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
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The problem of God in the philosophy of Josiah Royce and Robert L. Calhoun

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
Thesis

THE PROBLEM OF GOD IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE AND ROBERT L. CALHOUN


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
Albert Franklin Bramble

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts



AM 1,938 bra APPROVAL BY READERS FIRST Elgan S. Brightman Prof. of Phil. SECOND L. Hardel De Holf Asst. Prof. of Phil.





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


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
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CH PTER I


INTRODUCTION

STITINT OF FROBLET

This study seeks to investigate the problem of God in the philosophy of Josiah Rovce and Robert L. Calhoun. It deals with their arguments for the existence of God and the resultant views of his character.

n interest in the general problem and a desire for better understanding led to the choice of Josiah Royce's work. The work of Robert L. Calhoun, a contemporary, provided opportunity for critical comparison and greater insight into the problem. In examination of their contributions reveals that Royce gives a more thorough and systematic treatment to the problem and merits a more significant place in the bistory of philosophy. Devotion of more time and space to his work in this paper indicates recognition of his greater significance.

This study leads to a consideration of the graphents for God from the works of these two authors. The difference in their basic approach to reality gives two viewpoints in the solution of the problem. Criticisms are unde of their arguments and resultant concepts.




ISTORY ID PRIME TO DE LE FROBLE

In religious philosophy the problem of God is over the central issue. It is represented in nother form in the general field of philosophy as man's eternal so reh for reality. The problem is in this sense one of the oldest. Yet viewing it relative to the thinking of these two men, the problem of this thesis takes an original form.

Vistories of philosophy must include consideration of Josiah Royce and his idealistic position. To is merica's foremost representative of isolute Idealism, his particular form of one of the most influential schools of thought. His thinking has contributed much to the Idealism of our present generation. Several of merica's leading philosophers of today have consider his first influence.(1) he had an admirable spirit which was satisfied with nothing but the best. Truth was ever his secret. The mes the continuous seeker after God. These several reasons combine to place Royce among the great philosophers of all times.

The other philosopher, dobert L. Calhoun, still lives to continue his work. It is yet early to pass on his significance in the history of philosophy. Towever on the basis of available material, it can be said, for the present, that he merits a far less significant place.

1. Cf. H. H. Calkins, H. L. Hocking, G. L. Cunningham, and others. In explanation of abbreviations used will be found in the bibliography. 2 -




SOURCES OF DATE

Sources of data for this paper are indicated by the limitation given to the problem. As it deals with the arguments for God and the resultant concepts of God in the philosophy of Rovce and Calhoun, the sources used are the several works of these two men. The bibliography mentions those books which were found central to the investigation.

The critical points are by no means the exclusive judgments of the author, though he has attempted to include original ones. Indebtedness to the different critics of the two men is indicated by footnote references. Nuch more material was available on Royce than on Calhoun. The recence of Calhoun's main work has not permitted published criticisms. Hence, the criticisms of his argument and concept are in the main original.

I ETHOD OF PROCLDURE

Relative to the problem, the contributions of Rovce and Calhoun are given expression and then examined. In expositions and criticisms an attempt is made to follow the synoptic method of philosophy, which includes: preliminary synopsis of unanalyzed data, experiment and analysis, rationalistic deduction, and finally synopsis based on all these states. Some criticism is made on specific parts of an argument, and some deals with the whole concept. Throughout, our criterion is




that of coherence: (3) Do the arguments and the resultant concepts interpret all experience in a consistant war? Do they account for all the facts?

ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter one states the problem chosen for the thesis, tells something of its history, nd explains the manner in which the author deals with it. Chapter two takes up the first phase, the problem of God in the philosophy of Josiah Royce. It presents an exposition and criticism of his arguments and final conclusions. Chapter three considers the problem in the philosophy of Robert L. Calboun with similar treatment. The fourth chapter offers a brief comparison of the arguments of the two men. The fifth chapter presents the final summery and the author's conclusions. The thesis is completed with a selected bibliography.

^{2. &}quot;The coherence theory would then offer the following criterion: .ny judgment is true, if it is both selfconsistent and coherently connected with our system of judgments as a whole." Brightman, ITP, 6].



CH PTER II

THE PROBLES OF GOD IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSI H ROYCE


METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

One might say that Royce, in his search for proof of God's existence, follows the methods of a rational, or critical, empiricist. He makes use of experience because he believes that the only demonstrable truths of philosophy relate to the realm of experience. He employs reason because he finds it the most effective method of determining the nature and me ming of experience.

Royce obtains some fact from the empirical realm and moves from it, by inductive reasoning, to a concept of the whole of experience. By deductive reasoning, he completes the definition of the whole with characteristics derived from his foundational premises, and, in the end, the "whole" explains the empirical basis. The "practical" is judged by the "eternal."(3)

In practical terms, his method is to pursue those hypotheses which avoid self-contradiction. He considers

^{3.} Cf. Philosophical Review, V., 13. Cf. also PL, 326 and Philosphical Review, V., 13, 142: "All that is practical borrows its truth from the Eternal." In chapter two the author is assumed to be Royce unless otherwise stated.




theories which have been advanced to explain the flots of experience, discarding the indequate ones and building a system of his ofm from those which he believes to be true. The goal is reached then he has found a series of propositions which cannot be denied, when he reaches the ought which gives the most inclusive view.(4) He then tests this body of central truth by special application.

Technically the method is comparable to the method technically the method is comparable to the method is approached in one learn is a concept of that limit which is approached in one's thinking by what one believes to be true Being, or that one means then be refers to Being. Rowce attacks to define this limit by determining the real and complete meaning of Teality which is varuely implied in fragmentary passing ideas.

PI LD OF IV-STIG TICK

"Experience and thought, howce states, "are upon our hands; and to ether they determine for as the roblems relarding Beirg."(5) He bases his investigation upon those facts which relate to the constitution of the realm of experience.

4. PR, VI:, 139. "All or vario's selves be forctions not only of one shower, but of one so citute elf thet some are and somehow regentically constructs on expression of itself in the list of which or vario's partial expressions are judged."




e finds that as elf-conscion or trinking beings, an colors the world of experience while it the world of iden. By exchining the basic facts of experience and re-soming from their indications, Rowce attempts to determine the true nature and meaning of the sole of experience.

PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF GOD

As the datum of immedi te experience leads directly into a consideration of the meaning of ideas, Royce's concept of God will be the ultimate result of that investigation. The first examination of idea reveals two meanings implied therein, the internal and the external. Experience reveals that the primary character is the internal meaning. The nature of this internal meaning is as entially the embodiment of purpose. But it is a incomplete and fragment my purpose. Being, then, is that which embodies the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea. In the end this Being will be identical with the Christian concept of God.

CL - IFIC FION

Royce finds that the basis for an concept of being nust arise from the implications of self-consciousness, for that is the first fact revelled in experience. From this basis he derives sever 1 facts lich ust be accounted for in order to arrive at an understanding of reality. The sever 1 facts give different lines of thought thich led to concept of the mole.




The n ture of the sayor 1 f cts derived ermit classification of Novce's inquients. The line of the hit hich deals with the nomine of the "elf" is called the mount from Ferson bity. That thich de la with the eming of ideas is classified is the Emisterolo is 1 inquient. That which de la with the lo is 1 conditions necessary for the fact of er or is called the inquient from the Pos indications for the indication de la with the ideas of most indications have the Por 1 inquient.

These sever 1 rguments are all closely related. In lices their exposition is found in the sine subject inter. For example, in loyce's <u>Atuaics of Good and Evil</u>, in the chapter on the "Halications of elf-Co. ciousness," a collided expression of his Personality, Distension of his orks e charceives individual treatment.(6)

This classification is mide for convenience and better understanding. Roace eranded ill these arguments is evidence for his idealistic approach to reality. This is apparent as he says:

> The precent p per is in er ort to set forth in brief sole of the evidence for an ide listic interpret tion of the nature of relity. By ar unent is in its estential features identical with the one precented in the possibility of from t

6. The Person lity roument receives explicit tre tnent in SGL, the E isto plotical roument in I(1), the Error argument in R.P., and the 'oral argument in FL.



ligious spect of Philosophy, published in 1.85. nother st tement of the same considerations is to be found on pices 368-380 of my study entitled The Spirit of Lodern Philosophy... In a later and extended form my view of the doctrine here in question has so been expounded in a work en-The Conception of God, published in 1.97.(7)


Each is nort of the rener lapproach, but in considering all as arguments for the existence of God, they differ enough so that they are casily classified under different headings.

RGULIT FROM PJ OF LITY

It is by exemining the question, what self-conditionness implies, that philosophical idealism begins. Ind by this question Rovce hoves to gain a clearer notion of the fold ind his relation to it. So a who begin with this userion give some facile naver, as "I is thinking substance," and then pass to the construction of some theological doctrine, missing the whole signific nee of self-consci usness. It the same time the extremist has no right to s y, "I know weself, but nothing beyond myself," reducing the world to one's idea of it. This extreme shows no evidence of a thoroughgoing self-criticism.

The investigation of self-consciousness, "whose existence is to sprear to a wise reflection as the fact durely involved in our consciousness," (8) may be made from two standpoints first, from a consideration of the inner life, and second, from

- 7. 3GE, 140.
- 8. Ibid., 149.



a consideration of vour "supposed relation to a world of objects external to vourself."(9) The first standmoint marks the entrance into the argument from Personality. The second, based upon the implications of self-consciousness and de ling with the meaning of ideas, is classified as the Epistemological argument. It is dealt with in a following section.


In immediate experience one is sure of "Self-Consciousness" but far from realizing its meaning.

> Its existence we know only in the tense that, in dealing with it, we are dealing with no unreality, but with a central problem and principle of knowledge.(10)

To realize the meaning of this "Self" questions raised must deal specifically with it. How much of a "Self" is clearly known to direct reflection? Cormon sense replies that it is the empirical ego called by any one of us by our proper name. In other / words, it is "the knowing Self of this moment."(11) In my consciousness are all these current ideas, feelings, thoughts, judgments, and here am I the subject of all these. They constitute what J directly know. The rest of reality is for me an object of faith. By direct reflection I can cle rly understand my Self to be the knower of these current thoughts of this moment. Thus cormon sense answers the question. But does it make

9. SGI, 162.

- 10. Ibid., 150.
- 11. Loc. cit.




itself clear?

If I am the knower of this moment I must define my assurance. Ind "if it is immediate assurance, I must be able to give at once its content."(12) But then I try to do this J am at once baffled. Despite the assumption that I know only the present moment, I cannot tell the precise content of my present moment. Before I can reflect upon it, it has become a past moment. It follows then that the assumption that I am the knower of this present moment is false.

> For I know not now in full what it is that is present to me, nor who I muself am to whom this is present. And I find out that I do not thus fully know myself at any present moment just because, when I try to tell what I know, what I tell about is no longer my present, but is already my past knowledge.(13)

Cormon sense fails in its definition of the "Self," but it reveals a clue. It shows that there is a difference between what I really am and what I myself take myself to be from moment to moment. "I am twofold."(14) I have a true Self which escapes observation and a seeking self which bursues. Wy true Self is an ideal Self never fully present in any one moment.

SGL, 152.
 Loc. cit.
 Ibid., 154.



