The politics of financial regulation expertise: international financial organizations and expert networks
Date
2015-07
DOI
Authors
Ban, Cornel
Seabrooke, Leonard
Freitas, Sarah
Version
OA Version
Citation
Abstract
Who controls global policy debates on shadow banking regulation? By looking at the policy recommendations of the Bank of International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board, we show how experts tied to these institutions secured control over how shadow banking is treated. In so doing, these technocrats reinforced each other’s expertise and excluded some potential competitors (legal scholars), coopted others (select Fed and elite academic economists). The findings have important implications for studying the relationship between IOs technocrats and experts from other professional fields.
Description
This repository item contains a working paper from the Boston University Global Economic Governance Initiative. The Global Economic Governance Initiative (GEGI) is a research program of the Center for Finance, Law & Policy, the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, and the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies. It was founded in 2008 to advance policy-relevant knowledge about governance for financial stability, human development, and the environment.
License
Copyright 2016 Boston University. Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that: 1. The copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage; 2. the report title, author, document number, and release date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of BOSTON UNIVERSITY TRUSTEES. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and / or special permission.