Hallen, Barry2019-08-0119701970b14749579https://hdl.handle.net/2144/36834Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston UniversityPLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you.The central aim of this dissertation is to inquire whether there is any one concern or end that Karl Popper regards as primary and therefore binding for all areas of human endeavor. Attention centers upon his conjecture and refutation methodology for theoretical empirical science (Chapter I), his methodologies for theoretical and technological social science (Chapter II), and his social philosophy (Chapter III). The thesis of the dissertation is that Popper does subscribe to an ultimate concern, namely, the preservation and furthering of rationalism. Furthermore, that the means Popper stipulates for the realization of this end would inhibit, or prohibit, use of his methodology for theoretical science by certain sciences. [TRUNCATED]en-USSocial philosophyPopper, Karl R.Social sciencesRationalismThesis/Dissertation1171902556763999184543500001161