

2016

Rethinking geopolitical ambition: an analysis of India and its role in the United Nations Security Council

<https://hdl.handle.net/2144/17715>

"Downloaded from OpenBU. Boston University's institutional repository."

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Thesis

**RETHINKING GEOPOLITICAL AMBITION:
AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND ITS ROLE IN THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL**

by

JULIE GEORGE

B.A., Boston University, 2016

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

2016

© 2016 by
JULIE GEORGE
All rights reserved

Approved by

First Reader

David A. Mayers, Ph.D.
Professor and Chair of Political Science
Professor of History

Second Reader

Dino P. Christenson, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Political Science

Dedication

It takes a village to raise a child. I am indebted to a number of family members, particularly my parents and brother, faculty, close friends, and mentors for their unconditional support in writing this thesis. I cannot thank Professor Mayers enough, my thesis advisor, for his constant guidance and encouragement for the past four years at Boston University. I wholeheartedly thank my parents, brother, and closest friends for their love and patience throughout this process of writing. Last, I thank my mentors, both at Boston University and outside, for pushing me to strive for better analysis, stronger points, and meaningful conclusions. Thank you to the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library for granting me access to the countless archival manuscripts, which were pivotal to my work. I dedicate this thesis to the aforementioned individuals.

**RETHINKING GEOPOLITICAL AMBITION:
AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND ITS ROLE IN THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL**

JULIE GEORGE

ABSTRACT

Soft power is a significant aspect of India's identity in the international community. Moreover, India has committed itself in being a cooperative, active member of the international community. In an alternative theory of power within the field of international relations, I argue that while soft power reasons that states are not only shaped by threats, bribes, persuasion, and co-optation, but also by norms. Strikingly, India was pushed by the United States and the Soviet Union to join the Security Council in 1950 and 1955 respectively as a permanent seat member. However, India refused these offers and instead, supported the People's Republic China for the position. Since the early 1990s, India has actively pursued permanent membership to the Security Council and various reforms by convincing other countries to support its bid. Thus, in the case of India and its quest for permanent membership in the Security Council, an alternative way of thinking about soft power is the ability to serve as an effective player in international politics and influencing other countries' long-standing positions and preferences on this matter.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
The Predecessor to the United Nations Security Council	3
History of the United Nations Security Council	6
Functions of the United Nations Security Council	8
India's Past Stance on the United Nations Security Council	11
India's Chance at Permanent Membership in 1950 & 1995	15
India and China in the United Nations	19
India and the Bandung Conference -1955	20
India's Relationship with the United Nations	25
India's Present Day Role – United Nations Security Council	26
Why Does India Now Want to Have a Permanent Seat?	28
The Argument of Soft Power	31
What Does Soft Power Mean for India?	34
The Effects of India's Soft Power	36
Timeline of Security Council Reforms	41
Blocs on Security Council Reforms	43
Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reforms	44
India and the United States' Partnership	48
Lobbying Efforts	51
Soft Power and Negotiation	54
Impact in South Asian International Relations	55

Prime Minister Modi and UNSC Reforms	57
Agents of Soft Power	60
Impact on the United Nations Security Council	60
Gauging Countries for Inclusion in the Security Council	62
Pakistan's Stance on India and the Security Council	63
Consensus on Security Council Reform	65
Implications of Security Council Reforms	66
Efficiency	69
Conclusion	71
Bibliography	73
Curriculum Vitae	81

INTRODUCTION

Many of the international institutions established at the end of World War II have sought to alleviate issues such as colonization, the end of the Cold War, environmental threats, and global poverty. However, very little has been altered in the basic structure of these global institutions. In this paper, I analyze India's stance on global institutional reform, specifically with the United Nations Security Council as India seeks a Permanent Seat, from the period of the 1950s to present day. I specifically examine several manuscripts and correspondence among prominent Indian political leaders from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library that highlight India's perspective of the Security Council in the mid twentieth century.

The composition of the United Nations Security Council has been a point of contention for several decades; in 1992, the General Assembly created the "Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council"¹. Countries such as Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India hope to reform the United Nations Security Council in terms of expanded membership and allocating more Permanent Seats that are representative of various regions. Other Member States advocate the need for greater transparency and attention for the working methods of the council. In fact, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that the relevance of the Security Council would dwindle "if we don't change the council" and that it "risks a situation

¹ "Security Council Reform", *United Nations Security Council*,
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/faq.shtml#process>

² Harriet Grant. *UN Security Council Must Be Revamped Or Risk Irrelevance, Kofi Annan Warns*, The Guardian, September 23, 2015

where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries”². As a longstanding proponent of significant reform to the Security Council, India emphasizes the urgency of change by lobbying for a permanent seat as evidenced in the past several years.

A plausible explanation for India’s desire to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council could be the propelling of soft power on the international stage through the shaping of norms. Typically, the concept of power is seen through superior military capabilities, territorial conquests, and technology. Yet, power can also be demonstrated through three forms of soft power: threats, bribes, or co-options. In *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Joseph S. Nye Jr. explicates the term, “soft power”, which is getting a country to “want what it wants” in contrast with hard power, or “ordering others to do what it wants”³. Nye further defines soft power as the ability to shape the preferences of states through appeal and attraction, or coercion, without the use of force⁴. Nye argues that soft co-optive power is just as important as hard power as it has the ability to set the political agenda, determine the framework of debate in a way that shapes others’ performances, and affect what other countries want. Several trends today are making soft power and co-optive behavior relatively more important. In Jan Melissen’s *Wielding Soft Power: The New Public*

² Harriet Grant. *UN Security Council Must Be Revamped Or Risk Irrelevance, Kofi Annan Warns*, The Guardian, September 23, 2015

³ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, 1990, Print. pp. 166

⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs: New York. Print. 2004, pp. 5

Diplomacy, diplomacy is one of soft power's key instruments. Soft power also includes more coercive economic and diplomatic levers, such as participation in multilateral organizations. As Peter J. Katzenstein asserts, "changes in norms create only permissive conditions for changes in international political behavior"⁵. In an alternative theory of power within the field of international relations, I argue that while soft power reasons that individuals are not only shaped by threats, bribes, persuasion, and co-optation, but also by norms. Thus, in the case of India and its quest for permanent membership in the Security Council, an alternative way of thinking about soft power is the ability to serve as an effective player in international politics and influencing other countries' long-standing positions and preferences.

THE PREDECESSOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

To fully understand the United Nations Security Council and its foundation, one should compare it to the League of Nations. The League of Nations was a pioneer in the international system in that it advanced the goals of international security. However, it also possessed several weaknesses that the United Nations sought to overcome. In *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945*, the authors write "the League Covenant provided for a Council which can in some ways be seen as a precursor to the UN Security Council; but the arrangements for it proved to be ineffectual"⁶. The League Council's membership raises three concerns. The Council did not have all major powers of the time, evidenced by the absence of the

⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Columbia University Press. New York. Print. 1996, pp. 185

⁶ Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, *The United Nations Security Council and War*, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 10

United States, Germany being a member only from 1926 to 1933, and Japan leaving the body in 1933 and Italy in 1937. The only two countries that remained in the League Council were Britain and France. The last concern of the League Council was that all members had the right to veto power, irrespective if they were permanent or non-permanent members. As the number of participants in the League Council increased, so did the number of vetoes, which resulted in an increase of tension within the body.

Moreover, the League Council was vague in its management of international security as evidenced by Article 10 of the Covenant. For example, the Covenant does not go into specifics of what constitutes “aggression”. This is problematic in that issues such as violations of treaty regimes or human rights can threaten peace, but not be identified as “aggression” based on the Covenant. Article 10 of the Covenant reads:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled⁷.

This article is notably weak in its delineation of threats to international peace, as it does not expound on how the Council would advise and resolve the dispute. In this flawed text, the League Council only enforces economic sanctions if a state defies the principles of the Covenant. Military action, written vaguely in the text, is recommended, but not mandatory as evident in Article 16(2): “It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to

⁷ Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, *The United Nations Security Council and War*, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 65

recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League”⁸. The League Council also did not explicitly state how it would go about disarmament, but rather expresses the goal of decreasing armaments across nations. Article 8 states “The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations”⁹. Overall, the League Council had a myriad of ambitious objectives that inspired the establishment of the United Nations Security Council, but ultimately failed due to its vagueness and weaknesses.

After seeing the failure of the League of Nations, the founders of the United Nations composed a charter that would pledge that the major powers would join and remain in the organization. One of the biggest differences between the League Council and the United Nations Security Council derives from veto power. The United Nations Security Council deviated from the League Council’s veto power distribution by restricting the right to only permanent members. Additionally, the United Nations Security Council extended the range of international security issues it would address in comparison to its predecessor. While the League Council utilized economic sanctions principally, the United Nations Security Council had established that it could potentially use force first without the use of economic sanctions. Furthermore, the United Nations

⁸ Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, *The United Nations Security Council and War*, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 11

⁹ Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, *The United Nations Security Council and War*, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 12

Security Council deviated from the League Council in that it would not recommend military action to nations, but rather take military measures in its own right¹⁰. Essentially, the United Nations Security Council was specific in its efforts of promoting international security through a deliberate, comprehensive United Nations Charter – a contrast to the League Council’s ambiguous Covenant.

HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Ratified by the victors of World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Republic of China [Taiwan] on October 24, 1945, the United Nations Charter established the United Nations Security Council, which also appointed the five aforementioned countries as permanent members to the body. At this time, there were six non-permanent members, rotating every two years and distributed on a fair geographic basis. In 1965, the number of non-permanent members increased to ten, with five from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, and two from Western Europe.

The members of the United Nations Security Council met on January 17, 1946 in London for the first time as a body to discuss the elimination of weapons of mass destruction¹¹. As Jonas von Freiesleben relates in “Reform of the Security Council”, the Security Council “had turned into a political battleground between the East and West, serving mainly as a highly publicized forum where appeals for justice could be

¹⁰ Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, *The United Nations Security Council and War*, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 229

¹¹ “The UN Security Council”, *United Nations Foundation*, <http://www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/issues/united-nations/the-un-security-council.html>

proclaimed, antagonists demonized, and the virtue of one's own cause declared"¹². However, the number of Member Nations increased in the United Nations during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly from Africa and Asia. Thus, with the increase of membership came efforts to change the composition of the Security Council, which were rejected by the United States, United Kingdom, Republic of China, France, and the Soviet Union. Despite the resistance of the permanent Security Council members, the calls for reform were too loud to ignore.

There have been minimal changes to the United Nations Security Council since its inception. In 1965, an amendment was added to the UN Charter that called for an increase in membership to 15 for the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1991 A (XVIII). In 1971, the Republic of China [Taiwan] was replaced on the Security Council by the People's Republic of China. In 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation assumed the permanent seat in the body. These are the very few changes to the Security Council despite many countries recently coming forward and wanting a revamping of the body. In 1992, India and 35 other non-aligned countries called upon the General Assembly to focus on the item entitled *Question of Equitable Representation On and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council*. India and several other countries actually pushed for this item as early as 1979, but the General Assembly only placed it on the agenda in 1992¹³.

¹² Jonas von Freiesleben, "Reform of the Security Council", <https://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ManagingChange-1.pdf>, pp. 2

¹³ Jonas von Freiesleben, "Reform of the Security Council", <https://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ManagingChange-1.pdf>, pp. 3

Currently, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India are four of the leading countries that aim to make significant changes to the council, such as increasing the membership from 15 to 25 members. Known as the G-4 countries, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India have recommended expansion of the body, specifically the addition of six permanent Security Council seats and four non-permanent members. In 2012, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Hardeep Singh Puri, emphasized that the provision on the veto should be retained as well as a discussion on the specific conditions and circumstances under which the veto can be utilized by countries. He further elaborated that a potential veto restraint agreement could benefit a reformed Security Council¹⁴. As for the composition of the Security Council, a proposal to reform the body would require the approval of two-thirds of the United Nations General Assembly. Ultimately, many countries in the General Assembly are in support of an expansion of the United Nations Security Council, but there seems to be a lack of consensus on the type of seats or which countries should occupy them.

FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The overwhelming duty of the United Nations Security Council is the “responsibility to protect” the international community. This entails collective action to protect citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity when national authorities fail to do so¹⁵. Under the jurisdiction of the United Nations

¹⁴ PTI, “UN Security Council Serves No One’s Purpose: India”, *The Hindu*, November 3, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/un-security-council-serves-no-ones-purpose-india/article4061775.ece>

¹⁵ Hitoshi Nasu, “The UN Security Council’s Responsibility and the “Responsibility to Protect”, *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Volume 15, 2011, p. 377-418

Charter, the Security Council has the authority to do the following: uphold international peace and security in agreement with the principles and purposes of the United Nations; examine any dispute or situation which might result in international friction; advise methods of adjusting disputes or the terms of settlement; communicate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments; resolve the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken; request Member States to engage in economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or halt aggression; take military action against an aggressor; recommend the admission of new members; utilize the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in 'strategic areas'; and propose to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary General and, together with the Assembly, to select the Judges of the International Court of Justice¹⁶.

Due to the gravity and complexity of the issues that the United Nations Security Council handles, it has established a series of subsidiary organs to perform its functions. Article 29 of the United Nations Charter gives the United Nations Security Council the authority to create these bodies as needed. Some subsidiary organs created by the United Nations Security Council are Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Committees, Military Staff Committee, Sanctions Committees, Standing Committees and Ad Hoc Bodies. The Counter-Terrorism Committee is responsible for preventing domestic and international terrorist acts, criminalizing the financing of terrorism, denying all forms of financial support for terrorist groups, and sharing information with other governments on

¹⁶ "Functions and Powers", *United Nations Security Council*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml>

any groups practicing or planning terrorist acts¹⁷. The Military Staff Committee facilitates UN military measures and regulates armaments. The Sanctions Committees is responsible for applying pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives elicited by the Security Council without utilizing the use of force through the use of mandatory sanctions. The Security Council administers mandatory sanctions to enforce its decisions, especially in cases where peace has been threatened or diplomatic efforts have failed. The types of sanctions the body employs are comprehensive economic and trade sanctions, arm embargoes, travel bans, financial, and diplomatic restrictions. As for the Standing Committees and Ad Hoc Bodies, the Security Council has formed these as open-ended to handle specific issues for a limited time¹⁸. As one of the six main organs of the United Nations, the Security Council aims to maintain international security through these subsidiary bodies.

Additionally, one of the principal efforts of the United Nations Security Council is its Peacekeeping Operations and Political Missions. Peacekeeping operations are employed to maintain peace and security through the collaboration of military, police, and civilian personnel. These diverse operations facilitate political processes, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, promote human rights, restore the rule of law, and support the organization of elections. Furthermore, political missions are set forth to stabilize peace-building activities such as peace agreements. As an Advisory Subsidiary Body of the Security

¹⁷ “Our Mandate”, *Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/>

¹⁸ “Standing Committees and Ad Hoc Bodies”, *United Nations Security Council*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/structure.shtml>

Council, the Peacebuilding Commission is responsible for bringing together international donors, relevant actors, national governments, and troop contributing countries to arrange resources and propose comprehensive strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery¹⁹. The Security Council has carried out a myriad of peacekeeping operations and political missions throughout various regions pursuant to preserving global security.

INDIA'S PAST STANCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

India was one of the 51 original members of the United Nations when it was established in 1945. Its first encounter with the United Nations Security Council centered on the dispute over Kashmir in 1948, which was instigated by an incursion of tribal forces supported by the Pakistani military. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru looked to the Security Council to defuse the tension, but was disappointed. He felt that the western powers of the Security Council viewed this issue between two countries, and not as an invasion of one's territory by the other²⁰. Chinmaya R. Gharekhan's *India and the United Nations* builds on this argument by stating that Indian leaders thought the Security Council to be a political body dominated by individual countries' national interests, and not the specifics of the issue at hand²¹. To this day, the Kashmir dispute continues to be a controversial conflict that has resulted in increased tensions between India and Pakistan.

In its first term on the Security Council in 1950, India stressed that the United Nations should resolve the Korean War without intervention. However, the Security

¹⁹ "Structure", *United Nations Security Council*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/structure.shtml>

²⁰ Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, *India and the UN Security Council*, pp. 110

²¹ Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, *India and the United Nations*, in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*, 2007

Council ultimately chose to pursue an armed intervention, which India supported only via a field ambulance unit. After the Korean War, India took an active role in the repatriation of prisoners-of-war and refugees. It continued to support UN efforts through humanitarian assistance, military observers, and senior officials in UN operations in west Asia, Africa, and Asia. In its second term on the Security Council in 1967, India spoke critically of Israeli aggression against the surrounding Arab countries. Furthermore, it emphasized a pro-Arab policy by promoting sovereignty and the rights of Arab countries at the time. During the second term, India also rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as it viewed it immoral and unjust towards the equality of states. Specifically, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows states that have nuclear weapons to retain them while other countries are not allowed to possess them. India views this as discriminatory as the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China were the only countries that had nuclear weapons at the time and thus, saw this as a monopoly for possessing nuclear arms. In its third term on the Security Council in 1972, the body primarily focused on decolonization of Africa and issues in west Asia. At the time, India continued its strong stance against Israel and remained an active advocate against colonialism.

However, India drew a lot of attention when it conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 through the “Smiling Buddha” operation. As a result of the nuclear test, many countries came together to form the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the hope of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation efforts and safeguards. Conversely, India claims that the nuclear underground test was conducted for peaceful means as it was seen as research for mining

techniques, stimulation of oil reservoirs, and efforts towards nuclear engineering. In fact, India created the nuclear device, CIRUS or otherwise known as the Canada-India Reactor U.S., which included a 40-megawatt reactor and plutonium from Canada and the United States. Many countries did not view this explosion as peaceful and began to stray from nuclear technology collaborations with India in the hopes of forestalling India's future nuclear tests. India struggled to make the United Nations' Member States comprehend that it did not export nuclear weapons-related information, technology, or materials beyond its borders, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The short-term goal of the Nuclear Suppliers Group was to contain India's nuclear arsenal and sever India's access to nuclear material and technology²². As India is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to this day, it remains largely isolated from international trade in nuclear plants or materials.

India returned to the United Nations Security Council for its fourth term in 1977, taking an active role by co-sponsoring various resolutions. For example, it co-sponsored resolutions focused on the withdrawal of Israeli military troops from Lebanese territory, rebuked South Africa's actions in Angola's civil war, and three resolutions that denounced the minority white regime in Southern Rhodesia. Identifying as a Third World country, India also criticized apartheid in South Africa and the treatment of Indians in South Africa. In its fifth term on the Security Council in 1984, India continued its stance on South Africa and Israeli actions towards the Palestinians²³.

²² "The Peaceful Explosion", *AtomicArchive.com*, Web, <http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page17.shtml>

²³ Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, *India and the UN Security Council*, pp. 111

India was elected to the Security Council for the sixth time in 1991. At the time, India was struggling with coalition politics within its borders and an economic crisis, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It also had conflicting opinions on the Iraq-Kuwait situation, as its first reaction was to rebuke the US invasion. However, Delhi then supported US efforts and permitted US airplanes to refuel on Indian territory. This sparked outrage among the domestic crowd, which led the Indian government to stop US airplanes from landing in India for refueling. In terms of voting in the Security Council on the issue of Iraq, India ultimately chose to abstain on two vital votes. Additionally, it abstained on four resolutions that focused on an arms embargo against Libya, contributing humanitarian aid in Bosnia, increasing the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia, and the termination of Yugoslavia's membership to the United Nations²⁴. To several countries, India seemed to lack a handle on these global issues.

In contrast to the Security Council's ability, and sometimes inclination, to utilize force, India became a protester of human and military intervention in the 1990s. India attempted to become a non-permanent member of the Security Council once again in 1996, but failed. Instead, Japan won the position by a noticeably large margin, with many pointing to its financial prowess to gain votes in the General Assembly. In the same year, India rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which may have affected the election for the non-permanent seat. Two years after the inception of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, India pursued further nuclear tests, which elicited negative reactions from the international community for some time. However, many countries began to notice India

²⁴ Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, *India and the UN Security Council*, pp. 112

for its rising power as a result of its fast economic growth and nuclear capabilities. It was also in the 1990s that India became more vocal in asserting greater representation in international organizations. India pushed for this systemic change based on national capabilities, previous contributions to the United Nations, and ability to view issues objectively for the common good of the international community. For India, this fostered its desire to seek permanent membership in the Security Council.

INDIA'S CHANCE AT PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP IN 1950 & 1955

Strikingly, India was pushed by the United States and the Soviet Union to join the Security Council in 1950 and 1955 respectively as a permanent seat member. In Anton Harder's "Not at the Cost of China: New Evidence Regarding US Proposals for Joining the United Nations Security Council", it is asserted that the United States wanted to further its own Cold War strategy regarding China. In its strategy, the United States sought out India to take the permanent seat, which was ultimately declined by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Many critics of Nehru look to this pivotal point in history and rebuke the first prime minister for sacrificing India's national interests on the grounds of morality. However, Harder highlights that for Nehru, "integrating the People's Republic of China into the international community by conceding its right to the Chinese seat at the Security Council was in fact a central pillar of Nehru's foreign policy"²⁵. Furthermore, it is not true that Nehru rejected the idea of permanent membership in the Security Council for India. Rather, he believed that "India is not anxious to enter the Security Council at this stage, even though as a great country she ought to be there. The first

²⁵ Anton Harder, "Not at the Cost of China: India and the United Nations Security Council, 1950", *Woodrow Wilson International Center*, March 2015, pp. 1

step to be taken is for China to take her rightful place and then the question of India might be considered separately²⁶”.

Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin also pushed for India to be a permanent member of the Security Council in 1955. Nehru did not want to cause tension between India and China, and therefore, opposed the Soviet offer as well. The Prime Minister stated the following:

“Perhaps Nikolai Bulganin knows that some people in USA have suggested that India should replace China in the Security Council. This is to create trouble between us and China. We are, of course, wholly opposed to it. Further, we are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy certain positions because that may itself create difficulties and India might itself become a subject to controversy. If India is to be admitted to the Security Council, it raises the question of the revision of the Charter of the UN. We feel that this should not be done till the question of China’s admission and possibly of others is first solved. I feel that we should first concentrate on getting China admitted. What is Bulganin’s opinion about the revision of the Charter? In our opinion this does not seem to be an appropriate time for it.²⁷”

After hearing what Nehru said, Premier Bulganin also supported the idea that it was not the appropriate time to add a new permanent member to the council. From these exchanges, we learn that Nehru thought the issue of the People’s Republic of China in the Security Council and its relations to India took precedence in terms of foreign policy decisions.

²⁶ AG Noorani, “The Nehruvian Approach;” the quote comes from *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, second series, vol. 29, pp. 303

²⁷ AG Noorani, “The Nehruvian Approach;” the quote comes from *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, second series, vol. 29, 231

As for the United States' offer to India, Nehru and his sister, Ms. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit were in close communication when she visited Washington DC as India's Ambassador to the United States. In a letter to Nehru, Mrs. Pandit explained what was taking place in Washington DC:

“One matter that is being cooked up in the State Department should be known to you. This is the unseating of China as a Permanent Member in the Security Council and of India being put in her place...I told him [John Foster Dulles] our attitude and advised him to go slow in the matter as it would not be received with any warmth in India.²⁸”

The Prime Minister responded to Mrs. Pandit's letter with the following:

“In your letter you mentioned that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China. I suppose the state department would not like that, but we have no intention of following that course. We shall go on pressing for China's admission in the UN and the Security Council. I suppose that a crisis will come during the next sessions of the General Assembly of the UN on this issue. The people's government of China is sending a full delegation there. If they fail to get in there will be trouble, which might even result in the USSR and some other countries finally quitting the UN. That may please the State Department, but it would mean the end of the UN as we have known it. That would also mean further drift towards war. India because of many factors, is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council.

²⁸ Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 August 1950, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 1st Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 59, Subject: 1949-51, Letters to Jawaharlal Nehru from VL Pandit sent during her tenure as Indian Ambassador to the United States of America, 132, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

But we are not going in at the cost of China.²⁹”

The United States offered a permanent seat to India due to the tensions of the Cold War and as move to thwart the People’s Republic of China. For the United States, India was a large democratic country that supported non-alignment and could potentially serve the United States’ national interests in the Security Council. However, Nehru valued the United Nations in its efforts to mitigate tensions. To accept the permanent member seat would disrupt international stability and drastically affect the relationship between India and China. Nehru communicated to Ms. Pandit the following on the India–China relationship:

“As a realist, one has to recognize that Communists control the greater part of China and may, before long, control the whole of that country. In broader interest of international peace, it is not desirable that we should do anything that would make cultivation of normal friendly relations with the new China difficult, if not impossible.³⁰”

For Nehru, India’s foreign policy aimed to reveal to the world that the People’s Republic of China could be a cooperative power in the international community, as well as decrease Cold War anxieties. At the same time, Nehru wholly supported the idea that India deserved a permanent seat in the Security Council, but timing was an important factor.

Ultimately, India chose to not take up the Soviet or US offers for a permanent

²⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 30 August, 1950, in Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, Subject: 1949, 1950-1951, Letters received by V.L. Pandit as Ambassador to Washington from Jawaharlal Nehru concerning India’s relations with US, Pakistan, and other countries and developments at home, 137, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML)

³⁰ Cable to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, New Delhi, 19 July, 1949, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 12, (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1991), 389

Security Council seat because it valued stability in the international system. Even before the US and Soviet offers for permanent membership in the Security Council, India respected China and its friendship. Ting His-lin's "We Welcome the Indian Cultural Delegation" speaks of this nature in 1952, writing, "in the world today, the period demands that the people of China and India further strengthen their friendship to struggle for peace in Asia and in the world. Hence, friendship between China and India is not only the desire of the peoples of two big nations, but also the desire of all mankind"³¹. This mentality of friendship and stability reverberated in Nehru's decision in 1950 and 1955 to decline the offers of a Security Council seat.

INDIA AND CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The Sino-India relationship in the 1950s was a complex one as evidenced by Jawaharlal Nehru's communications with his sister, Shrimati Vijay Lakshmi Pandit. In a letter dated August 30, 1950, Nehru wrote, "There can be little doubt that the Chinese Government is trying its best to be friendly to us. Apart from present day conflicts and in the long run, I am sure that it is of great importance to Asia and to the world that India and China should be friendly."³² Additionally, Nehru made it clear his view of the Kuomintang representative in the Security Council. He writes that the Government of Formosa is "practically protected by a foreign power, the US", yet is supposed to be a

³¹ Ting Hsi-Lin, Translation: "We Welcome the Indian Cultural Delegation", in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 2nd Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 19, 1952, pg. 150-151, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

³² Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 30 August, 1950, in Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, Subject: 1949, 1950-1951, Letters received by V.L. Pandit as Ambassador to Washington from Jawaharlal Nehru concerning India's relations with US, Pakistan, and other countries and developments at home, I Installment, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML)

great power and serve as a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power. In another letter addressed to Ms. Pandit on September 12, 1950, Nehru reiterates India's support of the People's Republic of China taking up the permanent seat at the Security Council, "So far as we are concerned, we must go full steam ahead to support it and to get others to support it, and should make the USA and other countries appreciate that this is a vital matter for us and for the world. I am quite sure that if this is voted down because of the USA, the future will be quite dark."³³

Through these communications between Nehru and Ambassador Pandit, we gain a perspective on how India views China and the future of the international system. Nehru emphasizes how their "championing China's cause in the United Nations" went a long way in sustaining peace and security. Nehru further elaborates in his letter dated September 14, 1950, that he has "no doubt that the friendly influence we [India] have exercised on China during the past few months has helped the cause of peace. They [China] listen to us, even though they might not agree, because they feel that our advice is disinterested"³⁴. Nehru believed that India did have a place in the Security Council as a permanent member, but he prioritized how India could sustain stability in the international system by placing the People's Republic of China in the permanent seat.

³³ Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 12 September, 1950, in Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, Subject: 1949, 1950-1951, Letters received by V.L. Pandit as Ambassador to Washington from Jawaharlal Nehru concerning India's relations with US, Pakistan, and other countries and developments at home, I Installment, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML)

³⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 12 September, 1950, in Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, Subject: 1949, 1950-1951, Letters received by V.L. Pandit as Ambassador to Washington from Jawaharlal Nehru concerning India's relations with US, Pakistan, and other countries and developments at home, I Installment, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML)

INDIA AND THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE - 1955

The Bandung Conference, held from April 18–24, 1955, was important to India's mentality on its position in the international arena, and subsequently, its United Nations policy and aspirations. This was the first large scale conference organized by newly independent Asian and African countries such as India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Burma to advocate cultural cooperation, international peace, and opposition to colonialism. The fight against colonialism that India had to endure to gain independence pushed forth the Non-Alignment Movement. India desired to be the master of its fate. Many of the non-aligned countries promoted the principles of self-determination, national independence, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of States. In Nehru's speech to the Bandung Conference Political Committee on the status of global politics, he boldly stated to the delegations, "So far as I am concerned, it does not matter what takes place; we will not take part in it [blocs] unless we have to defend ourselves. If I join any of these big groups I lose my identity.³⁵" Moreover, Pakistan, Philippines, Iraq, and especially India, struggled against imperialism, and opposed multilateral military alliances, apartheid, and the use of force to solve international issues.

The Bandung Conference was pioneering in the fact that these smaller, although population dense, countries advocated peaceful coexistence among all nations and democratization of international relations. In his speech to the Bandung Conference participants, Nehru urged countries to be aware of the unaligned area and how joining different camps or alliances could lead to war. Unlike many Western countries, the

³⁵ Prime Minister Nehru: Speech to Bandung Conference Political Committee, 1955, Modern History Sourcebook, <http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955nehru-bandung2.html>

countries that attended the Bandung Conference pushed for international cooperation on an equal footing³⁶. The Bandung Conference was monumental in international politics because it was a milestone for Third World countries to collaborate, discuss their political views, and insist that their recommendations play a role in the world order.

By working alongside African countries, India emphasized the need for a positive approach to all issues, particularly because the Afro-Asian group assumed new character and power in the international system. Ms. Pandit attended the 18th Session of the General Assembly, where she ascertained that there were opportunities available in which India could take a prominent role in African and UN affairs with a clearly defined policy. India desired to be of assistance to African countries because many nations were divided among themselves and without common policies. Ms. Pandit writes, “We had abandoned no principles. We continued pledged to the things we believe in. We wanted the closest co-operation with the African nations but statesmanship demanded different methods of approach to world issues at different times”³⁷. She also convinced African leaders at this session that India did not have an ulterior motive of leadership, but rather had the desire to collaborate in the United Nations and outside with African and Asian countries in establishing a new world order that valued freedom and equality of opportunity for all without discrimination. However, Ms. Pandit not only calls for cooperation between Asian and African countries, but also the initiative to voice their opinions. She writes, “I

³⁶ “Milestones: 1953-1960”, *U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf>

³⁷ Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30 December 1963, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 2nd Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 7, pg. 9-10, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

stressed the point that, we, the new nations, now had the responsibility of living up to the statements we had made in the past. Soon our group would have the majority voice in the United Nations and we must use our power to good purpose”³⁸. Through Ms. Pandit’s words and encouragement for African and Asian countries, many leaders began to look to India for leadership in international cooperation at the United Nations.

The principles and spirit of the Non-Alignment Movement continued after the Bandung Conference. The major leaders of the Non-Alignment Movement were Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia; they later became the founding fathers of the movement.³⁹ Similar to the core of the Bandung Conference, the Non-Alignment Movement insisted that countries should not be passive in the world system. Rather, the movement urged Third World countries to have a voice in international politics and take concerted action. Based on India's Ministry of External Affairs, "In 1960, in the light of the results achieved in Bandung, the creation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was given a decisive boost during the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the United Nations General Assembly, during which 17 new African and Asian countries were admitted.⁴⁰" As the Non-Alignment Movement began to grow, so did the number of Member States in the United Nations. These non-aligned countries began to

³⁸ Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30 December 1963, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 2nd Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 7, pg. 10, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

³⁹ Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, "History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement". <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement>

⁴⁰ Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, "History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement". <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement>

take more of a firm stance in international politics, specifically India. Similarly, these countries made efforts to raise their voices so that the Great Powers' voices were not the only ones being listened to in the United Nations.

However, in 1971, India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, which shocked various countries and bruised India's reputation. It seemed to other countries that India was taking a stance of alignment in international affairs, especially when it interfered in the affairs of neighboring countries from the 1970s to 1980s. A great amount of debate that followed the Bandung Conference was categorizing Soviet policies in Central Asia and Eastern Europe as the same as Western imperialism. Although there was criticism of the signing of this treaty, Indo-Soviet relations began to gain momentum after Soviet leaders visited India in 1955. In his speech to the Bandung Conference participants on major blocs, Nehru asserted that he "belong[s] to neither and [I] propose to belong to neither whatever happens in the world. If we have to stand alone, we will stand by ourselves, whatever happens (and India has stood alone without any aid against a mighty Empire, the British Empire) and we propose to face all consequences..."⁴¹. Additionally, he argued that a relationship between countries can survive without any trace of bloc politics or alliances. In fact, Nehru stated that India does not agree with communist teaching or with anti-communist teachings. However, he stated, "We have had their (Soviet leadership) goodwill and their good wishes all along...and this is the consolation to use and we certainly hope to have that in

⁴¹ Prime Minister Nehru: Speech to Bandung Conference Political Committee, 1955, Modern History Sourcebook, <http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955nehru-bandung2.html>

the future”⁴². At the core of the Non-Alignment Movement, countries like India were not passive or neutral to global issues, but rather took a stance for their values of cooperation and stability, and were willing to cooperate with countries in good faith.

INDIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

India has fostered a close relationship with the United Nations as it shares several norms towards peace and security. From being the first country to raise the issue of racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa, to cosponsoring the landmark 1960 “Declaration on UN on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, India had established itself as a “leading advocate of the concerns and aspirations of developing countries and the creation of a more equitable international economic and political order”⁴³. According to its Ministry of External Affairs, India’s contemporary priorities rest on the idea that it “strongly believes that the United Nations and the norms of international relations that it has fostered remain the most efficacious means for tackling today’s global challenges.”⁴⁴ Moreover, the Ministry of External Affairs emphasizes how India believes in the spirit of multilateralism to accomplish comprehensive and equitable solutions to international issues. From its interactions within the United Nations both in the past and current day, India has and will continue to partner with like-minded countries to sustain peace and security in the world.

It is also important to note Pakistan’s attitude towards India in the United Nations

⁴² Aurobinda Mahapatra, “Revisiting the Treaty of Friendship”, *Russia & India Report*, August, 31, 2011, http://in.rbth.com/articles/2011/08/31/revisiting_the_treaty_of_friendship_12924

⁴³ “India and the United Nations”, *Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India*, April 8, 2015, <http://www.mea.gov.in/india-and-the-united-nations.htm>

⁴⁴ “India and the United Nations”, *Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India*, April 8, 2015, <http://www.mea.gov.in/india-and-the-united-nations.htm>

as these two countries have a complex relationship. Evidenced by the Security Council's countless struggles to resolve the Kashmir issue in the mid 1950s, India and Pakistan have utilized the body as a forum for bargaining and unsuccessful negotiation. This has certainly tainted their present day relationship in the United Nation, as Pakistan opposes India's aim for permanent membership in the Security Council. Also of importance, India and Pakistan have both served as a non-permanent member to the Security Council seven times. As a result, it is critical to understand India and Pakistan's relationship in the United Nations because of the obstacles and anxieties the countries face at a multilateral level from a contentious history. India's diplomatic and political capabilities will be tested in international forums such as the United Nations due to Pakistan's stance towards its rival. Therefore, India's quest for permanent membership in the Security Council requires widespread support from numerous Member States, but must also tackle Pakistan's full-fledged opposition.

INDIA'S PRESENT DAY ROLE - UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

After a near two decades of hiatus, India became a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2011. So far, India has served as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in the following years: 1950–1951, 1967–1968, 1972–1973, 1977–1978, 1984–1985, 1991–1992, and 2011–2012⁴⁵. In its seventh two-year term, 2011–2012, India joined the Security Council with many people observing its

⁴⁵ "Countries Elected Members of the Security Council", *United Nations Security Council*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp>

tenure as a “rehearsal for permanent membership”⁴⁶. Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone’s *India and the UN Security Council: An Ambiguous Tale* emphasizes New Delhi’s top priorities for expanding permanent membership of the body through five main goals. The five goals for India’s performance in the Security Council from 2011–2012 were making the body more effective and legitimate, enhancing India’s standing as a responsible world power, expanding the Security Council’s permanent membership, reforming the Security Council’s working methods, and protecting the primacy of state sovereignty from the United Nations sanctioned military interventions. Yet, India was unable to attain all of these goals in its last term. The authors raise the challenges faced by India in attaining these ambitions, which consisted of insufficient Indian government resources devoted to multilateral diplomacy, insufficient engagement with the normative features of many Security Council issues, and constant calls of entitlement to permanent membership⁴⁷. Despite the outcome of India’s most recent Security Council term, there is widespread consensus among India’s elites that a permanent seat on the Security Council is only a matter of time.

While India was unsuccessful in expanding the Security Council’s permanent membership during its seventh term, it is still eager to reform the council. M J Akbar stated, “The Security Council will not be changed from inside, but from outside.”⁴⁸ This is precisely what India has been doing through soft power for the past two decades in

⁴⁶ Krishan Srinivasan, “Image with No Definition”, *The Telegraph*, January 23, 2013

⁴⁷ Rohan Mukherjee, and David M Malone. “India and the Un Security Council: An Ambiguous Tale”. *Economic and Political Weekly* 48.29 (2013): 110-117. Print.

⁴⁸ Rohan Mukherjee, and David M Malone. “India and the Un Security Council: An Ambiguous Tale”. *Economic and Political Weekly* 48.29 (2013): 110-117. Print.

regards to lobbying and convincing other countries to support its candidature as a permanent seat member in the body. Srinath Raghavan asserts that India desires “to make its presence in the UNSC felt as an independent power, that is, a power that would not automatically follow the lead of the P-5 but would judge issues on their merits”⁴⁹. India is a country that is not swayed by other Member States’ viewpoints, but rather advocates for its opinions. For years to come, India will continue to be adamant in its goals towards the Security Council until tangible progress has been made that reflects the realities of the world.

WHY DOES INDIA NOW WANT TO HAVE A PERMANENT SEAT?

There is an abundance of reasons behind India’s quest for permanent membership in the Security Council. Many political observers believe that it deserves this position based on India’s physical presence, identification as the tenth largest economy in the world and third largest army, and having served in the Security Council for fourteen years. Additionally, India is a member of the G-4 and G-77, the world’s largest democracy, and the third largest contributor of peacekeeping troops for UN efforts. Ultimately, India has proven itself to be a cooperative country on the international level. Relevant standards such as gross domestic product, population size, and large contributions to the United Nations would qualify India as a permanent member of the council. Former Indian foreign minister I.K. Gujral stated, “True multilateralism...requires the full and equal participation of all nations – big and small – in the multilateral decision-making process...The voice of the majority must not only be

⁴⁹ Rohan Mukherjee, and David M Malone. “India and the Un Security Council: An Ambiguous Tale”. *Economic and Political Weekly* 48.29 (2013): 110-117. Print.

heard but also be respected”⁵⁰. For the past two decades, India has been campaigning for a permanent seat on the Security Council with greater fervor with each passing year.

Before the 2005 United Nations Summit, India united with Brazil, Germany, and Japan as the G-4 countries in the hopes to gain a permanent seat each in the council. While discussion on Security Council reform did not result favorably for the four countries due to dispute of greater African representation, it magnified the role of each country at the international level. In fact, Mukherjee and Malone assert that Brazil, South Africa, and India started to have a larger international role, such as in the Group of 20, which is focused on economic issues. In Rajesh Rajagopalan and Atul Mishra’s *Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts*, the authors assert, “there is little doubt that India has always desired a greater role in world affairs; its long quest for a seat in the United Nations Security Council is one indication”⁵¹. They further this point by highlighting India’s accelerated pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1960s as compensation for its minimal status in international affairs after its defeat in the 1962 War with China.

The issue of whether India has been successful in expanding permanent and non-permanent seats in the Security Council is multifaceted. Some critics argue that India’s goal of gaining a Permanent Seat is beyond reach. However, for many pundits, India is the top and most viable candidate for permanent membership in the council. Ramesh Thakur, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the Australian National University, stated, “If there was to be a vote on a new UNSC, (there

⁵⁰ Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 1990, “Speech by Mr. IK Gujral”, 45th Session, 13th Plenary Meeting, 28 September, <http://www.un.int/india/ind195.htm>

⁵¹ Rajesh Rajagopalan, Atul Mishra, *Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts*, Print. 2014, pp. 10

is) no question but that India would get through, I suspect with the largest majority of all candidate countries”⁵². Based on a 2012 survey of UN experts, India leads other candidates in potential permanent membership. Therefore, India’s awareness for its bid to join the Security Council as a permanent seat member has not gone unnoticed.

UN General Assembly President Sam Kutesa circulated a text among Member States as the basis for negotiations on the reform of the Security Council in 2015. India is pleased that the adoption of the text on reforms occurred at the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, calling it path-breaking and historic. It believes that this decision to move forward pushes the Intergovernmental Process to follow an irreversible text-based negotiations path that will affect the dynamics of the negotiations on attaining Security Council reforms. For India, the need for reform of the Security Council “cannot be seen to be an exercise ad infinitum and a results-based timeline is crucial”⁵³. Because permanent membership and expanding seats in the Security Council are important to India’s foreign policy and status in the international arena, it will continue to work towards this concrete outcome.

It should also be noted that countries such as Pakistan and Argentina have raised concerns about India and Brazil’s bid for permanent membership. To many political observers, Pakistan is irrevocably opposed to India’s quest to be a permanent member because of strategic rivalry on the subcontinent. In a similar fashion, many scholars feel that “Brazil occupies a place analogous to India’s...pointing to Portuguese-speaking

⁵² Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, *India and the UN Security Council*, pp. 113

⁵³ PTI, “India Suffers Blow as US, Russia, China Oppose UN Security Council Reform Talks”, *DNA*, August 12, 2015, <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-suffers-blow-as-us-russia-china-oppose-un-security-council-reform-talks-2113561>

Brazil's inferior credential in representing largely Hispanic Latin America"⁵⁴. Argentina has made it clear that it does not support Brazil's aim to be a permanent member. This parallel highlights the number of obstacles India and Brazil, as leading contenders for permanent membership to the Security Council, face in their quest. Essentially, these obstacles have not paralyzed India's drive to obtain permanent membership, but rather, is motivated to secure the support of the international community.

THE ARGUMENT OF SOFT POWER

While Joseph S. Nye, Jr.'s definition of soft power aptly describes how states can interact with one another on an international level without using force, it does not take into consideration the magnitude of shaping norms. Nye explains that soft power can derive from cultural, political values, and foreign policies. However, he highlights the limits of soft power by stating, "it tends to have diffuse effects on the outside world and is not easily wielded to achieve specific outcomes"⁵⁵. Yet, Nye's reasoning of soft power falls short in that it does not account for the long-term effects of countries' steadfast principles shaping other countries' perspectives on the same issues. In the case of India, soft power is utilized to persuade other countries of its aspiration to be a permanent member of the Security Council, as well as why it can serve the objectives for which the Security Council was established. Moreover, India strives to attain a specific outcome,

⁵⁴ Shashi Tharoor, "Security Council Reform: Past, Present, and Future [Full Text]", *Ethics & International Affairs*, Volume 25.4, Winter 2011, *Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs*,

https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/25_4/essay/001.html

⁵⁵ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs: New York. Print. 2004, pp. 32

make its imprint in the Security Council to enhance its cooperation on an international level, as well as be an active player in this forum. Essentially, India's push for acceptance in the Security Council as a permanent member is one form of soft power in its ability to influence or change other countries' long-standing positions and preferences.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs is currently pushing for an overhaul of reform in the Security Council membership composition. It urges the United Nations Security Council to reflect modern day global realities. For India, the only way for this to occur is through the expansion of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. The ultimate goal will be executed through soft power as the Ministry of External Affairs writes, "The Government of India has been actively working along with other like-minded countries for building support among the UN membership for a meaningful restructuring and expansion of the UNSC"⁵⁶. In the view of the Ministry of External Affairs and much of the international community, the Security Council reflects the immediate geopolitical architecture of post-World War II. India has attempted to persuade other countries of this urgent need to reform the Security Council by highlighting how the number of Member Nations in the United Nations has increased from 113 to 193 without any drastic change to the composition of the council.

In Shimla Rashtrapati Niwas's *The Many Forms of Soft Power: India and the World*, she asks these question: "Is there a middle path in terms of India's political commitments globally?" and "what are India's political values that are pre-eminent in

⁵⁶ Ministry of External Affairs, "*Indian Diplomacy At Work: Our View*", http://mea.gov.in/Portal/CountryNews/3018_Indian_Diplomacy_At_Work.pdf

their scheme of things?⁵⁷” For India, being a “norm shaper”, through soft power, is convincing the participating governments of the General Assembly to accept its request of permanent membership, as well as recognize the efforts the country has taken to promote international cooperation. Because India has continuously made efforts to show the United Nations that it longs to be a cooperative player, other representatives of the organization have taken heed to consider India as a permanent member of the council. India agrees to the principles of the United Nations Security Council and pledges to uphold the United Nations Charter. However, it firmly believes that the Security Council needs to adjust its norms and be inclusive of the other Member States in terms of representation. Over two decades, India has been successful in gaining other countries’ support of reform and views itself as a leader for attaining these much needed changes to the Security Council.

