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Some of the most important recent work on African labor history has been concerned with the mining industry in Southern Africa. The case of the South African gold mining industry has been at the center of this work. A distinctive feature of this industry was the high degree of control which mining capital developed over its black labor force, and the high degree of exploitation of black labor that went with this. This control was achieved through a variety of economic and extra-economic mechanisms, particularly recruiting agents, the compound system, and servile labor laws. These measures enabled South African mining capital to monopsonize black labor, ensuring adequate labor supplies for minimal cost.¹

Because mining capital did develop such control in this case, the analysis of the relations between mining capital and black labor in Southern Africa has tended to focus on capital's role in achieving its ends, rather than on the role of black labor. This is understandable in view of the highly coercive nature of the South African system and its limitations on black labor action. However, the Southern African case is deceptive. Mining capital in Central Africa did not always have this same degree of control over its labor force - a different historical pattern with important implications for both corporate labor strategy and black labor action.

This paper will examine black and corporate labor strategies on the Rhodesian Copperbelt, based on evidence from four specific mines: Rhokana (Nkana) and Nchanga Copper Mines owned by Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa (AA), and Roan Antelope and Mufulira Copper

Mines owned by Rhodesian Selection Trust of London (RST). This paper argues that from the beginning of the copper mines in 1926 until the depression, mining capital on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt did not achieve the same degree of control over its black labor force as existed in the South African gold mining industry; and that the crucial aspect of this lack of control was not the absence of servile labor measures, which did in fact exist in Northern Rhodesia, but rather the inability of mining capital to eliminate competition for labor and the competitive market determination of wages and other returns to labor. This meant that on the Copperbelt, black workers had some degree of effective market power in relation to mining capital, and that this greater role of market factors on the Copperbelt was indeed reflected in the consciousness and behavior of the black workers and in corporate labor strategy.²

Black workers on the Copperbelt understood their bargaining power in the labor market and they used it. They actively sought out the best employment, changing employers frequently in response to better rewards. This affected corporate labor strategy, which, unlike that on the Rand, had to be more responsive to black worker consciousness and behavior in order to secure and retain adequate labor for production. Only when the depression turned labor shortage into over-supply, did the pendulum of market power swing over to mining capital. This study suggests that while Southern African labor history has, with good reason, focused much attention on the determining role of corporate labor strategy and of the colonial regimentation of labor, Copperbelt labor history reveals important roles both for black labor strategy and for market factors in the relations between capital and black labor in colonial Africa.

Labor Supply before the Depression

The general labor shortage of the 1920s in Central Africa put workers, particularly skilled workers, in a good bargaining position in the labor market.³ Jobs were plentiful, while experienced workers were in short supply. Widespread and accurate information networks about wages, work, and living conditions at mines inside and outside Northern Rhodesia enabled miners to compare the potential rewards for their labor. Northern Rhodesian workers learned they could change jobs easily, and they did. They avoided organized recruitment in order to choose employers themselves. Many workers preferred to work for contractors because of "the loose system of control they exercised over labour at work and in the compounds."⁴ Mines with poor reputations, such as Nkana, had difficulty obtaining voluntary laborers.⁵ Even recruited labor could, and did, choose between working in or outside Northern Rhodesia.

When Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST) of London and Anglo-American (AA) of South Africa began construction on the four major copper mines in 1926, Northern Rhodesians did not automatically flock to the new mines. They compared Copperbelt wages, working and living conditions with those of other employers. Many chose to work elsewhere. In 1929, about 50,000 Northern Rhodesians were still working outside the country, of whom about 30,000 were in Southern Rhodesia. Some went simply because of proximity, but many more were drawn by the higher wages as well. Better working and living conditions also attracted Northern Rhodesians to the Union Minière copper mine in Katanga. Some 10,500 Northern Rhodesians worked there in 1929. Union Minière's shift to a stabilized labor policy in 1927 was accompanied by a dramatic upgrading of living conditions for their workers. "By the end of the decade Africans in Elizabethville enjoyed the best food and housing of any black in the

whole of central Africa."⁶ These advantages were well known, and Union Minière recruiters had no difficulty obtaining Northern Rhodesian labor. In fact, many Northern Rhodesians went to Katanga on their own rather than work on the Copperbelt.⁷ Within Northern Rhodesia, Broken Hill and Bwana Mkubwa mines competed with the Copperbelt companies for labor. Miners liked these mines because they allowed workers to bring dependents to the mines, providing housing and rations for them. Broken Hill was especially popular because it gave married, long-service miners five-acre plots to supplement their rations and wages.⁸

