The random oracle methodology, revisited
Files
Accepted manuscript
Date
2004
Authors
Canetti, Ran
Goldreich, Oded
Halevi, Shai
Version
Accepted manuscript
OA Version
Citation
R. Canetti, O. Goldreich, S. Halevi. 2004. "The random oracle methodology, revisited." Journal of the ACM, Volume 51, Issue 4, pp. 557 - 594. https://doi.org/10.1145/1008731.1008734
Abstract
We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called “cryptographic hash functions”. The main result of this paper is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a “good implementation” of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges