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The higher pragmitism

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THE HIGHER PRAGMATISM

Submitted by

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By Delo Corydon Grover

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2./It is held that the co-efficient of truth-values is not alone sensational, but also rational, logical, ethical, and aesthetic.

3./According to the pragmatism based upon empiricism truth is empirically <u>made</u>. This empirical pragmatism regards nothing as a priori, not even the categories of the understanding. But for the higher pragmatism these categories are not the products of experience but rather the a priori conditions of experience. They are the rational presuppositions necessary to lift individual human thinking above the plane of purely subjective and solipsistic relativity.

4./Its basis upon these rational presuppositions being once given, then the higher pragmatism may be formulated in the words of the Great Teacher as follows, "by their fruits ye shall know them".

Finally, let the higher pragmatism be considered with special reference to its use in the evaluation of religion.

1./Religion is regarded as primarily an a priori and original inarticulate sense of something that transcends us, together with an undefined feeling of our dependence upon the same. As such it is, of course, nothing for articulate knowledge.

2./In the determination of knowledge in religion there are involved certain factors, only part of which are recognized by the lower, or Jamesonian pragmatism. The higher pragmatism seeks to take due account of all the factors involved in the evaluation of the data of religion.

3./As apropos to this phase of the subject, it has to be recalled that the fact that knowledge <u>begins</u> with experience does not imply that it therefore <u>originates</u> in experience.

4./The problem of the philosophy of religion is found in the evaluation of or in the determination of the knowledge of the various expressions of the religious nature among men, and the factors involved in this work are (1) the rational or theoretical, and (2) the pragmatic.

5./The higher pragmatism is distinguished from the lower pragmatism by its recognition of rational and volitionally accepted presuppositions. There is no pragmatism, that has any right to rational standing, that is not based upon rational and volitionally accepted presuppositions. Even pragmatism, therefore, must be tested in the supreme court of the reason.

6./It is found that as distinctly supplementary to the theoretic and scientific truth-principle, there is also the principle of value, which is of pragmatic use in the determination of the knowledge of the religious life and nature among men.

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8./It is therefore a conviction of the present writer that this generation can learn no more important lesson than this of the rationally based and practically established principles of the higher pragmatism, as we have conceived it, to the determination of truth-values, both for the individual and for society, and none the less for locating the true ground of certainties in politics and ethics than in religion.

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Chapter I.--

An Historical Sketch of Pragmatism as a Philosophy.

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There is much difference of opinion as to the time which should be assigned for the beginning of pragmatism as a philosophy. Most pragmatists hold that the modern doctrine of pragmatism is not really new but that it is merely a new statement of ancient relativism. In the bibliography appended to this thesis will be cited an article by Professor Boodin, entitled, "From Protagoras to James"(The Monist, January, 1911), in which the view is presented that the pragmatism of James and others like him is really only a modern putting of the Protagorean philosophy. Professor James calls his book, "Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking". On the other hand, some authorities, such as the Edinburgh Review (April, 1909), take the position that pragmatism is really new.

It is significant that Protagoras should have asserted: "Man is the measure of all things; of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are not". Protagoras was a thorough-going relativist. Concerning the existence of the gods he was uncertain. He said, "With regard to the gods I know not whether they exist or not, or what they are like. Many things prevent our knowing; the subject is obscure and brief is the span of our mortal life"(Eus. P.E., XIV.,3,7.-- Cited in Bakewell's Source Book in Ancient Philosophy, p.67). James says, "I personally give up the Absolute"(Pragmatism, p.78). He declares also,"There is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic method. Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its means"(Pragmatism,59). Goethe wrote,"I have observed that I hold that thought to be <u>true</u> which is <u>fruitful for me</u>, which adjusts itself to the general direction of my thought, and at the same time furthers me in it. Now it is not only possible, but natural, that such a thought should not chime in with the sense of another person, nor further him, perhaps even be a hinderance to him, and so he will hold it to be false; when one is right thoroughly convinced of this he will never indulge in controversy"(quoted by Euberweg, Hist. of Phil.,Vol.I,75). Euberweg also quotes Goethe's words from <u>Maximen und Reflexionen</u>, "When I know my relation to myself and to the outer world, I say that I

possess the truth. And thus each may have his own truth, and yet truth is ever the same".

The history of the doctrine of relativism, and the long and various insistence upon truth as consisting in the meaning for the knower of that which is known will, I think, justify the view of pragmatism as a new name for some old ways of thinking. And so much may be said without expressing any judgment upon the validity of pragmatism, whether new or old.

As a philosophy bearing the definite form of pragmatism it is agreed that pragmatism had its origin in a series of Articles in the Popular Science Monthly in 1878, by Charles Pierce. Pierce took the position that thinking has for its purpose the resolution of doubt and the fixing of belief. And when we come to the determination of the real as meaning, Pierce held that "there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice"(Popular Sci.Mon., Jan., 1878, p.293). Pierce was writing upon the logic of science, and the principles that he set forth are the sum and substance of pragmatic theory as it has been since developed. Pragmatists hold that sensations, ideas, beliefs, are really for us just what they are for action or practice. Ideas which are really satisfactory for practice are always held to be true. Those ideas which are not satisfactory for practice are, as a consequence, held to be false. This is the pragmatic method of the evaluation of ideas, that is, for the determination of truth.