India has leverage in this issue of Security Council reforms, as it is strategic in how it goes about campaigning for its bid of permanent membership in the body. In Erik Voeten’s “Why No UN Security Council Reform?: Lessons for and from Institutionalist Theory”, he writes: “Although the permanent five are powerful, other states have considerable potential leverage. Japan and Germany could cease paying the UN’s bill; India, Brazil, and South Africa could co-opt developing nations to ignore UNSC

⁵⁷ Shimla Rashtrapati Niwas. (2015). “The Many Forms of Soft Power: India and the World”, *Indian Institute of Advanced Study in collaboration with Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi*, <http://www.iias.org/event/many-forms-soft-power-india-and-world>

decisions⁵⁸”. The United Nations is a logical platform in which India sees itself as a responsible stakeholder in a multilaterally structured and democratically governed body. It is not just the permanent five members’ voices that are being heard in the United Nations on various issues. Currently, India also has policymakers that are more pragmatic than previous ones as their negotiation style does not depend on the moral weight of its arguments, but rather a disposition of political calculus. Through multilateral diplomacy and striking endorsements from countries in their quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council, India rises in its international profile. Instead, rising powers such as India are exerting their influence in the international arena, cooperating with other countries to bring about reforms, and leading other countries to rethink their norms.

WHAT DOES SOFT POWER MEAN FOR INDIA?

Since being recognized as one of the founding countries of the United Nations, India has worked to advance the core principles of the United Nations Charter. For Narendra Patil of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, securing a permanent seat on the Security Council would be monumental for India as it would be an acknowledgment of the vital leadership India has put forth in the non-aligned movement, as well as representative of the developing world⁵⁹. Foreign policy analyst Raja Mohan asserts that India holds “strong cards in the arena of soft power” to advance its foreign

⁵⁸ Erik Voeten, “Why No UN Security Council Reform?: Lessons for and from Institutional Theory”, *Georgetown University*,

http://faculty.georgetown.edu/ev42/index_files/Multilateralism_and_Institutions_chapter.pdf

⁵⁹ Narendra Patil, “How Will it Help India if it Gets a Permanent Seat in the Security Council?”, *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*,

<http://www.idsa.in/askanexpert/getsapermanentseatintheSecurityCouncil>

policy goals⁶⁰. At the same time, many countries have and continue to look upon India for its perspective and advice on issues. In a letter, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit wrote to Nehru, “The Middle East countries and Russia, as well as the American friends of India look to India and to you to assume the leadership of Asia... We have been misrepresented far too long and the ‘big five’ are neither big enough nor united enough to lead the world”⁶¹. Therefore, soft power has not just been a part of India’s foreign policy in the 21st century; it has also been evident in India’s foreign policy from the inception of the Security Council and well into the non-alignment period.

In a panel interview at Brookings Institution held on November 13, 2015, leading India experts Tanvi Madan, David M. Malone, Rani Mullen, and Stephen P. Cohen discussed India’s foreign policy, ideas, institutions, and practice. Rani Mullen explained that India’s soft power is not determined by its hard power. Instead, Mullen stated that India’s foreign policies, power to entice, to influence, and attract other countries are what defines India’s ability to engage with other countries. For example, she recalls India’s ability to utilize its soft power strategically evidenced by the recent third India-Africa forum, which India hosted 40 African leaders. She states, “If Indian soft power and its power to attract is effective, it should open other countries to Indian viewpoints”⁶². Many

⁶⁰ Sundha Ramachandran, “India’s Soft Power Potential”, *The Diplomat*, May 29, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/indias-soft-power-potential/>

⁶¹ Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30 June 1945, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers, Correspondence, pg. 321, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

⁶² “Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Institutions & Practice”, *The Brookings Institution*, November 13, 2015, Moderator: Bruce Jones (Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, *The Brookings Institution*), Panelists: Tanvi Madan (Fellow and Director, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), David M. Malone (Rector, United Nations University, Under-Secretary General, *United Nations*), Rani Mullen (Associate Professor, Government, *College of William & Mary*),

countries have seen India countless times speak on the unfair distribution of power in major institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the Security Council. India has established itself as a leader pushing for Security Council reforms and much of the international community has taken notice of its efforts.

Soft power is a salient element in India's foreign policy in regards to leverage and influence on other countries. Mullen asserts that India's strategy is gaining momentum as evidenced by the growing trade deals, negotiations, and education programs. Additionally, she examines how there are memorandums of understandings signed between African countries and India pushing the issue of India not having a permanent Security Council seat. When asked a question about India on the global stage, its evolution in the United Nations, and if UN matters to Indian foreign policy, Malone stated, "I think it matters symbolically. And Indians are very good at working the UN system...And so I think the seat does matter to them...Would it prefer to be a permanent member, but a second-class one, or would it prefer not to be a permanent member? That's something Delhi will have to think about when the time comes. But I think it's an accomplished multilateral actor"⁶³. Mullen's assertion of India being an accomplished

Stephen P. Cohen (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/11/13-india/20151113_indian_foreign_policy_transcript.pdf

⁶³ "Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Institutions & Practice", *The Brookings Institution*, November 13, 2015, Moderator: Bruce Jones (Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, *The Brookings Institution*), Panelists: Tanvi Madan (Fellow and Director, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), David M. Malone (Rector, United Nations University, Under-Secretary General, *United Nations*), Rani Mullen (Associate Professor, Government, *College of William & Mary*), Stephen P. Cohen (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/11/13-india/20151113_indian_foreign_policy_transcript.pdf

multilateral actor stems from its ability to engage with other countries diplomatically and gain their trust and support in dialogue at the global level.

THE EFFECTS OF INDIA'S SOFT POWER

Although the road may be long and a successful outcome may not come to fruition, India has wielded international influence by convincing and collaborating with countries such as permanent Security Council members, United States, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as an increasing list of other countries to pledge support of its application. In fact, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs emphasizes how “India is also pursuing the matter through bilateral channels with [their] interlocutors. A large number of countries have supported India’s initiatives for reform of the UNSC as well as endorsed its candidature for permanent membership⁶⁴.” US Representative to the United Nations, Samantha Power, weighed in on the issue of reforming the Security Council in September 2015 with “Let me affirm that we support a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member”⁶⁵. This joint statement resulted from the Indian-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue, as well as the text that circulated in the General Assembly on the major reforms of the Security Council prior to the dialogue. Moreover, India and the United States are both dedicated to Security Council reform evidenced by their participation in the UN Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council Reform. In September 2015, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov met with Indian Ministry of External Affairs Sujata Mehta to discuss

⁶⁴ Ministry of External Affairs, “*Indian Diplomacy At Work: Our View*”, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/CountryNews/3018_Indian_Diplomacy_At_Work.pdf

⁶⁵ PTI, “US Backs India’s Bid for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat”, *The Indian Express*, September 23, 2015

the 70th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly; it was at this meeting that an assurance was made by the Russian Federation of India's efforts in gaining a permanent Security Council seat. The Russian Embassy released a statement soon after the meeting, "The Russian side reaffirmed the readiness to support the Indian candidature for the United Nations Security Council permanent membership in case of decision to extend it both categories – permanent and non-permanent members"⁶⁶. As for the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron is behind a renewed, modern partnership between the two countries and stated in November 2015, "UK backs India for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council"⁶⁷. This joint statement was released after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the United Kingdom, which also led to a civilian nuclear deal between the two countries worth 9 billion pounds. The Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Francois Delattre, has also supported India's representation in the Security Council stating in 2015, "France supports an enlargement of the Council in both categories of membership, permanent and non-permanent and supports Germany, Japan, which deserves to be mentioned today, but also India, Brazil, and African representation"⁶⁸. Moreover, India's capacity to have four out of the five permanent Security Council members endorse its candidature for a permanent

⁶⁶ PTI, "Russia Assures India of Support on UNSC Permanent Seat Bid", *The Economic Times*, September 16, 2015, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-09-16/news/66604729_1_permanent-membership-unscc-permanent-and-non-permanent-members

⁶⁷ "Modi-Cameron Issue Joint Statement, UK Backs India's Bid for Permanent UNSC Seat", *IndiaToday*, November 12, 2015, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/modi-cameron-issue-joint-statement-uk-backs-indias-bid-for-permanent-unscc-seat/1/522068.html>

⁶⁸ PTI, "France Supports India as Permanent UN Security Council Member", *The Economic Times*, May 6, 2015, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-05-06/news/61865626_1_permanent-member-united-nations-un-charter

seat in the body is not only both monumental and groundbreaking, but speaks of India's significant soft power.

In September 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi chaired the Special Summit of G-4 nations on the agenda of major Security Council Reforms in New York. Modi has repeatedly argued that countries exist in a fundamentally different world from the time the United Nations was created. On September 14, 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Decision 69/560, which served as the basis for negotiation within the IGN towards text-based negotiations on UN reforms. This is considered to be a historical moment because the text for these major reforms took 23 years to reach completion. While the foreign ministers of each G-4 country met in 2013 and 2014 to discuss Security Council reforms, the heads of the countries met in September 2015 for the first time in a decade. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, and Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe stressed the need for a more representative, legitimate Security Council for the future of global security⁶⁹. The leaders of the United States, United Kingdom, and France reaffirmed their support of India's permanent membership to the Council after each one met with Modi. India's External Affairs Ministry spokesman Vikas Swarup raised a point after the Summit that President Obama's reiterated support for India's quest for permanent membership is significant and that India is looking forward to how

⁶⁹ Joint Press Statement at the Meeting of Leaders of the G-4 Countries- Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan – on United Nations Security Council Reform, PMINDIA, September 26, 2015, http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/joint-press-statement-at-the-meeting-of-leaders-of-the-g-4-countries-brazil-germany-india-and-japan-on-united-nations-security-council-reform/

the Intergovernmental Negotiations advance⁷⁰. Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India are a force in international politics as evidenced by their efforts to be taken as serious candidates for permanent Security Council membership. Taking leadership in the movement of Security Council reforms, Modi chaired the G-4 Summit to reinvigorate their resolve to fulfill the principles of the UN Charter and advocated better representation at the international institutional level.

Additionally, India has put forth its bid for a 2021–2022 non-permanent seat as expressed by the Permanent Representative to the UN Asoke Kumar Mukerji. This is a unique diplomatic move by India. India put forth its candidature after Afghanistan withdrew its bid for a non-permanent seat during this term. This action by Afghanistan was a result of bilateral discussion between the two countries. The Permanent Mission of Afghanistan wrote in a letter, “The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has decided to withdraw its candidacy...This decision is taken on the basis of the long-standing, close and friendly relations between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India.”⁷¹ From this interaction, political observers can assume that India still longs to take a bigger role in international politics and has the ability to shape other countries’ decisions. Historically, India and Afghanistan have had a complex relationship, but Afghanistan’s decision to support India’s bid for a non-permanent seat in the 2021–2022 Security Council term emphasizes India’s ability to

⁷⁰ PTI, “US, UK, France Support India’s Permanent Membership in UN Security Council”, *The Financial Express*, September 29, 2015

⁷¹ “India Puts Candidacy for 2021-2022 UNSC Non-Permanent Seat”, *The Economic Times*, December 5, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-12-05/news/44808135_1_non-permanent-seat-india-and-afghanistan-unscc

collaborate diplomatically. India, among the other G-4 countries, has continued to show that it has the capacity and willingness to fulfill key responsibilities for the preservation of international peace and stability.

In terms of the future, India has revealed its soft power through its pledge to be flexible with detailed proposals on Security Council reforms. For example, India has shown room to compromise in regards to the right of veto as it may be willing to negotiate further on this matter. At this moment, India weighs the option of becoming a permanent member on the Security Council as an anticipated responsibility that is time-sensitive. Moreover, it believes that a straw poll should be taken to determine what hesitations and concerns countries may have in regards to reforms of the Council. India has taken extra efforts to signal to other Member States that it is in favor of cooperation and genuine reform of the Security Council. Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, Nirupam Sen, asserts that there is no added value in a resolution for Security Council reform if it avoids the acceptance of new permanent seats. It is also widely believed among Indian officials and diplomats that India will continue to “staunchly believe that time is on their side and that they can afford to wait the process out in hope of a permanent seat”⁷². India’s vigor in seeking permanent membership of the Security Council has not wavered and rather, looks to increase in the future.

TIMELINE OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS

On December 11, 1992, Security Council reforms were officially added to the General Assembly’s agenda at the 48th Session, specifically on the question of equitable

⁷² Jonas von Freiesleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, <https://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ManagingChange-1.pdf>, pp. 19

representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. Among those who advocated these reforms were India and 34 other countries from the Non-Aligned Movement. Additionally, Member States were given the task to submit comments on a potential review of membership of the Security Council with the deadline of June 1993. In 1993, the Open-Ended Working Group was created to record the progress of its efforts before the General Assembly. Some of the issues that the group discussed were veto restraints and improvements, as well as a category of elected seats with a longer term. In 2000, deliberations on Security Council reforms intensified as seen in the final document produced at the Millennium Summit. At the 2005 World Summit, the G-4 Countries, India, Germany, Brazil, and Japan advocated for permanent seats with veto power on the condition of a review taking place. The Group of Four supports a new permanent Security Council seat for each of its members as well as two seats for Africa. Between 2006 and 2007, alternative models were discussed and at one point, Brazil, Germany, and Japan showed interest for longer-term seats. However, India was firm in its stance that it did not agree to longer-term seats and placing the discussion of permanent seats on hold. The G4's official statement for a possible solution on expansion of the Security Council and veto power is:

Membership of the Security Council shall be enlarged in both categories, new permanent members and new non-permanent members. Member States should continue discussion on the use of the veto in certain circumstances and, in this context, the following voluntary offer is made. New permanent members would as a principle have the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members. However, new permanent members shall not exercise the veto-right until a decision

on the matter has been taken during a review, to be held 15 years after the coming into force of the reform⁷³.

From this statement, political observers can see India's flexibility on the use of veto power for the future permanent seat members. India agreed with Brazil, Japan, and Germany that the use of veto power would be reviewed 15 years after the new permanent seats were added to the Security Council. Therefore, while India is particular on gaining a permanent seat in the Security Council, it is strategic and rational in its campaign for reform.

BLOCS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS

Aside from the G-4 countries, there are several other blocs that are pushing for Security Council reforms with different goals. The L69 is a group of 42 Member States that are in support of permanent seats, extension of veto power for the permanent seats, and a non-permanent seat for small island states. In 2012, the L69 bloc, which includes India, advocated that new permanent Security Council seats should have veto power. There were some Member States that thought this convergence with African nations' position was a move to create momentum. There is also the Pacific SIDs (Small Island Developing States) bloc, which is in support of L69's proposals, but particularly for the call of a non-permanent seat for Small Island developing states. The C10/African Union group is a collaboration of 53 African countries that are in favor of two permanent seats for Africa with veto power. The key members of the C10 bloc are Sierra Leone, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Namibia, Zambia, Senegal, Kenya, Algeria, and

⁷³ Timeline UN Security Council Reform: 1992- November 2015, *Center for UN Reform Education*, <http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Timeline%20November%202015%20final.pdf>

Uganda. Additionally, there is the Uniting for Consensus bloc that has 12 core members that are opposed to new permanent seats, but advocate an increase in non-permanent seats or longer-term seats. There is also the Arab Group, which supported a new permanent seat for Arab countries in 2013, but has not repeated this claim since. The Accounting, Coherence, and Transparency (ACT) bloc focuses on the working methods of the current Security Council and is led by countries such as Austria, Chile, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Sweden among others. Last, there is the CARICOM bloc, or otherwise known as the Caribbean Community, which is also aligned with the L69 bloc⁷⁴. Although there are various blocs with different aspirations for Security Council reforms, they all have one thing in common: adjusting the Security Council to be more efficient, effective, legitimate, and representative for the good of the international community.

