


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Woodrow Wilson and the Spirit of Liberal Internationalism

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ABSTRACT

Woodrow Wilson is among most influential presidents in U.S. foreign policy history, and the most pious. The challenge for scholars is joining Wilson's faith and his foreign policies. What was the role of religion in Wilson's worldview? What is the place of religion in Wilsonianism? This article uses original archival sources and a synthesis of historical research to intervene in IR theory, demonstrating that Wilsonianism is a product of Wilson's specifically Southern Presbyterian upbringing, his admiration for other Christian idealists, and the influence of the budding movement of the Social Gospel. This finding raises a historiographic puzzle: why did late twentieth century IR scholars erase religion from theories of liberal internationalism? The article suggests Wilson's religion has been erased as part of the broader project of desacralizing and universalizing liberal internationalism. Wilson's worldview was a mirror for the kind of social and political order he witnessed and propagated in America, a Janus-faced spirit of universalism and exceptionalism, internationalism and parochialism, that continues to motivate the liberal internationalist project. Unearthing the Protestant origins of Wilsonianism helps us to explicate the missionary spirit driving the liberal internationalist project.

All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts ... Carl Schmitt¹

Whether you are all of you aware of it or not, the air you have breathed here is Christian, saturated with influence and the traditions of men who have followed the divine master and sought to learn of Him. Woodrow Wilson²

Introduction

International Relations (IR) theory has a problem with Woodrow Wilson's religion. Wilson is among the most influential presidents in U.S. foreign policy history and the only one to have an approach to IR named after him. Even the most critical scholar of

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¹Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985 [1922]), p. 36.

²Woodrow Wilson (WW), 'Baccalaureate Address' vol. 5 of Woodrow Wilson and Arthur S. Link, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton University Press, 1966–1994), p. 468.

Wilsonianism, the realist Henry Kissinger, notes, 'It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency and continues to march to this day'.³

Wilson was also the most pious of American presidents. The son, grandson, and nephew of Presbyterian preachers, Woodrow was born in 1856 in the manse of the First Presbyterian Church of Staunton, Virginia. His contemporaries and biographers place his faith at the center of his worldview and of the policies of his presidency. Fellow Princeton Professor Theodore W. Hunt noted,

It was the Hebraic spirit that permeated the thought and life of Woodrow Wilson and lay at the basis of all his educational and political career. We speak of him as a political idealist and so he was, but first and last a religious idealist.⁴

Based on his observation of Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, John Maynard Keynes wrote: 'The President was like a Nonconformist minister, perhaps a Presbyterian. His thought and his temperament were essentially theological not intellectual, with all the strength and the weakness of that manner of thought, feeling, and expression'.⁵ The historian George C. Osborn argued that Wilson believed that Christian values provide the underpinnings for liberty: 'For Wilson, the Holy Writ was God's message to man and constituted the Magna Carta of the human soul'.⁶ His personal physician and confidant, Cary T. Grayson, noted,

Apology is unnecessary for detailed accounts of Mr. Wilson's relationship to the church, because religion was flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone. He kept the faith which he inherited from his forefathers. He was deeply religious outside of the church and on weekdays, as well as inside and on Sundays.⁷

The problem for IR theory is joining Wilson's faith and his foreign policies. What was the role of religion in Wilson's worldview? What is the place of religion in Wilsonianism? If, as Kissinger argues, American foreign policy since 1912 has reflected Wilsonian principles, what are those principles, and what does that mean for the place of religion in U.S. foreign policy?

These are difficult questions. Rather than tackle them, however, the primary response by liberal internationalists is to pretend they do not exist.⁸ The leading theorists of liberal internationalism describe Wilsonianism as a set of principles without reference to faith. A 2009 book assessing the similarities between Wilsonianism and the policies of President George W. Bush included essays by John G. Ikenberry, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith, some of the leading theorists of liberal internationalism.⁹ The book is silent on religion. Similarly, Ikenberry's 2009 essay on the three 'periods' in liberal internationalism pinpoints 'Liberalism 1.0' in Wilson's ideas but ignores religion's influence.¹⁰ In a 2000 edited volume, Ikenberry describes Wilson as an idealist shaped

³Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 30.

⁴Theodore Hunt, 'Woodrow Wilson's Attitude Toward Religion', *The Methodist Review*, 40:5 (1924), p. 800.

⁵John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1919), pp. 41–42.

⁶George C. Osborn, *Woodrow Wilson: The Early Years* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), p. 28.

⁷Cary T. Grayson, 'A Personal Glimpse' in Arthur S. Link (ed) *Woodrow Wilson: A Profile* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), p. 82.

⁸The debate among historians is reviewed below.

⁹G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton University Press, 2009).

by his 'religious and ethical beliefs' but does not specify the content of those beliefs nor how they shaped Wilson's foreign policy goals.¹¹ These examples are the norm, not the exception, in contemporary IR theory.¹²

When liberal internationalists do attend to Wilson's faith, they use ambiguous language. Andrew Moravcsik in 'The New Liberalism' puts Wilson in the category of liberals who believe that identity is fundamental to state preferences, but doesn't explicate the content of that identity or how it informs preferences.¹³ This ambiguity begs additional questions: What identity? What preferences? There are an infinite variety of lessons one can draw from the heterogeneous traditions of Christianity, and it is not possible to draw a straight line from identity to policy preferences. An example helps to illustrate: Wilson's first Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, was a similarly devout Presbyterian, yet Bryan's and Wilson's policy visions diverged sharply during the administration. Bryan's Christian pacifism differed from Wilson's Christian internationalism, leading to Bryan's resignation in protest against military preparedness.

Instead of eliding the significance of Wilson's faith, this article uses original archival sources and a synthesis of historical research to intervene in IR theory, demonstrating that Wilsonianism is a product of Wilson's specifically Southern Presbyterian upbringing, his admiration for other Christian idealists, and the influence of the budding movement of the Social Gospel. Wilson projected an organic Calvinist view of the individual's relationship to the family onto society's relationship to the state. Wilson's view of American progress and leadership was rooted in the country's adherence to biblical values. Wilson's embrace of international institutions for arbitration was grounded in his belief that, just as American states merged to become a union, world states would unite through shared, Christian values. Wilson believed that America's leadership was chosen by providence, rooted in the soul, and lead abroad by missionaries. In sum, Wilson's liberal internationalism was of an unapologetically Christian variety.

This argument stands in opposition to the common contention that Wilsonianism originates in Immanuel Kant's 'Perpetual Peace'.¹⁴ Wilson's liberalism was not grounded in natural law and sovereignty like Kant's perpetual peace; it was rooted in the Christian origins of democracy, America's providentially derived leadership of the world, and cooperation between Christian states. Instead of linking Wilson to Kant, this essay connects Wilson to more immediate sources: his family, his idols, and his colleagues and

¹⁰G. John Ikenberry, 'Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order', *Perspectives on Politics*, 7:1 (2009a), pp. 71–87; See also G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton University Press, 2001); G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2011).

¹¹G. John Ikenberry, 'America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War Era', in Michael Cox (ed) *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 105. See Ikenberry, *After Victory*, op. cit., p. 118 on Wilson's moral crusade.

¹²Other prominent examples include Peter Beinart, 'Balancing Act: The Other Wilsonianism', *World Affairs*, 171:1 (2008), pp. 76–88; Richard N. Haas, 'Paradigm Lost', *Foreign Affairs*, 74:1 (1995), pp. 43–58; John L. Harper, 'The Dream of Democratic Peace: Americans Are Not Asleep', *Foreign Affairs*, 76:3 (1997), pp. 117–121; Michael Hirsh, 'Bush and the World', *Foreign Affairs*, 81:5 (2002), pp. 18–43; Amos Perlmutter, *Making the World Safe for Democracy: A Century of Wilsonianism and Its Totalitarian Challenges* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Tony Smith, *Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today* (Princeton University Press, 2016). Ikenberry's most recent book takes a slightly different tack (see fn 144).

¹³Andrew Moravcsik, 'The New Liberalism' in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 241.

¹⁴Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', *The American Political Science Review*, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151–1169; Ikenberry et al., *The Crisis*, op. cit.

contemporaries. Key figures include Wilson's father Reverend Joseph Ruggles, George D. Herron, William Gladstone, John Calvin, William Preston Few, and John Mott.

By linking Wilson's religious outlook to the views of his family, friends, idols and contemporaries, this paper builds on research on networks in constructivist international affairs.¹⁵ Methodologically, the paper moves beyond structural, homogenizing, or 'world religion' accounts of religion's influence. Instead, the paper situates Wilson's outlook in his cultural, political and social milieu. Rather than assuming coherence and clarity, the many tensions in Wilson's outlook are explored in order to map how those contradictions become embedded in Wilsonianism and the broader liberal internationalist project.