Twenty years later in 1898 Professor James in an address at the University of Calafornia brought forth again the method and the principle, and employed it in a discussion of religion. The fulness of time was then come, and since then many have written and spoken the words and ideas of "pragmatism".

F.C.S.Schiller of Oxford wrote his work, entitled, "Humanism: Philosophical Essays" in 1903, and there appeared by the same author "Studies in Humanism" in 1907. "Studies in Logical Theory" by John Dewey, and others, was published by the University of Chicago Press, also in 1903.

With a view to true perspective and a proper understanding of pragmatist metes and boundaries it will be well to draw a distinction here. The terms "humanism" and "pragmatism" and "instrumentalism" are often used interchangeably, and they refer essentially to the same thing.

Professor Bawden distinguishes the work of the three most prominent pragmatists as follows: "Professor James emphasizes the practical meaning of philosophy for every-day life, and in describing his point of view uses the words 'Pragmatism' and 'Radical Empiricism'. Mr. Schiller defends the rights of religious faith and feeling in determining our beliefs, and prefers the term 'Humanism'. His philosophy has much in common with what in other quarters has come to be called 'Personalism'. Professor Dewey is the champion of a scientific empirical method in philosophy. This method is quite generally known as 'Instrumentalism', but in a recent article is described by Professor Dewey himself as 'Immediate Empiricism'"(The Principles of Pragmatism, p.9). James is psychological, and his interest centers in the establishment of 'radical empiricism.' He seeks above all to make philosophy practical. His interests are not mystical, ethical or religious; they are rather epistemological and psychological in so far as that is involved in the establishing of the radical empirical method. His doctrine will be set forth at length in the next chapter of this thesis.

In "Humanism: Philosophical Essays" Schiller enlarged upon such topics as "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics"; "'Useless' Knowledge"; "The Desire of Immortality"; and "The Ethical Significance of Immortality". In the "Studies in Humanism" the author considers the nature of our freedom and the religious aspects of philosophy.

Schiller's metaphysical doctrine "consists essentially in the position that the self or person is ultimately real"(Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism"-- Reviewed by T. Whittaker, Hibbert Journal, April 1911, p. 677ff). Schiller is interested in making a place for the emotional and volitional nature of man. He would stand for faith as a volitional and legitimate trust in things hoped for. "For all we know, the wish and the will to believe may be a factor in determining the reality" Bawden, p.16). Humanism is ethical, mystical, religious, passional, volitional. And as seen above, metaphysically it is personalism.

Professor John Dewey has formulated an instrumental or functional theory of logical thought. Ideas are regarded as instruments for action. They originate <u>in</u> action and they are <u>for</u> action. With Dewey, therefore, pragmatism is "instrumentalism". It is logical theory. It has been set forth in many articles, but of special importance is the "Studies in Logical Theory" cited above. Dewey contributed four chapters of that work on "Thought and Its Subject-Matter"--(1)General Problem of Logical Theory

(2)The Antecedents of Thought, (3)The Datum of Thinking and (4) The Content and Object of Thought. Dewey says "The essential business of logic is henceforth to discuss the relation of thought as such to reality as such"(p.5). The main problem of logic is defined as "the relation of thought as such, or at large, to reality as such, or at large"(p.5). "How do the specifications of thought as such hold good of reality as such? In fine, logic is supposed to grow out of the epistemological inquiry and to lead up to its solution"(p.6).

Lotze's theory of logic, which is the logic of "pure" thought, is criticized as being inadequate for the solution of the logical problem. Lotze is represented as defining the business of pure logic by the Lotzean reference to "universal forms and principles of thought which hold good everywhere both in judging of reality and in weighing possibility, irrespective of any difference in the objects"(Quoted by Dewey from "Logic"--Trans.,Oxford 1888.--Vol.I,pp.10,11.Italics Dewey's). Over against such a logic of pure thought, or thought in general, is placed the instrumental or functional theory of thinking in the concrete. It is held that true epistemologists know that there is no "thought in general", that is, there is no thought apart from the concrete functioning of ideas within and constitutive of the thought process. Ideas are held to originate in experience and to point forward to experience. Ideas are relative to their antecedents, and their content is determined with a view to further action. The content of thought is determined by the object of thought. Thought does not have form wholly independent of ite object. It is instrumental.

Thus pragmatism is radical empiricism, a psychological method, with James; a personalism, intentionally ethical and affording speculative sanction to religion, with Schiller; and a logic of thought as growing out of experience and as instrumental for further experience, with Dewey.