Corporate Responses to the Labor Shortage

Northern Rhodesian companies responded to this situation in a number of ways. One avenue they pursued was to stem the outflow of labor to neighboring colonies. Since voluntary labor both remained at the mines longer and cost less (due to the absence of a recruiting fee), management preferred to utilize this kind of labor as much as possible. In this period, about two-thirds of the companies' labor force came to the mines on their own. The companies hoped that limitations on foreign recruitment would narrow the economic opportunities of Northern Rhodesian labor to the point where they could obtain a wholly volunteer labor force. To that end, they pressed the Northern Rhodesian government to help them secure more control over the labor supply, demanding immediate limitations on foreign recruitment. The government was willing to cooperate, but negotiations were lengthy and delicate. From 1925 on, the government reduced Katanga's allotment of recruits. However, recruitment continued until July 31, 1931. The flow southward into Southern Rhodesia did not diminish until the depression, and then due to market factors rather than legislation.

Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland did not coordinate their labor policies until 1936, when an agreement established the priority of each country's labor needs.⁹ Thus, during the 1920s the Northern Rhodesian government was not able to provide the copper mines with a monopoly over Northern Rhodesian labor.

The shortage of voluntary labor forced the mines to turn to recruiting agents. Initially, each mine hired private recruiting agents to go into the rural areas to obtain workers for six- to nine-month contracts. These agents guaranteed their recruits passage to and from the mines as well as wages, rations, housing, and medical care during employment. Yet these individual recruiters were unable to supply enough recruits, and as a result, their activities merely led to competitive wage increases without solving the labor shortage. In 1929, the mines attempted to solve this dilemma by establishing a joint recruiting agency, the Native Labor Association. This Association satisfied the mining companies' needs for extra unskilled labor. More important, it recruited some of the more skilled labor necessary for production. In the early 1930s, some 2400 trained Southern Rhodesian miners were recruited to upgrade the work force, and over 2000 Nyasaland workers were brought in to fill much needed clerical jobs.¹⁰

Rhodesian Anglo-American even petitioned the Colonial Office to permit permanent settlement for several thousand skilled laborers from Nyasaland at Rhokana, offering them good housing, recreation, medical, and welfare facilities, as well as social security benefits. The mines were willing to bear the cost of this proposal if it would keep production moving.¹¹

The mining companies also tried to limit labor needs through mechanization wherever possible. Both mines complained about the quality

of their laborers. L. Eaton of RST found "the native negro. . . small and unused to hard physical labor." Mechanization seemed the logical answer. Management believed labor could "be taught to handle simple mechanical equipment or routine work. The supply [of labor] is inadequate and recourse must therefore be had to minimizing methods in which the ore is moved by mechanical or gravity means."¹² Elaborate plans were drawn up to increase mechanization in the future.

However, none of these particular responses succeeded in overcoming competition between the mines for voluntary labor. Because of their need to attract voluntary labor, and their failure to monopsonize recruitment in the manner of the Rand mines, the mining companies had to offer conditions of employment comparable, or nearly comparable, to those at neighboring mines. This competition led to a situation where the mines "were all looking for recruits and making offers better than the man next door to get the native to engage."¹³

Wages on the Copperbelt rose accordingly. Each mine tried to outbid the other for labor. At Mufulira, for example, the general manager wrote the head office in 1929 saying that "Mufulira's pay was a little lower and should be put up with other Copperbelt wages." By that year, the average monthly wage of black workers on the Copperbelt was 18s, while many experienced men earned between 20s and 22/6d. A few underground workers even started as high as 30s. Skilled underground workers were in great demand, some drawing wages of 45s or more per month. By 1930, the average wages at Roan were 21s per month for surface work and 33s for underground work. These wages enabled the Copperbelt mines to compete with Union Minière for skilled labor, and to outbid them for unskilled labor. Northern Rhodesian wages were still below those of the sisal estates of Tanganyika and the Wankie mines in Southern

Rhodesia, which had average monthly wages of 22/6 and 32/6 respectively.¹⁴ However, since Katanga was the nearest competitor for Copperbelt labor, the mines concentrated on competing with Union Minière.

