant to statutory intellectual property. In fact, I have elsewhere suggested that the legislature seems better suited than the courts to craft rights over benefit generation.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, the common-law pattern may suggest that encouraging the generation of benefit may pose special difficulties that go beyond the questions of institutional competence. Accordingly, this article puts aside the issue of comparative institutional competence to examine whether the judicial doctrines evidence *substantive* choices that should caution against even legislative pursuit of benefit production in the intellectual property area.

From an abstract perspective, there would seem to be little reason for harms and benefits to be treated differently. Decades of cost-benefit analyses suggest that the two categories are interchangeable: reducing by one dollar damage that would otherwise occur is equivalent to providing a dollar's worth of new goods or services. The labels are themselves variable. One can verbally transform most benefit questions into "harms" and vice versa by juggling the baseline from which effects are measured. For example, this article defines harms and benefits using the status quo as a baseline, and, under that definition, benefits are obviously key to intellectual-product regulation: intellectual-product producers may lack any markets capable of being "harmed" unless they are first guaranteed some form of legal protection for the benefits their works generate. Yet one might instead argue that the proper baseline for copyright is the exclusive right over copying that it gives authors; under such a definition even copying that does not interfere with an authors' markets could count as a "harm," and, by verbal legerdemain, benefits would be cast out of the picture.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Providing rewards for benefits can pose dangers to competition that a court—with its two-party focus and limited sources of information—may be ill equipped to assess. See, for example, *Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.*, 35 F.2d 279, 281 ("[W]e are not in any position to pass upon the questions involved"; "records prepared by litigants . . . cannot disclose the conditions of this industry, or of the others which may be involved").

<sup>7</sup> See Gordon, *supra* note 5, at, for example, 151 n.4, 259 n.419, 272, and 281 (suggesting that legislators are better able than courts to provide the advance specification of boundaries that is crucial to a socially beneficial system of intellectual property).

<sup>8</sup> Note that the change of label does not change the underlying issue: the economic reason for granting an author an entitlement capable of being "harmed" has to do in the first instance with the increase in value to which she is in a position to contribute. This article uses the status quo as its baseline of comparison: if the act or omission that is the purported premise for liability adds value from what would otherwise be present, that addition is a benefit; if it subtracts, that is a harm.

Yet, for all their malleability, the two terms are not interchangeable. Once a stable baseline is chosen, the terms "harm" and "benefit" will indicate different phenomena. Notably, the common law usually employs the status quo as the baseline from which harm and benefit are measured. Adding to what already exists is different from taking from it, and it is plausible that each would entail different functional considerations that the makers of intellectual-product law would be unwise to ignore. For example, common-law cases might reveal that transaction costs are much more expensive or liability rules more strained when the issue is giving positive rather than negative incentives. Or, if the judges reveal a disinclination to order payment for benefit and that disinclination is not explainable in functional terms, that might lead to a useful reevaluation of the normative proposition that creators deserve some reward for their effort.

This article examines the reasons for the apparent disinclination of judges sitting in common law and equity to order recovery for benefit generation. It concludes that these reasons do not condemn a benefit-based grant of rights in intellectual products.

## II. TORTS AND RESTITUTION

### A. *The Asymmetry Critique*

Some observers believe that the common law has treated the internalization of harms quite differently from the way it has treated the internalization of benefits. If Harriet erects a reeking cattle feedlot next to Peter's residential neighborhood, for example, Peter will probably be able to obtain damages or an injunction against her, in nuisance. If, by contrast, Harriet builds a luxury resort hotel next to Peter's land, absent contract she will have no legal right to obtain monies from him, no matter how high his land values rise as a result of her development.<sup>9</sup> For injuring her neighbor, Harriet must pay. But for benefiting him, she cannot use the law to demand compensation he has not agreed to pay. As Saul Levmore has observed, "The law appears ready to create missing bargains in tort where harms are concerned, but is reluctant to do so in restitution where benefits are at stake."<sup>10</sup>

If the common law is more willing to internalize harms than it is to recapture benefits, then its purported preference for internalization be-

<sup>9</sup> See Restatement of Restitution § 1 at 9, illustration (c) (1937).

<sup>10</sup> Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65, 72 (1985).

comes a shaky precedent for intellectual property, particularly for the modern statutory pattern that gives authors and inventors rights that go beyond protection from being harmed in existing markets.<sup>11</sup> If indeed there is a “basic asymmetry”<sup>12</sup> between the way the law treats harms and the way it treats benefits, then intellectual property’s place in our overall jurisprudence is potentially precarious.

What follows is an argument that whatever asymmetry exists is attributable not to any per se difference between harm and benefit but, rather, to discrete problems that are likely to be absent when payment is sought for the use of an intellectual product.

### *B. On the Absence of a Duty to Benefit Others*

Consider first an asymmetry in tort law itself. Negligence law imposes duties to avoid unreasonable behavior that could cause strangers harm, yet, under the no-duty-to-aid rule, it generally declines to impose duties to create benefits for strangers.<sup>13</sup> Why does the law not impose liability for a failure to generate benefit as it does for a failure to take precautions against harm? There are two primary reasons, and they have to do with the appropriate choice of tools (sticks versus carrots) and do not reflect any lack of concern with encouraging benefit-producing behavior.

The first reason is a concern with liberty. Liability for failure to generate benefits for those with whom one has no prior relationship, like liability for failure to act to assist such persons, would be potentially all pervasive, for one can always do more for those who suffer. Liability schemes premised on harms are significantly more limited in nature, for there is much one can do without harming other people. Therefore, liability for

<sup>11</sup> In the early years of the nation, the copyright statute was quite harm oriented: it protected authors against little more than virtually verbatim reproduction. That was progressively altered. In 1870, authors were given rights over dramatizations and translations of their works; later an abridgement right was added. Today authors have “exclusive rights” to prepare and authorize derivative works (17 U.S.C. 106) not conditional on their having entered the derivative work market. See *Stewart v. Abend*, 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1990) (authors free to suppress their work without impairing their copyright) (dicta). Yet traces of the old approach remain, particularly in the fair use doctrine (17 U.S.C. 107) where absence of economic harm will assist a defendant who seeks to escape liability.

<sup>12</sup> Levmore, *supra* note 10, at 72. Levmore does not claim that the difference between harm and benefit per se is responsible for the differing case results. Although I will dispute the way he has articulated his asymmetry observation (see Section III B *infra*), this article builds on, rather than repudiates, Levmore’s analysis.

<sup>13</sup> Note that a duty to aid or to create benefits is distinct from a duty to allow a stranger to share one’s existing resources. For example, in *Ploof v. Putnam*, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908), a landowner was held liable for his servant’s cutting the plaintiff’s boat loose when it docked without permission in a storm; yet, had the boat worked itself loose, a passing stranger would not have been liable for refusing to assist the plaintiff.

failure to generate benefits would pose a greater danger to defendants' liberty than would liability for harm.<sup>14</sup>

The second reason is a concern with practicability. It can be hard to determine particular duties and the individuals on whom the duty should appropriately fall.<sup>15</sup> There are a large number of turning points leading to any event, and a large number of persons whose actions could have averted any given harm. What is the baseline from which any one bad samaritan's shortfall should be measured? It is hard to imagine how his liability might be computed.

Each of these reasons are at work in the area of intellectual products. Imposition of a legal duty to create would have a high cost in terms of liberty. Further, a liability approach<sup>16</sup> to force the creation of new works would likely be wholly impracticable—it is hard to imagine how the law could determine which persons should be penalized for failing to create what new things<sup>17</sup> or how to measure the benefits that a laggard author has failed to create. The law's unwillingness to impose a duty to produce benefits on potential creators thus does not indicate any lack of concern with generating incentives to encourage helpful activity or the production of valuable things. Rather, the principle that it is desirable to induce benefits is honored by other means, primarily by encouraging the formation of markets where payments for benefits will be forthcoming.<sup>18</sup> Giving creators a right to payment rather than a duty to create can generate incentives<sup>19</sup> without the liberty, practicability, and transaction cost problems just sketched.

<sup>14</sup> See Richard A. Epstein, *A Theory of Strict Liability*, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).

<sup>15</sup> The difficulty of identifying a salient defendant is recognized as one reason for the no-duty-to-aid rule. Saul Levmore, *Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations*, 72 Va. L. Rev. 879, 933–39 (1986) (also suggesting that, in the future, the need to find an individually salient defendant may have a decreasing importance for no-duty-to-aid jurisprudence).

<sup>16</sup> For a more general discussion, see Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1407–13 (discussion of “mandatory sharing” and other hypothetical liability models for intellectual products).

<sup>17</sup> Even if lazy authors could be distinguished from ones with incurable writer's block, the very imposition of liability on proven authors could, in the long term, discourage new entrants into the field. Compare William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, *Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism*, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1976) (a duty to aid might discourage potential rescuers from going to locations where rescues are likely to be needed).

<sup>18</sup> Intellectual property is, of course, one way of honoring this principle. Wendy J. Gordon, *Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors*, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1605–14 (1982) (using the market model to explain copyright).

<sup>19</sup> Note, however, that a principle of internalization is neither self-explanatory nor absolute, even if one restricts one's attention solely to economics. For example, copyright does not seek to internalize all benefits to an initial author; rather, it gives her a tool with which to demand a contract price from users, and each party will negotiate to receive benefits

### C. *Restitution as an Incentive for Harm Avoidance*

The second question to be faced in evaluating the charge of asymmetry is, Why is restitution not substituted for tort law as a general matter? Instead of punishing harm causers to discourage overly risky behavior, the law could, instead, hold out rewards for harm avoidance.<sup>20</sup> Restitutionary rules could allow potential injurers who install special brakes on their cars, put filters on their factory smokestacks, or otherwise incur trouble and expense to obtain recompense from all the persons who are thereby spared injury.

If a safe driver could obtain payment from pedestrians for the reduction in risk they experience, for example, then drivers' hopes of collecting restitutionary payments might be an effective incentive to take precautions. It might even be as effective as the desire to avoid a liability judgment under conventional tort law<sup>21</sup> and, in any event, could be a useful supplement to tort incentives. Further, that way the pedestrians would pay for what they get.<sup>22</sup> Why is this not the pattern that the law generally takes?

One reason is that restitutionary rights based on harms averted would be harder to implement than are tort rights based on harms caused. It is easier for a court to identify from a limited number of involved parties one who should be held liable for "causing" a cost<sup>23</sup> than it is to identify

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from the work. Even when contracts are not possible, it is usually preferable to encourage a creative user by allowing him to keep part of what he earns rather than stripping him to internalize all proceeds to a predecessor whose work he has copied. See generally Gordon, *supra* note 5, at section III C (remedies).

<sup>20</sup> This would give desirable incentives and also work toward spreading: the costs of paying to avoid risk would be borne by all those benefited.

<sup>21</sup> Persons who now drive carelessly can hope to be lucky enough to avoid an accident. But, on the one hand, if a driver could practicably sue for payment when careful, every act of carelessness would be costly in terms of receipts forgone. See R. H. Coase, *The Problem of Social Cost*, 3 *J. Law & Econ.* 1 (1960). On the other hand, people may not respond to opportunity costs in the same way they do to out-of-pocket payments, risk aversion might give a psychological boost to the tort incentive system, and transaction costs might be likely to block suits seeking payment for benefits since the benefits are likely to be fairly small in individual amount and the defendants are likely to be very large in number.

<sup>22</sup> Although it may be economically desirable to force the "cheapest cost avoider" to take precautions, it is less clear why such a person should not be paid for doing so. It is true that some actors deserve neither Paretian deference nor compensation; a thief who is forced to give up his spoils, for example, would seem to have little ground for complaint. See Jules Coleman, *Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law*, 68 *Cal. L. Rev.* 221 (1980). But a person who takes action to reduce harm does not seem an obvious candidate for Kaldor-Hicks treatment.

<sup>23</sup> Investigating who was factually linked to a particular accident can yield a short list of persons from which one or more can be chosen, via rough guess or other methods, as the person on whom liability should be placed to avoid such accidents in the future. See Guido Calabresi, *The Costs of Accidents* 140-43 (1970).



from among the uninvolved public at large who should be paid to avert a potential cost. It is also easier to make one party pay than to make a large group pay.<sup>24</sup>

Additionally, work in the economics of transaction costs has suggested that rewards and subsidies—*not* liabilities and taxes—are the most efficient methods of encouraging the production of benefits.<sup>25</sup> As Donald Wittman argues, in regard to risk creation, people behave reasonably more often than not. It is expensive to reward everyone for behavior they ordinarily should and ordinarily would engage in. Requiring those who benefit to pay for all such reasonable acts would make necessary a great many more court cases than would an opposite rule that merely requires the unreasonable actor to pay.<sup>26</sup> In addition, it is hard to decide what should be the relevant baseline from which this reward should be computed.<sup>27</sup>

Further, requiring potential victims to pay for any precaution taken on their behalf and allowing potential injurers to collect monies for any precaution they care to take would create a species of forced purchases. People cannot afford to buy everything they might like to have,<sup>28</sup> including protection from harm. Being forced to pay for something one would not have purchased is a harm, even if one is required to pay no more than fair market value for it.<sup>29</sup> And if the good doer is a volunteer, the

<sup>24</sup> Even if appropriate candidates for suit could be identified, transaction costs could discourage resort to this remedy. Each defendant might proffer particularized reasons why he should not have to pay, based on his physical position at the moment the precaution was taken, which could require an expensive degree of individualized adjudication.

<sup>25</sup> Donald Wittman, *Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?* 13 *J. Legal Stud.* 57, 61, 62–64, 71–72 (1984) (suggesting that a liability or “stick” approach is the best way to treat the generation of negative externalities (harms) and that the restitutionary or “carrot” approach tends to be preferable for dealing with the generation of positive externalities (benefits)). See also Levmore, *supra* note 15, at 879, 933–39 (examining the mix of carrots and sticks in the duty-to-aid branch of tort law).

<sup>26</sup> Wittman, *supra* note 25, at 62–64.

<sup>27</sup> Wittman usefully notes that requiring potential victims to pay for harm not inflicted would involve measurement problems and consequent information costs far in excess of those involved where injurers must pay. *Id.* at 62–65. If potential victims must compensate an injurer for efficient behavior, he argues, there may be no way to decide what level of inefficient behavior to measure from; the law would be “trying to measure with a yardstick that is hard to see at one end.” *Id.* at 64.

<sup>28</sup> See Levmore, *supra* note 10.

<sup>29</sup> See Peter Birks, *An Introduction to the Law of Restitution* 109–11 (1985) (“Market value is not [the recipient’s] value”); see also Levmore, *supra* note 8. It might be argued that this is not a significant problem because one can always sell the unrequested item. Selling the item, however, will involve transaction costs; in doing so, an individual lacks the market avenues and reputation with the public that an established dealer can rely on and, thus, may have to sell the item for less than fair market price; and the benefit is often

question will always remain (given the real-world inadequacy of fact finding) whether the unrequested action was indeed beneficial.<sup>30</sup>

In addition, this hypothetical restitutionary equivalent of tort law, whether conceived of as a substitute for tort law or as a supplement to it, would be inconsistent with the underlying entitlement patterns of the common law. Unreasonably causing people harm is usually considered wrongful.<sup>31</sup> Allowing potential harm causers to extract payment merely for behaving like reasonable people is normatively offensive. Some philosophers have suggested that one should *not* be entitled to claim a right of payment for doing those things that one is morally obligated to do.<sup>32</sup>

Perhaps most important, paying people to refrain from doing harm is likely to encourage precisely the wrong sorts of behavior. Otherwise moral people might (inaccurately) infer that one has no moral obligation to do the right thing unless one is paid.<sup>33</sup> Immoral people, on the other hand, might (accurately) infer that they can benefit financially by threatening harm to others. The possibility that the rule might erode conventional moral strictures and, in so doing, decrease the amount of voluntary good doing in the world<sup>34</sup> is troubling. Even more troubling is the likely effect on people who do not even attempt to comply with moral strictures.

A right to payment for harm avoidance would give an incentive for extortion.<sup>35</sup> The vicious or greedy might threaten harm in the hope of

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inextricably tied to something the recipient does not wish to sell, like an unsolicited paint job on one's house. Besides, if the item were easily salable, the "donor" would probably have found it cheaper to sell than to litigate.

<sup>30</sup> This very doubt is part of the reason why the term "do-gooder" has a somewhat negative connotation in ordinary parlance.

<sup>31</sup> See the discussion of the common-law duties to refrain from doing harm in Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1361–65.

<sup>32</sup> See, for example, Lawrence C. Becker, *Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations* 41–42 (1977). Compare the doctrine in unjust enrichment law that no restitution is due for fulfilling a preexisting duty. Restatement of Restitution, *supra* note 7, at § 60 (no restitution for fulfilling a legally enforceable duty); see also *id.* at § 61 (effect of moral duty on restitution).

<sup>33</sup> Something the law permits may gradually come to be regarded as morally permissible as well: for example, divorce. Similarly, something the law rewards may gradually come to be regarded as something that only needs to be done when one is paid. Tracing cause and effect in such cases is difficult.

<sup>34</sup> It is also possible that the availability of payment might take the "fun" out of doing good. Landes & Posner, *supra* note 17, have suggested that it would be difficult to feel altruistic and noble if good deeds always created a legal right to payment—and that payment might therefore discourage the doing of good deeds.

<sup>35</sup> For further treatment of how the potential for extortion bears on the appropriate allocation of property rights, see Harold Demsetz, *When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?* *J. Legal Stud.* 13 (1972). See also, for example, Levmore, *supra* note 15, at 886–89 (discussing the "moral hazard" that might result if rescuers were legally entitled to receive rewards).

being paid to restrain themselves. Not only would that inappropriately redirect income from productive persons to successful extortionists and encourage wasteful expenditures,<sup>36</sup> but it could also invite violence. To make credible a claim that one is capable of imposing harm, one may need occasionally to demonstrate one's capacity to injure.<sup>37</sup>

These reasons—and not a disinclination to encourage or reward benefit production—account for the law's usual refusal to order recipients to pay for others' efforts to protect them from harm. The few instances where the law has chosen a different course tend to prove that these are the reasons for the general no-recovery rule.

Consider the famous case of *Spur v. Del Webb*.<sup>38</sup> An injunction in favor of someone benefiting from the cessation of a nuisance was conditioned on the beneficiary's reimbursing the operator of the harmful enterprise (a naturally odiferous and insect-drawing cattle feedlot) for the costs of relocation or shutting down. That is, the owner of the feedlot was paid to eliminate his own harm-causing activity.<sup>39</sup> The party required to pay was a developer who had deliberately located a senior citizen residential development within scent of the previously isolated feedlot.

This case suggests that granting a restitutionary right of payment for harm avoidance may be appropriate in cases free of the dangers we have just canvassed. First, the absence of an extortionate motive on the part of the defendant was clear: the feedlot owner had not built his lot to force

<sup>36</sup> See R. H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 Va. L. Rev. 655, 672–74 (1988) (blackmail involves wasteful expenditures).

<sup>37</sup> Wittman is curiously unconcerned about the possibility of extortion, perhaps because he has focused on conflicts between legitimate resource uses, such as ranching and farming, factories and homes. Although there are some hints that he may be concerned with giving improper incentives toward extortion, his examples in this regard seem oddly far off the mark. See, for example, Wittman, *supra* note 25, at 65 n.25 (“If we reward everyone for not robbing \$3 million, then there are high transactions costs; if we reward only armored car guards, then there are improper incentives to become an armored car guard”). Perhaps his examples and his refusal to discuss the extortion issue directly, were intended tongue in cheek; however, the short shrift which Wittman gives to “justice” considerations in the land use context (see *id.* at 65 and n.26) suggests he may mean this approach seriously.

<sup>38</sup> *Spur Industries, Inc., v. Del E. Webb Development Co.*, 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).

<sup>39</sup> The court in *Spur* recharacterized the source of the damage: rather than focusing on the fact that the smells “cause” damage to the homeowners in the physical world, the court notes that the developer’s enforcing an injunction would “cause” damage to the feedlot owner. *Id.* at 186. This characterization provides an illuminating perspective on the much-bedeveled question of what should constitute “causing harm” in tort law. Although the court seems to be liberating “causing harm” from usual notions of physical sequence (compare Epstein, *supra* note 14), it does not seem to view “cause” as a concept that can flow equally easily in any direction. For this court, assignment of “cause” seems to be linked with the moral or entitlement status of the parties’ actions.

developers to pay him to shut down. Second, it was a person with the moral advantage who was required to cease his activities. The location of the residential development was unexpected in light of the prior path of the city's development,<sup>40</sup> so the defendant had not acted improperly in locating his business. As for the developer, he had deliberately created a conflict between his customers' needs and Spur's—"tak[ing] advantage of the lesser land values"<sup>41</sup> and then suing to remove one of the reasons for the land's low price. Thus, though the feedlot was the source of the physical harm (noxious smells), its owner had a position of moral superiority to the developer. Third, the court's unusual remedial structure provided a cure for the valuation problem. If the developer had any doubts that the reduction in noxious smells was "worth it" to him, he was not required to pay; he could choose not to enforce the injunction. Thus the extortion, morality, and valuation problems were absent—and the court did not apply the usual rule of no-payment-for-harm-avoidance.<sup>42</sup>

One sees the same pattern operating in more mundane areas. Bottle-deposit laws amount to paying people for not littering and, therefore, appear to be an exception to the rule that people have no legal right to be paid for harm avoidance. Yet a law that requires grocers to pay people for bringing back empties is different from a general rule that would allow people to claim payment for not littering, and the differences lie in the areas already identified: incentives for extortion, administrability, effects on morality, and potential for harm.

There is no potential for extortion: one's ability to litter is limited by one's willingness to spend money to purchase bottled drinks. Such schemes also lack the administrative problems that a general payment-for-harm-reduction rule would involve. The baseline is clear, and there is no problem with duplicative efforts; an empty can be brought back only once.

Further, since one can collect only for bottles that have been previously purchased, the bottle-deposit laws have minimal, if any, erosive effect on the legitimacy of demanding proper behavior as a matter of

<sup>40</sup> The court noted that, ordinarily, the developer's suit would have been defeated by the coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine but that, since many parties other than the developer would be harmed by the noxious odors (notably, the residents of the new homes), an injunction against the feedlot would be conditionally granted.

<sup>41</sup> *Spur*, 494 P.2d 708. As the court notes, the developer had "brought people to the nuisance to the foreseeable detriment of Spur." See *Spur*, *supra* note 38.

<sup>42</sup> For an alternative explanation of *Spur*, see Donald Wittman, *First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the Nuisance,"* 9 J. Legal Stud. 557, 566 (1980).

right.<sup>43</sup> Were the law to reward all nonlittering, by contrast, children might insist that their parents pay them for picking up after themselves on the ground that "the government pays you for not littering, so on the same principle you should pay me."<sup>44</sup> As for the possibility that the required payment will exceed the value of the benefit to the recipient and thus cause harm, the bottle-deposit laws circumvent this difficulty by making the potential litterer provide most of the funds.<sup>45</sup>

In short, there are many reasons why the law generally refuses to order people to pay when others reduce their risky or harmful activities: administrative difficulties, normative inconsistencies, incentives for extortion, and doubts about the value to the recipient of the purported risk reduction relative to the price. When these dangers are absent, the rule barring recovery for harm avoidance tends not to apply.

Much of the intellectual-property area is free of the dangers that caution against awarding restitution. First, the extortion dangers are absent. Many normative views converge in suggesting that there is no extortion in giving creators a right to be paid for the benefits they give others,<sup>46</sup> and the effects of such a right are far different from those of extortion: such a right shifts income in ways that increase rather than decrease productivity. Second, administrability problems are lessened. It is not difficult to identify who is best able to render a benefit when that benefit is a creative work that the defendant is already utilizing:<sup>47</sup> the creator of the benefit has already identified herself by making the work. Further, the parties benefited are not the whole world or some unidentifiable group. The infringer is fairly readily identified.<sup>48</sup> The class of potential defendants and potential plaintiffs is thus limited.

<sup>43</sup> Admittedly, persons other than purchasers can bring in bottles, but note that the payments they collect are not for mere proper behavior. When someone collects the bottles lying in the stands after a football game and takes them to a store to collect the deposits, she is paid, not for refraining from harm (mere proper behavior), but for undoing the harm that others have done. The prospect of reward has thus given her an incentive to provide an affirmative benefit.

<sup>44</sup> Paying people to do what is morally required may not always undermine their sense of moral obligation. Sometimes children who are paid for getting good grades or for cleaning their rooms thereby learn to do those things without payment.

<sup>45</sup> Someone who buys a bottled drink is required to leave the grocer some extra money as a deposit, which the grocer will pay to those who return bottles. Grocers and drink manufacturers also may bear some of the cost; the grocer may need extra staff or physical space to deal with bottle returns, and, since bottle deposits will increase prices, it is likely that bottle-deposit requirements will reduce sales.

<sup>46</sup> See for example Gordon, *supra* note 5, at section I (arguments from corrective justice).

<sup>47</sup> Note that, although one of the purposes of intellectual-property law is the maintenance of ab ante incentives, the rules it sets up can operate only *after* something has been created.

<sup>48</sup> For cases in which much of the world benefits, and where the transaction costs of identifying who benefits would therefore be astronomic, the law tends to conclude that

Provided that the subject matter of the protected work is sufficiently marked off to give the user fair notice that employing it will trigger an obligation of payment, and provided that the user's motivations are commercial, valuation is unlikely to cause difficulties. While the creator may be a volunteer in the sense that no one may have asked him or her to create, it is up to the user/infringer to decide whether or not to use the work. At that stage, the commercial user's decision indicates that the user wants to employ the work and can bargain with the creator for an appropriate price.<sup>49</sup>

The user will also find it more difficult to object on the basis of "forced purchase" or coercion than would the recipient of a harm-avoidance effort. True, the user of an intellectual product might argue that he is being forced to choose between paying for the work and doing without. However, the benefit creator has added that choice to the user's relevant range of choices (unlike those extortionists who say "Pay me or I'll take away something you already have"), and it is a contribution she probably was not obliged to make.<sup>50</sup> So although coercion in the form of forced purchase is still present, the coercion is of a less troubling sort. That there will be some coercion—in the sense of some nonconsensual limitation of one's choices—is inevitable.<sup>51</sup>

In sum, there are clearly fewer normative and incentive difficulties in having a legal system award payments to persons who make others better off by creating new works of authorship or invention than there would be in having a legal system award payments to persons who merely take actions that avoid harming others. Therefore, the common law's reluc-

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there is no intellectual property, just as it says there will be no restitution in general cases exhibiting that characteristic. Thus, it may be that the law does not give ownership rights in general ideas and discoveries (such as the discovery of gravity) in part because of the high transaction costs that would be involved in tracing the effects of such basic building blocks. Compare John Dawson, *The Self-serving Intermeddler*, 74 *Harv. L. Rev.* 1408, 1412 (1974).

<sup>49</sup> Even in these cases, however, there may be circumstances that make reliance on the market unwise. For example, there may be less than complete prior warning of a work's contents. See Gordon, *supra* note 18, at 1627–35 (circumstances that may justify a departure from the market).

<sup>50</sup> For arguments that the public has neither a positive nor a normative entitlement to the price and quantity of works that they could have obtained in a world without intellectual-property rights, see Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1446–55 and 1460–65; for arguments that the creators of intellectual products have a normatively acceptable conditional entitlement to be paid for the works they produce, see *id.* at 1455–60, and Gordon, *supra* note 5, at section *ID* (presenting a modified corrective justice claim).

<sup>51</sup> If users are not forced to choose between paying and doing without, creators will be forced to choose between not selling at all and enabling their customers to use their work in competition with them. The inevitability of coercion in the intellectual-property context is discussed at more length in Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1425–35, and sources cited therein.

tance to use restitution as a means of controlling harm-causing behavior does not cast a cloud over intellectual property.

### III. VOLUNTEERS AND FREE RIDERS

#### A. *Restitution's Rules against Rewarding Volunteers*

The rule against granting restitution to persons who refrain from causing harm is a fairly easy rule to justify. Let us take one more step in the direction of difficulty. How should the law treat persons who do not merely refrain from harm, but who confer affirmative benefits on others?<sup>52</sup> For them, awarding restitution would seem not to raise dangers of extortion and eroding norms. Further, it is well recognized that one is ordinarily behaving rightfully when one refuses to labor on another's behalf and that, because of this entitlement, labor can be the premise for a valid contract. Nevertheless, the well-known doctrine prohibiting restitution to "officious intermeddlers" and "volunteers"<sup>53</sup> provides that persons whose labor makes others better off will ordinarily have no legal recourse if they labor without advance agreement. Yet intellectual-product producers can sue to obtain payment for the "fruits of their labor" from copyists who never agreed to pay. Can these results be squared?

To prevail in restitution, persons whose voluntary actions provide benefits to others must ordinarily show one of a few very narrow justifications for departing from the market: mistake,<sup>54</sup> coercion,<sup>55</sup> request,<sup>56</sup> or a narrow range of exigent situations, such as danger to life and health.<sup>57</sup> Even then, a benefactor's ability to recover will often be further restricted by the court's desire to be sure that the defendant really was benefited

<sup>52</sup> As noted above, the usual baseline for determining harm and benefit in common-law tort causes us to ask what the complaining party's welfare level would have been had there been no interaction with the other party. This is also the baseline implicitly used in most everyday discourse and the one used in this article to define harm and benefit. This commonplace baseline is, in turn, consistent with the normative baseline I defend elsewhere: that strangers ordinarily have no entitlement to the goods others' efforts produce. See sources cited in note 5 *supra*. If so, then they are not "harmed" if deprived of those goods, and, if given some, are "benefited" from the perspective of either a positive or normative baseline.