Among the many who have written in this field Professor Bawden, in "The Principles of Pragmatism", has given an exposition which is peculiarly open to objection as being based upon thoroughly unsound philosophical presuppositions. He proposes to set forth "the necessary assumptions of a philosophy in which experience becomes self-conscious method", but in which the division of philosophy into theory of knowledge and theory of reality are disregarded. Some of us are not quite able to

see what a philosophy would be like "in which experience becomes self-conscious method" without "a theory of knowledge" or what the "necessary assumptions" of such a philosophy would be without a "theory of reality"(Preface by Bawden).
Bawden denies the unitary and identical character of the mind. Nor would he make any real distinction between the mind and the body(p.32). After a careful reading of Bawden I am unable to understand what meaning would attach to experience as he conceives it. What is experience which is not he experience of some one? He says "experience is always in specific centers of concrete interest and value", and "We participate in the evolution of reality" etc. Who or what are "we" under the author's view?(p.35).
Bawden has no use for an Absolute: "the only absolute required is the concrete process of experience itself"(p.39).
In his discussion of experience Bawden says "Immediate personal experience-- this is the starting point"(p.51).But how can there be personal experience without persons? How can there be consciousness which is not the consciousness of some one? How can there be meaning which is not meaning for some one? Professor Bawden has based his work upon unsound presuppositions, and his views are vitiated by their suicidal implications. He can theorize at all only by virtue of the fact that his doctrines are not true. If his doctrines with their speculative implications were true then all thinking, all experience, and all knowledge would be impossible. We will now pass to an examination of the pragmatism of Professor William James.This will be the subject of the next chapter.

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Chapter II.--

An Examination of the Pragmatism of Professor William James.

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It seems to many that Professor James was easily the Head Master in the pragmatist school from its origin until he lay down in death. Certain it is that during his later years Professor James contributed his full share toward the exposition of the pragmatist theory of knowledge and also of being.

Professor James can not be understood by any one who does not get his fundamental point of view. For him "the history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments"(Pragmatism 6). He held that men are determined in their philosophical position largely by temperamental reasons. The leaders of human thinking have been thus classified. "Plato, Locke, Hegel, Spencer, are such temperamental thinkers"(Prag.8). In philosophical literature we find men thus distinguished into two great camps, the 'rationalist' and 'empiricist',-- "'empiricist' meaning your lover of facts in all their crude variety, 'rationalist' meaning your devotee to abstract and eternal principles"(Prag.9). In any criticism that may be made upon the position of Professor James it must not be overlooked that he explicitly recognizes that in ordinary life both facts and principles are necessary, and, therefore, the difference between the so-called rationalist and the empiricist, as temperamentally predetermined, is held to be really only difference of emphasis. Intellectualism is synonymous with rationalism and sensationalism with empiricism. Rationalism is described as "always <u>monistic</u>" and empiricism as not being averse to calling itself <u>pluralistic</u>.

An interesting idea of James' view of this temperamental classification of men is seen by reference to a parallel column arrangement of characteristics distinguishing the two great, resulting human types. He distinguishes all men as "tender-minded" or "tough-minded", as follows:

"<u>The Tender-minded</u> Rationalistic (going by 'principles')	<u>The Tough-minded</u> Empiricist (going by facts)
Intellectualistic	Sensationalistic
Idealistic	Materialistic
Optimistic	Pessimistic
Religious	Irreligious
Free-willist	Fatalistic
Monistic	Pluralistic
Dogmatical	Sceptical"

(Pragmatism, 12).

I do not think that Green, the Cairds, and Royce would have altogether agreed with the description of their religious philosophy as "pantheistic"(Prag.17). James characteristically describes the theistic philosophy of Martineau, Bowne and Ladd as having "the air of fighting a slow retreat"(Prag.18). A thorough reading of the work of James leads me to think that he did not really understand the position of Bowne, Ladd and others of their way of thinking. Certainly no one ever insisted upon the concrete facts of nature more persistently than did Bowne. The crassest materialistic follower of Democritus could not regard the concrete fact-basis of science as more secure than did Bowne, as is made explicit in all his work. And yet with theistic thinkers of this type in mind James would say, in setting forth what he called the dilemma in philosophy: "You find empiricism with inhumanism and irreligion; or else you find a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out of all definite touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows"(Prag.20). And again James says of such theistic philosophy, "Its temperament, if I may use the word temperament here, is utterly alien to the temperament of existence in the concrete"(Prag.22). Such discussion, when spread over scores of pages, tends to show either a "temperamental" or a wilful failure to understand Professor Bowne and others like him.

James offers "pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy" (Prag.33) both the tough-minded and the tender-minded, the empiricist and the rationalist, the materialist believer in concrete things and the religionist who is "like a sleep-walker to whom actual things are blank"(quotation from Morrison I.Swift, Prag.32).

As to the meaning of pragmatism, first of all, it does not represent any special results; it is theoretically only a method. James sets it forth as a way of truth-determination in all realms. It is a method of reality evaluation. It makes use of theories and even od so-called "principles", but it has no place for a priori presuppositions."Theories thus becom instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest"(Prag.53). "No particular results then, so far, but only an attitude of orientation, is what the pragmatic method means. The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories', supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts" (Prag.54,55).

Further, what is pragmatism as a theory of truth? What is truth? What is meant when we speak of the truth of ideas, or of ideas as true? "It means nothing but this, that ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience" (Prag.58). Ideas are true as instruments in so far as they 'work'.