Competition for labor forced the mines to alter the traditional South African migrant labor system, since Northern Rhodesian workers - particularly more skilled and experienced workers - were accustomed to having their families with them during employment in Katanga and at other local mines. Since white labor was both scarce and expensive, it was still profitable to supply accommodations and rations to attract experienced African workers. The acceptance of married labor varied with the differing labor needs and managerial traditions of the two Copperbelt companies. Because of the nature of its orebody, the RST mine, Roan Antelope, required a higher percentage of experienced labor. As a result, the compound manager reported that "in the early days it was practically impossible to get labor and so when a native offered himself for work, we were only too pleased to take them together with their wives and families."¹⁵ When production started in 1930, the need for experienced labor increased. The percentage of married labor rose accordingly, moving from 20 percent of the work force in 1927 to 47.3 percent in 1932. The average length of service for surface workers climbed to eighteen months, with 64 percent of the African employees in 1932 having over a year's employment on the mine.¹⁶

In contrast, Anglo-American mines made more strenuous efforts to maintain a migrant labor force. Except for settling a small number of skilled miners, management saw no reason to spend money on accommodations for married workers. Anglo-American decided to rely on recruitment and mechanization instead. Since the orebodies at Rhokana and

Nchanga mines required less trained labor, these mines were able to maintain a lower standard for recruits. Anglo-American management was accustomed to the South African migrant labor system. Rhokana field management was appointed and closely supervised by South African consulting engineers from the Johannesburg office. These men preferred the migrant labor system.¹⁷ However, economics, not ideology, was the issue. Anglo was willing to stabilize where necessary, but as long as sufficient voluntary unskilled migrant labor could be found, the migrant labor system was cheaper for those workers. Consequently, Anglo-American's married labor force remained considerably lower than RST's.

These competitive labor strategies also affected compound conditions on the Copperbelt. As H. H. Field remarked in 1930, "it almost appeared now that competitive recruiting has been done away with, the mines were going in for a competitive Compound program."¹⁸ Roan was intent on keeping up with Union Minière's programs. Between 1926 and 1927, expenditure per worker increased by 40 percent, primarily for housing, food and social services. In 1932, Union Minière's service cost for each African employee reached a record 22.5d/ticket, while Roan spent 16.5d/ticket and Nkana spent 11.64d.¹⁹ Roan and Mufulira consulted frequently with government about improving conditions. They brought in teams of experts to help improve health standards. In contrast, Anglo-American mines hired fewer experts, and were less willing to provide more than the bare essentials for their workers.¹⁹

Although housing on all the mines was cramped and inadequate, Roan and Mufulira tried harder to create a village atmosphere to attract and keep labor. Most mine houses were round, one-room structures, built of Kimberly brick with dirt floors, a thatched or iron roof, and often lacking even one window. Some compounds had barracks, with long rows

of contiguous rooms, back to back. Only the simplest furniture was provided. There was no water or electricity. Frequent overcrowding occurred with seven or eight men sleeping in a house designed for four. Roan and Mufulira tried to provide similar living conditions on both mines, but housing conditions varied somewhat. In 1930, Mufulira had the best housing on the Copperbelt. Housing at Roan was not as good, but employees were allowed to build little fences around their houses, to make hen coops, and to keep fowl and small animals. Married workers liked this because it helped supplement the meager rations for women and children.²⁰ In contrast, Nkana compound, which housed some 6,000 laborers in 1931, was very stark, and "utterly unAfrican in its precision and mathematical regularity." The single men were housed in barrack-like buildings. There were no trees, and the general atmosphere was barren and hostile. Nchanga was similarly stark, although a housing program begun in 1931 did improve conditions somewhat by building some brick houses with kitchen huts in front. Most houses still had only one room for either a family or a number of single men.²¹

Health care and accident prevention received serious attention at the mines and in this period. Once again, the RST mines had the best record because of their need to compete for experienced labor. In 1931, only 17 out of 1000 Roan employees died from illness, while Nkana's death rate was 39 per 1000. Neither of these figures compare favorably with Union Minière's rate of 8.01 per 1000, nor the Rand's rate of 12 per 1000, but the RST mines were clearly trying.²² Both companies worked hard to minimize accident rates. Again, Roan had the best safety procedures. All African gang supervisors (boss boys) were trained in first aid work. Candidates for blasting certificates at Nkana received similar training. The death rate below ground on all the Northern

Rhodesian mines was 4.3 per 1000 in 1929 and 3.6 per 1000 in 1930, a little higher than those in South Africa and Katanga. In 1930, the fatal accident rates in Northern Rhodesia fell below those in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.²³ In this period of labor scarcity, the mining companies realized high accident rates would drive labor away.

The greatest differences in compound expenditures occurred in the recreation and welfare facilities. In order to attract skilled labor, both Roan and Mufulira provided facilities equivalent to or nearly comparable to those available at Union Minière, Broken Hill, and Bwana Mkubwa. This was especially true after production began. Union Minière's elaborate social service facilities set the standard for competition until Katanga recruiting stopped in 1931. After that, RST still competed with neighboring employers.

