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Korea under Japanese colonial administration

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Thesis

KOREA UNDER JAPANESE
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

By

CHUMAN CHUN

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Approved

by

First Reader

Lasker G. Hawley

Professor of

Second Reader

W. S. Gibbs

Professor of

Government

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Statement of the Problem

The assessment of a colonial administration as a success or failure is determined largely by the point of vantage from which one surveys the situation. A colonial administration could very well be a tremendous success from the point of view of the mother country, yet at the same time be an utter failure from the point of view of the subject habitants. On the other hand, what may seem to be an abortive colonial administrative policy so far as the administering country is concerned, may very well be a good one for the subject people. The antipodal conceptions held by subject peoples and colonial powers as to the proper criteria of successful colonial administration, plus the force of nationalism, and an increasing awareness of the maldistribution of the benefits of economic progress, are among the principal factors stirring colonial peoples in all corners of the globe to strive for independence.

Had the long-time dominant powers in Asia and Southeast Asia been able to reconcile their interests with the welfare of the subject peoples, many of the current problems, such as those which have arisen in French Indo-China, Egypt, Indonesia and Iran might have never occurred.

Although the circumstances and the nature of the problem in Korea differs in many respects from the problems confronting other colonial areas, such as

French Indo-China and Indonesia, nevertheless, upon the termination of Japanese colonial administration in Korea in 1945, that country was faced with many of the same problems which faced the colonial areas in Southeast Asia.

Among the problems confronting Korea were the problems of organizing administrative agencies, of adopting new systems, of educating the people in political life, of formulating national policy particularly in respect to ideology, of maintaining law and order and national defense, all problems which required immediate attention, and in many instances immediate solution. Effective administration presupposes the existence and functioning of well-organized and competently staffed administrative agencies; hence the first and foremost problem in Korea was the establishment of a rationalized administrative organization, a "must" in order to "keep the country going" and to maintain law and order on the country. Since the destruction of the entire nation by the war in Korea, this problem had become particularly acute.

Importance of the Study

It has been contended by some, especially the Japanese, that the Japanese colonial administration on Korea and Manchuria represents one of the most enlightened colonial policies. The validity of this statement is highly debatable since the contention is a value judgement largely determined by one's pre-existing political, economic and social predilections. The Japanese administration in Korea, as can be seen in the subsequent chapters, was primarily a military government with some aspects of civil administration incorporated in it. As a occupied military government, it was not concerned primarily with the welfare of the governed people.

Professor Friedrich, in his discussion on military government, asserts that:

"The role of coercion is so considerable in any occupied regime, the authoritarian character of such a regime is so tangible, the role of the military is so contrary to democratic ideal, that military government has appeared to be more "akin to dictatorship" than to democracy."¹

The Japanese administration on Korea properly fitted into the above description. It was not only "akin to dictatorship" but followed strictly the line of dictatorship. On the other hand, while the Japanese administration was far from democratic, it is recognized that it still may have made some worthwhile contributions. Because of the psychological affinity of the Japanese and the Koreans as two Oriental peoples, the Japanese administrative system may have been a step forward in the development of a administrative system adapted to the Korean people's needs.

Scope and Method

The present paper is an analytical study in which an attempt is made to evaluate the Japanese administration on Korea through a comparison with the concept and philosophy of democratic administrative institutions which prevail in the United States and an assessment of the extent to which the Japanese administrative system did meet the needs of the Korean people, thereby determining what elements of the two administrative

1. Carl J. Friedrich - Annals of America Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 267, p.1

systems may prove most valuable in the future development of Korean public administration. One assumption must be made for the purpose, namely, that democratic institutions are best adapted to the needs of the Korean people at this time.

The policy of a nation varies with the basic philosophy held by the policy makers of the country. Policy in a single country such as the United States may vary within a relatively short interval of time from the extremes of internationalism under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson to the unyielding isolationism of Herbert Hoover, from the conservatism of a Calvin Coolidge to the radical progressivism of a Franklin D. Roosevelt, all within the unaltered framework of democratic principles and institutions. This oscillation in policy without the destruction of time-honored principles and institutions is feasible in large part because the administrative institutions act as an equilibrating force. The administrative agencies do not change so rapidly or easily as policy. While the policy of the United States has changed fairly frequently, the administrative branch of the government, although tremendously expanded in recent years, has remained quite stable since the time of George Washington, and bounded by the philosophy of democratic institutions. We have seen in England and in France that a change of the administrative institutions is far more difficult to bring about than a change in policy.

During the Japanese administration Korea was subjected to the disparate policies of such dissimilar leaders as the Governor-General H. Yamanashi, known as "do nothing" and Governor-General Minami,

who made an extreme effort to Japanize the Korean people. With such changes among the top personnel, policy also changed proportionately in direct line with the philosophy of these men.

As a whole, however, the broad, basic policy for which all the Governors-General and chief civil administrators labored under the direction of Japanese government seems to have been directed toward one specific goal; a combination of political imperialism and economic mercantilism.

The problem of ever-growing population in the already over-populated Japanese mainland implanted into the minds of Japanese leaders an anxious desire and necessity for colonial expansion to broaden the empire of Japan. Further more, rapid growth of industry in Japan and productive capacity of industrial goods required markets for those produced goods as well as territories for raw materials. To solve those problems, Korea was a "must" and the only way out for the Japanese because of her geographical limitations. Korea, then, was to provide markets for Japanese industrial production, raw materials for Japanese industry as well as the route for further Japanese expansion to China.

After the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, the specific policies successive Governors-Generals were to gear Korean economy into strengthening and supplementing overall economy of the Japanese Empire. Administrative policies on economy, education, communication, and others were intended to keep order and gain sufficient compliance from the native population to further that basic objectives.

It is rather apparent that many of the policies formulated and directed toward that particular objective proved unsuccessful. For example, the Japanization of Korean people through intermarriage and through education had failed.² The book, Discussion of Korean Administration by Kaoru Abe is filled with accounts of such incidents as Danchun Revolt of 1930,³ Mansei (Korea forever) incident of 1923⁴ and many others which manifests violent disagreement of the Korean people against Japanese control and policies.

Why then was the Japanese administration in Korea considered quite efficient despite the failure of most of the specific policies? The justification seems to lie in the effective functioning of such key administrative agencies as the police bureau, the bureau of production, and others. Since the administrative machinery constituted the most successful element of the Japanese control in Korea, the present paper is confined to an evaluation of administrative aspects of the Japanese government in Korea and does not include discussion of the over-all policy. Further the present paper emphasizes the work of the administrative agencies of the central government since the Japanese administration in Korea was very highly centralized and the entire administrative system was dominated by the

2. Abe, Kaoru, Discussion of Korean Administration, p. 6-27

3. Lee Man-Kyn, History of Korean Education, p. 336

4. Abe, op-cit p. 55-60

few men at the apex of a hierarchical pyramid.⁵ The area of local government will be dealt with only briefly in the consideration of the organization of the administrative agencies.

Source Materials

The source material available on the subject of public administration in Korea is quite scanty. Most sources available are publications of either the Office of the Governor-General of Korea or the Japanese Government proper and as is to be expected, highly colored. The only statistics obtainable are similarly from Japanese sources and consequently must be used with great care. There are unfortunately no objective accounts to which one can turn.

5. See subsequent chapter for an account of the powers of the Governor-General.

CHAPTER II

THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Introduction

The end of World War II saw the final end of the imperialistic expansion of Japan; however, until the end of the war, as the most powerful nation in the Far East, Japan dominated large segments of that area of the world. The areas dominated by Japan, including Korea, Formosa (Taiwan), Karahuto, Manchuria, Port Arthur, and the South Pacific Islands, were under the administration of the Japanese colonial administrative system until the end of the war.

The Japanese colonial administrative system was entirely different from the administrative system in Japan proper; the administrative laws and regulations promulgated for Japan proper by the Japanese administrative agencies were not applicable to the colonial areas. In general, the laws and regulations of Japan did not apply to the colonial areas except in instances when the Imperial Ordinances or Creed specifically designated that the scope of a particular law or regulation should be extended to the colonial areas. The inclusion of the colonial areas under the Constitution of Japan was, of course, out of the question since the colonial inhabitants were subject peoples and not members of the ruling class. It was for this reason that the colonial areas were administered by special laws and regulations.¹

1. See: T. Uchida, Essence of Administrative Laws of Korea, pp. 27-28.

The fundamental differences in the administrative systems of Japan proper and the colonial areas, according to Mr. Uchida, are as follows:

1. Existence of separate administrative organization.

In Japan the power of administration is vested in the Emperor and the Cabinet; the Ministers of the departments act as the heads of each office and agency under the general direction and coordination of the Emperor. The colonial administration on the other hand was generally delegated to the colonial officer (Commander) and the Cabinet or other Ministers of departments had no direct authority over it. Only the Minister who was responsible for the administration of a colonial area had the power of supervision over the agencies and personnel in that area.

2. No separation of administrative and legislative powers.

In the Japanese law-making procedure the consent of the Imperial Diet is an absolute requirement. The laws created in Japan by legislative process do not apply to the colonies, except those few that are designated by Emperor's creed or ordinances to be enforced in the colonial areas. The enactment of just laws and regulations for the colonial areas was in no way guaranteed by the principles of legislative process. The legislative and administrative powers are both vested in the hands of administrative agencies, and even the most important laws and regulations which would require the legislative action of the Diet in Japan proper, could be effected by the Order or Ordinance issued by the administrative agency in the colonial area. In the colonial areas the separation of powers between the legislative and administrative branches of government was non-existent.

3. Principles of Administration by Law is not applied.

In a sovereign country the power to define the rights and duties of the citizens rests solely with the legislative branch of the government, and in a democratic government with the chosen representatives of the people. Those fundamental rights and duties cannot be altered without the enactment of measures through the approved legislative procedure. In a colonial area there is no such guarantee against the curtailment of individual liberties; the legislative power is delegated to the colonial administrator who rules by decree. In contrast to the situation in Japan proper then, no constitutional limitations upon the government existed in Korea or other colonial areas. The peoples' rights were abridged by arbitrary administrative acts but redress of grievances through the right to appeal to administrative courts was denied. The only recourse open to the

subject inhabitants was to present their case to the same administrative officials together with a request for a withdrawal of the regulation. Remonstrance or objection to a particular law was sometimes permissible by a clause included in a law. The decision to continue to enforce the particular measure or to withdraw it, however, was entirely discretionary with the enforcing administrators.

4. Principle of 'Personal Law' is applied.

The laws of a nation usually regulate the conduct of all persons within its territory, and all are subject to the same law. In the Japanese colonial areas a distinction was made between the subject inhabitants and the Japanese inhabitants, and two different sets of laws were applied. This kind of law which was applied on the basis of the nationality of the person concerned was commonly referred to as 'personal law.' To justify the enforcement of compulsory military service, the 'personal law' aspects of the Japanese administration in Korea were gradually soft-pedaled, and a program of 'Japan-Korea Unity,' which actually was a policy of Japanization of Korea, was emphasized from the time of Governor-General Ugaki.²

Central Government

Office of Governor-General and its Powers. The Japanese Constitution of 1889 reads in part: "The administrative power is vested in the hands of the Emperor."³ Consequently the power of establishing or of reorganizing the administrative agencies was exclusively an Imperial discretion and as a rule did not require the consent of the Diet. This power Mr. Uchida describes as "the supreme power of administrative organization."⁴ By virtue of this "supreme power of administrative organization" the administrative system of

2. Ibid. pp. 29-31

3. Article 10, Japanese Constitution of 1889, reprinted in the Compendium of Laws and Statutes, Recording Section of Japanese Cabinet, November, 1938.

4. Uchida, op. cit., p. 33.

Korea and other colonial areas was created and administered under the direction of the Emperor.

The Governor-General of Korea, therefore, was directly responsible to the Emperor of Japan and under the mandatory power granted by the Emperor, had the power to control and supervise the policies and administration of Korea. According to the legal provisions, the office of the Governor-General was a dictatorial office, combining in one person the broad powers of legislative, judicial, and administrative functions. The enabling acts creating the office of Governor-General and the powers delegated to this official were as follows:

Powers of the Governor-General of Korea.

1. The power of overall supervision of affairs of the state. The control and administration of Korean affairs were, as a matter of principle, mandated to the Governor-General of Korea, except the creation of the oath of office, the appointment and removal of officers, reorganization of the army, conferment of honours, amnesty of crimes, powers which are vested solely in the hands of the Emperor. With the further exception of foreign affairs and military policy, which were under the Central Government of Japan, all other powers were given to the Governor-General of Korea including matters which would require the Emperor's direct decision in Japan proper. The powers which were apportioned among the various ministers in Japan, in Korea were delegated to the Governor-General. For example, in the administration of justice, the regulations governing court procedure were the Governor-General's Office Court Regulations. The entire court system, including criminal and civil courts of both original and appellate jurisdiction, were directly responsible to the Governor-General. The Governor-General had no authority to render judicial decisions; he did, however, have great influence over the entire judicial system through his power to determine the appointment of all judicial personnel as well as the control of court procedure. In this respect his power was equivalent to that of the Minister of Justice in Japan. Matters requiring the direct decision of the

Emperor, i. e., foreign affairs and military organization or policy, were submitted to the Prime Minister of the Japanese government proper.⁵

2. The power of issuing ordinances which can be substituted as law. In Korea the legislative and administrative powers were not separated, and, as indicated above, the Governor-General possessed both these powers. Even matters which required legislative action in Japan proper did not need to be regulated by law in Korea. Provided there was no contravention of Japanese law, including the Constitution and the Imperial Creed, all domestic matters in Korea were regulated by order of the Governor-General. This administrative procedure was known as "Institutional Regulation" or Seirei (). The Seirei had the effect of law.

3. The power to issue regulations and orders. Besides the power of "institutional Regulation" the Governor-General, by the rights attached to the Office of Governor-General or by the powers especially delegated to that office, had the right to issue the Order of the Office of Governor-General (). These Orders of the Office of Governor-General were comparable to the Imperial Creed, Cabinet Orders, or Departmental Orders in Japan. The penalty for infraction of these Orders could not be in excess of one year imprisonment at hard labor or 200 won fine or both.