Pragmatism is thus held to be not only a method but also a genetic theory of truth. Truth is held to be generated by each man, and is determined with reference to all ideas by the degree of satisfactoriness with which they 'work' as parts of our experience, and, says James, "individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently" (Prag.61). This is not unlike the idea of Goethe, as already quoted: "And thus each may have his own truth". If such a theory were to be admitted as ultimate, our epistemology would certainly be narrowed down to the merest solipsism. It is not strange, therefore, that Goethe, even though somewhat dogmatically, should have added "and yet truth is ever the same". James explicitly holds that not not only do 'half-truths' have to be made, but that "like the half-truths, the absolute truth will have to be made, made as a relation incidental to the growth of a mass of verification experience, to which the half-true ideas are all along contributing their quota" (Prag.224).

It is held by James that reality and truth are in constant mutation. This is distinctly Bergsonian. This James thinks is "the most fateful point of difference between a rationalist and being a pragmatist" (Prag.226). We see here no doubt the reason why James thought of himself and Bergson as so closely kin in their philosophical views. It is true according to Heraclitus, Bergson and James that all things flow. Knowledge is not thought of by James as "a static relation out of time" in which a unitary, abiding and identical knower grasps the flowing sense-manifold of experience in a timeless form, but all experience is process, and knower and known are only conjoined or disjoined terms of this experiential process. It should be noted, however, that if a flowing stream should represent the flowing experiences which are known, and if the banks should represent the flowing knowing-experiences, then all would be flowing, both banks and stream, that is, both knower and known, and it is evident that not even the stream could ever be known as flowing. If banks and

stream really flowed together, the fact of flowing at all could never be 'known as' such. Change is a fact of experience, and something identical must abide across the flux of change in order to know even change, that is, to have the experience of change. In the personal experience of self-consciousness alon can change and identity be reconciled, and a provision be made for any adequate theory of knowledge.

In the work of Professor James the pragmatic epistemology is to be thought of as 'radical empiricism'. James was greatly interested in the establishment of the pragmatic method because he regarded it as essential to the establishment of what he called 'radical empiricism'.

He boldly declared that "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we can not"(The Meaning of Truth, p.vf.). And further he set forth that "The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving"(Meaning of Truth, p.vii).

The pragmatic epistemology is made to be 'radical empiricism' by the adoption of the primary postulate, which James defines as follows: "The only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience". And this is followed by the declaration "that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more nor less so, than the things themselves", and the conclusion is "that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience"(Meaning of Truth, p.xii).

If we were to grant to this'radical empiricism' its primary postulate (which according to any ordinary theory of empiricism we could not), even then it is not seen how, by any philosophic procedure known to empiricism, the relations between things can ever be experienced as relations, or how relations between parts of experience can themselves ever be experienced as such relations. The knowledge of relations is not seen to be possible on any theory known to pure empiricism, but only through a synthetic process of thought. James concedes that "The great obstacle to radical empiricism in the contemporary mind is the rooted rationalist belief that experience as immediately given is all disjunction and no conjunction, and to make one world out of this separateness, a higher unifying agency must be there".

He adds, "In the prevalent idealism this agency is represented as the absolute all-witness which 'relates' things together by throwing 'categories' over them like a net. The most peculiar and unique, perhaps, of all these categories is supposed to be the truth-relation, which connects parts of reality in pairs, making of one of them a knower, and of the other a thing known, yet which is itself contentless experientially" (Meaning of Truth, p. xiii). Here is an interesting notion of the categories. We would certainly admit the view of James that the categories, as such, are all contentless. Their 'content' comes as the result of the constitutive and synthetic act of the knowing mind.

In the view of James the categories are experimentally generated; they are discovered ways of getting on. "Our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent times" (Prag. 170). The "common-sense categories" were discovered, verified and spread abroad in the course of historic and prehistoric practice, that is, experience (Prag. 182). It has been the "curious and idle" intellects, says James, that have forsaken this common-sense level for the "critical" level of thought (Prag. 185).

I do not believe, therefore, that the pragmatist theory of knowledge, as thus conceived by James, can fare any better than the ordinary empirical theory with the inadequacy of which we have been long familiar.

So much, for the present, for Professor James' pragmatist theory of knowledge. The pragmatist <u>test of truth</u>, as conceived by him, will fare little better. If all ideas which we can not "validate, corroborate and verify" by some process of ordinary empiricism are false, then indeed 'true' ideas are few. And if "the true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking" and if we are confined to the methods of empiricism for the determination of the expedient, then must our progress toward the realization of the true be indeed slow. As thus stated, pragmatism has only to be understood in order to be found inadequate to the task laid upon it.

Here again the fact needs emphasis that philosophical presuppositions count for much. Much of our current pragmatism is based upon (a) a doubt of the existence of unitary and identical thinking persons and (b) a pluralistic metaphysics. If pragmatic theory can be once allied with sound philosophical

presuppositions, then it is believed that it may be useful as an epistemological philosophy in attaining a profounder apprehension of that degree of truth requisite for highest personal development.

