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THE *HAKURA* SYSTEM**

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LAND AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN DAR FUR, 1785-1875:
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By G. Michael La Rue

In the historiography of pre-colonial Africa, land is generally assumed to have been abundant, and therefore not an economic constraint.¹ Thus the control of African labor has received far more attention than the control of land in Africa. In particular the coercion of African labor for the purpose of producing an agricultural surplus through the institution of slavery has been vigorously studied.² But slavery was not the sole means of coercing labor to give up part of its product, and labor was not the only factor in agricultural production. Control over land was widely used within Africa to obtain part of free cultivators' agricultural production, and even slave-owners had to have access to land for their slaves to cultivate.

In nineteenth-century Dar Fur, control over land was certainly not the sole basis of social stratification. Political power, mercantile or pastoral wealth, religious piety, ethnicity, occupation, military prowess, gender, age and servility were among the factors which determined an individual's standing in society. Yet the hakura system of land tenure provides a useful key to understanding how the introduction of new principles for the allocation of land and labor transformed the economy and society of Dar Fur.³

The hakura system developed and expanded as the sultanate of Dar Fur grew from a small mono-ethnic entity into a vast multiethnic empire with trading links not only to Wara, Asyut and Omdurman, but also to Benghazi, Cairo and Sawakin.⁴ This land tenure system lasted in full vigor until the end of the sultanate in 1916, and in form at least endures today. The hakura system was both a scale on which status could be measured, and a tool through which it could be acknowledged, conferred, or enhanced. For the historian of Dar Fur, it has left numerous traces in the form of sultanic land charters, summaries of court cases, and oral accounts, all preserved by the current residents of Dar Fur⁵; and confirmatory bits of evidence in travelers' accounts, archival material and secondary sources.⁶

The changes in control over land in Dar Fur, and its effects on patterns of social stratification there will be the topic of the present paper. Because other parts of pre-colonial Africa appear to have undergone similar transformations, the first section of the paper will examine the way in which the control of land has been treated in recent writings on pre-colonial African economies. The second section will discuss the hakura system and social stratification in Dar Fur.

The Control of Land in Pre-Colonial Africa

Reasons for neglecting to study the control of land are easy to find. First, the fact that land is abundant in Africa as a whole has led many to assume that it is without economic value, and it has been offhandedly relegated to the status of ceteris paribus in many otherwise worthy studies. Second, none of the commonly used theoretical frameworks is entirely adequate for the study of the control of land in pre-colonial

African economies. A third reason is that in many instances the sources on pre-colonial land holdings are not as complete as they are on other subjects such as trade with Europeans on the coast.⁷

The first two points were illustrated by Jack Goody, a well-known scholar who set out to examine the issue of feudalism in Africa:

it should be borne in mind that in pre-colonial conditions in Africa land was sometimes of little importance; for relatively low population densities (as compared, say, with Europe and Asia) meant that, in many regions, land was not a very scarce resource and hence its tenure could hardly provide the basis of differentiation for the "class" system.⁸

In making this statement, which has set the tone for many discussions (or rather dismissals) of the subject of the control of land in pre-colonial Africa, Goody ignores a number of fundamental issues. These include the variability of land quality; the question of the security of those who work the land and the issue of differential access to land. He also dismisses all references to feudalism in the historiography of pre-colonial Africa, excepting only Ethiopia.⁹ These objections will be taken up in detail below before moving on to the theoretical difficulties involved in discussing the control of land in pre-colonial African societies and economies.

Land is never uniform; it differs in natural endowments, location and defensibility (which was a vital consideration in much of pre-colonial Africa). The differences in soil types, annual rainfall and mineral deposits in different regions, and the diversity of economic activities which these varied natural endowments favor have been widely acknowledged as one of the primary bases of regional and international trade.¹⁰

Beyond the natural physical endowments of the land, locational factors help to determine the value of land for agricultural production. These factors include the location of the land in relation to transport, to the market for its products, and to the other factors of production, notably labor. Prior to the introduction of modern transport, land in Africa was even more highly differentiated by locational factors than it is today.¹¹ Even within a relatively restricted area, locational factors played a role in determining the value of a piece of land. For example, there is a limit to the distance a farmer is willing to walk or ride from home to field, and consequently land near settlements is more valuable and closely controlled than distant areas.¹²

A further factor affecting the value of land in pre-colonial Africa was the security of those who worked it. Security could be achieved through inaccessibility, natural or man-made defenses, or by participation in some larger social network capable of withstanding the normal range of aggression.¹³ Centralized states could usually shield their cultivators from slave raiding (at least before the introduction of modern firearms) in exchange, of course, for a share of the cultivators' product. It was this exchange which has led some scholars to suggest that the European concept of feudalism could usefully be applied to the study of African societies, as will be seen below. Fear of attack caused many groups to flee deeper into the forest, swamps, or mountains, areas which are usually not considered ideal for agriculture; and new crops were adopted by others in part because of the difficulty of carrying them off or destroying them in slave raids. The problems of security seriously

circumscribed the activities of cultivators in pre-colonial Africa, and in those areas where wars and slave raids were frequent, reduced the area of land available for agricultural production rather dramatically.¹⁴

Having considered the value of land in general, the question of its value to cultivators must be taken up. Access to land is a right of membership in many societies, but both members and outsiders must seek permission to use the land from the lineage head, the local ethnic leaders, or in more centralized states, from centrally appointed officials.¹⁵ The lack of homogeneity of land, even within a very restricted geographical area has led to elaborate rules designed to parcel out the various sorts of plots so that each individual or household receives a portion of the bottom land by the river, of the stony soil on the hills and so on. The care and energy expended in the allocation of land and the subsequent litigation, mediation and adjudication of disputes over it both reflect its value and offer means by which access to land can be controlled.¹⁶

While land in the abstract might have been abundant, specific tracts of land were more valuable to their cultivators than other tracts with similar physical endowments, location and security, because of the labor and other investments which the cultivators had put into them.¹⁷ Clearing the land, marking the boundaries, fencing it, terracing it or cutting paths through the bush, all involved a considerable labor investment. Well established fields have often benefitted from the practice of allowing flocks or herds to graze the stubble of the previous year's crop, so that their manure will improve the soil. Cultivators have also made the land more valuable by building or maintaining suitable seasonal or permanent housing within a reasonable distance, as well as locating and if necessary improving a nearby supply of water for man, beast, and crops. All these investments help to further differentiate one piece of land from another, and would tend to prevent a cultivator from leaving an improved piece of land precipitously.

No subsistence farmer would lightly abandon a staple food crop which was yet unharvested, nor a full granary, for each represents not only a considerable labor investment but also the potential margin between life and death. Historically, the sheer weight of the contents of the granary limited the distance a cultivator could move and take it along, except in cases where inexpensive water or animal transport was available in specific areas or to specific individuals.¹⁸

Given the combined effect of the factors already cited, it is not surprising that African cultivators did value certain pieces of land more highly than others, and that they would not leave the land they cultivated without good reason. Of course, many of the factors described above could change. An environment which had been favorable to agriculture could deteriorate due to drought, flood, soil exhaustion, or locusts. A seemingly ideal location could become a backwater as trade routes shifted, a political or commercial capital moved away, or a new form of transportation was employed. Security could decrease or disappear as a polity disintegrated, as a new kingdom arose, as nomads moved in, or as slave raiders found a new region to work.