<sup>53</sup> Restatement of Restitution, *supra* note 9, at § 2; see also *id.* at §§ 106, 112. It is sometimes said that, when recovery is denied, plaintiffs tend to be called "intermeddlers," but, when they win, they are more likely to be called "volunteers." Both words refer, however, to the same basic pattern: conferring benefits on someone who has not asked for them. This article uses the terms interchangeably.

<sup>54</sup> *Id.* at §§ 6–69.

<sup>55</sup> *Id.* at §§ 70–106.

<sup>56</sup> *Id.* at §§ 107–11.

<sup>57</sup> *Id.* at § 112. The *Restatement's* necessity exception is itself built on few cases.

and that forcing him to pay or disgorge will not leave him worse off than he would have been in the status quo ante.<sup>58</sup> Other limitations tailored to particular situations (such as the requirement that only a person who “intends to charge” may recover payment for services rendered in an emergency)<sup>59</sup> further restrict the voluntary actor’s ability to sue for payment in recompense for beneficial labors performed.

The *Restatement of Restitution* is not hospitable to persons who generate benefits as a by-product of self-serving activity. “A person who, incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to the protection or improvement of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to contribution.”<sup>60</sup> For example, a mine owner whose drainage efforts clear both her mine and her neighbor’s mine of waters is not entitled to contribution from the neighbor.<sup>61</sup>

A person who writes a book and publishes it is certainly operating in the furtherance of his or her own interests. Except in regard to someone who has bargained with the author for production of the work (such as a patron, granting agency, employer, or contract publisher), the author is a sort of volunteer. When a book is mass marketed, many strangers will come across it. If a stranger makes copies of the book for sale, copyright law will give the author a right of action against the copyist even if the author “volunteered” to send the work into the stream of commerce. Since that right of action will be available whether or not the copyist had a contract with the author promising to refrain from copying and whether or not the copyist’s actions harm the author,<sup>62</sup> it is clear that, under copyright law, a unilateral transfer of “benefits” is sufficient to trigger liability.

How then can copyright or any other form of intellectual property be squared with the rules against giving restitutionary rights to “volunteers”? I will suggest that the reasons for denying recovery in volunteer cases do not apply to most conflicts over intellectual property.

One basis for the refusal to reward volunteers is the danger of compulsion and a preference for free choice: one should not be required to pay

<sup>58</sup> See, for example, *id.* at §§ 40 and 109, comment b.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.* at § 114. See Landes & Posner, *supra* note 17.

<sup>60</sup> Restatement of Restitution, *supra* note 9, at § 106. There are situations in which protecting one’s own interests does not bar restitution, but these tend to be associated with coercion, as where a property owner discharges another’s duty when that is the only way to prevent a third party from lawfully taking the property. *Id.* at §103.

<sup>61</sup> *Id.* at § 106, illustration 2.

<sup>62</sup> Sometimes the absence of harm may make it easier to obtain fair use treatment, however. See *Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios*, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).



for what one has not asked for.<sup>63</sup> The classic justification for the volunteer/intermeddlers doctrine is that, without it, a recipient of benefits, who is best capable of handling his or her own affairs, would be forced to cede control to the intermeddling of outsiders, whether well meaning or self-serving.<sup>64</sup> Another related concern is that if any compulsion is imposed, it be imposed fairly.

Also, there is a concern with avoiding harm to the defendants—a concern that restitution might require the recipients of benefits to pay more than the benefits are worth to them.<sup>65</sup> If the recipients have not bargained in advance, it is hard for a court to know how to value the benefits conferred and hard to be sure that subjecting the recipients to restitution would not leave them worse off in the end than if they had received nothing. No one can afford to pay market price for all the desirable goods in the world.

Another set of concerns involve deleterious systemic effects. Restitution may undermine the operation of efficient markets, for example.<sup>66</sup> Consumers should actively seek out the lowest prices for products and services that best meet their needs and not be forced to pay for whatever a volunteer foists on them.<sup>67</sup> Further, willing buyers and sellers can set up a pricing mechanism more effectively than can a court operating at second remove. If the availability of restitution substitutes courts for markets, there could be a sharp increase in administrative costs and an increased risk of inefficient resource allocation. Such systemic costs could be considerable.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>63</sup> See John Wade, *Restitution for Benefits Conferred without Request*, 19 *Vand. L. Rev.* 1183 (1966); Edward W. Hope, *Officiousness (Parts I and II)*, 15 *Cornell L. Q.* 25, 205 (1923–24).

<sup>64</sup> It has been argued, for example, that, if courts allow recovery for benefits conferred without request, “the only person reasonably secure against demands he has never assented to create, will be the person who, possessing nothing, is thereby protected against anything being accidentally improved by another to his cost and to his ruin.” *Isle Royal Mining Co. v. Hertin*, 37 *Mich.* 332, 338 (1877) (as quoted in Wade, *supra* note 63).

<sup>65</sup> We have seen this concern operating before. See text at notes 28–29 *supra*.

<sup>66</sup> Levmore, *supra* note 10.

<sup>67</sup> This justification, in turn, has several dimensions: if consumers know what is best for themselves and are likely to reveal their preferences honestly only in actual bargaining, then court-imposed bargains will be a poor substitute for real markets. See, for example, Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, *Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability Rules: One View of the Cathedral*, 85 *Harv. L. Rev.* 1089 (1972). Consumers left to themselves will find efficient providers because such providers will provide more product for less money; a restitution system would undermine efficiency by giving payment to inefficient providers who happen to be fast enough to provide the desired thing before the consumer has concluded his or her bargain with the intended supplier. See Levmore, *supra* note 10.

<sup>68</sup> The goal of reducing systemic costs, like the other goals discussed here, is not an absolute. For example, the cases reflect no single-minded devotion to finding the lowest-cost

In the following section, this article suggests that, in the typical intellectual-property context, where one person deliberately sets out to use a work authored by another, awarding restitution would be consistent with the goals of preserving autonomy, avoiding harm, and minimizing systemic costs. It also suggests that it is a desire to achieve these goals—and not an indifference to rewarding and internalizing benefits—that explains the overall volunteer rule.

*B. The Structure of Plaintiff/Defendant Relations  
in Torts and Restitution*

Comparing the structure of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant in volunteer cases and in intellectual-property cases will lay to rest a large part of the asymmetry challenge. In the initial discussion of the purported asymmetry in the common law's treatment of harms and benefits,<sup>69</sup> cases where suits for harms would be allowed were implicitly compared with cases where suits for benefits would be disallowed. If we compare the underlying fact patterns handled respectively by tort law and by the restitution doctrines regarding volunteers, however, we see they are distinguished not only by the difference between harm and benefit but also by the far different roles played by the defendant in the two classes of cases. I will argue that the difference between the underlying structure of tort suits and the structure of the paradigmatic volunteer cases provides a more plausible explanation for any difference in result between torts and volunteer cases than the mere difference between harm and benefit.

In all the classic examples in which the law would refuse restitution, the benefactor conferred benefits on the other party without that party's having sought them. When Harriet's hotel complex causes a rise in land prices or when the drainage effort of a mine owner clears both her and her neighbor's mine of waters,<sup>70</sup> or when M recommends H's services so that H's profits rise,<sup>71</sup> none of the recipients has asked for their benefits or has even had the opportunity to refuse them. In each case a volunteer as plaintiff is paired with an "involuntary recipient" as defendant. Let us call these "paradigmatic pairs" since this pairing presents the para-

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alternative but simply a preference for avoiding high costs and for giving desirable incentives where possible within the constraints imposed by other goals.

<sup>69</sup> See text at notes 9–12 *supra*.

<sup>70</sup> Restatement of Restitution, *supra* note 9, at § 106, illustration 2. See also Levmore, *supra* note 10, at 72 (no restitution when W cleans up his own groundwater and causes an increase in the purity of his neighbors' wells).

<sup>71</sup> Levmore, *supra* note 10.

digmatic structure for which the volunteer/intermeddler doctrine was initially crafted. It should be contrasted with the pairing of injurer and victim in the ordinary tort case.

In the ordinary tort case, the person sued did something to bring the suit on him or herself. D has imposed a cost on P without P's consent, so there is some fairness in using the legal system to make D respond in kind.

In restitution cases involving the paradigmatic pair, P helps D, and then P sues D. The only active person is P. Involuntary recipient D has done nothing: D has neither forced P to generate benefits nor actively worked to direct those benefits toward himself.<sup>72</sup> The volunteer P cannot credibly claim to be redressing any burdens involuntarily thrust upon her by D. The only thing that P is suffering involuntarily is D's nonpayment. While one can see why the injurer in a tort case might be considered responsible for the plaintiff's injury, it is harder to see why the involuntary recipient in a restitution case should be responsible for the plaintiff's failure to negotiate a fee in advance.<sup>73</sup>

Where a plaintiff's claim is not based on an action by the defendant, the plaintiff's suit has a lesser claim to fairness. At least a century of jurisprudence has seen in our system's insistence on an "act" as a prerequisite of liability a means of reconciling fairly the citizenry's simultaneous claims for security and liberty.<sup>74</sup> The law's refusal to impose liability on the passive member of a paradigmatic pair is consistent with this tradi-

<sup>72</sup> I do not mean to overstate the active/passive distinction. The line between the two categories is elusive. For example, by taking advantage of what the volunteer has done without rendering repayment, the recipient may be "acting" in a way that decreases the importance of his or her initial lack of choice.

