Intuition in Bergson's philosophy
Goldwasser, Saul M.
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Problem. This thesis represents an attempt to understand and evaluate Bergson's doctrine of intuition, and its use in an intuitive method. Various definitions of intuition, along with a continual re-amplification of possible meanings, are scattered throughout most of Bergson's works. There are times when contradictions appear to occur. Therefore, the first goal of this thesis is an attempt to fit all of the possible meanings of intuition into a coherent scheme . In addition, for Bergson, the use of intuition implies a method, and, therefore, the second goal of this thesis is an attempt to determine of what value Bergson's intuitional method is to philosophy. The adequacy of Bergson's intuitive method is contingent upon an adequate development of intuition and a fair critique of the limitations of the intellectual faculty. Therefore, Bergson's critique of the intellect is carefully examined. Further, while the object of intuition is duration, duration may be related to the self, to life and to matter. This thesis considers the use of intuition in these three realms. The intuition of the self. For Bergson, an intellectualist view of the self can only lead to its fragmentation. On the one hand, and particularly in An Introduction to Metaphysics, the intuition of the self appears to be a return to a felt immediacy of experience, an immediacy prior to intellection, prior to analysis. On the other hand, near the conclusion of that same work, Bergson notes that the intuition of the self can arise only after painstaking analysis. These two apparently conflicting views of intuition are strains that weave through most of Bergson's works. [truncated]
Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University
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