This finding has three intertwined implications. The most immediate is that Wilson's specific religiosity and its emanations have been not neglected, but deliberately scrubbed from theories of liberal internationalism. Like the deletion of race in IR theory, these are studied elisions that have led to systematic misunderstandings.¹⁶ Because the discipline of IR is commonly understood to be always and already secular, these elisions have exacerbated the problem of understanding the role of religion in international affairs. By uncovering liberal internationalists' systematic erasure of religion from Wilson's worldview, the paper contributes to the burgeoning IR scholarship on religion¹⁷ and affirms the constructivist view that the discipline continues to be motivated by normative political theory.¹⁸

The second implication is more difficult to demarcate. Unearthing the Protestant origins of Wilsonianism helps to explicate the driving 'spirit' of liberal internationalism. In using the term 'spirit' I follow Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, which argued that the Calvinist ethics of hard work and thriftiness created the cultural conditions for the emergence of middle-class capitalism.¹⁹ The Calvinist conception of predestination taught the emergent bourgeoisie that the pursuit of wealth is a duty. This was a theology with economic implications. Similarly, excavating the Protestant origins of Wilsonianism helps us to understand the Janus-faced spirit that creates the cultural conditions necessary for the liberal internationalist project. Wilson is properly identified as a Christian internationalist rather than just a liberal internationalist. This distinction matters; ignoring the former identity leads to a misunderstanding of the Janus-faced spirit that drives the latter.

One face of the spirit is the internationalist one, embodied by Wilson's desire to spread American values through economic and security cooperation, democracy promotion, and humanitarianism. This is a spirit that would be familiar to Kant as well as contemporary liberal internationalists like Slaughter that stress the institutional aspects of Wilsonianism. It would also be familiar to liberal internationalists like Smith, and it propels

¹⁵Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton University Press, 2009).

¹⁶Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).

¹⁷Daniel Philpott, 'The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations', *World Politics*, 55:1 (2002), pp. 66–95; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

¹⁸R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); David Patrick Houghton, 'The Role of Self-Fulfilling and Self-Negating Prophecies in International Relations', *International Studies Review*, 11:3 (2009), pp. 552–584.

¹⁹Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, and R. H. Tawney, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1930).

multilateralism, idealism grounded in an aspiration toward universal ethics, and the reduction of war through diplomacy.

The second face of the spirit of liberal internationalism is the parochial and specifically Protestant one, embodied by Wilson's belief that Protestant ethics exclusively provided the requirements for social, political, and international order. This face helps to explain aspects of Wilson's worldview that are inexplicable within a Kantian framework. Wilson supported the development of democracy abroad in populations with homogeneity of race and community of thought. He believed that democracy was made possible by an organic connection between society and the state, not republican institutions. He supported the annexation of foreign territories in order to civilize heathen populations and to tutor the lesser races and religions. He viewed Christian missionaries as the tip of the spear for advancing progress and American influence abroad; Christianity was the source of justice and liberty in the world, missionaries the mechanism for its expansion, and progress achieved through Christianization.

This is the third implication. Liberal internationalists disavow the parochial and specifically Protestant aspect of Wilsonianism because it propels ideas about American exceptionalism and the responsibility of America to convert the world owing to divine providence. This is the spirit that drives the liberal internationalist tendency toward crusading and overexpansion and is thus familiar to realists like Kissinger and Hans Morgenthau. While liberalism has long been critiqued for its missionary zeal by Morgenthau and Kissinger, and more recently by Andrew Bacevich, Michael Desch, and Christopher Layne, understanding the Protestant origins of Wilsonianism helps us to pinpoint the genealogy of liberal internationalism's reoccurring tendency toward imperial overreach.²⁰ In *Diplomacy*, Kissinger describes Wilson's legacy as giving a crusading impulse to American foreign policy: 'American's values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world'.²¹ Here 'crusade' is a metaphor rather than a descriptor, which is how Wilson used it (see below). But Kissinger's broader point remains apt: *the missionary spirit is a structural feature of liberal internationalism*. Similarly, in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* Morgenthau argues that liberals' belief in the righteousness of their position, the moral baseness of their enemies, and the eventuality of their triumph leads to their overestimating their universality: 'Liberal philosophy, unaware of the limited character of this experience, gave it a universal meaning and transplanted it to the international scene'.²² Morgenthau notes that Wilson's slogans for American-led progress are constitutive of belief: 'In the light of this analysis, those Wilsonian slogans reveal themselves to be more than a clever propagandistic device; they are the expression of an eschatological hope deeply imbedded in the very foundations of liberal foreign policy'.²³

Understanding that the missionary spirit is a structural feature of liberal internationalism thus helps to explain the origin of ideas about American exceptionalism and the country's recurrent tendency toward overreach. Liberal internationalism's spirit is

²⁰Andrew Bacevich, *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008); Michael C. Desch, 'America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreach in U.S. Foreign Policy', *International Security*, 32:3 (2007), pp. 7–43; Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

²¹Kissinger, op. cit., p. 18.

²²Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 47.

²³Ibid., p. 52.

synthesized from a surprising amalgam of universalism and parochial paternalism, secular humanitarianism and Christian crusading. The rhetoric of Kantian republicanism notwithstanding, the liberal internationalist spirit is remarkably particular in its vision for political development. Despite liberal internationalist's best efforts to purify Wilson, and to secularize Wilsonianism, it is a spirit that George W. Bush would find familiar, since it is born of a faith in American providence and the divine duty to propagate liberty.

This argument is developed in the remaining five sections. The next section lays out the argument for the Christian origins of Wilsonianism. The following section addresses alternative explanations for the relationship between Wilsonianism and religion. The first empirical section describes Wilson's religious milieu. The second empirical section is organized around the tenets of Wilsonianism as articulated by Smith and Ikenberry—democracy, human progress, international cooperation, and economic openness—in order to show how each aspect develops from Wilson's unapologetically Protestant worldview. The conclusion elucidates the implications of this research for IR theory.

Argument

No one who has ever given any serious attention to President Wilson's life could fail to agree that he was primarily a Christian idealist. By this I mean a man who almost always tended to judge policies on a basis of whether they were right by Christian standards, not whether they brought immediate material or strategic advantage. I mean also a man whose foreign policies were motivated by the assumption that a nation as much as an individual should live according to the law of Christian love, and by a positive repudiation of the assumptions of the classical 'realists' about international behavior.²⁴

Observers used to see beyond the Kantian template. In announcing the 1912 Democratic ticket, the *New York Times* described Wilson as 'orthodox in religion' and 'Presbyterian of the purest blue stocking variety'.²⁵ One of Wilson's advisors, the Congregationalist minister George D. Herron, believed that Wilson's support for democracy was a reflection of his faith: 'The uttermost democracy, the democracy that scales the whole human octave, is to him the certain issue of the idea for which Jesus lived and died'.²⁶ Herron argued that in repudiating the colonial world order, WWI took on a religious importance:

From now on, the war will take on new and wide spiritual aspects—will become more and more religious, more and more apocalyptic. To the American mind and motive, it will become a crusade for a democracy whose application shall at last comprehend all the facts and forces of life—all moral and social and economic relations; a democracy, in fine, which shall be an approach to the early Christian idea of the kingdom of heaven. It is precisely this idea which President Wilson has brought into the sphere of practical politics.²⁷

²⁴Arthur S. Link, 'Wilson: Idealism and Realism' in Arthur S. Link (ed) *Woodrow Wilson: A Profile* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), pp. 165–166.

²⁵'Blue stocking Presbyterians' connotes austere, Scottish Covenanters, 'Orthodox in Religion, Straight in Politics', *The New York Times*, 07 July 1912.

²⁶George D. Herron, *Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace* (New York: M. Kennerley, 1917), pp. 76–77.

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 142–143; Milan Babik, 'George D. Herron and the Eschatological Foundations of Woodrow Wilson's Foreign Policy, 1917–1919', *Diplomatic History*, 35:5 (2011), pp. 837–857.

Thomas Knock, ‘the preeminent historian of Wilson’s foreign policy’,²⁸ noted that the Covenanter tradition shaped Wilson’s political thought. Covenant theology is based upon the notion that a population and its leaders enter into free agreements with a higher power serving as the witness. American Presbyterians expanded the idea of covenant to account for the relationship between the US and providence.²⁹ Knock argued that Wilson’s penchant for covenants—as a student at the University of Virginia and Johns Hopkins, as a professor, and as a promoter of the League of Nations—are evidence of his desire to bring the world in harmony with God’s law.

