

**THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION:
BETTER GOVERNANCE AND MORE LEGITIMACY IN A ‘SOFT CORE,’ MULTI-CLUSTERED
EUROPE OF OVERLAPPING POLICY COMMUNITIES**

Vivien A. Schmidt
Boston University

Abstract:

The future of Europe is one of differentiated integration, in which the overlapping participation of a large majority of member-states in the EU’s many policy communities makes for a *soft core* EU, as opposed to the often-evoked *hard core* around the Eurozone. The paper argues that this multi-clustered Europe is the only possible future, once one takes stock of the challenges facing the EU from its many crises, its problems of governance, and the questions raised about its legitimacy against a background of increasing EU politicization and the rise of populist Euroskepticism.

Memo for “The Transformative Power of Europe Re-Visited: Closing Conference of the KFG Research College ‘The Transformative Power of Europe,’” 07–09 June 2018 Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.

[This paper builds on a draft paper prepared for the workshop: “What Future for Europe? Differentiation and Beyond” School of Government, LUISS Guido Carlo University (March 19-20, 2018)]

THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION

Introduction

Quo vadis Europe? The future of Europe will be one of differentiated integration. The question is not whether but how that differentiation will develop. EU leaders themselves have increasingly acknowledged the likelihood of greater differentiation, stating in the ‘Rome declaration’ of March 25, 2017 that: “We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later.” Moreover, the European Commission, in the White Paper on the Future of Europe published earlier that same month, on March 1, 2017, elaborated a scenario made up of ‘coalitions of the willing’ that would carry forward new cooperation projects in areas such as defense and security, justice, taxation and social policy, with other Member States able to join those projects at a later stage, once ready or willing (Commission 2017).

Many possible differentiated futures have been evoked over the years, including a multi-speed Europe, a hard-core Europe around the Eurozone, a Europe of variable geometry, and more. This paper takes a middle way through these views, arguing that the future is likely to consist of a *soft-core* Europe made up of the multiple clusters of member-states that overlap in their participation in the EU’s many policy communities.

Rather than a small hard core of member-states engaged together in deepening across policy areas, in particular around the Eurozone, then, or all member-states moving forward together in lockstep, I see a soft core of member-states united by their participation in many if not most policy communities—but not all necessarily in the same exact set of sectors. The EU now has too many members with too many diverging interests and ideas to be able to reach optimal agreements on deeper integration within the current institutional/legal set-up. Although many such divergences may have long existed, the problems have become more acute as a result of the concatenating crises in key areas such as money (eurocrisis), borders (immigration and refugee crisis), security (terrorism and the neighborhood), and the continuing integrity of the EU itself (Brexit). In conjunction with these crises has come an over-arching political crisis. It results from the failures of EU governance to resolve the multiple crises, and manifests itself in the increasing politicization of the very idea of European integration, along with growing questions about European democracy and legitimacy, as national electorates turn increasingly to populist parties to protest perceived failures of EU and national policies,

politics, and economics. All of this together challenges the gains of European integration, and could even threaten to bring disintegration.

EU integration itself has long been a process in which groups of member-states have sometimes advanced on their own in one or another area outside the treaties (e.g., Schengen), with others joining later as a new policy community is incorporated into the EU. Some differences may just be a matter of time or timing. Others may be fundamental, involving differences in philosophies or identities that will take a long time to reconcile, if ever. But in the interim, the question to be answered is whether and/or how member-states can stay together even as some may go further more quickly than others in ways that result in optimal solutions. And for this, we need to consider not only the possibilities for differentiated integration in key policy areas but also the institutional consequences of such arrangements, to ensure that they would work in any given policy area without undermining the common institutions so necessary to continued EU integration, let alone to the continuing goals of European democracy and legitimacy.

In order to explain why the future direction of Europe is necessarily one of differentiated integration and to make suggestions for how this could best be implemented, we begin with the challenges posed by the many crises the EU is currently facing, then consider the problems it confronts regarding its governance, following by the questions regarding its legitimacy. With all these issues in mind, we then consider the current state and future possibilities for differentiated integration, and propose ways for the EU to move forward through greater differentiated integration.

Crisis Challenges to EU Integration

The European Union has been in the midst of a cascading series of crises over the past decade, including the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit, not to mention the ups and downs of the security crisis every time a terrorist attack hits or a new conflict arises on the borders. Each of these crises potentially represents an existential challenge for the EU. All demand concerted EU responses, meaning some form of greater coordination and, in consequence, deeper EU integration. But only in one case, the Eurozone crisis, has deeper integration been successfully pursued, and it has not been a great success.

Although the euro was indeed saved, the Eurozone lives with the lingering threat of deflation, low growth, rising poverty, and high unemployment, particularly in Southern Europe. Much of this can be attributed to the suboptimal policies linked to deeper integration through the austerity and structural reforms of ‘governing by rules and ruling

by numbers' in the Eurozone (Schmidt 2015a, 2016). In response to the crisis, rather than providing some form of debt forgiveness or debt mutualization accompanied by greater investment stimulus, the EU reinforced macroeconomic austerity rules mandating low inflation, low deficits, and low debt while agreeing to greater oversight over member-state governments' budgets (Blyth 2013; De Grauwe 2013). These policies have led to greater divergence among EU economies rather than the expected convergence, as Northern Europe has continued to flourish while Southern European countries have struggled to recover. Spillover effects on the politics, moreover, have increased the split between the North—where mainstream parties resist any 'transfer union' while populist parties call for a more restricted Eurozone—and the South—where mainstream parties ask for more solidarity while populist parties call for an end to austerity or even to the euro.

