Hopp, WalterDahlstrom, DanielTapinç, Merve Rumeysa2025-02-122024https://hdl.handle.net/2144/497772024How do we know our beliefs and commitments which have moral significance and shape our character as advised by the Oracle of Delphi “Know Thyself”? We ordinarily both take ourselves to have, and aspire to have, certain beliefs and commitments. It is also very important to us to that we get these facts right about ourselves. Knowing which beliefs and commitments we hold, which we aspire to hold, and whether there is an ontological gap between them, is an important component of personal integrity and wellbeing. I identify two central challenges in achieving Delphic Self-Knowledge. One challenge is the problem of indifference, which arises when agents know their dispositional beliefs and actions but do not care about them. I argue that empiricist views, according to which we know our beliefs by observing how we reason, act, and react, faces the problem of indifference. The second challenge is the problem of epistemic irresponsibility, which arises when agents believe that they have a belief or a commitment on the basis of insufficient evidence from their conscious judgements and decisions. I discuss that the transparency theorists face the problem of epistemic irresponsibility because they claim that forming a judgement about what is true, or a decision about what to do, are sufficient for self-knowledge of having a belief and a commitment. I argue that these are often not sufficient. I argue that the challenges they encounter prevent the current theories on self-knowledge from providing a satisfactory account of a phenomena I call “epistemic aspiration,” which arises when moral agents aspire to have certain beliefs. I offer a self-knowledge account that explains both the significance of caring about one’s beliefs and actions, but also the significance of taking epistemic responsibility for knowing one’s beliefs and actions. To achieve this, I argue that commitments are expressive of our value-driven self. I go on to argue that knowledge of commitment requires external evidence and we need knowledge of fit between what we take ourselves to be committed to and our actions to know whether we in fact act in the way we are committed to.en-USPhilosophyEpistemologyEthicsBeliefsCommitmentsEpistemic aspirationEpistemic responsibilityIntentionsSelf-knowledgeThesis/Dissertation2025-02-11