Clarity, vagueness, and knowledge
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Abstract
The purpose of this inquiry is to consider whether or not clarity is essential to knowledge, and whether vagueness can in the least characterize knowledge.
The task of Chapter I is to define the three primary concepts of this study, namely, (1) knowledge, (2) clarity, and (3) vagueness. Knowledge is a kind of belief. It is the kind of belief that is seen to be true and not false, and this kind of belief, which is knowledge, is to be called well-grounded belief. Knowledge is thus a term within the subject-matter of logic.
Clarity applies only to representations and not to external objects. There are two kinds of clarity that need to be distinguished here, namely, sensory clarity and logical clarity. While this inquiry is concerned only with the latter, the former must be considered to avoid confusion of these two possible meanings of the term. Any appearance is clear that has the character of definiteness, of determinateness in nature, and that has sharply defined and easily recognizable limits. This is sensory clarity. Logical clarity, on the other hand, applies to the meaning of our ideas or concepts. An idea, logically speaking, is conscious content with a meaning that goes beyond itself. An idea or concept is clear when the mind apprehends specifically and without ambiguity or doubt what that concept refers to, what is intended by it. This is the second fundamental definition of the present study.
Since the term vagueness may ·be applied in various ways, it is desirable to distinguish between its meanings and thus 'avoid any confusion about what is intended by vagueness for the purposes of this inqull-t. Three kinds of vagueness may profitably be considered here: sensory vagueness, verbal vagueness, and logical vagueness. The definitions of these in the order given immediately follow. Any sensory appea-rance is vague that is indefinite, indeterminate, and not well-defined in nature. Words are vague in so far as there is doubt about the limits and extent of their applicability whenever. an attempt is made to define them. But neither of the. above definitions is what is most required here. Logical vagueness, like logical clarity, applies to the meaning of ideas. An idea is vague when the mind does not perceive exactly what it intends by that idea, when every effort to specify its meaning leaves the mind hesitant and unsettled as regards that meaning. This is the third fundamental definition of the dissertation.
The relation between clarity and knowledge is considered in Chapter II. It is there pointed out that clarity is essential to all well-grounded belief, or to all belief that is seen to be true. For it is necessary to apprehend clearly the what and the why of knowledge, the content and the grounds of knowledge. If the mind does not grasp clearly what is known, it has no way of determining whether or not it is really known. If the mind does not perceive clearly what the grounds for knowledge are, it cannot determine whether or not they are genuine grounds.
Clarity is essential to the two distinguishable levels of knowledge, namely, knowledge with the warrant of certainty and that with the warrant of probability. Reference to the latter is particularly important since some might imagine that clarity (though essential to certainty) is not essential to it. But careful analysis shows that in the case of probability there must be clear apprehension of what is believed to be probable, of the alternatives to that belief, and of the evidence for that belief and for the alternatives.
Chapter III contains an account of other considerations than those mentioned above that lend weight to the position that clarity is essential to knowledge. While the following arguments are not as fundamental as those of Chapter II, they lend support to that position: (1) Disagreement among philosophers calls for an emphasis on clarity as essential to knowledge. (2) Clarity in knowledge is required for intelligible communication. (3) The success of mathematics is a telling example of what happens when the view that clarity is essential to knowledge is taken seriously. ( 4) The success of scientific method is another convincing example of what happens when that view is put into effect. (5) What success philosophy has had, in the form of decisivP. additions to knowledge, has been possible only when clarity was emphasized.
But it might be urged that while clarity is essential to knowledge, vagueness may to some extent characterize knowledge. Nobody believes that there is a kind of knowledge that is entirely vague, but Whitehead and Russell affirm that all knowledge is to some extent vague. This position is stated in Chapter IV. The chief reasons for Whitehead's view are these: (1) Vagueness characterizes the empirical grounds of our knowledge. (2) The deeper aspects of reality lie beyond the reach of clarity. (3) The essential togetherness of things calls for the view that whatever can be made clear is abstracted from a larger whole in which alone it has its proper setting. Clarity thus distorts the picture of reality, for it succeeds only by taking things out of their context. This results in distortion, for all things are what they are because of where and when they are, because of their interrelations with and in the whole universe. (4) Inclusiveness, therefore, is required above all else, even in considerable measure at the price of clarity. For unless some vagueness is allowed in knowledge, what knowledge we claim will consist of trivialities and not metaphysics. (5) Mysticism has a ~ight to be heard, and mysticism offers a kind of knowledge that is in large measure vague.
Whitehead's and Russell's position that knowledge is somewhat vague, is critically evaluated in Chapter V. Their view is rejected as untenable because of the following considerations: (1) Knowledge cannot itself in the least be vague without ceasing to be knowledge. That is, where the vagueness begins knowledge ceases. For if logical vagueness is allowed in the what of knowledge, in so far there is no way of determining that our knowledge is genuine. And if vagueness is allowed in the apprehension of the grounds of knowledge, there is in so far no way of ascertammg whether or not the grounds are either genuine or sufficient. This argument is decisive when it is seen that vagueness is such that the law of contradiction cannot be applied to it. (It must be added, however, that there may be knowledge of something that is vague, in the sensory connotation of that term, without logical vagueness characterizing knowledge in the least.) (2) Though clarity is gained by abstraction this can neither disqualify it as essential to knowledge nor justify in the least the position that knowledge can be to some extent vague. (3) Nothing is gained for philosophy by the doctrine that knowledge is or can be somewhat vague. (4) There are insurmountable difficulties accompanying this position. (a) It encourages an easy contentment with vague ideas and makeshifts for arguments. (b) It blurs the line that marks off philosophy from the baseless opinions of mankind. (c) If accepted, it would become a fertile source of confusion and ambiguity in our thought. The conclusion to be drawn is, then, that vagueness cannot in the least characterize knowledge.
But it might be urged that if the requirement of this inquiry holds good, many important topics must be excluded from the reach of knowledge. This objection is examined in Chapter VI. From some quarters, for instance, it might be urged that the door has been closed to knowledge (1) of what ought and ought not to be done, (2) of other minds, and (3) of God. These contain typical difficulties. Analysis of the problems involved shows that if knowledge of these topics is p~ssible it must be possible in terms that are clear. Whether or not there is such knowledge is an interesting question but not one with which this inquiry is required to deal.
It might still be argued that symbolic, mythical, and poetic expression of knowledge must be ruled out, if the position here adopted is correct. But all that that position requires is that l{nowledge be clear, that when knowledge is expressed for purposes of precise communication the language must be clearly defined, and that any expression of knowledge must be reconcilable with what has been gained by analysis. Once knowledge has been gained, it may be expressed to suit any of the appropriate moods of humanity.
Conclusions of This Dissertation. (1) Knowledge, by its very nature, involves clarity. Apprehension of both the what and the why of knowledge must be logically clear. (2) Logical vagueness cannot in the least characterize knowledge. (3) If knowledge of what ought and ought not to be done, of other minds, of God, or of any other subject is possible it must be possible in terms of conclusions (1) and (2).
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 1940
N.B.: between p. 144 and p. 152, there are only five pages without numbers. It appears that the author mis-numbered the pages; no actual content is missing.
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