Roan's welfare facilities aimed to attract and keep adequate numbers of more skilled educated workers at the mine. Many of these men were interested in "bettering themselves," and were attracted by facilities for reading, debating, and similar activities. Consequently, Roan attempted to fulfill these needs as well as to supply the more standard amusements such as sports and cinemas. A full-time welfare officer was hired in 1929, and in 1930 a large recreation hall was completed. "In the main hall provision has been made for letter writing, there are tables and benches placed conveniently, and racks for native newspapers are provided. It is also possible to obtain soft drinks, biscuits, writing paper and envelopes, pencils, tobacco and cigarettes. Hot tea is always available.... Another item which is popular is a gramophone with a quantity of records." The gramophones often did not work, and the reading material disappeared, but the hall still provided a center

where more educated miners could come to relax and learn. The welfare officer organized activities for the rest of the work force as well. Football fields and sports grounds were built. Physical training classes, football, pushball and other games were popular. Twice-weekly movies frequently had audiences of over 2000 people. The movies were carefully screened to keep "the native from losing his respect for European women." Concerts, gramophone recitals, debates, and indoor games were held in the evenings for more educated audiences. Night school classes were offered in English, first aid, and other subjects of interest to those aiming for self-improvement. While the mines offered few programs for women, there were some activities for children. A small school tried to educate an often fluctuating pupil population. A playground with swings and other equipment was fenced in during 1930.²⁴ These activities increased Roan's attractiveness to married workers with children by offering advantages not available in the rural areas. Since married workers were generally more skilled, welfare policies designed for their needs encouraged these workers to remain at the mines for longer periods of time, therefore supporting Roan's policy of encouraging longer-service, married labor.

Mufulira closed in 1931, but before the closure welfare facilities for families were being developed. Management hired a woman welfare officer; and work was started among the women and children. They stressed the need "to save the children from ignorance," and "to give women interests which would usefully occupy their time."²⁵

The higher turnover of labor at Nkana and Nchanga called for different welfare policies. A migrant labor force could not utilize programs demanding extended participation. Education, Pathfinder Scouts, debating clubs, and other activities were less appealing to short-term employees. Management wanted welfare activities to control and amuse

workers during their leisure hours, not to keep them at the mines. Consequently, welfare programs concentrated on sports and cinemas. A welfare officer, Mr. Nutter, ran a small children's school. He taught carpentry and other skills which could supplement wages. The men practiced repairing mine furniture and other mine equipment, thus saving money for the company. He also went around the compound checking conditions and teaching hygiene. This was unpopular, as Nutter had a well-deserved reputation for taking advantage of miners' wives while their husbands worked. Despite objections, the mines kept Nutter on as welfare officer. Clearly his low salary and money-saving activities were more important than his effectiveness as a welfare officer. Nchanga had even fewer facilities before it closed down in 1931.²⁶

Northern Rhodesian labor gradually responded to these labor strategies, and by 1930, many Northern Rhodesians chose to work on the Copperbelt rather than elsewhere.²⁷ Within the Copperbelt, these workers with the greatest leverage in the wage labor market, namely experienced miners, gravitated to the RST mines because of the conditions described above. Inexperienced unskilled labor went to the less popular Anglo-American mines. As these workers gained experience, they frequently moved over to the more popular mines. This behavior reveals black labor's growing awareness of and ability to manipulate the wage labor market, and demonstrates the need (as long as market forces on the Copperbelt favored black labor) for a corporate labor strategy which would accommodate this reality.

Corporate Labor Strategy in the Depression

When the world depression hit the Northern Rhodesian copper industry in 1931, the mines shifted suddenly from a shortage to an overabundance

of laborers. With the closing of Katanga to Northern Rhodesian laborers, the mines short-circuited their biggest competitor. With the fall in copper prices (from £74 a ton in early 1931 to £24 a ton at the end of 1931),²⁸ production on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt almost ground to a halt. Only Rhokana and Roan Antelope maintained a limited output of copper. European employees were reduced from 3,326 to 964 in 1932. Mufulira and Nchanga became virtual ghost towns. The African labor force declined from 30,000 miners in early 1931 to 11,636 by January 1932. By December 1932, this number dwindled to a mere 6,677. Large numbers of unemployed workers drifted around the Copperbelt in search of work. In 1935, the government reported a "floating population of at least 5000 natives moving between Ndola and the mines looking for work."²⁹

Suddenly African laborers lost their leverage in the wage labor market, a leverage which was now gained by the mining companies. As employment opportunities dried up all over Southern Africa, miners clung fiercely to their jobs. Absenteeism and desertion fell to new lows. Roan listed only five absentees daily in 1932. Even the unpopular Anglo-American mines had no trouble keeping workers.³⁰ At Nkana mine alone, over 20,000 men applied for work in 1935; only 6,723 were accepted. At Roan in 1936, some 500 men applied for only 150 jobs.³¹ Even skilled and semi-skilled men were easier to hire, for these men were more accustomed to urban life. Consequently, many of them remained near the Copperbelt after losing their jobs, hoping to be rehired so they could continue to live in town. This excess of potential laborers allowed the mines to raise their standards for recruits. Physical conditions, education, and skill levels for new employees were all increased. Each mine kept a labor pool of hand-picked men in the compounds.

