

2020-10-08

Still head waiters who are occasionally allowed to sit? Heads of mission after COVID-19

Jorge Heine. 2020. "Still Head Waiters Who Are Occasionally Allowed to Sit? Heads of Mission after COVID-19." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Volume 15, Issue 4, pp. 648 - 658. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191x>
<https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42401>

"Downloaded from OpenBU. Boston University's institutional repository."

Still Head Waiters Who Are Occasionally Allowed to Sit? Heads of Mission after COVID-19

Jorge Heine

Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, United States

jsievertheine@gmail.com

Received: 17 June 2020; revised: 30 August 2020; accepted

Summary

‘A diplomat these days is nothing but a head waiter who is occasionally allowed to sit’, the actor Peter Ustinov once quipped. The paradox is that at the height of the current phase of globalisation, diplomacy and diplomats were sidelined rather than recognised for their key roles as ‘hinges’ of this process. Will the COVID-19 pandemic, with its cutting back on travel and (most likely) the budgets of ministries of foreign affairs, and the blistering attacks of populists on diplomats lead to their further marginalisation? Looking at the newly emerging role of Chinese ambassadors, this article argues that may not necessarily be the case.

Keywords

ambassadors – COVID-19 – digital diplomacy – global health governance – globalisation – foreign policy – populism

1 Introduction

Xu Bu, China’s Ambassador to Chile, does not conform to type. A rare exception amongst most of his Chinese colleagues in Latin America, he does not speak Spanish. And if he has been taking lessons in the language of Cervantes since his arrival in Santiago in January of 2018, it does not show. He does not come from the Latin America Division of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, having served 33 years previously in Southeast Asia, UN Headquarters in New York, Canada and the United Kingdom. Xu is now serving in Chile{AU—Is ‘Chile’ correct as edited (instead of This is wrong. “The hottest seat” refers to Venezuela. Please restore my original text.‘Venezuela’) for consistency with text below?} In contrast to his more mild-mannered Shanghainese predecessor, Ambassador Li Barong, now serving in Venezuela in one of the hottest seats in Chinese diplomacy anywhere, and known to be quite forceful in private with his counterparts in the Chilean Foreign Ministry but more self-effacing in public, Xu does not mince words wherever he finds himself.¹

In the somewhat sleepy and overcautious diplomatic circles of Santiago, no Head of Mission cuts a more prominent and daring figure than Xu, who in his two-and-a-half years in Chile has made a name for himself (not always favourably) by standing up forcefully for China's interests.² Not even the US Ambassador to Chile has been able to cast a shadow over Xu's many activities — amongst other things, because for much of Xu's tenure that post has been vacant, throwing into stark relief the contrasting approaches to diplomatic management of Beijing and Washington these days.

When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Chile in April 2019, and gave a rousing speech denouncing China's role in Latin America, Xu responded in kind, asserting in an interview with a leading daily that 'Mr Pompeo has lost his head and gone too far'.³ Later that year a Member of Parliament (MP) from Chile's ruling right-wing coalition, Jaime Belloio, stopped over in Hong Kong after a visit to Taiwan, and met with Joshua Wong, the Hong Kong student leader, a meeting amply covered in the Chilean press. Xu promptly took to the opinion pages of *El Mercurio*, Chile's newspaper of record, to object to the ways that Belloio spoke about China. This led to a spirited and highly unusual exchange in these opinion pages between the Ambassador and the MP.⁴

Perhaps the most controversial of Xu's public interventions, though, was in April 2020, when he publicly contradicted Chile's Minister of Health, Jaime Mañalich, on the matter of 500 ventilators to be donated by China. Mañalich had asserted that Xu had committed to such a donation, something denied by Xu when asked by reporters. The issue dominated the news cycle for several days, just at a time when the curve of COVID-infected Chileans was climbing rapidly, and the urgency to acquire more ventilators was especially salient⁵

Is it that 'China's diplomats have done away with diplomacy', as the *Financial Times* put it shortly thereafter, albeit in a different context?⁶ Hardly. Xu is known for his effectiveness, and for getting things done. Shortly after his arrival, he managed to clear the way for a major investment by Chinese corporate giant Tianqi Lithium, one that had been opposed by vested interests in two different Chilean governments. Rather, much as the world is going through extraordinary times, so is diplomacy, now hit by the double whammy of populism and the pandemic.