First, as to the existence of unitary and identical persons, it must be said that James treats of the existence of souls, that is, of personal identity, in the empirical fashion. He says that "Hume, and most empirical psychologists after him, have denied the soul, save as the name for verifiable cohesions in our inner life. They redescend into the stream of experience with it, and cash it into so much small change value in the way of 'ideas' and their peculiar connexions with each other. As I said of Berkeley's matter, the soul is good or 'true' for just so much, but no more" (Prag. 92). To all of which it may be said that while such a pluralism of ideas, existing only as logical abstractions, regarded as entities independent of and apart from concrete, unitary, abiding and identical persons, may be enough for empirical psychology, even as such they could have no meaning except for such unitary, abiding and identical persons. The empirical psychologist can talk of his theory of the non-existence of identical persons only by virtue of the fact that such theory is not true. No theory even of pragmatic values can have any valid meaning apart from the necessary philosophical presupposition of unitary, abiding and identical persons.

In the second place the pluralistic metaphysics upon which much of our current pragmatism is based must receive our attention. Too often, as with James, pragmatism, starting as a method of knowledge, ends up as a metaphysical theory of mutually independent things, that is, of things which do not interact, and to all of which yet other things may be added without in any way effecting the things that were (Prag. 166). But it does not occur to James to ask how we can know, in any sense whatever, that which is really independent and without any relation of interaction with us.

James advances the hypothesis "that the actual world, instead of being complete 'eternally', as the monists assure us, may be eternally incomplete, and at all times subject to addition or liable to loss" (Prag. 166). He sustains his hypothesis by urging the fact of our own incompleteness of present knowledge. It would not be hard for us to agree that the world

is incomplete, if that is involved in our own limitation of knowledge of the world. If this is the Jamesonian philosophy of common sense, such a philosophy may indeed be common, but it can not be exceedingly fruitful.

James thinks this question of the essential unity or plurality of being is "the most central of all philosophic problems"(Prag.129), and he is out and out a pluralist. My own view of the discussion is that James overlooks the fact that both "oneness" and "manyness" have no meaning except for a unitary, identical and abiding mind. Epistemology can avoid solipsism for human intelligence only by a metaphysical reference to a monistic absolute intelligence. For human thinking such a monism at the base of all is the only alternative to the collapse of all adequate theory of knowledge.

James' pragmatic treatment of "oneness"(Prag.132) is not objectionable. But it must be remembered that even pragmatism can never do away with the rationally necessary a priori presuppositions, without putting an end to all investigation,-- even that of pragmatism itself. It remains that the validity of every judgment depends upon the condition of things existing fundamentally in a system. Side-by-sidedness without any real interaction somewhere is not enough.

James says further: "Against this notion of the unity of origin of all things there has always stood the pluralistic notion of an eternal self-existing many in the shape of atoms or even of spiritual units of some sort"(Prag.138). Such a radically empirical pluralist as James may pass by such a problem as of little or no consequence in his philosophy, but it yet remains that absolute causal unity is a rational presupposition without which all knowledge would at least lose its objective and universal validity. When more broadly conceived, I would think that such a presupposition would even itself have the highest kind of pragmatic value. All the objects of objectively and universally valid thinking must be capable of being subsumed under such an absolute generic unity.

Further, as to the fundamental unity of purpose involved in the conception of the world as generically one, James remarks, "the appearances conflict with such a view"(Prag.141). I would add, by way of commentary, that James gives us a good statement of surface appearances, no doubt, but, unless we are to be satisfied with these and ask no basal question, such a view makes no place for rational or adequate theory of knowledge, and certainly such a view is too limited to leave any place for

an adequate theory of being. And yet in the evaluation of life, and in its enrichment, an adequate theory of knowledge and also of being would seem to have even high pragmatic importance,-- at least when pragmatism is rightly conveived.

James holds that "everything makes strongly for the view that our world is incompletely unified teleologically and is still trying to get its unification better organized"(Prag.141). I would rather say that everything points to the view merely that men are everywhere trying to systematize and organize the parts and uses of the world for their own teleological ends, which is something very different, and that this work of scientific mastery is still going on. This mastery is attained however only by intelligent obedience to and harmonization with an order, or law, which men find but do not make. Man's inventions, discoveries, systems, are intelligible, and have rational worth, only by virtue of harmony with a basal order of intelligence,-- with which these works of men are thus commensurate. John ~~Edward~~ Caird's Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, page 22, may be cited as apropos to this phase of the discussion.

James declares it to be a risky procedure in dogmatism to claim "absolute teleological unity, saying that there is one purpose that every detail of the universe subserves"(Prag.142). I do not, however, see how it should be so regarded, unless it be to dogmatize when one assumes presuppositions to which one is rationally shut up as necessary to give one's thought processes any meaning or philosophical worth.

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Chapter III.;-

An Exposition of the Higher Pragmatism as the Determination of Truth-values by the Practical Test of Life Experience,--With Special Reference to the Evaluation of Religion.

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The opinion has already been expressed in this thesis that if pragmatic theory can be once allied with sound philosophical presuppositions, then it may be useful as an epistemological philosophy in attaining a profounder apprehension of that degree of truth requisite for highest personal development.