Loother to y of stating the foregoing result would, therfore, be to say that, unless I am more than the knowing and the immediately known self of this moment, I am not even as much as the self of this moment.(15)


In order to be the thinking being or self of this noment, I must be organically related to the true and complete reflective person implied in my finite consciousness. I can come to know the nature of this true Self by examining the logical implications of my imperfect selfhood. My finite selfhood implies that the content and he ming of my true Self must include my whole world of objects as well as the whole truth of my inner life.(16)

> If, then, this nalysis of the concept of Personality be sound, there is logically possible but one existent Person, namely, the one complete Self.(17)

CRITICISH OF RGU JEF FROM PIPSON LITY

he agree with Royce in holding that the fact of finite personality logic lly implies the existence of a Supreme Being, but for different reasons. The point that concerns Rowce is found in what is called the relation of the d tum self to the whole self. And this relation is a problem. Rowce calls the datum self the pursuing self, and the whole self the true self. He finds that the pursuing self continually pursues the true self, and the true self is God.

SGE, 162.
 Loc. cit.
 Loc. cit.



~

nother intermentation of this relation holds that the pursuing self by memory and inticipation relates all its experiences so as to identify itself as the true self of this perticular moment. Ind that this is true is revealed by self-experience. Does not memory link the "self" to its pact experiences? That I am the I who yesterday attended a class is my knowledge by the ability of my own mind in memory. That I will be the I who attends a class tomorrow is likewise by knowledge by the ability of mind in anticipating and relating. Mind, or self, can in its experience identify its true self. That is a fact rever led in this further examination of our self-activity.

Thus it can be said that there is more in this self which is certain than Royce finds. The finite self is, at the present moment, dependent on something real other than himself, but Royce does not have sufficient ground for his conclusion that the finite self must be a p rt of the Supreme Self. It is more empirical to explain the relation of the datum self to the whole self as a relation possible by the ability of mind, rather than by "common ground" within the being of the Supreme Self. Under this interpretation the finite self is dependent upon the Supreme Self in a manner consistent with experience.

It must be added that Royce has overlooked the real force of the argument from Personality. In brief, self-consciousness is a fact of immediate experience, a basic fact. Now as the concept of God must explain all facts, how better explain finite personality than by a Supreme Person, God? Personality

from an immersonal source is inconceivable. That more rational hypothesis is possible than that which holds that God is the Supreme Person, the cause of finite personality? This cansideration Royce has overlooked in his speculative argument. The conclusion of this argument is conscidered in the section dealing with the character of God.

EPISTLNOLOGIC L RGULENT


Royce believes that an important method in seeking to understand reality is to inquire into the me ming of the empirical idea. It has been the tondency to lay stress upon the external aspect or objective reference of ideas. For Royce, the primary char ever of an idea is its internal aspect or embodiment of purpose.

His definition of an idea makes it an active response to outer sense impressions, and this response is caused not by the outer impressions but by the purpose expressed in the idea. Consequently his definition of idea is in terms of immer purpose.

> In idea is any state of consciousness whether simple or complex, which, when present, is then and there viewed as at least the partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose.(18)

The basis for this conclusion is of i port nce, for from it Royce finds his way to his concept of the Absolute.

18. WI(1), 22.




He justifies his conclusion by a psycholo icel malveis of the contents of consciousness.(19) malysis reveals that there is a difference betwien outer sense impressions and active responses to those impressions. The active response involves much more than the sense impression gives. It involves consciousness of how one proposes to act toward the things of high he has ide s. is in the case of a friend and an energy, it is not the mere sence impression hat tells on it is friend or energy; it is consciousness of different attitudes and intended behavior toward these two sense objects.(20) and this inner action is that which Rovce calls the inner character or purpose of an ide .

The inner purpose of an idee, as it gets a present conscious embodiment in the contents and form of an idea, constitutes the internal meaning of the idea.(21) The fact that ideas do refer beyond themselves constitutes their external meaning.(22) The relation of these into access was revealed in the foregoing consideration of the idea of a friend or an enemy. It is an idea because one fulfills his rocard by doelling upon his inner affection for that friend, by getting the idea present to mind. Eut in the external sense one means the real being called friend in as much as the idea refers to that real friend and resembles

WI(1), 21.
 20. Ibid., 22 f.
 21. Ibid., 25.
 22. Ibid., 26.

15



him. However, we must remember that the extern 1 and internal me nings are but different spects of the same thing. Senarati n is made for clarity.


This places before us the problem of the relation of internal and external meaning of ideas. In dealing with this problem common sense tells us that we must djust the internal structure of our ide s to an external structure in an independent world of preexistent facts. This view presents a hopeless contrast between the internal purpose and the external validity of ide s.

In the solution of the true rel tion between the two apparently different meanings of ideas, Royce believes the whole problem of loing lies. He says:

> I say, then, at the outset, that the whole problem of the Nature of Being will for us, in the end, reduce to the question: How is the internal leaning of ideas consistent with their a parently external meaning? Or again: ow is it mossible that an idea, which is an ide essentially and primarily because of the inner purbose that it consciously fulfills by i's presence, also possesses a meaning that in any sense appears to go beyond this internal purpose?(.3)

Realism offers its solution to the problem by ttempting to define the reality of the world is totally independent of our ideas. But this independence is not consistent with our analysis of the knowing set. There is a real relation between the knower and the object which Re lism obtenpts to make un-

23. 11(1), 32.



neccessry. If external objects can exist independently of ideas, unaffected by and indifferent to them, idea can also exist as independent facts having no need for external objects.(24) in idea, looking upon the object which Realist cives it, might say:

> I not only do not need ou, but o serve, u on second thought, that I never no nt cu tall, never referred to ou, never conceived you, and, in truth, an even now not addressing you. In short, you are nothing. (25)


The folly of belief in an independent world of fact is apparent to Royce. He concludes: "Matever Being is, it is not independent of the ideas that refer to it."(26)

Pysticism asserts that the real cannot be molly independent of knowledge. To be real means to the mustic to be felt as the absolute goal. The real is inmediate and knowable, but it is also something deeper than what is usually seen or felt by finite beings. Within the knower lies the motive that selects the relative for his ideas and leds him to distinguish truth from error. But Royce points out that until recognized no claim of being can be made for any object. Insticism holds that reality is uttained when thought is satisfied and no questions or doubts remain. Is the absolute goal, we hity is a quietus of all thinking and all striving. For Royce the possession of absolute knowledge as defined by the mystic would be an

24. This seems to be a signific nt never to Re lish's fundament 1 criticism of Idealish.

25. NI(1), 266.

26. Ibid., 190. Macintosh and al ost all critics criticize Royce for rejecting an untenable form of le list and concluding that my realistic solution is i possible. Cf. PK, 384.



end of conscious thinking and therefore a zero of conciousness.(27) Mysticism's explanation is in decuate.

Realism and Mysticism mid in the effort to arrive at the true concept of being by mointing out that "our finite consciousness indeed seeks a meaning that it does not now find presented."(28) But what is this me ming? So fur it is not the independent being of Realism nor the immediate datum of Hysticism.

Critical Rationalism finds that the real "gives warrant to ideas, makes them true, and enables us to define determinate, or valid, noshible experiences."(29) Rovce points out that more validity is an unintelligible conception. It can at the most merely tell us what reality is not by narrowing down the number of possibilities. Ithough it is indecuste, it contains much that is true. Certainly being must be valid. It is on the right track; it only fails to take us for enough. Validity needs to be tested, and that is accomplished as we ask, "What is truth?"

Truth is frequently defined in terms of external meming as "that about which we judge."(30) But this definition is possible only if we regard our thought as independent of being. The examination of Realism shoved us Now difficult it was to define reality a long as we sunder the external and internal

27.	WI(1),	191.
28.	Ibid.,	195.
29.	Ibid.,	266.
30.	Ibid.,	270.



Truth has also been defined as "correspondence between our Ideas and their objects."(32) Two things are implied in this definition: first, if an idea is true, it must have an object; and second, it must correspond to its object. Each of these implications raises several problems. First, what is the nature and degree of that correspondence between idea and object when one talks of a true idea? Welp on this problem a wes from the field of mathematics. It shows us, as in the case of the numbers and stabols of algebra representing objects, that two objects need not be alike in oppear nce to correspond.


> Mhat is involved in correspondence is the mossession, on the part of the corresponding objects, of some system of ideally definable characters that is convon to both of them, that is, for the purposes of our thought, the same in both of them, and that is such as to meet the systematic purpose for which the particular correspondence is established.(33)

applying this to idea in its correspondence to object, idea is not confined to any kind or degree of general similarity to its object, as, for example, an idea shout color need not itself be a color. Or, as Royce says, "a true idea of a dog need not it-

31. VI(1), 371. The exact nature of internal and external meaning is here doubtful. If he identifies them, as he seeningly does, with knower and known, is he not desurting the me nings he derived from his analysis?

32. Ibid., 300.

33. Ibid., 304.



self bark in order to be true."(34)

This still leaves us in doubt. If in ide can differ so widely from its object, if correspondence is not the test of truth, then that is? The only inster possible, Rovce finds, is in terms of pur ose. "The idea is true if it oscesses the sort of correspondence to its object that the idea mants to possess."(55) and is Rovce continues:

> Unless that kind of identity in inner structure between idea and object can be found which the specific nurmose enbodied in a given idea demands, the idea is false. On the other hand if this particular sort of identity is to be found, the idea is just in so far true.(30)


The conclusion from this consideration is plain. One cannot stand apart from the internal meaning, the conscious inner purpose, of an idea and determine whether or not the idea corresponds to its object. The criterion of truth is not external, it is internal. The truth of an idea cannot be determined by examining its external object. It is done by comparing the fulfilled idea to its own specific purpose.(57) This inner purpose determines the port of likeness the idea must possess to be true.(33) at this point Royce finds his preliminary definition of an idea, as a state of consciousnels em-

36. Loc. cit.

37. The fulfilled idea is de possible by the object. The object is important in the provine process -- by the of idea, 38. UI(1), 308.

^{34.} NI(1), 705.

^{35.} Ibid., 306.




bodying conscious pur one, justified.

It is plain now, that the internal and external meaning of ideas a most be surdered. But to stop here would be to end in subjective idealism. For an an internal meaning be linked to an external meaning? In other words, then his articlea an object at all?

Finy older theories reard the object is cluse id prigi of ide s. This they more or less uncritic lly occepted as fact. Put a lince it those ideas of future events, such as de th or in eclipse predicted for next year, refute this theory.

Insight into the moble, is mained in the domain end to of the usual oppeal to objects of vision and touch as trained closes of objects of ideas. In these instances there is a very typical feature of the rol tion of idea and object, namely, "that an idea has an object depends at least in a rol moon this, that the idea selects its object."(19) This activity of selection is anifest in consciousness by attention. It involves the inner meaning of an idea. Just as the cort of correst ondence by which an idea is judged is determine by the internal meaning of an idea, the selection of the object, lso, is determined by it.(40)

39. /I(1), 517.40. Ibid., 513.



Thus fir two ficts including in the object of in ideal is predeter including sole v. That is, it is selected from all other objects through the treative interest in nobject which the internal meaning of the ideal involves. Includless the ideal is selective in this way, it can be neither true nor filse. For in its intention to be true, it intends sort of correspondence it in object. This correspondence is determined by the purpose embodied in the ideal (41) Becond, though the ideal predetermines the object it elects and the sort of correspondence it intends, the ideal cost not determine that the object is such that the ideal shall att in entire present with it.(42)


In these two ficts there is a contradiction. The first shows up that the object, in so fir s it is the object of in idea, seems to be itogether determined. The second shows us that:

> No finite ide predator ines, in its object, exectly the character which, when present in the abject, i as the ide the desired trath. For observe, first, that the ide of the orld or of space, is in my c se something other than be more ide itself. Ind the truth of the ide depends upon confirm tion of the ide through the necessary of the character of this other, -- the object.(43)

That this sound point is true is evidenced by the possibility

41. /I(1), 319.