Cultivators who had to make choices about leaving or staying on a specific piece of land could not have taken much comfort in the notion that land in the abstract was abundant in Africa. So long as they could be reasonably sure that they could grow enough to provide food and seed for the coming year, and that they could enjoy more of the fruit of their labor by staying than by leaving, cultivators would tend to stay on the

land which they had already cultivated. Those who had doubts, or thought they recognized other opportunities, might attempt to diversify into other crops, regions, or economic activities, but they would not readily opt for a sudden and total displacement of the agricultural production of themselves and their entire kin group.¹⁹ This very reasonable evaluation by the cultivators of the risks involved in moving enabled those who controlled land to dominate those who worked it.

The question of the control of land has frequently arisen in the historically oriented literature on pre-colonial Africa, but the topic is usually put aside rather quickly. In some cases, the significance of land and its control has been overlooked because of misconceptions such as the notion of the abundance of land in Africa, already discussed above, or the notion of a "traditional," presumably inert, land tenure system which only changed in the colonial period. In other cases, land has been neglected because of theoretical bias.

Feudalism, the market and classical economic theory, underdevelopment theory, and classic marxist theory and its modifications have each been used by scholars who have touched upon the question of land in their studies of pre-colonial African economies. These various approaches will be discussed in order.

The practice of describing African societies in feudal terms has been criticized by several scholars, notably Jack Goody.²⁰ He was right to argue that because feudalism has many meanings even in its European context, applying feudal terminology to African states confuses rather than clarifies discussion. His suggestion to use terms such as "clientage" or "fief" where appropriate but to avoid the broader "feudal" was a good one. But the principal motive behind the use of feudal terminology was the discovery that the control of land had been transferred to subordinates by their political superiors. In his effort to exorcise the vague and confusing nomenclature, Goody threw out the phenomenon as well, despite the evidence that such transfers of land had occurred in Uganda, Nupe, Zaria, Bariba and the interlacustrine states.²¹ Clearly land had some scarcity value or else it could not have served to cement important patron-client relations which were fundamental to a number of states in Africa.

The premise that land is abundant in Africa has already been shown to require considerable modification if not rejection for the pre-colonial case. Goody, however, accepted this premise and went further, following Nieboer, to argue that slavery was a logical consequence of the abundance of land. Goody expresses this relationship as follows:

If there is a plentiful supply of land, no man need bend his knee to a lord simply in order to get a living. It is critical to my thesis that in Africa there were no landlord-tenant relationships, nor any institution one can legitimately call "serfdom" or "peonage." Slavery was widespread, though the payoff was limited. Clientship also existed but the rewards for voluntary subjection were either in cattle (as in Ruanda) or in political rights over land, that is, the right to collect tax.²²

Speaking of the social consequences of the relative abundance of land in Africa, Goody wrote,

Politically, chiefship tended to be over people rather than land; these a leader had to try to attract as well as restrain. The conditions for the forms of domination that obtained in the European Middle Ages hardly existed except for slavery itself. In slavery, labour is controlled by political force; in serfdom, economic controls, such as land tenure, are of equal importance.²³

Goody maintains that "only in Ethiopia, which had the plough, was there any landlordism in Africa." In a footnote, he expands on this point,

In Africa labour requirements led to slavery but not serfdom.... Domestic slaves, dependent kinfolk and clients filled other servile roles, but the supply of land and the degree of control made it difficult to exploit labour by anything other than slavery.²⁴

On this point Goody makes it clear that he is following Nieboer who wrote,

in primitive societies capital is of little use and subsistence easy to acquire; therefore every able-bodied man can, by taking a piece of land into cultivation, provide for himself. Hence it follows that nobody voluntarily serves another; he who wants a labourer must subject him, and this subjection will often assume the character of slavery.

... among agricultural peoples slavery, as an industrial system, only exists where there is still free land; it disappears as soon as all land has been appropriated.²⁵

Nieboer's thesis has been criticized by other scholars from a comparative perspective.²⁶ Here it has already been argued that a free cultivator had a considerable stake in remaining on land already under cultivation, and the existence of free land per se may not be enough to encourage a cultivator to flee a newly imposed oppression.

It can be further argued in rebuttal of the Nieboer-Goody thesis that the concentration of population and particularly the introduction of new elements into an already populated area whether in areas favored for agriculture, or near commercial or political centers, often gave rise to a pattern of differential access to land.²⁷ Near such population centers, there was an increased demand for food and other agricultural products which had to be supplied from a relatively restricted area due to the costs and difficulties of transport. One could expect that there would be an attempt to squeeze more out of the local farmers, and to increase the output of a given area of land by applying more labor to it. Slave labor was often used for this purpose.²⁸

The use of the market model to study the control of land has been virtually precluded by the apparent lack of a market for agricultural land in much of pre-colonial Africa. One scholar went so far as to state that "land, an essential factor of production has been prevented by custom and law from coming under the influences of economic forces."²⁹

This extreme position was refuted by A. G. Hopkins, one of the leading advocates of using the market and classical economic theory to study African economies whether in the colonial or pre-colonial periods,

who noted that indigenous land laws far from being a constraint on development permitted "a widespread and rapid expansion in the production of export crops" in the early colonial period. But he also found that the factor market in land was very limited, because "land was not scarce enough to acquire a market value."³⁰ One can agree that relatively little land was sold in pre-colonial Africa (except in areas influenced by European or Muslim practices) without subscribing to Hopkins's explanation.³¹ Where there was no market for land, or one which only operated within tight social and political restraints, the market model is insufficient because the responses to economic stimuli will not be worked out through the market mechanism alone.

The underdevelopment school, best known for its emphasis on the expansion of the capitalist world system and the negative effects this had on areas outside the metropolises, has touched on the question of changes in the control of land in peripheral areas. Land was certainly one of the elements affected by the penetration of the world capitalist system, as stated by A. G. Frank:

the expansion of the capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and entirely penetrated even the apparently most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world. Therefore the economic, political, social and cultural institutions and relations we now observe there are the products of the historical development of the capitalist system no less than are the seemingly more modern or capitalist features of the national metropolises of these underdeveloped countries.³²

Frank's initial message was applied to African cases by a number of scholars including Wallerstein, Samir Amin, Walter Rodney and Alpers.