This tests to the limit a profession under pressure over the course of the past few decades. The purpose of this essay is to explore the ways in which the current global health crisis affects diplomatic practices. First, it considers how the rise of populism and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic have wrought further havoc with an already battered activity. Then, it discusses the behaviour of Chinese Heads of Mission before and during the pandemic. Finally, it concludes with some of the ways that COVID-19 may impact diplomatic practice.

¹ Peña 2019. {AU—Per the *HJD* co-editors, please provide page numbers wherever possible throughout the footnotes, so that readers can easily find the specific points or evidence in the sources (even where there are not direct quotations).}

² "El Embajador Xu Bu en Chile : cómo la diplomacia china se ha vuelto más opinante y agresiva", 2020.

³ Guerrero 2019.

⁴ 'El insólito round entre el embajador chino y el Diputado Belloio' 2019.

⁵ 'El embajador chino vuelve a contradecir a Mañalich : No conozco el compromiso del gobierno de China de donar ventiladores a Chile', 2020.

⁶ Hille 2020.

2 The Populist Onslaught

In the United States, the United Kingdom and in several European countries, the hollowing out of traditional manufacturing, the rise of immigration, and the wealth shift from the North Atlantic to the Asia Pacific, has triggered a backlash against globalisation. This rise of protectionism, chauvinism and nativism has gone hand in hand with a pronounced hostility towards those denounced as the handmaidens of globalism. Cosmopolitan elites, and most prominently diplomats, seen as facilitators and enablers of these trends are amongst the main targets of such movements.⁷ This has come to highlight what Andrew F. Cooper refers to as ‘the disintermediation dilemma’: ‘diplomacy both as an institution — with an emphasis on the conduct of international relations — and in terms of mode of operation — a focus on means such as embassies — remains contested and stigmatized’.⁸

In the United States, there has been a veritable ‘war on peace’ undertaken by the Donald Trump Administration on the State Department, sometimes referred to by President Trump as the ‘Deep State Department’. Three years into his presidency, one-third of all senior positions remain unfilled.⁹ The impeachment hearings held in the United States House of Representatives in late 2019 and early 2020 were largely focused on the removal by the White House of the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch.¹⁰ In the United Kingdom, the Ambassador to the European Union first and the Ambassador to the United States later were forced into abrupt resignations, having been put in untenable situations by manoeuvrings and/or lack of support by the leaders of the Brexit movement.

In Brazil, the appointment by President Jair Bolsonaro of a middle-ranking diplomat as Foreign Minister was widely seen as an attempt to humiliate the prestigious Brazilian Foreign Ministry, colloquially known as Itamaraty. It is only fierce pushback from the military that has avoided the implementation of foreign policy measures like moving the Brazilian Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, leaving the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) group, or cutting back trade and investment links with China that would have undone decades of painstaking diplomatic efforts on the part of Brazil. In an unprecedented move, half a dozen former Foreign Ministers from across the political spectrum signed a letter denouncing the mishandling of Brazilian foreign policy.¹¹

Their seeming to be ‘out of touch’, their command of foreign languages and their living (by definition) abroad for long periods of time make diplomats easy targets of populists bent on vindicating the values of *Blut und Boden*. It is also what makes foreign ministries to be first on the list of budgetary cutbacks when it comes to fiscal belt-tightening by the new champions of nativism. In so doing, they express the widespread view of the likes of former US presidential candidate Ross Perot, who said ‘Embassies are relics from days of sailing ships. At one time, when you had no world communication, your ambassador spoke for you in that country. But now, with international communication around the world, the ambassador is primarily in a social role’.¹²

⁷ Cooper 2019.

⁸ Cooper 2019, 800.

⁹ Farrow 2018; Burns 2019.

¹⁰ Fleishman 2019.

¹¹ Cardoso et al. 2020.

¹² Galboa 2001, 2.