43. Ibid., 323.



of error in finite ide c. If intended corre ondered to selected object fore all that the involved, dich states in solutions would be true.(44) howce here wints out the place in sigbific nee of the object in the knowing rocess.


In the five of them ormosing facts how can the idea be in relation to its object? The solution of this problem ill overcode the last obstruction in understanding the relation between idea and object. and solution is rescible.

Ideas sack their own remine. Doing to be a the judged by nothing but that the intend. The last relact their object and standard of correspondence. Fut this the the the idea reports the object is other than itself. This flat itself is a part of that the idea must an contain by intends.(45) and the idea, as will acching its own fulfill ent of yurnowe, in so fir that it is defined to be an fulfill ent of yurnowe, in so fir that its definite remine and that, selects the object to be appreciably determine the object, "<u>ruch that no other o ject</u> <u>could the its alloce as the object of this its</u>. (4c) and, howce continues:

> In spite of the fact to the object is such solely by the fill of the ide, the ide undertikes subrisively to be either true or filse field compared with the tobject.(47)

- 44. JI(1), 324.
- 45. Ibid., 307.
- 46. Loc. cit.
- 47. Loc. cit.

33



Royce is saying here that the correspondence intended by the pur ose embodied in the idea is sound for in the object. The possession by the object of the idea's intentions mark it is true. Usence of the sought for correspondence rks it filse. This which brings to the fore the priority of idea in the knowledge process.


The total effect of the foregoing ficts is this -- the idea always finds in its object not ing but the idea's own conscious purpose or will embodied in a more determining form than the ide possesses at this moment. Thus:

Then I have an idea of the world, my idea is will, and the world of my idea is simply my own will itself detorminately e odied (48)

The solution to the contr iction in the true relation of idea and object is now apparent. One's "true will" is to seek one's present interfect conscious will in some more determinate form.(49) The present interfect will is the till of the passing moment. It is the internal meaning consciously present as for as it goes. It is this till one seeks to bring to clearer consciousness. And the object beyond, "the other," the external meaning, the goal of this quest, is this pore determinate

49. If the object is thus set up as he final judge is this not to say that the object is the real, and the idea but a fragment of it? In identifying the completed internal meaning with the object does not Royce reject the finality of internal meaning?

^{48.} WI(1), 327.



understunding the relation of object to ide, but results from all this relative to the nature of reality? Just this: if every finite idea as inperfect and indeterminate seeks only, in its other, its greater determination, that the dosired limit of determination the idea would face a present content which would allow no other to take, for this ideal purpose, its place.(51) Thus, when in the case of a present and imperfect passing idea all possible instances that could illustrate it were present, you would experience:

> first, the complete fulfilment of your internal meaning, the final satisf ction of the will embodied in the idea; but secondly, also, that absolute determination of the embodiment of your idea is this embodiment would then be present, that absolute determination of your purpose, which would constitute in individual realization of the idea.(53)


This final embodiment berein described is the ultimate nd cenuine object that any present idea seeks as its other. Ind this is true being.

So in his consideration of ideas, beginning with a datum and moving to the whole, Royce finds a demand for the concept of an individual being. The very incompleteness of our

50. Rovce does not explain how the idea finds more in the object than its uncoses intend.

51. WI(1), 336. But how could the incomplete idea of this moment ever 'mor this limit?

52. Ibid., 338 f.




present ideas demands a completely individual fulfilment. In this and the fact that every other concept is self-contradictory and that denial involves inherent affirmation lies the logical necessity of his fourth concept of being.(53) In final statement it runs:

What is, or what is roal, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form nd in final fulfilment, of the termil eming of finite ideas.(54)

This being the nature of being, we can define an idea as true when it corresponds to its own final and completely individual expression.(55) As all finite ideas, fragmentary and imperfect, must be fulfilled we must conclude that the final concept of being is an individual life present as a whole. Our very noter to make the whole of being, the universe, our problem has as the fulfilment of one idea the constitution of a sincle life of concrete fulfilment. "All varieties of individual expression are thus subordinate to the unity of the whole."(56)

The final concept of being is an individual life present as a whole. It is at once a system of facts and the fulfilment of whatever purpose a finite idea imperfectly embodies. It is the completed will, the completed life of experience, fulfilling the will and experience of any finite idea. Rowce concludes:

53. (I(I), 348 f.
 54. Ibid., 339.
 55. Loc. cit.
 56. Ibid., 394.



That is, is for us no longer where form, but Life; and in our world of what was before mere truth the light of individuality and of will have finally begun to shine. The sin of true Being has arisen before our eyes.(57)

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
This marticular idealistic argument is accentable. It presents an interpretation of facts as they are known to finite man. The first datum of experience is the self-emperience. In self-experience we are thinking beings. It is logiting the procedure to seek the ultimate emplanation of the universe through that which is nost near to our being. In this argument Powce begins not by asking that we know and reasoning from these facts to an interpretation of the world-ground but by asking how can we know, how is it possible for us to gain knowledge, ideas?

Variant interventions of Novce's argument are possible It is at times difficult to scentain just that interpretation Rowce himself is living to the several facts up for consideration. Some confusion is caused by Rowce's arbig ous use of terms. Cunninghar thinks this double use of terms troublesome even to Rowce.(55) which it is apparent is he develops the internal and external deming of idens. By express statement these is but two different spects of the same thing, sen rated abstractly for all rity. Put 1 ter he see is to employ the terms in a separate sense, internal meaning representing the idea and

57. I(I), 348 f.

53. Cunningham, ILBI, 50.

27




external meaning the object.

t times it sounds is if lovce need to the extreme making the iden redetermine the object harm. If this he is conclusion then disagreement follows. But his insistence when otherness of the object milles it milling that the object is given its similiant place in the imaging robess.(59)

They loyce concludes that the idea dater i ea its on correspondence, I do not lelieve 'e is a instat the idea deter ines not is to be found in the object. There tot the ide deter has that correspondence is to be looked for in the object. The idea does determine that correspondence is to be looked for, and as it looks for it ad finds it. then in a sense it 's predetermined that we in the bject. To ce c uld have c rried his malaris forther, showing bot bearing or erience has upon or iden. 'e neglect d this spect of the ide . berhans on unnecessary one for his nurroses. Put by oritting a consideration of experience, he le ves us ofth uncont int. 's to now the idea miss the information which makes correspondence possible. Now does the idea find it possible to look for points a priori? Or re they gained through experience? Royce leaves one with the feeling that the correspondence is contained in fragmentary form in the idea and the idea's purposes cause it to seeh for a more determinate en bodi ent. C. this vie. Localedre is inherent in the mind of man. Ill that

9. I(I), 537. "...The idea udertates adminsively to be either true or false ther commed with that object."



is necessary is reliable of all that is in i.d. But we interpretation that bolds to the view that no ledes of thin s is inherent in wind does not be we room for the embidied. It is not true to experience to hold that wind concesses the abilities which must knowledge a possibility. Order this interpretation the object can influence the idea and ather ideas influence other ideas, and this is that become in a rearience.

In showing that ideas are expressions of emboried purpose, Ronce's argument leads us to a purposive concept of being. The concept of an Absolute Person, purposive and dynamic, is compatible with the finite non-controlled by our ose. Ronce's conclusion is consistent ith the empirical basis.


Lowever, ffter following to be thrown his illuminiting discussion of ide s, there is decided let own in is betwetions. Le finds that ideas eet for individual excression in the beyond, and from this concludes that the ultimate being must be individual. This concludes that the ultimate being must be individual. This concludes that the ultimate being ingly made. The line of thought excreasing it runs: " s all ideas seek individual expression and it is possible to have an idea of the universe, the whole of being, then the mode is a unity, m individual." This line of reasoning course well like the traditional outological argument which that convincingly disproved.

Ronce finds that the inverfact idea seets its prester duter in tion and true being is present then the itua mesches



the desired limit of determinition which would allow no other to take its place. The question here would be; ould the desired limit of determination be identical with God. as Mant pointed out relative to the causal argument, going from cause to effect ad infinitum does not lead us to God. The first cause reached by this process is hypothesis. Onewhere in the infinite regress one must stop and say this is first cause, God. In so doing one does not end with God, but an hypothesis that the posited first cause is God. The same criticism can be made relative to Royce's "limit of determination". Somewhere the idea must stop and say, "This is the limit ; all possible fulfilments are present; I an in the presence of true being". Thus the idea merely posits this limit as the finally determinate fulfilment.

Relative to the foregoing conclusion difficulty arises in the maintenance of consistency between derived ficts and deduction. By definition finite ideas are imperfect, fr fimentary. They are finite because they are imperfect. If this be true, then the question arises as to how the imperfect idea can ever know the "desired limit of determination". Or again if the imperfect finite idea can know the limit of determination, then thet limit is necessarily imperfiect. On the surface Royce seemingly gives a basis for certainty, but exa ination show no trustworthy basis. There is no doubt that the completely determined idea could be in the prosence of true being, but there is doubt, as Royce presents the cise, that




the finite idea could realize the finally provide for .

Criticis a beard on his criterio of trot, is ternal correct adence.(30) is criterio ands: It is the -this instant's idea -- if, is its on a size, and on ibs un plan, it corres onds, even in its varueness, but to a final and complete individual excression. Additionary onderco is into dol but the idea.

According to the several definitions involved in this criterion of truth, it can never determine the first or folding of a idea. For the truth of an idea can only be judged by its "our ensure and on its on plan." Is the ideas of a ensure and out plan is, coording to longe, indefinite, vagas, and fragmentary, the idea can never of be ond itself to it, on final and complete individual expression. This criterion is apt to be lost in the desire expressed in any idea.

Purther, if he idea of an object is deter ined by the purpose subodied in the idea, how can this manual e he nee up as a test for fruth? This, in effect, is to the the inta the criterion for the idea. That a this hair is never ccessible to us for the are be our very a three his test to the fragmentary and incomplete surpose.

^{60. (}I(I), 339. 'e label Royce's criterin of ruth "internal corres ordence" for the reason that it differs from the common theory of correspondence. If ther that correspondence between idea and object it is between incommilete idea and commilete idea.



It is also noniceable that Norce uses the criterion of coherence. Dis entire investigation rests upon an operal to this test for writh. Coherence is best surred up by asking -does this idea, which explains this fact, fit into the most rational whole of experience? Royce's use of this method is apparent in his consideration of Realism, Mystician, and Critical Rationalism.


Ronce very explicitly finds correspondence, as it is commonly understood, indecuate.(61) Yet in the end is not correspondence between an incomplete and fragmentary idea and its finally determinate and complete expression equally inpossible?

D. C. Macintosh criticizes Royce for following psychological idealism, which a we that things depend for their existence upon their being in the mind, or at least in the conscious relation to some subject.(62) This is what D. E. Perry has labelled "the erocentric predicament."(63) If Macintosh interprets Royce as maintaining this position with finite beings and their world, one must disagree. It thes it does seem that Royce takes the finite idea the cause behind the object's existence. But his position holds that the object is a true "other" independent of finite ideas. The idea selects its object, true, but it can in no way determine what that

61. NI(I), 301 f.

62. 'acintosh, Pr, 94.

63. Permy, FPM, 129 f.



object is. "The idea usertake: sub issively to be either true or false when compared with that object."(64) Relative to the world-ground there is no apparent objection to the view that things exist in the mind of the Supreme Person.


In general, Poyce's analysis of the knowledge process is valid. Is it stands it is a cogent presentation of the idealistic position. But Rowce's several conclusions drawn from this analysis do not merit the logical necessity which he finds theirs. From an empirical basis he deduced points which are not consistent with experience.

