Three Papers on the Politics of Financial Cooperation and Statecraft
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Abstract
Financial globalization has increased interdependence among financial markets in different regions, requiring new frameworks of analysis of the politics of interstate relations to fully understand global financial markets. The three papers in this dissertation manuscript address this demand by formulating multiple hypotheses on what drives financial cooperation between states, how states use asymmetries in interdependence for statecraft, and how monetary policies of one economy can influence the politics of others. The first paper argues that financial cooperation in the international monetary system has a hub-and-spokes structure, with the United States as the hub economy. It demonstrates that this structure affects other economies' motivation to engage in regional financial cooperation. The second paper addresses how volatility in the Fed’s balance sheet affects the level of support for incumbent regimes in other countries. It finds that the effects differ significantly between democracies and autocracies for those with higher reliance on the global financial market. The third paper builds on theories of middle power behavior and emerging economy financial statecraft to develop a theory of middle power financial statecraft and applies it to South Korea.
Description
2023
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Attribution 4.0 International