These workers were fed and housed in the compounds, and provided a ready back-up system for labor needs.³²

Corporate strategy designed to attract laborers away from nearby competitors were no longer necessary. Recruits poured into the mines voluntarily. The Native Labour Association was disbanded as formal recruitment became an unnecessary expense. Despite higher wages to the south, the excess labor supply allowed Northern Rhodesians to work outside the country without threatening the labor supplies of the copper mines.³³ The new market conditions meant that the copper mining companies could now lower their wage and living standards without jeopardizing their labor supply. In a world where copper prices were falling rapidly, low-cost labor was an important factor determining profitability. Already low-cost producers on the world market, the Northern Rhodesian mines had to lower their costs even more in order to survive the current world crisis. They soon set about adjusting their labor policies accordingly.

Although no formal ties existed between RST and AA, the two companies quickly took advantage of their new position in the labor market. The lessons of earlier competition had been well learned. The two companies maintained close contacts, both at the highest levels of management, and on the Copperbelt. Led by Rhokana in 1932, the mines made across-the-board cuts in African wages. In 1933, surface wages for new employees were lowered from 17s/6d per 30 working days to 12s/6d per 30 working days, and underground wages were similarly reduced from 30s/0d to 22s/6d (at Nkana it was 20/6) per 30 working days. Increments for experience remained the same, but the maximum levels were reduced.³⁴ The mines reassured themselves that they were only providing a fair wage in a formerly unrealistic and inflated labor market. The

wage cuts were declared "reasonable" and became the foundation of a new labor policy.

Housing conditions deteriorated now that adequate supplies of labor were readily available. In 1932, only 220 out of a total of 2,325 houses had more than one room. This housing was for a married labor force of 37.33 percent. Unmarried quarters were always overcrowded, frequently housing 4-6 men in one small house. Nkana's conditions were even worse. A visiting district commissioner described the married quarter as "little more than slums."³⁵ Even Mr. Geddes, a director of Anglo-American, admitted that "the siting of the married quarters quite defeated him."³⁶ At Kitwe Compound, barrack-type houses were built, with two rooms to each family, the back of one house facing the front of the other. Overcrowding and lack of privacy were endemic. The new Mindolo compound had separate houses in better condition, but the compound was small, and did not relieve the general congestion. Visitors to the Rhokana compounds were struck by "the more rigid and mechanical atmosphere and less of the personal touch than exists at Roan."³⁷ The Commission of Enquiry in 1935, after their tour of the compounds, declared that their "general impression . . . was a lack of shade in the compound and that the huts might be described as austere quarters rather than houses."³⁸

Little effort was made to improve the welfare programs at the mines. The labor supply was no longer affected by such variations. Mr. Nutter continued running his little school, teaching carpentry and generally seeing "to the repairs in the compounds."³⁹ Both mines maintained small welfare halls, but attendance was low. Roan reported a daily attendance at their welfare hall of less than 10 in 1932. Only the dry canteen was well used.⁴⁰ The compound managers had no incentive to increase the popularity of their recreation programs, and dismissed

the need for change. They concluded that "you are up against the native apathy towards anything that is done for his recreation. . . . They [the Africans] have the idea that whatever is required of them, . . . it is solely for the amusement of the Bwanas."⁴¹ Now that labor supplies were abundant, the companies saw no reason to improve their programs.

Mining accidents increased in this period, despite government inspections of the mines. With the labor glut, the mines no longer feared loss of labor due to accidents, despite widespread African knowledge of mining conditions. The fatal accident rate rose from 1.33 per 1000 in 1932 to 3.93 per 1000 in 1933, but dropped again to 1.84 per 1000 in 1935, due to some efforts at reform after a strike in 1935. Serious personal injuries also rose, reaching a peak of 13.67 per 1000 in 1933. The majority of accidents were underground and some increases can be explained by initial production problems. However, safeguards were clearly inadequate. Nkana was the worst offender. Even one of Rhokana's directors, Mr. Geddes, had to admit in 1933 that Nkana was shamefully behind Roan, and that of the 15 deaths in the last 5 months of 1933, 10 of them "should and could" have been prevented by the European staff.⁴² Despite such chastisements, no serious efforts were made at reform.