4. Power to request the use of the armed forces. For the maintenance of peace and stability, the Governor-General could request the use of the army and navy in Korea through the Commanders of the forces.⁷

5. The power of supervision of the administrative offices. The Governor-General had the power to guide and supervise the governmental offices in Korea, and if the order or decision made by one of these offices was contrary to the regulations or ordinances of the Governor-General or contrary to the public welfare, it was within his right to suspend or reverse the order or decision.⁸

5. Imperial Creed Establishing the Korean Government, Law No. 30, Art. 3, 1911. Reprinted in the Compendium of Laws and Statutes, Recording Section of the Japanese Government, November, 1938, p. 42.

6. Loc. cit., Imperial Creed, Art. 3.

7. Loc. cit., Imperial Creed, Art. 3, Sec. 2.

8. Loc. cit., Imperial Creed, Art. 5.

6. The power of supervision of officers. The Governor-General supervised the officers of the Government and recommended promotion or demotion of senior officers to the Emperor through the Prime Minister. The promotion, demotion, or disciplining of junior officers were entirely within the discretion of the Governor-General alone. Recommendations for the peerage or honors of special distinction of civil servants were also made by the Governor-General through the Prime Minister.⁹

7. The management of the Korean Emperor's household was also in the hands of the Governor-General.

Line Organization

As an assistant to the Governor-General the Office of Chief Civil Administrator was established. The Chief Civil Administrator was appointed directly by the Emperor and his duty was to guide and supervise the administrative and clerical matters of bureaus and affiliated offices as an assistant to the Governor-General.¹⁰ While the position of Chief Civil Administrator was second in line to that of the Governor-General, he was not authorized to perform the functions of the Governor-General in the event of the latter's absence without a special Imperial Creed to that effect. Hence, when the Governor-General was absent from the office, "Institutional Regulations" or the Governor-General's orders could not be issued, nor was there any channel through which to submit or receive important decisions requiring the direct attention of the Emperor. Until 1937 there was no law or regulation covering this gap in the administrative organization. At that time the

9. Loc. cit., Imperial Creed, Art. 6 and 7.

10. Loc. cit., Imperial Creed, Art. 8.

Imperial Creed provided that in the event of the absence of the Governor-General another directly appointed civil servant was authorized to perform the functions of that office.¹¹

Within the Office of Governor-General there were nine Bureaus: Interior (home affairs), Financial, Industrial and Mining, Agriculture and Forestry, Education, Judicial, Police, Foreign Affairs, and Planning and Affiliated Bureaus of Railroads, Communications, and Government Monopoly. The Bureaus were similar to the Departments in the United States governmental organization, each having the responsibility of administration within its respective field. In each Bureau there was a Bureau head who guided and supervised the officers and employees under the direction of the Governor-General and Chief Civil Administrator.

In addition to the Chief Civil Administrator and the heads of the Bureaus, as assistants to the Governor-General there were also Secretariates, Staff, Forestry Officers, School Supervisors, Engineers (Senior and Junior officers), Compilation Staff (Senior and Junior), and Interpreters (Senior and Junior). Other administrative assistants included Civil Engineering Officers, Specialists (Senior and Junior), Clerical Staff, Statisticians, Police

11. Imperial Creed, No. 82, April 1937, Ibid., pp. 379.

Staff (Senior and Junior), and Detectives.¹²

Affiliated Offices

The existing affiliated offices are outlined in detail in the accompanying chart, and the functions of most of the offices are obvious. However, there are a few offices which require further clarification:

1. Central Council. The Central Council was the consulting agency of the Governor-General which was appointed to study and investigate the Old Korean customs and the new administrative system in order to advise the Governor-General how the two might be made to work together more harmoniously. The members of the Council were appointed directly by the Emperor on the recommendations of the Governor-General. The Chairman of the Council was the current Chief Civil Administrator; the remainder of the members were appointed upon the recommendation of the Governor-General from among the educated Koreans with a high standing in the community.¹³

2. The Judicial Courts. The court system was divided into three levels: local courts, appeal courts, and supreme courts. All criminal and civil cases were tried in these courts and appeals from both types of cases were heard in the appropriate courts.


3. Monopoly. The Monopoly Office handled tobacco, salt, insam, and opium.

12. Imperial Creed, No. 497, 1920 (Law establishing staff officers in Korea.)

13. Imperial Creed No. 355, Loc. cit.

TABLE I

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION



GOVERNMENT GENERAL OF KOREA

Governor-General's Secretariat	Private Secretaries Offices Personnel Section Councillors Office (or Inquiry Section) Document Section Accounts Section Census Section (Temporary) Mobilization Section
Home Affairs Bureau (Bureau of Interior)	Local Administration Section Social Affairs Section Public Works Section Local Officers Training School Civil Engineering Branches
Financial Affairs Bureau	Internal Revenue Section Customs Office Tax Supervising Office Property Custody Section Budget Section Finance Section Price Stabilization Section
Industrial Bureau and Mining	Commerce and Industry Section Mining Section Gold Production Section Sea Production Section Fuel Section Standards (measurements) Office Fuel Laboratory Commercial Museum Geological Laboratory
Agricultural and Forestry Bureau	Agricultural Administrative Section Agriculture Production Section Farm Animal Section Food Administration Section Food Research Section Land Improvement Section Forestry Administration Section Forestry Section

Educational Bureau	Education Section Compiling Section (Editorial) Social Education Section Art Museum Young Men's Training Office Teaching Research Section Meteorological Observatory
Judicial Bureau	Judicial Affairs Section Criminal Section Civil Section Prison Section
Police Bureau	Police Affairs Section Peace Preservation Section Censorship Section Health Section Protection Section Commerce Police Section Library Section Demolition Engineers Training Office Cattle Quarantine Station
Bureau of Foreign Affairs	Foreign Affairs Section Overseas Affairs Section
Bureau of Planning	First Section Second Section Third Section Fourth Section

AFFILIATED OFFICES

Central Council	General Affairs Section Investigation Section
Communications Bureau	General Affairs Section Supervising Section Accounts Section Insurance Section Postal Money Order and Saving Supervising Office Engineering Section Post Offices Telegraph Offices Telephone Offices Airports Electric Works Section Marine Affairs Section Employees' Training School Seamen's Training School
Railway Bureau	General Affairs Section Supervising Section Traffic Section Operating Section Construction Section Mechanical Section Accounting Section Employees' Training School
Monopoly Bureau	General Affairs Section Business Section Manufacturing Section Salt and Insam Section Branch Offices
Provincial Office	Governor's Secretariat Internal Affairs Department Municipalities Counties Villages Insular Offices Police Stations Industrial Department Police Affairs Department

Provincial Office (Contd.)	Public Hospitals Public Schools Quarantine Station for Export Cattle "Bu, Kun, Do" Tenancy Council
Custom House	General Affairs Section Surveillance Section Customs Duty Section Inspecting Section Branch Offices Coastguard Stations
Law Courts	Supreme Court Courts of Appeal Local Courts Public Procurator's Offices
Prisons	Prisons for Adults Prisons for Juveniles
Police Training School	
Public Depositories	
Forest Stations	
Saisei - in Asylum - Orphans Department, Blind and Deaf-mutes Department	
Leper Asylums	
Eiko Reformatory	
Central Laboratory	
Agricultural Experimental Stations	
Stud Farm	
Sheep Farm	
Serum Manufactory	
Forestry Experimental Stations	

Fishery Experimental Stations

Council of Inquiry into Customs Appeals

Council of Investigation on Forest-lands

Marine Court

Council of Inquiry into Korean Post Office Life Insurance

Seoul Imperial University University Hospital University Library

Government Schools and Colleges

Government General Library

Society for Compiling Korean History

Society for the Preservation of Treasures

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

As pointed out in the chapter on central government, the administrative system in Korea was highly centralized following a military pattern; there was no autonomy for the provincial and local governments comparable to that which exists in the United States at the state and local level. The administration of provincial or local governments by provincial or local administrators was generally by mandatory power received from the Governor-General who mandated the power originally received by him directly from the Emperor to these subordinate officials. The organization of local government and its limitations, and the source of powers of the administrators of provincial and local government is the concern of this chapter.

For administrative purposes the whole of Korea was divided into thirteen provinces as follows: Kyung Ki, North and South Choog Chung, North and South Chun Lha, North and South Kyung Sang, Hwang Hai, North and South Pyung Ahan, Kang Won, and North and South Ham Kyung. These thirteen provinces were subdivided into 20 municipalities, 218 counties, 2 islands, 91 principalities, and 2,245 townships. For the administration of these areas the following administrators were responsible for the respective areas under the general direction of the Governor-General of Korea.¹

1. Office of Governor-General of Korea, Korean Situation, 1941, p. 15.

For the purpose of administration the affairs of each province were subsumed under three major departments; domestic affairs, finance, and police. In a province such as Kyung Ghi where there was a concentration of commercial or industrial production activities, the department of production was established in order to supervise the activities and to stimulate production. The functions of these departments will be discussed later.

Development of the local Self-Government System²

Unlike the form of local government which has developed in the United States, the governing bodies of local and provincial government in Korea under the Japanese administration were federal officers functioning within a hierarchical organization where the chain of command ran directly from the Governor-General to the provincial Governors thence to the inferior officers. Decisions were made by these administrators without consent from the people, and in most cases also without consultation. In July 1920, however, an important revision in the political system was made in the local government in Korea under the Japanese, and consultatory or advisory bodies, elected by the people, were established throughout the country.³

2. For more detailed historical development see: Office of Governor-General, Administrative Report, 1935-1936, pp. 202 et seq.; also Korean Situation by Office of Governor-General, 1941, p. 14.

3. Office of Governor-General, op. cit., p. 15.

The creation of these organs was a reluctant concession to the steadily increasing popular demand for self-government in Korea. The office of Governor-General describes these organs as:

. . . the first step toward realization of local self-government, since the condition of Korea did not justify immediate enforcement of a complete system of local autonomy, while the people themselves needed a course of training to fit them for self-government.⁴

Prior to the 1920 revision, all the large towns had their own advisory bodies; however, they were composed of comparatively few members, and even these were in no sense representatives of the people since all were appointed by the Japanese administrators. Similarly, each province, city, and district had its body of councillors, but here again the members of the council could scarcely be said to serve as spokesmen of the people since the position was appointive, not elective, and the post purely an honorary one. The 1920 revision of the system was supposed to make these local bodies more representative by increasing the membership and providing an increased number of elective offices.⁵

December 1930, after one decade of experience under the revised local government system, the Japanese administrators once more yielded to the surge of popular demand for self-government and carried through a second reorganization of the local government system. At this time the provinces, principalities, and cities were made self-governing bodies to a certain degree,

4. Office of Governor-General, Administrative Report, 1935-36 p. 202.

5. Loc. cit.

with the power to issue local ordinances and to enforce rules and regulations applicable to the particular area.⁶

These concessions to the popular demand for self-government, at first glance seemed like unusually magnanimous gestures on the part of the over-lords. Upon closer examination one sees that this was only a dam to stem the flood of popular opinion. Any hope for the development of democratic principles or for the growth of any real local self-government was completely vitiated by the numerous qualifications and restrictions incorporated in the revision granting local autonomy.⁷ The restrictions were as follows:

1. Only two-thirds of the local council were elected and the remainder of the members were appointed by the Provincial Governor.

2. The questions to be discussed in the Council were limited almost entirely to financial matters, in particular the subject of revenue; other matters were discussed only when and if the Governor considered it necessary.

3. The Provincial Governor possessed the power to veto an action of the council upon the direction of the Governor-General or at his own discretion, if the act were considered ultra vires or incompatible with the laws and regulations of the nation or province. The Provincial Governor possessed a similar power of veto in respect to financial matters if he considered the revenue or expenditures approved by the council to be inadequate or improper.

4. Even questions usually submitted for the approval of the council might be decided and action taken by the Provincial

6. Office of Governor-General, Korean Situation, p. 14.

7. For a supporting opinion regarding the effect of these limitations see Uchida, op. cit., pp. 171-172.

Governor under the direction of the Governor-General if the council was unable to convene with the requisite majority present. The Provincial Governor had the same power to act whenever an immediate decision was required on a pressing matter which did not permit time to call a meeting of the council.

5. The Provincial Governor could suspend the meetings of the council for a period of time, but adjournment was effected only by the order of the Governor-General.⁸

Officers of Provincial and Local Governments
And the Functions and Powers of Office

The Provincial Governor. A provincial governor, while being subordinate to the Governor-General, administered the affairs of his province, supervised all public bodies, and was authorized to issue local ordinances. At the beginning of the Japanese administration, the provincial governor had no power over the local police, for this agency of the government stood entirely apart from other executive organs and was controlled solely by a police captain who was under the direction of the military police. In August 1919, however, when the gendarme system came to an end, the control of the local police was transferred to the hands of the provincial governor, and in each province a police department was formed composed mainly of police, sanitary, and quarantine officers.⁹

8. Provincial Ordinance, No. 51.

9. Office of Governor-General, Administrative Report, 1935-36, p. 200.

The provincial governor was the single and supreme head of his province and was directly responsible to the Governor-General. Within his jurisdiction, the administrative area which constituted a province, the provincial governor was able to issue the ordinances and was vested with the responsibility of administering and supervising the area. The provincial governor directed and supervised all the officers and employees of the provincial and local governments within his jurisdiction under the direction of the Governor-General. His power of control also extended to the public and semi-public bodies and groups.

