The devolution paradigm: theoretical critiques and the case of Kenya
OA Version
Citation
Abstract
Devolution’s assumptions presume democracy, yet its proponents view it as an antidote to
repressive centralized states, where its assumptions do not hold. This contradiction explains why
devolution mostly reproduces the status quo rather than transforming it in transition political economies.
Scholars have both supported and criticized devolution, while numerous donors, civil society activists,
local politicians, and ordinary citizens still view it as a solution. Disaggregating the theoretical
assumptions underpinning the devolution paradigm and juxtaposing them against a case study of Kenya
demonstrates how old incentives undermine new formal legal changes and why institutional change may
be a dependent rather than an independent variable. Thus, a range of institutional initiatives from
organizational tinkering to devolution and constitutional engineering often fail in autocracies and nominal
democracies.
Description
License
© 2019, by the author.