For the African pre-colonial period, the underdevelopment school has focused on the deleterious effects of the slave trade. In one of his rare references to Africa, A.G. Frank declares that "Africa was also converted into a single-product export economy, and that product was its most precious patrimony: its own people, and among them the most productive ones."³³ Walter Rodney developed this thesis more fully in his writings, but tended to neglect any impact that the expansion of the capitalist system might have had on the control of land. According to Rodney, in the pre-contact societies,

every African was assured of sufficient land to meet his needs by virtue of being a member of a family or community. For that reason, and because land was relatively abundant, there were few social pressures or incentives for change to increase productivity.³⁴

For Rodney, linkage to the international world system had little effect on agriculture, let alone on control of land:

even the most politically developed African states did not play the role of initiators and supervisors of agricultural development. One reason may have been the lack of population pressure and hence the scattered nature of settlements. Another may have been state concentration on trading non-agricultural products to the exclusion of

other things. Certainly, when African societies became linked up with other social systems outside the continent on the basis of trade, little attention was paid to agriculture.³⁵

But elsewhere, he contradicts this position by noting that in Yoruba territory the slave trade led to an increase in military activity, which in turn produced a number of refugees who,

were made to give service to their new overlords by farming the land, in return for armed protection. However serfs were also used as soldiers, which means that they had access to the means of production (the land) only through meeting an obligation in military labor. That is a measure of the extent to which the principle of kinship had been weakened, and it indicates that, in contrast to the typical communal village, states such as those in nineteenth century Yorubaland allocated roles and rewards to their citizens on the basis of reciprocal obligations characteristic of feudalism.³⁶

In short, Rodney is arguing here that the impact of the capitalist world system broke down the pre-existing system for the allocation of land along kinship lines, and helped to establish a quasifeudal system in the Yoruba states.

The contrasting statements by Rodney serve to illustrate an observation made by Alpers in an important article on underdevelopment theory:

What has not been given serious thought by most Africanists is the possibility that international trade might have penetrated the agricultural economy in any number of subtle yet important ways, particularly in terms of how people thought about the economy, how they allocated their labor, and how relations of production were affected in the local community.³⁷

Critics would argue that the global approach of the underdevelopment theorists is scarcely conducive to the sort of study required to detect the impact of the spread of the capitalist world system on local agricultural production systems, and in fact few members of this school have undertaken this sort of study.³⁸

Some Africanists have attempted to use a Marxist perspective in their writings on pre-colonial Africa, and the question of control over land has been raised there. Because none of the classic Marxist formulations of pre-capitalist modes of production seem to fit all the African data, it has been found necessary either to modify one of them or simply to devise a new one.³⁹ A second approach has been to put aside the mode of production controversies to focus on key issues of the empirical cases.

Perhaps the best known example of the formulation of a new mode of production is Coquery-Vidrovitch's "African mode of production." This formulation has been attacked by other Marxists on theoretical grounds, but here it must be considered from the perspective of what it tells us about the control of land.⁴⁰ This new mode of production is "based ... upon the combination of a patriarchal-communal economy and the

exclusive ascendancy of one group over long-distance trade."⁴¹ Apparently land remained in the hands of local elders:

No African political regime, no matter how despotic, felt the need to eliminate communal village structures within their borders which did not interfere with their exploitation. As long as the village transmitted its tribute to the chief of the district or of the province, it ran the life of the collectivity as it pleased. The elders assured the worship of the clan's ancestors; the chief of the land allocated available land to each family and to each generation; groups of women dominated the local food markets. There was no need to supply the ruler with a contingent of plantation laborers or porters, tasks generally performed by royal slaves seized in foreign countries.⁴²

As will be seen, this does not cover all the pre-colonial African material, nor even Dahomey, which was the concrete example the author used: "only the King of Dahomey in the nineteenth century asserted his right of eminent domain when he took over land for the plantations sought by Europeans."⁴³ The evolution beyond this stage in Dahomey came, according to Coquery-Vidrovitch precisely when the King proceeded to the "private appropriation of land."⁴⁴

This approach has been found unsatisfactory not only on a theoretical basis but on a factual one as well. K.P. Moseley notes that the changes in the pre-colonial Dahomean economy affected both land and labor:

The settlement of slaves on royal plantations seems to have been inaugurated by King Kpengla in the late 1700's primarily for the provisioning of the capital. This practice assumed substantial proportions in the following century, both to feed the burgeoning palace and army, and to produce palm oil for export. The large-scale application of servile manpower to commodity production was particularly salient, perhaps, on the estates which, accompanied by a dependent labor force of slaves and their descendants, remained the principal reward for official services. A class of large landowners, some of them royal dignitaries, seems to have emerged on the plateau prior to the conquest, producing foodstuffs for the wholesale market.⁴⁵

Moseley also indicates that the expropriated land was "often already inhabited," which meant that the creation of such estates clearly had social as well as economic effects.⁴⁶ It will be seen that parallel developments occurred elsewhere in pre-colonial Africa.

The slave mode of production has also been used to explain the pre-colonial African cases. Again leaving aside the theoretical debate over what constitutes a mode of production, the utility of this specific formulation for a study of the control of land can be considered using examples from the works of Emmanuel Terray and Paul Lovejoy.

In tracing the effects of the increased export of gold from the Abron kingdom of Gyaman, Terray argued that the choice of the slave mode of production had ramifications for the entire society.⁴⁷ Maintaining an

adequate labor force necessitated the creation of an army, and the raiding of nearby regions for slaves. Similarly, to control the slave population the rulers had to centralize political power in their own hands. Terray's emphasis on the control of slave labor excludes any role for the control of land:

in Ashanti, as in Gyaman, the earth was plentifully available; the instruments of production were made of materials - wood, iron - that could be obtained directly, easily or by exchange, and their simplicity meant the vast majority of people could make them themselves; also the subjection of the producer was not able to be accomplished through the appropriation of the material factors of production, as was the case under feudalism with the ground, or in capitalism with machines.⁴⁸

This flat denial contrasts markedly with the arguments of Dumett, who reviewed the evidence on pre-colonial gold production in the Akan and Asante areas and concluded, "Terray seriously underemphasizes the importance of Akan state administrative organization, land tenure relationships and taxation as the bases for government economic power and finance."⁴⁹ Dumett further underscores the importance of control over land: "any discussion of the connections between economic production and political authority ought to scrutinize allocation and control over land, yet this is largely ignored in the Terray article."⁵⁰ Dumett's belief that the allocation and control of land merits further attention is supported in the Asante region by T. C. McCaskie and Ivor Wilks, and more generally by Lovejoy.⁵¹

In his most recent work, Lovejoy argues that the presence of large numbers of slaves in pre-colonial Africa meant that the slave mode of production was dominant.⁵² Earlier in arguing that slave plantations were more important to the economy of the Sokoto Caliphate than peasant holdings, he had emphasized the large percentage of the population that was servile. According to Lovejoy plantation slavery required not only the predominance of slave labor, and a market system to distribute plantation output but also "the availability of cultivable land which could be farmed in large aggregates, in contrast to small peasant holdings [and] ... the existence of a planter class which had access to land and labor or which commanded the capital that could acquire these factors...."⁵³

Despite this promising definition, Lovejoy provides few details about the control of land in northern Nigeria: "gradually plantations were established to place the economy on a firmer footing."⁵⁴