RGUILTT FROM THE FORMET OF FROM

Rowce leads into the problem of error in a very direct manner. Ifter establishing his idealistic postulates he permits the haunting thought of doubt to confront us. Skenticism declares all postulating to be in error. But there is a clue, even in this most thorough doubting. Implied in it is the fact "that we can be in error about an external world."(65) If skepticism says that no absolute truth exists, then, it must add that "no absolute truth exists <u>save this truth itself</u>, that no absolute truth exists."(66)

If one could see what is involved in this fact of error, absolute truth would be possible. Examining logical conditions

64. MI(I), 327.
 65. R.P, 398.
 66. Ibid., 376.



necessary for error, Royce considers several descriptions of error, such as: The idea that fails to agree with its object, and the psychological conditions for error. These however are inadeouate. Considering several classes of error, such as: error about one's neighbor's mind, and the expected future, he finds that cormon sense has so arranged judøments and their relations that error is logically impossible.

Solution comes to this problem in drowning the common sense view that I and all else are separate self-existent beings, and regarding the knower and the object known as present to a third thinker whose thoughts include both.(67) You and I and all objects are present to this [1]-Inclusive Thought. We is able to view our ideas and the objects referred to and determine their truth and falsity.


> Ind to similar, let us overcore all our difficulties by declaring that all the many Bevonds, which single significant judgments seem varuely and separately to postulate, are present as fully realized intended objects to the units of an all-inclusive, absolutely clear, universal, and conscious the ht, of which all judgments, true or false, are but fragments, the whole being at once Absolute Truth and isolute Knowledge.(68)

CRITICIST OF NIGULAT PROD FORCEDILITY OF REC-

This unique argument demends careful consideration. In its treatment Rorce avoids much of the ground upon which Cunning-

67. R.P. 42.

68. Ibid., 423. Such a conclusion does overcore many difficulties, but it also leads one into many new difficulties.




ham criticizes him. In this argument Romee treats in a less direct way the meaning of an idea. That he here holds to the priority of internal meaning is evident in his discussion of the common sense view of error.(69) However his final concept of being does not here, as in his Emistemological argument, depend upon this aspect of ideas. It is used here to show how cormon theories as to the possibility of error are impossible and untenable.(70)

The errors of finite beings are rade as finite beings judge an act as true or false upon the basis of coherence. Hence one is in error because his idea does not interpret the object known in the light of the most comprehensive whole of experience. Ind it is a society of persons who set up this whole of experience. So man is judged by men. Ind for all practical consequences such judgments are valid. However, these judgments are not always true judgments. For in experience society has been known to reject an idea wet in the end accept it. This points to the objectivity of truth which is essentially the fact established by lowce's argument from the possibility of error. Truth is possible or error is possible only through a Supreme Being who judges an idea true or false.

69. RAP, 396.

70. If his priority of internal meaning be unacceptable, the several explanations of error must be reexamined in light of the accepted view.




truth and error and that objects in no way become a part of the subject.

However it is not becessary to conclude that G-d is an All-inclusive Being because error is possible about all ideas of all things. Here it is enough to point out that it is not necessary for God to be all-inclusive in order to judge all ideas. It is enough for God to know all objects and ideas about those objects and unnecessary to include all in his being. Is it not enough to say that God can make all ideas his own and by knowing the object referred to by the idea affirm or reject it? This conclusion avoids many of the difficulties into which Royce's view takes one.

This argument has a clos relation to that is known as the moral and religious arguments. These point to the objective existence of value in a bubrene Being. Noyce's argument, that God is the Being necessary to make ideas true or false, closely approximates the nature of such arguments.(71) If truth be objective, then it must be explained by a Supreme Being of some sort. This argument confilms our bellef in the objectivity of truth. But this does not volidate to de'. further conclusion, that God is the backute ll-Inclusive eing. Such a concept is derived from a one-sided intermetation of the knowing process. This further conclusion fails to leave one satisfied with the way in thich it returns to exclusion its

71. See the following discussion of Norce's moral argument.



empirical basis.


My concept of God is different and yet not so different. In brief, He is the Supreme Person, the orld-ground, the Cause and Sustainer of all that is. Furthermore, it is he the makes ideas true or false, but it is unnecessary to conclude that he is an absolute being in the Porcean sense.

A further point thick may be urged grinst both interpretations of this argument is expressed in the question: Now do we know that this argument does not establish the objectivity of error rather than truth? This is a nutzling question. On the basis of this single argument there is no ans er. To be consistent it nust be concluded that this argument merely establishes the fact of a Supreme Deing. This exact nature must be determined on the basis of other facts. ovever, that is possible on the basis of other facts.

MOR L J'GU! MT

In discussing the mor 1 life PA ce finds the supreme moral principle to be loyalty to loyalty.(72) This is deducible from the moral life of human persons. But to talk of a moral life without relating man to his place in the real universe opens any theory to serious objections.(73) It is in his efforts to show the metaphysical basis of the principle of loylty that Royce presents his moral argument.

> 72. IL, 201. 73. Ibid., 301.




low lty is rervice of clures ind cluses link human lives into the unity of one life.(74) Therefore, if the for 1 principle of low lty has any basis, human lives can be linked in some require spiritual unity. This essentially is the prgument in brief. The question now is: Is such unity of ect?(75) That it is, is videnced by the fact that if an were not linked by genuine spiritual ties he would not remain loyal. The very fact of loyalty implies the spiritual life. It is also evidenced by the fact that a loyal man gets good by believing his cause has real existence outside of his private self. "The loyal min's good is estentially in inticipation of good that he remarks is not his own, but as existent in the cluse."(76)

> and if is loy ltw is i deed ell founded, there must be unities of spiritual life in the niver e such that no one an ever, by himself, experiences these unities a facts of is orn consciousness... Is spiritual unity of life, high transcends the individual experience of the real, must be real. For loy lty, as we have seen, is a service of cruses that, from the hum noting of view, one r uperpersonal.(77)

If this be right, the real goodness of the eurities is never completely minifested to invione or a group of men. "Such goodness, then, if completely experienced at 11, must be experienced upon some higher level of consciousness than only one human being ever reaches."(78)

PL, 301.
 Loc. cit.
 Ibid., 308.
 Ibid., 309.
 Ibid., 310.




Thus it is that unit is a fact and that it must be based upon the unity of the spiritual life which transcends the individual experience of any man. But how can one be sure of this transcendent spiritual unity? To establish this certainty Royce identifies loyalty with truth seeking; "Truth speking and loyalty are therefore essentially the same process of life merely viewed in two different aspects."(79) His problem is now to establish the objectivity of truth. To do this he shows the inadequacy of pragmatism as a theory of truth and continues to establish the objectivity of truth through the consideration of error. This consideration reveals that if our iders are false they are false because there exists that real state of facts which determines our ideas as true or false false.(30)

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This argument is the ost cogent and consistent of the Roycean arguments. Royce here shows that the nature of the moral life implies a unity which lies beyond the experience of any man or group. He here points out the evidence for the objectivity of the moral life in finite experience. That these evidences do point to a unity which does go beyond finite experience is an accentable point. But beyond the practical evidence he advances his unique argument from the possibility of error as a powerful theoretical argument for the objectivity


79. PL, 314.80. Ibid1, 342.



of morals.

As pointed out in de line with this argument from error, it does point to the objectivity of truth. Perhaps some would object to Royce's identification of loyalty with truth, of mor lity with truth. Here perhaps lies a point for controversy and possible destruction of this particular argument. However we hold with Royce that the one is but the other in a different aspect. If morality is anything it is true and of value. If truth is anything it is of moral worth. And if anything be of value, is it not morality and truth? Agreement on this point does not commit one to his further conslusions .

In substantiating his argument by the argument from the possibility of error, Royce gives the argument from morals a unique expression. His critics must deal with this further theoretical ground for the objectivity of morals. Philosophers dealing with the problems and history of philosophy generally fail to mention Royce's moral argument for the existence of God. Why this is so is not all results and the moral conspicuous place among the many expressions of the moral argument.



ROYCE'S CONCEPT OF THE CHARACTER OF GOD

In portraying the character of the God established by his arguments, Royce deduces necessary attributes from the established hypothesis. The exposition of this paper considers each attribute separately, showing how Royce considers it a necessary concept. The foundational arguments are of little concern in this section of the thesis. Except to note inconsistencies or agreement between argument and conclusion, they are not considered.

Omniscience.

The all important divine attribute is omniscience, which Royce seeks to establish as necessary to his concept of being. If God can be shown to be an omniscient being, his character would involve as a consequence other attributes "that we could at pleasure express under other names."(81)

Omniscience means the possession "to the full all logically possible knowledge, insight, wisdom."(82) This divine attribute is established in the consideration of the nature of a being sufficient to explain all finite ideas. As finite knowers and objects known were considered, it was found that

> 81. COG, 8. 82. Ibid., 7.

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for both to be involved in an act of knowledge under finite limitations it was necessary for both to be included in a third being whose knowledge included both. There is possible an infinite number of knowers, an infinite number of objects, and an even greater number of possibilities. To include all of these the necessary being must possess all logically possible knowledge, Absolute Thought, And as all possible ideas must be experienced and judged by the third being, he is Absolute Experience. In so far as this necessary being is Absolute Thought and Absolute Experience, he is an Omniscient Being.

Criticism.

With this interpretation of omniscience Royce ends in epistemological monism. This is clear as it is remembered that to be true or false an idea must be included, with its object, in the Mind of God. Epistemological monism is not untenable. And Royce's conclusion is consistent with his system. But it raises many difficult problems which epistemological dualism avoids.(83) Most notable among these is the problem of evil and the problem of finite knowledge. Royce avoids much criticism in maintaining the finite duality of subject and object. But finite duality is man's because of his incomplete and fragmentary nature. In reality the finite idea and object of that idea are one. It appears to man as "other" because of his finitude.

83. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 74 f.

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Royce attains fundamental unity but he does so at the expense of finite experience. Finite experience becomes illusory.

Unity.

Omniscience implies unity. As all knowers and objects known exist in actual or possible relations to each other, then all must be present to a single unity of consciousness.

Criticism.

That God is one is an acceptable point. But unity can be obtained on a basis more true to experience. The Roycean God is one because he is everything, quantitatively and qualitatevely. This concept is difficult to understand. If finite experience be real, then it must be real just as experienced. This being so, then it must exist in relation to the worldground in a manner that does not deny its reality or trustworthiness. To make man a part of God is to deny his experience of independence. In granting Royce this type of monism one faces the problem of reconciling man's experience with God's experience. At this point, also, the Roycean concept is not consistent with finite experience.

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Eternality.

The Divine attribute of eternality is derived by a consideration of our temporal experience. The real world is a temporal order.(84) In fact no other than a temporal meaning is in any way definable for our consciousness.(85) This being the case, the real world is a temporal series of events. For man this temporal series is capable of infinite divisibility. But this temporal world regarded in its wholeness is an eternal order. Which means that the whole content of this temporal order is at once consciously experienced as a whole by the Absolute.(86)

> Our view declares that all the life of the world, and therefore all temporal sequences are present at once to the absolute.(87)

As the individual views the events of the temporal order, they are divided with reference to his point of view into "what <u>now</u> is, and <u>what no longer is</u>, and <u>what is to be</u>, but <u>is not yet</u>."(88) However these same events are for the Absolute all equally present. And presence in this sense is what is meant by the eternal order of the world.

84. WI(1), 134.85. Ibid., 136.

- 86. Ibid., 138.
- 87. Ibid., 140.
- 88. Ibid., 141.