3 Diplomacy in a Post-COVID-19 Era

As Albert Camus observes in *The Plague*: ‘There have been as many plagues as wars in history, yet always wars and plagues take people equally by surprise’.¹³ Still, there should have been nothing surprising about it. In 2017 Bill Gates, in a speech to the Munich Security Conference, said that the three biggest threats to humanity were climate change, nuclear war and pandemics. In 2015, President Barack Obama predicted that the next global pandemic would hit the world in 2019.

“Major crises have major consequences, usually unforeseen”, in the words of Francis Fukuyama.¹⁴ The pandemic might have been an opportunity to bring the world together. Enhancing international cooperation in the face of such an insidious enemy as the coronavirus could have been a natural outcome, given the enormity of the challenge. In fact, there was a close precedent to such a situation. In 2008 in the midst of the financial crisis, President George W. Bush called the first meeting of the Group of 20, held in the White House on 18 November of that year.¹²

Yet nothing of the sort has occurred on this occasion.¹⁵ If anything, the biggest health crisis in more than a century brought out the worst out of various international players, underlining the enormous lack of foresight of some of the big powers, as well as a remarkable incapacity to manage the pandemic, with tragic consequences, a matter that this author has dealt with elsewhere.¹⁶

In this context, what are diplomats to do? How will the management of international affairs evolve in years to come?

As Shaun Riordan points out, diplomats have quickly adapted to ‘diplomacy in the time of pandemic’, using the full potential of tools like Zoom, including things such as breakout rooms and other modalities that facilitate the sort of informal exchanges within formal meetings that are such an essential part of the craft.¹⁷ Yet one of the most fascinating aspects of the effect of COVID-19 on diplomacy has been the interface between disease management and statecraft. A critical element for contact tracing is, of course, data from mobile phones. The building of data banks, of big data analysis, and to do this not just on a national but an international basis have led to the generation of new platforms, which need suitable diplomatic management.¹⁸

There is no doubt that many of these newly developed diplomatic practices are here to stay. As social distancing and travel restrictions remain in place, the tools of digital diplomacy will gain wider currency and will presumably displace the last traditionalist holdouts in ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs), and the notion that the diplomatic cable is the only ‘tried and true’ instrument of statecraft.

A different question is the role that Heads of Mission and diplomats more generally will play in this new environment. From cutting travel to conferences to cutting manpower in

¹³ Camus 1991. {AU—Please provide a reference in Bibliography for Camus 1991 citation.}

¹⁴ Fukuyama, 2020.

¹⁵ Patrick, 2020

¹² Cooper and Thakur, 2012.

¹⁶ Heine 2020.

¹⁷ Riordan 2020.

¹⁸ Riordan 2020.

missions, and even the latter altogether, is only a short step, and the matter is already being pondered in several countries. For some time now, the notion that, given current communications technology, Ambassadors should be little more than elevated messengers for whatever MFA headquarters want to convey, if any — as some matters can be dealt with directly from MFA to MFA, without intermediaries — has been around. The broader question of representation brought up by Paul Sharp some years ago, in his article, ‘Who Needs Diplomats?’ has thus come under renewed focus, given the current attacks of populists in the West against diplomats.¹⁹ This might lead to a further *capitis diminutio* of their standing. Keeping your head down has been a traditional mode of survival in ossifying bureaucracies.

Yet there is a different approach, one that empowers Heads of Mission and diplomats more generally, that has received a renewed impetus after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. This refers to China’s approach, one that reflects a deft deployment of diplomacy for the purposes of international change management²⁰The assertive behaviour of Ambassador Xu in Chile, mentioned above, is by no means an exception. In the past few years but especially in the course of 2020, Chinese diplomats have gone out of their way to stake out Chinese positions through social and traditional media, in Latin America where they can be found in sixteen countries, and in the rest of the world. This is a change from the staid, low-key, if not downright wooden, style of past Chinese Ambassadors, so well described in her book on the subject by Liu Xiaohong.²¹ Building on Liu’s categories, we could posit that this, the sixth generation of Chinese Ambassadors, has taken to Twitter like ducks to water.²² And they have been especially active in defending China’s position in the evolving debates on the pandemic, which has accelerated this and other previous trends.