Others who have studied plantation slavery in Africa, without embracing the slave mode of production, are similarly reticent about the means by which slave villages or plantations were founded, and how their establishment might reflect changing patterns of control over land. Cooper in his study of plantation slavery on the Kenya coast acknowledged that control of land was necessary in addition to the control of labor, but did not pursue the issue.⁵⁵ Mason is a bit more forthcoming about the foundation of slave villages (tungazi) in nineteenth-century Nupe:

Many of the lands belonging to the original inhabitants of the Bini area, the Kintsozi, were irredeemably lost in the period under study. Although these lands were sparsely

settled, it seems always to have been accepted that the Bini owned them. The Bini villagers therefore granted land to the Bida slave-owning elite. There is no evidence of these lands having been taken by force, although the futility of resisting the slave-owners would have been apparent to the Bini villagers. As a result of this change of land control, the Bida area has become a patchwork of tracts, those owned by Bida people being interspersed by those claimed by the Bini. In many cases, although the Bini resigned the use of the land, they maintained legal ownership of it - this being expressed in the exercise of their rights over the productive trees on that land.⁵⁶

Each of these cases illustrate that the same forces which brought changes in the organization of labor in agricultural production also had consequences for the control of land. The concept of a slave mode of production does not tell us how control over slaves and land came into the same hands, nor how this dual control changed specific societies. Cooper in a critique of Terray and others said: "Precisely those ruling classes capable of exploiting slaves to this extent balanced and adjusted a variety of economic bases: slave production, tribute collection from within and without the polity, taxes on trade and administered trade."⁵⁷ It is this diversity and complexity which has stymied Africanists who have chosen a particular aspect of pre-colonial African economies for emphasis.

Land was clearly one of the principal resources in pre-colonial African societies, and control of land was both a sign of, and basis for social domination. The case of Dar Fur presented in the following section should serve to illustrate this point while underscoring the multiple and interconnected bases of social stratification.

Land and Social Stratification in Dar Fur

In the period 1785-1875, a new set of principles for allocating land and labor came to dominate the economy and society of northern Dar Fur. The pre-existing system of land tenure, based on communal holdings by various local sedentary groups, was gradually replaced by the hakura system, based on sultanic land grants.⁵⁸ The spread of the hakura system particularly in the area around Kubayh and al-Fashir (respectively the sultanate's commercial and political capitals) was paralleled by an increase in the local use of agricultural slaves. The most immediate reasons for this transformation were the establishment of a permanent capital at Rahad Tandalti, and the expansion of trade along the darb al-arba'in, Dar Fur's trans-saharan trade route which ran from Kubayh to Asyut in Upper Egypt. Both these developments followed hard on the conquest of Kordofan by Sultan Muhammad Tayrab in 1785-1786.⁵⁹

The establishment of a permanent political capital, al-Fashir, in northern Dar Fur permitted the next sultan, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid (1786-1803) to consolidate his hold on what had formerly been the sultanate's distant eastern edge, and to keep a watchful eye on the Zaghawa, a powerful ethnic group which had opposed his accession.⁶⁰ In the last decade of the eighteenth century, Dar Fur surpassed Sinnar as an exporter of slaves to Egypt, largely as a result of the conquest of Kordofan, and Kubayh flourished as a commercial center.⁶¹

Kubayh and al-Fashir, only a day's donkey ride apart, became urban

centres. Al-Fashir filled quickly with the sultan and his court; Kubayh attracted jallaba traders from the northern riverain Sudan, Egypt and beyond.⁶² Holy men came to instruct the children of the sultan, of the noblemen and of the merchants; and slaves were imported from the "pagan" lands to the south to draw water, haul firewood, grind the millet and hoe the fields.⁶³

The presence of a large body of outsiders in a pre-colonial African society, whether as rulers, traders, holy men or slaves, caused a shift in the principles which that society had previously used for allocating resources and status. The Fur sultans had been recognized earlier as rulers of northern Dar Fur, but their physical presence in the area required some more practical accommodations. By their presence, the sultan and his court displaced some of the former residents of the land, diminished the power of the local ethnic leaders, and made the area a new focus for settlement.⁶⁴ Similarly in Kubayh the merchants needed a place to live and a reliable means of obtaining food.

The hakura system of sultanic land grants was a major element in the domestic policies of the Fur sultans because estates could be granted to attract religious or mercantile immigrants, to reward followers, to co-opt opponents, to maintain royal relatives or to make indigenous leaders of the recently incorporated regions dependent on the sultans for their authority. The pre-existing system of land tenure in the northern region of Dar Fur is nowhere fully described, but it appears to have been based on communal ownership of land by sedentary ethnic groups.⁶⁵ Access to land was determined by ethnicity and lineage.

The changes which resulted from the application of the new principles embodied in the hakura system were gradual but cumulative. The eventual effect was to give the sultan authority over all land in the sultanate. To see how this was accomplished requires first a sketch of the system at its height under Sultan Muhammad Husayn (1838-1873) and then a brief explanation of how the system was used to break the hold of the indigenous ethnic groups on the most desirable land in northern Dar Fur.

There were two main types of hakuras, administrative and agricultural, and the use of a single term, hakura, were part of a political and territorial hierarchy. Of the four provinces of Dar Fur, only the northern one, Dar al-Rih, will be considered here.⁶⁶ The magdum had twelve shartays under him, each of whom ruled a smaller geographical dar (also called a shartaya) contained within Dar al-Rih. The shartays were appointed by the sultan, but normally this was simply a confirmation of the hereditary successor to the position. The shartays were usually from the dominant ethnic group in their dars and in some cases they were the descendants of the presultanate political rulers.⁶⁷ Shartayas were (and are) often called simply hakuras but here will be called administrative hakuras for clarity.

Within each administrative hakura were a large number of agricultural hakuras which were estates granted by the sultan to individuals or lineage groups. Over three hundred agricultural hakuras were reported to have existed within the largest administrative hakura in Dar al-Rih.⁶⁸ These smaller agricultural hakuras which varied in size from areas of 10 to 20 square miles down to less than a square mile, were often granted to individuals who were not from the prevailing ethnic group of the dar in which they were located.⁶⁹ The hakura-holder (Ar. sid al-hakura, pl. asyad al-hawakir) had some political and judicial duties to perform and would typically have several villages and their shaykhs under him. The social structure within a hakura will be described more fully below. It

is important to note that foreign hakura-holders would not have had access to the land under the prior land tenure system, except by becoming a client to a local ethnic leader.