In the refugee crisis, the EU response has, in contrast with the Eurozone, involved a lack of coordination accompanied by increasing fragmentation. Member-states have divided over what to do and how, retreating even from the integration already in place, both in terms of Schengen's borderless Europe and the rules governing asylum seekers. The failure of the EU to reach a workable agreement has contributed to the populist upsurge on the extreme right in both Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and Southern Europe. Across the CEECs (and now even in Austria), populist political leaders have seized on the refugee crisis (and immigration more generally) as a vote getter. The Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban in particular has used it to rally support. Images of barbed wire to keep out the 'barbaric hordes' that threaten Hungarian purity and safety serve to focus attention away from the Orban government's increasingly anti-democratic institutional measures designed to keep the man and his party in power in perpetuity. In Southern Europe, the two countries most negatively affected by the Eurozone crisis—Greece and Italy—have in contrast borne the brunt of the crisis, as refugees in increasing numbers wash up on their shores. In Italy in particular, the election of a populist governing majority has been in large part due to the failure of the EU to find a common solution to the refugee crisis. The extreme right *Lega Nord* (Northern League) broke through to become the largest right wing party once it rebranded itself as *La Lega* (the League) and switched from calling for throwing out the South from Italy to one focused on throwing out the 'immigrants' (meaning refugees).

In the security crisis, moreover, the failure to move toward any significant integration continues to plague the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)—and this despite the rising risks of terrorism coming from the Middle East and the continued threat from Russia linked to the frozen conflict in the Ukraine and, more recently, fake news. The election of Donald Trump to the US presidency only intensifies the security crises, in particular given Trump's pre-election statements supporting Russian President Putin and

questioning the value of continuing with NATO, his subsequent pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal, and his threatening discursive skirmishes with the North Korean leader (e.g., ‘I have a bigger button than you’) prior to a seeming warming of relations.

Brexit represents its own special challenge. Here, the uncertainty of how and what the UK will negotiate in terms of its future relationship with the EU opens up a whole range of questions not only about the future of the UK but also of the EU. The negotiation process itself risks splitting the member-states with regard to the terms of Brexit, in particular given all the other crises that have made EU governance increasingly gridlocked. Moreover, the loss of the UK—if it comes to that—while perhaps facilitating agreements among the remaining 27, at the same time weakens the EU economically as well militarily, unless some form of positively differentiated integration is negotiated. But even more importantly, and regardless of the outcome, British exit of from the EU in any form challenges the very idea of European integration, and raises the specter of EU disintegration.

These crises not only pose major policy challenges for the EU, whether with regard to promoting economic prosperity, guaranteeing the borders, ensuring security, or negotiating Brexit. They also represent significant political challenges, with spillover effects on national democracy and legitimacy. As authority and control have moved up to the EU level in order to solve common problems, national democracy has been increasingly emptied of substance in EU dominated policy areas, in particular as EU level technocratic decisions are perceived to have substituted for the national level politics of left and right. All member-states as a result struggle with an upsurge of populism, as the political extremes have made the EU a prime target because of concerns about national identity and sovereignty focused on the impact of the euro and fears of immigration mingled with worries about terrorists. The simple fact of Brexit only further intensified the populist pressures by energizing European extremist parties with calls for withdrawal from the EU, or at least the euro, as well as an end to open borders (Schengen) and restrictions on immigration and citizenship. Finally, even though most populist parties moderated their rhetoric with regard to exit from the euro and/or the EU subsequent to Macron’s election defeat of Marine Le Pen, that moderation may be short-lived, unless the EU manages at least to begin to respond to the crisis challenges with new, more successful policies as well as new politics. The Italian election, in which a majority of euro-skeptic parties won and have formed a government, shows that this was indeed only a momentary respite.

In short, until the EU begins to resolve its many crises, this kind of politicization is not going to go away. But that very politicization makes crisis resolution difficult, given the EU’s longstanding problems regarding its governance and its legitimacy.

The Problems of EU Governance and the Complications from Increasing Politicization

The failure to resolve the EU's multiple crises points to deeper problems of EU governance. These are embedded in the very architecture of the EU, in the ways in which the different modes of EU governance have evolved and in how EU actors have engaged with one another over time. Understanding how EU governance has affected crisis resolution is therefore arguably a first step to thinking about how to resolve the current crises. The next step requires understanding how politicization has affected EU governance. There is a politics that exists purely at the national level, putting pressure on national party politics through the increase in citizen dissatisfaction and the rise of anti-system parties. There is a politics that moves from the bottom up, through the nationally influenced politicization of EU relations, in particular in the Council. And there is also a politics that exists solely at the top, with the increasing politicization of the interactions of EU institutional actors.

EU Multi-Level Governance, Old and 'New'

Sorting out the exact linkages between EU governance and the failure to solve the crises is not easy. This is because analysts have long disagreed over which EU governance processes predominate and who is in control of those processes. Traditional conceptions of EU governance as involving actors focused on power and interests confront self-styled 'new' views centered on consensus-seeking deliberation and persuasion. On-going convictions that member-state political leaders are in charge through their intergovernmental negotiations in the Council clash with alternative certainties that technical actors are in control via their activities in supranational EU administrative and regulatory bodies. And both may be contradicted by views that hold that the European Parliament can no longer be ignored because it has increasingly become a force to be reckoned with in the name of democratic legitimacy (Schmidt 2018).

The contemporary debates on EU governance thus divide in three. One group sees intergovernmental actors in the European Council as in charge, whether they depict such actors as engaged in coercive processes of hard bargaining (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1998; Schimmelfenning 2015; Tsebelis 2016) or persuasive deliberative processes of consensus seeking (Puetter 2012; Bickerton et al. 2015). Another group finds that supranational actors in the Commission (along with the ECB and other regulatory agencies) are in control, whether because of their incremental gains in institutional competences and powers of enforcement (Haas 1958; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Ioannou et al. 2015) or their ideational role in policy design and discretionary oversight (Bauer and Becker 2014; Dehousse 2015; Epstein and Rhodes 2011). Yet another group

considers the European Parliament to be an increasingly important actor, at least informally, as a result of its growing institutional and discursive influence (Hix and Hoyland 2013; Fasone 2014; Dinan 2015; Héritier et al. 2016).

The benefit of such debates among theorists of European integration is that each group lends insight into the powers and influence of its preferred EU actor. The drawback is that they lose sight of the overall picture, that is, how all such EU actors have become more dynamically interactive in EU level governance, and empowered. Moreover, they also tend to miss out on the increasingly politically charged nature of those dynamics of interaction.