I have called the pragmatic theory that may be thus conceived the higher pragmatism. As setting forth the presuppositions upon which alone the higher pragmatism can be solidly based, I may be permitted to quote from the Preface to my book, "The Volitional Element in Knowledge and Belief", (Which is on file as collateral work in the present course). I have there said:

> There is nothing more pressing in the thought activities of our time than the bringing into true perspective the matter of presuppositions in philosophy and religion. The really significant philosophical and religious thinking of our time is, in all cases where the thinking is consistent, based upon the appropriate presuppositions.
>
> ***** These presuppositions which are so determinative for all our thinking and for all our conclusions are largely a matter of the will; that is, the mental response to the soul's environment which these represent is practical, passional, volitional.
>
> Philosophical theory is determined in character and speculative significance by its presuppositions touching two questions. First, is thinking and knowing an active process representing the self-directed working of a unitary and abiding ego, or is it a passive process representing the reaction which something which may be variously styled brain, mind, substance or inner life makes against something which may be variously styled nerve stimuli, sensation or the outer world? The philosophers of this generation see more clearly than ever what a long train of consequences for moral and speculative theory follow

upon the answer to this question. What the answer shall be is, at the first and at the last, with more or less analytical reflection thrown between, determined volitionally. The present author holds it as a rational presupposition that thinking and knowing represent the self-activity of a unitary and abiding ego.

A second question, the answer to which is equally determinative for philosophical theory, runs as follows: Is fundamental being to be regarded as intelligent, free, purposive, self-existent embodiment of the principle of efficient causation, or is it non-intelligent, non-purposive, non-causal, essentially an unknowing and unknowable somewhat of which nothing can be affirmed and nothing denied? Upon a thinker's answer to this question will depend the trend and outcome of all his logical reasoning in metaphysical theory. Here also will follow important speculative consequences touching the problems of thought and knowledge and the bases of religion. It is a conviction with the author that fundamental being can be found nowhere short of free intelligence, self-existent, the constant and unfailing creator and upholder of all that is, the World-ground, the Absolute, the Christian's God. If something less than this is to be accepted as rational presupposition in metaphysical theory, nevertheless the author can not begin with any metaphysical presupposition, touching fundamental being, short of self-existent, causal intelligence if, upon reflection, he hopes to reach any very valuable conclusion.
The primary acceptance of such presupposition is volitional. Afterwards it is supported by processes of analytical reflection which, other assumptions being freely made, shut our thought up to accept it or nothing. Then follows with the present author its final acceptance, which in the last analysis is free, rational, volitional.****
(As relevant to this phase of our present inquiry I may cite the whole of the preface and also the essay which bears the title of the book, "The Volitional Element in Knowledge and Belief").

I believe that as a protest against the rigor and vigor method of formal logic in the determination of truth-values, or as an appeal from a narrow and exclusive intellectualism,

to the wide and all-inclusive field of life experience, the higher pragmatism may have an important message for our generation. It is a lesson much needed to be learned that the co-efficient of truth-values in the actual experience of men is not alone sensational, as the empiricists would teach, but also rational, logical, ethical and aesthetic.

According to the pragmatism which is based upon empiricism truth is empirically made. Truth is regarded by such pragmatism as relative, at least the knowledge of truth and reality is relative. Even for the higher pragmatist there is, indeed, no possible standard of truth or test of knowledge apart from and independent of our own thinking. Professor Bowne well says: "Every rational being must at last trust his rational insight "(Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 278). The words of John Caird may be cited:"It is possible to doubt everything else save this ultimate relation of reality to thought.**** Whatever, therefore, has reality must be capable of approving itself to consciousness"(Intoduction to the Philosophy of Religion,50). But the higher pragmatism can not accept the proposition which James sets forth as the postulate of his 'radical empiricism', namely, "that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience." Humanism and Jamesonian pragmatism make this postulate hold even for the categories. This empirical pragmatism regards nothing as a priori, not even the categories of the understanding, but these are held to be the results of prehistoric experience, "long ago wrought into the structure of our consciousness and practically irreversible"(Meaning of Truth, 64). But for the higher pragmatism, upon the other hand, these fundamental categories are not the products of experience but rather the a priori conditions of experience. They are among the rational presuppositions necessary to lift individual human thinking above the plane of purely subjective and solipsistic relativity.

The higher pragmatism is an appeal from the 'pure reason' of assumed complete and exclusively empirical assimilation, validation, corroboration and verifying of ideas, as the measure of their truth, to the 'practical reason' which was formulated a long time ago as follows: "by their fruits ye shall know them." This,(sound rational assumptions being ~~pre-given~~ made, as the only valid basis upon which to rest any adequate theory of truth and knowledge) becomes the higher

pragmatic test of true ideas. Men need ever to be reminded that truth-values belong to those ideas which are validated and verified not, on the one hand, by the tests of sense experience alone, nor, on the other hand, by the tests of formal logic and pure intellectualism, but rather by the fruits of a normal and expanding life. Men have full right to hold that those ideas are true which, appropriate rational presuppositions being given, are verified by their fruits.

Finally, let the higher pragmatism be considered with special reference to its use in the evaluation of religion.

It may be premised that religion is always and everywhere primarily a priori and original, undefined human sense of something that transcends us, together with an inarticulate feeling of our dependence upon the same. Religion is thus one of the great, primary, human instincts. Of course, religion, in this a priori character, is nothing for articulate knowledge, not even as relative and solipsistic.

