Popper's views of theory formation compared with the development of post-relativistic cosmological models
Date
1963
DOI
Authors
Leith, Thomas Henry
Version
OA Version
Citation
Abstract
This dissertation confronts contemporary physical cosmology with
Karl Popper's standards of scientific method and theory construction.
To the degree to which there are differences, an attempt is made to
criticize the major cosmological models in the light of Popper's analysis
and, in turn, to explore revisions necessitated in this analysis
by the unique problems of cosmology.
As background, the major facets of Popper's work are presented
in detail: his falsifiability criterion for demarcating scientific
theories from metaphysics, his hypothetico-deductive method, and his
rejection of induction. Then the origins of general relativity and
its competitors are analyzed both as explanatory background to modern
cosmology and so as to reveal the history of certain problems pertinent
to Popper's scheme: for instance, the use of arguments from simplicity,
the ideas of the utility of analogy and models, and the relation of
theory to reality. Finally, the great variety of evolutionary, fundamentalistic,
and steady-state models available for study is explored
in detail as to presupposition and methodology so that their distinctives
are revealed and a basis for comparison with Popper's suggestions provided. [TRUNCATED]
Description
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University
License
Based on investigation of the BU Libraries' staff, this work is free of known copyright restrictions.