The Price of Anarchy in Transportation Networks by Estimating User Cost Functions from Actual Traffic Data
1606.02194v1.pdf (1.001Mb) Final author draft
Cassandras, Christos G.
Paschalidis, Ioannis Ch.
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CitationJing Zhang, Sepideh Pourazarm, Christos G Cassandras, Ioannis Ch Paschalidis. "The Price of Anarchy in Transportation Networks by Estimating User Cost Functions from Actual Traffic Data." 2016 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control.
We have considered a large-scale road network in Eastern Massachusetts. Using real traffic data in the form of spatial average speeds and the flow capacity for each road segment of the network, we converted the speed data to flow data and estimated the origin-destination flow demand matrices for the network. Assuming that the observed traffic data correspond to user (Wardrop) equilibria for different times-of-the-day and days-of-the-week, we formulated appropriate inverse problems to recover the per-road cost (congestion) functions determining user route selection for each month and time-of-day period. In addition, we analyzed the sensitivity of the total user latency cost to important parameters such as road capacities and minimum travel times. Finally, we formulated a system-optimum problem in order to find socially optimal flows for the network. We investigated the network performance, in terms of the total latency, under a user-optimal policy versus a system-optimal policy. The ratio of these two quantities is defined as the Price of Anarchy (POA) and quantifies the efficiency loss of selfish actions compared to socially optimal ones. Our findings contribute to efforts for a smarter and more efficient city.