Agricultural hakuras could be obtained by sultanic grant, through inheritance, or by personal request; and the land in question might be uncultivated or already cultivated either by the prospective grantee or others, but in each case the process was similar.⁷⁰ Once the sultan had decided to grant the land whether at the grantee's request, through the intercession of a state official, or of his own volition, an envoy was sent out from the local shartay's court to head a delegation which included the grantee and the "people of the boundaries" (ahl al-hudud or ahl al-arkan) who were the holders of adjacent land, to walk or ride the boundaries.⁷¹ Later the various "hills, trees, stony outcrops, river beds" and so on which marked the boundary were recorded in a report sent to the sultan for inclusion in a written land charter (hujja) which could be reconfirmed by later sultans for the grantee or his descendants.⁷²

Land disputes often arose - between those with overlapping claims, between heirs of the original hakura-holder or between a new hakura-holder and the earlier residents on the land. In any of these types of disputes, if local attempts at reconciliation failed court cases could be heard before qadis, maliks or other officials, or in extreme cases before the sultan himself.⁷³ Decisions were often made on the basis of documentary evidence, although witnesses were also produced in court. Once a verdict was reached a summary transcript (sijil) was produced, which included the date, a list of important members of the audience, and the seal of the presiding official.⁷⁴

The social and economic relations within the agricultural hakuras were a microcosm reflecting the sultanate as a whole, in that outsiders to the area imposed themselves on the local population, and if possible ruled them through their existing leaders. Agricultural hakuras could be simple or subdivided. In the case of a hakura which covered only a small area or had only a small number of inhabitants, the division of the cultivator's product was arranged between the sid al-hakura, or his agent (wakil) and the cultivator directly. Larger or more populated hakuras were often subdivided into smaller areas called fisan (local Arabic plural of fas in this sense).⁷⁵ A section of a hakura cleared for cultivation was called a fas, and was the responsibility of a sid al-fas (fas-holder) who might be a man with his family, or the head of a lineage group with many households of followers and numerous slaves, perhaps living in several villages, each under village shaykhs. The sid al-fas would agree to control his following, and to collect the revenues from them on behalf of the sid-al-hakura, and also his share of the crop, in exchange for a share in each.

Friction frequently resulted from the spread of the hakura system into areas where ethnicity and lineage had previously defined land rights. When already occupied land was granted as a hakura, the new sid al-hakura was often of a different ethnic group than the earlier occupants who were typically from one of the local sedentary populations, such as Berti, Tunjur, Zaghawa or Fur. The local ethnic leaders were often included in the hakura system as asyad al-fisan (fas-holders) on land which they had farmed for generations. Instead of distributing their agricultural production within their own households and lineages as they had done formerly, they had to pay taxes to the hakura-holder. As might be expected, this change in social and economic status was not always accepted willingly. The earlier occupants might move away, or attempt to

make life difficult for the sid al-hakura by legal or extra-legal means. One hakura-holder asked to exchange his hakura for one in another area; a second, the khafir Muhammad Kannun of Kubayh was sued by a man who claimed that the khafir had illegally usurped his land.⁷⁶

The incremental nature of these changes can now be considered. As the Fur sultans gradually absorbed the pre-existing ethnic polities into the sultanate, the shartays grew increasingly dependent on the sultans for their authority. This was accomplished by such tactics as dividing the territory of obstreperous shartays between lesser officials; favoring a weaker claimant to one of the inherited positions; and arranging strategic marriage alliances within the ruling elite.⁷⁷ Even in a conflict between a new jallaba immigrant and a loyal member of their own ethnic group or entourage, the shartays had to do the sultan's bidding or face his wrath. A number of rather pointed sultanic letters instructing lesser officials in their duties have been found.⁷⁸

Shartays could not afford to resist the sultan's practice of granting choice bits of land within their dars to a merchant, a faqih, or a royal relative no matter at whose expense. Initially land granted as a hakura was chosen for its agricultural potential, which compared favorably to the surrounding area; for its plentiful water supply; for its proximity to Kubayh or al-Fashir; or for its location along a trade route.⁷⁹ The early hakuras often became focii for the granting of additional hakuras as successful hakura-holders attracted further immigrants, or asked for more land for their own descendants.⁸⁰ The establishment of adjacent hakuras strengthened the claims of both parties since their common boundary was mentioned in both sets of documents, and they would testify for each other in the face of any threat to their lands. They could also stand together in any physical fracas which arose between the new settlers and the earlier occupants, or even against state officials.⁸¹

The occupants of land adjacent to a hakura frequently found it prudent to reinforce their claim to the land - whether based on ethnicity, occupation or both - by establishing it as a hakura, with all the advantages of sultanic backing, and documentary proof of ownership.⁸² Both patterns can be found near Kubayh and Kafot where new jallaba immigrants and their descendants asked for adjacent pieces of the best agricultural land along the wadi, while the indigenous ethnic groups sought to defend their holdings (which adjoined the jallaba hakuras but were on slightly higher and less fertile lands) by having them recognized as hakuras as well.⁸³

By Sultan Husayn's reign an individual agricultural hakura was rarely an island in the sea of an ethnic dar. Hakuras were frequently found clustered in groups, or in chains along the major wadis. Near Kubayh and al-Fashir, the entire cultivable land area was covered by contiguous hakuras with an ethnically heterogeneous set of hakura-holders. Each hakura-holder was individually dependent on the continued good will of the sultan lest he seize the land and give it to another. As a group the hakura-holders supported each other against the sultan and his officials; and against those who might challenge their rights on the basis of old ethnic and lineage principles for allocating land.⁸⁴

The mere existence of slavery within a society does not necessarily transform the organization of agricultural production.⁸⁵ In Dar Fur as elsewhere some slaves were simply added to the family labor pool, where they were treated as junior kin for their entire lives - doing the hardest work, eating out of the common bowl but never getting a choice morsel or the last bite.⁸⁶ Slavery in Dar Fur appears to have been as

old as the sultanate, for slaves are mentioned in some versions of the story of Ahmad al-Ma'qur, the local Wise Stranger who fathered the first sultan.⁸⁷ Slaves are often mentioned in the stories of the foundation of villages. Kubayh and Kafot, for example, were each reportedly named after the individual slaves who dug the first wells in those places.⁸⁸

Taking the growth of slave exports from Dar Fur in the 1790s as indicative of the increased local availability of slaves which coincided with the spread of the hakura system, it appears that the agricultural use of slaves grew apace with the hakura system. Unfortunately there are no descriptions of the organization of agricultural production in Dar Fur which antedate the hakura system. An early description mentions that millet, the staple grain, was harvested by a family laboring with their slaves.⁸⁹ By contrast, oral accounts emphasize that large slave-owners did not work: "The slaves would work for you, while you sat comfortably."⁹⁰

The organization of agricultural slave labor in Dar Fur has not yet been fully analyzed, but it is clear that a wide range of possible arrangements existed within the sultanate: a single slave joining in with familial labor⁹¹; small groups of slaves working under familial supervision⁹²; large groups working together on their owner's fields⁹³; and separate slave villages under slave overseers, working for an absentee owner.⁹⁴ Oral informants speaking of a later period (Sultan "Ali Dinar's reign, 1898-1916) frequently cite five to fifteen slaves as the number owned by an established faqih, a village shaykh, or the sid al-hukura of a modest sized hakura, and there is no reason to believe that this could not have been true of the earlier period as well.⁹⁵

Agricultural slavery was very common in Dar Fur by the reign of Sultan Muhammad Husayn (1838-1873) and virtually every hakura-holder had slaves.⁹⁶ In at least one documented instance, an individual received a hakura "and its 40 slaves" simultaneously.⁹⁷ A person worthy of the sultan's favor could expect to receive a variety of gifts from him.⁹⁸ Faqihs who had received a hakura to support their teaching of the Qur'an in a local khalwa could reasonably expect to receive slaves along with gifts of livestock, grain and other goods from notables, or from the sultan himself if his children were being, or had been, instructed by the faqih.⁹⁹ State officials (who were also agricultural hakura-holders) often acquired slaves as booty, in raids or war. They and the sultans were reported to have had slave villages.¹⁰⁰

Merchants bought slaves to work their land during their absences abroad. Oral sources, referring specifically to the reigns of sultans Muhammad Fadl (1803-1837) and Muhammad Husayn (1838-1873) mention instances of large merchants and hakura-holders in the Kubayh area who owned 30 to 80 slaves for agricultural work.¹⁰¹ Slaves were of course for sale in all major markets and anyone could buy them.¹⁰²

The growth of the hakura system, internal slavery and long distance trade increased the degree of social stratification in Dar Fur. Social status had always been measurable on several scales - age, sex, ethnicity, occupation, religious piety and political power among them. But now the boundaries of the ruling elite could be traced by noting the intersection of the groups of hakura-holders, slave-owners, and large consumers of imported goods. All major state officials, important sultanic relatives, major religious leaders and traders had agricultural hakuras, and frequently they had multiple holdings.¹⁰³

The hakura-holders were in essence a class. That they made common cause against the sultan and threats from others who challenged their

control over the land has already been discussed. They were known to the sultan, and he turned to them or to his own household whenever he made political appointments. Hakura-holders made marriage alliances among themselves, and consequently were eventually related by blood or marriage to each other, and to the sultans.¹⁰⁵

The hakura-holders had numerous followers, and slaves who did much or all of their manual labor for them.¹⁰⁶ They lived in better houses, entertained more guests, and ate, drank and dressed better than masakin, although the elite slaves of the sultan and other high state officials might also live well.¹⁰⁷ They were distinct from the commoners, and from those with some social stature but without land or slaves. They knew who they were, and worked together for their common interests. Finally they controlled the two principle factors of agricultural production: land and labor.

Conclusion

In the period 1785-1875, north central Dar Fur underwent a number of simultaneous transformations. From a quiet backwater on the eastern edge of the early sultanate, it became the political and economic center of Dar Fur. The pre-existing political entities, each based primarily on a single ethnic group, were first made allies, then political dependents and slowly assimilated to the sultanic political system. Increasing contact with the broader regional and world economies helped to transform the earlier subsistence economy, in which control over land and labor was in the hands of the ethnic hierarchies, into a much more complex system.

As the capitalist penetration of the pre-capitalist agrarian society of Dar Fur progressed, land and labor were gradually transferred to the hakura system. These factors of production became increasingly to manipulation by political and economic forces within and beyond the sultanate. Agricultural slave labor was an essential factor in coercing free cultivators to submit to the new economic regime; but no cultivator free or slave could have produced a crop without land. Social stratification which had previously rested on diverse social and economic factors, was heightened, reinforced and made more permanent as control over both land and labor was gathered into the hands of a new slave - and land-owning class. Because this historical pattern was not confined to Dar Fur, the relationship between the control of land and social stratification in pre-colonial Africa merits more attention from theoreticians and historians.

Notes

¹For explicit examples of this see A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (New York, 1973) p. 15; Martin Klein Peasants in Africa (Beverly Hills, 1980) 12-12; R. S. O'Fahey State and Society in Dar Fur (London, 1980), 49. Additional examples of this will be cited throughout the first half of the paper, along with some salutary exceptions.

²For a review of this literature to 1979 see Frederick Cooper, "The Problem of Slavery in African Studies," JAH 20,1(1979) 103-125. For a lengthier bibliography and later synthesis of material, see Paul Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa (Cambridge: 1983).

³For an introduction to the political and social history of Dar Fur, see R. S. O'Fahey and J.L. Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan (London, 1974); O'Fahey, State and Society; A.B. Theobald, 'Ali Dinar: Last Sultan of Dar Fur, 1898-1916 (London: 1965); Musa al-Mubarak al-Hasan Tarikh Dar Fur al-siyasi, 1882-1895 (Khartoum, 1970).

⁴On trade see sources noted above and G. Michael La Rue, "The Export Trade of Dar Fur, ca. 1785-1875." Paper presented at the Symposium on the Quantification and Structure of the Import and Export and Long-Distance Trade of Africa in the Nineteenth Century sponsored by the Institut fur Afrikanistik of the University of Köln, West Germany. The revised conference papers will be published in Figuring African Trade (Berlin: Kölner Beiträge zur Afrikanistik 11, forthcoming), edited by Gerhard Liesegang. See also Terence Walz, The Trade Between Egypt and Bilad as-Sudan, 1700-1820 (Cairo, 1978).

⁵For examples of the local written documents from Dar Fur, see M.I. Abu Salim, al-fur wa al-ard: watha'iq tamlik (Khartoum, 1975); R.S. O'Fahey and M.I. Abu Salim, Land in Dar Fur: Charters and Related Documents from the Dar Fur Sultanate (Cambridge, 1983). For an example of the way oral accounts can be used to illuminate the written documents, see G. Michael La Rue, "Khabir 'Ali at Home in Kubayh: A Brief Biography of a Caravan Leader," Paper presented at the ASA Annual Meeting, Boston, December 1983. To be published in African Economic History (forthcoming, 1984).

⁶The most important of the travelers are: W.G. Browne, Travels in Egypt, Syria and Africa (London, 1806); Muhammad b. 'Umar al-Tunisi, Voyage au Darfour Transl. N. Perron (Paris 1845); and Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, vol. IV, Wadai and Dar Fur, transl. by A.G.B. & H.J. Fisher (London: 1971). The most valuable archival source is the National Records Office (Formerly the GRO) Khartoum Sudan. The secondary literature on the hakura system is still rather sparse; consult the works on Dar Fur noted above and their bibliographies.

⁷For an illustrative reference to the comparative lack of information on the internal pre-colonial economy see Hopkins, Economic History, 8.

⁸Jack Goody, "Feudalism in Africa?" JAH 4,1(1963), 10. This article was later included as chapter 1 in Goody, Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa (London, 1971). Goody's conclusion that African societies were relatively undifferentiated has recently been challenged. See John Iliffe, "Poverty in Nineteenth-Century Yorubaland" JAH 25,1(1984) 43-58.

⁹For a recent reiteration, see J. Goody, Cooking, Cuisine and Class: A Study in Comparative Sociology (Cambridge, 1982), 98.

¹⁰Hopkins, Economic History, 54, 58-60. Klein, Peasants, 13.

¹¹Hopkins, Economic History, 71-75. Philip D. Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade (adospm. 1975), 278-286. Richard Roberts, "Long-Distance Trade and Production: Sinsani in the Nineteenth Century," JAH 21 (1980), 169-188.