For the performance of local administrative functions the provincial governor was vested with the following powers:

1. Power to issue ordinances. For the execution of administrative responsibility in the area, the provincial governor, by the right which was mandated to the office or by a special mandate from the Governor-General, was empowered to issue provincial ordinances. The provincial governor also had the power to impose a maximum sentence of three months imprisonment or a fine up to the maximum of 100 won or both for the violation of these ordinances.¹⁰

2. The power to request the use of the armed forces. To maintain law and order, he could submit a request to the Governor-General to use the armed forces. In case of emergency, the provincial governor may submit his request directly to the commanding officer of the armed forces of the area.¹¹

3. The power of supervision over the administrative officers of the area. The provincial governor directed and supervised the inferior officers. In the event that a decision or order made or is-

10. Uchida, op. cit., p. 89.

11. Loc. cit., Regulations on Local Offices, Sec. 8.

sued by an inferior officer (county keeper, island administrator, or mayor of a principality) was considered by him to be contrary to public laws and regulations, to endanger the public welfare, or to be an action ultra vires, he had the power to revoke or to stop the execution of the order or decision.¹²

4. The power to give special awards or punishments. As an incentive to better performance of duties by the officers and employees under the provincial general, he possessed the power of reward and punishment. In the case of officers and provincial governor had to request the Governor-General to mete out the award or punishment as the instance may deserve; for the employees he could execute the function independently. This power was of great importance since it was in this manner that all promotions and demotions were made.

5. The power to mandate the business. The provincial governor was permitted to mandate part of his function to inferior administrative officers, usually heads of principalities, county keepers, island administrators, or heads of police departments.¹³

6. The power of supervision over the public and private bodies. The provincial governor had the power to supervise the public and private bodies, such as principalities, cities, towns, school associations, irrigations associations, and farm associations.

The Departments

Since the division of functions for the administrations of a province could only be made by the Governor-General,¹⁴ all the provinces had uniform administrative systems with three major departments: domestic

12. Loc. cit., Sec. 7.

13. Loc. cit., Sec. 10.

14. Ordinance from Office of Governor-General, No. 65.

affairs, finance, and police. In a province where there was considerable industrial productions a department of production was also established; by the end of the war four provinces had a department of production: Kyung Ghi, South Chun Rha, North Kyung Sang, and South Kyung Sang.

The main functions of each department were as follows:

1. Domestic Affairs Department--local administration, education, industry, civil engineering, and accounting.
2. Finance Department--revenue, public property custody.
3. Police Department--police, public health.
4. Production Department--promotions and supervision of production and industry.

Local Government Organization and Administration

Each province was again subdivided for administrative purposes into principalities (Bu), counties (Gun), islands (To), cities (Up), and towns (Myon). These administrative areas were headed by head of principality, county keeper, island administrator, and head of city and towns, respectively. These officers were the highest single-head officers of the area and were vested with the responsibility of supervising and directing the administrative system in the area. Their main duties were to execute the public functions within the power mandated by higher officers and to maintain law and order in the area.¹⁵

Principalities (Bu). The principalities were corporate persons and

15. Uchida, op. cit., pp. 91-92

fourteen cities had the status of principalities by the end of the war.

Those cities having principality status included Seoul, Inchun, Gunsan, Mokpo, Taigu, Busan, Masan, Pyon Yang, Chin Nam-po, Shin Ui-chu, Wonsan, Chung Chin, Hamhung, and Kaisung. The heads of the principalities were public officers who were appointed by the Emperor of Japan upon the recommendation of the Governor-General, with the exception of the Heads of Seoul who were appointed directly by the Emperor without recommendation by the Governor-General.¹⁶

The main functions of the principality were:

1. Water system
2. Sewerage
3. Hospitals
4. Public markets, public hotels, public baths, public parks, public grounds, personal consulting office and employment office, public clinic, public restaurant, public washing places, and housing.
5. Improvement of area, maintenance and improvement of roads and bridges, place for waste disposal, meat packing houses, burial grounds, crematories, public auditorium, public library, fire prevention, and other functions essential to the general welfare.¹⁷

The Islands (To). The administration of islands was vested in the island administrators who were empowered to issue ordinances within the

16. Loc. cit.

17. Ibid. p. 93.

jurisdiction either by law or by direct mandate of power from the Governor-General. Violation of these ordinances was punishable by imprisonment, fine or both. Frequently the head of the police department of the island assumed the responsibility of island administrator.¹⁸

The Public Employees. The employees who occupied other key positions in the principalities, counties, and islands were: (1) In the principalities--procurators, engineers, and school examiners; (2) in the principalities, counties, and islands--junior engineers, interpreters, revenue officers, forestry chiefs, and clerks. These employees were paid from the local funds.¹⁹

Cities (Up) and Towns (Myon). The counties and islands were again subdivided into cities and towns. The responsible heads of cities and towns were appointed by the provincial governor and enjoyed the status of semi-officials. These men kept in close contact with the rural people; otherwise their functions were mostly of a clerical nature under the direction and supervision of the county keeper and island administrator. The heads of cities and towns were permitted to appoint their deputies; however, the permission of the county keeper and island administrator was required prior to the appointment.

18. Loc. cit.

19. Ibid., p. 92.

CHAPTER IV

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

Administration of Korea during the Japanese occupation was, as has already been indicated, carried out mainly by the administrative bureaus under the direct supervision and guidance of the Governor-General. To exploit all the administrative bureaus, there is neither enough time nor space. The analysis, therefore, will be concentrated on a few administrative bureaus which played most important roles in the Japanese domination of Korea.

Education

A man develops his power of reasoning and his power of judgment in accordance with his level of education, i. e., learning. Thus, a nation can not deceive its learned subjects with illogical explanations of its detrimental policy. That is why England and France did not develop as sound an educational system in such colonial areas as India and Indo-China as in their home land. Such somewhat suppressed educational policy was carried out in most of the colonial nations and Korea was by no means an exception to this situation under the Japanese rule.

The Korean education before the Japanese rule centered upon the study of Confucianism and had as its ultimate goal the making of public servants. Pupils first entered the "Sotang," found in every town and village, and

there they were taught to read and write Chinese ideographs. For a more advanced course, they went to the "Han-gyo," or public high school established in every district, after which they proceeded to the "Songkyun Kwan" at Seoul, the highest seat of learning in the country. The graduates from this institution sat for the civil service examination "Kwago," and successful candidates were eligible for permanent, official positions. During the Japanese occupation, however, a complete change was brought about in the Korean educational system.

In analyzing the administration of the educational system in Korea during the Japanese occupation, four distinctive periods are noted. The first period was from about 1910 to 1919, and can be classified as the "period of practical education." The years from 1919 to 1931 comprise the second period and can be classified as the period of educational reform. The third period consists of the years between 1931 and 1936 and can be classified as the period of application of education to everyday-living; that is, everyday-living as the Japanese intended it to be. The years between 1936 to the end of World War II comprise the last period which can be classified as the period of destructive education. The success or failure of educational policies administered in these periods will become more clear by an analysis of each administration.

1. The First Period, 1910-1919.

From the political viewpoint, these years were regarded as a period

of military administration. It was an extremely strict administration controlled by the army. During this period, however, the main concentration in the field of learning was on practical education so that the economic standard would become sound and so that colonial exploitation would have its start. Terauchi, the first Governor-General summed up the aims of the educational policy with the following statement. The main objective is "to create practical people who can find for themselves the means of earning their meal rather than to create cultured people." ¹ The first of the Educational Ordinances which appeared in the form of Imperial Ordinance No. 229 was proclaimed on August 24, 1911. The policy and objective of the Japanese government at that time seemed to be concentrated on the Japanization of the Korean people. This fact is obvious by the words of Article 2 of the Ordinance itself. The Ordinance reads as follows:

Korean Educational Ordinance - Promulgated August 24, 1911, by Imperial Ordinance No. 229.

Part I--Principles

- Article 1. The education of the Korean people in Korea is to be carried out in accordance with this ordinance.
- Article 2. The basic principle of this education is to cultivate good and loyal citizens on the basis of the Imperial Rescript on Education.
- Article 3. Education must be suitable for the time and the conditions of the people.

1. Lee, Man-Kyu, History of Korean Education, p. 174.

- Article 4. Education is to be generally divided into three parts, common education, vocational education and college education.
- Article 5. The objective of the common school is to educate students and to teach them common knowledge and skills, especially to cultivate the character of a citizen and to popularize the useage of the national language (Japanese language).
- Article 6. The objective of a vocational school is to teach the skills and knowledge of agriculture, commerce, industry, etc.
- Article 7. The objective of a college education is to give a higher degree of learning and higher skills of craft.

Part II--Schools

- Article 8. A common school is to give a common education to the children. The school must give consideration to the physical development of the children, to their moral education and must teach them common knowledge and skills that are necessary to everyday living.
- Article 9. Schooling periods for the common school are to be 4 years. However, one year may be shortened if it is deemed necessary by the local conditions.
- Article 10. A person who can enter a common school must be over 8 years old.
- Article 11. A common high school gives a common high education to boys and it teaches common knowledge, cultivates character, and teaches knowledge and skills that would be helpful in life.
- Article 12. School years of a common high school are to be 4 years.
- Article 13. A teachers' course or an intensive teachers' course may be established in a public common high school and give

education to the persons desiring to be common school teachers. School year for a teachers' course is to be one year and an intensive teachers' course should be accomplished within one year. Persons who can enter the teachers' course must be graduates of common high schools and persons who can enter the intensive teachers' course must be the persons who have finished two years of common high school or equivalent.

Article 14. A girls common high school gives a common high education to girls, develops female virtues, cultivates their character and teaches helpful knowledge and skills in life.

Article 15. School years for a girls high common school are to be 3 years.

Article 16. The persons who can enter a girls common high school must be over 12 years of age and must have finished four years of common school, or equivalent or better.

Article 17. An arts and crafts course may be established in a girls' common high school and girls over 12 years of age may specialize in sewing and handicraft. School years should be less than three years.

Article 18. A public girls' high common school may establish a teachers' course and may give necessary education to persons who desire to be a common school teacher. School years for the teachers' school should be one year. Persons who enter the teachers' school must be graduates of girls' high common school.

Article 19. Vocational schools perform the education of subjects on agriculture, commerce, industry, etc.

Article 20. Vocational schools should be classified as agricultural schools, commercial schools, industrial schools, and elementary vocational schools.

Article 21. The school years for vocational schools should be between two to three years.

- Article 22. Qualification for admission to a vocational school is to be over 12 years of age and a graduate of a four-year common school or equivalent.
- Article 23. School years and the qualification for admission for elementary vocational school may not necessarily follow the regulations specified in Article 2, but the Governor-General shall specify it.
- Article 24. Colleges shall give instructions on high learning and skills.
- Article 25. School years for colleges shall be between three to four years.
- Article 26. Qualification for admission to colleges shall be over 16 years of age and graduates of common high schools or the equivalent.
- Article 27. Establishment or discontinuance of public or private common school, common high school, girls' common high school, vocational school or colleges require permission from the Governor-General.
- Article 28. The Governor-General decides the regulations concerning curriculums, and other subjects, teachers, text-books, and tuition in common schools, common high schools, girls' common high schools, vocational schools and colleges.
- Article 29. The Governor-General makes the necessary regulation for the schools not included in this chapter. ²

In looking over the first Educational Ordinance, with the exception of a few words in Articles 2 and 5 which are specifically intended for the Japanization of the Korean people, one sees it would be a fine educational system, considering the fact that the social conditions of the time required

2. Governor-General of Korea, Compendium of Laws and Statutes of Korea, Section 15, pp. 9-10.

general mass education rather than quality education of a few, if only the ordinance had been made with a sincere desire to improve the standard of the Korean people. But this was not the case. The statistics show that eight years after the proclamation of this ordinance there were increases of only three high common schools for boys and one for girls, four vocational schools, no increases in colleges and even in the common schools the increase was not noticeable.³ The only conclusion which can be arrived at from these facts was that Japanese colonial administration in Korea was to hold down the educational level of the Korean people. The existing educational system concentrated on practical learning that could be applied to every day living without developing too much thinking power.

Failure of this policy and the administration of it was evident toward the year 1919. The independent movement among the Korean people, especially in the schools, was forming into such a forceful power that it began to attract the world's attention and the Japanese government was forced to re-examine the Korean situation. The result was a complete change of policy and administration from the "military administration" to the "cultural administration." Together with this policy and administrative changes,

3. Lee, Man-Kyu, History of Korean Education, p. 187.

the educational system also changed since the schools attracted more attention as the centers of many independent movements. Thus the second period began.

2. The Second Period, 1919-1931.

The uprising of the March 1 independence movement in 1919 created another page of history in which the Korean people made known to the world, and especially to the Japanese, of their determination for independence. This unrest was, of course, a direct indication that Japanese policy and administration had failed. It became evident that a slight change of policy would not be enough. Thus, Prime Minister Hara, of Japan, sounded off in the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper on August 1919, that "We will carry out various reforms in Korea, and will endeavor to assimilate in the future the Korean education, industry and commerce and even the system of civil servant appointments with those of Japan."⁴ Concomitant with this statement, the appointment of retired navy admiral Saito to the post of Governor-General and Doctor Mizuno to the post of Chief Civil Administrator materialized.

Saito and His "Cultural Administration"

Governor-General Saito's arrival was greeted with a baptism of bombs. Soon after his arrival, he made quite a drastic change in the administrative system. The military police were replaced by a civil police system, thus eliminating the influence of the army. The school system was also changed

4. Ibid., p. 246.

and furthermore received a greater attention than before.

The following table shows the comparative increase of schools and students. *

	1911		1919		1937	
	' Schools	Students'	' Schools	Students'	' Schools	Students
Common School	172	20,121	402	89,288	2,601	901,182
High Common School	5	819	12	3,156	27	15,629
Girls' High Common School	2	394	6	687	21	7,148
College	5	409	8	901	15	3,986
University	0	0	0	0	1	561 ⁵

*These statistics exclude industrial and other specialized fields.

Together with the marked increase of schools and students, there were also some administrative and policy changes. First, a partial change in the educational system was carried out as an appeasement to the highly unsatisfied Korean people. These changes were:

- a. a six year primary system
- b. instructions in foreign languages
- c. an eased attitude toward foreign missionaries, etc.

Meanwhile, Governor-General Saito appointed an educational committee and instructed it to re-examine completely the educational system in Korea

5. Ibid., pp. 250-251.

in order to "catch the true picture of Korean education." There were altogether 28 appointed members in this educational committee.