‘Post-functionalist’ theories help fill in some of the picture of the new political dynamics of EU governance. These theories emphasize the increasing importance of crosscutting cleavages at the national level, increasingly split between traditional political divisions based on adherence to right/left political parties and newer identity-related divisions based on xenophobic/authoritarian versus cosmopolitan/liberal values (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi et al. 2008). The main link between the results of post-functionalist work and EU integration theory has come from scholars concerned about whether politicization is a good thing or a bad thing for EU governance in general and/or for intergovernmental, supranational, or parliamentary actors in particular. For the most part, the divide has been between scholars who have argued that politicization is a good thing, necessary for European integration to be accepted by national publics (e.g., Follesdal 2006; Hix and Hoyland 2015), and those who have seen it as a bad thing, making it increasingly difficult for the EU to produce effective policies because of conflicting preferences, or even to agree on the benefits of the outcomes (Scharpf 2013). For the post-functionalists, in contrast, politicization is not necessarily a good thing or a bad thing because, like it or not, it is a ‘thing,’ and here to stay (Hooghe and Marks 2009; De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Kriesi 2016). By now, and in particular since the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit, no one can dispute this. But it only further complicates EU decision-making, in particular in the Council, as member-state leaders bring national political concerns to the table, whether these involve domestic electoral interests or identity-related ideas.

The EU Level’s New Politicized Dynamics of Interaction

Politicization is not just at the bottom and from the bottom up, however. It is equally at the top, in how the interrelationships of major EU level actors—Council, Commission, European Central Bank, and European Parliament—have become more political in every way. That politics is certainly connected to the national pressures. But it also concerns political struggles for power and influence among the various EU level actors. Such struggles are ideational, regarding which political-economic ideas about what to do

prevail, as much as institutional, involving which actor gets to do what, and coercive, concerning who imposes the costs of the decision on whom (Carstensen and Schmidt 2017). Battles are fought not just over who is in charge of decision-making but also over which policies to implement how and why.

In the Council, even if partisan politics *per se* remains largely absent, the politics of nationally partisan governments has infected Council decisions. Individual governments have been able to impose their preferences through threatened (or actual) vetoes of impending legislation, often the case of the UK pre-Brexit, and through refusal to agree to and/or implement legislation, the case of populist governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) on aspects of refugee and immigration policy. At the same time, coalitions of member-states have been able to gain agreement for their preferences, as the result of coercive threats (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2015) or deliberative persuasion (Puetter 2012). In the case of the Eurozone crisis, for example, Council actions can be seen as the result of a coercive bargaining process dictated by Germany following its rational interests (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2015) or as a consensus-seeking deliberation ‘in the shadow of Germany’ (Schmidt 2018).

In the EP, politicization arrived first and foremost in the form of the larger presence of populist representatives elected in the 2009 elections—even if this has had little impact on EP policies, given the populists’ marginalization in the work of the Parliament. More significant was the EP’s 2009 successful election push on the *Spitzenkandidat*. This was a clear attempt by the EP to reinforce its own political power vis-à-vis the Council in the appointment of the Commission president, as well as an effort to increase democratic legitimacy for the EU as a whole (Dinan 2015).

While the so-called non-majoritarian institutions, including supranational actors such as the Commission, the ECB, the ESM (European Stability Mechanism), and other regulatory agencies, have not experienced the same degree of politicization as the majoritarian institutions of the EU, politics has nonetheless exerted its influence both in bottom up fashion and in top-to-top relations with other actors. The bottom-up politics involves the diffuse influence of national politics (generalized from across the member-states), with non-majoritarian institutions having become ever more aware of and concerned by public perceptions of their actions. This has made them increasingly intent on communicating with the public directly—to inform the citizens of EU actions as well as to legitimate those actions. For the Commission, an early example was its ‘Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue, and Debate,’ launched in 2005 following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. For the ECB, examples include its increasingly ‘speaking to the people’ via its four yearly meetings with the EP as well as ‘speaking to the markets’ in

ways to make them back off from attacking member-states' sovereign debt ever since Draghi's famous promise to 'do whatever it takes' to save the euro (Schmidt 2014).

Politics also comes through the deeper top-to-top intensity of political interactions between majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions. The politics is particularly manifest in the greater pressure from majoritarian bodies—both the Council and the EP—on non-majoritarian institutions such as the Commission and the ECB to do their bidding.

The Council, for one, has deliberately sought to take back control through the creation of *de novo* regulatory bodies outside the main EU institutions, intended to contain if not reduce Commission powers (Puetter 2012; Bickerton et al. 2015; Fabbrini 2016). The Commission has taken this in stride, in particular because such agencies were established in areas where the Commission's own powers were previously weak and served to enhance its objectives (Peterson 2015). Moreover, instead of continuing with its earlier attempts to push 'ever closer union,' the Commission has become more centered on accomplishing its core goals (Peterson 2015; see also Kassim et al., 2013). As such, the Commission's ideas and institutional entrepreneurship have focused on making European integration work better, whether or not this serves its specific power and interests (Bauer and Becker 2014; Dehousse 2016; Epstein and Rhodes 2016). But its efforts to improve performance have also caused it to clash with the Council, most notably in the context of the Eurozone crisis, where its exercise of discretion through its increasing flexibility in the application of the rules has resulted in clashes with Northern European Council members in particular (Schmidt 2016).

Even the ECB, as the most insulated from the political interference of other EU actors because of its charter-based autonomy, has nonetheless become more 'political,' in particular in the context of the Eurozone crisis. In contrast to its early focus on maintaining the institution's 'credibility' by avoiding interaction with member-state leaders, the ECB president opened up dialogue with the more powerful governments to gain tacit agreement for politically sensitive departures from orthodox *ordo-liberal* monetary policy, most notably just prior to ECB President Draghi's announcement that he would do 'whatever it takes' to save the euro (Spiegel 2014).