¹²John Levi and Michael Havinden, Economics of African Agriculture (Harlow, 1982) 73,75. Ivory Wilks, "Land, Labour, Capital and the Forest Kingdom of Asante: A Model of Early Change," in J. Friedman & M. Rowland (eds) The Evolution of Social Systems (London, 1977) p. 500. Robin Horton, "Stateless Societies in the History of West Africa" in JFA Ajayi & Michael Crowder (eds) History of West Africa v. I (New York, 1976), 77.

¹³Horton, "Stateless Societies," 79, 83-84.

¹⁴Examples of the insecurity of pre-colonial Africa, particularly in the era of the slave trade abound. See for example, Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna (Madison, 1966) 52-53. Michael Mason, "Captive and Client Labour and the Economy of Bida Emirate: 1857-1901," JAH 14,3 (1973) 467. For an extreme example of the reduction of the area available for cultivation see the case of the montagnards of northern Cameroon: Antoinette Hallaire, "Des montagnards en bordure de plaine: Hodogway (Cameroun du Nord)," Etudes Rurales 37-39(1970) 212-231.

¹⁵Horton, "Stateless Societies," 88-91.

¹⁶On the lack of homogeneity of land see Hopkins, Economic History 18; Levi & Havinden, Economics, 75. On disputes over land see David J. Parkin, Palms, Wine and Witnesses: Public Spirit and Private Gain in an African Farming Community (San Francisco, 1972) 2-3, 15.

¹⁷Goody denies this: J. Goody, Production and Reproduction: A Comparative Study of the Domestic Domain (Cambridge, 1976) 82. But compare C. Meillassoux, Maidens, Meal and Money: Capitalism and the Domestic Economy (Cambridge, 1981) 27, 30, 39.

¹⁸Meillassoux, Maidens, Meal and Money, 40; Curtin, Economic Change, 5.

¹⁹See Sara Berry, Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria (Oxford, 1975), for an example of the use of kinship ties to spread the risk of diversification into cocoa production.

²⁰Goody, "Feudalism," 1-18.

²¹See Goody, "Feudalism" for specific references. See also John H. M. Beattie, "Bunyoro: An African Feudality," JAH 5 (1964) 25-35.

²²Goody, Production and Reproduction, 108.

²³Goody, Technology, Tradition and the State, 30.

²⁴Ibid., 30, note 2.

²⁵J. Goody, "Slavery in Time and Space," in James L. Watson (ed) Asian and African Systems of Slavery (Berkeley, 1980) 22.

²⁶See Bernard J. Siegel, "Some Methodological Considerations for a Comparative Study of Slavery," American Anthropologist 14 (1947), 357-392; Orlando Patterson, "The Structural Origins of Slavery: A Critique of the Nieboer-Domar Hypothesis from a Comparative Perspective" Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences ccxcii(1977) 12-34.

²⁷On differential access: Curtin, Economic Change, 22-23; Horton, "Stateless Societies," 88-91. On the effects of population pressure: R. F. Stevenson, Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa (New York, 1968), 16-17, 232. D. Biebuyck, (ed) African Agrarian Systems "Introduction" p.28 (London, 1963) K. P. Moseley, "The Political Economy of Dahomey" in Research in Economic Anthropology 2(1979), 80. Philip Burnham, "Raiders and Traders in Adamawa: Slavery as a Regional System" in Watson (ed) Asian and African Systems of Slavery 46,50-51.

²⁸Levi & Havinden, Economics, 80. On the use of slaves see J. L. Spaulding, "Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class in the Northern Turkish Sudan" International Journal of African Historical Studies 15,1(1982), 14.

²⁹Hopkins, Economic History, 37, citing F. J. Pedler, Economic Geography of West Africa (1955), 215.

³⁰Hopkins Economic History, 9.

³¹Curtin, Economic Change, 236. Land was definitely sold in precolonial Africa. See I. Wilks "Land, Labour...." 500; Spaulding, "Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class" 7-8.

³²A. G. Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," 4, in J.D. Cockcroft, A.G. Frank and D.L. Johnson (eds) Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy (Garden City, 1972).

³³A.G. Frank, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (New York, 1979) 20.

³⁴Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (New York, 1982), 41.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., 117.

³⁷Edward Alpers, "Rethinking African Economic History: A Contribution to the Discussion of the Roots of Under-development," Ufahamu III (1973) 120.

³⁸For critiques see Aidan Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy" New Left Review, 107(1978) 49ff.; F. Cooper, "Peasants, Capitalists and Historians: A Review Article," Journal of Southern African Studies 7, 2(1981) 288. A.G. Frank, Mexican Agriculture, 1521-1630: Transformation of the Mode of Production (Cambridge, 1979) xi, xii, 1.

³⁹See for example Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York, 1976) 13-14. For a statement on the freedom of modern Marxists to construct their own modes of production see Maurice Bloch, "Modes of Production and Slavery in Madagascar: Two Case Studies," 129-130, in Watson (ed) Asian and African Systems of Slavery. More generally see Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy," *passim*.

⁴⁰Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Research on an African Mode of Production," 33-51, in M.A. Klein & G.W. Johnson, Perspectives on the African Past (Boston, 1972). Originally published in French as "Recherches sur un mode de production africain" La Pensee, 144(1969) 61-78, and widely reprinted in anthologies. For one critique see E. Terray, "Long Distance Exchange and the Formation of the State" Economy and Society 3,3 (1974), 317.

⁴¹Ibid. Coquery-Vidrovitch "Research", 45.

⁴²Ibid., 45.

⁴³Ibid., 49.

⁴⁴Ibid., 50.

⁴⁵Moseley, "The Political Economy of Dahomey," 72-73.

⁴⁶Ibid., 81.

⁴⁷Terray, "Long Distance Exchange," 331.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Raymond E. Dumett, "Precolonial Gold Mining and the State in the Akan Region: With a Critique of the Terray Hypothesis" in Research in Economic Anthropology 2(1979) 64. For Terray's response on the broader issues involved see his, "Gold Production, Slave Labor and State Intervention in Precolonial Akan Societies: A Reply to Raymond Dumett" Research in Economic Anthropology 5(1983) 95-130.

⁵⁰Dumett, "Precolonial Gold Mining," 48.

⁵¹T.C. McCaskie, "Office, Land and Subjects in the History of Manwere Fekuo of Kumase: An Essay in the Political Economy of the Asante State," JAH 21(1980); Wilks, "Land, Labour..." 487-534; Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Plantation Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate." Paper delivered at the

American Historical Association, 91st Annual Conference, Washington, D.C. 1976. A revised edition appeared as P. Lovejoy "Plantations in the Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate," JAH 19,3 (1978) 341-369, but some of the sections which are most relevant to the present discussion were eliminated in the revision.

52P. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, 269-273 and passim.

53Lovejoy, "Plantation Economy," 4.

54Ibid., 14.

55F. Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa (New Haven, 1977) 57-60.

56Mason, "Captive and Client Labour," 469.