Sickness rates improved at both mines, although once again Roan had the best conditions. This was the one area of labor policy that did not suffer during the depression. However, sickness and deaths from illness were still much worse for Africans than for European employees. Children suffered the most. Crowding in the compounds encouraged epidemics which periodically swept through, leaving death and disruption

in their wake.⁴³ Health care aimed primarily to keep workers productive rather than to maintain the health of dependents. Also, fear of disease spreading to the European community undoubtedly kept management alert to health needs.

Compound discipline was tightened up now that miners no longer wanted to leave employment. Dismissal became a potent weapon much feared by the workers. Management could count upon large numbers of recruits eager to replace any dismissed workers. Consequently, dismissals were an effective threat keeping workers efficient and well-behaved. Workers were well aware of the difficulty of being rehired at other mines if they were dismissed for bad conduct. Scrivener, the compound manager at Rhokana, admitted in 1935 that if a labor shortage developed, the present policy of dismissals would not be sufficient to maintain discipline, but as long as the labor surplus continued, it was an effective method. Spearpoint, the compound manager at Roan, reiterated this view point when he told the 1935 strike commission that "we find the threat of dismissal and the bonus system fulfills our needs."⁴⁴

Conclusion

The argument of this paper has been that the relationship between capital and labor on the Copperbelt was significantly affected by black worker consciousness and behavior and by market factors, more so than it was on the Rand. This was evident in different ways before and during the Depression. The failure of the mining companies to eliminate intra-industry competition for labor and competitive wage determination meant that during a period of labor shortage, black workers were able to wield some market power, which forced corporate labor strategy to respond to

them. This illustrates the importance of the control achieved in the areas of recruitment and wage minimization by mining capital on the Rand. When the Depression created an oversupply of labor, mining capital took full advantage of its new economic power over black labor by lowering wages and abandoning recruitment. Consequently, when labor shortages returned to the Copperbelt after the Depression, the companies had to revert to their pre-Depression policy of encouraging married stabilized labor, which politicized black workers in important ways, so that black labor strategy came to play an even greater role in class relations on the Copperbelt. These political consequences of stabilization on the Copperbelt tended, in turn, to confirm the fears of Rand mining capital about the danger of precisely such policies, fears which led it to maintain its migrant labor system.

From the very beginning of mining on the Copperbelt, therefore, black worker consciousness and behavior came to play particularly significant roles in the capital-labor relationship. This study reaffirms the need to give more attention to black labor strategies in the labor history and political economy of colonial Africa.

Notes

¹F. A. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold (London, 1976); Charles van Onselen, Chibaro (London, 1976); Eddie Webster, ed., Essays in Southern African Labour History (Johannesburg, 1978); F. A. Johnstone, "Class Conflict and Colour Bars in the South African Mining Industry," Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar Papers No. 10 (London, 1970).

²See Jane L. Parpart, "Labor and Capital on the Copperbelt: African labor strategy and corporate labor strategy in the Northern Rhodesian copper mines during the colonial period," Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, forthcoming.

³See Charles Perrings, Black Mineworkers in Central Africa (New York, 1979).

⁴Interview, Gabriel Musumbulwa, Luanshya, 30 Aug. 1976. Mr. Musumbulwa is currently an employee at Roan Antelope Copper Mine. He was elected to the Legislative Council in 1958, and was Minister of African Education in 1960.

⁵C. F. Spearpoint, "The African Native and the Rhodesian Copper Mines," Supplement to the Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxxvi, no. CXLIV (July, 1937), p. 7. Northern Rhodesia, Department of Native Affairs, Annual Report, 1930.

⁶Jean-Luc Vellut, "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba c. 1890-1930," in R. Palmer and N. Parsons, The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (Los Angeles, 1977) p. 334.

⁷Charles Perrings, Black Mineworkers in Central Africa (New York, 1979), pp. 88-89. Zambian Archives (ZA)/1/9/18/43/1; J. Moffat Thompson, secretary of native affairs (SNA), to chief secretary (HCS), 23 Sept. 1929.

⁸RCM/CSD/WMA 65(205.5); Spearpoint to general manager, Roan Antelope Copper Mine (RACM), 16 Nov. 1938.

⁹Charles Coulter, "The Sociological Problem," in J. Merle Davis, ed., Modern Industry and the African (London, 1933), p. 53. A. Pim and S. Milligan, Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of the Northern Rhodesia (Colonial No. 145 of 1938), [The Pim Report], p. 32.

¹⁰ZA1/9/18/36/2; J. Moffat Thomson to P. C., Kasama, 2 April 1931. In 1932, only 19,492 men out of a daily average of 30,000 were recruited. RCM/CSD/KHB41; RST, London to general manager, Mufulira, 30 Jan. 1930. Northern Rhodesia, Department of Native Affairs, Annual Report, 1930.