<sup>73</sup> This latter argument owes its origins to a comment in Charles Fried, *The Artificial Reason for the Law, or: What Lawyers Know*, 60 *Tex. L. Rev.* 35, 46 (1981). The strength of such fairness-based arguments depends in part on there being market avenues through which the plaintiff *can* seek a fee or otherwise capture the benefits it generates. Where plaintiffs cannot reap the relevant payments through consensual agreement, then neither party is more fairly responsible than the other for the failure of payment, and the same reasons that impel the law to "make bargains" in torts and other areas can potentially justify liability here. As discussed below, without property rights the fee-collecting efforts of intellectual-product creators will often be blocked by transaction costs and strategic behaviors among users. Similarly, in some restitution cases, emergencies make resort to the market impossible. In such contexts, Fried's argument against restitutionary recovery would be inapplicable.

<sup>74</sup> See, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, *The Common Law* 115 (M. D. Howe ed. 1963); and Epstein, *supra* note 14. Although Holmes and Epstein are an odd set of bookends (with Holmes insisting that the mere fact that an act causes harm should not alone be a sufficient basis for liability and Epstein's one-time insistence on the opposite), they are not unusual in agreeing that the law should not impose liability where an act is lacking.

Of course, there have also been many contrary strains in that same jurisprudential century. Some instrumentalist approaches, for example, might impose liability precisely to encourage action where it was formerly absent.

tional balance. The no-recovery rule in such cases would seem to be attributable more to the passivity of the defendant than to a distinction between harm and benefit.

Restitution's paradigmatic pairs do not appear in the typical intellectual-property case.<sup>75</sup> Although one might well view intellectual-property plaintiffs as volunteers, intellectual-property defendants who seek out a creative work and deliberately copy it for their own gain are hardly involuntary recipients. As in ordinary tort suits, the fact patterns that ordinarily give rise to intellectual-property suits have active defendants. Within restitution itself the presence of a choice by the defendant tends to assist plaintiffs in recovery.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, the volunteer pattern does not condemn intellectual-property recoveries.

An example will illustrate the importance of this active/passive issue. Levmore, in arguing that the law treats harms and benefits asymmetrically, presented the following example. "[I]f M often recommends H's services so that H enjoys increased profits, H owes no restitution—whether or not M is paid by those seeking advice. Yet if M defames H's business, H can collect for lost income."<sup>77</sup> But praise is not the true benefits analogue to defamation. For, in defamation, the defendant M has been active, while, as a recipient of praise, defendant H has been passive. The better analogue to defamation is a case where the defendant actively advertises that M has praised his business, using M's name and kind words as an endorsement to increase profits. This case turns the harm element into benefit but retains all the other elements of the defamation action, including the active status of the defendant. In endorsement cases, a suit to recoup the benefits received is far from disfavored by the courts. In virtually all states today, the putative endorser, whether a private person or a celebrity, can sue for use of his name in such a connection under the rights of privacy or publicity—asserting a right to restitution, if you will, good against those who actively seek a particular kind of benefit.

### C. *Beyond the Involuntary Recipient*

Suits for restitution by intermeddlers have three implicit but separable components: First, the plaintiff claims that she has given the defendant

<sup>75</sup> Where such pairs do appear, plaintiffs should lose even in the intellectual-property context.

<sup>76</sup> See, for example, Birks, *supra* note 29, at 114–16, 263; Wade, *supra* note 63, at 1212 (restitution favored if the benefactor “affords the other an opportunity to decline the benefit or else has a reasonable excuse for failing to do so”).

<sup>77</sup> Levmore, *supra* note 10.

something of hers that warrants payment. With intellectual products that is typically labor combined with the money and other resources that the plaintiff invested in the making of the intellectual product. Second, the plaintiff asserts that her claim to payment should not be defeated by the fact that she no longer has her usual leverage by which to obtain payment by contract. Third, the plaintiff asserts that this claim to payment should not be defeated by the involuntary nature of the setting in which the benefit was transferred to the defendant.

Let us dispose of the involuntariness issue by assuming that intellectual-property suits should be limited to those occasions where the recipient voluntarily seeks the transfer of benefits to himself.<sup>78</sup> We would then have to face the merits of the remaining two components of the claim. The plaintiff was once in control of the labor and other assets, and the law would have prevented strangers from forcefully extracting them from her—but she allowed them to escape her control by investing them in the creation of a product which she sold. Now someone threatens to reap more from the plaintiff's efforts than she bargained for: the purchaser of her book, boat hull, or invention may have wanted only to use the object she sold him, but now some third party wants to copy it and sell the reproductions. Should resources voluntarily invested warrant explicit extracontractual judicial protection against deliberate use by others?

If deliberate uses of others' efforts always triggered an obligation of payment, it would cause paralysis. What defines a community is interdependence: persons learn from each other, sell complementary products, build on a common heritage.<sup>79</sup> A general principle requiring payment for all benefits reaped would destroy the synergy on which culture and commerce both rest. But sometimes need and practicality may conjoin to make some such protection desirable; after all, one purpose of tangible property law itself is to offer extracontractual legal protection for voluntary investment, as when farmers can call on the law to prevent marauders from raiding their storehouses.

<sup>78</sup> Of course, even a person who actively seeks out benefits may not voluntarily *pay* for them, but that is a separate issue. All property involves involuntariness about payment: if you take my briefcase, the law makes you pay for it even though you may not want to. While that is coercion of a sort (see Robert Hale, *Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty*, 43 *Colum. L. Rev.* 603, 612 (1943)), it is still premised on some sort of voluntary action on your part (taking the briefcase) in effectuating the basic transfer. If one were to reformulate the analysis to incorporate the involuntariness about payment, then one would say that defendants in paradigmatic volunteer cases have two claims of involuntariness: (a) they were involuntarily forced to receive benefits, and (b) now the plaintiff is seeking to force them involuntarily to pay for what they received. The focus here is claim *a*. The focus of Section III F *infra* will be on claim *b*.

<sup>79</sup> See, for example, Dawson, *supra* note 48.

Some criteria immediately suggest themselves as candidates for marking off those areas of enrichment that are suitable for judicially ordered payment.<sup>80</sup> First, as the discussion above suggests, intentionality on the recipient's part is one factor relevant to the appropriateness of granting a right over benefits. Whether or not the benefits are substantial (rather than *de minimis*) and whether they are traceable to their origins are two others. In addition, it is likely that a lawmaker will feel it unnecessary to order restitution for a benefit that is of a reciprocal sort<sup>81</sup> unless it is necessary for incentives.<sup>82</sup>

But even substantial and nonreciprocal benefits can be deliberately utilized without a duty of payment being imposed. For example, hundreds of motels and restaurants may be built (quite intentionally) to take advantage of a tourist attraction like Disneyworld without the Disney organization having any right of recompense. Sections IIID through IIIF examine additional criteria that may account for this pattern and their implications for intellectual property.

#### *D. Harm and Autonomy: Demarcation*

As noted earlier, courts often deny restitutionary recovery where defendants are passive, in part to protect the defendants from being harmed and having their autonomy impaired. But limiting any restitutionary right to intentional uses will provide less than complete protection for defendants.

If things are not bounded and marked, the strong possibility exists that people will knowingly use them—and thus trigger an obligation of payment—but do so without knowing they are using something that has a price tag. As a result, they may be worse off after receiving the “benefit” and having to pay for it than they would have been had they never received it at all. Thus, in addition to intentionality, there must be demarcation; things that trigger obligations of payment must be identifiable in advance and marked as such. The legislature must define the covered subject matters (books? inventions? ideas?), and producers must provide a way to indicate which of the potentially covered subject matters (*this* book?) are owned and by whom.

If owned things are defined and marked as owned, then people likely

<sup>80</sup> For a full discussion of relevant criteria and their application, see Gordon, *supra* note 5, at sections III–IV.

<sup>81</sup> Reciprocity minimizes the likelihood there will be unfairness between parties.

<sup>82</sup> See, generally, Thomas Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (1987) (Tragic Common, Prisoner's Dilemma, and other examples show that even the presence of reciprocal payoffs does not guarantee mutually beneficial cooperative behavior).

will refrain from using those things unless they believe that the use is worth the charge they will later have to bear (discounted by the possibility of enforcement). Notice and warning reduce the danger that recipients will have to pay more for a thing than the value they place on it. Notice can also minimize the administrative costs of tracing ownership.

For this and other reasons, demarcation plays a strong role in intellectual property.<sup>83</sup> Patents must be clearly defined and placed on record; owners of patents, copyrights, and trademarks are encouraged to mark their works with notices (the famous “C in a circle” is only one of many such notices);<sup>84</sup> and there are governmental facilities to register one’s copyright, trademark, or patent claim. Further, traditional intellectual-property doctrines largely limit their protection to fairly clearly bounded and demarked subject matters—such as works “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” for copyright.<sup>85</sup> Even those states that permit recovery for unauthorized use of “ideas” generally require that these ideas be concrete and narrow. Similarly, when the New York Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether an extemporaneous conversation of a famous author could be owned, the court stressed the importance of “distinct, identifiable boundaries.”<sup>86</sup>

So long as demarcation is practicable and practiced, intellectual property can avoid some of the most obvious dangers to autonomy: users will know in advance if they are using something that imposes an obligation

<sup>83</sup> It has also long been recognized, for example, that clear demarcation contributes to the efficient working of markets. See, for example, Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. Legal Stud. 321 (1985); Gordon, *supra* note 18, at 1612.

<sup>84</sup> The copyright notice had been and is no longer mandatory, though advantages still adhere to its use.

<sup>85</sup> In fact, controversy over standards of infringement in intellectual-property law frequently centers on the danger that their application will blur otherwise-distinct subject-matter boundaries.

