Dying to win: elections, political violence, and institutional decay in Kenya
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Abstract
Introduction
This paper examines the lessons learned from Kenya's 2007 post election violence and what
has happened since then. It notes that the root causes of the violence still persist, have not
been addressed, and easily could be reignited. Faced with a situation where institutions and
the rule of law have been weakened deliberately and where diffused violence is widespread,
both Kenya's transition to democracy and the fate of the nation remain vulnerable. The
argument here is that the problems faced in holding and managing elections in conflict
situations often are not simply technical. Instead, in Kenya and elsewhere, many difficulties
are symptomatic of larger political and institutional questions related to democratic change
that are more difficult to analyze in causal terms or to address.
Democratic theorists from Robert Dahl2 onward have long understood that
democracy consists of much more than just multi-party elections. At the heart of the
democratic experiment are two underlying caveats bordering on truisms. First, there must be
a willingness to lose elections and not to win them by any means and at all costs, including
killing one's opponents. In established democracies, both politicians and the public accept
that tomorrow is another day to get their person elected. Second, and central to democracy
and the democratic process, is a belief in the integrity of the rule of law and institutions that
must be matched by the way in which laws and institutions operate in practice. Where this
does not occur, democracy is vulnerable. However, there is little by way of agreement about
the underlying causes or events that give rise to these two factors or trigger the incentives for
elite consensus necessary for their emergence. [TRUNCATED]
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African Studies Center Working Paper No. 263
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Copyright © 2010, by the author.