Many countries that support reforms for the Security Council desire to see concrete results after several years of negotiations. From 2007 onwards, many member states turned to Intergovernmental Negotiations to push for concrete efforts, particularly India, Japan, Brazil, and Germany. From 2016 to 2017, Japan will serve as a non-permanent member of the Security Council after feeling uncertain that it would not attain a permanent seat in 2015. Yet, India is still adamant on becoming a permanent member of the Security Council and poses as a strong candidate for an expanded body. India will remain an ardent protester of the Security Council's status quo until satisfactory reforms have been achieved to its liking.

⁷⁴ "Is there Momentum for Security Council Reform? What are the Obstacles?", *Center for UN Reform Education*, May 31, 2015, <http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/602>

INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS

The United Nations' Intergovernmental Negotiations have been under way since September 15, 2008 in discussing Security Council reforms as a result of the General Assembly's decision 62/557. The five issues that the intergovernmental negotiations focus on are the categories of membership, veto power, regional representation, size and functioning of the Security Council, and relationship between the General Assembly and Security Council. The General Assembly ruled that reform would depend on the widest possible political acceptance as seen in resolution 62/557, and not strictly by consensus. Jamaican Ambassador Courtenay Rattray, the chief of the negotiating team, has been praised for his efforts in moving the reform process substantially forward. It is important to note that Jamaica is a member of the L69 group and has been vocal in supporting Security Council reforms. From the negotiations, a text was created to debate and converge on reforms. However, countries such as the Russian Federation and China do not consider the text produced by the intergovernmental negotiations as the foundation for discussion on reforms. Rather in 2013, the Russian Federation and China claimed that timing of the text-based negotiations was not yet right. Moreover, they expressed that the that while there is widespread support for reforming the Security Council among Member States, there still is a lack of consensus on which reforms should take place. The Indian delegation has countered this point by asserting that timing is a key factor in these negotiations.

When asked about the timeline of progress, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Asoke Mukerji stated that it depends, particularly if the United

Nations General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft retains Ambassador Rattray as the head of the negotiating team⁷⁵. On October 23, 2015, it was announced that the Permanent Representative of Luxembourg Ambassador Sylvie Lucas would be the next head of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reforms⁷⁶. Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn, stated that Ambassador Lucas would work conscientiously to converge the Member States to collaborate on a more representative, transparent, and effective council to handle peace and international security issues of the 21st century.

In February 2015, the Foreign Ministers of China and Russia released a communiqué that reiterated “the importance they attached to the status of India in international affairs and supported its aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations”⁷⁷. Both countries’ leaders are looking for the broadest consensus among the United Nations General Assembly on United Nations Security Council reforms through diplomatic means. Currently, the Russian Federation, once opposed to expanding permanent Security Council seats, is now considering “any reasonable option of expanding the Security Council including the so-called ‘intermediate solution’, which

⁷⁵ Suhasini Haidar, “U.N. Motion Raises India’s Hope for Permanent Security Council Seat”, *The Hindu*, September 15, 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/un-motion-raises-indias-hope-for-permanent-security-council-seat/article7652441.ece>

⁷⁶ “Security Council of the United Nations: Luxembourg chairs the Negotiations on its Reform”, *The Official Portal of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg*, October 2015, <http://www.luxembourg.public.lu/en/actualites/2015/10/26-onu/index.html>

⁷⁷ “India’s UNSC Aspirations: Is China on Board? – Analysis”, *Spearhead Research*, March 6, 2015, http://spearheadresearch.org/SR_CMS/index.php/internationalaffairssecurity/indias-unsc-aspirations-is-china-on-board-analysis

eludes to a compromise”⁷⁸. The United States has outlined that the election of any additional permanent members should be country-specific in nature rather than regionally-specific, emphasizing the maintenance of international peace and security, and overall, supports a modest expansion of permanent members.

The five categories that the Intergovernmental Negotiations are focused on exemplify the root of many countries’ frustration with the Security Council. While the issues of expansion in permanent Security Council seats and extension of the veto power are problematic, the G-4 countries, first and foremost, continue to demand recognition as permanent members on the body. On the issue of veto power, there has been discussion of only utilizing this power for “responsibility to protect” situations such as genocides. In regards to regional representation, potential Security Council reforms include the expansion of seats to African and Arab countries, small islands, and Eastern European countries. Yet, this proposal of expansion based on a rotational basis or permanency has faced opposition from a number of countries. As for the expansion of the body, increasing the number of members may not correlate with a decrease in efficiency. Also, an enlarged Security Council could lead to creative, multi-faceted solutions. Moreover, a larger Security Council could place pressure on permanent members with veto power when casting their votes. With more member states, permanent members with veto power may vote differently or think more strategically due to the increased representation of the body. In the last category, a number of countries have pledged support behind the

⁷⁸ “UNSC: Misreading an Opportunity”, *Center on International Cooperation, New York University*, August 16, 2015, http://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/unsc-misreading-opportunity

recommendation of having more consistent, analytical annual reports as well as special reports from the Security Council to the General Assembly⁷⁹.

Now that the negotiations text is being circulated throughout the United Nations General Assembly, permanent members of the Security Council cannot veto or stop the Intergovernmental Negotiations process. Therefore, even if countries oppose Security Council reforms, the process will continue to progress where aspirant countries need a two-thirds majority from the United Nations General Assembly on the proposals. In the history of the Intergovernmental Negotiation process, this is the first time that a decision on Security Council reform has been adopted by consensus through an official formal L Document of the United Nations General Assembly. This is also a victory for India because the text-based negotiations are one step closer in adopting potential reforms. For seven years, countries were making statements about reforms, but the text offers a tangible platform in which Member States can engage in productive discussion about the proposals.

INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES' PARTNERSHIP

In a 1953 interview with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, the Leader of the United States Delegation to the United Nations, Ms. Pandit recalls how President Eisenhower “deeply desired friendship with India...He was conscious of the fact that the key to be used not through any pressure of events or any compulsion but because the

⁷⁹ Vesselin Popovski, “Reforming and Innovating the United Nations Security Council”, *Commission on Global Security Justice & Governance*, 2015, http://www.globalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Commission_BP_Popovski1.pdf

great Indian nation realised its responsibility to all freedom-loving peoples⁸⁰”. When nations such as the United States or Soviet Union courted India in the 1950s with offers for a permanent seat at the Security Council, India cited international security and timing to be the factors for its refusal. However, India was aware of its position in the international arena and responsibility for preserving peace, similar to how the country views itself as a leader today, but now deserving a permanent seat in the Security Council.

President Barack Obama’s endorsement of India’s bid for a permanent Security Council seat in November 2010 was historic. While visiting India, President Obama addressed dignitaries, “As two global leaders, the United States and India can partner for global security...And that is why I can say today, in the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member⁸¹”. It signaled to the international community that the world’s largest democracies were fostering an indispensable partnership. The United States also supports reforms that will lead to a United Nations Security Council that is efficient, effective, credible and legitimate. In a speech to the Indian Parliament, President Obama stated, “In Asia and around the world, India is not simply emerging. India has emerged⁸².” Though the

⁸⁰ “Interview with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Leader of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations”, 3 April 1953, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 2nd Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 4, pg. 4, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

⁸¹ “Obama Backs India on Permanent UN Security Council Seat”, BBC, November 8, 2010, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11711007>

⁸² Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jim Yardley, “Countering China, Obama Backs India for U.N. Council”, *The New York Times*, November 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09prexy.html?_r=0

endorsement may be a symbolic one, countries such as China and the remaining Permanent Members have taken notice of India's posture in the international community.

The significance of President Obama's message should not be taken lightly. Ben Rhodes, one of President Obama's top foreign policy advisers, stated that the endorsement was made to send a powerful message in regard to India's performance on the world stage. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry was shocked at the United States' statement and stated that it would hope that the country "take a moral view and not base itself on any temporary expediency or exigencies of power politics"⁸³. Nonetheless, after President Obama's statement, Indian officials were ecstatic to hear the United States' call for India to lead, not as an opportunity, but as a responsibility. Some pundits have declared the United States' political statement as bold because it is the recognition of India's movement towards global power, as well as the United States' efforts to be a partner of India.

Both the United States and India can benefit from a partnership. Tanvi Madan from the Brookings Institution panel interview stated, "There's nothing like a rising India, a democratic India, that will show through the power of example that democracies can succeed as well. And I think that's been kind of a key element...saying that the U.S. is a principle partner in India's rise. That they've acknowledged that role, there will be a key role in terms of helping"⁸⁴. For a permanent member of the Security Council like the

⁸³ Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jim Yardley, "Countering China, Obama Backs India for U.N. Council", *The New York Times*, November 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09prexy.html?_r=0

⁸⁴ "Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Institutions & Practice", *The Brookings Institution*, November 13, 2015, Moderator: Bruce Jones (Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, *The Brookings*

United States to recognize India as a desired future permanent member offers credibility to the latter's aspiration. India portrays itself as a country that is willing to go great lengths to fortify the legitimacy of the Security Council. Moreover, now that India has secured the United States' support for its bid, other Member States will be bound to think of India as a serious contender, rethink their norms of Security Council reforms, and view India as a potential permanent member of the Security Council.

LOBBYING EFFORTS

The expansion of the Security Council is contentious for a number of reasons. To date, there have been relatively few concrete efforts to reform the body that have been successful. Additionally, many pundits question the Security Council's legitimacy and if it reflects 21st century realities. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan asked, "The need for Security Council reform is not questioned...It needs new members and more of them, but how many, and which ones?"⁸⁵ Some countries feel that an expansion to the Security Council could lead to the dilution of the body's powers or impede its decision-making. However, there are an overwhelming number of countries that feel that increased representation in the body would result in greater legitimacy of the resolutions. One thing that is certain is that there has been a lack of consensus over which countries

Institution), Panelists: Tanvi Madan (Fellow and Director, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), David M. Malone (Rector, United Nations University, Under-Secretary General, *United Nations*), Rani Mullen (Associate Professor, Government, *College of William & Mary*), Stephen P. Cohen (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2015/11/13-india/20151113_indian_foreign_policy_transcript.pdf

⁸⁵ "UN Security Council: Expansion Debate", *Stanford University*, web.stanford.edu/group/IDL/Shurshikova.ppt

would be included in these reforms or which alternative model should ultimately be adhered to.

Many point to the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of a consensus resolution for the Intergovernmental Negotiations Group as notable. At the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the basis of a negotiating text was adopted by consensus and not by a vote. For the past seven years of Intergovernmental Negotiations, leaders have conducted discussion and debate without a text. UN General Assembly President Sam Kutesa circulated the texts to all Member States, which included key positions and proposals. This 25-page document consists of the views from various groups of countries such as the G-4, L69, and other regional blocs. However, the Uniting for Consensus group, led by Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea were vocal in their opposition towards the text-based negotiations. Despite their lack of support for the text, the text was passed by consensus, which India advocated strongly for years. India's Ambassador to the UN Asoke Kumar Mukerji stated, "Those who ask for not imposing artificial timelines may be advised to desist from inflicting artificial delays on this process"⁸⁶. India has asserted that a results-based timeline is imperative in attaining Security Council reforms rather than an exercise ad infinitum, which is why it strongly urged other countries to participate in the text-based negotiations document.

Since formally launching its campaign to gain a permanent Security Council seat in 1992, a rising number of countries have pledged their support in India's bid. With

⁸⁶ PTI, "United Nations Adopts Documents Based Negotiations For Security Council Reforms", *The Indian Express*, September 14, 2015, <http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-others/united-nation-adopts-documents-based-negotiations-for-security-council-reforms/>

great power comes great responsibility; a permanent seat in the Security Council with veto power certainly demands thoughtful and responsible leadership. In 2005, India asserted that a permanent seat on the council should also include veto power. The Indian Ambassador to the UN, Nirupam stated at the general Assembly on the High Level Panel Report: “A new category of permanent members without veto would not balance the weight of existing permanent members. That is precisely why new permanent members should have the veto under guidelines that would act as an example to other permanent members”⁸⁷. In 2005, a BBC World Service Poll with the help of international polling firm GlobeScan was conducted across 23 countries with over 23,000 respondents on the issue of Security Council reforms. A majority of countries, 22 out of the 23, were in favor of increasing permanent Security Council seats, most notably to India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil. Steven Kull, director of Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, who helped conduct this poll stated, “Very large majorities all around the world are calling for the UN to become more powerful in world affairs. Consistent with this sentiment there is broad support for making the UN Security Council more representative by adding new members...The readiness for dramatic change is very palpable”⁸⁸. On behalf of the United Kingdom, Philip Parham expressed at the General Assembly in 2010, “on the Council’s structure, we continue to support permanent membership for Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, as well as permanent representation

⁸⁷ Shairi Mathur, “Voting for the Veto: India in a Reformed UN”, *Foreign Policy Centre*, September 2005, <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/565.pdf>

⁸⁸ “23-Country Poll Finds Strong Support for Dramatic Changes at UN, and for Increased UN Power”, *GlobeScan Incorporated* and *The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)*, November 15, 2004 – January 5, 2005, http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll4.html

for Africa”⁸⁹. Additionally, a rising number of developing countries have pledged their support of India’s candidature for a permanent Security Council seat at the General Assembly meeting. Thus, India will continue to earnestly canvass for a permanent seat in the body until tangible reforms are attained.

When it comes to seeking a permanent Security Council seat, India’s use of soft power in lobbying for its bid characterizes its negotiating style multilaterally. Many pundits assert that Indian negotiators have a tendency to over negotiate or do not know when to proclaim a win. David M. Malone argues that India needs to be more strategic about what it wants. He elaborates on this point by highlighting India’s need to compromise in small ways, which does not come naturally to many of its negotiators⁹⁰. However, to gain wider support for its bid of a permanent seat in the Council, India has shifted away from its insistence on retaining the veto power and has campaigned more on the issues of expansion of permanent Security Council seats and non-permanent seats. According to the Defence Forum India, 84 countries have supported India in its bid for permanent membership in the Security Council⁹¹. For each country that has reinforced

⁸⁹ “Solution to Reform of Security Council ‘Is in Your Hands’, General Assembly President Says as Member States Begin Annual Debate on Long-Standing Issue, *United Nations*, November 11, 2010, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/ga11022.doc.htm>

⁹⁰ “Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Institutions & Practice”, *The Brookings Institution*, November 13, 2015, Moderator: Bruce Jones (Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, *The Brookings Institution*), Panelists: Tanvi Madan (Fellow and Director, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), David M. Malone (Rector, United Nations University, Under-Secretary General, *United Nations*), Rani Mullen (Associate Professor, Government, *College of William & Mary*), Stephen P. Cohen (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2015/11/13-india/20151113_indian_foreign_policy_transcript.pdf

⁹¹ “Countries Supporting India for a Permanent Seat at UNSC”, *Defence Forum India*, <http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/threads/countries-supporting-india-for-a-permanent-seat-at-unsc.16149/>

India's candidature for a permanent seat there are several news articles and memos from the Indian government expressing their support. As a result, India is pushing its diplomacy, collaboration, and leadership on the international level through public endorsements. Furthermore, India has been sending emissaries to different countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, China, and the African Union to rally support for its bid. From these two strategies of sending emissaries and publically promoting its endorsements, India has been wholly successful in gaining support for its bid of a permanent seat in the body.