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Eternal, since it is inclusive of all distinctions of temporal past and temporal future, -- eternal, since, for this very reason, the totality of temporal events thus present at once to the Absolute has no events that precede, or that follow it, but contains all sequences within it, -- eternal, finally, because this view of the world does not, like our partial glimpses of this or of that relative whole of sequence, pass away and give place to some other view, but includes an observation of every passing away, of every sequence, of every event and of whatever in time succeeds and follows that event, and includes all the views that are taken by the various finite Selves.(89)

Criticism.

As Royce's Absolute includes all time sequences which for us are past and future as well as present, his concept implies divine foreknowledge. If foreknowledge be a fact, then all future events are determined, even the choices which man will make. Thus the reality of man's freedom disappears. And if finite freedom be mere appearance, then the goodness of God becomes questionable.(90)

Absolute Will.

So far, God is merely a passive being, knowing and experiencing all. To be an active creator he must will. But what is will and how is God able to will? Viewing the power to will in finite beings, analysis reveals that it involves the

90. The same criticism can be made against traditional theism.

^{89.} WI(1), 141.

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preference of some datum attended to over against other data that remain. It is then the act of attending to a datum to the exclusion of others.(91) But how can God do this?

As previously stated, the Absolute is a unified being. Its contents form one moment. Its unity is the unity of a single instant. It neither requires nor permits a beyond.(92) Yet the very nature of the thinking act involves the thinking of unrealized possibilities. Here is the problem. How can the system be a unified system, a whole, in the face of unrealized possibilities? The answer comes as the element of Divine Will is added which in operation, realizing that the absolute system of ideas is fulfilled in this world, says:

> "...'There shall be no world but this,' i.e. no other case of fulfilment; and therefore other abstractly possible fulfilments remain not genuinely possible." It is this aspect of the ultimate situation which defines the world as a Whole, and which, without introducing an external cause, or a mere force, does as it were colour the whole unity of the Absolute Consciousness with a new character, namely, the character of Will.(93)

Criticism.

The addition of this voluntaristic element is found more in his later works. Thilly suggests that it was the result

91. COG, 192.
 92. Ibid., 210.
 93. Ibid., 212.

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of the nature of the problems he was dealing with and partly in order to escape the criticism of exaggerating the intellectualistic element.(94)

In order to account for the particular unity of this world, Royce introduces the element of will. Absolute Will determined that the Absolute Being choose this world to the exclusion of all other possibilities. This world was chosen because it best fulfilled the purposes of the Absolute. Why it does this must remain a mystery. This makes us question the moral nature of the Absolute. This world appears to be very imperfect for God's purposes as we can know them. And our knowledge of those purposes reveals them as morally good. If this world best suits the Absolute's purposes then his purposes must be other than good, for a world is conceivable which excludes the active influence of evil, making goodness a greater possibility. If the Absolute chose this world as the best, among other purposes, for moral purposes, then finite experience of morals and their ends must view God as finite, for the moral life seeks to eliminate a great deal that is too much a part of our world.

This world, as known to finite beings, does not fulfill

94. Thilly, HP, 561. Howison criticizes Royce for this decidely intellectualistic interpretation. Cf. COG, 81-132.

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God's known purposes. Much of the world might be overcome to realize a better possible world. Surely the Roycean God knew the best possible world and that this world was not the best possible. Why did not God choose that possibility toward which finite beings are striving?

Divine Love.

The fact that the Absolute Will wills that there shall be no other world than this leads to the attribute of Divine Love. As will is the aspect of selective attention in consciousness, love is the affection of consciousness which involves selection of content as valuable. Love in finite being is preferred by virtue of characters that remain undefinable. To the loving consciousness no other object could fill the place of the beloved object. Love in the Absolute consciousness exemplifies this generalized definition of love.(95) This world has value for the Absolute as no other world would have. The inexplicable aspect of Divine Love is "why some other world, with a different sequence of data, might not fulfill, just as well, the same ideas". (96) It is Divine Will and Divine Love that constitutes the individuating process of Absolute Being. By Divine Will the individual becomes an individual because he

95. COG, 215.
 96. Loc. cit.

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becomes the object of an exclusive interest.(97) Divine Love renders individuality intelligible, as the fulfilment of the very exclusiveness of love.(98)

Criticism.

The addition of Divine Love to the character of God, in this sense, adds little. As the affection of consciousness which involves selection of content as valuable, the attribute of love causes the Absolute to select this world as its object. But this world is not an object for the Absolute. It is the Absolute himself. Is it possible for God to love himself? If God selected this world as that one which best expressed his ideas, as the object of his selection, how could it be a part of his being? The selected world can in no way be a part of God.

This world has value for the Absolute as no other world would have. Is this world, then, final? Can it not change? Does this world embody the complete purpose of God? If so it follows that God is a capricious moral agent, good at one time and evil at another. If it be said that evil, is not really evil, that in the sight of the Absolute it appears as part of divine plan, then the Absolute attains perfection at our expense. Furthermore, love in finite beings exists between two distinct

> 97. COG, 258. 98. Ibid., 266.

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persons dependent upon a common source. How can the Absolute express this character of love as there is no object other than himself for him to love? Royce's interpretation of Divine Love does, if his absolute be accepted, offer an explanation of finite individuality. This interpretation stands or falls with this system.

Morality.

Absolute Being is morally good. As God must judge all desires of finite being, so must the desire and the possessor be included in a higher thought which actually possesses the desired good thing. Above every desire there exists the satisfaction of the desire in the higher thought.(99) Royce concludes:

> The world then, as a whole, is and must be absolutely good, since the infinite thought must know what is desirable, and knowing it, must have present in itself the true objects of desire.(100)

Criticism.

Though Royce's moral argument is valid, this further development of divine character is unacceptable. Any theory of being which is identified with God must explain in a consistent way the fact of evil as finite beings experience it.

For the metaphysical monist the fact of evil is a real problem. If God be all, how explain the fact of evil in a

99. RAP, 444. 100. Loc. cit.

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consistent way with his goodness. The monist has several ways of disposing of this problem. He can first of all deny the existence of evil. This method Royce finds unacceptable. Finite experience affirms the reality of evil. (101) Viewing evil as caused by Divine Being, there is but one course open. And that is to affirm the necessary and constitutive aspect of evil in the moral life. There are two methods of accounting for this "necessary and constitutive aspect of evil." One is to account for it as the conditions of the moral life so willed by God. The other is to account for it as a condition forced even upon God. The question is: Which makes for a more coherent interpretation of God as a good God? The first of these is the path of the Absolutist, for to affirm the second would be to deny the complete unity which the Absolutist seeks. However, the second path offers the most coherent explanation of the fact of evil and the goodness of God.

In explaining the metaphysical significance of finite experience of evil, Royce finds that it has its place in the life of Divine Being. As we are one with God, part of his life, our suffering is his suffering.

> Here is the first truth: when you suffer, your sufferings are God's sufferings, not his external work, not his external penalty, not the fruit of his neglect, but identically his own personal woe.(102)

101. SGE, 17 f. 102. Ibid., 14.

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But the real problem is found in asking why man and God must suffer. Royce finds:

The sole possible, necessary, and sufficient answer is, because without suffering, without ill, without woe, evil, tragedy, God's life could not be perfected.(103)

In the explanation of how existent evil should be treated, this is acceptable. But as an explanation of the existence of evil, it is very unsatisfying. Why is it necessary that perfection of God's Being involves the overcoming of evil?

The Absolutist finds evil to be the method of God's perfection.(104) Thus evil as we experience it is due to the will of God. But this interpretation reflects upon the goodness of God, for evil is very undesirable to finite beings. To meet this point, Royce finds that evil is in the end but a part of a greater good. In God's plan it serves to bring about the good. So in God's understanding, what is seen as evil is but an aspect of the good.(105)

This is a very unsatisfying interpretation of finite experience. Evil is very real and the antithesis of the good, though good can be realized from evil. If God suffers in our suffering, he must experience evil in much the same way as we, otherwise our experience is not His experience. If God ex-

SGE, 14
 Loc. cit.
 RAP, 451.

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periences evil as but an aspect of a larger good, then he becomes perfect at our expense, for we fail to realize this greater significance of evil. God surely could not suffer in our suffering if he experienced it as a part of goodness. That would be hypocrisy. But if He does, how can we reconcile the finite point of view with the Absolute point of view?

Royce's interpretation is consistent with his concept of Absolute Being. But it seems more consistent with finite experience to find evil as a necessary condition not due to the Will of God, but forced upon him by the nature of His being.(106) Such an interpretation gives us a real necessity for evil, gives it a reality that our experience reveals it to have, and avoids any reflection on the moral character of God. Relative to the thought leading to the attribute, it is to be noted that the same method can be used with as much authority to show that God is an evil being. "The world then, is a whole, is and must be absolutely evil since the infinite thought must know what is undesirable, and knowing it, must have present in itself the true objects not to be desired."

Personality.

The attribute of personality is established in Royce's argument from personality. He finds that our finite self-

106. For that which we believe the most consistent interpretation of this view see Brightman, PG and FG.

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consciousness logically implies the existence of one true Person. This is clear as one considers one's own self and thought in reference to a world of objects. In order for our fragmentary selves to be the self of this moment or the being who thinks about this world of objects, they "must be organically related to a true and reflective Person whom your finite consciousness logically implies."

The character of personality is also implied in the unity of Absolute Being. If God is the All-Knower, then it is necessary that he be one. If he is one, it must be unity in the self-consciousness of an All-Knower, and because he is selfconscious he is also a Person.

Criticism.

As the argument from the meaning of ideas led primarily to the concept of an omniscient being, thus eventuating in epistemological monism, the argument from personality results in the view that there is but one being -- metaphysical monism. Among monists there is possible a distinction relative to the nature of the final monism. If the monism is in terms of quantity, the label is Quantitative Monism. If the monism is in terms of like quality, the label is Qualitative Monism. Royce affirms both these types of monism. His Absolute Being is quantitatively and qualitatively One.

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The one great danger in any form of monism is the loss of individual selves in the One being. It becomes the problem of the one and many. In Royce's system the importance and place of the One is clear, but the exact meaning of the many is doubtful. The main criticism of this point, in the main, is that Royce fails to explain selfhood consistent with finite experience of it.

That Royce fully intended this Absolute Unity is evidenced by the general trend of his thinking and his many explicit statements to that end.(107) For him the final unity of all life is found in the concept of an All-Inclusive conscious Person. This, he considers, the logical outcome of his investigation.

But, relative to finite selves, what are the conditions upon which this unity is established? Consideration of the knowing process revealed that everything must exist in and for an Absolute Mind. Thus he established his unity. Material things are not material but states of the Absolute consciousness. Finite selves become but active phases of Divine Thought. As Johnson points out, it is difficult to reconcile these assumptions with experience.(108) But if such assumptions be accepted, his conclusion follows.

107. CF. WI(I), 341, 394, 401, 424, and SMP, 307.108. Johnson, JRPR, 185.

Johnson points out that in his epistemological and metaphysical monism Royce surrenders the identity of the human self. This is plain in his metaphysical monism as he insists that finite selves are but parts of the Absolute Self. It is not so plain in his epistemological monism for on the human plane he insists on the dualistic nature of the knowing act. However, as previously stated, this dualism is only in appearance. In reality such is not the case for in Absolute Mind both subject and object exist. Finite epistemological dualism is lost in Infinite epistemological monism. "He saves the unity of the World-Self by at last denying the ultimate distinctness and self-identity of finite selves."(109) That this is the case is shown as Royce states:

> And the true Self is inclusive of the whole world of objects. Or, in other words, the result is, that there is and can be but one complete Self, and that all finite selves, and their objects, are organically related to this Self, are moments of its completeness, thoughts in its thought, and, as I should add, Wills in its Will, Individual elements in the life of the Absolute Individual.(110)

In establishing the organic unity of the Absolute at the expense of finite selfhood, Royce denies many empirical data which are more certain than Absolute unity.(111) Selfconsciousness as we experience it is ours, and ours as independent individuals, not as parts of a whole. The individual

- 109. Johnson, JRPR, 197.
- 110. SGE, 146.,
- 111. Johnson, JRPR, 198.