No shrinking violets, they have not stopped from questioning even government officials, as they did with Eduardo Bolsonaro, the son of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, when he blamed China for the coronavirus spread.²³ In so doing, Chinese diplomats express the more assertive foreign policy style of President Xi Jinping, who has brought to bear a very different approach from the one recommended by Deng Xiaoping, of ‘biding your time and nurturing your strength’ (*taogang yanghui*), followed during the Presidencies of Jiang Zemin (1992–2002) and Hu Jintao (2002–2012). Under the Xi Presidency, China has significantly increased its presence abroad, being ranked in 2019 as the country with the highest number of posts abroad, including 169 embassies, 96 general consulates and 8 permanent missions.²⁴

It also embraces what has been referred to as the newly minted Wolf Warrior (*Zhanlang*) diplomacy of the Chinese MFA.²⁵ The latter was seen for long as a ‘weak sister’ amongst the Chinese ministries, carrying less clout than heavyweights such as the National Development and Reform Commission or the Ministry of Commerce. Yet at a time when the Chinese are ‘no longer satisfied with a flaccid diplomatic tone’,²⁶ the MFA, encouraged by a 2019 handwritten message to diplomats by President Xi to show ‘a greater

¹⁹ Sharp 1997.

²⁰ Holmes, 2015.

²¹ Liu 2001.

²² Youkee 2020.

²³ Stuenkel 2020.

²⁴ Lowy Institute 2019.

²⁵ Zhu 2020.

²⁶ ‘West Feels Challenged by China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’ 2020.

fighting spirit', has switched from its earlier cautious bureaucratic behaviour to a much more outgoing one. Zhao Lijian, one of the ministries' Twitter stars, and number 3 at the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, was promoted to a MFA spokesperson on his return to Beijing.

Throughout Latin America, but also in Europe, Africa and Asia, in 2020 Chinese diplomats have thus taken to the media front lines with brio. In Europe, some observers opine that Chinese diplomats have overplayed their hand, and triggered pushback.²⁷ But this is by no means the rule elsewhere.

In Latin America where China has had an increased presence in the course of the new century, the pandemic, as in other areas, has accelerated the trend for more outgoing and assertive Heads of Missions, pushed to the forefront to defend China's role in the health crisis. Yang Wanming, China's Ambassador to Brazil, served previously in Argentina and in Chile, dealing with complex issues in all three countries, while developing a high media profile and much goodwill. Something similar can be said about Wei Qiang, the Chinese Ambassador in Panama, and avid Twitter user. He is amongst the most popular Heads of Mission in Panama City, and strikes quite a presence with his debonair ways and impeccable Spanish and English.²⁸

In empowering diplomats in this way, China has grasped that in today's media-driven societies, there is no substitute for an articulate spokesperson on the ground, representing his or her country, standing up for it, engaging local public opinion in a variety of ways and practicing network diplomacy. And the frantic, real-time pace of social media demands wide latitude for diplomats. There is no way Beijing, nine time zones away, can aspire to tell Wei what to respond to a tweet, or how to react to the latest Panamanian headline involving China.

Moreover, the Chinese MFA seems to thrive in the chaotic frenzy of the Twittersphere and the 24-hour news cycle. Reflecting generational differences between the old guard and the young and upcoming 'twiplomats' in the ministry, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, Cui Tankai, publicly contradicted in an interview the statements by Zhao Lijian, the MFA spokesperson.²⁹ This would have cost the job of at least one of them in most other foreign ministries but it did not seem to harm their standing.

4 Conclusion

Some years ago, this author wrote that there was a great paradox in the fact that, at the height of the current phase of globalisation, diplomacy and diplomats were not getting the recognition they deserved for their roles as 'hinges' of that process that had brought so much progress to the world, underlining that they found themselves in a transition from 'club' to 'network' diplomacy.³⁰ Today, the backlash against globalisation expressed in the rise of populism in the West has brought in its wake renewed attacks on diplomats, denounced as enablers of that process. The COVID-19 pandemic, in turn, has come to question many of the established modus operandi of contemporary statecraft. The virtual

²⁷ Crawford and Martin 2020.

²⁸ Youkee 2020.

²⁹ Martin 2020.