SOFT POWER AND NEGOTIATION

The issue of permanent membership and reforms in the Security Council for India is one that cannot be closely compared to other multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. India's soft power through foreign policy at the Security Council emphasizes the "long game". India is committed to its campaign of permanent membership and greater representation in the Security Council as evidenced by its willingness to promote its aspirations for over twenty years. There is no alternative body or institutional forum to the United Nations, whereas with the International Monetary Fund or World Bank, India can turn to, join, or form a number of bodies for similar purposes such as the BRICs bank. However, the United Nations is an important multilateral organization that has principles, which India strongly adheres to and hopes to uphold in the international community. As a founding member of the United Nations, India is betrothed to principles, goals of the Charter, and specialized programmes and agencies.

IMPACT IN SOUTH ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

However, one of India's biggest obstacles in attaining permanent membership on the Security Council is China. Malone from the Brookings Institution panel argues that by China's opposition of Japan's bid for a permanent seat, it indirectly ostracizes other countries such as India in its candidature⁹². Malone believes that as long as the Security Council remains meaningful and relevant in the international system, India and Brazil will eventually attain permanent Security Council seats. Stephen Cohen mentioned in the Brookings Institution panel that there is a memo from the Chinese Foreign Ministry that argues that China should place its support behind India in Security Council and not Japan⁹³. Cohen also states that China is now a South Asian power and now the two countries, India and China, are linked when dealing with South Asia. Therefore, international relations in the United Nations Security Council and South Asia point to India and China's complex relationship. Where once in the 1950s India and China supported one another, India has now aligned itself with the United States against China

⁹² "Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Institutions & Practice", *The Brookings Institution*, November 13, 2015, Moderator: Bruce Jones (Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, *The Brookings Institution*), Panelists: Tanvi Madan (Fellow and Director, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), David M. Malone (Rector, United Nations University, Under-Secretary General, *United Nations*), Rani Mullen (Associate Professor, Government, *College of William & Mary*), Stephen P. Cohen (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2015/11/13-india/20151113_indian_foreign_policy_transcript.pdf

⁹³ "Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Institutions & Practice", *The Brookings Institution*, November 13, 2015, Moderator: Bruce Jones (Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, *The Brookings Institution*), Panelists: Tanvi Madan (Fellow and Director, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), David M. Malone (Rector, United Nations University, Under-Secretary General, *United Nations*), Rani Mullen (Associate Professor, Government, *College of William & Mary*), Stephen P. Cohen (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2015/11/13-india/20151113_indian_foreign_policy_transcript.pdf

in the chance of gaining a permanent seat in the Security Council. Tanvi Madan echoes these sentiments as she mentions how the soft power element is evident in both the United States and India's speeches, as well as a lack of China's name being mentioned. Despite China's stance on an expanded Security Council, India will push forward in its aspiration to serve as a permanent member of the body.

If India were to be appointed a permanent seat in the Security Council, there would be a paradigm shift felt in the international community. Some pundits argue that giving India a permanent seat would counterbalance China's rising influence. Other say that India's values are closely linked to the United States' as it is the oldest democracy in the world. From its past efforts in the Non-Aligned movement, India has guarded its independence and avoided joining global blocs. These experiences could help foster India's leadership if chosen to be a permanent member to the Security Council as they would be free from geopolitical biases that may impact other Member States. India would also bring to the Security Council's table the impact of being a developing country turned rising power. India understands the struggles of developing countries, especially in South Asian and African countries, but works to create a stable, prosperous future for its people. With this mentality, India could serve as a well-rounded permanent member of the Security Council.

PRIME MINISTER MODI AND UNSC REFORMS

Prime Minister Modi has referred to the Security Council as a result of circumstance of a bygone era. He has continually pressed United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to include India in the Security Council to make the body

representative as well as have the reforms occur in a fixed timeframe. In a letter to the United Nations Security General dated July 4, 2015, Modi wrote, “It must now reflect the realities and needs of the 21st century. A Security Council that includes the world’s largest democracy, major locomotives of the global economy, and voices from all the major continents, will carry greater credibility and legitimacy and will be more representative and effective.⁹⁴” It has been a top priority on Modi’s agenda to showcase India’s ability to serve as a responsible leader in a reformed Security Council.

Modi, emphasizing that India is the largest contributor to the UN Peacekeeping forces, stated in April 2015, “India is a country that is for peace, and helps bring peace to the world, and yet we are fighting to get a seat in the UNSC”⁹⁵. Then in October 2015 at the Third India-Africa Forum Summit, Modi asserted, “This is a world of free nations and awakened aspirations. Our institutions cannot be representative of our world, if they do not give voice to Africa, with more than a quarter of UN members, or the world’s largest democracy with one-sixth of humanity. That is why India and Africa must speak in one voice for reforms of the United Nations, including its Security Council”⁹⁶. One of Modi’s strengths in leadership is not only raising awareness of India’s capabilities as a stakeholder in international relations, but also persuading other likeminded countries to

⁹⁴ PTI. “UNSC Must Include India to Make it More Representative: PM Narendra Modi”, *The Indian Express*, September 18, 2015, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/unsc-must-include-india-to-make-it-more-representative-pm-narendra-modi/>

⁹⁵ Agencies, Paris. “It is India’s Right to Get a Permanent Seat in UNSC: PM Modi”, *Hindustan Times*, April 12, 2015, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/it-is-india-s-right-to-get-a-permanent-seat-in-unsc-pm-modi/story-Ynt5HnseN5glUzG6PEiLxH.html>

⁹⁶ PTI. “India-Africa Summit: PM Modi Pitches for UNSC Reforms”, *DNA*, October 29, 2015, <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-africa-forum-summit-pm-modi-pitches-for-unsc-reforms-2139848>

do the same. This has been especially relevant in India's foreign policy for the past few decades.

It is important for the Indian government to make sure other countries understand that it has contributed to the global order and desires to sustain international peace and security. This is most evidenced by Modi's interest in visiting countries over the last two years, which have garnered wide international attention. While visiting Paris, Modi expressed how India has contributed and collaborated with the international community in WWI and WWII. In these visits, the media often publishes how and who has publicly supported India in their candidature for a permanent Security Council seat. Madan writes, "But what's been really interesting is the number of countries he's actually in some way engaged in, or somebody senior in the India government has. And if you look at every statement that comes out, there is always a sense that India's pushing not just for support at the UN, so you see endorsements of that."⁹⁷ No other country has gone to the extent India has to secure support from an abundance of countries in serving as permanent member of the Security Council.

Since Narendra Modi was elected as Prime Minister in 2014, he has made 37 foreign trips on five continents. He has visited Australia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, China, Fiji, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

⁹⁷ "Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Institutions & Practice", *The Brookings Institution*, November 13, 2015, Moderator: Bruce Jones (Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, *The Brookings Institution*), Panelists: Tanvi Madan (Fellow and Director, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), David M. Malone (Rector, United Nations University, Under-Secretary General, *United Nations*), Rani Mullen (Associate Professor, Government, *College of William & Mary*), Stephen P. Cohen (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2015/11/13-india/20151113_indian_foreign_policy_transcript.pdf

Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, France, Nepal, the Russian Federation, Singapore, and the United States. He has also planned to visit Belgium, Saudi Arabia, and Laos for the remainder of this year. Modi has underscored India's capacity to be an international power by boosting bilateral relations⁹⁸. Not only has this solidified India's posture in the international arena, but also other countries have taken notice of India's capabilities and leadership in global issues.

AGENTS OF SOFT POWER

Through India's use of soft power and shaping other country's norms on reforming the Security Council, there have been changes in long-standing preferences. India's agents of soft power depend on key members of India's government such as Prime Minister Modi, Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj, and various ambassadors. In February 2015, Prime Minister Modi spoke to more than 110 Heads of Missions from around the globe in New Delhi about India's leading role and adaptation to global changes. The focus of this conference was "Diplomacy with Development"⁹⁹. Not only was Prime Minister Modi able to speak to Ambassadors and Heads of Missions about India's efforts to promote proactive policies and areas of opportunity, but also was able to emphasize India's heritage and values. Essentially, the spreading of the message of India's capacity and capabilities to serve as an effective, collaborative leader in the

⁹⁸ "Around the World with PM Narendra Modi", *The Hindu*, December 24, 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/specials/narendra-modis-foreign-trips/article7677038.ece>

⁹⁹ Suhasini Haidar, "Position India in a Leading Role Globally: Modi to Indian Ambassadors", *The Hindu*, February 8, 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/position-india-in-a-leading-role-globally-pm-to-indian-ambassadors/article6868993.ece>

international arena is a result of India's ambassadors, high commissioners, and key officials who are passionate about their country's diplomacy. Moreover, these prominent leaders desire for other countries to recognize India's potential to serve the international community.

IMPACT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

India reasons that the United Nations Security Council in its current structure is “completely out of tune” with global realities and serves “no one's purpose”. The working methods of the Security Council do not just impact the 15 members, but also the 193 member states of the General Assembly. Therefore, through lobbying efforts, India has pushed to gain traction on the issue of Security Council reform, as well as by urging member states to send their views on how the working methods of the council can be enhanced, which will be incorporated in a concept paper. When India was assigned Presidency of the Security Council in November 2012, it stated that the Security Council is “polarized and politically divided”, specifically on the issues such as Syria. It used the position of presidency to highlight the need for reform and an expansion to the council with permanent representation from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Hardeep Singh Puri said, “In order to give the Council effectiveness there is need to enlarge its size. India's point of view is that the Security Council needs to be more transparent”¹⁰⁰. He also emphasized that, “some permanent members should come off the high table but they need to bring on board other

¹⁰⁰ PTI, “UN Security Council Serves No One's Purpose: India”, *The Hindu*, November 3, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/un-security-council-serves-no-ones-purpose-india/article4061775.ece>

countries which carry weight, participate in the Council's work and will lend credibility to its images and functioning"¹⁰¹. From India's perspective, over 100 countries are in support of Security Council reform and therefore, it is in the interest of the minority to listen to the global majority's opinions.

In February 2016, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Syed Akbaruddin stated, "I fail to understand that if since 1945 the total population of the UN's membership has increased more than 3 times, the number of countries members of the UN has increased more than 3 times, yet we are hearing voices saying that increase of the size to less than 3 times what it was in 1945 is too much"¹⁰². India has been promoting an urgent need to reform the Security Council for numerous years and it will not subside in its critiques of the current status.

GAUGING COUNTRIES FOR INCLUSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

There are a number of variables that India could promote for its candidature of a permanent Security Council seat such as being the largest democracy, second largest population, largest contributor of UN peacekeeping forces, third largest military, and tenth largest economy. But Indian elites and political officials do not lead with these variables when discussing their campaign in gaining a permanent seat. These objective standards of population, gross domestic product, and contributions to the United Nations peacekeeping forces do not capture a country's aspiration to serve as a permanent

¹⁰¹ PTI, "UN Security Council Serves No One's Purpose: India", *The Hindu*, November 3, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/un-security-council-serves-no-ones-purpose-india/article4061775.ece>

¹⁰² PTI, "UNSC Expansion Should be Based on Contemporary Realities: India", *The Economic Times*, February 23, 2016, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/unsc-expansion-should-be-based-on-contemporary-realities-india/articleshow/51107828.cms>

member of the Security Council entirely. International affairs experts Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick assert that there should be a criteria-based process to gauge countries' aspirations to join a potentially reformed Security Council. Their model looks to a number of variables such as political stability, the capacity and willingness to act in defense of international security, ability to negotiate and implement contentious agreements, and the institutional wherewithal to contribute to the UNSC agenda¹⁰³. These indicators go beyond the measurements of economy, population, and contributions to the United Nations. With these other factors, India propels the mission of representing the realities of the 21st century and hope to include a larger voice on international affairs.

PAKISTAN'S STANCE ON INDIA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Politics does not occur in a power vacuum. Pakistan strongly opposes India's movement towards permanent Security Council seat expansion. Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Maleeha Lodhi, states that adding permanent members is a sterile move as they would not be accountable to those they are supposed to represent¹⁰⁴. Although Lodhi did not explicitly state India when speaking, she asserted that there are a number of countries who seek to "promote their self-arrogated right to a privileged and unequal status. And they have maintained this rigid position since the

¹⁰³ Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, "UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests", *Council on Foreign Relations Press*, December 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-alliances/un-security-council-enlargement-us-interests/p23363>

¹⁰⁴ IANS, "UN Security Council Reform: Talks Focus on Points of Accord", *The Hindu*, February 8, 2016, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/unsc-reform-talks-focus-on-points-of-accord/article8209557.ece>

process began about two decades ago”¹⁰⁵. She goes on to say that it is due to these countries’ rigidity and blind pursuit of national ambition that Security Council reforms have not been accomplished. However, Lodhi did comment to Pakistani media that the United Nations is declining in moral legitimacy and this could be reversed if the Security Council took into account the collective voice of the General Assembly.

Pakistan is a member of the Uniting for Consensus group, which supports the expansion of non- permanent seats or a new category of longer-term seats and is opposed to adding any permanent seats. The Uniting for Consensus group has a core membership of about twelve countries such as Italy, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Spain and Turkey. While Pakistan is against the expansion of permanent Security Council seats, it is in favor of a more democratic, accountable, transparent, and effective Security Council. In February 2015, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif spoke to President Barack Obama about reservations of India and its efforts to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. A spokesman for the prime minister stated that India is not eligible to hold a permanent Security Council seat due to its non-compliance of UN resolutions regarding Kashmir. Additionally, the spokesman reiterated to President Obama that a permanent Security Council seat held by India would not be tolerated at any cost due to the contentious issue of Kashmir and self-determination for the people¹⁰⁶.

¹⁰⁵ Karthikeyan Hemalatha, “Pakistan Takes a Jibe at India’s Quest for Permanent Seat at UNSC”, *The Times of India*, October 3, 2015, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pakistan-takes-a-jibe-at-Indias-quest-for-permanent-seat-at-UNSC/articleshow/49601565.cms>

¹⁰⁶ “Pakistan Will Not Accept India as UNSC Permanent Member: Nawaz”, *Dawn.com*, February 13, 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1163163>

Pakistan's efforts in the Uniting for Consensus bloc have placed it at odds with India in this matter. India is not just a member of the Group of Four as evidenced by its collaboration with the L69 bloc of about 40 developing countries. Meeting often at India's Mission, the L69 bloc is also the name of the draft resolution that pushed for Intergovernmental Negotiations and its endorsers to remain effective in reform efforts. The L69 bloc advocates for the extension of veto rights of permanent Security Council seats. Overall, as long as India works to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council, Pakistan will remain opposed during the inter-governmental negotiations.

CONSENSUS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

There is momentum on Security Council reform as evidenced by the consensus among countries in regards to the expansion of the body from 15 members to the mid-20s. While this has received opposition from certain countries such as the Russian Federation, other countries are focusing on points of convergence of reforms. India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Syed Akbaruddin stated, "By our account, there is more that unites us than what divides us; there is greater convergence than divergence"¹⁰⁷. For example, at the second session of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reforms (IGN), there was overwhelming support for increased membership, transparency, involvement of non-member countries in Security Council activities, and mediation over the authorization of military force. The United States and Russian Federation support the increase of size from 15 members to 20

¹⁰⁷ PTI, "UNSC Expansion Should be Based on Contemporary Realities: India", *The Economic Times*, February 23, 2016, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/unsc-expansion-should-be-based-on-contemporary-realities-india/articleshow/51107828.cms>

members, highlighting that any more would lead to inefficiency of the body¹⁰⁸. Both Washington and Moscow have vocally endorsed increasing permanent Security Council seats with India as one of the members.