Finally, the EP's politics has also entailed greater scrutiny of non-majoritarian institutions' actions through investigative committees and close questioning in public hearings (Héritier et al., 2016). Most importantly, however, the new political dynamics comes in through the EP's role in co-decision processes via the 'trilogues' with Council and Commission, in which the EP has increasingly pushed its own political agenda—itsself the result of political compromise within the grand coalition of center right and center left parties (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2015; Héritier et al. 2016).

Questions of EU Legitimacy

We should not forget that the political interactions at the EU level are not just about power and influence; they are also about legitimacy—including the legitimation of the exercise of power and influence. The EU's multiple crises, combined with the problems of increasingly politicized governance incapable of resolving the crises, raise serious questions for EU legitimacy. While the (Weberian) legitimacy of the EU's governing authority may not be in question as yet, the legitimacy of its governing activities are increasingly contested. The questions focus not only policy effectiveness and performance raising concerns about the EU's 'output' legitimacy, or on citizens' political participation and governing elites' responsiveness causing problems for the EU's 'input' legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). They also involve the quality of policymaking processes, including their efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to interest consultation, casting doubts on the EU's 'throughput' legitimacy (Schmidt 2013). Moreover, because the EU's legitimacy is fragmented, split between an EU level that is mainly about output and throughput legitimacy and the national level that is primarily about input legitimacy, the failure to resolve the crises causes problems not just for perceptions of the EU's governing capacity but also member-states' democratic (political) legitimacy (Schmidt 2013, 2015a, 2016).

What used to be seen as purely technical and therefore impartial decision-making is now increasingly contested politically as political (Caramani 2017). Questions are raised not only about who acts with legitimate authority but equally about which policies are legitimate and on what grounds (Crum and Curtin 2015). Such growing EU level concern with legitimacy is manifest not only in the increasing discursive intensity of the internal debates over what to do and who should decide but also in their externalization. EU actors now join in public discourse, deliberation, and contestation about what should be (or is) done, who should do it, and why, much more so than in the past, when the main voices heard were those of the member-states leaders. And in a EU originally conceived as apolitical and technocratic, the most important questions raised by its increasing multi-level politicization center on legitimacy.

But what establishes legitimacy in the EU? This has long been a matter of debate. Up until the current cascading series of crises, while some scholars argued that the apolitical/technocratic EU was indeed democratically legitimate because of its policy outcomes and governance procedures (e.g., Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002), others contended that the EU suffered from a 'democratic deficit' because of its lack of 'politics' (e.g., Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2006; Hix 2008). Since 2010, however, with the onset of

the Eurozone crisis, most scholars now see the EU as lacking in legitimacy on all grounds—politics, policies, and processes (e.g., Scharpf 2013; Schmidt 2013, 2016; Curtin and Crum 2015).

In the early years, theorists of EU integration assumed that the only legitimacy possible for the EU was ‘output’ legitimacy, based on good economic and social performance—whether by serving national interests (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991), satisfying domestic constituencies (Moravcsik 1998), or providing beneficial policies for all (Haas 1958; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Over time, however, came an increasing focus on the quality of the governance processes under the influence of neo-liberal economic philosophy, which favored technocratic ‘throughput’ over popular input to produce optimal output (e.g., Majone 2001). As a result, throughput legitimacy often joined output legitimacy (or was even conjoined with it) under the assumption that this enhanced policy effectiveness (Schmidt 2013). Such a focus on policy and process has largely been seen as responsible for the depoliticization of EU policymaking, in which neo-liberal policies have been presented as technical and neutral, such that TINA, there is no alternative, and therefore no political debate necessary—or possible (Fawcett and Marsh 2014; Flinders and Wood 2014; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013).

But while such ‘depoliticization’ may have long characterized EU level governance, politics—along with input legitimacy—has remained primarily at the national level. Despite the fact that EU level input legitimacy has often been ascribed to the Council via member-states’ indirect representation of their citizens and to the EP through their direct elective representation of the citizens, these don’t compare to national input legitimacy. The Council is not a representative arena *per se*, but rather a bargaining or deliberative arena in which member state leaders represent their countries’ interests and their citizens’ concerns. In contrast, the EP is indeed a representative arena, but it is only marginally representative, given the high rate of voter abstention and low level of citizen awareness or engagement with it (Scharpf 1999; see also Schmidt 2013; Crum and Curtin 2015). As a result, input legitimacy has remained largely at the national level. But the problem here is that as the EU has integrated increasingly deeply, it has eroded national input legitimacy and therefore democracy by encroaching more and more on national decision-making. As a result, EU legitimacy has come into question even more than before, as populist-inspired politicization—which claims political legitimacy (input)—now challenges technocratic-driven depoliticization—which had assumed that good policy performance (output) and quality procedures (throughput) was sufficient for legitimacy.

The EU’s impact on member-state democracy initially made for what I had characterized over a decade ago as national ‘politics *without* policy,’ as more and more responsibility for decisions has been moved up to the EU level from the national (Schmidt 2006). This

Europeanization of national policies has also led to increasing politicization (De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Zürn 2016; Kriesi 2016), in particular with the rise of populist political extremes contesting its legitimacy (Kriesi 2014). In the most contentious EU-related policy areas, such politicization has today engendered what we could call national ‘politics *against* (EU) policy—or even ‘politics *against* (EU) polity’ in the case of Brexit and some of the more extreme Euroskeptic parties (Schmidt 2018). At the same time, my characterization of the EU level as consisting of ‘policy *without* politics,’ based on long-standing EU preferences for apolitical and/or technocratic decision-making, also no longer fully describes EU governance today (Schmidt 2006). The increasingly politically charged nature of interrelationships means that the EU level has moved to ‘policy *with* politics’ in more contentious areas (Schmidt 2018).

So what does all this mean for the future of the EU? Questions of legitimacy combined with the problems of EU governance confronted with increasing politicization means that the EU will have great difficulty engaging in any deeper integration demanding uniformity across the member states. Differentiated integration is the only way forward. But what kind of future differentiation can manage to respond to questions of legitimacy while overcoming problems of politicized governance?

What Future for the EU?