<sup>86</sup> The court noted that, even if conversation were capable of ownership (a question the opinion did not reach), in order to recover, a speaker would have to “indicate that he intended to mark off the utterance in question from the ordinary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a unique statement and that he wanted to exercise control over its publication.” Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 241, 244, N.E.2d 250 (1968) (dicta). The case illustrates the importance of demarcation to the fair treatment of defendants. A. E. Hotchner wrote a biography of his friend Ernest Hemingway, which quoted extensively from their conversations. When Hotchner used the conversations, he had no idea ownership would be claimed in Hemingway’s oral speech, but, later, Hemingway’s widow brought a suit against Hotchner claiming such ownership. Had she prevailed, the biographer would no doubt have been taken by surprise—despite the fact that his use was intentional. He might have been forced to sacrifice the book or, in order to save it, to pay the widow much more than the verbatim record of the conversations had been worth to him *ab ante*. In the end, the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the widow’s suit.

of payment and can decide whether the benefit to them is likely to exceed the price.

### *E. Systemic Costs and Benefits*

One reason for refusing to order restitution for an intentional reaping of benefits is that a potential benefactor may be able to obtain payment without recourse to the courts. In the typical volunteer case, it is the volunteer (the future plaintiff) who knows what she is about to do and is in the best position to make a bargain about it. Harriet knows that her hotel will raise land values where it locates, the mine owner knows that her efforts in pumping and draining will help her neighbors, and M knows that his recommendations will help H's business. And even if they do not know, persons like them are in a better position to know than are unknowing recipients.<sup>87</sup> There is usually no good purpose served in letting such persons go to court.

If the volunteer thinks the law will not give restitution, then she will seek to make a bargain by asking the potential recipients for contributions before the project begins. Something like this happens in oil exploration: neighboring lessees will learn a great deal about whether or not it is worthwhile to drill under their own land from the results of their neighbor's drilling. So "dry-hole contribution agreements" have come into being: contracts by which the neighbor who stands to benefit from the information agrees to pay a share of his neighbor's drilling costs should the hole come up dry. In many shopping malls, where small stores are likely to benefit from the propinquity of large department stores that draw masses of customers, the small stores may be willing to pay extra rent to subsidize the larger stores' entry. Similarly, if landowners like Peter are likely to benefit from a venture like Harriet's, she might try to persuade them to pay her something to encourage her to build nearby. Or, as another alternative, the owner of an attraction could simply buy the land on which the beneficial spillovers will fall. This is apparently what the Disney organization did with Epcot Center: it bought up surrounding land and built on it enough hotels and restaurants to capture much of the benefit Epcot generates.

If a benefit-generating landowner has realistic opportunities that she lets slip through her fingers, there is no reason for the judiciary to come to her aid. As a mode of internalization, market bargains are clearly preferable to restitution suits, with their attendant problems of uncertain

<sup>87</sup> The law often makes judgments based on the likely distribution not only of information but also of information costs.



valuation, forced purchase, and the like.<sup>88</sup> Therefore, at a minimum, there needs to be some good reason for the plaintiff's failure to have sought advance consent from the benefit's recipient.

In restitution law, the range of acceptable reasons is quite limited, as mentioned above: mistake, request, coercion, and a narrow range of emergencies. One can understand the narrowness; given the continual use by everyone of benefits generated by others, sharp boundaries are needed to keep us off the slippery slope that could lead to a paralyzing morass of claims.<sup>89</sup>

How does this relate to intellectual property?

Objections to restitution based on high systemic costs lose much of their force where the presence of a restitutionary right will allow markets to evolve, rather than substitute for a market transaction.<sup>90</sup> In the classic volunteer setting, giving volunteers a restitutionary right may discourage them from seeking the consent of potential recipients,<sup>91</sup> but, in the intellectual-property setting, giving creators restitutionary rights tends to encourage consensual markets.<sup>92</sup>

This occurs largely because the identity of the party who has superior access to information and who is otherwise better able to enter transactions is different in the two contexts; the law needs to speak to the party able to react to its messages.<sup>93</sup> In the volunteer context, the benefactor

<sup>88</sup> There also may be nonmarket alternatives that have advantages over individualized restitution suits. For example, if coordination problems among Peter and his fellow landowners prevent them from reaching agreement with Harriet, she—as a potential generator of beneficial spillovers—might also seek subsidies or tax breaks from the local government. Conceivably, such an entity might have institutional information-gathering advantages over a court.

<sup>89</sup> Thus, proposals to award restitution whenever transaction costs bar otherwise-desirable trades considerably overshoot the mark. For such a proposal, see Note, A Theory of Hypothetical Contract, 94 *Yale L. J.* 415 (1984).

<sup>90</sup> Intentional torts like trespass have both characteristics: they encourage consensual bargains but, when someone disregards an owner's right to withhold consent, they give the owner at least a market-like payment via the tort damage remedy. Punitive damages and criminal law "kickers" further encourage use of the consensual route. Calabresi & Melamed, *supra* note 67.

<sup>91</sup> Even within the volunteer area, there can be occasions when giving restitutionary rights will not inhibit market formation; on those occasions, the law is more likely to give restitution. See Levmore, *supra* note 10.

<sup>92</sup> Intellectual-property law also imposes liability for harms, of course, which can operate to preserve markets; but markets capable of being harmed may not come into being unless the law gives some right over benefits. (As elsewhere in the article, I am defining harm and benefits in relation to a status quo baseline.) Therefore, the restitutionary species of right is the more fundamental.

<sup>93</sup> If information is distributed in such a way that only a potential plaintiff can react to a

(plaintiff) has the greater access to information, and the rule of law that speaks to the plaintiff and encourages him to engage in desirable market-forming behavior is a rule of no liability.<sup>94</sup> In the intellectual-property situation, by contrast, a no-liability rule creates the possibility of market-impeding strategic behaviors. Because here it is the recipient/copyist (defendant) who has the greater access to information and who can better initiate a transaction,<sup>95</sup> the rule that would encourage the formation of markets would be a rule that imposes liability. The rule of law in each case gives the party with information and ability to internalize the incentive to do so.

To illustrate the reasons why a rule of no liability would have little effect in encouraging creators to make bargains with potential users, note that it is the copyist (the future defendant) who knows what he is about to do and is in the best position to make a bargain about it. The creator may not even know that a potential copyist exists. As a result, a creator who wanted to respond to a rule of no liability by making bargains with potential users might be unable to do so. Since a copyist, who is in the best position to initiate bargaining, will seek to make a bargain only if he thinks that his unconsented use will result in liability, a rule imposing liability on the copyist is likely to best internalize benefits to the author.

Enforcement practicalities aside, such liability defeats much strategic behavior and brings needed information forward: a potential copyist has an incentive to identify his needs and seek a license if he knows copying

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rule of law by contracting around it, then, other things being equal, a no-liability rule is preferable. This is the volunteer case. If information is distributed in a way that only a potential defendant can bargain around the applicable legal rule, then, other things being equal, a rule imposing liability is preferable. This is the intellectual-property case.

In the volunteer cases, internalization is effectuated by consensual arrangements, against a background of liberty-to-use that is potentially distressing to the provider of benefits. In the intellectual-property cases, internalization also occurs via the market but against a background of judicial compulsion potentially distressing to the copyist.

<sup>94</sup> If restitution suits were available to volunteers, they could choose whether to proceed via suit or via consensual bargain. Volunteers who have poor quality goods or unreliable skills are precisely those who might fear that recipients will refuse what they have to offer and who might prefer to sue rather than worry about the recipient saying "no." Volunteers who expect recipients to be willing to pay are likely to prefer face-to-face negotiations.

But direct negotiations are not always practicable, even for the possessors of skills and objects that others desire. Conceivably, rather than refusing to give restitution, the law could condition recovery on proof of a net monetizable benefit to the recipient, coupled with proof either of the volunteer's having made a good faith effort to proceed via the market or that market failure precluded even such effort. Compare Note, *supra* note 89.

<sup>95</sup> See also Holderness, *supra* note 83 (analyzing the transferability of open versus closed entitlements).

without permission will trigger liability.<sup>96</sup> Because of this, a rule imposing liability helps cure market failure in the intellectual-product context.<sup>97</sup>

Of course, occasional cases of market failure should not immediately trigger judicial exceptions. The cost of making individualized inquiries is high. For example, in the ordinary property case, it may be appropriate for courts to refuse to investigate whether market arrangements are impracticable because a closed-door policy may usefully encourage internalization by contract to occur fairly frequently.<sup>98</sup> Where consensual bargains *cannot* be reached in a definable and significantly large class of cases—arguably, most intellectual-property contexts—a legislative or judicial body may be acting properly when it declares that class of situations entitled to different treatment (provided, of course, that the costs of maintaining the system do not eat up the resulting gains).<sup>99</sup>

From the incentive perspective, a benefactor need not be paid so long as that person, and persons like him, would engage in the benefit-generating activity regardless of the possibility of obtaining restitution from beneficiaries. In many restitution cases, the plaintiffs had their own sufficient motives for engaging in the activities independent of the potential payment from the recipient.<sup>100</sup> A court may presume that, because the person seeking payment has already engaged in the valuable activity,

<sup>96</sup> There is the possibility that, even with liability, a copyist will copy without permission in the hope that he or she will not be apprehended. This introduces familiar questions about remedy and deterrence.

<sup>97</sup> For a fuller outline of the way intellectual-property rights encourage markets, see Gordon, *supra* note 18, at 1610–14 (markets in copyright); for other economic functions served by copyright doctrines, see Landes & Posner, *supra* note 3.

<sup>98</sup> An important part of the classic public-goods problem is strategic behavior by consumers: underdisclosure of their desire for a good they can obtain without paying. In the paradigmatic volunteer cases, the danger of strategic behavior is low. The recipients are readily identifiable in advance and are usually limited in number, so bargaining is likely to be fairly easy. The very fact that a volunteer chooses litigation over advance bargaining is therefore suspicious, suggesting that the recipient would have thought the benefit not worth the price tag.