The historian John M. Mulder writes that another key influence was William Gladstone. Gladstone is known among IR theorists for his moral foreign policy, especially his support for British intervention for Christian Bulgarians from Muslim Turks.³⁰ In his late teens, Wilson hung a portrait of Gladstone over his desk and told a cousin, ‘That is Gladstone, the greatest statesman that ever lived. I intend to be a statesman, too’.³¹ Wilson also pointed to his admiration for the pioneer of the Reformation, John Calvin: ‘He may be called the great reforming Christian *statesman*’.³² While later scholars of liberalism would differentiate the effects of the Enlightenment from the Reformation, to Wilson they were intertwined.³³ That is why Arthur Link, the preeminent Wilson biographer, refers to Wilson not as a liberal or an unmodified idealist but as a ‘Christian idealist’.³⁴

Yet, the religious spirit underlying Wilsonianism has been erased from IR theory as part of the broader project of desacralizing and universalizing liberal internationalism. Revisions began in the 1930s with Wilson’s biographer Ray Stannard Baker describing his views as vaguely ‘spiritual’ or ‘moral’. In an influential recent text, Historian Cara Burnidge argues that Baker and other promoters of the League refashioned Wilsonianism in order to appeal to Catholics, Jews, and non-evangelical Protestants.³⁵ While the most intimate assessments of Wilson’s legacy emphasize the centrality of Protestantism to Wilsonianism,³⁶ late twentieth and early twenty-first century historians³⁷ have more often scrubbed out the parochial aspects of Wilson’s worldview in favor of the universal.

²⁸Trygve Throntveit, ‘What was Wilson Thinking: A Review of Recent Literature on Wilsonian Foreign Policy’, *White House Studies*, 10:4 (2011), p. 470.

²⁹Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 4.

³⁰Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Principles & Problems of International Politics: Selected Readings* (Knopf, 1950), pp. 53–54; citing William Ewart Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horror; and Russia in Turkistan* (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1876).

³¹John M. Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation* (Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 40.

³²Emphasis in the original. WW, ‘Renaissance XX: Calvin—Geneva, France’, vol. 5 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 489.

³³Barry Hankins, *Woodrow Wilson: Ruling Elder, Spiritual President* (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 45.

³⁴Arthur S. Link, ‘Wilson: Idealism and Realism’ in Arthur S. Link (ed) *Woodrow Wilson: A Profile* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), p. 165.

³⁵Cara Lee Burnidge, *A Peaceful Conquest: Woodrow Wilson, Religion, and the New World Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), p. 140.

³⁶Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters* (8 vols.) (New York: Doubleday, 1927–1939); Keynes, op. cit.; Herron, op. cit.; Hunt, op. cit.; Harley Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937); Link, op. cit.; Osborn, op. cit.; Cary T. Grayson, *Woodrow Wilson; an Intimate Memoir* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

³⁷David Fromkin, ‘What Is Wilsonianism?’, *World Policy Journal*, 11:1 (1994), pp. 100–111; Niels Aage Thorsen, *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson 1895–1910* (Princeton University Press, 1988); John Milton Cooper, *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography* (New York: Random House, 2009); John A. Thompson, *Woodrow Wilson: Profiles in Power* (London: Pearson, 2002); John A. Thompson, ‘Wilsonianism: The Dynamics of a Conflicted Concept’, *International Affairs*, 86:1 (2010), pp. 27–47; Throntveit, op. cit.; Trygve Throntveit, *Power Without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the American Internationalist Experiment* (University of Chicago Press, 2017).

The result is that the most recent historical scholarship has had to ‘rediscover’ and reassert the religious origins of Wilsonianism.³⁸ Everything old is new again.

Liberal internationalists have proven immune to this rediscovery. Perlmutter (1997), Hirsh (2002), Chandler (2006), Ikenberry (2001, 2009, 2011), Beinart (2008), Moravcsik (2008), Slaughter (2009), and Smith (2016) do not mention even the existence of a debate about the salience of Wilson’s religion. Because scholars of liberal internationalism are normatively committed to the liberal internationalist project, they stress its universal components instead of its parochial ones. As a result, it is important to examine the claim that Wilsonianism is grounded in a secular Kantianism.

Alternative explanations

The main alternative explanation to my argument that Wilsonianism is grounded in religion is that Wilson’s faith had no impact on his policies. John A. Thompson states that ‘Wilson’s career cannot persuasively be interpreted as an attempt to reform human affairs in accordance with some higher, or Christian, ideal’.³⁹ Trygve Throntveit suggests Wilson was a pragmatist, not a religious fundamentalist.⁴⁰ John Milton Cooper Jr. points to Wilson’s synthesis of religion and science, his marriage to an Episcopalian, his visit to the Vatican, and his association with Catholics and Jews as evidence of the secular basis of Wilson’s policies.⁴¹ Niels Aage Thorson dismisses religious influence on Wilson as ‘premodern’.⁴²

These arguments create a straw man of the argument that Wilson’s faith matters. Wilson’s religion matters, as does his class, regional origin, administrative position, and his other ideological commitments. It is not all or nothing. Nor does it mean that Wilsonianism is irrational. Sociologists have long moved beyond the view that science and religion are necessarily in tension. Additionally, if Wilson’s faith does not matter, then religion must never matter for any U.S. President. But would scholars make such a claim about devout Muslim leaders in Iran, or Turkey? The idea that Protestantism is uniquely practiced at differentiating church and state is empirically unsustainable.⁴³ Moreover, Wilson himself argued against differentiation:

This belief [in differentiation] is in direct opposition to the Scripture’s views of religion. In the Bible a saving faith in Christ is represented as an ornament and help to the businessman; an unflinching aid to the soldier who is fighting in a just cause; the true dignity and motive of

³⁸Lloyd Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Lloyd Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism During World War I* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991); Lloyd Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Mark Benbow, *Leading Them to the Promised Land: Woodrow Wilson, Covenant Theology, and the Mexican Revolution, 1913–1915* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2010); Babik, op. cit.; Burnidge, op. cit.; Hankins, op. cit.; Malcolm Magee, *What the World Should Be: Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based Foreign Policy* (Baylor University Press, 2008); Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy*. (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2012); Markku Ruotsila, *The Origins of Christian Anti-Internationalism: Conservative Evangelicals and the League of Nations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).

³⁹Thompson, *Woodrow Wilson*, op. cit., p. 249.

⁴⁰Throntveit, op. cit., p. 464.

⁴¹Cooper, op. cit., pp. 4–6.

⁴²Thorsen, op. cit., pp. 237–238.

⁴³Jonathan Fox, ‘World Separation of Religion and State into the 21st Century’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 39:5 (2006), pp. 537–569.

the lawyer, causing him to uphold truth and justice, and always to strive to deal out the law with an equal hand; and above all, as the first requisite for a statesmen, upon whom rests so heavy a responsibility, both to God and man.⁴⁴

Such commitments are not campaign rhetoric; the religious origins of Wilson's world-view are most visible in his early writing and his private correspondence.

The second alternative explanation is that Wilson's values reflect universal ethics. Tony Smith traces Wilson's liberal internationalism back to Kant's promise of perpetual peace, correctly noting 'the liberal tradition is one where morality and practicality come together in a conviction based on faith and reason'.⁴⁵ He is rightfully critical of Ikenberry and Slaughter's institutional emphasis given that they ignore Wilson's views on culture.⁴⁶ Yet Smith's goal in *Why Wilson Matters* is to critique those who label Wilson a crusader.⁴⁷ As a result, Smith downplays the role of religion and suggests that Wilson believed that democratic culture and institutions, combined with economic power and geostrategic advantage, gave the US its exceptional place in the world.⁴⁸ Even though he mentions the Calvinist roots of Wilson's thinking (pp. 105–6, 52–56), he contends that by 1916 Wilsonianism was a 'secular religion'.⁴⁹

This version of Wilsonianism would have been unintelligible to Wilson. Wilson embraced the terms 'crusade' and 'missionary' not in a metaphorical sense but with their full, Christian connotations. Crusaders were pioneers for truth, brotherhood, and freedom against the forces of darkness and disorder. Missionaries provided moral authority that exemplified and extended American power abroad. Smith is correct that Wilson used the terms moral, ethical, and Christian interchangeably; Wilson saw ecumenical Christian ethics as the foundation for liberal values, democratic values, and international order. Smith overlooks the *lack of evidence* that Wilson extended this view to Catholic, Jewish, or religious ethics; nowhere in Wilson's voluminous writings are there statements that could be interpreted as his believing that other religious traditions provided the sustenance for liberal internationalism. Wilson was no student of comparative religions such as exists today. On this point the silence is deafening.