Before answering the question of how to go forward, we first need to rethink how the EU works as a whole, along with its *finalité*, that is, where it is going. The EU was never going to become the United States of Europe that European federalists have long envisioned. But is it going to become a *two-speed* Europe (Piris 2012)? A Europe of concentric circles surrounding a compact core (e.g., Glenicker group 2013; Eiffel group 2014; Future of Europe Initiative 2012)? A Europe with a *hard core* centered around the Eurozone? Or, failing these, a Europe completely *à la carte*?

I prefer to think about the EU’s future organization in terms of a *soft core* Europe, made up of overlapping clusters of European countries participating in the EU’s many different policy communities, all administered by a single set of EU institutions, and in which most member-states will be involved in most areas (beyond the Single Market, to which all belong by definition), even if some, like the UK, will have more limited involvement.

Toward a *Soft Core* Europe

The problem with a *two-speed* Europe is that it doesn’t reflect the realities of what is already a *multi-speed* Europe, with different member-states participating in different policy communities. While all member-states are part of the Single Market, membership

in other policy areas is variable, with many countries in, others out of the Eurozone, Schengen, Common Security and Defense Policy, and so on. The problem with a *hard core* Europe is that it can't work, given diverging ideas and interests among the main countries expected to coalesce.

The EU, first of all, is already moving at many speeds. The EU's policies other than those related to the Single Market have highly variable geometry – whether Schengen borders (minus the UK and Ireland but with Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland), Common Security and Defense Policy (without Denmark but with the participation of Norway in the Nordic Battlegroup and with all members being able to opt in or out), the Charter of Fundamental Rights (with opt-outs for the UK and Poland), and of course there is the Single Currency. The Eurozone includes 19 out of 27 member-states, the rest of which have either permanent opt-outs (UK and DK), are resistant but without opt-out (Sweden), or may be eager but not yet ready to opt in (the other CEECs). Such country-based policy-related variability, moreover, is likely only to increase over time given the possibilities for even more differentiation allowed by the Lisbon Treaty through 'permanent structured cooperation' in the defense and security policy arena and 'enhanced cooperation' in all others,

Brexit adds yet another level of complexity to the EU, depending upon how and in which areas its involvement with the EU is renegotiated. For the UK, if we continue to think about the EU as at two speeds, the question is whether the UK would be at the outer limits of the second speed, in a third speed all its own, with many more opt-outs—or outside with occasional opt-ins. Put more simply, will the UK remain on the outside, with multiple opt-ins, or on the inside with even more opt-outs.

And how are we to think of 'outside insiders' like Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland that participate in the Single Market as well as in a range of other EU policy communities such as Schengen and CSDP but don't have a vote. Further complications come from initiatives like the Bologna process for higher education harmonization, which was set up outside the EU by EU member states, includes most member states (but again not the UK) as well as many non-EU states across Europe, and was aided financially and administratively by the Commission (Ravinet 2008). Or what about the Eastern Partnerships and other 'Neighborhood' policies which by now involve deep and comprehensive free trade agreements, gradual integration into the EU economy, 'mobility and security pacts,' and the promotion of democracy and good governance?

The EU, in short, is already multi-speed. But as such, many argue that there is therefore even greater need for it to coalesce around a small group of countries willing to integrate more deeply in all areas. The problem with a *hard core* Europe, especially one in which

the Eurozone sits at the core, is that it assumes that France and Germany agree on policy. They do not, in particular in the Eurozone, where Germany stands for restrictive budgetary policy to maintain stability, France for more expansionary policy to promote growth (Blesse et al. 2016). Were such a hard core to be established, it would most likely be dominated by Germany. Moreover, there is little certainty that a smaller hard core around Germany and France would be able to come to agreement more readily than the larger EU membership, in particular if the unanimity rule were maintained. Furthermore, why assume that a cluster of member-states that takes the lead in one policy area (i.e., the Eurozone) would have the ability, let alone the will or imagination, to lead in the others (e.g., in security or immigration)? In fact, deeper integration in one area could instead produce an even higher degree of differentiation without integration in other policy areas (Tocci 2014). What is more, any such deeper integration could fully alienate the post-Brexit UK. The British might very well ask, ‘why deal with the EU at all?’ if the Eurozone were to become the central focus of EU integration as a whole, with a hard core of member-states led by Germany and France, where insiders with dedicated institutions then set the trajectory for the remaining outsiders.

However, the EU could retain its appeal—for the UK as well as other member-states resisting membership in the Euro, such as Sweden, or on the outside looking in, such as Norway and Switzerland—if the Eurozone were to be seen as just one of the EU’s many policy ‘communities’, and if the EU itself were seen as consisting of a *soft* core of multiple clusters of member-states, in which any duo or trio of member-states would take leadership in any given policy community. With this in mind, while the UK may continue to stand aside with regard to the Eurozone, it could decide that it should reclaim a leadership role in Common Security and Defense Policy, as one of two European nuclear powers. As for immigration policy, given the problems of reaching a common policy in the context of the refugee crisis and mounting disagreements over immigration more generally, this might be an area where deeper integration involving EU wide agreement on principles of treatment could be accompanied by more differentiated integration regarding the modalities of implementation—with positive incentives in place of imposed quotas that don’t work (as detailed below).

Seeing the future of EU integration as a differentiated process of member-state participation in different policy communities beyond the Single Market would also allow for each such community to further deepen by constituting its own special system of governance. In two of the three crisis policy areas, immigration and security, the EU has so far done very little of the institution building and law-making required for deeper integration.

Rethinking Eurozone Governance from the bottom up

The Eurozone is different, since it has already deepened its integration, with dedicated oversight processes such as the European Semester, with dedicated institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and Banking Union, and even more envisioned, such as a European Treasury, a Finance Minister, and more. Such deepening, when viewed not as at the center of a hard-core Europe but the first of the developing policy communities of a soft core Europe, could be seen as a template for the future of EU governance.