The idea of re-examining the Korean educational system was a very fine one and worthy of praise if it was meant for the good of the Korean people. But the composition of this committee showed the true intention of the Governor-General. It was composed of 9 officers from the office of the Governor-General, 6 high officials from Tokyo, 4 members from the Japanese House of Peers, 3 members from universities in Japan, the President of the Bank of Korea and the Presidents of Pyongyang High Common School and Suwon Agricultural College, a total of 25 Japanese, and 3 Koreans who were Pro-Japanese, making a total of 28 members. In January, 1921, the first conference of the Committee was held in Seoul and began with a speech by the Governor-General proposing 12 points to which the Committee should direct its thoughts.⁶

The results of this conference, carefully scrutinized and re-examined by the Privy Council of Japan, finally appeared in the form of the Second Educational Ordinance, promulgated in February, 1922.

The important changes in the new Educational Ordinances⁷ were:

1. Six school years for common schools instead of four years.
2. Korean educational system would follow the Japanese educational system as closely as possible.

6. Ibid., pp. 251-252

7. Governor-General of Korea, Compendium, Article 5, Educational Ordinance, Section 15, p. 11.

3. Departed from the idea of practical education.
4. Added teachers' education and university education to the existing three: elementary, professional and college education.
5. De-emphasized the characteristics of Korea.⁸

As a result of this period of expansion of schools the president and faculty were appointed in April 1926, and the Keijo (Seoul) Imperial University was established.⁹

The important administrative policy developed during this period was the idea of one school in every Myon, the local administrative unit. The objective of this policy was to establish 1704 more schools, mainly elementary schools with four school years, during the period of 1929 to 1936 by establishing over 130 schools every year, thus enabling every myon to have at least one elementary school. The current expenses were to be paid by land tax, house tax, tuition, and by government assistance (grant).¹⁰

3. The Third Period, 1931-1936.

The reflection of the world situation threw a dark shadow on the steps of Korean education under the Japanese during this period. Police control of the entire Korean nation was well in their hands by now and thus cast away the necessity of appeasing the Korean people. An important consideration faced by the administrators of the Japanese government at this time was

8. Ibid., see Volume II, pp. 262-264, for 3, 4, and 5 above.

9. Lee, Malkyu, Op. cit., p. 55.

10. Ibid., p. 298.

the world situation. Japan already had severed her relations with the League of Nations, and unbound herself from the Washington Agreement over the Problem of Manchu annexation, thus bringing about a storm in commercial and military affairs of the world. The policies of the government-general of Korea, of course, had to be in step with the policies of Japanese Government.

Governor-General Ugaki who came into the office in 1931 formulated policies accordingly. He stated that "Japan is in a critical condition" and to cope with this "critical condition" formulated a policy of "revitalization of farm villages and fishing villages" by advocating self-sufficiency and increased production. Furthermore, the production of industrial goods, particularly the goods needed for war, became an acute problem in Japan because of a shortage of raw materials and space. These problems could readily be solved in Korea because of her closeness to Manchuria, where the production of raw materials was plentiful. As an inducement for capital investment, therefore, the educational systems in Korea were directing their attention to the creation of semi-skilled laborers, or laborers who could understand the Japanese language so that they could work under Japanese capitalists. This was the picture and purpose of Korean education under the Japanese at that time.

The plan of establishing at least one school in each myon which started in 1925 was completed in 1936, but at the completion of this plan, there were still only 20 per cent who were going to schools out of the entire Korean school-age boys and girls.¹¹ Considering the achievement of sixty-five

11. Ibid., p. 330.

per cent literacy in Japan at that time, this could hardly be a self-justifying accomplishment for the administrators.

Realizing the short-comings in the result of the first plan, the Government-General organized a second plan in 1936. The main objectives of the second plan were:¹²

- a. to admit all the applicants to schools and by the end of the plan, 60 per cent of school-age boys and girls would be in school, thus creating the first step in compulsory education.
- b. to admit students in the public elementary schools with a yearly average of about 70,000 during the ten years starting with 1937 and thus increasing the number of students to 763,000. Also to increase the grades in the already established schools.
- c. to establish about 2,200 more simplified schools covering every small village in the country, thus enabling them to accommodate about 154,000 more students in ten years.

The expenditures were to be 16,775,000 won for the year the plan was to be completed and 32,715,000 won for temporary expenditures up to that year. These expenses were to be met by tuition and taxes except 6,210,000 won, which was 50 per cent of the expenses for personal services paid by the national grants-in-aid. Thus an average payment for each house in Korea for educational expenses was 1 won and 70 cents during that time.¹³

In spite of all the endeavors of the governor-generals to create faithful subjects out of the Korean people through education, the Koreans had never

12. Ibid., pp. 330-331

13. Ibid., p. 331

failed in their national consciousness. Independence movements still appeared in one form or another and also the ideological battle started to take shape around this time. The revolts for independence had continued day after day and the Communists also used the slogan of independence in their revolts to get popular support. Both types of people were classified as political criminals and the political criminals convicted during 1924 to 1935 were as follows:¹⁴

<u>Year</u>	<u>Persons</u>
1924	932
1925	933
1926	1,616
1927	1,654
1928	2,831
1929	3,078
1930	5,559
1931	6,673
1932	4,494
1933	4,043
1934	3,252
1935	2,820

The figures of this table show the general feeling of the Korean people toward the Japanese administration and also show the feelings of the students since they played leading parts in independence movements. Therefore, the above figures include many students. This was a clear testimony of failure of the Japanese administration in their general policy, yet the relative decline in the numbers from 1932 on was a proof of the effective control of the police

14. Ibid., p. 336.

department and the school administration.

During this period, "in November of 1930, school inspectors were stationed in the provincial governments to supervise the teachers and guide the moral life of the students." ¹⁵ The inspectors were appointed by the Governor-General and were directed to supervise the following functions:¹⁶

- a. Educational administration
- b. Conditions of school education
- c. Conditions of Japanese language propagation and arrangements for it to continue
- d. Arrangements for school hygiene
- c. Conditions for school economy
- f. Relationship between the school and its location
- g. Situation and attitude of school officers (including teachers) in their work, and other especially designated functions.
- h. Allowed to change the school curriculum of any school if thought necessary
- i. Could test literary abilities of students and report the results of their inspection to the Governor-General and also to the provincial governors

Looking over the powers and duties of inspectors, it is easy to comprehend the controlling power they enjoyed because the possibility of promotion

15. Government-General of Tyosen, Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937-1938, p. 39.

16. Government-General of Korea, Compendium of Laws and Statutes of Korea, Volume III, Chapter 10, pp. 2-3.

and punishment largely depended upon their reports.

The system of utilizing inspectors lasted until the end of the Japanese colonial administration. This kind of control in a fundamental institution of learning can only be exercised in a dictatorial administration. The office of inspector with such a controlling function will not be necessary in the present Korea though some kind of coordination officer could be useful.

4. The Fourth Period, 1937-1945.

Most of the capitalistic countries cannot survive without an outlet for their production, i. e. , a market. This was particularly true for a small country like Japan. Since Japan had a very limited area in her own domination, she had to resort to foreign markets for the disposal of her produced goods. Together with this necessity for market expansion, the overgrowth of population in Japan presented another insolvable problem to the Japanese administrators. Those problems could not be overcome only by a comparative economic advantage of which Japan had yet to achieve. The military-minded leaders of the time, therefore, advocated the only alternative they knew of and the only method they thought they were capable of, that of territorial expansion by military conquest, without any calculation of the far reaching consequences. In September 1931, Japan detached Manchuria from China, and in July 1937, started the march toward China which led the way to World War II, a war which proved to be most fatal for Japan.

During the War the entire policy in Korea followed the policies of Japan,

concentrating on the execution of the War. Educational policy, of course, had to follow the pattern. In March, 1938, Governor-General Minami declared the educational policy as follows:

In order to confirm the national policy and to follow the world trend, education must be built upon the three solid policies of clarification of the national character, of Japan and Korea as one body, and of endurance and training.¹⁷

The intention of the Government-General was to solidify public opinion with these iron-clad policies on education, and these policies may have succeeded if the Japanese domination continued longer and if the people, educated under the Japanese domination, had become the centers of the Korean society. But the Japanese domination was not long enough to make the Korean people accept these policies because the leaders of the Korean society realized their meaning. The policy of clarification of the national character meant the destruction of individuality which is essential in any democratic society, the policy of Japan and Korea as one body meant the destruction of the Korean national character and the policy of endurance and training meant the destruction of cultural advancement.

The following is an explanation of the blunt statements expressed above:

a. Clarification of National Character. It seems that Japanese policy makers, like Nazi leaders in Germany, cherished the idea of race-supremacy as a motivating force toward war. To develop the idea of race-supremacy,

17. Lee, Man-Kyu, History of Korean Education, p. 339.
 Government-General of Tyosen, Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937-1938, p. 86.

the policy makers stressed the significance of the more than 2,500 year old Japanese Shinto Mythology, tracing the present Emperor Hirohito as the descendent of God and the people being subjects of the Emperor, subjects of God.¹⁸ This theory was nothing particularly new, but it was stressed with force during this period so that the minds of the Japanese and the Koreans would be permeated with the idea that their bodies and souls were owned by God, i. e., the Emperor. Thus to go to war and die for the Emperor was the greatest honor that any Japanese subject could attain. The individual was insignificant in comparison to the cause of preservation of the "nation of God's descendent," the nation of the Emperor.

b. Japan and Korea as One Body. The slogan and policy of "Japan and Korea as one body" was formulated with the thought of uniting the Korean people with the Japanese in the execution of the war. To administer this policy the Government-General acted in a most ruthless manner. The police department arrested nationalists and revolutionaries one after another and dissolved any organization that could possibly have any relation in clarifying the Korean national character, not to speak of any organization that advocated it.¹⁹ For example, the Korean Language Association was raided in October, 1942, and over 100 of its members were arrested. Among those

18. See Imperial Rescript on Education.

19. Lee, Man-Kyu, History of Korean Education. See pp. 342-343 for further accounts of arrests and controls in schools.

arrested were thirty Korean school teachers and because of this the schools were immeasurably affected. Japanese administrators, utilizing the opportunity, replaced these Korean educational leaders by Japanese and exerted pressure by every means to carry out this policy of "Japan and Korea as one body."

Another method used to obliterate Korean character was the prohibition of use of the Korean language. In March, 1938, the new Educational Ordinance changed the Korean language teaching in schools from a compulsory curriculum to a selective course. Not satisfied with this, the Bureau of Education of the Government-General finally prohibited the teaching of the Korean language in April of that year, the time when the new Educational Ordinance, promulgated in March, was to be enforced.²⁰

This was wholly motivated by the desire to create solid Japanese citizens of the Koreans who would be useful in the war. This policy of the Japanese administrators could be accelerated and brought to fruition by having the Koreans forget their characteristics and national consciousness.

One humorous outcome of all the efforts to create unity between Japan and Korea was the enforcement of the Japanization of Korean surnames. In other words, the Korean people were "advised," but forced in actuality, to change their surnames to Japanese-like surnames. Though it was not com-

20. See the Educational Ordinance described in the subsequent pages. The Ordinance does not directly prohibit the teaching in Korean but states that the Korean educational system should follow the Japanese Educational Ordinance which makes teaching in Korean illegal.

pulsory, the people with Korean surnames could not get any positions nor were the students without Japanese surnames accepted in schools.²¹

Thus the policy of Korea and Japan as one body, a policy to create unity between the Korean and Japanese people, was forced upon the Korean people. The Korean people were to speak the Japanese language and imitate Japanese customs and all other habits. Yet there were discriminations between the Koreans and the Japanese, who even with the above policy, would not let the Korean people forget they were Koreans. (The economic discrimination can be fully substantiated in the sections of Finance and Industry.) The policy was defeated by the Japanese desire to be a dominating power.

c. The Policy of Endurance and Training. The necessity of a great labor force is an inevitability in the execution of a war. Foreseeing the necessity of a greater labor force, the administrators of the Government-General formulated the policy of endurance and training. Under this policy, the students were sent to factories and other places where labor forces were necessary instead of pursuing literary and cultural advancement. The school grades were marked according to the accomplishments in the factories rather than accomplishments in the schools. Advancement to higher education was also based on the merits earned in the factories. Cultural advancement completely disappeared from school learning. Instead, the school system

21. Lee, Man-Kyu, History of Korean Education, p. 345.

was utilized to create a necessary labor force which received no payment. This period of destructive education probably did more harm to the advancement of the Korean people than any other period in her history.

To supplement the above described policies, a new Educational Ordinance was promulgated on March 3, 1938. The contents of the Educational Ordinance are described below.

Educational Ordinance²²

- Article 1. The education in Korea will be carried out according to this ordinance.

- Article 2. Ordinary education will be administered in accordance with the primary school ordinance and the sections concerning middle school and high girls' schools in the secondary school ordinance. However, the duties vested in the minister of education in the primary school ordinance and in the parts concerning middle school and higher girls' schools in the secondary school ordinance, will be executed by the Governor-General. When a special provision is necessary because of the local conditions, the Governor-General may establish it.

- Article 3. The vocational school education will be administered in accordance with the section on vocational schools in the secondary school ordinance. However, the Governor-General will determine the rules concerning the supplementary courses in vocational schools. The duties of the Minister of Education in the parts of vocational schools in the secondary school ordinance will be vested in the Governor-General.

- Article 4. The college education will be administered by the college ordinance and the university education and the preparatory education for university will be administered by the university ordinance. However, among those Imperial

22. Government-General of Korea, Compendium of Laws and Statutes of Korea, Volume III, Section IV, p. 39, Imperial Creed No. 103.

Ordinances, the duties vested in the Minister of Education will be executed by the Governor-General. The establishment of colleges and the qualification of instructors of University preparatory school will be determined by the Governor-General.

Article 5. Teachers' education will be administered in accordance with the part of teachers' school regulations in the teachers' educational ordinances. However, duties vested in the Minister of Education in this ordinance will be administered by the Governor-General.

Article 6. The Governor-General will make the rules that administer all other educational establishments including private schools and schools that give special education.

Supplementary

This ordinance will be effective as of April 1, 1938. As of effective date of this Ordinance, the common schools, high common schools and girls' high common schools existing in Korea will become elementary schools, middle schools and higher girls' schools which are established in this Ordinance.