This lacuna is worth exploring since instead of an ethical pluralism, there is evidence in Wilson's writings of sectarianism. Take, for example, Wilson's views toward Roman Catholicism. Notes from his undergraduate education show him arguing that religious education became a problem when 'Roman Catholics poured into this country'.⁵⁰ While a law student, Wilson participated in a debate on the question: 'Is the Roman Catholic element in the United States a menace to American Institutions?' Wilson took the negative position not on the grounds that Catholics could hold liberal values, but because American institutions were stronger than the Vatican. He argued that while the 'Romish Church' did indeed seek to dominate Americans, the Anglo-Saxon people were never conquered by Rome owing to their decentralized structure. Following Gladstone, Wilson argued that the threat of Papal domination was real but since

⁴⁴WW, 'A Christian Statesman', vol. 1 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 188–189.

⁴⁵Smith, op. cit., p. 13. For a similar definition see Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴⁶Smith, op. cit., p. 27

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 22.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 76.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 148.

⁵⁰WW, 'Wilson's Notes and Topical Headings on Professor Atwater's Lectures on Civil Government', vol. 1 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 426–428, 432–434.

Americans were forearmed, American institutions would be safe.⁵¹ Wilson wrote three separate polemics to the *North Carolina Presbyterian* criticizing the editor for publishing an article about the installation of a new Roman Catholic bishop.

Probably the editor of the *Star* does not realize that, in giving unqualified endorsement to the views of Roman prelates, he is helping on the aggressive advances of an organization whose cardinal tenets are openly antagonistic to the principles of free government—an organization which, whenever and wherever it dares, prefers and enforces obedience to its own laws rather than to those of the state—an organization whose avowed object is to gain ascendancy over all civil authority.⁵²

As Wilson matured and grew in prominence, he became more circumspect in his discomfort toward the Vatican. He spoke well of liberal Catholics like Father Leahy of St. Paul's Roman Catholic Church of Princeton.⁵³ He was fastidious in proclaiming his respect for all religions during his presidential campaign.⁵⁴ Yet Wilson's sectarianism is still palpable in less discrete moments. During the Mexican Revolution he complained repeatedly about the reactionary tendency of Roman Catholics in America.⁵⁵ He rejected Thomas Ewing's nomination to a judgeship on the grounds that 'Mr. Ewing is a Roman Catholic, but not of the genuine and democratic sort that we are accustomed to associate in our mind with that church'.⁵⁶ In conversation, Wilson 'spoke quite caustically against the Catholics in their endeavor to control the Government through appointments' and through only recommending other Catholics for office.⁵⁷ His closest advisor, Colonel House, believed that Wilson was prejudiced against the Catholic Church.⁵⁸

Wilson's efforts to promote the League were hampered by his blind spot when it came to (Catholic) Ireland's pursuit of sovereignty. Irish (Catholic) Americans were frustrated by his unwillingness to press home rule on Great Britain in the same way that he pressed the other European powers to relinquish their colonies. 'The Irish question' irked him, however, rather than inspiring him as a way to advance Kantian values. Instead, he questioned the patriotism of Irish Americans:

I find, moreover, that there is an organized propaganda against the League of Nations and against the treaty proceeding from exactly the same sources that the organized propaganda proceeded from which threatened this country here and there with disloyalty, and I want to say—I cannot say too often—any man who carries a hyphen about with him carries a dagger that he is ready to plunge into the vitals of this Republic whenever he gets ready.⁵⁹

This article will not delve into other examples for reasons of space, but Wilson's sectarianism is also visible in his views regarding the Ottoman Empire, his support for an American mandate for (Christian) Armenia, and his attitude toward Unitarians.

⁵¹WW, 'News Item in the *Virginian University Magazine*', vol. 1 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 643–646.

⁵²WW, 'Letter to the Editor: 'Anti-Sham' No. 1–3', vol. 2 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 97–98, 100, 115.

⁵³WW, 'To Lawrence Crane Woods', vol. 19 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 266.

⁵⁴WW, 'To William Gibbs McAdoo', vol. 26 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 452.

⁵⁵WW, 'Two Letters to Edith Bolling Galt', vol. 34 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 240–244.

⁵⁶WW, 'To Thomas Watt Gregory', vol. 44 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 146–147.

⁵⁷Edward M. House, 'From the Diary of Colonel House', vol. 45 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 175–179.

⁵⁸Edward M. House, 'From the Diary of Colonel House', vol. 46 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 326.

⁵⁹WW, 'An Address in the City Auditorium in Pueblo, Colorado', vol. 64 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 501.

A final alternative explanation is that while Wilson's early writing suggests strong Christian influence, his mature works are more secular.⁶⁰ This view has some merit, given that Wilson undoubtedly changed his views on American intervention over time.⁶¹ Yet, here the empirical record is also clear: throughout his life Wilson referred to Christianity as the foundation for democracy, human progress, and international cooperation.

Woodrow Wilson's milieu

This section introduces Wilson's religious milieu, with a specific focus on his family, Southern Presbyterianism, the Social Gospel movement, and Christian internationalism. His father was a minister who served as a chaplain to the Confederate Army. Wilson's grandfather was a missionary to the Orkney Islands.⁶² His maternal grandfather, Thomas Woodrow, was an Old School Presbyterian, the more conservative and orthodox of the two prominent American Presbyterian traditions. His uncle James Woodrow was a Southern Presbyterian theologian.⁶³ When Wilson enrolled in Princeton it was 'an Ivy League Bible college'.⁶⁴ Students studied the Bible and apologetics alongside the liberal arts.⁶⁵ They were expected to attend chapel five times a week and often attended prayer meetings and revivals.⁶⁶ After graduation from the University of Virginia Law School, Wilson earned his doctorate in political science, and went on to a professorship at Bryn Mawr College and was president of Princeton from 1902 to 1910.

Scholars deemphasizing the place of religion in Wilsonianism frequently point to his secularization of Princeton University. Reconciling this secularization with Wilson's worldview means understanding that he was neither a theocrat nor a theologian. Wilson's idols were other Christian idealists, not preachers. Wilson saw in religion the necessary requirement for social and political order:

To my thinking, the Christian Church stands at the center not only of philanthropy, but at the center of education, at the center of science, at the center of philosophy, at the center of politics; in short, at the center of sentient and thinking life.⁶⁷

Even as he followed trends at other colleges, he urged students to look to the church for educational, economic, and political guidance.

Wilson saw the bible as providing the basis for social and political order. And racial order. His father, Reverend Wilson, argued that slavery had roots in the bible, and preached that the institution of slavery was part of God's divine order whereby the wife was obedient to the husband, the children obedient to the parents, and the slaves

⁶⁰Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century' in G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds) *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 92.

⁶¹Tony Smith, 'Wilsonianism after Iraq' in G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds) *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 53–88.

⁶²Osborn, op. cit., pp. 4–5.

⁶³Hankins, op. cit., p. 2.

⁶⁴P.C. Kemeny, *Princeton in the Nation's Service: Religious Ideals and Educational Practice, 1868–1928* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 56.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 5.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 5.

⁶⁷WW, 'The Present Task of the Ministry: An Anniversary Address at the Hartford Theological Seminary', vol. 19 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 215–222.

obedient to the masters.⁶⁸ Reverend Wilson's view was typical of fellow leaders of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America.⁶⁹ Society included advanced races, and slavery 'by saving a lower race from the destruction of heathenism, has, under divine management, contributed to refine, exalt, and enrich its superior race!'⁷⁰ The end of the Civil War did not change Reverend Wilson's views. Rather, the war forced Southern Presbyterians to work within the caste system of racial segregation.⁷¹

Woodrow Wilson would make his views on the hierarchy of races clear through his support for segregating the civil service.⁷² Internationally, Wilson supported annexing the Philippines and Puerto Rico, saying, 'They are children and we are men in these deep matters of government and justice'.⁷³ His views on the hierarchy of religions were made manifest through support for Christian missionaries, an international legal order based on Christian values, and Christian states' tutelage of the lesser races. In that respect, Wilson's racism, like his sectarianism, is simply one aspect of a broader white American paternalism.⁷⁴

Religious practice changed drastically during Wilson's lifetime as Protestant ministers began linking salvation to the doing of good works. They interpreted the Lord's Prayer, 'Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven',⁷⁵ as directing Christians to rid the world of evils including poverty, crime, racial tension, child labor, war and other concerns now typically associated with liberalism. Religious civil society leaders like Herron, Charles Macfarland, Walter Rauschenbusch, William Preston Few, John Mott, and the Jewish leader Stephen Wise worked with trade unions and missionary organizations to direct social movements. This emergent tradition came to be called the 'Social Gospel'. Led by the Federal Council of Churches (FCC), these Christians enacted their faith through disinterested service and leadership.⁷⁶ They did not seek theocratic government, but like the missiologist and legal theorist Hugo Grotius, they assumed that Christian ethics provided the foundation for universal cooperation. Like Wilson, their faith and liberalism were synthesized.