In the evaluation of the elements and principles of all knowledge and belief there are certain factors, only part of which are recognized by the lower or Jamesonian pragmatism. The higher pragmatism undertakes to take account of all these factors of the knowledge process in its epistemology. Kant pointed out that knowledge may <u>begin</u> with experience even though it does not follow that it <u>originates</u> by experience. Just so the knowledge of religion with all its power to invest life with value for us, that is, the <u>knowledge</u> of that with which we are originally endowed as an undefined sense of something that transcends us may <u>begin</u> only with experience, even though it does not <u>originate</u> by experience.

Religion, as undefined and a priori, has a universally normal tendency to express itself in concepts, teachings and institutions, and these determine the conduct of men as individuals and as members of society. The problem of the philosophy of religion is found in the evaluation of these various expressions of the religious nature among men, and the factors involved in their evaluation are

(1) the rational or theoretic and
(2) the pragmatic.

These factors are not to be thought of as mutually independent, but rather do they exist and work together in reciprocal relations.. The rational or theoretic factor includes cognition, feeling, willing,-- that is, all the elements of the whole unitary mind or ego. The pragmatic factor includes all the elements of practical life experience such as can not be measured by any formal logic, or any merely conceptual thinking.

Our present purpose does not admit a full consideration of the rational factor in the development of the knowledge and evaluation of religion. Did our present purpose contemplate so much we would show (1) how the rational factor developes the original, inarticulate sense of dependence upon something that transcends us into an intelligible and articulate conviction, knowledge or belief. We would show in the second place (2) how the rational factor everywhere and always developes a more or less definite symbolism, at the center of which is the principle and use of the analogy of self.

But the rational or theoretic factor in the development and evaluation of the concepts, teachings and institutions of religion, is not the only factor involved. Religion can not be fully accounted for or explained by any logic of pure intellectualism. In its most original and universal sense it defies theoretic and scientific explanation. Dr. Harold Höffding, therefore, in his great work entitled, "The Philosophy of Religion", brings the religious problem everywhere to essential pragmatism for solution. Hoffding argues as follows:

Life has certain needs. That which will satisfy those needs has value, and, so far forth, may be retained as true.

Life has needs which have been satisfied in the past by religion with its manifold and various concepts, teachings and institutions. Therefore religion has had value.

Life still has needs, but the conditions of their satisfaction have changed. Can the needs of humanity under the changed conditions be still satisfied by religion with its changed concepts, teachings and institutions? Can the concepts, teachings and institutions of religion be so adapted as to meet the needs of life equally well, or better, than in the past? If so, religion has conserved its old values under changed conditions. Here, Hoffding insists, is our problem. Religion is concerned not so much with intellectual science as with the evaluation of life. The test of religion in every age, and among all peoples,

is its power to have value for life, that is, to invest life with value for us. Our way of looking at religion, therefore, that is, our philosophy of religion, our estimate of its truth, will depend always upon the tested power of religion, by its concepts, teachings and institutions, to create and conserve life values. The application of this method is what we mean by the use of the pragmatic factor in the attainment of religious conviction, knowledge or belief.

Further, as with the rational factor in the determination of truth in the fields of science or religion, so with the pragmatic factor, the character of the results must depend largely upon rational and volitionally accepted presuppositions. There is no pragmatism, even, that has any right to rational standing, that is not based upon rational and volitionally accepted presuppositions. Even pragmatism, therefore, must be tested in the supreme court of reason.

It follows that there is what may be called a lower pragmatism and a higher pragmatism. What I will call the lower pragmatism, of which the leading expositor was Professor James, is based (1) upon a radically empirical postulate, as already stated, which however (though somewhat inconsistently) is itself volitionally predetermined, and (2) upon a recurring doubt concerning the existence of unitary, identical and abiding persons, and (3) upon a metaphysical pluralism. I have already set forth the inadequacy of this lower pragmatism in the second chapter. On the other hand, it has already been pointed out that Hoffding everywhere brings the problem of the truth of religion to the practical test of value-conservation for solution. The difficulty with the work of Hoffding is that he too fails properly to estimate the importance of the theoretic or rational factor in religion. He denies the validity of scientific explanation when applied to religion. It may, however, with Professor Ormond, be reasonably insisted that the critical use of self-analogy in the determination of knowledge in religion is both valid and scientific. Analogy must of course be critically grounded, and symbols and representative concepts must be critically used. But analogy, when thus used, is a safe and scientific principle for the teleological interpretation of the world and the World-ground, and of the relation between these. We are undoubtedly on secure footing when we stand upon the thesis that analogy is a

principle of real intelligibility in reference to God and religion. And by the critical use of this principle we can reach a true, though incomplete, explanation of the world, of God and of religion.

But as distinctly supplementary to the theoretic and scientific truth-principle there is also the principle of value which is of pragmatic use in the determination of the religious nature and life among men. The value-principle has the relation to the truth-principle that Kant's Practical Reason holds to his Pure Reason. As against the lower, empirical pragmatism it is insisted by the higher pragmatism that we need to know the scientific and theoretic truth about a concept or percept of religion in order to give these any really pragmatic value. The higher pragmatism holds that theoretic and rational truth, upon the one hand, and pragmatic value, upon the other hand, have a reciprocal relation in the evaluation of religion. There are, therefore, two motives in religion, namely, the truth-motive and the value-motive. The one is tributary to the other, and neither is complete or adequate without the other.