³⁰ Heine 2013.

inexistence of international cooperation in confronting the disease has also reflected the crisis of multilateral diplomacy.

Yet a change in the role of Ambassadors and diplomats more generally is in the offing. After decades of minimisation of their role and steady encroachment of other actors into the diplomatic field, China is taking the lead in doing something different. Against the observed trend in the Anglosphere to turn Ambassadors into veritable ‘punching bags’ to score domestic political points, and *contra* Ross Perot, China has grasped that in today’s media-driven societies, the Ambassador is *not* ‘primarily in a social role’ but in a substantive one. Thus, for some years now but especially during this pandemic, China has been empowering Ambassadors, putting them front and centre in its foreign policy projection. This has given them a very different profile from the diffident, withdrawn persona that has been the hallmark of diplomats since the days of Maurice de Talleyrand. It has also taken traditionalists by surprise, especially in the Old Continent. But it may yet have a broader impact on diplomatic practice.

Bibliography

.{AU—Please cite or delete.}

Burns, William J. ‘The Demolition of U.S. Diplomacy: Not since Joe McCarthy Has the State Department Suffered Such a Devastating blow’. *Foreign Affairs* (2019).**{AU—Please provide volume, issue, and full article page numbers.}**

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-10-14/demolition-us-diplomacy>

Camus, Albert. *The Plague*. New York : Vintage International , 1991.

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique , Aloyso Nunes Ferrero, <Calso Amorim, Celso Lafer, Francisco Rezek, José Serra, Rubens Ricupero and Hussein Kalut, ‘Brazilian Foreign Policy Today Is a Violation of its *Constitution*’. *The Wire*, 13 May 2020.

<https://thewire.in/world/brazils-foreign-policy-today-is-a-violation-of-its-constitution>

{AU—Please provide all authors’ names up to 10; if 11 or more provide first 7 followed by et al. Please also provide page number.}

Cooper, Andrew F. ‘The Disintermediation Dilemma and Its Impact on Diplomacy: A Research Agenda for Turbulent Times’. *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 30 (4) (2019), 799–807.

Cooper, Andrew F. and Ramesh Thakur. *The Group of 20 (G20)* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).**{AU—Please cite or delete.}** It has been cited

Crawford, Alan and Peter Martin, ‘China’s Coronavirus Diplomacy Has Finally Pushed Europe Too Far’. Bloomberg, 21 April 2020.

‘El embajador chino Xu Bu vuelve a contradecir a Mañalich: No conozco el compromiso del gobierno de China de donar ventiladores a Chile’. *El Mostrador*, 21 April 2020.**{AU—Please cite or delete.}** cited

<https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/2020/04/21/embajador-de-china-xu-bu-vuelve-a-contradecir-a-manalich-no-conozco-el-compromiso-del-gobierno-de-china-a-donar-ventiladores-a-chile/>

‘El insólito round entre el embajador chino y el Diputado Bellolio’. *El Mostrador*, 2 September 2019. <https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2019/09/02/el-insolito-round->