There is a possibility, however, that a recipient will refuse to pay even if he values the benefit at more than the price demanded, attempting to free ride by gambling on the volunteer's willingness to continue without his contribution. In the land context, where the development is in the public interest, the government may be able to solve the problem by using eminent domain. Where eminent domain is not appropriate, desirable development may not occur. See Lloyd Cohen, *Holdouts and Free Riders*, 20 *J. Legal Stud.* 351, 359 (1991); see also *id.* at 362 (special legal rights solving an analogous problem in the corporate context).

<sup>99</sup> As was suggested earlier, the availability of self-regulating market avenues in most intellectual-property contexts should keep the transaction costs fairly low.

<sup>100</sup> For example, the mine owner who drains her mine and also happens to drain her neighbor's.

incentives are irrelevant. Of course, if the benefactor is engaged in an act that others are likely to replicate, incentives should remain relevant. But the restitution court may have no way to know if there exists a substantial class of persons like the plaintiff, who have not yet engaged in the valuable activity but would do so if restitution were assured. The varying fact patterns of different volunteer cases may make it difficult for a court to generalize to classes of activities or to make predictions about categories of behavior. In such cases, *ex post* reasoning may be a court's only recourse. It is also possible that other restitution cases may underplay the need to provide incentives because they arise out of situations like those involving mistake, where the parties, because they fail to understand their situation, are not aware that restitution is directly implicated and is likely to affect their payoffs. Judicial efforts to create *ab ante* incentives can have only muted effects when addressed to parties whose primary attention is elsewhere.

With intellectual products, by contrast, the actors know their fortunes will be affected by the shape of intellectual-property law. Further, the existence of potential incentive effects is obvious.<sup>101</sup>

In a world without intellectual-property rights, an author may want to bargain with her audience for payment, but the audience cannot be identified in advance. Further, the benefits are those that will flow from an as yet undisclosed intellectual product.<sup>102</sup> Even if the author could somehow identify and contact all the potential recipients—an expensive proposition—the creator is unlikely to be successful in her effort to obtain a payment from each. Many of those potential customers may refuse to pay, preferring to gamble on the possibility that others' monies will be sufficient to draw the work into publication, when they can then make a cheap copy. The odds on the gamble may seem good if there is a large group of potential purchasers. Also, the work's contents may be unknown since the author may be trying to trade disclosure for payment; with the benefits uncertain, there is low perceived cost in the event the free-ride gamble fails to pay off.<sup>103</sup> If enough people take this apparently low-cost gamble in the hope of taking a free ride, the requisite funds

<sup>101</sup> Although intellectual property is commonly premised on the intuitive claim that legal protection will increase creators' rewards and thus their incentives to produce, it has also been argued that intellectual products will be adequately produced without explicit legal intervention; see note 108 *infra* and accompanying text.

<sup>102</sup> Compare Holderness, *supra* note 83.

<sup>103</sup> Also, if the work is as yet undisclosed, there is an element of risk even in paying the creator: the work when received may turn out not to have been worth what was paid. For all these reasons, an audience member may decide that the net payoff of the free ride gamble is higher than that of the purchase gamble.

may not be forthcoming.<sup>104</sup> The Prisoner's Dilemma and other free-rider games<sup>105</sup> illustrate analogous dynamics.

Free riding is not unique to intellectual-property cases. The same temptation also plagues land-development efforts and is one of the reasons why governments are given the power of eminent domain.<sup>106</sup> The problem is endemic and worse with intellectual property.<sup>107</sup> Just as eminent domain can solve the strategic behavior problems in land development, copyright can solve these strategic behavior problems among authors and users.

The presence of a publisher does not much alter the desirability of granting intellectual-property rights to resolve potential bargaining stalemates. Admittedly, the author may find it easier to deal with a publisher than with an undifferentiated audience (only one party, low transaction costs), but then the publisher must deal with the audience. The author's problems with information, transaction costs, and free riders would sim-

<sup>104</sup> The danger, of course, is the classic public goods problem: that the resulting pattern of low funding will discourage desirable endeavors. An intellectual product is, in Harold Demsetz's phrase, a "privately produced public good." See Harold Demsetz, *The Private Production of Public Goods*, 13 *J. Law & Econ.* 293 (1970).

It might be argued that, if members of the audience are unable to coordinate themselves to overcome this problem simultaneously and voluntarily, then the group members could, in stages, sign a contract to impose duties of contribution on themselves that would be effective only upon the assent of all or a designated percentage of them. Indeed, if audience members could reliably impose such duties on themselves, court-imposed rules would be unnecessary. Most of the same information gaps, transaction costs, and free-rider problems, however, would plague a group of audience members in their efforts to obtain consent to such a contract as would afflict an author or publisher.

<sup>105</sup> See Charles Goetz, *Law and Economics* 12–37 (1984); Morton D. Davis, *Game Theory* 95–103, 128–31 (1970).

<sup>106</sup> A related reason is the possibility of holdouts. Persons owning land on which the developer wants to build may not be able to free ride by holding on to their property; they might, in fact, suffer if the development were built around them. They might nevertheless engage in strategic behavior—holding out—in order to extract a significant portion of the developer's gain. See Cohen, *supra* note 98.

Note that eminent domain is allowed only where there is a "public purpose." Judicial intervention to cure private parties' frustration regarding free riders and holdouts in the land context could be costly; to allow recourse to judge-set prices every time a land buyer could make a plausible argument that strategic behavior was blocking an otherwise-desirable bargain could drastically undermine the self-regulating market system. For intellectual property, however, when it is advisable to end the indeterminacy in which bargaining might be floundering, the mode of intervention does not undermine market functioning. Quite the contrary. So, not only is the need for intervention likely to arise more often with intangibles than with tangibles, but it also has lesser systemic cost.

<sup>107</sup> Denying restitution may work to encourage internalization through voluntary bargain in many land cases, and, for real property, this market encouragement may be more valuable than the social loss stemming from the occasional bargain that founders. But, for intellectual property, denying a right of action is not likely to have the same market-encouraging effect.

ply be passed on, one step further down the line. How much would a publisher pay for a book that could be lawfully copied by all comers once it appeared on the market? Unless the publisher has a lead-time advantage or some other sort of real-world clout<sup>108</sup> that can discourage copying, the rate the publisher would offer the author in such a world might be too low. If the anticipated rate of payment is low, otherwise-desirable works may not be created.

In sum, because of the structure of the volunteer/recipient relation, the rule that best speaks to most volunteers is a rule of no liability. Because of the structure of the creator/copyist relation, the rule of law that best speaks to the copyist is a rule of liability. Thus, the same market-furthering considerations that suggest there should be no liability in the volunteer context suggest that there should be liability in the intellectual-property context. Further, in most of the fact patterns that give rise to volunteer cases, courts are likely to believe *ab ante* incentives either unnecessary or difficult to provide effectually through judicial intervention.<sup>109</sup> By contrast, the need for a liability system to provide positive incentives is likely to be greater in regard to intellectual products than it is for other kinds of resources, and the commercial producers and users of intellectual products are likely to be quite responsive to legal stimuli. A strong argument in favor of intellectual-property rights is made when the greater need for positive incentives is coupled with a fairly low-cost market mechanism for their provision.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>108</sup> For example, publishers might threaten to issue retaliatory below-cost editions if pirate editions appear. Other noncopyright modes of restraining copying include gentlemen's agreements, book clubs, patron relationships, and technological fences. The classic source here is Stephen Breyer, *The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Book, Photocopies, and Computer Programs*, 84 *Harv. L. Rev.* 281 (1970); see also Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1334–54, 1400–1405 (discussion of “copy privilege”), and the sources cited therein.

<sup>109</sup> Emergencies constitute an unusual class of volunteer cases, for here incentives are predictably important, and the actors know they will be affected by restitution law. This reinforces the discussion in the text, for emergencies can give rise to volunteer recoveries. See *Restatement of Restitution*, *supra* note 9, at §§ 112–17.

<sup>110</sup> I have elsewhere identified this combination as “asymmetric market failure,” arguing that the case for intellectual property protection is strongest where (1) in the absence of a legal right, potential creators of new works will find it difficult to consummate market bargains; and (2) potential users of those works who could practicably bargain for licenses will be willing and able to do so if the law requires. Where this combination is present, it means that, without a duty to pay, there will be positive externalities and that imposing such a duty internalizes without throwing the entire matter into the judicial lap. See the discussion of asymmetric market failure in Gordon, *supra* note 5, at section III; also see Gordon, *supra* note 18, at 1610–18 (when market failure makes it unlikely that a potential user of a copyrighted work could obtain a socially desirable license to employ the work, that favors the user being relieved of liability under the fair use doctrine).

*F. Fair Compulsion*

Fairness and compulsion are the last of the considerations identified above as contributing to restitution's reluctance to order payment for benefits generated. At first blush, a person who intentionally uses a demarcated, bounded product would seem to have little ground to complain if payment is demanded for his use. The purchasing decision remains his own. But such a person may still complain that he is being subjected to an unfair compulsion, because he is being forced to choose between paying for what he wants and not having it. Using legal compulsion on persons who act intentionally and after warning is not ipso facto justifiable. The bully who says "Cross that line and I'll knock your block off" is not and should not be privileged to batter the person who intentionally and defiantly crosses the line. He may be a more honorable bully than the one who hits the other children without warning, but he remains a bully.<sup>111</sup> So even an active recipient can accurately claim he is being "compelled" when he is made to pay for a demarcated resource he has used.

This is not fatal, however. The primary question is not whether compulsion is used, but whether it is being used fairly. If the user is really using something that is a pure benefit to him—a mere increase in the number of choices open to him—and if he has no prior entitlement to the new thing, then the creator and the law would seem justified in demanding that the user pay for this increase in his range of choices.<sup>112</sup> This is the basic point of John Locke's theory of property: one who makes something new without in the process depriving others is entitled to have some right in it.<sup>113</sup> The fairness of the compulsion used rests ultimately on noneconomic grounds. It seems fair to shift to the noncreator the burden of explaining why he should have an entitlement to something that primarily owes its existence to another's effort.<sup>114</sup>

But, to satisfy this claim to fairness and to avoid causing harm, the

<sup>111</sup> Before treating a consent as valid, our law consistently asks whether the person posing the choice was entitled to do so. "Your money or your life" is an assault because the highwayman is not so entitled. The same inquiry needs to be made treating as a binding consent someone's willful encountering of a known cost. See Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1425–35 ("consent as a criterion for moral adequacy").