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experiences wholeness which resists all fusion into a larger whole. Royce in the end denies self-consciousness as the experience of an independent individual. If our experience be so untrustworthy, how can it be trusted in any case as a starting point?

The conclusion that God is a person under such circumstances is to destroy the whole meaning of personality as experienced by finite beings. An essential to personality is that there shall be interaction with other persons. Where is this possible in a system which finds only one true Person?

If all find their being in the one Self, wherein lies the necessity for a finite moral life? In the end perfection will be the lot of this One Self, and finite selves, good or bad, will share equally as parts in this Self. And if selves are not real selves, how can God be an ethical being? Is he not perfecting his own being at our expense?(112)

And finally, in the reduction of all to one Self Royce denies his social metaphysic.(113) A social universe with one person is impossible. Society can only mean a number of persons. This empirical fact is denied or at least explained away.

112. Johnson, JRPR, 199.
 113. Loc. cit.

These criticisms are invalidated if Royce's interpretation is held to allow for finite selfhood. But in denying metaphysical and epistemological distinctness to finite selves, he denies the evidence for pluralism. Consequently this interpretation does not satisfy finite experience. The resultant status of the finite self is perhaps true to his system, but not to the empirical basis.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF GOD IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT L. CALHOUN

METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

Calhoun, as Royce, begins with experience and arrives at the point which demands the concept of God as the most rational explanation of experience. Royce, using the empirical basis as a starting point, soon moved into the speculative field but Calhoun remains throughout close to the empirical basis. In the end it is this same basic fact which demands the concept of God. Royce's method differs in that logical necessity comes from implications which grow out of a consideration of the base. Calhoun purposely holds himself to experience, as he has little interest in speculative theory.(114) His primary aim in presenting his work keeps him from the speculative field.

However, as one deals with that which is beyond immediate knowledge, he necessarily engages in speculation. This is true of Calhoun as he establishes his belief in God and formulates his concept of God's character. The world of fact is ours by practical considerations; it is explained theoretically. In attempting an explanation Calhoun's methods are analogy, analysis, and synthesis. His use of these becomes

of God is necessarily speculative. From this section on, the author is assumed to be Calhoun unless otherwise stated.

clear as he states:

It [analogy] involves the concrete conscious use of one vividly realized part of experience to illuminate another, ... Analysis and synthesis ..., less artistic and more critical procedures; the one employed to purge out ... such irrelevant and incongruous factors ...; the other -- synthesis -- employed to amplify the picture in systematic, coherent fashion, ...(115)

To summarize: Calhoun finds by a practical examination of man a world of facts which is best explained by the concept of God. As this world of fact reveals God, then it is theoretically sound to interpret his being according to the nature of these facts. Vividly realized experiences illuminate the idea of God, such illumination guided by analysis and synthesis.

FIELD OF INVESTIGATION

General field: Everyday human behavior and its total objective setting.

To be valid the method of analogy must start with a factual field from which analogies can be drawn. Investigation of the unknown must start from a basis in the known. Calhoun finds this known field to be human experience. But not all human experience is understandable. There are many divergent views on common experiences. Just where then, asks Calhoun, shall one begin? We can't let the experts chart our course, for the experts are having their own difficulties. "The stars covered, the horizon obscured, where now shall we find a base

115. GCL, 179.

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line from which to reckon?"(116)

Calhoun considers the minds of men, but finds that they diverge widely; nature, but nature says so little regarding the values which vitally concern us; God, but God is today nothing more than a well-meant anachronism. He concludes that the base line should be everyday human behavior in its total objective setting.(117) This, above all, is plain fact. Human behavior is common experience as men live day by day in a common life. Calhoun's starting point is thus common ground to all.

Specific starting point: The day's work as vocation.

Within the general field the most common starting point must be found. Calhoun finds that to seek in the everyday life of plain people for intimations of God should suggest at once beginning with the day's work and the yearly round. "For it was there primarily," says Calhoun, "that among much simpler folk religion was grounded."(118) So his discussion begins with a consideration of the day's work as vocation. To do needful work, then; to lose oneself and find oneself therein; to participate thus in a common task and a shared life: this, and the summons to it, we shall mean by vocation. In vocation Calhoun finds the base and root for the religion of the rank and file.(119)

116. GCL, 179.
117. Ibid., viii.
118. Ibid., 12.
119. Ibid., 74.

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
CLASSIFICATION OF ARGUMENT

Calhoun professes to be presenting what he calls Religious Realism, following the more general approach of that school known as Critical Realism. This self-classification reveals his general philosophical position, but tells little about the nature of his argument for God. Wieman and Meland classify Calhoun's approach as that of an evolutionary theist with roots in naturalism.(120) Their classification is based upon the field from which Calhoun draws his facts which eventuate in belief in God.

Further classification in regard to this specific argument is possible from a consideration of these facts. They are drawn from the physical universe as the common man sees it. This justifies calling him an evolutionary theist, for the major fact revealed by the universe is the gradual emergence of higher forms, the highest of which is man. But these facts reveal a purpose which cannot be attributed to man and which has not simply been read into them. Calhoun thus stresses the teleological nature of the universe. And it is this fact which makes it reasonable for him to conclude that the power behind the world is a Sovereign Mind. The nature of the considerations of this argument mark it as an expression of the physico-teleological form.

As man is the highest expression of the evolutionary process, it is he who furnishes clues to the nature of reality.

120. Wieman and Meland, APR, 221 f.



The common activity of man is work, vocation. And investigation therein is, for Calhoun, the logical starting point. Calhoun's consideration of the evolutionary process is the basis of his argument for God; theorizing about vocation is the basis for his concept of the character of God.

ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE


To reason about God as existing in actuality, and not merely in idea or in experience, one must argue from actually observed consequent to sufficient ground.(121)

In other words the common life of observable fact as interpreted by reason furnishes the starting point. This life furnishes us facts for which sufficient ground is found in the concept of God as Sovereign Mind. A survey makes his position more coherent.

Beginning the construction of the world picture by considering human experience in its total objective setting and finding therein the day's work of specific importance, Calhoun comes upon active minds. That brings up the question of minds and their place in the world. In considering this question, Calhoun builds a world picture of observed consequents.

The actual observed consequents are: (a) the unfinished universe consisting of physical events, living organisms, minds, and forms or pure possibilities in which we observe characteristic marks of organization without complete fixity, and intricate order maintained in and throughout fluent variety;

121. GCL, 145.



and (b) man as emergent, animal world-child, critic, creator, worshiper, and clue to the nature of the universe.

The unfinished universe.

The phrase "an unfinished universe" brings up two ideas: phenomenal flux; and order, pattern, or law. These are so exemplified in the universe that it seems at the same time to be perpetual incompleteness and partly ordered becoming. (122) In physical events we find fluidity as well as rigidity. In the physical world we see marks of organization, of intricate order in fluent variety. (123)

Turning to the order of living things Calhoun finds the same problems in increased complexity.

A living organism, to repeat a phrase used earlier, is a complex whirlpool in which detailed content perpetually changes, yet approximately stable patterns persist. (124)

A mammal in its anatomical organization is unified or integrated in at least four important ways: by a jointed skeletal system; a circulatory system; a neural system; and an enclosing envelope of skin and other surface membranes. An organism unified anatomically exhibits corresponding unification in its more fluid and shifting behavior: metabolism, in which is found the prolonged maintenance of characteristic form; reproduction; and in function of that called mind. Asking how such stable fluidities

122. GCL, 148.
 123. Ibid., 159.
 124. Loc. cit. =

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as the more complex organisms were produced, the answer given is: by evolution from simpler organisms. But that, in the end, is to say that for the production of adaptive organisms, adaptive organisms are required. "Emergent evolution" is merely the restatement of the problem, not the solution.

Confronting the flux of minds and their activities they are found to be at once products in some sense and participants in the evolutionary process.(125) ...hen living organisms appear and follow the phenomena of differentiation and integration, minds emerge and develop. Minds develop not in isolation but in social contexts and these also have their place among the products of evolution. Man's social organizations as well as man as an individual displays more complex variability in behavior than other living organisms. Here the line is crossed from biology into history, and again the inadequacy of the term "evolution" is apparent.

So minds, able to think, to learn, to build, to destroy and build again, emerge somehow, "and it is they that now pour scorn upon themselves and their achievements."(126) But that does not undo the world that brought human minds to birth. Concluding Calhoun says:

> 125. GCL, 139. 126. Ibid., 143.

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
The answer which seems to me least incredible of the answers so far proposed is the familiar one which Plato wrote into the Sophist, the Philebus, and the last book of the Laws: That Mind in significant measure such as we have sought to describe is among the first principles of the universe; not merely a product of evolution but one of its primary grounds. (127)

Calhoun now turns from the actual world to an elusive realm of possibilities, "which are never, as such, actual and which seem not likely ever to be completely exemplified in actual events, things, or persons." (1.8) Form or pure possibility, he finds, is in short:

> every verbal or other symbolic expression whose meaning is anything else than a particular event, thing, person, or other actual entity as particular and actual. (129)

With formal possibilities are numbered also ideals or unactualized values. The distinctive note of ideals is their claim to represent various aspects of the good as ultimate goal of thought and action, thereby serving as criteria for both these aspects of behavior. But here enters the inescapable human equation which is an ever-present source of probable error. (130)

127. GCL, 144.
 128. Ibid., 165.
 129. Ibid., 166.
 130. Ibid., 168.



Man.

Coming upon man as an animal engaged in mental behavior by following the line of actual events through physical and organic processes, and gain by following the lines of interconnectedness among forms, or structural and ideal essences, he is present as an unideal and disturbing participant. As a product of the world processes man is an animal, a world-child. (131) "He is a body-mind hierarchy in which each of the main sorts of processes we have discussed is to be found." (132) At all these levels he is intimately interrelated with the actual world of nature. At the same time, "man who is animal and world-child is also critic, creator, and worshiper." (133) These roles can be fulfilled only by one who in some degree stands clear of his immediate environment and reacts upon it autonomously. Critical judgment is the primary function of these three. It involves the partial emancipation from the immediate present that is basic to all behavior. Mental behavior may be regarded as the medium for the directed and purposeful actualizing of imaginatively apprehended possibilities and values. (134) Man can turn this capacity for critical judgment upon himself and his work. Often he finds himself and his work inadequate.

GCL, 169.
 Loc. cit.
 I33. Ibid., 170.
 I34. Ibid., 171.

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Man's comparison of self with some greater good is frequently a primary factor in the complex experience of worship.


In a wider consideration of this last statement, Calhoun finds that man must be brought into just perspective as the most directly accessible clue to the universe, and the one with which every speculative theory must set out. (135) To gain through man insight into the nature of reality, it is necessary to combine the detailed insights and information accumulated through the process of learning and the sagacity of a mind open to all that is significant in each situation. (136)

Sufficient ground.

These several observable facts comprise for Calhoun the world-picture. The problem now is to find an explanation that offers sufficient ground for the observed consequents. In considering this picture of an unfinished world, showing some of characteristics of organization without complete fixity and of intricate order in and through fluent variety, he says:

> Our concern as theologians here is two-fold: to enquire on what terms, if at all, this total worldpicture may be held together in such fashion as not to violate our sober judgment as to what seems reasonable; and to discover whether in such n inquiry, there may come to light reenforcement for belief in.