But there is one caveat. What the Eurozone needs, rather than centralized governance by restrictive rules and sanction-triggering numbers, is to coordinate macroeconomic governance while decentralizing microeconomic governance to the benefit of national capitals. The Eurozone already has an amazing architecture of economic coordination, reaching into all the Eurozone ministries of finance and country economic experts. Why not use that coordination to ensure that countries themselves determine what works for their very specific economic growth models and varieties of capitalism? And to have the new ‘competitiveness councils’ or the existing fiscal councils act more as industrial policy councils rather than structural adjustment hawks? Moreover, why not use the Maastricht criteria as general guidelines for variable yearly targets, depending upon the Eurozone’s employment as well as inflation prospects? And rather than demanding that all member-states meet the same yearly targets (e.g., of deficit and debt), why not set differential country-specific targets (depending upon where the member-states are in their economic cycle, and whether they are over-heating and therefore need to contract, or are contracting and need to expand)? Such decisions on the yearly budgetary cycle could be debated with the other member-states in the Euro-group as well as the Commission, the EP, and the Council to enhance legitimacy. All of this together would make Eurozone governance more democratically legitimate, especially if national parliaments were brought in both nationally and at the EU level, via consultation with the EP.

Such a bottom-up approach is likely not only to promote better economic performance but also much more political legitimacy at the national level. This is because it would put responsibility for the country’s economics back in national governments’ hands. And this in turn could help counter the populist drift in many countries, as political parties of the mainstream right and left could begin again to differentiate their policies from one another, with proposals for different pathways to economic health and the public good.

None of this will work, however, if member-states continue to have to contend with excessive debt loads that weigh on their economies (e.g., Greece and Italy), if they are left without significant investment funds provided by banks or the state (e.g., Portugal, Spain, Italy, and even France), as well as if some countries continue to have massive surpluses while failing to invest sufficiently (i.e., Germany and other smaller Northern

European countries). Some extra form of solidarity is necessary, with the European Stability Mechanism turned into a real European Monetary Fund (EMF), some form of mutualized debt instruments such as Eurobonds or safe assets, Europe-wide unemployment insurance, EU investment resources that dwarf the Juncker Plan (as called for by Macron), among other mechanisms. Failing this, at the very least member-states should be allowed to invest their own resources in things like infrastructure, education and training, incurring long-term debt at low interest rates, even if this does not fit the current deficit and debt rules.

More Solidarity Mechanisms Across Crisis Areas and More Resources

The other crisis areas need more, rather than less, integration, and they also require solidarity mechanisms. For the Eurozone, many have already proposed some sort of unemployment fund for all countries to pay into, to use when their unemployment goes above a certain threshold. But there also should be an intra-European ‘EU mobility adjustment fund’ to support the extra costs for social services and the retraining needs of workers in countries with greater than usual EU migrant worker inflows which may constitute an excessive burden to the welfare state. This could have worked for the UK, with a mobility fund addressing the Brexiteers’ fears about the impact of EU freedom of movement on the National Health Service (esp. because the government, in trying to access the funds, would most likely have to admit that there was little or no excess cost). But even more significantly, it could benefit other member-states with other kinds of out-migration as opposed to in-migration concerns. Such a fund, for example, could compensate Greece for the costs of educating the 2000 medical doctors who have gone to practice in Germany, or Austria, which has not been allowed to set quotas for German students studying medicine in the country (by ECJ decision), without compensation either for how much they spent or the reduction of the number of doctors for Austria itself.

More integration through new solidarity mechanisms has great advantages, especially if a EU mobility adjustment fund were accompanied not only by the oft-proposed EU unemployment fund but also by a European fund for refugee support. Different countries would benefit at different times from the funds, which could be triggered when any one country finds itself overburdened by the extra costs it incurs because of the asymmetric functioning of the Single Market and the Single Currency, or because of its openness to refugees. Different funding mechanisms are possible, including from member-state contributions, but the best would be from the EU’s own resources, based on monetary gains of the Single Market and Single Currency. This could involve using a proportion of VAT collected in trans-border transactions or of the Financial Transactions Tax. Or even why not use ‘helicopter money’ from the ECB if possible? And what of an EU ‘solidarity tax’ levied on all citizens and residents of the EU, which would have the added advantage to build a sense of citizen-to-citizen solidarity. This, plus the financial and

cross border transaction generated taxes, might ensure that no one could claim any longer that the EU was a 'transfer union' in which one or more member-states paid for the rest.

More generally, we need to emphasize the fact that to be sufficiently democratic and legitimate, a future soft core Europe would need to ensure that its many policy communities are governed in a manner that allows for as much decentralization and deconcentration of decision-making to the benefit of the member-states as possible. But even this would not be enough to guarantee the ultimate effectiveness of EU governance, or its legitimacy in terms of results.

Reforming the Institutional Rules

For such differentiated integration to work, for all member-states feeling part of this *soft core* EU, whatever their level of involvement, they need to have institutional voice and vote in the sectors in which they participate. This contradicts Prodi's earlier promise to the EU's neighborhood of 'everything but institutions,' since policy participation needs to come with institutional engagement. This means that all members should be able to exercise voice in all areas, but vote (in the Council and the EP) only in those areas in which they participate. Since all are members in the most significant policy community, the Single Market, this ensures that they will be voting a lot. But for the Eurozone or Schengen, for example, only participant members should be able to vote. For the Eurozone, this would mean envisioning that where some members in the future, say, pledge their own resources to a EU budget, their representatives would be the only ones to vote on the budget and its use, although everyone could discuss it (no separate Eurozone Parliament, then, but separate voting for members of a deeper budgetary union). For Schengen, this could mean that current Schengen participants that are not EU members, like Norway or Switzerland, would have voice and vote. For these two countries, it could also mean that they could vote on Single Market issues. For the moment, they experience a major loss in democratic (input) legitimacy, since they have to follow Single Market rules and regulations, as well as contribute to the EU budget, without the ability to exercise voice, let alone vote. For the UK, moreover, which is currently negotiating a reduction in its involvement in order to 'take back control,' what is the value-added of continuing engagement with the EU if they do not have a voice and a vote in the areas in which they participate?