- entre-el-embajador-chino-y-el-diputado-bellolio/Farrow, Ronan. *War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence* (New York: Norton, 2018).
- Fleishman, Jeffrey. 'In the Trump Impeachment Hearings, Career Diplomats Are the Unlikely Stars'. *The Los Angeles Times*, 20 November 2019. **{AU—Please provide page number.}** <https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2019-11-20/career-diplomats-speak-truth-to-power-in-trump-impeachment-hearings>
- Fossa, Lisette. 'El Embajador Xu Bu en Chile y cómo la diplomacia china mundial se ha vuelto más opinante y agresiva'. *Interferencia*, 5 May 2020. **{AU—Please cite or delete.}** cited <https://interferencia.cl/articulos/el-embajador-xu-bu-en-chile-y-como-la-diplomacia-china-mundial-se-ha-vuelto-mas-opinante-y>
- Fukuyama, Francis. 'The Pandemic and Political Order: It Takes a State', *Foreign Affairs* (99) (4) (2020). Pp.26-32. **{AU—Please cite or delete. If retained, please provide full article page numbers.}** Cited
- Galboa, Eytan, 'Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects'. *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12 (2) (2001), 1–28.
- Guerrero, Francisca. 'Entrevista a Xu Bu: El Sr Mike Pompeo ha perdido la cabeza y ha ido demasiado lejos'. *La Tercera*, 14 April 2019. <https://www.latercera.com/mundo/noticia/embajador-china-pompeo/613890/> **{AU—Please provide page number.}**
- Heine, Jorge. 'From Club to Network Diplomacy'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, eds. Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). **{AU—Please provide full chapter page numbers.}** pp.54-68.
- Heine, Jorge. 'A World (Order) Turned Upside Down?' In *The World before and after Covid-19: Intellectual Reflections on Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations*, ed. Gian Luca Gardini (Salamanca: European Institute of International Studies, 2020), 23–27.
- Holmes, Marcus "Digital Diplomacy and International Change Management", in Corneliu Bjola and Marcus Holmes (eds.), *Digital Diplomacy : Theory and Practice*. London and New York : 2015, pp.13-32.
- Hille, Kathrin. 'Wolf Warrior Diplomats Reveal China's Ambitions'. *The Financial Times*, 11 May 2020. **{AU—Please provide page number.}** <https://www.ft.com/content/7d500105-4349-4721-b4f5-179de6a58f08>
- Liu, Xiaohong. *Chinese Ambassadors: The Rise of Diplomatic Professionalism since 1949*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).
- Lowy Institute. Lowy Institute Global Diplomacy Ranking 2019. 2019. https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/country_rank.html#.
- Martin, Pete. 'An Unusual Public Spat between Two Top Chinese Diplomats Points to an Internal Split in Beijing over How to Handle Rising Tensions with a Combative U.S. President'. Bloomberg, 23 March 2020.
- Patrick, Stewart. 'When the System Fails: Covid-19 and the Cost of Global Dysfunction'. *Foreign Affairs* 99 (4) (2020), pp.40-50. **{AU—Please cite or delete, If retained, please provide full article page numbers.}** Cited
- Peña, Nicolle. 'El poderoso e influyente embajador chino'. *La Segunda*, 25 January 2019. **{AU—Please provide page number.}**
- Riordan, Shaun. 'Covid-19 and the Digitalization of Diplomacy'. In *The World before and after Covid-19 :Intellectual Reflections on Politics, Diplomacy and International*

Relations, ed. Gian Luca Gardini (Salamanca: European Institute of International Studies, 2020), 44–47.

{AU—Please cite or delete. If retained, please provide page number.}

Sharp, Paul. ‘Who Needs Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation’. *International Journal* 52 (4) (1997), 609–634.

Stuenkel, Oliver. ‘China’s Diplomats Are Going on the Offensive in Brazil’. *Foreign Policy*, 15 May 2020. **{AU—Please provide page number.}**

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/15/chinas-diplomats-are-going-on-the-offensive-in-brazil/>

{AU—Please cite or delete. If retained, please provide page number.}

‘West Feels Challenged by China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’. *The Global Times*, 14 April 2020. **{AU—Please provide page number.}**

<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1185776.shtml> Youkee, Mat, ‘Chinese Ambassadors in Latin America Take to Twitter’. *Diálogo Chino*, 29 May 2020.

<https://dialogochino.net/es/comercio-y-inversiones-es/35646-chinese-ambassadors-in-latin-america-take-to-twitter/>

Zhu, Zhiqun. ‘Interpreting China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’. *The Diplomat*, 15 May 2020. **{AU—Please provide page number.}**

<https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/interpreting-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/>

Jorge Heine

is Research Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, and a Wilson Center Global Fellow. He has served as Ambassador of Chile to China (2014–2017), to India (2003–2007), and to South Africa (1994–1999), and as a Cabinet Minister in the Chilean government. A past Vice-President of the International Political Science Association, he was Centre for International Governance Innovation Professor of Global Governance at Wilfrid Laurier University from 2007 to 2017. He has held visiting appointments at the Universities of Konstanz, Oxford, Paris and Tsinghua, and has published fifteen books, including co-editing (with Andrew F. Cooper and Ramesh Thakur) *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (Oxford University Press 2013).