¹¹ PRO/CO 795/43/36043; H. S. Munroe, Rhodesian Anglo-American to Permanent Undersecretary of State, C. O., 30 Jan. 1931.

¹² RCM/CSD/W(2)HA 58; L. Eaton, report, October 1929. Eaton was an engineer called in to Roan Antelope Company Mine to study this problem.

¹³ ZA1/9/18/34/1; H. Y. Willis, Report on Rhodesian Natives in Katanga, six months ending 31 Dec. 1931. Mr. Willis was the British Vice-Consul in Elizabethville. Spearpoint, "African Native," p. 8.

¹⁴ RCM/CSD/KHB41; E. E. Barker to A. D. Storke, 27 Nov. 1929; Northern Rhodesia, Department of Native Affairs, Annual Report, 1929; ZA1/9/18/43/1; J. Moffat Thomson to C. S., 20 Oct. 1930; RCM/CSD/KMA18; African earnings per shift, all mines, 1930-1948; Perrings, Black Mine-workers, pp. 82, 88-89; PRO/CO 795/18/18254; 1926 Native Reserves Commission, Evidence, H. E. Scott, I, p. 206, and delegates of the Broken Hill Mining Conference, Exhibit 5, IV.

¹⁵ Bruce Fetter, The Creation of Elizabethville (Stanford, 1976), p. 85. Northern Rhodesians working at Union Minière were paid in British sterling which kept pace with the falling value of the franc. In 1926, Northern Rhodesian wages were worth twice the real wage of a Congolese working at Union Minière. Consequently, after the fall of the franc in 1927, the cost of Northern Rhodesian labor in Katanga rose. This was a factor pushing Union Minière towards a stabilization policy with laborers from within the Congo. RCM/CSD/WMA 65(205.5); Spearpoint to general manager, RACM, 16 Nov. 1938.

¹⁶ Spearpoint, "African Native," pp. 34-35. Northern Rhodesia, Luangwa Province, Annual Report, 31 Dec. 1930. Married workers in 1931 at Roan worked for an average of 20.25 months, while single workers left after only 9.79 months. J. Merle Davis, "The Problem for the Missions," in J. Merle Davis, ed., Modern Industry, p. 313. RCM/CSD/KSN 3/1/4; Annual Report, Ndola, 1932.

¹⁷ SEC/LAB1; W. J. Scrivener, "Native Labour as Affecting the Copper Industry of Northern Rhodesia," 17 Aug. 1934. Perrings, "Black Labour," p. 302.

¹⁸ RCM/CSD/KHB 41; H. H. Field to manager, Native Labour Association, 22 Aug. 1930.

¹⁹ Fetter, Elizabethville, p. 112; Coulter, "The Sociological Problem," p. 65

²⁰ RCM/CSD/W (2) HA62; A. J. Orenstein, "Report on Health Conditions at Bwana Mkubwa, Nkana, Nchanga, Broken Hill, and Roan," 20 Dec. 1929; RCM/CSD/KHB41, E. E. Barker, general manager, MCM to Colonel Stephenson, Native Labour Association, 1930; RCM/CSD/KHB41, H. H. Filed to manager,

Native Labour Association, 22 Aug. 1930; Interview, Mr. A. Mwalwanda, Roan, 13 Sept. 1976.

²¹LMS Box 9; Reverend A. M. Chirgwin, Report to Central Africa Committee, May-July 1931. Reverend Fr. S. Siemieski, "The Mine Compound and its Moral Influence upon the Native," General Missionary Conference, 1931, Northern Rhodesia.

²²Coulter, "The Sociological Problem," pp. 66-67.

²³Spearpoint, "African Native," p. 9; Northern Rhodesia, Department of Native Affairs, Annual Report, 1931. E. A. G. Robinson, "The Economic Problem," in Modern Industry and the African, p. 166. Katanga's over-all accident rate in 1931 was 1.80 per 1000, while Rand gold mines had an accident rate of 2.35 per 1000.

²⁴Spearpoint, "African Native," pp. 40-46; RCM/CSD file 210.6, Compound Monthly Report, RACM, 31 Jan. 1932; ZA7/13/7; Annual Reports, Luangwa Province, 31 Dec. 1930; Interview, A. Mwalwanda, Luanshya, 13 Sept. 1976.

²⁵Rev. H. C. Nutter, "Native Welfare Work in the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia," General Missionary Conference, 1931, p. 123; CBM Box 1211, R. J. B. Moore to A. Cocker Brown, 25 Feb. 1935.