Wilson did not write on theological matters. He saw no need to investigate the contradictions between faith and science that became prevalent after the publication of Charles Darwin's *On the Origins of Species*: 'I saw the intellectual difficulties, but I was not troubled by them ...'⁷⁷ Link wrote, 'Historical criticism and the evolutionary

⁶⁸Joseph R. Wilson, 'Mutual Relation of Masters and Slaves as Taught in the Bible. A Discourse Preached in the First Presbyterian Church, Augusta, Georgia, on Sabbath Morning, Jan. 6, 1861.' University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1999, <http://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/wilson/wilson.html>, p. 9.

⁶⁹Randall Balmer and John R Fitzmier, *The Presbyterians* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), p. 55.

⁷⁰Joseph Wilson, op. cit., p. 21.

⁷¹Balmer and Fitzmier, op. cit., p. 73.

⁷²Cooper, op. cit., pp. 170–171, 204–206, 272–273.

⁷³Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1998), p. 127.

⁷⁴Ambrosius provides a succinct summary of Wilson and the race issue: '[Wilson's] racism coincided with his liberalism, fundamentally including his foreign policy' Lloyd Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 15. See also Stephen Skowronek, 'The Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes: Racism, Liberalism, and the American Political Tradition', *American Political Science Review*, 100:3 (2006), pp. 385–401; Lloyd Ambrosius, 'Woodrow Wilson and *The Birth of a Nation*: American Democracy and International Relations', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 18:4 (2007), pp. 689–718; Andrew Zimmermann, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 200; Burnidge, op. cit., pp. 78, 94–101.

⁷⁵Matthew 6:10 King James Version.

⁷⁶Burnidge, op. cit.

⁷⁷Emphasis in the original. WW, 'Confidential Journal', vol. 6, Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 462.

hypothesis, which he readily accepted, only strengthened his belief in revelation and the truth of scriptures.⁷⁸ One reason that liberal internationalists have erased his faith is a perceived need to defend Wilson against realist charges of unreason. Yet, to Wilson, rationality and Christianity were entirely compatible.

Nor did the differences between Southern Presbyterianism, the Social Gospel, and Christian internationalism trouble him; Wilson shared with the three traditions a belief in the Christian provenance of democracy, human progress, and international cooperation. Wilson claimed no specific affiliation with the Social Gospel movement, but was close with many of the leaders, especially Herron, Wise and Mott. Wilson spoke repeatedly to meetings of the foremost liberal Protestant body, the FCC, including at its founding, as well as to the Salvation Army and the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA).

Wilson's Christian internationalism was part of the growing trend of transnational connection. The expansion of international trade and communication in the latter half of the 1800s was accompanied by the creation of intergovernmental associations like the Universal Postal Union. Religious groups were no exception: The International Congresses Against Alcoholism (1885–1934) and The British, Continental and General Federation for the Abolition of Vice (1875) were created in this period. The culmination was the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1910, which was presided over by Mott and galvanized the modern missionary movement. It is against this backdrop that Wilson's views on democracy, human progress, and international cooperation should be understood.

Wilsonianism

Since Ikenberry, Smith, Slaughter, and others define Wilsonianism around the principles of support for democracy, progressive history with U.S. leadership, international cooperation, and economic openness, this section does the same in order to establish that these principles are grounded in a specifically Protestant worldview.

This connection is most obvious for the first three tenets, while economic openness was more driven by Wilson's domestic advisors and will therefore be omitted. The historian Harley Notter explains that Wilson's domestic economic policies, called the New Freedom, were a product of policies central to the Democratic Party platform in the early 1900s, as well as Wilson's opposition to special interests and economic exploitation.⁷⁹ Internationally, Wilson's vision likewise reflected his view that markets should serve social welfare. This belief is markedly similar to Burkean conservatism rather than Kantian liberalism. Notter notes,

Wilson's similar belief [to Burke] in the superior authority of moral standards was as plain in frequent instances as was his conception of morality itself: right action according to individual conscience, justice, truth, regard for common welfare. It was in fact the visible lode-star for his ideal and vision of the New Freedom and the achievements of America.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Arthur Stanley Link, *Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography* (United States: Quadrangle Books, 1972), p. 27.

⁷⁹ Notter, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73.

Support for democracy

It is Christianity that has produced the political liberty of the world, gentlemen. Political liberty is based upon this proposition, not that man's brain is of equal value with another ... but that man's soul is of equal value with another man's soul.⁸¹

Wilson transposed the organic Calvinist view of the individual's relationship to the family onto society's relationship to the democratic state. Just as a child matures and becomes a parent, democracy was the product of social maturity. In his seminal 1885 treatise 'The Modern Democratic State', Wilson explained that the reason democracy took root in Australia, Switzerland, the U.S., and Britain but not France or South America is because those societies lacked the necessary character.⁸²

Democracy is, of course, wrongly conceived when treated as merely a body of doctrine. It is a stage of development. It is not created by aspirations or by new faith; it is built up by slow habit. Its process is experience, its basis old wont, its meaning national organic oneness and effectual life. It comes, like manhood, as the fruit of youth: immature peoples cannot have it, and the maturity to which it is vouchsafed is the maturity of freedom and self-control, and no other. It is conduct, and its only stable foundation is character.⁸³

He critiqued the liberal John Locke and the social contract theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau for an overly legal view of democracy, since to the U.S. and Britain laws reflected the social will:

Democracy in America ... and in the Eng. colonies, has had, almost from the first, a truly organic growth. There was nothing revolutionary in its movements: it had not to overthrow other polities: it had only to organize itself. It had, not to create, but only to expand self-government. It did not need to spread propaganda: it needed nothing but to methodize its ways of living.⁸⁴

It is this organic element to Wilson's thinking that has led scholars to suggest a marked Hegelian influence. Laurence R Veysey notes that Wilson was among a group of educators who advocated instilling in students a kind of 'liberal culture' from which moral and social standards would naturally emanate.⁸⁵ Christian Rosser follows Ronald Pestritto in suggesting that Wilson's Hegelian ideas about the nation as a moral organism originated with his teachers, such as George S. Morris, Herbert B. Adams, and Richard T. Ely.⁸⁶ Others have written about the connection between Wilson and Hegel on the issues of public administration, the presidency, and progress.⁸⁷

⁸¹WW, 'An Address in Nashville on Behalf of the Y.M.C.A.,' vol. 25 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 209.

⁸²France and South America were, of course, predominantly Catholic.

⁸³WW, 'The Modern Democratic State', vol. 5 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 63.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 67.

⁸⁵Laurence R. Veysey, 'The Academic Mind of Woodrow Wilson', *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 49:4 (1963), pp. 616–617, 626.

⁸⁶Christian Rosser, 'Woodrow Wilson's Administrative Thought and German Political Theory', *Public Administration Review*, 70:4 (2010), pp. 547–556.

⁸⁷Robert Miewald, 'The Origins of Wilson's Thought' in Jack Rabin and James Bowman (eds) *Politics and Administration: Woodrow Wilson and American Public Administration* (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1984), pp. 17–30; Fritz Sager and Christian Rosser, 'Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy', *Public Administration Review*, 69:6 (2009), pp. 1136–1147; Rosser, op. cit.; Scot J. Zentner, 'President and Party in the Thought of Woodrow Wilson', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 26:3 (1996), pp. 666–677; Ronald J. Pestritto, *Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism* (Blue Ridge Summit: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).

The contrast with the liberal internationalists' view of Wilson spreading 'constitutional orders limited by checks internal to the government'⁸⁸ could not be starker. At the core of Wilson's philosophy of democracy is that government is *not* a Kantian system of law, but rather a relationship:

*The State, therefore, is an abiding, natural relationship, neither a mere convenience nor a mere necessity; neither a mere voluntary association nor a mere corporation; nor any artificial thing created for a special purpose, but the eternal, natural embodiment and expression of a higher form of life than the individual, namely, that common life which gives leave to individual life, and opportunity for completeness,—makes individual life possible and makes it full and complete.*⁸⁹

In a seminal essay on democracy, Wilson goes on to discuss other ingredients of democracy that are familiar to contemporary liberals: a middle class, printing, and mass education.⁹⁰ But then he returns to the core of what is necessary for democratic institutions: homogeneity of race and community of thought, and self-awareness that the nation is an organic body.⁹¹

Wilsonian democracy was not the republican system of institutions, but a mature Protestant society guided by a sense of service. Mulder rightly notes, 'In effect, Wilson was making theological claims for the state, extending to the political sphere what his Calvinist forbears had traditionally claimed for the church'.⁹² Wilson made clear that it is this organic connection drives democratic institutions:

Parties are reformed and governments are corrected by the impulses coming out of the hearts of those who never exercised authority and never organized parties. Those are the sources of strength, and I pray God that these sources may never cease to be spiritualized by the immortal subjections of these words of inspiration of the Bible.⁹³

Similarly, the general Secretary of the FCC, Macfarland, saw society as united organically and motivated by service to the collective. It was only through this unity of spirit that democracy could be realized.⁹⁴ Protestants of Wilson's age did not separate religion and society in the way that contemporary liberals prescribe.