The education policies, with all the above described variations, were, of course, administered by the Bureau of Education which carried out the wishes of Chief Civil Administrators who in turn were directly responsible to their respective governor-generals. The Bureau of Education, though expanded with the progression of years, consisted of the following organizations:

The Education Section, Training Section, Editorial Section, Social Section and Youth Training Posts are to be established in the Bureau of Education.

The Educational Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning education and art and science.
2. Matters concerning teachers.
3. Matters concerning schools and kindergartens.
4. Matters concerning weather bureaus.
5. Matters concerning the teachers' co-operatives.
6. Matters concerning preservation and investigation of treasures, historic remains, scenic spots and natural interests.
7. Matters under the dominion of the Bureau but do not belong to any other section.

The Training Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning the training of youths.
2. Matters concerning the training of Army and Navy volunteers.
3. Matters concerning the special training of youths.
4. Matters concerning the training of leaders.
5. Matters concerning the training of citizens and education of citizens with spirit of service.
6. Matters concerning the physical improvements.
7. Matters concerning the social education and social educational work.
8. Matters concerning religion and religious books.

The Editorial Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning text-books.

2. Matters concerning sanctioning and recommendation of reference books for elementary school teachers.
3. Matters concerning investigation of national language.
4. Matters concerning movies, records and announcements for schools.
5. Matters concerning music and songs for schools.
6. Matters concerning publication and distribution of calendars.

The Social Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning military protection.
2. Matters concerning relief and treatment.
3. Matters concerning housing.
4. Matters concerning social welfare.
5. Matters concerning orphanage and reform schools.
6. Matters concerning other social works.²³

The Youth Training posts administers the training of main bodies of youths.

The importance placed on the education by the Japanese as a primary means of achieving their objective: Japanization and pacification could easily be detected from the careful selection of text books used by the Korean children. In pursuance of this matter, the office of Government-General, as a justification, stated that:

To meet the change of condition in the Peninsula, a fundamental revision (of text books) became necessary. Therefore, in August 1928, a Temporary Text-Book Inquiry Committee was formed to discuss plans. This resulted in fifty-three kinds of new books covering ethics,

23. Government-General of Korea, Compendium of Laws and Statutes of Korea, 1942. Volume 2, Section 1, pp. 22-23.

national language (Japanese), arithmetic, etc., in 172 volumes for common school use. In view of the patriotism and loyalty displayed by the Peninsula people since the outbreak of the China Incident and as a result of the fundamental revision of the Educational Ordinance in March 1938, similar instruction is given to Japanese and Korean children in order to form them into true and loyal Imperial subjects through their mental and physical training. Accordingly, from 1939, Japanese and Korean children used the same text books in their schools. The books used for ethics, national history, geography, science, songs and Korean language are compiled by the Educational Bureau of the Government-General and those for national language, penmanship, arithmetic, drawing, by the Educational Department of Japan.²⁴

To achieve the objective, Japan ventured even such unselfish deeds as paying out supplementary money from Japan proper for education and other cultural institutions. The payment was as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount</u>
1911	12,350,000 won
1913	10,000,000
1920	10,000,000
1921	15,000,000
1925	16,554,529
1926	19,405,471
1927	15,000,000
1932	12,500,000
1935	12,885,822
1939	12,904,313 ²⁵

The efforts of the governor-generals toward those objectives, without a doubt, materialized with some degree of success. In order to push this accomplishment a step further, Governor-General Minami set forth a policy to abolish the distinction between the Korean and the Japanese people "in

24. Government-General of Tyosen, Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937 - 1938, p. 88

25. The years not included here were approximately the same as the amount paid in the year that preceded them.

accordance with the Imperial statement of universal brotherhood.¹¹ He organized a Temporary Committee on Education and as a result of its study, unified the Sections two and three of the Education Ordinance which distinguished Japanese speakers from non-Japanese speakers. This enabled co-education of Japanese and Korean.²⁶ The co-education of Japanese and Korean started since 1938 and this also was the fatal year that the usage of the Korean language was completely prohibited.²⁷

Irrespective of Japanese objectives, the assimilation of educational system between Japanese and Korean people paved a way for Korean people to attain a higher education with some-what opportunity. With a similar educational preparation, Korean people were able to compete for higher learning in colleges²⁸ and universities,²⁹ though the disadvantage of competing in foreign language was too obvious.

Economy

Korean economy under the Japanese Colonial Administration could be classified into five periods of transition in its development. The first period was during the first ten years after the annexation and ended in 1920. The second period was the duration of about ten years from 1920

26. Chosen Bunka Fkyusha, A Grand View of Korea, p. 288.

27. Loc. Cit.

28. Ibid., p. 291.

29. Ibid., p. 292.

to 1931, the year that the Manchu Incident started, and marks another transition. The third period was during the five or six years between the Manchu Incident and China Incident and the termination of this period probably was 1937, the year that started the China Incident. The fourth period was during the time from the China Incident to the beginning of World War II which could be called the period of war economy, and the last period started with World War II until the time of the Japanese defeat.

1. The First Period, 1910-1920.

This was the period of the establishment of economic foundations, mainly concentrated in such basic developments as streets, harbors, railways and communications. At this stage Japan already had the long-range view of colonial expansion and "their economic policy" through the Government-General of Korea, "was to establish a solid ground in Korea as a market for the Japanese industrial goods." 30

Consequently, capital investment from Japan was mainly directed to transportation, communication, electric power, and to land purchase and the trade between Japan and Korea shows an unbalanced and excessive import by Korea until about 1920. The policy of the Government-General was not to integrate the Korean economy into the Japanese economy but to connect to Japanese industry as a market, Korea maintaining her econ-

30. Takeo Suzuki, The New Construction of Korean Economy, p. 9.

omic independence only to the extent that it would not be a Japanese burden.

However, the World War I industrial boom brought about a change in the Japanese economy and the Korean economy was also influenced accordingly. The rapid development of industries in Japan during World War I created a big problem of food shortage and Japan began to look for the solution in Korea. The rice export to Japan from Korea increased drastically since 1920 and 1921, and the policy of the Government-General shifted to meet this demand from Japan proper which lead to the second step in the development of Korean economy.

The Second Period, 1920-1931.

The second period went into its full swing with the establishment of "The Plan to Increase Rice Production" by the Government-General in 1920. In 1921, the Government-General opened a meeting for research in industrial economy to set a "General Direction for Korean Industry." Its report stated that the "objective" of the future Korean economy "is to adopt itself to the policy of the Japanese economy" and "to maintain close relationship between Korea and Japan." It is interesting to note that the "General Direction for Korean Industry" includes all phases of industry. However, the first paragraph of the report stressed that "improvement and increase of rice production multiplies the wealth of Korea and contributes to the fulfillment of the food problem in Imperial Japan."³¹ Korea thus specialized in rice production and depended completely upon Japan as her rice market and as a supplier of other industrial goods

31. Ibid., pp. 12-13

and gradually lost her economic independence.

The 1929-1930 depression brought about an indirect influence to the Korean economy which was heavily dependent on the single-crop production of rice. Though the production of rice in Korea was an absolute necessity for the Japanese food problem, still the depression created a big enough economic problem to necessitate a re-examination of the entire economic structure. The biggest single factor to change the direction of Korean economy at this time, however, was the discovery of electric power resources together with the beginning of the Manchu Incident.

During the four years from 1922, the Government-General twice carried out investigations for power potentials and the investigations revealed a great possibility of power supply. Subsequently in 1926, Mr. Noguchi of the Nitrogen Company of Japan established the Hydro-Power Company of Korea, which started an industrial wave in Korea. This trend was further accelerated by the starting of the Manchu Incident in 1931, and once again turned the wheels of Korean economy in another direction.

The Third Period, 1931-1937.

This period, in short, is a period of industrialization in Korea. Governor-General Kazunari Ugaki, who came to occupy the office right before the outbreak of the Manchu Incident, developed a policy of utilization of resources.³² He advocated the "policy of the movement toward farm development," of which the attention was directed toward the encouragement of cotton production in the south and sheep production in

32. Ibid., p. 7.

the north" and the "policy of over-all production increase." His policy was not by any means a positive step toward Korean industrialization. However, the war-time economy resulted in a tremendous increase in the price of gold and that in turn brought about an unexpected gold rush in Korea. Consequent result was a general prosperity.

Furthermore, the establishment of the Manchu Nation under the domination of Japan forced a re-examination on the importance of Korea as the "Mainland Root," which connects Japan to Manchuria, in other words, as the communication and transportation center.

On the other hand, the war-time economy control started to take effect in Japan proper and also right after the formation of the Manchu Nation, the Government of Manchu restricted the flow of capital into Manchuria. This caused the flow of capital to Korea and the Government-General welcomed this advantage. This was generally known as the "Free Economic Policy of Ugaki," but it was not a conscious and positive effort of the Government-General. The trend was simply a result of favorable conditions created by power supply, cheap labor, and lack of restrictions from government in the industrial development in Korea.³³

The best proof of the industrial development could be given by the following table.

33. See Ibid., p. 21, for substantiation.

Comparative Table of Amount of Production
in Various Industries

Products	1931 1,000 yen	Per- cent	1937 1,000 yen	Per- cent	Index 1931=100
Agricultural	702,855	63	1,541,366	52	219
Forestry	59,413	5	138,710	5	233
Marine	77,562	7	187,953	6	242
Mining	21,741	2	110,429	4	507
Industrial	<u>252,294</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>959,308</u>	<u>33</u>	380
Total	1,114,495	100	2,937,766	100	263

The Fourth Period, 1937-1940.

In the midst of industrial development, the China Incident broke open and the Korean economy had to change its direction once again.

The freedom without any control could not be kept up too long since the economic policy of Korea was largely directed and influenced by the Japanese economy. In December 1937, the important industrial control came into effect. Subsequently with the National Mobilization Law proclamation, the independence of Korean economy became already a past history and mutual dependency with Japan for a war-time economic system came into full effect. Korea as the advanced military base for the Chinese mainland also had to shoulder the burden of the advanced base of economic supply.³⁴ The development of industry shifted from light industry to heavy industry. For example,

34. Ibid., pp. 25-28.

in 1939 the composition of Korean industry from the vantage of production amount indicated that agriculture was 42 per cent, forestry 5 per cent, marine products 8 per cent, mining products 6 per cent, and industry 39 per cent. Comparing with the 1936 figures which were agriculture 52 per cent, industry 31 per cent, the tremendous increase in industry can easily be comprehended. While this industrialization was in progress, world tension finally broke out in the form of World War II.

The Fifth Period, 1940-1945.

Probably all wars create a similar effect in any country as in Korea. During the nightmarish period of World War II, the industry-mainly light industry-for civilian consumption came almost to a dead-end, but the military industry-mainly heavy industry-showed somewhat of an eye-opening progress.

The economic policy of the office of the governor-general during this period was concentrated solely on the industrialization of the Korea - Manchuria area³⁵ where the supply of natural resources was abundant. On January 28 and 29 of 1941, the Korean-Manchurian Affiliation Conference, a conference between the Governor-General of Korea and the government of Manchuria, was held.³⁶ At the time this conference was greatly hailed by all of the public information systems, which were controlled by the office of

35. Ibid., pp. 63-68.

36. Ibid., p. 64.

the Governor-General, as a great industrial advancement for both Korea and Manchuria.

True to the official claims, this period contributed more to the industrialization of Korea--especially in heavy industry--than any other period. However, candor will oblige even for the Japanese to admit that this was the result of a necessity of executing the war rather than a fruit of philanthropy--mainly that of the Korean people as the Japanese claimed.

The conference was concluded with several agreements. The important agreements born out of the conference were:

1. Mass supply of Mil-San coal and hard coal to Manchuria from Korea.
2. Supply of anthracite coal, pig iron, and iron supplies to Manchuria from Korea in sufficient quantity.
3. Larger supply of electricity to Manchuria.³⁷

The main objective of these provisions concluded in this conference was to create a supply center for war and strategic materials which are not located within the concentrated industrial area in Japan proper.

War is a destructive adventure for both winning and losing nations. Ironically, this destructive adventure of Japan, however, contributed to the development of industrial power in Korea and relieved the labor situation even though all administrative and technical positions including minor ones were held

37. Ibid., p. 64.

by the Japanese themselves.

It is obvious from the above description of Korean economy under Japanese administration that the Korean people were too busy earning their living and never had any opportunity for self-improvement either spiritually or materially. This method of economic subjugation probably was the key to pacifying colonial subjects and maintaining colonial administration.

The economic subjugation and economic policy of the Japanese colonial administration can be demonstrated more precisely through financial administration and taxation.

Finance. The shuffle on financial matters to Japanese liking, realizing the importance of and necessity of colonial exploitation, started as early as August 1904, when Baron Megata was appointed financial advisor, and the so-called "financial clearance" began. The "financial clearance" started with the "establishment of a central bank, uniform currency, gold standard, etc.,"³⁸ that was essential in the modern economy. The jinx exerted in this "clearance" was the placing of the central bank which played a most important role in the national economy under Japanese control and later under Japanese administration since the bank was owned by the government.

As the time progressed and as the Japanese colonial control took successful effect, the economic and financial control appeared in various forms. Among the important organization of such were farm associations which con-

38. Government-General of Tyosen, Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937-1938, p. 50.

trolled irrigation and other farm necessities, financial co-operations, and industrial guilds. Needless to say, these organizations were under strict control of the office of the governor-general via provincial offices.

Another important contributing factor to the over-all picture of Korean economy and finance was the Japanese investment in Korea. According to the investigation of the Bank of Choen at the end of 1931, the Japanese investment in Korea amounted to 2,128,790,000 won. Considering that one billion and 700 million won of the entire national wealth, which was seven billion won according to the figure given by the office of the governor-general, was owned by the government, the Japanese possessed about 60 per cent of the national wealth of Korea.³⁹ In 1938 the figure of Japanese investment was increased to somewhere between three billion 600 million won and five billion--the accurate amount could not be acquired because of lack of statistics--which would be about 85 per cent of the national wealth.⁴⁰ It is not difficult to see from these figures how complete the economic and financial controls were in Korea under the Japanese colonial administration.

To understand the finance of a nation, importance of the budget should not be over-looked. The revenue and expenditure prepared by the Governor-General's office showed as follows:

39. Investigation Section of the Chosen Shokusan Bank, Japanese Capital Investment in Korea and a General View of Business, p. 2.

40. Ibid., p. 4.

		<u>Ordinary</u>	<u>Extra-Ordinary</u>	<u>Total*</u>
1911	Revenue	24,067,588	24,674,199	48,741,782
	Expenditure	27,891,437	20,850,345	48,741,782
1926	Revenue	151,041,757	43,446,157	194,487,914
	Expenditure	143,001,596	52,486,318	194,487,914
1935	Revenue	240,463,427	49,803,987	290,267,414
	Expenditure	210,991,070	79,276,344	290,267,414
1938	Revenue	364,242,213	154,672,815	518,915,028
	Expenditure	290,198,033	228,716,995	518,915,028 41

*Unit-won

It is extremely peculiar that the extra-ordinary revenues and the expenditures should be such tremendous amounts for each year. However, it is understood that much of the unjustifiable incomes which came from exploitation of the Korean people were classified as extra-ordinary revenue and expenses for subjugation of the Korean nationalists were classified under extra-ordinary expenditures.

The principle source of revenue, of course, was taxation and this probably is the other important aspect in the colonial administration.

Taxation. The principal taxes of the old Korea were the land and household taxes, and those two supplied the bulk of the national revenue. However, "not only was the incidence of them grossly unfair but the assessors usually resorted to making false reports from selfish motives, the result being that only a portion of the amount actually collected reached its

41. Op. cit., Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937-1938, p. 252.

final destination--the national treasury." 42

Early in the protectorate regime, revised regulations for tax collection were issued, by which revenue officers were specially stationed at various important places and were put under the immediate supervision of the Finance Department. In 1909, land registers were prepared in order to make clear which lands were taxable and in whose possession they were, that the tax "might be properly imposed, and evasion of it rendered impossible."

In 1913, the custom of collecting the tax from tenant farmers was discontinued, as it was unreasonable from the legal standpoint, and the landowners were held directly responsible for its payment. Also as a result of a land survey which was finished in 1918, the land tax was completely remodelled, and in lieu of levying the tax according to class and locality, a single rate was fixed at 1.3 per cent of the land value. In 1922 this was increased to 1.7 per cent. 43

Thus systematic taking-over of lands and properties started through constant increase of taxes to the extent that the Korean people would lose their lands and properties by default of payment of taxes, while the Japanese were safe since they were administered under the tax laws of Japan proper.

The tax provisions that came into force were:

- a. Corporation income tax in August 1916, which was revised again in 1920.
- b. Exchange tax in April 1921. This tax was imposed on both exchanges and bill brokers, the rate being

42. Government-General of Tyosen, Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937-1938, pp. 53-54.

43. Ibid., p. 54.

10 per cent of the brokerage charged by the former and 0.05 per cent. of the contracted amount for the latter.

- c. Sugar consumption tax in April 1919, of which the rate was raised again in 1922.
- d. Business tax and unearned increment tax in March 1927. The business tax was levied on certain profitable businesses, twenty-four of such were specified, and the unearned increment tax was levied on interests on public bonds and industrial debentures, the rate was 2 per cent. of interests occurring from them.
- e. Tax on playing cards from 1931, made payable in revenue stamps.
- f. Income, inheritance, liquor and non-alcoholic beverages taxes during 1934 and 1935.
- g. National loan bond interest tax, corporation capital tax, foreign currency loan special tax in 1937. ⁴⁴

At the beginning of 1937, the tension between China and Japan was mounting to a critical situation. In consequence, from the necessity of mobilization, tax rates were ever surmounting, especially for income, unearned increment, and temporary profits taxes.

The North China Incident which started in July 1937, gave the final push to the ever-increasing taxes and from August of that year, Korea went under an emergency status under the North China Incident Special

44. Op. cit., Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937-1938. pp. 55-58.

Tax Law.⁴⁵ The North China Incident Special Law being an emergency measure, therefore needs no special consideration here.

To take care of the administrative and of tax collection, "in May 1934, ninety-nine tax offices and five supervising offices were established to conduct the business of internal taxes formerly in charge of the financial departments of each province." ⁴⁶

Government Monopoly. The importance of the Monopoly Bureau cannot be ignored in the financial picture of Korea during the Japanese occupation.

Monopoly practice by the office of the government-general was created mainly for two reasons: (1) as an important source of revenue, and (2) to control production and distribution of certain commodities. The practice of monopoly started as early as 1907 when the government became aware of the financial implication in the production and export of Insam, roots of a particular type of plant with a tremendous medical value. To exercise complete control of Insam production and distribution, the Insam Law was proclaimed in October 1920, and it was brought under the administration of the Monopoly Bureau which was then organized. The revenue from the Insam monopoly gives some idea of the importance of the financial administration of Korea. It was quoted as follows:

45. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

46. Ibid., p. 40.

1911-	119, 573 won
1920-	2, 544, 556 won
1930-	2, 449, 463 won
1937-	1, 812, 964 won ⁴⁷

Since the establishment of the Monopoly Bureau, its activity increased by years. In September 1929, it took over the purchasing, marketing and manufacturing of opium and morphine. "From March 1930, it took charge of all matters governing the purchase, import, export, and control of salt,"⁴⁸ and finally in June 1931, the system of distribution of tobacco and cigarettes through a private wholesale company was abolished and sales were made directly by the Monopoly Bureau.⁴⁹

Agriculture

Agriculture, as is in most far-eastern nations, occupies the most vital part in the economic picture of Korea. Such being the case, a separate section is warranted for the analysis of its administration.

The core of the agricultural administration was, of course, the Bureau of Agriculture and commerce.⁵⁰ Korea is essentially an agricultural

47. Ibid., p. 64.

48. Ibid., p. 39.

49. Loc. cit.

50. In 1943, the Agricultural and Forestry Bureau was reorganized by the Government-General's Order No. 88 and became the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce.

country, over seventy per cent⁵¹ of the entire population being engaged in agricultural pursuits of one kind or another. This would provide more than sufficient proof indicating the importance of agriculture in the economic life of Korea.

According to the Rules on Division of Work in the Government-General in Korea, issued on December 1, 1943, by the administrative order No. 88, the administrative function of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce was as follows:

Article 4. The Agricultural Section, Food Policy Section, Agricultural Resources Section, Arable Land Section, Marine Products Section, Commerce Section and Engineer Training posts are to be established in the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce.

The Agricultural Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning general agricultural policies.
2. Matters concerning agricultural groups.
3. Matters concerning production of agricultural products.
4. Matters concerning fertilizers, agricultural implements and other materials to be used in the agricultural production.
5. Matters concerning silk yarn and silk thread.
6. Matters concerning livestock farming, livestock hygiene and policies on horses.

51. See Annual Report on Administration, p. 119.

7. Matters concerning settlers.
8. Matters concerning the control of export and import of vegetables.
9. Matters concerning agricultural experimental stations, research institute for farm animal hygiene, sheep farms, and horse farms.
10. Matters under the dominion of the Bureau but not delegated to any particular section.

The Food Policy Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning supply and adjustment of prices of principle food stuffs.
2. Matters concerning rationing of important food supplies and controlling of export and import food supplies.
3. Matters concerning purchase, sale and maintenance of foods by the central government.
4. Matters concerning management of the finance of the Korean Food Administration.
5. Matters concerning improvement, manufacturing and maintenance of main foods.
6. Matters concerning warehouses for rice and for other uses in agriculture.

The Agricultural Resources Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning the investigation of agricultural resources.
2. Matters concerning the examination of grains and straw-bags.

The Arable Land Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning creation and improvement of arable lands.
2. Matters concerning irrigation association.

3. Matters concerning uncultivated national lands.
4. Matters concerning reclamation of public swamps and dry beaches for the agricultural purpose.

The Marine Production Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning marine products.
2. Matters concerning marine and fishing associations.
3. Matters concerning marine markets.
4. Matters concerning marine experimental stations and marine product testing stations.

The Commerce Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning commerce.
2. Matters concerning trade.
3. Matters concerning such industrial goods as textile, good, etc., which are not under the domain of any other section.
4. Matters concerning chamber of commerce and industrial and commercial associations, and industry associations.
5. Matters concerning generalization of industry permits (permits for industry) and industrial organizations.
6. Matters concerning price control.
7. Matters concerning office of standards

The Agricultural Engineer Training Posts administer the training of agricultural engineers.⁵²

The rural communities in Korea with its population predominantly farmers, had advanced very little in social changes from the days of feudalistic society.

52. Governor-General. Compendium, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, pp. 21-22

The big farm owners mostly lived in cities and appointed a trustee in the farm location to supervise their farms. The methods of collecting tenant fees were:

1. One-half of grain products to be collected at the time of harvest, or
2. Payment of certain amount of money or grain under the mutual agreement between the owner and the tenant irrespective of the quantity of production.

The existing methods were quite convenient for the Japanese individuals and companies who eventually became the owners of the major part of the arable lands in Korea.⁵³ Consequently, the office of the government-general exerted no effort to bring about any change to the existing semi-feudalistic system. The lack of any effort toward agrarian reform at that time could very well be attributed as the creation of fertile ground for communism and consequently the direct cause of today's trouble in Korea.

The main organizations through which the Japanese secured the control of agrarian lands were the Korean Farm Association, financial co-operations, irrigation associations and industrial guilds that were located all over the country.⁵⁴ Personnel and administrative methods of those organizations give more than sufficient indication as to what means were

53. Himeno, Minoru, Pictorial Charts of Korean Economy, p. 167.

54. Loc. cit., and also Government-General of Korea, Korean Situation, pp. 45-47.

used to acquire the control of lands by the Japanese.

It would, of course, be a misrepresentation of facts if the Japanese contribution toward advancement of agriculture in Korea is left unsaid.

Realizing Korea as the most important source of food supply, all government-generals, without exception, endeavored to improve agricultural production.

To this end, their concentration was directed toward:

1. Suwan Government Agricultural Experimental Station which was founded in 1906 and gradually branched out in several places in various provinces, to experiment all possible agricultural advancement. This is somewhat similar to that of agricultural experimental stations in the United States which were organized with the aid of the Federal Government in the form of Agricultural grants-in-aid, and also with similar success. The only difference was that while those of the United States are operated under private enterprises, mainly universities, those in Korea were under the direct supervision and operation of the government.
2. Fire land tillers' settlement, by transferring the government farmlands to the landless farmers without cost.
3. Irrigation system improvement; about forty per cent of the paddy fields had been entirely dependent upon the rainfall without any irrigation system. Therefore, in July 1917, regulations relating to "irrigation association" were promulgated for a better irrigation. These irrigation associations eventually in 1919 came under the government subsidizing work. ⁵⁵

The concentrated effort to increase agricultural products was not wasted. The endeavor increased the total value of crop production in

55. See Annual Report, pp. 123-124.

1936 to 1,208,910,000 won of which 308,040,000 won was exported, mostly to Japan, forming fifty-two per cent of the total value of export trade in that year.⁵⁶ Obviously, encouragement of production was directed toward the crops that were needed most in Japan such as rice, apples, etc. However, for home consumption, food value of barley and wheat was greatly advertised and usage of them was encouraged in accordance.⁵⁷ Other important crops produced in Korea were soya-beans which was the second most important article for export, red beans, millet, cotton, hemp, sugar beet and among the fruits were apple, pear, grape, peach, persimmon and chestnut.

Encouragement of barley and wheat for home consumption and exportation of large portions of rice to Japan was a policy born out of food shortage in Japan and execution of this policy was possible because the majority of arable lands were owned by the Japanese. The distribution of farmers by each class that bears out the above fact, was in 1941, as follows:

Self-farmers	527,717
Tenants and partial self-farmers	729,431
Complete tenant farmers.....	1,641,702
Fireland or migratory farmers	56,818
Hired hands	95,778 58

56. Ibid., pp. 123-124

57. Ibid., pp. 124-126

58. Government-General, Korean Situation, p. 26.

The division by nationality gives a further clarity to this picture.

The same year, 1941, the division was as follows:

Korean	3,043,465	
Japanese	5,893	
Chinese and Manchurians	4,089	
Other foreigners	1	59

The exploitation of agricultural products which were and still are the chief sources of livelihood for the majority of Koreans, created a tremendous discontentment among the people and consequently presented problems constantly. To subdue these problems, in October 1934, following the enactment of the Korean Farmland Act, Tenancy Committees were established in each province and island to arbitrate disputes in accordance with the Law for Mediation of Disputes on Tenancy Questions.

Police

The backbone of the Japanese administration of Korea was undoubtedly the police force. Its effective control was the main weapon in carrying out and enforcing policies irrespective of opposition from the Korean people. To understand the reason for such effectiveness, it is important to trace its historical development.

The Japanese government early realizing the importance of police control and its strength, proposed on several occasions the transfer of police

59. Loc. cit.

power to the Japanese government from the Korean government. After the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Japanese government, utilizing the force and advantage acquired by the victory in that war, forced the Korean government to engage a Japanese advisor to institute reform in the police system. Thus, the Korean police system was established on a more or less modern basis under the Japanese. At the same time it was "arranged to make use of the Japanese gendarmerie stationed in the country to protect telegraphs and railways." ⁶⁰ In 1907 the Japanese took over the additional duties of both "high and ordinary police." ⁶¹

The police and gendarmerie were thus made to work together. But the strong anti-Japanese movement created a necessity for closer unity between these two organizations. Accordingly, in June, 1910, shortly before the annexation, they were combined into one force and placed under the dictatorial direction of a single authority of the gendarmerie. "A police headquarters was next established in Seoul with the commander-in-chief of the gendarmerie at its head, and a subordinate office in each province with the local gendarme captain in charge of it." ⁶² According to local requirements, gendarmes and police were separately distributed.

60. Government-General of Tyosen, Annual Report, 1937-1938, p. 174.

61. Loc. cit.

62. Loc. cit.

Railway centers and peaceful towns had a police station in them with a police sergeant or inspector at its head, while outlying districts and less peaceful districts were guarded by gendarme detachments.