135. GCL. 172.136. Ibid., 173.



and wars of thinking about a Being at once real enough, great enough, and good enough to be called God. (137)

In attempting this Calhoun considers the four live hypotheses which are offered to explain the array of facts in the world-picture: chance combination; natural law; guidance by some unconscious but quasi-purposive force; and Mind. He finds Mind the most rational explanation of the world-picture. The bewildering array of facts found in the world are unexplainable by any irrational factor. There is in the worldpicture intelligible order which has not been read into it and which cannot be accounted for as the outcome of known non-mental processes. Following Leibniz he finds the world as perceptible and intelligible, perceptibility and intelligibility necessitate the existence and activit of a Being sufficient to account for t eir presence. A Being sufficient in explanation is found in the concept of God as Sovereign Mind.

Thus by a consideration of man's world which reveals intelligible order not read into it and which cannot be accounted for as the outcome of non-mental processes, Calhoun concludes that the sufficient ground for explanation lies in the concept of God.

137. GCL. 174


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CRITICISM OF THE PHYSICO-TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

This line of argument is but a minor part of an appeal presented by the author. The main concern of his book is an appeal for the religious motive to dominate in the everday common life of man. It justifies this appeal (the argument is found in this justification) and proceeds to point the way to such a life. It is an admirable point and an emohasis greatly needed. Religion is too often merely "Sunday religion." If there be any truth in religious belief, the divorce of religion from the common life has no justifiable ground. But this emphasis is not up for consideration. Expressed purposes limit this study to a critical evaluation of Calhoun's argument for God.

There is much that is valid in this argument as Calhoun presents it. Conviction of the actuality of God is established by the rationality of the universe, the emergence of novelties in the evolutionary process, and the fact of personality. Though these facts by no means exhaust the many evidences for God, they are of the most significant. And these are found in Calhoun's line of argument. His entire consideration of the universe reveals rationality, purpose, and evidence of mind at work. The emergence of novelties is accounted for, in the most rational way, by belief in God. And man, the highest expression of the universe, leads to God. For these reasons the argument



is acceptable.

But to present this argument as the only line of evidence for belief in God is not exhaustive. Doubtless Calhoun's purposes limit him to a presentation of those which are the most convincing to his own thinking. In general, there is much objection to a method which seeks objectivity for a religious faith and wholly neglects that faith. Calhoun establishes his belief upon considerations which do not deal directly with that belief. Such procedure is not to be wholly condemned. The point is that it is difficult to understand why the author neglected the very thing he was seeking to justify. Has religion no validity of its own? Can it not itself reveal processes which establish its objectivity? It is true that the common man is seemingly the result of purposeful forces, but what about those purposeful forces which are immanent in his being? Calhoun falls short, at least of thoroughness, in his consideration of the common life.

Wieman and Meland classify Calhoun's approach to God as a brilliant contribution to his group.(138) They refer to the idea that belief in God comes from deeper levels, "from something that is deeper than thinking."(154) But neither they nor Calhoun gives us any hint as to what this something is. Of what use is

138. Wieman and Meland, APR, 221.

139. Loc. cit.

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this mysterious approach? Any approach must be present to the conscious life of man, otherwise it is of no significance. And present to the conscious life of man means present to the thought of man. Our very nature makes thought the includer of all. Calhoun makes no use of this approach in his work.

CALHOUN'S CONCEPT OF THE CHARACTER OF GOD

The outcome of his considerations leads Calhoun to conclude that God is "Creator-Redeemer: Living Mind at work."(140) How can a Living Mind at work be thought of? As man is the highest expression of God's purposes, we can survey his activity as living mind and reasonably assume that God acts in some analagous manner.

Analogy.

Calhoun draws his analogy from his own life, from its relations with his own life experience. He considers not merely his body but his whole career. Every event that is a part of his life in every moment, day, or year, that he lives. He is the sensitive core of his living, yet not merely the core of it. He permeates it all and reaches beyond it in all sorts of ways. He influences things and people and is influenced by them. He considers distant ends as well as the present. His self is nourished among other selves, things, and happenings. His life

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is a field of force patterned, active, influencing, and influenced by things and other such fields of force. Liwing is never well done, but always incomplete and faulty. Ignorance, laziness and cowardice keep one from doing all that he can. There are conditions given over which man has little or no control.(141) But some form of good emerges for all that, and one finds himself in the midst of it. With this characterization of the activity of human mind, let us see how the mind of God can function in an analogous manner.

Omniscience.

Now suppose, says Calhoun, the inclusive field of spacetime to be the whole vehicle of one Mind. A field in which Mind is present and operative everywhere at many diverse levels. How can one think of such Mind as resident through, active within, and transcendent beyond the space-time order? Starting with analogy and proceeding by way of critical analysis and synthesis, Calhoun enters the speculative realm which deals with his working conviction that God is Sovereign Mind.(142)

Considering God as Omniscient Knower, Calhoun finds restrictions of at least four sorts that beset human minds but do not apply to God.(143) First, limitations that hamper everyone

- 142. GCL, 183.
- 143. Loc. cit.

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^{141.} Analogy from this point could find a "given" in Gods being. This suggests a finite God.

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who is bound to a particular location. For human observers there is a fixed time cone which delimits the entire range of events, past, present, and future. This does not hold concerning God. If he is omnipresent throughout the world, no events transpiring within the world are hidden from Him.(144)

Second, those limitations imposed upon finite man by his sense organs. Sensory knowledge of the outside world is fragmentary. Man receives sensory stimulations of light, sound, color, and smell from objects external to him. But God is not dependent upon such confining sensory organs. To an omnipresent God those objects which are external to man are internal to Him. "The very field in which the events transpired would itself be for God, ..., a 'boundless uniform sensorium' or vehicle for immediate apprehension of such events."(145)

Third, God has an infinite time-span of apprehension as regards all events which have transpired.(146) Human minds retain somehow the impressions of past events, taking them up into habit patterns. But the real time-span man can conclude in a single pulse of awareness, the specious present, is very meagre. He can at times, by intense concentration or by using signs to

144. GCL, 183.

145. Ibid., 184.

146. Calhoun's concept of the time-span is like Royce's except that it does not include the future. Cf. WI(2), 132.

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stand for huge aggregates, increase the range of his specious present. But man can by no means grasp in a moment the whole concrete coherence of things past. But God can do just that. God has before Him in a single infinite time-span all the events which have come to be and are coming to be.(147) In this way Calhoun affirms the eternality of God.

> When we spoke of His freedom from limitation in space-time, we affirmed His omnipresence. When we speak now of His apprehension as encompassing all that has transpired and is transpiring in an infinite time-span, we affirm His eternality.(148)

Fourth, the omnipresence and eternality of God in respect to events past and present implies not merely presence in and continuous through, but transcendence beyond all that has yet come to be. Events transpire for God but He sees more than the events and their forms. "He sees also all the great families of timeless forms in their main trunks and branches." (149) These ramify out endlessly beyond all that has been, is, and will be, through all that may or might be, and the implications of all of these. But to say that God is conscious of all this endless infinite, or that it is within Himself, is meaningless. The multitude of forms is not completely manageable by mind. (150) God, however, is deter-

147. If God has all before Him in a single infinite timespan, and the time-span be within the mind of God, is not his realistic position difficult? This interpretation implies that all reality is of the nature of mind, idealistic.

- 148. GCL, 186.
- 149. Ibid., 187.
- 150. This also suggests a finite God.

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
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minate in His nature not indefinite, so He has present in His Being a vast range of possibilities not yet expressed in what has come to pass, including many that will never be so exemplified. And He is conscious of such possibilities from moment to moment of real duration. Therefore, for God there would be no learning by trial and error, nor being forced to consider unforeseen and startling events, not because He has access through His own transcendent nature to the forms of all and at every point the forms that are the most revelant. God is Himself the dominant power in bringing events to pass.(151) For these reasons Calhoun holds God's knowing to be incompatible with man's in at least four ways. Hence he thinks of God as omniscient.

There are two respects in which there are limitations of God's knowing, analogous to man's. First, if He is determinate in nature, not indefinite or all-inclusive, it will mean, as regards knowing, that He is a Subject occupying a distinct cognitive point of view. Second, God cannot know in full what has not come to pass.

Actual happening, the fact of coming to be, makes a difference for God, the same as that fact for man makes a difference in the manner in which a thing can be known. If the stream of events be indeterminate then foreknowledge is not at any point complete.(152)

> 151. GCL, 186. 152. Ibid., 188.



Calhoun finds that neither of these limitations involves any deficiency in God. Omnioresent throughout the world, though not of it nor encompassed within it, God is everywhere near. Every physical event that transpires is in principle knowable by Him, but not all receive His attention. "A definite cognitive point of view implies selection among data which in principle are all knowable."(153)

Omnipotence.

Considering next God's omnipotence as Doer he states:

The same two general characters of onnipresence and eternality, or sovereignty with respect to space-time and real duration or world process, which so widely differentiate His knowing from ours, are basic also in His doing.(154)

Basing God's omnipotence as Doer on analogy to human work he recognizes that Divine Mind is unhampered by certain of our disabilities, namely, ignorance, inner conflict, restrictions in space-time, and inferiority to particular finite sources. Ignorance and restrictions in space-time are excluded if God is omniscient. He is free from inner conflict for He has full vision at every juncture of what is good. His natural predilection is fully determined toward the good, which is His permanent goal.

> 153. GCL, 189. 154. Loc. cit.

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However Calhoun does not go so far as to ascribe absolute omnipotence to God. He believes God's power limited. First, by His own nature, God is Perfect Spirit and perfection necessarily involves limitation. As the characters of wisdom, justice, and mercy limit one another, so is God's power limited as His nature involves these characters. God must be true to Himself. There are things which He cannot do because He is God.

> This reciprocal limitation of one divine characteristic by another is what may be better maintained, I think, than what is often called the "self-limitation" of God.(155)

In this view of Divine limitation Calhoun finds God limited not by quasi-artificial restraints voluntarily imposed upon Himself, but by the intrinsic nature of His Being, which cannot act otherwise than toward the fullest possible realization of good.

Second, God's power as Doer may be thought of as limited by various factors not within Himself.(156) Calhoun calls these rigidities. They are not to be regarded as evil. They contribute in some way to productive work. The hindrances they impose bring about evil as well as good.(157) Among these factors called rigidities are: certain forms or characters incompatible with certain others; a class intrinsic to various modes of extension, in space or time or both; and a class called by the name, inertia, the tendency to follow the line of least resistance. These con-

155. GCL, 193. With this I must agree.

156. There is a similarity here with Brightman's theory of "The Given" in God. Cf. PG and FG.

157. The existence of these rigidities is not explained.

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tribute conditions for productive work, and through them and their help minds are able to effect results that are good.

> Yet by them also, in diverse ways, its work is hampered and its results vitiated. For God as well as for men, I judge that such hindrances have to be overcome, and that at no actual juncture in the world-process are they completely eliminated.(158)

Third, in considering rigidities of the second and third sorts named, Calhoun finds the factor of flux in the behavior of all concrete things. If flux involves real contigency or indeterminacy then it constitutes another limitation upon God's power. No event is rigorously determined until it has transpired. For Calhoun this reveals "God, and with God chance and contigency."(159) Fourth, contingent upon the view of indeterminacy, finite persons may be regarded as able to oppose their wills and energies to one another and to God.

Thus by analogy Calhoun reveals God to be: a) Omniscient Knower, which characteristic involves omnipresence, eternality, transcendence, and limitation; and b) Omnipotent Doer, limited by His own nature, by various factors within Himself, by indeterminacy in concrete things, and by finite persons.