Wilson, Macfarland, and Southern Presbyterians did not believe that church guidance entailed theocracy. Macfarland stressed the centrality of character to religious authority: 'You are to become, and you are to make your church become, the mover and the moulder of the entire social and democratic order'.⁹⁵ Similarly, in his 1937 volume, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson*, Harley Notter wrote that Wilson viewed the foundation of liberty in the idea that one was responsible to God.⁹⁶ Adherence to Christian ethics, not theocracy, provided the endpoint for progress.⁹⁷

Wilson defined democracy as a subcategory of the 'modern constitutional state' with representation through a meritocratic administrative bureaucracy, which is why political

⁸⁸Smith, 'Wilsonianism', op. cit., pp. 57–58.

⁸⁹Emphasis in the original. WW, 'Notes for Lectures on Administration', vol. 7 of Wilson and Link, p. 124.

⁹⁰WW, 'The Modern Democratic State', vol. 5 of Wilson and Link, pp. 71–74.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 74–75.

⁹²John M. Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation* (Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 119.

⁹³WW, 'An Address in Denver on the Bible', vol. 24 of Wilson and Link, p. 18.

⁹⁴Charles S. Macfarland, *The Christian Ministry and the Social Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1908), p. 43.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 40.

⁹⁶Notter, op. cit., p. 9.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 360.

theorist Ido Oren describes Wilson as a believer in racial hierarchy and a conservative along the lines of Edmund Burke.⁹⁸ Oren emphasizes Wilson's racist sympathies, yet neglects Burke's, and Wilson's, belief that religion provides the foundation for civil society and Christianity the engine for progress. Wilson wrote: 'The relation of religion to citizenship is the relation of Christ and his example to individual conscience. A church that does not go out to wage war, in a Christian way, against existing evils, has forgotten its Christian obligations'.⁹⁹ Wilson's belief in the Christian origins of democracy helps to explain his otherwise confusing view that the medieval Roman Catholic Church was 'an absolutely democratic organization'.¹⁰⁰ The church was not only an administrative meritocracy, as Oren emphasizes; *it was also a church*.

This paper focuses on the origins of Wilsonianism rather than the policies of the Wilson presidency. Nonetheless, there is evidence that Wilson's views shaped his policies. Notice his references to missionaries, salvation, and the unspeakable (Muslim) Ottoman Turks in his argument for establishing a mandate over (Christian) Armenia:

Personally, and just within the limits of this room, I can say very frankly that I think we ought to [establish a mandate]. I think there is a very promising beginning in regard to countries like Armenia. The whole of America has been engaged for Armenia. They know more about Armenia and its sufferings than they know about any other European area; we have colleges out there; we have great missionary enterprises, just as we have Robert College in Constantinople. That is a part of the world where already American influence exists, a saving influence and an educating and uplifting influence. Colleges like Beirut in Syria have spread their influence very much beyond the limits of Syria, all through the Arabian country and Mesopotamia and in the distant parts of Asia Minor, and I am not without hope that the people of the United States would find it acceptable to go in and be the trustee of the interests of the Armenian people and see to it that the unspeakable Turk and the almost equally difficult Kurd had their necks sat on long enough to teach them manners and give the industrious and earnest people of Armenia time to develop a country which is naturally rich with possibilities.¹⁰¹

Similarly, in his rejection of Congress's May 1920 resolution to seek peace with the German government, Wilson noted that among the goals of the war are 'release of the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire from the intolerable subjugation which they have had for so many generations to endure ...'.¹⁰² Hankins likewise points to Wilson's entering WWI as grounded in his desire to save democracy and advance Christian progress.¹⁰³ Keynes and Clemensceau both found Wilson's inflexibility and vagueness at the Paris peace talks a product of his Presbyterianism.¹⁰⁴

I want to conclude this section by comparing Wilson's views of democracy with how he is portrayed by liberal internationalists. Smith describes Wilson as calling for Kantian-

⁹⁸Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 38.

⁹⁹WW, 'President Wilson Urges Democracy: Tells Princeton Alumni Association Revival is Essential Before the Colleges Can Have the New Learning', vol. 19 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 497.

¹⁰⁰Oren, op. cit., p. 193 fn.73; WW, 'Address at the Inauguration of the President of Franklin and Marshall College', vol. 19 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 743. Wilson frequently repeated this line between 1909 and 1912.

¹⁰¹WW, 'Remarks to Members of the Democratic National Committee', vol. 55 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 321–322.

¹⁰²WW, 'A Veto Message', vol. 65 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 329.

¹⁰³Hankins, op. cit., p. 145.

¹⁰⁴Hankins, op. cit., pp. 200–201.

style constitutional orders.¹⁰⁵ Yet Wilson understood democracy to be based not on the constitution, but on mature Protestants enacting their values collectively:

Justly revered as our great Constitution is, it could be stripped off and thrown aside like a garment, and the nation would still stand forth clothed in the living vestment of flesh and sinew, warm with the heartblood of one people, ready to recreate constitutions and laws.¹⁰⁶

Slaughter follows Throntveit in describing Wilson as promoting social change ‘fostered by the state itself’.¹⁰⁷ Yet Wilson saw *society* as the engine of change: ‘A law cannot work until it expresses the spirit of the community for which it is enacted’.¹⁰⁸ Slaughter argues that Wilson viewed democracy as originating in peace, economic prosperity, social equality, and the slow progress of time.¹⁰⁹ Some of that is true, but to Wilson, democracy first necessitated adherence to Christian values.

Progress led by the US

There is a mighty task before us, and it welds us together. It is to make the United States a mighty Christian nation, and to Christianize the world.¹¹⁰

The Bible (with its individual value of the human soul) is undoubtedly the book that has made democracy and been the source of all progress.¹¹¹

Wilson believed that America was guided to progress by adherence to Christian values: ‘Nothing makes America great except her thoughts, except her ideals, except her acceptance of those standards of judgment which are written large upon these pages of revelation’.¹¹² His early article ‘Christ’s Army’ depicts the world as composed of two great armies: those of Christ and those of the devil. Historian Malcolm Magee contends that ‘Wilson clearly believed he had been called to lead this army, as a messenger of Christ ...’¹¹³ Wilson’s calling was especially clear in wartime:

... America is roused ... And this spirit is going out conquering and to conquer until, it may be, in the Providence of God, a new light is lifted up in America which shall throw the rays of liberty and justice far abroad upon every sea, and even upon the lands which now wallow in darkness and refuse to see the light.¹¹⁴

Yet such language was not confined to wartime. In his seminal 1920 State of the Union address, Wilson quoted Abraham Lincoln’s urging to oppose slavery, ‘Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it’.¹¹⁵ Wilson went on to say that Lincoln’s sentence is:

¹⁰⁵Smith, ‘Wilsonianian’, op. cit., p. 57.

¹⁰⁶WW, ‘The Modern Democratic State’, vol. 5 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 69.

¹⁰⁷Slaughter, op. cit., p. 95; Trygve Throntveit, ‘“Common Counsel”: Woodrow Wilson’s Pragmatic Progressivism, 1885–1913’ in John Milton Cooper Jr. (ed) *Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War and Peace* (Washington, DC and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 25–56.

¹⁰⁸WW, ‘An Address on the American Spirit’, vol. 39 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 416.

¹⁰⁹Slaughter, op. cit., p. 95.

¹¹⁰WW, ‘Two News Reports of an Address in New York on Youth and Christian Progress’, vol. 16 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 228.

¹¹¹WW, ‘To Mary Allen Hulbert Peck’, vol. 24 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 11.

¹¹²WW, ‘An Address in Denver on the Bible’, vol. 24 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 18.

¹¹³Magee, op. cit., p. 25.

¹¹⁴WW, ‘A Memorial Day Address’, vol. 37 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 127–128.

¹¹⁵Abraham Lincoln, ‘Cooper Union Address’, 27 February 1860, <https://www.nps.gov/liho/learn/historyculture/cooperunionaddress.htm>.