The March 1st Independence Movement of 1919 probably was the biggest blow to the Japanese administration, especially to the police system, at that time. The independence movement of the Korean people added strength day by day, influenced by the successive events of the Paris Peace Conference and President Wilson's fourteen points advocating self-determination of weaker nations. The under-current of the movement was blown up on March 1, 1919, with a big surprise for the Japanese policy makers. The necessity of changing the policy toward Korea became most acute. The first step taken by the Japanese Government to remedy this situation was that a civilian, not a military person as it had been up to that time, was to be appointed as a governor-general and a policy of appeasement to the Korean people was to prevail.

Accordingly, retired Admiral Saito was appointed as the Governor-General on August 12, 1919, and a former Japanese Minister of State and able administrator, Dr. Mizuno, was appointed to the post of chief civil administrator. Thus the program of "cultural administration" was started instead of continuing the "military administration."

The first action under the "cultural administration" was the creation of the civil police force and termination of control by military police or

gendarmerie.⁶³

A police bureau was organized in the Government-General as a central organ replacing the former headquarters which was administered by the commander-in-chief of the gendarmes in Korea. The police bureau was entrusted with the entire administration of police and sanitary affairs. At the same time, the power over the local police was transferred to the provincial governors. A Third Department (in 1921 this was changed to the police department) was formed in each provincial office with a civil servant at its head and a police station in every town and district with a staff of police officers.⁶⁴

At the time of this reform:

"The number of gendarmes discharging police duties under the old system was about 8,000, the replacing of which by civilians (Japanese and some Koreans), raised the police force to 16,835, including 2,000 new men. This force was distributed among 247 police stations with 121 police boxes (kobansyo) in urban districts and 1,438 police offices in rural districts. In 1919 again extension work was undertaken and the force increased to 250 urban police stations with 160 police "boxes" and 2,300 rural police offices in existence with a force of over 20,000 officers and men." 65

Late in 1924, however, following the general retrenchment policy, reduction was made by about 2,000 men, and the force, until the end of

63. Chiba, Ryo, Unknown Stories of the Korean Independence Movement, pp. 1-108.

64. Chosen Bunka Fkyusha, A Grand View of Korea, p. 318.

65. Op. cit., Annual Report, p. 175.


the war, stood at approximately 1,304 officers and 18,482 men at 254 police stations and 2,771 substations.⁶⁶

The policemen were mostly trained in the police training institute in Seoul which was under the direct management of the government. Recruits for the service were admitted by examination and passed nine to twelve months training in this school. The major subjects taught included ethics (Koreans called it forced permeation of Japanese spirit), law, police administration, criminology, hygiene, gymnastics, etc.

66. Loc. cit.

The following chart shows the organization of the police system after the reform which continued until the end of the war.

TABLE III



At the start of the Japanese administration, the exercise of police control varied as between the Koreans and the Japanese, each having its separate law to be applied. But after the establishment of the annexation, it was arranged, at least in theory, to bring both under the single control. The control extended from the control of guns and powders and its manufacturing to business control extending to such places as second-hand stores, pawnshops, bathhouses, hotels, restaurants, public notaries, kisangs (entertainers), licensed brothels and prostitutes, under the laws enacted in 1912 and 1916. Regulations were enacted during 1913 to 1917 for the control of traffic covering all roads and all kinds of vehicles. In addition, provisions were made for the control of building, hunting, speculation and even to the extent of thought control:⁶⁷

The administration of those regulations was mainly carried out in provincial level or by local governments under the direction of provincial governments. But the issuance of general directives and over-all supervision of police administration were the functions of the central government. Those functions were, of course, delegated to the police bureau by the Governor-General and administered by five main sections in the police bureau of the Government-General. They were the police section, defense section, economic police section, peace section and health section and each section's functions were defined in the Government-General Order No. 88. It reads:

67. Government-General of Tyosen, Annual Report, p. 176.

Article 7. The police section, defense section, economic police section and the health section are to be established in the Police Bureau.

The following matters are administered in the Police Section:

1. **Matters concerning police administration.**
2. **Matters concerning policing areas, placement of police officers and their duties.**
3. **Matters concerning police uniforms, arms, ammunitions and other equipment.**
4. **Matters concerning service merit and medals of police officers and fire officers.**
5. **Financial matters concerning police officers at the defense of frontier and the families of the dead police officers.**
6. **Matters concerning military affairs.**
7. **Matters concerning police cooperatives.**
8. **Matters concerning control of gun powders.**
9. **Matters under the Police Bureau but do not belong to any section in the Bureau.**

The Defense Section administers the following functions:

1. **Matters concerning defense and guarding.**
2. **Matters concerning air defense.**
3. **Matters concerning sea defense and fire extinguishing.**

The Economic Police Section administers following functions:

1. **Matters concerning economic police.**
2. **Matters concerning control of laborers.**

The Peace Section administers the following functions:

1. Police matters concerning foreign affairs and high police.
2. Matters concerning control and censorship of newspapers, magazines and other publications.
3. Matters concerning copyright.
4. Matters concerning control and censorship of movies.
5. Matters concerning the control of records.

The Health Section administers the following functions:

1. Matters concerning prevention of epidemics.
2. Matters concerning doctors and medicines.
3. Matters concerning the control of opiums and other narcotics.
4. Matters concerning burial and cremation.
5. Matters concerning butchery business.
6. Matters concerning bacteriological examination, manufacturing of anti-serums, and health tests.
7. Other matters concerning public health and welfare. ⁶⁸

The existence of the "Peace Section" in the above ordinance was the most noteworthy one which no democratic form of government but only a totalitarian government could tolerate. As it was specified, it administered censorship of newspapers and functions of "high police" which mainly were control of subversives and "thought control." The idea of

68. Government-General of Tyosen, Compendium of Laws and Statutes, 1942. Volume 1, Chapter 2, pp. 23-24.

thought control actually came into practice because of too numerous participants in the independence movement. The office of the government-general, however, stated that:

"In December 1937, for the necessity of preventing the repetition of crimes by 'thought offenders' in consideration of the special character of dangerous thoughts in Tyosen, the Probation Act for 'Thought Offenders' was promulgated for their protection by observing the trend of their minds and their actions."⁶⁹

The government-generals of Korea utilized this Act extensively and any Korean who was undesired by the Japanese for either economic or political reason was eliminated under this Act. As such, when a police can put away people at their will, effective control of the people is not difficult and thus the Japanese control of Korea was maintained.

Justice

The system of administering Justice in Korea followed closely the practice of German law where the central nation of public law devotes superiority of State over individuals rather than the practice of Common Law. Under this concept, the Police Bureau was able to function in obtaining the goal of complete control. The Justice Department, under the same philosophy, functioned as an agency of enforcing effective control rather than as an administrator of Justice. The Rules on Division of Work in the Government-General in Korea defined the function of the Justice Bureau as follows:

69. Op. cit., Annual Report, p. 42.

Article 7. The Administrative Section, The Civil Section and The Criminal Section are to be established in the Justice Bureau. The Administrative Section administers the following functions:

1. **Matters concerning establishment, abolition and defining of sphere of jurisdiction of the courts.**
2. **Matters concerning prisons and prison guards training posts.**
3. **Matters concerning parole of prisoners.**
4. **Matters concerning identification of criminals' movement.**
5. **Matters concerning protection and observation of thought criminals.**
6. **Matters concerning preventive imprisonment (detention).**
7. **Matters concerning trial and correction of juvenile delinquents.**
8. **Matters concerning judicial protections.**
9. **Matters concerning mutual benefit societies of prison staffs.**
10. **Matters concerning lawyers.**
11. **Matters within the domain of the bureau but not especially delegated to any other section.**

The Civil Section administers the following functions:

1. **Matters concerning civil and non-litigation cases.**
2. **Matters concerning trial of civil and non-litigation cases.**
3. **Matters concerning mediation and arbitration.**
4. **Matters concerning registration.**

5. Matters concerning census.
6. Matters concerning notarial act.
7. Matters concerning deposits.

The Criminal Section administers the following functions:

1. Criminal matters.
2. Matters concerning trials of criminal matters.
3. Matters concerning public prosecution.
4. Matters concerning direction of amnesty and execution sentences.
5. Matters concerning delivery and extradition of criminals.⁷⁰

Realizing the importance of effective control of internal security in the Colonial Administration, Japan started annexation of the function of Justice early. Prince Ito, the first Resident General, under the new agreement in 1907, caused Judicial affairs to be separated from those of executive. At that time, after the example of Japan, law courts were constituted on the three-trial system, and professional Japanese were appointed to the important posts.

"With the pressure of annexation closing in, and together with the financial difficulty of the Korean Government, the entire jurisdiction of the country, this was at last entrusted as the care of Japan in 1909. As a result of annexation in the year following, extra territoriality enjoyed by foreign residents came to an end, and

70. Japanese Government, Compendium, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, p. 22.

all were alike brought under Japanese Jurisdiction." ⁷¹

Under the system of "three instances", there are three kinds of law courts with a procurator's office attached to each. Local courts deal with the first hearing of both civil and criminal cases. A court of Appeal deals with appeals against judgment pronounced by a local court, while the Supreme Court passes final judgment on appeals against a decision in a court of appeal and also performs those functions vested exclusively in the highest tribunal. In a local court, the hearing is held by a single Judge as a rule, but when it is a question of a civil suit involving 1,000 won upward on a case of personal process or some other specific case, three judges and the Supreme Court by five, and so form Collegiate Courts. Simultaneously with the adoption of this system, rules for lawyers, notaries public, and bailiffs were published.⁷² The competency of Korean Judges and procurators was formerly limited to the handling of cases, civil or criminal, in which Koreans only were involved. But such limitation being thought no longer necessary, revision of the regulations for courts of Justice was again made in March 1920. "With the object of doing away with all such objectionable discrimination between Korean and Japanese on the bench".

71. Government-General of Tyosen, Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937-1938, p. 193.

72. Chosen Bunka Fkyusha, Chosen Taikan, p. 310.

At first, Judges had no security of tenure, but in 1911 some revisions were made in the regulations by which Judges serving the Government-General were secured of their positions for life unless they forfeited the privilege by being condemned to imprisonment or by laying themselves open to disciplinary punishment. Nevertheless,

"as a special provision was still retained making it possible for the Government-General to order them suspended from duty whenever deemed necessary, the regulations were further modified in 1921 so that Judges might enjoy the feeling of absolute stability in their independent capacity" ⁷³

In 1921, an age limit for the bench, modeled on the one in Japan, was introduced by which the retiring age for the Supreme Court was fixed at 63 and for Judges in general at 60, though, on a resolution by a General Council of the Supreme Court, the period of service may be prolonged by five years more in the case of men of very exceptional merit. Eligibility for the bar as defined by law, has been granted to those licensed to practice law in Japan, and those who have previously served on the Korean bench or bar. But, in December 1921, an examination system was specially instituted for candidates, either Korean or Japanese, for the Korean bar ⁷⁴

In March 1920 flogging was deleted from the list of penalties. This had for a long time been a common form of punishment and the opinion of Japanese administrators when properly administered suited to the social condition of the Koreans and had, therefore, been retained when the Criminal Law was adjusted in 1921.

73. Ibid., p. 194.

74. Ibid., p. 194.

The system of mediating between disputing parties in minor civil matters without, if possible, going to law was started in 1910, and shows a good record each year. During 1937, the total number of cases receiving good offices at the hands of the local police reached 191, out of 332 cases filed on application for arbitration.

The Law for the mediation of Disputes on Tenancy Questions was enacted in 1932 and put into effect from February 1933. By this law, the disputing parties had been encouraged to apply to the proper courts for arbitration instead of bringing formal suit which might involve them in further disputes or needless delay.

In view of the rapid increase of this kind of disputes in recent years together with the prevalence of dangerous thoughts and the threat on the economic life of the forming population, it is hoped to secure by this law, peaceful settlement of all tenancy disputes ⁷⁵

Owing to the dissimilarity in usages and conditions in Japan Proper, Korea was left free to make special laws within its own jurisdiction - by Government-General himself. This created many difficulties on amalgamations of offices, properties, and court procedures for the criminal offense committed in the territory.

In order to remove all such handicaps, new laws were enacted in 1918, and all were put into force that year, except the provision relating to transfer of domicile, which was left to the discretion of local administrators.

75. Ibid., p. 195.

In Korea, however, the ground having been fully prepared, the domicile Transfer Law was made public in June, 1922. By virtue of this new law, Koreans and Japanese inter-marrying are legally entitled to be enrolled on the one or the other's family register.

In 1937, there were 1,221 cases of inter-marriages between the two peoples.

Civil Law and Census Registration Law. The Civil Law was promulgated in March, 1912. Though in principles it was based substantively on the one for Japan, much of native usage was contained in those provisions relating specially to legal capacity, relationship and inheritance, after ten years, however, necessitated by the social advancement, the revision of the law was enacted in 1922, making the Japanese civil law applicable to Koreans in matters of unbileage, judicial divorce, bastardy, family council, acceptance of succession and separation of property, and it was also provided that personal acts mentioned in the law, such as creation of a collateral family, revival of an extinct family, marriage, adoption, and divorce by mutual consent, should become valid when duly reported to the proper authorities.⁷⁶

Courts. Law courts in 1937 comprised of one Supreme Court, three courts of appeal and eleven local courts with forty-seven branches and 173

76. Government-General of Tyosen, Annual Report on Administration of Tyosan, 1937-1938, p. 197.

sub-branches, with a personnel of 224 judges, 107 procurators, eight chief clerks, four interpreters, and 811 clerks and student interpreters.

During the year 1910 the number of civil cases received at law courts were about 26,000; but in 1937 they numbered as many as 55,657.

Classifying them under typical first instance cases, record show that:

1. Cases of personal process numbering 190 in 1911 rose to 1,575 in 1937. Such increase was mainly due to legal permission being given to petition for divorce by wives, etc.
2. Cases about real estate properties numbering 4,430 in 1911 increased to 13,167. This comparatively small increase was due to the establishment of titles as the result of real estate ownership investigation; and also to the confirmation of rights secured by registration.
3. For Tenancy Cases, in former days, tenants in accordance with old custom, obeyed absolutely the commands of landowners and they had no recourse to action at the law courts to fight for their rights. However, owing to the advance of social ideas and instigated by tenancy disputes in Japan proper, there has been a change and in 1937, the total of 872 such disputes were brought to the courts;
4. Cases involving buildings were only 526 in 1911 but soared to 1,697 in 1937. This may be taken as a reflex of the housing problem which has become very prominent.
5. Cases regarding rented lands and houses have been increasing due to the difficulties of dwelling houses in towns and cities.
6. Cases about money matters.⁷⁷

The number of criminal cases officially taken up reached 7,000 in 1911. This number has also increased and in 1937, a total of over 46,874

77. See Ibid., pp. 197-198

was recorded.