The Director Generals of United Nations Affairs and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan met in New Delhi on March 4th 2016 to advance the reform agenda. In a statement expressing full support behind gaining concrete outcomes, the leaders reiterated “their commitments as aspiring new permanent members of the reformed UN Security Council, as well as their support for each other’s candidatures. They also reaffirmed their view of the importance of developing countries...to be represented in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of an enlarged Council”¹⁰⁹. The next meeting will take place in June 2016 in Japan. Therefore, the international community will continue to see consistent efforts within the G-4 bloc, especially India’s dedication, to advance Security Council reforms from the text-based negotiations.

IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS

The United Nations Security Council is a creature of post-World War II. Erik Voeten asserts that multilateral security institutions were purposively designed by the

¹⁰⁸ IANS, “UN Security Council Reform: Talks Focus on Points of Accord”, *The Hindu*, February 8, 2016, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/unscc-reform-talks-focus-on-points-of-accord/article8209557.ece>

¹⁰⁹ Press Trust of India, “India, 3 other G-4 Countries Hold Discussions”, *Business Standard*, March 4, 2016, http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/india-3-other-g-4-countries-hold-discussions-116030401613_1.html

winner of WWII and created barriers for potential rising powers¹¹⁰. Voeten recalls John Ikenberry's point from *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* that these institutions were planned out by the victors of WWII with the possible objective of locking in these favorable structures to them. Yet, India does not want the Security Council to continue to function as a product of post-World War II.

The Center for UN Reform Education states that there are no Member States that have vocally promoted the option of retaining the current size of the Security Council¹¹¹. However, there are Member States that have been vocal about their reservations of expanding the council to the extent that it could lead to difficulty in reaching consensus on international issues as well as carrying out its work efficiently. The G-4 countries, specifically Germany and Japan, are wary that the no-expansion option may be the alternative if the progress on Security Council reforms stalls. However, India believes that the bid for permanent Security Council membership is growing in awareness and support, especially as its population and economy is rising in absolute numbers and relative to the rest of the globe. India feels that major powers on the world stage must be included in the representation of the Security Council for the body to remain legitimate.

For those who support "the low twenties option", proponents feel that expanding five to seven mixed number of permanent or non-permanent members would be ideal for

¹¹⁰ Erik Voeten, "Why No UN Security Council Reform?: Lessons for and from Institutionalist Theory", *Georgetown University*, http://faculty.georgetown.edu/ev42/index_files/Multilateralism_and_Institutions_chapter.pdf

¹¹¹ Jakob Silas Lund, "Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform", *Center for UN Reform Education*, January 19, 2010, <http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/414>

efficiency. The United States advocates this model and will not accept an expansion beyond the low twenties. Countries that oppose this model believe that this is a minor adjustment to the currently flawed Security Council. The G-4's "mid twenties option" calls for the expansion of six permanent and four non-permanent members to the body. At the core of this model is the belief that this expansion would add to the legitimacy and efficiency of the council. There are only a few countries that support the "high twenties option", but many Member States feel that efficiency would be sacrificed for greater geographical representation¹¹².

Article 23 of the United Nations Charter emphasizes that due regard must be taken when choosing non-permanent members for the Security Council in regard to equitable geographical distribution and contribution of UN members to the protection of international peace and security. There are a number of countries, particularly from Africa and Latin America, that believe that geographical representation must be taken seriously at the permanent Security Council seat level. India believes that an enlarged Security Council would alleviate the democratic deficit and serve for more effective multilateralism efforts. Yet, there are countries that are hesitant to support this idea because of the fear that establishing more permanent members would lead to greater tension in the body when it comes to decision making and less of a voice for the non-permanent members.

However, an enlarged Security Council would be more representative of the 21st century in regards to geographical representation. It would certainly allow for more

¹¹² Jakob Silas Lund, "Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform", *Center for UN Reform Education*, January 19, 2010, <http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/414>

countries to partake in decision-making, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping on a greater scale. However, the expansion of the Security Council will not solely make the body more legitimate but also a focus on transparency and accountability, which several countries support. As stated by India's Permanent Representative Asoke Kumar Mukerji, India is not looking to gain a permanent Security Council seat as a "badge of honour but as a matter that affects India deeply in areas ranging from terrorism to development"¹¹³. It should be noted that while there may be several implications from Security Council reforms, there are a wide array of benefits that could bolster the body with further legitimacy and effectiveness to solve issues of security.

EFFICIENCY

Many Member States express the need to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of Security Council reforms, particularly in regard to the component of efficiency. Most Member States value the objective of hoisting the Security Council's legitimacy and efficiency. However, there are many political observers who believe that an expansion of the Security Council could weaken decision-making and efficiency of the body. While there lacks a consensus on an identifiable threshold at which the body would become ineffective due to the number of members, there is consensus on the need for effectiveness. Common arguments against the expansion of the Security Council center on the potential inability of Member States to create effective resolutions and a lack of cooperation due to the diversity of interests.

¹¹³ "Global Campaign Needed to Back UN Security Council Expansion: India", *NDTV*, December 19, 2015, <http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/global-campaign-needed-to-back-un-security-council-expansion-india-1256767>

While the aforementioned claims are valid arguments, political observers should not fuse the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness. Rather, effectiveness may not have a significant impact from an enlarged Security Council. The Working Group has continuously reiterated that an increase in the members of the Security Council does not necessarily relate or correlate to a negative result on the effectiveness or efficiency of the body. Proponents of an enlarged Security Council believe that a ratio must be met in the expansion of permanent and non-permanent members to strengthen the body's efficiency and capacity for decision making. Additionally, supporters of this claim such as Pierre Schori of Sweden assert that an expanded Security Council would "adapt and adjust, in order to safeguard and strengthen its legitimacy and efficiency in global politics"¹¹⁴.

The question of whether an enlarged Security Council would diminish efficiency is an important one. In Aris Alexopoulos and Dimitris Bourantonis' *Can Expansion Lead to a More Efficient UN Security Council? A Veto Players Analysis*, findings reveal that the proposed reforms of expansion do not lead to a less efficient decision-making. The authors argue that the "core of such an expanded UNSC is always smaller if not the same with the core of the current Council, due to the fact that most of the potential new members belong to the middle or upper level of economic development"¹¹⁵. They also point out that international relations scholars who argue that an expanded Security Council would lead to less decision capacity neglect to think of the potential Member

¹¹⁴ "Security Council Should Enlarge Membership, Review Veto Power to Increase Legitimacy, Efficiency, General Assembly Told", *United Nations*, October 14, 2003, Plenary: 30th & 31st Meetings, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/ga10172.doc.htm>

¹¹⁵ Aris Alexopoulos and Dimitris Bourantonis, *Can Expansion Lead to a More Efficient UN Security Council? A Veto Players Analysis*, pg.1, <http://www.arisalexopoulos.gr/files/can%20expansion%20lead....pdf>

States who may have preferences over policy outputs that might be convergent¹¹⁶. Therefore, when discussing efficiency and an enlarged Security Council, political observers must not only be aware of the number of actors in the body, but also their policy preferences.

CONCLUSION

Soft power is a significant aspect of India's identity in the international community. India's use of soft power has propelled the momentum of its campaign for a permanent Security Council seat. Moreover, it has committed itself to being a cooperative active member of the international community. At the beginning of India's candidature for a permanent seat, there were a number of countries that opposed or did not publicly support its movement of Security Council reforms. However, countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and a myriad of African countries have stood up recently to promote India's responsibility to lead as a permanent Security Council member. Over the past two decades, an increasing number of countries have shifted from their original stances and advocated India's bid with public endorsements and call for reforms. Not only has India taken a more active leadership role in the United Nations for Asian and African countries in the past seven decades, it has also shaped other countries' norms of accepting India's ability to promote international cooperation and serve as a potential permanent member in the Security Council.

While attaining Security Council reforms for expansion of the body or extension

¹¹⁶ Aris Alexopoulos and Dimitris Bourantonis, *Can Expansion Lead to a More Efficient UN Security Council? A Veto Players Analysis*, pg.24, <http://www.arisalexopoulos.gr/files/can%20expansion%20lead....pdf>

of permanent seats and non-permanent seats may take years before fruition, India has garnered widespread international recognition of its hope to serve as a permanent Security Council member by shaping other countries' norms. As aptly stated by KMS Kodithuwakku in "Soft Power as a Tool in Indian Foreign Policy", "In this transformed international system, soft power is crucial in enhancing influence over international outcomes because it has become more difficult to compel nations and non-state actors through principle levels of hard power"¹¹⁷. India relies on soft power to its own potential and capabilities, which has been significant to its identity. India will continue to pursue permanent membership with the policy of soft power in international dialogue until Security Council reforms are achieved. With India's steadfast commitment to Security Council reforms, I believe that it has elevated levels of cooperation through soft power. As long as other countries view India as a cooperative, capable player in the United Nations, India's soft power will continue to dominate its foreign policy decisions.

In the twenty-first century, India actively pursues this cause because it believes that it is the appropriate time to serve as a force of stability. Additionally, an enlarged Security Council would increase the representation of the body and offer more Member States to partake in diplomacy of important global issues. As a serious contender for the permanent seat to the council, I believe that India's support for more voices in the body has secured other countries' encouragement in its campaign. Not only would reforms for expansion of permanent and non-permanent seats add to the representativeness of the

¹¹⁷ KMS Kodithuwakku, "Soft Power As a Tool in Indian Foreign Policy", *Proceedings of 8th International Research Conference, KDU*, November 2015, pg. 1
<http://www.kdu.ac.lk/proceedings/irc2015/2015/dss-014.pdf>

Security Council, but also the legitimacy of the policymaking. It will certainly be a tough road ahead for India to attain its desired position in the Security Council, but nonetheless, it will be one that is worth fighting for through diplomacy and soft power. India is prepared to play the crucial role of executing Security Council reforms in the interests of all countries, remain committed to equity, and serve the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agencies, Paris. "It is India's Right to Get a Permanent Seat in UNSC: PM Modi", *Hindustan Times*, April 12, 2015, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/it-is-india-s-right-to-get-a-permanent-seat-in-unsc-pm-modi/story-Ynt5HnseN5glUzG6PEiLxH.html>
- Alexopoulos, Aris and Dimitris Bourantonis. *Can Expansion Lead to a More Efficient UN Security Council? A Veto Players Analysis*, pg.24, <http://www.arisalexopoulos.gr/files/can%20expansion%20lead....pdf>
- "Around the World with PM Narendra Modi", *The Hindu*, December 24, 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/specials/narendra-modis-foreign-trips/article7677038.ece>
- Cable to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, New Delhi, 19 July, 1949, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 12, (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1991), 389
- "Countries Elected Members of the Security Council", *United Nations Security Council*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp>
- "Countries Supporting India for a Permanent Seat at UNSC", *Defence Forum India*, <http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/threads/countries-supporting-india-for-a-permanent-seat-at-unsc.16149/>
- Functions and Powers", *United Nations Security Council*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml>
- Gharekhan, Chinmaya R. *India and the United Nations*, in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*, 2007
- "Global Campaign Needed to Back UN Security Council Expansion: India", *NDTV*, December 19, 2015, <http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/global-campaign-needed-to-back-un-security-council-expansion-india-1256767>
- Grant, Harriet, *UN Security Council Must Be Revamped Or Risk Irrelevance*, *Kofi Annan Warns*, *The Guardian*, September 23, 2015
- Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, "History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement". <http://mea.gov.in/infocusarticle.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement>

- Haidar, Suhasini. "Position India in a Leading Role Globally: Modi to Indian Ambassadors", *The Hindu*, February 8, 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/position-india-in-a-leading-role-globally-pm-to-indian-ambassadors/article6868993.ece>
- Haidar, Suhasini. "U.N. Motion Raises India's Hope for Permanent Security Council Seat", *The Hindu*, September 15, 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/un-motion-raises-indias-hope-for-permanent-security-council-seat/article7652441.ece>
- Harder, Anton. "Not at the Cost of China: India and the United Nations Security Council, 1950", *Woodrow Wilson International Center*, March 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/cwihip_working_paper_76_not_at_the_cost_of_china.pdf
- Hemalatha, Karthikeyan. "Pakistan Takes a Jibe at India's Quest for Permanent Seat at UNSC", *The Times of India*, October 3, 2015, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pakistan-takes-a-jibe-at-Indias-quest-for-permanent-seat-at-UNSC/articleshow/49601565.cms>
- Hsi-Lin, Ting. Translation: "We Welcome the Indian Cultural Delegation", in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 2nd Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 19, 1952, pg. 150–151, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).
- IANS, "UN Security Council Reform: Talks Focus on Points of Accord", *The Hindu*, February 8, 2016, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/unsc-reform-talks-focus-on-points-of-accord/article8209557.ece>
- "India and the United Nations", *Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India*, April 8, 2015, <http://www.mea.gov.in/india-and-the-united-nations.htm>
- "Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Institutions & Practice", *The Brookings Institution*, November 13, 2015, Moderator: Bruce Jones (Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, *The Brookings Institution*), Panelists: Tanvi Madan (Fellow and Director, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), David M. Malone (Rector, United Nations University, Under-Secretary General, *United Nations*), Rani Mullen (Associate Professor, Government, *College of William & Mary*), Stephen P. Cohen (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The India Project, *The Brookings Institution*), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2015/11/13-india/20151113_indian_foreign_policy_transcript.pdf
- "India Puts Candidacy for 2021–2022 UNSC Non-Permanent Seat", *The Economic Times*, December 5, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-12-05/news/44808135_1_non-permanent-seat-india-and-afghanistan-unsc

- “India’s UNSC Aspirations: Is China on Board? – Analysis”, *Spearhead Research*, March 6, 2015
<http://spearheadresearch.org/index.php/internationalaffairssecurity/indias-unsc-aspirations-is-china-on-board-analysis>
- “Interview with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Leader of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations”, 3 April 1953, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 2nd Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 4, pg. 4, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).
- “Is there Momentum for Security Council Reform? What are the Obstacles?”, *Center for UN Reform Education*, May 31, 2015, <http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/602>
- Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 30 August, 1950, in Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, Subject: 1949, 1950–1951, Letters received by V.L. Pandit as Ambassador to Washington from Jawaharlal Nehru concerning India’s relations with US, Pakistan, and other countries and developments at home, 137, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML)
- Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 12 September, 1950, in Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, Subject: 1949, 1950–1951, Letters received by V.L. Pandit as Ambassador to Washington from Jawaharlal Nehru concerning India’s relations with US, Pakistan, and other countries and developments at home, I Installment, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML)
- Joint Press Statement at the Meeting of Leaders of the G-4 Countries- Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan – on United Nations Security Council Reform, PMINDIA, September 26, 2015, http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/joint-press-statement-at-the-meeting-of-leaders-of-the-g-4-countries-brazil-germany-india-and-japan-on-united-nations-security-council-reform/
- Katzenstein, Peter J. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Columbia University Press. New York. 1996. Print.
- Kodithuwakku, KMS. “Soft Power As a Tool in Indian Foreign Policy”, *Proceedings of 8th International Research Conference, KDU*, November 2015, <http://www.kdu.ac.lk/proceedings/irc2015/2015/dss-014.pdf>
- Lowe, Vaughan, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, *The United Nations Security Council and War*, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print.
- Lund, Jakob Silas. “Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform”, *Center for UN Reform Education*, January 19, 2010, <http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/414>