... immortal because it embodies in a form of utter simplicity and purity the essential faith of the nation, the faith in which it was conceived and the faith in which it has grown to glory and power. With that faith and the birth of a nation founded upon it came the hope into the world that a new order would prevail throughout the affairs of mankind, an order in which reason and right would take precedence of covetousness and force, and I believe that I express the wish and purpose of every thoughtful American when I say that this sentence marks for us in the plainest manner the part we should play alike in the arrangement of our domestic affairs and in our exercise of influence upon the affairs of the world. By this faith, and by this faith alone, can the world be lifted out of its present confusion and despair. ... This is the time of all others when democracy should prove its purity and its spiritual power to prevail. It is surely the manifest destiny of the United States to lead in the attempt to make this spirit prevail.¹¹⁶

In emphasizing the importance of faith in advancing liberty at home and abroad, Wilson opposed policies of isolationism and drew a parallel to Manifest Destiny.

Wilson believed that the American spirit advanced progress in the world. Like Weber's 'spirit' of capitalism, the term 'spirit' as used by Wilson had a meaning that would be foreign to Jews, or even contemporary Christian evangelicals, but was familiar to American Protestants: the soul of the country. The American spirit dated back to the founders and that American contemporaries were their 'spiritual descendants'. Wilson also used the language of spirit in reference to war and spoke of victory as the work of salvation:

The true Americanism, the only true Americanism, is that which puts America at the front of free nations and redeems the great promises which we made the world when we entered the war which was fought, not for the advantage of any single nation or group of nations but for the salvation of all.¹¹⁷

The consequence of such language was an unapologetically Christian vision of war:

We have buried the gallant and now immortal men who died in this great war of liberation with a new sense of consecration. Our thoughts and purpose now are consecrated to the maintenance of the liberty of the world and of the union of its people in a single comradeship of liberty and right. It was for this that our men conscientiously offered their lives. They came to the field of battle with the high spirit and pure heart of crusaders.¹¹⁸

Wilson embodied the ecumenical Protestant vision of leaders advancing social progress through the force of character. Despite his discomfort with Catholics, Wilson denounced sectarianism while using the ecumenical language of God as a common mobilizing force behind America's holy mission:

We are a God-fearing people. We agree to differ about methods of worship, but we are united in believing in Divine Providence and in worshipping the God of Nations. We are the champions of religious right here and everywhere that it may be our privilege to give it our countenance and support. The government is conscious of the obligation and the nation is conscious of the obligation. Let no man create divisions where there are none. Here is the nation God has built by our hands. What shall we do with it? Who is there who does not stand ready at all times to act in her behalf in the spirit of devoted and

¹¹⁶WW, 'An Annual Message on the State of the Union', vol. 67 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 484–485.

¹¹⁷WW, 'A Press Release', vol. 65 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 264.

¹¹⁸WW, 'Cablegram from Paris to Joseph Tumulty', 4 CO JM U.S.G., 28 May 1919, 11:50am. Library of Congress (LOC), Papers of Joseph Tumulty, Box 49.

disinterested patriotism? We are yet only in the youth and first consciousness of our power. The day of our country's life is still but in its fresh morning.¹¹⁹

The spirit of America, synonymous here with the spirit of religion, provided the drive behind national action.

Wilson supported the Christian missionary movement as emblematic of American leadership. Wilson was close with the famous missionary and National Secretary of the YMCA, John Mott.¹²⁰ Wilson addressed YMCA meetings on at least three occasions and supported their efforts to 'Christianize the world'.¹²¹ Wilson saw the YMCA as a means to gain entry to Japan, Russia, and China, bypassing governments and working directly with people to spread Protestant values.¹²² He pressed Mott multiple times to become ambassador to China on the grounds that the YMCA's Christian influence was key to the country's development, noting 'The Christian influence, direct or indirect, is very prominently at the front and I need not say, ought to be kept there'.¹²³ Mott declined after being pressed by Wilson directly as well as through friends.¹²⁴ Wilson refused Mott's first two rejections of the post, stating that the Mott would be granted leave for missionary work, since 'I am eager to unite what you represent with what this government means to try to represent'.¹²⁵

Wilson's support for missionaries was emblematic of his belief that America's Protestant values sustained the country's prosperity and justified its leadership in the world. Christianity was the key to progress and American Christians the mechanism for its dissemination.

When I think of the great bodies of opinion which sustain the affairs of the world, it seems to me that the heart and nucleus of them is the principle of Christianity and that, therefore, the conservation of that great fountain of all that is just and righteous is one of the most important things conceivable ... And when I hear men like Mr. Stuart¹²⁶ pleading for the means to introduce this great influence into a part of the world now for the first time feeling its connection with the rest of mankind, now first awakening to the possibilities of the power that lies latent in it, I wonder if it is possible that the imaginations of Christian people will fail to take fire. Why, this is the most amazing and inspiring vision that can be offered you, this vision of that great sleeping nation suddenly cried awake by the voice of Christ. Could there be anything more tremendous than that? And could there be any greater contribution to the future momentum of the moral forces of the world than could be made by quickening this force which is being set afoot in China? China is at present inchoate; as a nation it is congeries of parts in each of which there is energy, but which are unbound in any essential and active unit, and just as soon as its unity comes, its power will come in the world. Should we not see that the parts are fructified by the teachings of Christ?¹²⁷

¹¹⁹WW, 'Address of President Wilson at the Fiftieth Anniversary Dinner of the Manhattan Club', 4 November 1915, Papers of Joseph Tumulty, LOC, Box. 47, p. 8.

¹²⁰Mott was also chairman of the executive committee of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, president of the World Missionary Conference, and chairman of the International Missionary Council; had organized the World's Student Christian Federation; and was General-Secretary of the International Committee of the YMCA (Magee, op. cit., p. 32).

¹²¹Ian Tyrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 199.

¹²²*Ibid.*, p. 208.

¹²³WW, 'Letter to William Jennings Bryan', 11 February 1913, LOC, Papers of William Jennings Bryan, Box 29.

¹²⁴Magee, op. cit., p. 32.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 32; WW, 'Letter to John R. Mott', vol. 27 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 202.

¹²⁶The Rev. Warren Horton Stuart, Presbyterian missionary to China and Professor at Hangchow college.

¹²⁷WW, 'Remarks to Potomac Presbytery', vol 36 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., pp. 50–51.

Here we see the complete vision of Wilsonianism: Christianity as the source of justice and liberty, missionaries as the mechanism for its expansion, and progress achieved through the Christianization of the world.

I want to conclude this section by again comparing Wilson's views with how he is portrayed by liberal internationalists. Smith argues that Wilson envisioned American leadership to be manifested through international organizations.¹²⁸ Smith's goal is to downplay the missionary aspects of Wilsonianism. In this respect, *both* liberal internationalists and realists neglect a key aspect of Wilsonianism; Wilson used and embraced the terms 'crusade' and 'missionary' not in a figurative sense, but in their full, Christian meaning. In reference to the Allied soldiers of WWI, Wilson said, 'These men who lie here are men of unique breed. Their like has not been seen since the far days of the Crusades'.¹²⁹

That Wilson's policies for international cooperation through the League failed did not sway his vision: that was not the working of providence. In his final public appearance, he made a comment that is fitting to end this section:

I am not one of those that have the least anxiety about the triumph of the principles I have stood for. I have seen fools resist Providence before and I have seen the destruction, as will come upon these again—utter destruction and contempt. That we shall prevail is as sure as that God reigns.¹³⁰

As we will see in the next section, the mechanisms for international cooperation were grounded not only in Christian values with missionaries as agents, but also via an alliance of self-identified Christian nations.

International cooperation

I believe that the solid foundation of the League of Nations is to be found in Christian principles and in the sustaining sentiment of Christian peoples everywhere ...¹³¹

At an ecumenical Protestant conference in October 1917, several months before Wilson's Fourteen Points were unveiled to Congress, the FCC called for the establishment of an international organization that would facilitate communication between states, provide a forum for the resolution of disputes, regulate interstate commerce, promote religious and ethnic tolerance, and advance disarmament. Historian Andrew Preston describes the FCC as 'drafting plans for a league of nations'.¹³² Such logic was not particularly novel, given that Protestant missionaries had for decades deemphasized their national identification in order to Christianize the world. Wilson consulted closely with the FCC throughout his career.¹³³ Preston concludes, 'The mainline churches had already sketched out the principles that would soon be better known as Wilsonianism—peace without victory, democracy promotion, self-determination, cooperation through international organizations—long before the United States had entered the war'.¹³⁴ Burnidge

¹²⁸Smith, *Why Wilson*, op. cit., p. 15.