Ethical.

For Calhoun the goodness of God admits no proof. He affirms this attribute of God, but offers no justification for

158. GCL, 194.

159. Ibid., 195. Calhoun, more so than Royce, makes possible a satisfying concept of finite freedom.


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this conclusion. For him as with Plato, 'God is good, and the author only of good to men.'(160) And this he finds is the crux of religious faith.

> The world is great: that needs no proof. In it the sovereign power is good: this admits no proof. But to affirm it with all one's heart and mind is to believe in God, great beyond our conceiving, yet not too great to be good.(161)

160. GCL, 190.

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


CRITICISM OF CALHOUN'S CONCEPT OF THE CHARACTER OF GOD.

Criticism of Calhoun from the standpoint of our purposes is hardly fair to his purposes. Yet the contribution he makes to our problem as we have extracted it from his work is basic to the main emphasis of his book. Our negative criticisms concern, that which he fails to mention. There are times when it appears that Calhoun deals in conclusions and beliefs rather than in the justification of points of view. There is much that a thorough treatment of this problem would bring in. For example; more than one line of argument for God is necessary, a more exhaustive consideration of the ethical nature of God would have contributed much, and the consistent treatment of the concept of God deals with the problem of evil.

Though Calhoun recognizes the significance of man and from him builds his concept of God by analogy, he neglects the most important fact of this highest revelation, his personality. In such an emphasis on the worth of man, one feels that such neglect is purposive. What more consistent conclusion could result from any analogy from man than that there be a Supreme Person?


Calhoun's treatment of the ethical nature of God is unsatisfying. Too much room for doubt is possible. It would seem that an expression of the physico-teleological argument



would find much evidence of good in the w rld. And from that evidence conclude that God is good. But Calhoun fails to stress even this point. His treatment seems to be but a statement of his belief. For his own thinking that perhaps is adequate, but for the inquiring reader, wholly unconvincing. If God is not good, there is little value or need in searching or believing. Perhaps the point is avoided because of the subsequent necessity of explaining evil. And Calhoun did not purpose to enter into the technical realm more than was necessary.

Calhoun offers us a finite God. On the whole, this concept of God appears to be the most satisfying and consistent. That Calhoun offers a finite God is evident in his limitations of God's omniscience and omnipotence. His concept of rigidities is evidence for his belief in a finite God. He goes beyond traditional thought in making this original contribution. But these rigidities are not within God's being. And here Calhoun is to be criticised, there is reason for conceiving these as existent apart from God. To do so results in a fundamental dualism which is untenable.

Despite the inadequacy at points in his treatment, there is much that is acceptable. His concepts of limitations to Divine omniscience and omnipotence make possible a concept of finite freedom compatible with our direct experience of it. His concept of Divine limitation makes possible a consistent explanation of evil as we experience it. His treatment of omniscience and omnipotence presents no contradictions when



considering the goodness of God. His treatment of eternality does not permit foreknowledge, thus avoiding conflict between omniscience and omnipotence, and again aiding a consistent concept of finite freedom. In general, it may be said that Calhoun escapes many difficulties which Royce does not. Calhoun offers a conception closer to the empirical facts.

Calhoun also insists upon the absolute otherness of finite persons, and with his position it is possible. This is not the case in Royce's system. Though he insists upon the "otherness of selves," they find their completion in the one true Self. It is difficult to understand how "otherness" is possible in Royce's system.



CHAPTER IV


ROYCE VS. CALHOUN

Having completed our investigations, it is now time to compare these two men. Comparison is made not merely to show the superiority of one to the other, but to illustrate the differences between one of the greatest American philosophers of religion who followed the idealistic tradition and one of our contemporaries of the opposing trend of realism.

Probably the first difference, already mentioned, is that of their basic approach. Royce is the idealist; Calhoun the realist. These bases direct each to particular aspects of the field of experience. Royce in his many works examines the realistic position and finds it inadequate. Calhoun in his work finds no place for a consideration of the idealistic position.

Comparison of Arguments for God.

Royce's contributions to this problem are more thorough and systematic. Granting him his premises, his completed concept is consistent within itself. Calhoun, however, seems to deal in conclusions. His concepts are not established so much by argument as by statement. While with Royce, the establishing of his points carries him through a detailed investigation which results in his conclusion.



Both men ground their investigation in an empirical basis. Their difference consists in that they consider different aspects of this basis with different methods. Royce's inquiry leads him into a consideration of ideas which is in line with his idealistic approach. Calhoun begins his inquiry by an investigation of finite work. This reflects his realistic premises. The realist would perhaps claim that Royce falls prey to the "egocentric predicament." If man is in the egocentric predicament, he cannot discount it, rather he must make the most of it. And this is the attempt that Royce makes.

The spirit evidenced by both men is a deeply religious one. To both religion is real and dynamic. It is the normal state of man's living. In application they make religion the central factor, Rojc in his concept of the Beloved Community and Calhoum in his Christian doctrine of Vocation.

Calhoun's primary interest is not so much in proving God's existence as it is the interpretation of His nature and our relations to Him. Royce, however, continually seeks to prove God's existence, perhaps as much for his own certainty as for that of his reader. Consequently his works cover the entire religious field in a systematic way. His belief in God is established by argument and the resultant concept of God is worked out in detail. The attributes of God are the logical outcome of his argument. Thus every concept is an advence over a previous one, but the new is always consistent with the


old. Calhoun does not present his contributions in similar fashion. It is often difficult to follow his establishment of divine attributes. His argument for the existence of Qod has no logical connection with his argument for Divine character. (162) So again it can be said that Royce is the more consistent and systematic, and the thorough nature of his work on this problem and in the philosophy of religion make it a more valuable contribution to the field.

The methods used by each in his arguments differ considerably. Royce is primarily the rationalistic empiricist, Calhoun the naturalist. Royce is the theoretical philosopher, while Calhoun is primarily the practical. Royce proceeds from accepted fact and reasons his way to a concept of the whole. His particular concept is made necessary because of the implications arising from the facts. Calhoun, not interested so much in theory, seeks a concept that the common man can understand and live by.

Comparison of concepts of the character of God.

Royce's concept of God is best summed up by the term, "Absolute," and Calhoun's by the term, "Finite." "Absolute" in that God is all thought and all experience, "Finite" in that God is limited by factors within and without. Considering these concepts in relation to the foundational arguments,

^{162.} However this is no criticism of his argument or of his concept of God. The final test in each case is coherence.



Royce's entire work is much more systematic and thorough. For him the concept of God's character is the logical outcome of his argument. Alteration of the argument would affect the resultant concept. In Calhoun's work this is not the case. His concept of God's character has no direct connection with the argument. Each stands on its own merits.

For both Royce and Galhoun the most important attribute is that of omniscience. Royce defines this attribute in terms of Absolute Thought and Absolute Experience. Establishment is the direct result of his consideration of ideas. Calhoun defines omniscience in terms of omnipresence and eternality. God is resident through, active within, transcendent beyond the space-time order, and apprehends all that has transpired and is transpiring in an infinite time-span. This concept of omniscience has no direct connection with Calhoun's argument for God. Invalidation of the argument would have little effect on the attribute of omniscience.


Relative to the attribute of eternality, both men have much in common. Their greatest difference lies in that Royce includes all that was, is, and will be in the experience of God, while Calhoun includes only all that was and is. Here, as with the attribute of omniscience, Royce's concept of eternality is the outcome of basic premises while Calhoun's is not.



Both men agree that God is morally good. Calhoun makes this attribute a conclusion which admits of no proof. Royce finds that God is good because God must know what is desirable, and knowing it, must have present in himself the true objects of desire. Royce's contribution on this attribute is by far the more profound.

Calhoun considers specifically the omnipotence of God. He finds God limited by factors within His being and without His being. Calhoun's concept is a concept of a finite God. Royce does not consider omnipotence, but the idea is present in his establishment of omniscience. For Royce God is Absolute Thought, Absolute Experience, and Absolute Will. All that the traditional attribute of omnipotence implies is found in the Roycean concept of God.

The more thorough work of Royce is evident in his further contribution along this line. In addition to the forementioned character traits, which for Calhoun completes his concept, Royce considers unity, will, love, and personality.




CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary.

Following the problem of this thesis into the philosophy of Josiah Royce, four arguments for the existence of God were found, the Epistemological argument, the argument from Personality, the argument from the Possibility of Error, and the Moral argument. The Epistemological argument began with the fact of idea and found there an internal and external meaning. Investigation showed the logical priority of the internal. Tn fact it appeared to be the sole determiner of the idea. But the objective world exerts its influence. It exists, and the idea refers to it. The problem became, how can an idea, determined by its own purpose, refer to an object and be true? The only consistent explanation was to conclude that there is an All-Inclusive Being who contains both the idea and the object. This argument was found confusing and at points neglecting essential facts in its considerations.

The argument from personality began with the consideration of the finite self. Individual selves were wholly unable to state just what they were. They found themselves very fragmentary. To be the self they are, they must be more than they appear to be. To be the selves they are it was found that they




must be a part of the true and complete Self, God. This argument was found neglecting essential facts and the real force of personality.

The argument from the Possibility of Error inquired into the logical conditions necessary for error. It concluded that for error to be possible the knower and object known must be included in a third being, God. This argument was found more acceptable than the previous two. Here is a powerful theoretical argument for the existence of a supreme being.

The Moral argument sought to establish the objectivity of moral values. This Royce did in terms of his concept of loyalty. This argument was given additional force by a consideration of the possibility of error. This was found to be Royce's most consistent and forceful argument for God.

Concluding the investigation of his arguments, Royce's concept of God's character was considered next. He presented God as Absolute Thought, Absolute Experience, Absolute Unity, Absolute Will, Absolute Love, Morally good, Eternal, and Personal. His concept was found to contain much that was acceptable and much that was not.

Taking up the problem in the philosophy of Robert L. Calhoun, we found in his work an expression of the physico-teleological argument. Calhoun found purpose at work in natural precesses and in the gradual emergence of man. These purposive



processes were found to reveal mind at work. The only explanation of these meanings was to conclude that they were the work of a Sovereign Mind. Though this argument did not rise to the theoretical height of the Roycean arguments, its conclusion was found justifiable. Calhoun's method is more apt to be the way the common man finds his way to God.


Calhoun established his concept of the character of God by analogy to the limited abilities of man. He portrayed God as omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, omnipotent, moral, transcendent, and limited. Though these attributes are not the direct outcome of his argument for God, they are closely related and consistent with his conclusion.

Comparing these two men and their work on this problem, Royce was found the more theoretical, consistent, and systematic.(163) His many works reveal a profound and systematic inquiry into the nature of reality. Calhoun was not so concerned with the proof of God. He was more interested in defining God and His relations to man.

Conclusions.

Royce, in following Plato's way of idea, pursues the most fruitful pa h towards understanding reality. However, the conclusions resulting from his analysis of ideas do not merit the logical necessity he claims for them.

163. Consistent within his own system.





Royce's arguments result in epistemological monism and his concept of God in metaphysical monism. These conclusions are not impossible, but they raise many difficult problems which Royce does not solve to the satisfaction of experience.


Royce offers a unique approach to the objectivity of values in his argument from the possibility of error. His use of this argument to substantiate the moral argument gives a profound throretical argument for the existence of God.

Calhoun, though not the equal of Royce, offers an acceptable argument for God, though his exposition of it be inadequate. And his concept of God, though lacking completeness and theoretical justification, is in the main consistent with finite experience.

Both men reveal a deeply religious character and devotion to an ideal. Though neither offers final solution to the problem of God, both have made significant contributions.








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