Justice and the good life : an analysis and defense of a communicative theory of ethics
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Abstract
The central question of this dissertation 1s whether Habermas's
discourse ethics can successfully take account of the kinds of
criticisms of Kantian formalism, first raised by Hegel, without at the
same time abdicating the universalism of the Kantian conception of
justice. Specifically, it considers whether the universality of moral
principles can be maintained while recognizing the particularity of
our experiences and values. This question is pursued in the context
of a discussion raised by contemporary Anglo-American ethicists.
Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre
argue that . our notions of the right and the good are derived from a
notion of the good life which defines the character of any given
community. This would seem to undercut the force of Habermas's
quasi-deontological position, which asserts that norms are only
legitimated by universally valid criteria. This dissertation maintains
that Habermas's theory of moral character accounts for both our
historical rootedness and our ability to adopt a universalistic
standpoint from which to question and assess our culturally
mediated beliefs. When Habermas's position is considered in light of the arguments of critics such as Carol Gilligan, Martha Nussbaum, and
Larry Blum, who criticize neo-Kantian tendencies to characterize
morality as moral argument and the consequent failure to develop
concepts of moral character, moral perception, moral emotion, and
moral judgment, it becomes clear that Habermas needs a general
moral theory that extends to the private sphere. It is posssible to
reformulate Habermas's ethical theory so that the distinction
between norms and values issues from an ideally regulated discourse
that at the same time defines the boundary between public and
private. The gap between norms and values also can be bridged by
incorporating the notion of symmetrical reciprocity as a meta-norm
of discourse, which would ground both principles of justice and a
notion of the good without privileging any historically specific vision
of the good life.
Description
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Boston University, 1990.
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