²⁶Acc. 72/1/1, To the Secretary of Native Affairs, from the underground people, Compound Office, Northern Rhodesia, early 1930s. This is a letter from miners complaining of Mr. Nutter's conduct in the compounds. See also, D. O., Nkana to P. C., Ndola, 11 May 1931. Mr. Nutter's salary was £25 per month.

²⁷Northern Rhodesia, Department of Native Affairs, Annual Report, 1930.

²⁸J. H. Holleman and S. Biesheuvel, White Mine Workers in Northern Rhodesia, African Social Research Documents, Vol. 6 (Cambridge, England, 1973), p. 10.

²⁹KSN 3/1/4, Northern Rhodesia Annual Report, Ndola District, 1932; Davis, Modern Industry and the African, 151; KSN/3/1/5, Northern Rhodesia Annual Report, Ndola District, 1935; RCM/file 210.6, Luashya Compound Monthly Report, 30 April, 1932.

³⁰Northern Rhodesia, Department of Native Affairs, Annual Report, 1934; Evidence of R. Hesom (Asst. C. M., Mufulira) to the Russell Commission, (Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia (London, 1935), Cmd. 5009), p. 155.

³¹SEC/LAB34 vol. 1; Report of the Sub-Committee of the Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board on Administrative Control of the Industrial Population (Lusaka, 1936); Chairman's Report of Meetings of the Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board held at Ndola on 7-8 Nov. and 16-17 Dec. 1935.

³²LMS Box 26, Central Africa, Rev. A. J. Cross to Mr. A. M. Chirgwin, 31 Jan. 1932; Davis, Modern Industry, p. 313; ZAl/9/18/36/2, Report of the Board of Management of the Native Labour Association, Ltd., for the year ending 31 Dec. 1931; KSN 3/1/4, Annual Report, Ndola District, 1932.

³³Northern Rhodesia, Department of Native Affairs, Annual Report, 1932; The Pim Report, pp. 52-54.

³⁴RCM/CSD/WMA 5; GM, RACM to RACM London, 13 Feb. 1932; Evidence to the Russell Commission (1935) by Scrivener, p. 559; also, Pim Report, pp. 52-54.

³⁵RCM file 210.6, Roan Monthly Compound Reports, 30 June 1932; The Pim Report, p. 45; RCM/CSD/WMA 139, C. F. Spearpoint to R. M. Peterson, 15 Oct. 1935. In 1935 underground workers were 66 percent married and Nyasa underground workers were 84 percent married. ZAl/9/18/28/1, F. Ayer to E. H. Jalland, Acting Secretary of Native Affairs, 2 Aug. 1934.

³⁶ZAl/9/18/57/1, Meeting of Sir Auckland Geddes and Government officials, 13 Dec. 1933.

³⁷ZAl/9/82/9, Extract from Report of a Tour by the Secretary for Native Affairs during 7 Aug. 1934. See also Acc. 72/3, vol. I, P. C., Ndola to G. M., Rhodana, 28 July 1934; Evidence of Dr. Charles Fisher to the Russell Commission, p. 545. Dr. Fisher was the medical doctor in charge of African patients at Nkana. Also, interview with Dr. Fisher at Kitwe, 21 Aug. 1976; ZAl/9/82/11, Extract from a Tour Report by the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, 7 Aug. 1934, Minute No. 608-99.

³⁸Russell Commission Report, p. 62.

³⁹LMS Box 29, Central Africa, R. J. B. Moore to T. Cocker Brown, 13 Jan. 1936.

⁴⁰Davis, Modern Industry and the African, p. 305; KSN 3/1/4, Annual Report Ndola District, 1932.

⁴¹Evidence of C. Spearpoint to the Russell Commission, pp. 595-596; RCM file 210.6, Roan, Compound Monthly Report, 31 Jan. 1932.

⁴²G. St. J. Orde Browne, Labour Conditions in Northern Rhodesia (Colonial No. 150 of 1938), p. 33; ZAl/5/18/57/1, Meeting of Sir Auckland

Geddes and Government officials, 13 Dec. 1933, p. 8. See also, ZA/7/1/15/7, Annual Report, District Commissioner, Ndola District, 1932.

⁴³ZA/7/1/15/7, Annual Report, Ndola District, 1932. The incidence of malaria went from 351 per 1000 in 1930 to 163 per 1000 in 1932. Acc. 72/3, vol. 2, Dr. Hooper (Senior Medical Officer, European hospital, Nkana) to Chairman of the Beer Hall Committee, 6 Nov. 1935. Hooper cited cases where ailing children were not given medicine because of lack of money. Interview with Dr. Charles Fisher, Kitwe, 21 Aug. 1976.

⁴⁴Evidence of W. Scrivener to the Russell Commission, p. 464; Evidence of C. Spearpoint to the Russell Commission, p. 89.