- Mahapatra, Aurobinda, “Revisiting the Treaty of Friendship”, *Russia & India Report*, August, 31, 2011, http://in.rbth.com/articles/2011/08/31/revisiting_the_treaty_of_friendship_12924
- Mathur, Shairi. “Voting for the Veto: India in a Reformed UN”, *Foreign Policy Centre*, September 2005, <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/565.pdf>
- McDonald, Kara C. and Stewart M. Patrick, “UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests”, *Council on Foreign Relations Press*, December 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-alliances/un-security-council-enlargement-us-interests/p23363>
- “Milestones: 1953–1960”, *U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf>
- Ministry of External Affairs, “*Indian Diplomacy At Work: Our View*”, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/CountryNews/3018_Indian_Diplomacy_At_Work.pdf
- “Modi-Cameron Issue Joint Statement, UK Backs India’s Bid for Permanent UNSC Seat”, *IndiaToday*, November 12, 2015, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/modi-cameron-issue-joint-statement-uk-backs-indias-bid-for-permanent-unsc-seat/1/522068.html>
- Mukherjee, Rohan, and David M Malone. “India and the Un Security Council: An Ambiguous Tale”. *Economic and Political Weekly* 48.29 (2013): 110–117. Print.
- Nasu, Hitoshi. “The UN Security Council’s Responsibility and the “Responsibility to Protect”, *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Volume 15, 2011, p. 377–418.
- Noorani, AG. “The Nehruvian Approach;” the quote comes from *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, second series, vol. 29.
- Nye Jr., Joseph S., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, 1990, Print.
- Nye Jr., Joseph S., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs: New York. 2004. Print.
- “Obama Backs India on Permanent UN Security Council Seat”, BBC, November 8, 2010, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11711007>
- “Our Mandate”, *Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee*,

<http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/>

“Pakistan Will Not Accept India as UNSC Permanent Member: Nawaz”, *Dawn.com*, February 13, 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1163163>

Patil, Narendra. “How Will it Help India if it Gets a Permanent Seat in the Security Council?”, *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, <http://www.idsa.in/askanexpert/getsapermanentseatintheSecurityCouncil>
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 1990, “Speech by Mr. IK Gujral”, 45th Session, 13th Plenary Meeting, 28 September, <http://www.un.int/india/ind195.htm>

Popovski, Vesselin. “Reforming and Innovating the United Nations Security Council”, *Commission on Global Security Justice & Governance*, 2015, http://www.globalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Commission_BP_Popovski1.pdf

Press Trust of India, “India, 3 other G-4 Countries Hold Discussions”, *Business Standard*, March 4, 2016, http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/india-3-other-g-4-countries-hold-discussions-116030401613_1.html

Prime Minister Nehru: Speech to Bandung Conference Political Committee, 1955, *Modern History Sourcebook*, <http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955nehru-bandung2.html>

PTI, “France Supports India as Permanent UN Security Council Member”, *The Economic Times*, May 6, 2015, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-05-06/news/61865626_1_permanent-member-united-nations-un-charter

PTI. “India-Africa Summit: PM Modi Pitches for UNSC Reforms”, *DNA*, October 29, 2015, <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-africa-forum-summit-pm-modi-pitches-for-unsc-reforms-2139848>

PTI, “India Suffers Blow as US, Russia, China Oppose UN Security Council Reform Talks”, *DNA*, August 12, 2015, <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-suffers-blow-as-us-russia-china-oppose-un-security-council-reform-talks-2113561>

PTI, “Russia Assures India of Support on UNSC Permanent Seat Bid”, *The Economic Times*, September 16, 2015, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-09-16/news/66604729_1_permanent-membership-unsc-permanent-and-non-permanent-members

PTI, “United Nations Adopts Documents Based Negotiations For Security Council

Reforms”, *The Indian Express*, September 14, 2015,
<http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-others/united-nation-adopts-documents-based-negotiations-for-security-council-reforms/>

PTI, “UNSC Expansion Should be Based on Contemporary Realities: India”, *The Economic Times*, February 23, 2016,
<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/unsc-expansion-should-be-based-on-contemporary-realities-india/articleshow/51107828.cms>

PTI. “UNSC Must Include India to Make it More Representative: PM Narendra Modi”, *The Indian Express*, September 18, 2015,
<http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/unsc-must-include-india-to-make-it-more-representative-pm-narendra-modi/>

PTI, “UN Security Council Serves No One’s Purpose: India”, *The Hindu*, November 3, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/un-security-council-serves-no-ones-purpose-india/article4061775.ece>

PTI, “US Backs India’s Bid for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat”, *The Indian Express*, September 23, 2015

PTI, “US, UK, France Support India’s Permanent Membership in UN Security Council”, *The Financial Express*, September 29, 2015

Rajagopalan, Rajesh, Atul Mishra, *Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts*, Print. 2014.

Ramachandran, Sundha. “India’s Soft Power Potential”, *The Diplomat*, May 29, 2015,
<http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/indias-soft-power-potential/>

Rashtrapati Niwas, Shimla. (2015). “The Many Forms of Soft Power: India and the World”, *Indian Institute of Advanced Study in collaboration with Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi*, <http://www.iias.org/event/many-forms-soft-power-india-and-world>

“Security Council of the United Nations: Luxembourg chairs the Negotiations on its Reform”, *The Official Portal of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg*, October 2015,
<http://www.luxembourg.public.lu/en/actualites/2015/10/26-onu/index.html>

“Security Council Reform”, *United Nations Security Council*,
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/faq.shtml#process>

“Security Council Should Enlarge Membership, Review Veto Power to Increase

Legitimacy, Efficiency, General Assembly Told”, *United Nations*, October 14, 2003, Plenary: 30th & 31st Meetings, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/ga10172.doc.htm>

“Solution to Reform of Security Council ‘Is in Your Hands’, General Assembly President Says as Member States Begin Annual Debate on Long-Standing Issue, *United Nations*, November 11, 2010, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/ga11022.doc.htm>

Srinivasan, Krishan. “Image with No Definition”, *The Telegraph*, January 23, 2013. http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130123/jsp/opinion/story_16467700.jsp

“Standing Committees and Ad Hoc Bodies”, *United Nations Security Council*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/structure.shtml>

Stolberg, Sheryl Gay and Jim Yardley, “Countering China, Obama Backs India for U.N. Council”, *The New York Times*, November 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09prexy.html?_r=0

“Structure”, *United Nations Security Council*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/structure.shtml>

Tharoor, Shashi. “Security Council Reform: Past, Present, and Future [Full Text]”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Volume 25.4, Winter 2011, *Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs*, https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/25_4/essay/001.html

“The Peaceful Explosion”, *AtomicArchive.com*, Web, <http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page17.shtml>

“The UN Security Council”, *United Nations Foundation*, <http://www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/issues/united-nations/the-un-security-council.html>

Timeline UN Security Council Reform: 1992– November 2015, *Center for UN Reform Education*, <http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Timeline%20November%202015%20final.pdf>

“UN Security Council: Expansion Debate”, *Stanford University*, web.stanford.edu/group/IDL/Shurshikova.ppt

“UNSC: Misreading an Opportunity”, *Center on International Cooperation, New York*

University, August 16, 2015, http://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/unsc-misreading-opportunity

Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30 June, 1945, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers, Correspondence, pg. 321, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 August 1950, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 1st Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 59, Subject: 1949–51, Letters to Jawaharlal Nehru from VL Pandit sent during her tenure as Indian Ambassador to the United States of America, 132, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30 December 1963, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 2nd Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 7, pg. 9–10, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30 December 1963, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 2nd Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 7, pg. 10, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

Voeten, Erik. “Why No UN Security Council Reform?: Lessons for and from Institutional Theory”, *Georgetown University*, http://faculty.georgetown.edu/ev42/index_files/Multilateralism_and_Institutions_chapter.pdf

Von Freiesleben, Jonas. “Reform of the Security Council”, <http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ManagingChange-1.pdf>

“23-Country Poll Finds Strong Support for Dramatic Changes at UN, and for Increased UN Power”, *GlobeScan Incorporated* and *The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)*, November 15, 2004 – January 5, 2005, http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll4.html

CURRICULUM VITAE

Julie George

114 Haverford Road Hicksville, New York 11801
 juliegeorge9294@gmail.com

YOB: 1994
 516.474.4999

EDUCATION

Boston University, College of Arts and Sciences	GPA: 3.82
<i>Combined Bachelor/Master in Political Science, Minor in English</i>	May 2016

Master's Topic: A contemporary and historical analysis of India in the United Nations Security Council using qualitative and quantitative methods, granted Weinstein Family Grant of \$1500 and Boston University Student Academic Enhancement Fund of \$500 to carry out archival research at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi, India

Coursework Includes: India and the World: The Foreign Policy of a Rising Power, British Political Institutions, Approaches to the Study of International Relations, Political Analysis: A Primer, United States Foreign Relations Since 1898, Introduction to Databases and Mining, United States as a World Power, Shakespeare, Nuclear Security, Political Theory Seminar

Published: Tufts Hemispheres (Soft Power in Full Force: India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group), Boston University Political Science Newsletter, International Relations Review (Managing Air Pollution in New Delhi, The Changing Nuclear Triad, The Start of Something New: India and the United States' Strategic Relationship), United Nations Association-United States of America Mobile App (United Nations Population Fund: Maternal Health, United Nations Development Programme: Eradication of Extreme Poverty), Best Delegate (Economic Empowerment of Women, Food Security, Researching Country Policy and Solutions for the United Nations Security Council)

Honors: Pi Sigma Alpha Member, College of Arts and Sciences Dean's List, Carnegie Junior Fellowship – South Asia Program Finalist 2016 - 2017

UNIVERSITY ACTIVITIES

United Nations Economic and Social Council Youth Forum on the Post-2015 Agenda (February 1–2, 2016):

- Invited to attend the United Nations Economic and Social Council's Youth Forum on the Sustainable Development Goals by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, H.E. Mr. Oh Joon
- Engage in a dialogue with Member States, non-governmental organizations, and international actors on how youth can implement the 2030 Agenda, which the

results will be presented at the Economic and Social Council's high level segment in July 2016

Boston University International Affairs Association (September 2012–):

- *President*- negotiate a new and official partnership with the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, supervise a 10 person Executive Board overseeing 200 undergraduates, monitor \$150,000+ finances, contracts, and expenditures, host regular academic symposia on a weekly basis, and organize university cultural exposition (known as Global Village) and Alumni networking events
- *Secretary General of the Boston Area Model United Nations Conference VII* – served as the forefront leader of the collegiate conference, supervised and delegated tasks to a six person Secretariat, aided in the doubling of conference profit from the previous year, led training sessions for staffers with presentations, and was point of contact for delegations and advisors from 25 universities
- *Chief Financial Officer of the Boston Area Model United Nations Conference VI* – created a budget based on previous conferences, established a five year plan of budgetary costs and income for the conference, fostered relations with numerous corporate and local sponsors, designed the Delegate Handbook that reached over 400 individuals
- *Travel Team Member* – awarded Best Delegate at the University of Chicago and Honorable Mention at Georgetown University
- *Boston University Representative at WELAND Conference in Beijing, China* – Chaired the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission on the topic of Post Conflict Reconstruction of South Sudan and Sustainable Development, taught international high school students beginner and advanced Model United Nations skills
- *Conference Staff for Boston Area Model United Nations Conference and Boston Invitational Model United Nations Conference*- Chair of the United Nations Security Council, Chair of Ad Hoc Committee of the Secretary General, Co-Chair of the United Nations General Assembly: Special Question of Palestine, Co-Chair for the Communist Party of Vietnam

Boston University Community Service Center (September 2012–April 2013):

- *Alternative Spring Breaks Coordinator* – coordinated a volunteer trip of 11 volunteers to the International Rescue Committee in Atlanta, Georgia where we helped refugees in teaching computer, grammar, and mock interview lessons over spring break
- *First Year Student Outreach Program* – served as staff leader for incoming freshman undergraduates to volunteer with community service partners on human rights focused issues
- *One World Youth Project Ambassador* – taught local Boston middle school students about tolerance, culture, and communication skills by connecting to other middle school classes in Guyana and Istanbul

- *Empowerment League* – volunteered at the Jewish Vocational Services Center in downtown Boston and taught refugees English grammar lessons and held mock interviews

Diversity in Law Association (September 2012–):

- *President*- designed a proposal to connect undergraduate students at Boston University with students at Boston University Law School as a Mentor-Mentee model
- *Secretary*- responsible for taking detailed minutes at Executive Board meetings, creating strategies to recruit and retain members of all majors and age

College of Arts & Sciences (September 2013–):

- *Dean's Host* – assist in Opening Houses to advise prospective students, lead Question and Answer sessions of tours of Boston University
- *Peer Mentor*- responsible for co-teaching with two instructors on lessons of how to utilize Boston University and the city of Boston to freshman undergraduates

Howard Thurman Center's Culture Council Representative (September 2015–):

- Offer insight on how to promote unity among Boston University's student organizations

RESEARCH

Research Assistant – Research Projection: Ideational Pragmatism in India

Professor Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University

- Conducted research on LexusNexus on *The Indian Express, The Economic Times, and The Times of India's* articles on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Manmohan Singh, Atal Bihari Vajpayee

Independent Research: Rethinking Geopolitical Ambition: An Analysis of India and its Role in the United Nations Security Council

Advisor: Professor Mayers, Professor of Political Science and History at Boston University

- Conducted archival research at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi, India (Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers, Homi J. Bhabha Papers, B.N. Rau Papers)

Independent Research: The Changing Faces of the Triad

Professor Cappella, Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston University

- Analyzing India, Pakistan, China's Trilateral Nuclear Strategic Dialogue and the effects of their diplomacy
- Submitted an analytical essay to the International Relations Review titled "The Changing Nuclear Triad"

Research Assistant - Research Project: Transnational Immigration and Globalization of China and India

Professor Min Ye, Director of East Asian Studies Program, Associate Professor of International Relations at Boston University

- Conducted material search of China and India's impact of immigration through Undergraduate Research Opportunities Program
- Researched retention rates, foreign direct investments, and political communications between Indian and Chinese leaders

WORK EXPERIENCE

Boston University Study Abroad – London Student Office <i>London Program Assistant</i>	January 2015–April 2015
Boston University Office of the President <i>Office Assistant</i>	September 2014–December 2015
Boston University Student Programs and Leadership <i>Office Assistant</i>	September 2013 – December 2015

INTERNSHIPS & FELLOWSHIPS

Best Delegate Diplomacy Fellowship (Secretary-General) Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	June 2015–August 2015 January 2015–April 2015
Best Delegate Diplomacy Fellowship (Ambassador) Congressman Joseph Kennedy Office of Newton	June 2014–August 2014 February 2014–May 2014
Russo & Pedranghelu, Attorneys at Law	May 2013–August 2013
U.S. Senate– The Honorable U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer	May 2013–August 2013

VOLUNTEER

<i>American India Foundation (Light a Lamp Campaign)</i>	2015–
<i>North East India International Model United Nations Conference</i>	Oct.–Nov. 2015
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Trainer who taught about renewable energy to high school and university students • Held in Assam, India 	
<i>Long Island Mar Thoma Church Youth Fellowship</i>	2011–2013
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Secretary, Area Representative, led Charity: Water presentations 	
<i>Somerset Gardens Senior Living</i>	2011
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recreational Volunteer to the elderly and patients with Alzheimer's Disease and Dementia 	

SKILLS

Strong knowledge of R, SQL, Python, Microsoft Excel, WordPress, PowerPoint, Outlook; Typing Speed: 72 WPM; Limited Working Proficiency in Spanish and Malayalam