Theories as recipes: third-order virtue and vice
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Accepted manuscript
Date
2020-02
Authors
McSweeney, Michaela Markham
Version
Accepted manuscript
OA Version
Citation
Michaela Markham McSweeney. 2020. "Theories as recipes: third-order virtue and vice." Philosophical Studies, Volume 177, Issue 2, pp. 391 - 411. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01398-7
Abstract
A basic way of evaluating metaphysical theories is to ask whether they give satisfying (not necessarily truthful!) answers to the questions they set out to resolve. I propose an account of “third-order” virtue that tells us what it takes for certain kinds of metaphysical theories to do so. We should think of these theories as recipes. I identify three good-making features of recipes and show that they translate to third-order theoretical virtues. I apply the view to two theories—mereological universalism and plenitudinous platonism—and draw out their third-order virtues and vices. One lesson is that there is an important difference between essentially and non-essentially third-order vicious theories. I also argue that if a theory is essentially third-order vicious, it cannot be assessed for more standard “second-order” theoretical virtues and vices, like parsimony. This motivates the idea that third-order virtues are distinct from second-order ones. Finally, I suggest that the relationship between truth, progress, and third-order virtue is more complex than it seems
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International