57Cooper "The Problem of Slavery," 116. A similar point was made by Stephen B. Baier, "Ecologically Based Trade and the State in Precolonial West Africa" Cahiers d'Etudes Africains, 77-78 XX-1-2 (1980) 150-151.

58For an introduction to the hakura system see O'Fahey, State and Society, 49-68. For more details see O'Fahey and Abu Salim, Land in Dar Fur.

59For a brief history of the conquest of Kordofan see O'Fahey and Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan, 134-140.

60O'Fahey and Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan, 139.

61La Rue, "Export Trade of Dar Fur" and Walz, The Trade Between Egypt and Bilad as-Sudan.

62O'Fahey, State and Society, 140.

63On the holy men, see O'Fahey, State and Society, 115-130. On the slaves see O'Fahey, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dar Fur," JAH 14,1 (1973) 29-43. The remarks on slavery more generally are based on my fieldwork in Dar Fur, 1979-1980. See also Lidwien Kapteijns, "Mahdist Faith and Sudanic Tradition: History of Dar Masalit, 1870-1930" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1982; forthcoming, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 60-75, for a description of slavery in a contiguous area.

64For details of the displacement of the Isirra from the site of al-Fashir, oral interview (OI) Shayhu Salih Jalis/Oct. 27, 1979; OI/Fadl Musa/ October 13, 1979. Oral informants will be fully cited in my eventual thesis.

65Ladislav Holy, Neighbours and Kinsmen: A Study of the Berti People of Dar Fur (1974), esp. 94-98.

66This area was also known as dar al-toknyawi, and was the site of my fieldwork conducted in 1979-1980.

⁶⁷Here I have used the transliteration magdum (rather than the classical maqdam, following the pronunciation of my Sudanese oral informants and the practice of British Condominium officials. On the evolution of the office of magdum from military leader to provincial governor see O'Fahey, State and Society 87-91; O'Fahey and Abu Salim, Land in Dar Fur; and my eventual thesis which should help to clarify the succession of the magdums. On the continuity of certain ruling families before and during the sultanate see for example NRO;CivSec 1/20/60 f 75 on the Tunjur shartays of Dar Hamra.

⁶⁸OI/ 'Ali Hasabo/ March 12, 1980.

⁶⁹Personal observations, 1979-1980.

⁷⁰O'Fahey, State and Society, 57-59. O'Fahey and Abu Salim, Land in Dar Fur, 20-21.

⁷¹O'Fahey, State and Society, 57-59.

⁷²O'Fahey and Abu Salim, Land in Dar Fur, Doc. XLV, 115-117 is a report of such a delegation. In the same volume will be found numerous examples of confirmatory charters.

⁷³R.S. O'Fahey, "The Office of qadi in Dar Fur: A Preliminary Enquiry," BSOAS 1,1(1977) 110-124. O'Fahey and Abu Salim Land in Dar Fur, 8-11.

⁷⁴For examples see O'Fahey and Abu Salim, Land in Dar Fur, Abu Salim al-fur wa al-ard.

⁷⁵OI/ Ali Hasabo/ March 12, 1980, and the documents in his possession which I photographed: collection 12.

⁷⁶Tunisi, Darfour, 48-49; O'Fahey and Abu Salim, Land in Dar Fur Doc. xliiii, 109-112.

⁷⁷OI/ Abboh Hamad Hasaballah / Aug. 27, 1980. NRO/ CIVSEC 1/20/60, f. 82. Personality report on Yusuf Magdum Sharif.

⁷⁸See for example O'Fahey, State and Society, 111.

⁷⁹A number of the early hakuras were located on the large wadi which passes by Kutum, Kafot and Kubayh. See La Rue, "Khabir 'Ali," 21-22.

⁸⁰OI/ Ahmad BoshAhmad/ October 12, 1980.

⁸¹Tunisi, Darfour, 118-119; O'Fahey and Abu Salim, Land in Dar Fur, p 61ff for the cases of 'Aqrab and Muhammad Hud.

⁸²OI/ Muhammad Tamim Darir/ October 14, 1980; Hasan Husayn Hamad/ October 15, 1980; Muhammad Ahmad Khatim/ Oct. 12, 1980; Muhammad Ahmad Habib/Oct. 16, 1980; 'Ali Muhammad Harir/Oct. 16, 1980; Sulayman 'Isa Sulayman/Oct. 16, 1980.

⁸³As in note 82, and personal observation.

- ⁸⁴See sources cited in note 76 above, and La Rue "Khabir 'Ali," 24.
- ⁸⁵Cooper, "The Problem of Slavery," 116.
- ⁸⁶Based on distillation of oral interviews, and personal observation of mealtime behavior of persons of differing status in Dar Fur, 1979-1980.
- ⁸⁷OI/Ahmad Muhammad 'Uthman/ Apr.7, 1980.
- ⁸⁸OI/Adam Daw al-Bayt (a/k/a Adam Sagadali)/ June 2, 1980.
- ⁸⁹Browne, Travels, 320.
- ⁹⁰OI/Abbakr Muhammad 'Uthman/ May 21, 1980.
- ⁹¹Numerous oral informants. For example: Muhammad az-Zaki/Aug. 31, '1980.
- ⁹²OI/Husayn Muhammad Sayf al-Dawla/May 21, 1980.
- ⁹³See La Rue, "Khabir 'Ali," 29; OI/ 'Abd al-Kabir Kakom/Sept. 12, 1980; OI/Majdhum 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Jalis/Oct. 11, 1980.
- ⁹⁴OI/Hajja 'Asha Ahmad Tahir/June 16, 1980; Hasan Ahmad Nur/June 1, 1980.
- ⁹⁵OI/ Abboh Hamad Hasaballah/ Aug.27, 1980; Muhammad az-Zaki, Aug. 31, 1980.
- ⁹⁶Personal observation based on oral interviews.
- ⁹⁷'Fahey and Abu Salim, Land i Dar Fur, Doc. xxxviii, p.101.
- ⁹⁸OI/ Ahmad Bosh Ahmad/Dec.18, 1979 and Oct. 12, 1980.
- ⁹⁹As in note 98, above.
- ¹⁰⁰'Fahey, State and Society, 105-108.
- ¹⁰¹La Rue, "Khabir 'Ali," 29; see also note 97 above; OI/ 'Abd al-Kabir Kakom/12 Sept 1980; Majdhub 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Jalis/Oct. 11, 1980.
- ¹⁰²Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, IV 256, 377.
- ¹⁰³'FAhey, State and Society, 52-54.
- ¹⁰⁴Distillation of oral interviews.
- ¹⁰⁵OI/Adam Bashir Ibrahim/Oct.31 and NOvember 1, 1980; Abboh Hamad Hasaballah/Aug. 27, 1980.
- ¹⁰⁶OI/Abbakr Muhammad 'Uthman/May 21, 1980.
- ¹⁰⁷OI/'Abd al-Rahman Nimayr, 'Abd al-Rahman Ahmad Nimayr, Muhammad Adam Mansur/ Dec.3,1979.