Pragmatism has been described as a philosophy which puts the burden on the practical and value side. We have a right, indeed, to give a large place in the development of our knowledge of religion to the pragmatic principle. Professor Ormond would agree with Hoffding in making a real test of religious conceptions, teachings and institutions to depend upon the creation and conservation of values. The religious consciousness has in itself the sense of transcendence which creates as well as conserves values.

Among the original and a priori elements of the human personality are the primary instincts which reach out after God, freedom and immortality. In the most universal developement of consciousness these take on the form of root-concepts in all natural as well as in revealed religion. Since these concepts root back in the a priori and instinctive life it follows that no abstract demonstration is possible in reference to any of them. For example, there seems to be universal in man an instinctive reaching out after immortality. Human belief in immortality does not rest on any so-called "proofs". Considerations which determine humanity at this point come from the side of value rather than from the theoretic side.

Surely then, and lastly, it behooves all who love truth, and who seek to conserve truth-values, to appeal from all sense empiricisms, upon the one hand, or so-called logical demonstrations, upon the other, to this higher pragmatic test of truth-evaluation in religion. Herein we discover the unique value of President McConnell's book, "Religious Certainty". Its significance lies in the scope of suggestion and clearness of illustration with which the author shows the application of the principles of the true higher pragmatism, which, as we conceive it, is at once both rational and pragmatic, in locating the true grounds of certainty in all matters of religious life, knowledge and faith. And it is my firm conviction that the present generation can learn no more important lesson than this of the application of the rational and practical principles of the higher pragmatism to the determination of truth-values, both for the individual and for society, and none the less for locating the true grounds of certainty in politics and ethics than in religion.

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Chapter IV.--

Bibliography.

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In the preparation of the present thesis definite use has been made of the following sources:

1.--"The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy", by William James. Longman & Co., 1897.

2.--"Studies in Logical Theory", by John Dewey and Others, University of Chicago Press, 1903.

3.--"Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking", by James. Longmans & Co., 1907.

4.--"The Meaning of Truth", by James. Longmans, Green & Co., 1909.

5.--"The Philosophy of Religion", by Hoffding. Meyer's translation. Macmillan & Co. 1906.

6.--"Religious Certainty", by Francis McConnell. Eaton & Main, 1910.

7.--"Creative Evolution", by Bergson; Mitchell's translation. Henry Holt & Co., 1911.

8.--"Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion", by John Caird, Maclehose and Sons, New Edition, 1910.

9.--"The Principles of Pragmatism", by Bawden, Houghton Mifflin Co. 1910.

Magazine and review articles are found in great number bearing on this subject. The following have been consulted for the present thesis:

1.--"Pragmatism",-- Edinburgh Review, April 1909. This review is thorough and critical. The writer holds that pragmatism as a philosophy is really <u>new</u>.

2.--"Can Pragmatism Furnish a Philosophical Basis for Theology?", by O.C.McIntosh, Harvard Theological R., III, 1,-

As apropos to this inquiry I have been interested in a sentence which I find in one of Doctor J.E.Clark's letters to me touching the present thesis. Doctor Clark writes: "Your <u>text</u> is well taken, and in the ethical field you will be able to use it valiantly. I fear, however, unless you open up some new depths of truth, and discover a closer relation between pragmatic values and epistemological facts than has hitherto been found, that even the higher pragmatism will still remain a 'point of view' and not a philosophic system."

3.--"From Protagoras to James", by J.E.Boodin. The Monist, January 1911.

Professor Boodin holds that the teaching of Protagoras and modern pragmatism are in essential agreement. This is the view of most pragmatists. The Edinburgh Review cited above represents the contrary view. I would myself incline to agree with Professor Boodin. Modern pragmatism brings a new name at least for the hoary doctrine of the relativity of all human knowledge.

4.--"Personality and a Metaphysic of Value", by Leighton. Int. J.E., XXI, 1.--

Reviewing this article in the Philosophical Review C.A.Ruckmich writes: "Fundamental problems of modern philosophy center in questions of evaluation; but a system of values involves a systematic study of personality,--- values are human in origin."
It is then pointed out that "there are three kinds of valuing attitudes: (1) theoretical or truth attitudes; (2) practical or overt action attitudes; (3) immediate emotional or feeling attitudes. The first, applied to the three types of experience, viz., nature, fellowman, and God, establishes their reality."

If it be true, and we hold it to be so, that theoretical or truth attitudes of a reasoning personality are involved in the establishing or determination of the reality of nature, fellowman, and God, then will all merely"empirical" pragmatism be seen to be inadequate to the developement of any valid metaphysic, even a metaphysic of value.

5.--"Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism", by F.C.S.Schiller, Edition 1910, Swan Sonnenschein & Co. London.--As reviewed by T.Whittaker, in the Hibbert Journal, April 1911.

6.--Articles on the Logic of Science, by Charles Pierce, Popular Science Monthly, November 1877, and January, March, April, June, and August, 1878.

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