<sup>112</sup> This assumes that the amount of payment demanded will not exceed the benefit the product brings. To the extent the product can be sufficiently demarcated and its contents known, so as to avoid surprise, this is not likely to be a problem: only a person who wishes to use the product at the marked price will do so.

<sup>113</sup> John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, Second Treatise, at ch. 5 (Peter Laslett ed. 1953).

<sup>114</sup> There are indeed grounds for public entitlement, such as free speech or extreme need, but they fall far short of yielding strangers all the benefits others generate. See Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1459–65. See also Wendy J. Gordon, *Reality as Artifact: From Feist to*

right to restitution would have to be limited to recouping the value added by the benefactor. That can be a difficult scheme to implement.<sup>115</sup> Property is a simpler scheme. But property can bring with it injunctive powers that can extract more than the value added and, thus, would be inconsistent with a restitutionary cause of action based on a claim to be paid for labor conferred. In this way, intellectual-property statutes—which do give injunctive powers—appear to exceed what the logic of a benefits-oriented jurisprudence itself would grant.

Further, the basic principle of restitution gives a right only against unjust enrichment that is “at the expense of” the plaintiff,<sup>116</sup> much as the right to sue for tort damages is usually limited to plaintiffs who were foreseeable. In cases where a right to payment is based on labor expended, such requirements of nexus would seem to require that the plaintiff had expended some labor directed toward *this* defendant or the market he serves. Yet statutory copyright allows suits not only against persons selling in an author’s expected and as-yet-unrealized markets but also against persons who would have been fully outside the plaintiff’s range of expectation when she originally produced the work. In this way, too, statutory intellectual property may exceed common-law bounds.<sup>117</sup> Conversely, restitution law can give answers only to a partial set of questions since it does not address the subject matters of intellectual property; in some of those subject matters (for example, general ideas), the public should have an entitlement capable of trumping any restitutionary claim.

In sum, though a right over benefits to create positive incentives appears to be consistent with traditional patterns of judge-made law, specific forms of intellectual property depart from those patterns. Whether the departures are justified or not is fruit for another article.<sup>118</sup>

### G. *Restitution and “Natural Law”: Implications for Noneconomic Policy Debates*

Restitution has a conditional and limited willingness to order payment for services rendered. This article has concentrated primarily on the economic reasons that may justify a subset of restitutionary rewards. An-

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Fair Use, 55 *Law & Contemp. Probs.* 93 (1992) (arguing that the public deserves special latitude to use others’ created works as facts).

<sup>115</sup> See Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* 175 (1975).

<sup>116</sup> Restatement of Restitution, *supra* note 9, at § 1 (“a person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other”).

<sup>117</sup> I argue that common-law notions of connective justice require such connection between plaintiff and defendant. See Gordon, *supra* note 5, at 180–96, 204–5, and 238–48.

<sup>118</sup> For a start to that inquiry, see Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1384–88 (examining the right to sue for unexpected uses of one’s work).



other possibility may be a moral judgment that persons who labor to give others benefits *deserve* some kind of reward for the value their labor helps create.<sup>119</sup> It will be useful to explore briefly the implications that the preceding discussion has for this topic.

In the typical natural-law defense of intellectual property, the argument may begin with a right to reward for the benefits one's labor has created but moves almost immediately to a right of property, putting aside altogether arguments regarding incentives and public welfare. But even if the pattern of restitution law surveyed above shows some recognition of a *prima facie* moral right to reward, the ultimate right of recovery seems to generate no more than payment for an author's contribution, however that may be defined; this is less than a full property right. Further, even if one grants a moral starting point for the pattern, its results would seem to depend on a peculiar four-step interplay among policies and principles: (1) there might be the (arguable) moral argument in favor of having beneficiaries pay those who produce benefits; (2) against this is weighed the desire to protect the defendant and the fear of eroding the market system and overloading the courts; (3) when exigency is great enough, the need to encourage desirable behavior<sup>120</sup> reinforces the (arguable) original impulse to reward the deserving; (4) if exigent need is joined with some assurance that markets will not be eroded by granting a right of payment and some protection for the defendant appears, the incentive and reward policies then conjoin to outweigh any remaining concerns with imposing burdens on the judiciary and protecting the defendant from nonconsensual obligations.<sup>121</sup>

This article suggests that the active role of the intellectual-property defendant may provide him some protection for his autonomy. It also suggests that the likelihood that markets will evolve if a duty of payment is imposed obviates most concerns with preserving markets and conserving judicial resources. Once the weight of these two concerns (autonomy and systemic costs) is lightened, it is arguable that the postulated moral

<sup>119</sup> Note that the author is not the only person who causes her work to have value; the work's value (the "benefit" it yields) also depends on the audience's capacity to appreciate and demand it. Even the usually cited source for natural law defenses of property—John Locke—did not subscribe to a labor theory of value. See Karen Iversen Vaughn, John Locke: Economist and Social Scientist 17–45, 85–90 (1980).

<sup>120</sup> See Restatement of Restitution, *supra* note 9, at § 112, comment b.

<sup>121</sup> See *id.* at §§ 112–17; Restatement (Second) of Restitution § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) ("benefit conferred through justifiable response to exigency"). At one point the authors of the first Restatement hint that the presence of exigency may even put into place a presumption in favor of rewarding volunteers, so long as they are not officious (have some good reason for volunteering) and intend to charge for their services. See Restatement of Restitution, *supra* note 9, at § 112, comment b, at 463 ("Exceptional situations").

right to deserve reward may be heavy enough to assert itself even without proof of exigency or significant economic need. If this is so, then intellectual-property protection that is broader than pure incentive considerations would justify *may* be consistent with the common-law patterns: many commentators see such mixtures of desert and social-policy arguments operating in the law of copyright.<sup>122</sup> It cannot be proven, however, that the restitutionary right of action is independent of economic considerations since, in the typical case involving an intellectual product, the autonomy and systemic cost arguments just mentioned will be accompanied by a plausible claim that assuring plaintiff a right of action will yield desirable incentives.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

In general outline, statutory intellectual property's pursuit of benefit production is not inconsistent with the common law's pattern of entitlements. Though the common law of tort imposes no duty to generate benefits and imposes no liability on those benefited by others' efforts to behave reasonably, these patterns are explained by considerations that have few negative implications for intellectual property.

Restitution is an area notoriously governed by "pockets" of rules and judges unwilling to generalize.<sup>123</sup> Nevertheless, one can identify the primary concerns that, in restitution law, militate against a cause of action, and these concerns are lessened in the case of intellectual property: legislatively defined rights over intangibles are unlikely to displace otherwise-available market avenues and, if coupled with advance specification and demarcation, are unlikely to cause defendants to be harmed by an intellectual-product producer's assertion of a right of action. Further, legislative specification can help calm the fear of slippery-slope problems that (along with restitution's procedural history) may have contributed to the atomism of restitution law.

All of this does not "prove" that intellectual property is consistent with the common law. Among other things, the broad scope of the statutory

<sup>122</sup> See Paul Goldstein, 2 Copyright 5, 685–86 (1990), and *id.* at vol. 1, 8–9; see also Gordon, *supra* note 1, at 1438 (suggesting "that the [copyright] system serves economic goals and employs markets to achieve a rough compromise between authors' claims to reward and the public's needs" and distinguishing that from the view that "intellectual property rights for creators are only justifiable when the public gains something it would not otherwise have had").

<sup>123</sup> This is changing; even English jurisprudence now seems to accept the notion that a variety of disparate cases exhibit similar enough themes to constitute a restitution subject category. See Lord Goff of Chieveley & Gareth Jones, *The Law of Restitution*, at v (3d ed. 1986).

exclusive rights and the injunctions permitted under current intellectual-property statutes may not be justifiable by recourse to the common-law pattern.<sup>124</sup> Further, patent proprietors are permitted to sue even persons who, without copying, happen to invent something that duplicates the patented invention; though this rule potentially is justifiable in terms of providing incentives, it has little parallel in the common-law pattern. I leave to other fora the questions of whether the use of common-law analogy could yield precise components and limitations for intellectual-property causes of action,<sup>125</sup> whether statutory intellectual-property patterns have good ground for departing from the restitutionary model, and whether other grounds exist for distinguishing between harm and benefit.<sup>126</sup> This article has concerned itself with how some traditional doctrines of tort and restitution have dealt with the imposition of rights and duties to encourage the production of benefit. The article concludes that, despite an apparent asymmetry in its treatment of positive and negative incentives, the common law's relative unwillingness to provide positive incentives would not extend to circumstances such as those faced by producers of intellectual products.

<sup>124</sup> In addition, in those cases where a patent suit is premised not on copying but on mere duplication, restitutionary principles would not support a cause of action.

<sup>125</sup> See, generally, Gordon, *supra* note 5, at section III (set of minimum constraints).

<sup>126</sup> This article has suggested that the law is not hostile to the pursuit of positive incentives, that it may favor giving such incentives, and that the law may even recognize a noneconomic (moral) duty to pay for benefits conferred. But nothing in the preceding discussion proves that the law gives equal status to positive and negative incentives or that moral duties to pay for benefits received are as strong as moral duties to refrain from doing harm. In fact, restitution's reluctance to impose net harm on defendants may suggest that judges believe a duty to pay for benefits received is *weaker* than a duty to refrain from harm; see, for example, Gordon, *supra* note 5, at 205–11. Also outside the immediate scope of this article is the constitutional-law literature on the harm/benefit distinction, represented most recently by Jeremy Paul, *The Hidden Structure of Takings Law*, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1393, 1433–64 (1991).