But to make EU governance truly workable, the institutional decision-making rules also require revision. Among these, the unanimity rule for intergovernmental decision-making needs to be abandoned. The most sensible replacement would be one setting up 'constitutional' treaties amendable by 2/3 or 4/5 majorities. At the same time, many of the current treaty-based laws should become ordinary legislation, amendable by simple majority through the Community Method—as detailed by Dieter Grimm (2015). Thus,

for example, while the Lisbon Treaty would remain a constitutional treaty, amendable however by 2/3 or 4/5 majorities, the various treaties involving the Eurozone, such as the Stability and Growth Pact or the Fiscal Compact, should become ordinary legislation—much like the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack. This means that they would be open to amendment through political debates and compromise, and subject to the Community Method of co-decision—all of which would enhance EU input legitimacy.

In the case of new legislation, moreover, whether ordinary or constitutional, opt-outs for individual Member States should be allowed for exceptional reasons, such as where a member-state's government, citizens, and/or parliament reject the initiative (e.g., the UK and Denmark on the Single Currency). But as Fritz Scharpf (2014) has argued, any such opt-out could be subject to denial by qualified majorities, in cases where the opt-out would unfairly advantage the member-state and/or threaten the viability of the policy itself. Alternative accommodations could then need to be made for the member-state in question.

The knotty problem remains the question of politics and democracy. Representative institutions need to be reinforced. At the moment, the EU serves the purpose of the populists, by hollowing out national representative institutions, allowing the populists to claim that they are the true representatives of the people. To change this, the EU needs to do more to reinforce citizen representation and participation. For the Eurozone in particular, this at the very least demands more involvement of the European Parliament in decision-making, through a return to the Community Method. Turning Eurozone treaties into ordinary legislation, moreover, would help break the stalemate that makes it impossible to change such legislation (given the unanimity rule), and make them subject to political debate. But the EP would also need to find more ways to bring national parliaments into EU level decision-making. And the EU as a whole must devise new means of encouraging citizen participation, from the ground up.

Conclusion

The future of EU governance is very open. It is best conceived not as a hard core Europe centered around the Eurozone but rather as a soft core of multiple overlapping clusters of member-states in the EU's many policy communities. In this context, increasing flexibility in the EU's legislative and policy processes, along with decentralization to the benefit of the member-states, would enhance policy effectiveness (output legitimacy), policymaking accountability (throughput legitimacy) as well as political responsiveness to citizen's expressed concerns (input legitimacy).

Soft-core differentiation has certain common institutional requirements, including one set of laws overseen by the ECJ and ensured by national courts with one set of central institutions, including the Commission, Council and European Parliament. That said, any number of specialized institutions may be established in a given policy community that deepens integration in that area, and is ‘made-to-purpose,’ just as in the Eurozone the ECB is in charge of monetary policy, the ESM of providing bail-out funds, with Banking Union having its own further set of institutions

The danger for the EU, in particular in light of its many crises, is *differentiated disintegration*. The best way to avoid this is planned *differentiated integration*, which means that the heterogeneity of EU member-states’ economies and politics is recognized as at the basis of European integration. But this still leaves the question of how to construct a more democratically legitimate European Union, in particular given the problematic impact of European integration on national democracy. My preliminary suggestion is that deeper integration must at the same time allow for greater differentiation and decentralization. For the Eurozone in particular, this would mean increasing decentralization of the European Semester to the benefit of national governments, parliaments, and civil society, with the governing rules and numbers treated more as guidelines in the emerging EU-wide system of budgetary coordination. In this context, the consultative process at the national level would feed into EU level recommendations—as a bottom-up rather than top-down process—more in tune with the changing realities in national and EU economies and responsive to the diverse needs of European member-states’ heterogeneous economies. Other still-to-be-deepened policy areas could follow suit, with general EU level guidelines allowing for greater differentiation among individual member-states or clusters of member-states.

In short, re-envisioning the future of the EU in terms of a *soft core* multi-clustered Europe makes the most sense. To extend a metaphor I have previously evoked, the future cannot be a hard core Europe, with one set menu (*prix fixe, pas de substitutions*) for the chosen few. This is not to suggest, however, that the EU is now to be ‘*Europe à la carte*,’ where everyone orders different dishes. Rather, this is an elaborate gourmet ‘menu Europe,’ with a shared main dish (the Single Market), all member-states sitting around the table and engaging in the conversation, and only some choosing to sit out one course or another (Schmidt 2009). Moreover, because everyone is at the table, even those joining the diners for only particular courses may slowly over time partake of more and more dishes even as they learn the manners of the table and the rules of the conversation.

References

- Bauer M. and Becker S. (2014) 'The unexpected winner of the crisis: The European Commission's strengthened role in economic governance', *Journal of European Integration* 36.3: 213-229
- Bickerton, C., Hodson, D. and Puetter, U. eds. (2015) *The New Intergovernmentalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Blyth, M. (2013) *Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Caramani, D. (2017) "Will Vs. Reason: Populist and Technocratic Challenges to Representative Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 111.1: 54-67
- Carstensen, M. and Schmidt, V. A. (2017) 'Power and Changing EU Modes of Governance in the Eurozone Crisis,' *Governance* early view DOI: 10.1111/gove.12318
- Commission (2017) 'White Paper on the Future of Europe – Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025', COM(2017)
- Crum, B. and Curtin, D. (2015) 'The Challenge of Making European Union Executive Power Accountable'. In Piattoni, S. ed., *The European Union: Democratic Principles and Institutional Architectures in Times of Crisis*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- De Grauwe, Paul (2013) "The Political Economy of the Euro," *Annual Review of Political Science* vol. 16: 153-70.
- De Wilde, P. and Zürn, M. (2012) 'Can the Politicisation of European Integration be Reversed?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50.1: 137-153.
- Dehousse, R. (2016) 'Why has EU macroeconomic governance become more supranational?', *Journal of European Integration* 38.5: 617–631.
- Dinan, D. (2015) 'Governance and Institutions: The Year of the Spitzenkandidaten', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53.1: 93-107
- Eiffel Group. 2014. *For a Euro Community*, 14 February 2014, <http://www.bruegel.org/about/person/view/389-the-eiffel-group>
- Epstein, R. and Rhodes, M. (2016) 'The political dynamics behind Europe's new banking union', *West European Politics* 39.3: 415-437
- Fabbrini S. (2016) 'From Consensus to Domination: The Intergovernmental Union in a Crisis Situation', *Journal of European Integration* 38.5: 587-599
- Fasone, C. (2014) 'European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Representation. What Place for the European Parliament?', *European Law Journal* 20.2: 164-185.
- Fawcett, P. and Marsh, D. (2014) 'Depoliticisation, governance and political participation', *Policy & Politics*, Special issue, 42.2: 171–88
- Flinders, M. and Wood, M. (2014) 'Depoliticisation, governance and the state', *Policy & Politics*, Special issue, 42.2: 135–49

- Future of Europe Group. 2012. *Final Report of the Future of Europe Group*, 17 September 2012, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa/Aktuell/120918-Zukunftsgruppe_Warschau_node.html
- Follesdal, Andreas. 2006. "The Legitimacy Deficits of the European Union," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 14(4): 441-68.
- Glienicker Group 2013. *Towards a Euro Union*, 18 October 2013, <http://www.bruegel.org/about/person/view/373-the-glienicker-group>
- Grimm, Dieter (2015) 'The Democratic Costs of Europeanization: The European Case,' *European Law Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 460–473.
- Haas, E. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
- Héritier, A., Moury, C., Magnus, G. Schoeller, and K., Meissner, I. (2016) 'The European Parliament as a Driving Force of Constitutionalisation'. Report for the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. PE 536.467 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/supporting-analyses-search.html>
- Hix, S. (2008) *What's Wrong with the European Union and how to fix it*, Cambridge: Polity Press
- Hix, S. and Høyland, B. (2013) 'Empowerment of the European Parliament', *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 171-89
- Hoffmann, S. (1966) 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus*, 95: 892-90
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', *British Journal of Political Science* 39 :1: 1-23.
- Ioannou, D., Leblond, P. and Niemann, A. (2015) 'European integration and the crisis: Practice and theory', *Journal of European Public Policy* 22.2: 155-176.
- Kassim, H., J. Peterson, M.W. Bauer, S. Connolly, R. Dehousse, L. Hooghe, and A. Thompson (2013) *The European Commission of the twenty-first century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keohane, R. and Hoffmann, S. (1991) *The New European Community*, Boulder: Westview Press
- Kriesi, H. (2016) 'The Politicization of European Integration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54 (Annual Review): 32-47
- Kriesi, H. (2014) "The Populist Challenge," *West European Politics* vol. 37, no. 2: 379-99.
- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Dolezal, M., Helbling, M., Höglinger, D., Hutter, S. and Wueest, B. (2012) *Political conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Majone, G. (1998). 'Europe's Democratic Deficit', *European Law Journal*, 4.1: 5-28.
- Majone, G. (2001) 'Non-majoritarian institutions and the limits of democratic governance', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 157.1: 57–78

- Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
- Moravcsik, A. (2002) 'In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40.4: 603-624
- Peterson, J. (2015) 'The Commission and the New Intergovernmentalism'. In Bickerton, C., Hodson, D. and Puetter, U., (Eds.) *The New Intergovernmentalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Piris, Jean-Claude (2012)
- Puetter, U. (2012) 'Europe's deliberative intergovernmentalism - the role of the Council and European Council in EU economic governance', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19.2: 161-178
- Ravinet, Pauline (2008), "From Voluntary Participation to Monitored Coordination: why European countries feel increasingly bound by their commitment to the Bologna Process," *European Journal of Education*, 43: 353–367.
- Roederer-Rynning, C. and Greenwood, J. (2015) 'The culture of trilogues', *Journal of European Public Policy* 22.8: 1148-1165
- Sandholtz, W., and Stone Sweet, A. (eds.) (1998) *European integration and supranational governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Scharpf, Fritz W. (1999) *Governing in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Scharpf, Fritz W. (2013) 'Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Disabling of Democratic Accountability', In Schäfer, A. and Streeck, W. (Eds.) *Politics in the Age of Austerity*, Cambridge: Polity
- Scharpf, Fritz (2014) "After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy," MPFIG discussion paper 14/21. Available at: http://www.mpifg.de/people/fs/publ_en.asp#DiscussionPapers
- Schimmelfennig, F.(2015) 'Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis', *Journal of European Public Policy* 22.2: 177-195.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. (2006) *Democracy in Europe* Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Schmidt, V. A. (2013) 'Democracy and legitimacy in the European Union revisited: Input, output and "throughput"', *Political Studies*, 61.1: 2-22.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. (2014) 'Speaking to the Markets or to the People? A Discursive Institutional Analysis of EU Leaders' Discourse during the Eurozone Crisis', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 16: 1, 188-209
- Schmidt, Vivien A. (2015) 'Forgotten Democratic Legitimacy: "Governing by the Rules" and "Ruling by the Numbers"'. In Matthijs, M. and Blyth, M. (eds.) *The Future of the Euro*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. (2016) 'Reinterpreting the Rules "by Stealth" in Times of Crisis: The European Central Bank and the European Commission', *West European Politics* Vol. 39, no. 5, pp., 1032-1052
- Schmidt, Vivien A. (2018) "Rethinking EU Governance: From 'Old' to 'New' Approaches," for Symposium Issue "Liberal Intergovernmentalism and its Critics,"

- eds. Marieke Kleine and Mark Pollack *Journal of Common Market Studies*
(forthcoming)
- Schmidt, V. A. and Thatcher, M. (eds.) (2013) *Resilient Liberalism*, Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press
- Spiegel, P. (2014) 'If the Euro Falls, Europe Falls', *Financial Times*, (May 14, 15, 17)
- Tocci, Natalie. 2014. "Imagining Post-Crisis Europe," *Imagining Europe* Istituto Affari
Internazionali Working Paper no. 10 (June).
- Tsebelis, G. (2016) 'Lessons from the Greek Crisis', *Journal of European Public Policy*
23.1.: 25-41.
- Zürn, M. (2016), 'Opening up Europe: next steps in politicisation research', *West
European Politics*, 39.1: 164-82.