The Politics of the international criminal court: a study of state behavior and self-referral
OA Version
Citation
Abstract
This study explores why states refer political actors within their own country to be prosecuted for alleged human rights abuses at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Pre-existing literature that studies political interests in the context of the ICC often empirically delves into a single case intensively or is within the larger context of understanding its legal implications. My research is intended for a political science audience and additionally incorporates a wider selection of case studies to create a more nuanced and exploratory narrative on variation of state behavior in relation to the ICC. I utilize comparative historical analysis and process-tracing techniques for the following states: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Philippines. Included in my selection are states that did self-refer (Uganda and DRC) and those that could have, given their status as a State Party and the severity of human rights atrocities within their state, but did not self-refer (the Philippines). Through these methods, alongside primary source research of local newspapers, I seek to understand why some states experiencing armed conflict self-refer to the ICC and others do not. My findings reveal that states are most likely to self-refer when the goals of the regime converge with that of the ICC. This can come in the form of delegitimizing political adversaries (e.g., Uganda), bolstering international reputation to sustain foreign aid (Uganda and the Philippines), or receiving international support to build domestic capacity (the DRC). Notably, a larger selection of cases shows that, while justice is inherently political, both states andthe ICC may have multiple motivations that drive the referral process.
Description
2024
License
Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International