Grave crimes, such as murder, robbery, etc. were quite numerous in the country, but it was evident that they have on the whole tended toward diminution year by year. Intellectual crimes on the other hand, such as fraud, forgery, perjury, etc. had increased. Important criminal cases tried and decided in the first instance were as follows:

	1937	1921	1912
Disturbances	16	20	15
Forgery of documents	330	512	373
Adultery and Bigamy	68	617	601
Injury	4,937	2,985	1,062
Theft	6,341	4,938	5,120
Robbery	264	1,148	882
Fraud, Blackmail	1,666	2,439	1,757
Dispossession	865	1,460	776
Felling forest trees by stealth	9,503	822	112
Breach of taxation laws	17,160	943	44 ⁷⁸

Prison. Most of the prisons before the annexation were attached to police stations and not only was their accommodation of the worst description but the prisoners suffered gross maltreatment. Early in the protectorate period, therefore, the matter of prison reform claimed consideration, and new prisons were established in the chief centers.

In 1909, the Japanese Government took over all the Judicial functions of the country and ran the prisons and new prison laws was enacted in 1912.

78. IBID., p. 199

The end of 1919, as a consequence of increasing prisoners, saw 10 prisons and 13 branches in existence; and by 1938 there were 28 prisons including 11 branches, with 2,273 Jailers and Wardens including 71 women. In 1937 there were 19,358 prisoners, showing a tendency of increase.

For the prisoners, the "Hamburg system" was adopted and the finger print method was introduced in Korea in September, 1920.⁷⁹

Also for the sake of keeping "discipline and health", effort has been made to find work for all convicts and by 1919 over ninety per cent of prisoners were utilized in prison labor.

The principle trades worked by them are brick-making, paper-making, show-making, weaving, tailoring, cabinet work, stone work, etc. Since 1933 the prison workshops accepted orders for making large quantities of articles to be used in the Manchukou Government Offices and in the Kwantung Army. Therefore, in 1934 regulations for Vocational Training of Convicts were promulgated to teach better workmanship and to create a general uniform regulation.

The offenses committed in Korea by persons in pursuance of their political ideas, on a rapid yearly increase from 1928, were viewed with apprehension, but by constant arrests, and by other reasons, these have gradually decreased since 1932 when the highest had been reached. In view of the above circumstances, the System for Probation of Persons Accused of Subversive Ideas in Korea, and its allied regulations, similar to the system in force in

79. Ibid., pp. 200-201.

Japan Proper, was promulgated on December 21, 1936. Seven offices were created for the purpose, and they were located in Seoul, Hamburg, Chong-Chin, Pyong-Yang, Sinuichu, Taegu, and Kochu.

Communications

The administration of Communication Bureau includes State Railways, private railways, trainways, navigation, principle navigable rivers, aviation, posts, telegraphs and telephones, money orders and postal savings, post office insurance, and electric and gas undertakings.

State Railways. The first railway in Korea was the Seoul-Inchon line opened in 1900, and this was followed in 1905 by the opening of the main line between Seoul, and Pusan. These were undertakings by private companies. In 1906 the Seoul-Sinuizu Main Line, the Masan Branch Line, both built for army use during the Russo-Japanese War, were opened to the public, and with the former the trunk line from North to South was made complete.

In 1906 the Japanese Government took over all existing lines and placed them under the Railways Bureau of the Protectorate, but on the Government-General being established in 1910, control of them once more changed hands. ⁸⁰

From the necessity of establishing single control of railways in Korea and Manchuria for the commercial and military reason, in 1917 the Government-General concluded a contract with the South Manduinan Railway Company and entrusted to it the entire management of the Korean

80. Ibid., p. 157.

State Railways. This continued down to March, 1924, when Government-General again took over the operation of the State lines in the country.

At the end of March, 1937, the total investment in government railways reached over 612 million won, covering a length of 3,737 Kilometres (not including the 328 Kilometres of North Korean Railways, which in 1933, entrusted again to South Manchurian Railway Company to enable shipment of large cargoes from Manchuria and Korea) in active operation with 542 stations and employing 29,000 men in all including 12,000 Koreans and two foreigners.⁸¹

The Growth of Railways.

Fiscal Year	Length (kilo)	Passengers	Freight	Receipts
1937	3,737	35,906,000	11,369,000	76,908,000
1936	3,575	33,708,000	9,980,000	65,036,000
1935	3,389	29,344,000	8,667,000	56,477,000
1934	3,077	25,614,000	7,681,000	49,666,000
1933	2,935	22,238,000	7,254,000	43,153,000
1932	3,142	20,591,000	6,248,000	38,686,000
1931	3,008	19,670,000	6,025,000	36,300,000
1930	2,792	20,650,000	5,936,000	36,021,000
	(Mile)			
1925	1,309	18,241,000	4,297,000	30,708,000
1920	1,157	12,421,000	3,186,000	28,816,000
1911	674	2,024,000	888,000	4,095,000 ⁸²

Outside of these Government Railroads, there were a very few private Railroads.

The Trainways were operated mostly by private public utility companies such as the Keizyo Electric Company Trainways in Seoul.

81. Ibid., p. 158.

82. Ibid., p. 159.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

History so far has proved that the antipodal interests, both political and economical, prevent the existence of an enlightened colonial policy and administration of such policy which can be beneficial to both governing and governed people. The rapid transition of colonial areas in the near east, middle east, and in the far east, as well as in Africa, to the status of independent nations with the accompanying rights of political and economical self-determination, provides ample justification for such a statement.

The Japanese Administration in Korea was basically a military administration. By nature it was highly personal and centralized. In discussing the role of military government, a lecturer at the military Government School in Virginia stated that:

"Military government is not a missionary enterprise, and while you do pay attention to the welfare of the governed, you do it because paying attention to their welfare where you can well tend to avoid the more violent kinds of outbreaks against you; but it is utterly misleading to put the welfare of the governed on a par with military necessity."¹

The role of coercion was so considerable and the authoritarian character was so tangible that the Japanese administration in Korea had appeared more akin to dictatorship than any other form of government. The laudation by the Japanese that the colonial administration in Korea was one of the most enlightened must, therefore, be judged with certain misgivings if the

¹ I. Friedrick, Carl J., American Experiences in Military Government in World War II, p. 27

criteria for such judgement involves consideration of democratic principles, such as general welfare of the people and justice.

The laudation of success by the Japanese however, can best be justified when one's point of view is concentrated toward the achievement of the primary objective of the Japanese Empire; the expansion and administration of territories for mercantilistic purposes.

Korea, from the time of annexation to the time of Manchu incident, was mainly to provide raw materials and markets for Japanese production. Since the creation of Manchukou, however, Japanese objective in Korea was the creation and maintenance of "mainland route", a direct route to Manchuria and eventually to Chinese mainland thru the means of railroads, highways, communications, and others. On the other hand emphasis on domestic policies within Korea was to provide raw materials, particularly food stuffs and minerals for Japanese industry and in areas of local manufacture, was to supplement and strengthen the overall economy of the Japanese Empire. The entire administration system in Korea under the Japanese domination was intended to keep order and gain sufficient compliance from the population to further those basic objectives.

The administrative system utilized by the Japanese in Korea was personal and legal rather than efficient. The system was strictly military and German. In discussing the German administrative system, Mr. Bachof Otto states that:

"German Law distinguishes between public and private law. The concept on 'public power' is the central notion of public law; it denotes the relation of superiority and subordination between the state or some other public authority on the one hand and the individual on the other.

The typical phenomenon of administration within the scope of public law is the 'administrative act' i. e., 'an expression of will within the scope of administration addressed by a superior authority to an ascertained person (Verwaltungsakt).'

An administrative act may be either an order or a prohibition, but it may also alter or create rights or it may be merely declaratory according to which the various factual situations are enumerated which entitle the police to take action. Public authorities are authorized, if necessary, to enforce the act directly. As a matter of principle, no judicial authorization is needed for this."²

The guiding philosophy of Japanese administration being the German which signifies the concept of superiority of state over individual, it's policies and organizations were authoritarian in character. In view of the fact that the state, in the case of Korea, was represented solely by the office of the government-general the effectiveness of the administration from the Japanese vantage, was largely dependent upon the effective enforcement of total control and guidance toward Japanese objective by the office of the government-general through such primary mediums as military, police, both secret and uniformed, and justice organizations and through secondary mediums such as education, commerce, agriculture, and many other direct as well as indirect governmental organizations.

The problems that face the Japanese colonial administration in Korea were the problems of dictatorial and centralized form of government with most of decisions made at the top of the hierarchical pyramid. Furthermore they were varied according to the policies and organizations of the governor-general at the particular period. However, through the

2. Otto, Bachof: International and Comperative Law Quarterly Vol. 2, pp. 370-372

colonial domination, Japanese administrations enjoyed some degree of success in some areas while plagued with problems in other areas. The area where Japanese administration achieved a relatively comfortable degree of success toward the achievement of her objective were the fields of education, police, and economics.

The objectives of Japanese expansion during World War II were two-fold; politically in the battle of power politics on the one hand, and economically to acquire markets for her industrial goods on the other. As the sphere of influence and market for industrial goods expanded rapidly to Manchuria and China, a need for semi-skilled factory workers was more than apparent. Japan looked toward Korea for the solution. In order to produce the greatest possible number of unskilled and semi-skilled industrial workers, an idea of universal education came into existence under the administration of the Governor-General Saito whose reign is commonly referred to, for obvious reasons as "cultural administration." The idea was translated into the policy of "one school in every myon" or "one school in every village." It is, therefore, not hard to understand the fact that educational programs were directed largely toward teaching of elementary phases of industrial trades. Simultaneously, the entire educational organizations including schools, and all the education branches of the local provincial and national governments, were entrusted with the task of indoctrination-a task of Japanization of the Korean youth.

The Japanese colonial administration enjoyed relative success in both

objectives; a mass production of industrial workers, and Japanization, since influencing young minds is a comparatively easy task.

Another aspect of the Japanese colonial administration which saw a relatively successful result was the administration of law enforcement agencies; namely police and justice bureaus. The lack of any kind of legislative restrictions plus the philosophy of "one is guilty until he is proven innocent" derived from the concept of superiority of state over individuals, enabled those administrative organs to function effectively toward attainment of compliance of the Korean people with the Japanese objective. It was, therefore not necessarily a cooperative submission by the Korean people, but a forced one. The existence of such unique sections as thought control section and extraordinarily large number of secret and uniformed police verifies the point. There were, indeed, a few disturbances and even "the ~~Mansei~~ revolt," a major uprising against Japanese control. Nevertheless those law enforcement agencies achieved an eventual compliances from the subject people.

In spite of comparative success in achieving their goals, the administration of education, police, and justice, were not necessarily free of administrative problems. There were several of which the most important was the budgetary problem.

In the administration of educational policies, the lack of funds stopped the attainment of establishing "one school in one village" far short of it's goal. In the administration of law enforcement agencies, the need to

maintain a large number of personnel demanded an enormous amount of funds. The lack of ample supply of such funds resulted in low salaries which in turn created an ever-present personnel problem.

Another major problem that plagued the colonial administration was the lack of flexibility. All the governor-generals who occupied the office in Korea were either active or retired generals and admirals. Being of military backgrounds, a strict regimentation was demanded of the entire administrative system and their policies were to be followed to the letter. Such restrictions prohibited the utilization of local conditions to its advantage, particularly in the administration of education as well as many other areas of governmental agencies. The high or special section in the police bureau and school inspectors in the education bureau were the most noticeable instruments to enforce such regimentations and from the point of view of local administrators, existence of such instrument, more often than not, served as a hindrance rather than an assistance since its control and directions were usually without the knowledge of particulars or local conditions.

Of all phases of colonial administration, the area where Japan exerted most effort was in the administrations of economic policies. It is quite natural since the primary objective of Japan in Korea was the attainment of mercantilistic advantage. Korea was not only to provide a link with Manchuria and China through the "mainland route", but also Korean Economy was to be integrated into the entire economic structure of Japan proper.

The natural resources of Manchuria and Korea and the hydro-electric power plant at Yalu river rendered a most important economic and industrial center to Japan. The problem of food shortage was solved by the abundant production of rice, wheat, and apples, in Korea and production of barley in Manchuria. The problem of over-population in Japan was eased considerably by the large scale immigration to Korea, Manchuria, and China. The contribution Japan made in the advancement of agricultural and industrial technology in Korea in the course of obtaining her objective, could, by no means be passed without notice. Had the once dominant Japanese given even the slightest degree of consideration to the problem of just distribution of wealth in Korea, it is possible that the Japanese colonial administration may have been met with better cooperation from the Korean people.

It is interesting to note that the greatest difficulty faced by the Japanese administrators was the problems of political subjugation of the Korean people. In spite of the relatively solid control of Korea and Korean people through the usage of military and police forces, the Japanese autocracy was forced to succumb and make concessions to popular opinion. The creation of office of elected advisory councils in the 1920's is one of those concessions. It is significant to observe that during the period following World War I to the early 1930's, while there existed a relative democracy in Japan, she, like Britain, France, and other colonial powers, was forced

to bow to popular sovereignty by establishment of local self-governments with elected advisory councils even though this was just a lip service since councils powers were totally restricted.

It is rather ironical that the Japanese endeavor to produce more useful people in the attainment of economic exploitation and political subjugation through educational and economical advancement, should be the direct cause of creating exactly contrary result. Development of minds and achievement of high standard of living were the direct contributing factors toward the inalienable right of men to seek freedom of mind as well as body. Apparently Japan like most other colonial powers had not found the solution to this contradicting by-products of human mind.

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