¹²⁹WW, 'Remarks at Suresness Cemetery on Memorial Day', vol. 60 of Wilson and Link, p. 606.

¹³⁰WW, 'Wilson Overcome Greeting Pilgrims; Predicts Triumph', vol. 68 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 468.

¹³¹WW, 'To the Most Reverend Randall Thomas Davidson', vol. 53 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 451.

¹³²Andrew Preston, 'Religion and World Order at the Dawn of the American Century' in Andrew Johnstone and Helen Laville (eds) *The US Public and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 79.

¹³³*ibid.*, p. 80.

¹³⁴*ibid.*, p. 251.

likewise argues that Wilson's foreign policy was the outward manifestation of the Social Gospel, with a Christianized world system propelling progress.¹³⁵ Wilson advanced this idea in a 1915 speech to the FCC: 'The world has advanced, advanced in what we regard as real civilization, not by material but by spiritual means'.¹³⁶

Historians note that Wilson's vision for the League was steeped in a Calvinist framework.¹³⁷ The rules for the League were recorded in a covenant, not a charter or constitution. The League was to be headquartered in Geneva, the birthplace of Calvinism. Wilson connected the League to his Scottish Presbyterian Covenanter tradition:

I wish that it were possible for us to do something like some of my very stern ancestors did, for among my ancestors are those very determined persons who were known as the Covenanters. I wish we could, not only for Great Britain and the United States, but for France and Italy and the world, enter into a great league and covenant, declaring ourselves, first of all, friends of mankind and uniting ourselves together for the maintenance and the triumph of right.¹³⁸

Like Wilson's ancestors, Gladstone also rooted his liberalism in the primacy of the Christian nation-state and believed that only Christian states were capable of meaningful international cooperation.¹³⁹ Gladstone inherited these notions from the missiologist Hugo Grotius, whose genealogy of international law begins with the commandments of God, and who states that institutional cooperation was only possible for Christian nations with leaders beholden to God.¹⁴⁰

Wilson's application of Christian principles to international cooperation built on a long history of Christian internationalism. Prominent advocate for the Social Gospel William Preston Few transposed the duty of the Christian to the domestic society and state onto the international stage.¹⁴¹ Likewise, to the Democratic Party Wilson urged, 'It is time that the party should proudly avow that it means to try, without flinching or turning at any time away from the path for reasons of expediency, to apply moral and Christian principles to the problems of the world'.¹⁴²

I want to end this section by again contrasting Wilson's views on international cooperation with how he is portrayed. Ikenberry notes that Wilson's vision for international cooperation was less legalist than it was driven by international socialization.¹⁴³ Yet Ikenberry neglects the fact that Wilson believed that international cooperation was *predicated* on Christian principles and an alliance of Christian nations.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁵Burnidge, op. cit., p. 3.

¹³⁶WW, 'An Address to the Federal Council of Churches in Columbus', vol. 34 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 329.

¹³⁷Preston, *Sword*, op. cit., p. 285; Magee, op. cit., pp. 14–15, 105–106; Benbow, op. cit.

¹³⁸WW, 'An Address in Free Trade Hall', vol. 54 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 552.

¹³⁹Ruotsila, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁴⁰Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations*, transl. A.C. Campbell (New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901[1625]). http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/553#Grotius_0138_760, pp. 277–278.

¹⁴¹Preston, 'Religion', op. cit., p. 74; W.P. Few, 'Force and Right in the Government of the World' in R.H. Woody (ed) *The Papers and Addresses of William Preston Few, Late President of Duke University* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1951), p. 297.

¹⁴²WW, 'A Press Release', vol. 65 of Wilson and Link, op. cit., p. 263.

¹⁴³G. John Ikenberry, 'Introduction: Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism' in John G Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith (eds) *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 1–24.

¹⁴⁴In Ikenberry's most recent work, the word 'Christianity' appears only once in a passing reference to discarded arguments from 1848 for a worldwide system of arbitration (G. John Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), p. 87). In a surprising explicit

This distinction matters. Scholars of Wilsonianism invariably point to its internal tensions. The goal of international cooperation often conflicts with the goal of promoting democracy. The goal of American leadership conflicts with the goal of self-determination. Wilson proclaimed his support for national self-determination abroad, but he held sectarian and racist views and segregated the federal civil service. Some of that tension is abridged once we recognize that Wilson did not believe all nations to be equally capable of democracy or international cooperation. Wilson's worldview was a mirror for the kind of social and political order he witnessed and propagated in America, a Janus-faced ethic of universalism and exceptionalism, internationalism and parochialism that continues to motivate the liberal internationalist project.

Conclusion

The other debate is whether or not it is a hopeless venture to encourage the spread of liberty. Most of you all around this table are much better historians than I am. And people have said, you know, this is Wilsonian, it's hopelessly idealistic. One, it is idealistic, to this extent: It's idealistic to believe people long to be free. And nothing will change my belief. I come at it many different ways. Really not primarily from a political science perspective, frankly it's more of a theological perspective. I do believe there is an Almighty, and I believe a gift of that Almighty to all is freedom. And I will tell you that is a principle that no one can convince me that doesn't exist. George W. Bush¹⁴⁵

This article has demonstrated that Woodrow Wilson's liberal internationalism was grounded in his Southern Presbyterianism and liberal Protestantism. Although contemporary theorists connect Wilson to Kant, this article presents an alternative genealogy.

Why did late twentieth century scholars erase Wilson's religion? The most obvious explanation is that liberal internationalists are normatively committed to the liberal missionary project; to do so, the parochial must be purified in favor of the universal. Ikenberry grudgingly acknowledges the most obvious similarity between the two presidents in the above quote, buried in an endnote to the 2009 volume comparing Bush and Wilson.¹⁴⁶ Yet, even when introducing this quotation, Ikenberry refers to Bush's 'faith in democracy' rather than his Christian faith. The aspiration toward secularity runs deep in liberal internationalism.

What should scholars do with the recognition that liberal internationalism is a missionary project that masks its own provincialism? One response is to rehabilitate Wilson. Smith makes this move by unearthing Wilson's realism, thereby distancing

but not entirely coherent shift, Ikenberry does mention Wilson's Christian faith (Ibid., pp. 136–137). Ikenberry says Wilson viewed himself like a church leader, exhorting town members to attend church so as to 'make the town stable, peaceful, and civilized' through gradual, generational reform. So, too, would the League of Nations make the world civilized: 'It would be a living thing, and its principles of rectitude and right would slowly enlightened those who inhabited its conference halls' (Ibid., p. 137). In making this surprising shift, Ikenberry provides no citations to the literature on the League's connection to the Federal Council of Churches (Preston, *Sword*, op. cit.), or the League as the institutional manifestation of the Social Gospel (Burnidge, op. cit.), or the connections between Wilson's Calvinist roots and Covenanter aspirations (Preston, *Sword*, op. cit; Magee, op. cit.; Benbow, op. cit.). A more empirically grounded view of the effect of Wilson's faith is provided by Ambrosius: '[Wilson's] belief in God's providential mission for the United States in world history and his racial/ethnic identity profoundly limited the president's international vision and statecraft, which expressed a Eurocentric, particularly Anglo-American, bias and drew a global color line' (Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism*, op. cit., p. 1).

¹⁴⁵Ikenberry, 'Introduction', op. cit., p. 120, citing Rich Lowry, 'A Theology of Freedom', *National Review Online* 17 July 2007, <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/145976/theology-freedom-rich-lowry>.

¹⁴⁶Ikenberry, 'Introduction', op. cit., p. 120.

Wilson from policies of overexpansion.¹⁴⁷ Throntveit and Slaughter similarly unearth Wilson's pragmatism, thereby finding material for a liberal internationalism of gradual expansion.¹⁴⁸ All three seek to find in Wilson a usable past that can save the liberal internationalist project. In that respect, all three are unintended decedents of the same spirit, saving the world through ideological and institutional conversion.

This paper suggests a less cathartic response. It is to simply recognize the inescapable tension at the heart of the liberal internationalist project. The spirit of liberal internationalism is a desire to expand using military force when necessary, but primarily to rely on social and political strategies common to other missionary projects: contact, exchange, information, and education, so as to give the gift of democracy to those who are ready to receive it. Liberal internationalism so often resembles Christian humanitarianism because they are products of the same missionary impulse.¹⁴⁹ So too does liberal internationalism frequently resemble the other face of the missionary tradition: blindness to one's own violence, unreason, intolerance to other ways of life, and parochialism. Such is the nature of all missionary ventures.

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¹⁴⁷Smith, *Why Wilson*, op. cit.

¹⁴⁸Slaughter, op. cit.; Throntveit, 'Common Counsel', op. cit.

¹⁴⁹Barnett, op. cit.